The Third Path: On LGBTQ, “Liteness,” and Harmful Critique (Column 728)
With God’s help
Today I was sent a post by Yael Mishali responding to a letter from the Binyamin Rabbis’ Council. The Binyamin Regional Council decided to invite the gay singer Eden Hason to perform. In response, the Binyamin Rabbis’ Council published the following letter:
Right at the outset I must say that I very much appreciated the inevitable call for unity—namely, to set the matter aside from here on so that there not be division. That is, after their demands were accepted (“henceforth to jointly refine the summer shows”), we are all called to remain united and prevent disputes. How lovely and how typical. Truly Torah scholars who increase peace in the world (like Yasser Arafat, who could be considered the world champion in the number of peace agreements he signed).
On this painful issue, Yael Mishali published the following response. I won’t copy it here due to its length, and will only say that Mishali explains to them that they are irrelevant and calls on the public to ignore this benighted approach and to embrace their many LGBTQ children, as the sand on the seashore. Needless to say, I agree with the spirit of her words and that we are dealing with a problematic rabbinic approach. And yet this response jarred me, and I think its harm outweighs its benefit. As I will explain, it exemplifies a broader, more general phenomenon, and thus it is worth analyzing.
Inviting the Artist or Attitude Toward the LGBTQ-niks
Mishali slid—without quite noticing—from the specific question of inviting a gay artist to perform (which was the trigger for her post) to a discussion devoted entirely to the general question of the proper communal and familial attitude toward LGBTQ people. That shift matters for what I want to say here.
The question of inviting such an artist seems to me far simpler, and it is much more reasonable to oppose the rabbis’ stance on it. The rabbis’ committee relies on slogans about harming the values and sanctity of the family in Israel. I didn’t understand why or how this harms anything. Will there be children in the audience who are not LGBTQ who, after the performance, will be persuaded to become so? Or might there be those who are LGBTQ who, if such an artist is not invited, will be persuaded to return to being straight? Perhaps there are a few teens in some intermediate state, but I seriously doubt that in a religious society anyone who has a choice will choose to act as LGBTQ “just because.” Generally, we are dealing with people who are simply that way and not because of some artist’s influence. They have no real choice. I think the opposite concern—that such calls push LGBTQ people into a corner and cause them severe distress—is far more serious.
Beyond that, in their view is it permissible to invite an artist who publicly violates Shabbat, or who eats non-kosher food? I assume there would not be such objections to that. In any case, I haven’t heard comparable objections to such artists. Among the rabbis there is a taboo regarding LGBTQ phenomena, partly perhaps as a reaction to the culture war that some LGBTQ activists wage, at times with aggressive and silencing tactics. Still, I don’t see a substantive justification for the taboo. On the contrary, the fear of influence and of granting legitimacy to Shabbat desecration—something that is up to the youth’s decision—exists far more than any “influence” that would turn someone into LGBTQ, which, as noted, is generally not up to them. Even regarding the artist himself: being LGBTQ is not up to him, whereas desecrating Shabbat certainly is. The LGBTQ artist is simply that way and has little choice (he is coerced), and therefore he is surely less culpable and less wicked than the artist who desecrates Shabbat.
In short, by every parameter I can think of, there is much less logic in inviting a Shabbat-violating artist than in inviting a gay artist. So why is everyone fighting for “family sanctity”? In my estimation, even though they dress it up with values and lofty spiritual declarations, this is essentially a mere social taboo that, naturally, takes longer to change in a religious society. It is very convenient to drape these primal feelings over the halakhic prohibition. I think the “Hardal” (national-Haredi) rabbis in general obsess over LGBTQ phenomena and wage hopeless holy wars against them; this too, in my view, stems from taboo and psychological fixation, not from moral or spiritual reasoning.
Mishali’s Response
If one truly chooses to focus on attitudes toward LGBTQ people rather than on the question of inviting the artist, I would expect a few words about the halakhic prohibition. The elephant in the room isn’t mentioned at all in her piece, and I get the impression it does not interest her in the least. She treats the phenomenon as though it were just another hobby of children, and the rabbis’, parents’, and religious society’s fuss as mere madness. Hello! There is a severe biblical prohibition (sexual prohibitions—“be killed rather than transgress”) on male-male intercourse, and this is undisputed. I would expect that before preaching to the rabbis, Mishali would open with something like: “Although it is clear that we are dealing with a very serious halakhic prohibition,” and only then go on to describe the reality, the distress, and the need and duty to relate to the phenomenon and to the people with inclusion.
Why does this matter? Because my concern here is not Yael Mishali herself nor her response. It is a symptom of a mode of discourse that severely harms the just struggle for the proper attitude toward LGBTQ people. Responses like Mishali’s present the picture exactly as the rabbis wish to present it: on one side stand the rabbis, God-fearing and uncompromisingly committed to halakhah and Torah, courageously and firmly battling for Torah values and sanctity against the winds of the times; opposite them stand a few “lite” types shouting liberal and progressive slogans as if these were Torah values. The real religious versus the lites. Note that this is precisely how those Hardal rabbis wish to frame the struggle, and in that sense Mishali plays into their hands.
How Should One Have Responded?
So, you’ll ask, what should she have done? As noted, one cannot argue about the very existence and gravity of the prohibition. It stands, in black fire upon white fire, in the Written and Oral Torah and in all the halakhic decisors. I wrote above that, in my view, one should have started by acknowledging that we are dealing with an extremely serious prohibition accepted by all decisors, and that there is no counsel against God. After that preface, it is crucial to explain that fear of Heaven does not mean callousness, nor does it mean ignoring reality and its complexities. Despite the prohibition, a person endowed with such inclinations cannot overcome them. He is coerced in every respect. I don’t think there is any compulsion greater than this. I customarily cite here the Talmud in Ketubot 33a–b, which discusses whether lashes are more severe than death:
If you say they are, whence do we know that death is more severe? Perhaps lashes are more severe, for Rav said: Had they flogged Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, they would have worshiped the image! Rav Sama son of Rav Assi said to Rav Ashi (and some say: Rav Sama son of Rav Ashi to Rav Ashi): Do you not distinguish between a beating that has a limit and a beating that has no limit?
Note well: although death is certainly more severe and more painful than lashes, unending lashes throughout one’s life, until one surrenders, are more severe and more painful than a threat of death. Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, who offered their lives and entered the fire rather than serve idolatry—had they been flogged in such a manner, they would certainly have yielded. Why? Because an ordinary person, and even an extraordinary one, cannot endure constant suffering with no light at the end of the tunnel. In the end he gives in. Likewise, one can demand that a person restrain himself and refrain from sexual relations for a certain period (e.g., during his wife’s niddah), but a person cannot refrain from sexual relations for his entire life. Here he will certainly break; this is absolute compulsion. Thus, even though there is no way out and no halakhic permit regarding this grave prohibition, the appropriate attitude from a halakhic-Torah perspective toward such people is as toward fully coerced individuals. Certainly more coerced than Shabbat violators, niddah violators, and eaters of pork. Yet, for some reason, the conservative side treats all of those with marvelous inclusion and outreach, while LGBTQ people merit a crusade—unyielding and uncompromising.
A response along these lines would cast the dispute in a very different light from what I described above: all of us are committed to Torah and fear of Heaven; all of us value family sanctity and halakhic norms; and yet there remains a debate about how one should act. This is not “liteness” versus fear of Heaven, as conservatives and Hardalim are happy to portray it (and as emerges from Mishali’s response), but rather a debate over what fear of Heaven and commitment to Torah and halakhah actually mandate. The claim is that the Torah and halakhah themselves require us to accommodate the phenomenon and to give these people a place in the community like anyone else. That is a wholly different statement, and it presents a genuine alternative to the conservative approach expressed in the letter above. Such a claim also stands a chance of being accepted (in my estimation they too will eventually tire of the jihad against LGBTQ people and will grasp what the rest of the world has already understood. It takes them time to adjust, since rabbis—and religious people in general—tend toward conservatism and clinging to social taboos and fixations. Among them/among us, change always takes longer; but it is already here, and I am fairly sure it will continue apace).
A Theological and Meta-Halakhic Note
One can, of course, wonder: if this is indeed the situation, why does the Torah prohibit it? If one truly cannot withstand this prohibition, what is the point of prohibiting it? Take, for example, the prohibition of theft. There are those who suffer from kleptomania (a tendency to steal). The prohibition applies to them as well, of course, although they likely cannot withstand it; if they transgress, they would presumably be considered coerced. So why prohibit it at all? Here the answer is simpler. The prohibition was indeed given for ordinary people who can withstand it. Were we all kleptomaniacs, the Torah would likely not have prohibited it. Therefore the prohibition exists, and once it is established it applies to everyone, kleptomaniacs included—though they are considered coerced regarding it. What about homosexuality? There the situation seems different, for unlike kleptomania, everyone for whom this prohibition is relevant is someone with such an inclination and therefore cannot withstand it. So what is the point in prohibiting it?
I have cited in the past R. Moshe Feinstein’s claim that the Torah does not place a person in a trial he cannot endure (and it is difficult to square this with kleptomania). From this he infers that homosexuality cannot be an inborn and natural inclination; it must be a choice by people who can choose otherwise. In his view it must be the counsel of the evil inclination; otherwise the Torah would not have prohibited it. Now consider the implications if we understand that he erred about the facts. In most cases we are indeed dealing with an inborn and natural inclination (I am not entering here into the question of whether it is genetic; that is irrelevant to the discussion). But if we reject RMF’s factual premise, then his meta-halakhic premise—that the Torah does not set before a person a trial he cannot withstand—leads us inexorably to the opposite conclusion: the prohibition does not exist regarding those who have such an inclination. It was stated only regarding those who do so out of lust while having another option (straight people with desire, or bisexuals). This line of reasoning could lead to an actual halakhic permit for the act itself, at least for those whose inclination is such.
As for me, I do not know whence RMF derived his meta-halakhic premise. It seems to me entirely unfounded; precisely for that reason I cannot justify a permit for the act, even for those whose inclination is such. Therefore I wrote above that, in my view, the prohibition applies to them as well, but they are coerced.
Yet even if one asks all the questions and finds no answers, good questions do not change reality. For our purposes, even if one adopts RMF’s meta-halakhic premise (that the Torah does not demand of us what we cannot endure), I do not see how one can derive from it factual conclusions (that it is mere desire and not an ingrained inclination). Reality owes us nothing. To understand and know it, one must observe and examine it with open eyes, rather than doing casuistry based on theological assumptions. Difficult theological questions, however good, are not a sufficient basis for making factual determinations about reality—certainly not when they contradict experience and what we see with our own eyes. Therefore, even if one adopts RMF’s stance, the conclusion that it is always a matter of desire and not inclination is untenable and there is no rational reason to accept it. At the same time, as noted, there is no genuine justification for the approach that for such people there is no prohibition at all.
Broader Implications: The Third Path
I have tried to explain why “lite” critiques of the standard rabbinic approach to LGBTQ issues can greatly harm a justified struggle. I have shown that there is a better and more effective way to critique the conservative approach—on the basis of halakhic and Torah arguments (and, of course, factual ones). This principle applies to debates over changes in halakhah more generally.
In many cases, critics and innovators advance “lite” arguments—that is, they explain that something is not moral or not ethical, ask how it will be received in the world, and point to problematic consequences (see the series 475–480 on Modern Orthodoxy, and in particular column 478, where I explained the difference between it and Reform. The main difference concerns whether one relies on consequentialist considerations), etc., etc. In doing so, they effectively play into the conservatives’ hands and shoot their own just struggle in the foot. Conservatives insist on portraying their opponents as “lite,” and such criticism really is lite. Instead, arguments for change should be framed in halakhic terms and based on halakhic reasoning. Morality can be a motivation, but the justification must be halakhic and Torah-based. The non-lite critic argues that the conservatives are halakhic offenders, not merely that they are immoral. We must understand that the identification of everyone who is not conservative/Hardal with “lite” is a manipulation by the Hardalim and conservatives, and we must not cooperate with it. The manner of criticism (justified in itself) exemplified by Mishali is an excellent parable for this point, and it teaches about the general rule. One could almost say that with such defense attorneys, there is no need for prosecutors.
The Third Path raises a flag of a Torah and halakhic alternative—not a flag of “morality” set against the halakhic flag. Our goal is to show that there is another Torah, and not to attack the Torah and commitment to it in the name of contemporary morals and values. It is important to understand that this mistake is embedded so deeply in all of us that many who do not identify with Haredi/Hardal approaches nonetheless conceive of themselves (!) as “lite,” and thus do not allow themselves to break free of the deeply flawed and problematic models of Torah and halakhah.
I have often said that, in the Enlightenment period, young people were confronted with an impossible dilemma: to be wise and wicked, or righteous and foolish. It is no wonder that most of the public chose to be wise and wicked—thus secularism was born. The other side of the coin is those who chose to be righteous and foolish, and thus were born conservatism and Haredism—that is, foolish, disconnected, and benighted religious conceptions. Framing the discussion and the dilemma in this way causes double harm: we lost the wise, who left and walked away; and those who remained hold to a benighted Torah. The same is happening in our day, partly due to conservatives and their way of conducting the discussion, and partly due to the modes of criticism leveled against them. The critics themselves cause the Torah and halakhah to remain on the benighted side, and anyone moral and rational is therefore non-religious or non-Jewish, or at best “lite.” In this way, by means of this problematic form of criticism, we ourselves lend a hand to the terrible desecration of God’s name carried out by conservatives, turning Judaism as a whole into a benighted and repellent Torah, as is happening today.
This is why the conceptualization of the Third Path is so important. Our aim is to say that it is not the “lite” version of one of the two existing paths, but an alternative path. Without such conceptualization, true change in Torah and Judaism is not really possible, and we are condemned to live within the horrific dichotomy I described (where to be a Jew means to be foolish, divorced from straight thinking and from facts, and immoral).
Discussion
I actually feel quite a bit that on the “light” side too, thank God, there is no shortage of major fools. And in discussions like these, all the more so.
Yeah, right—this is of course in complete contrast to your response, which definitely doesn’t presume to determine the truth that something is a pile of nonsense without offering any reasoning whatsoever.
A little self-awareness wouldn’t hurt.
I’ll address only the crudest and most common demagogic trick—the assumption of an LGBT or homosexual “phenomenon.” One could just as well declare the existence of an “interest community” that includes both lenders at interest and borrowers at interest, a “prostitution community” that includes prostitutes and adulterers, a “drug community” that includes users and dealers. And then one could conduct “studies” claiming that this is an uncontrollable urge; but even without examining the data of that “study,” it would be clear that it is “fake.” Indeed, a lender and a borrower at interest fall under the same prohibition, but it is obvious that these are two different phenomena economically and motivationally. The same goes for a drug dealer and an addict, a prostitute and an adulterer, the active and passive partners in male homosexual intercourse.
It is true that the active and passive partners are both called “gay” and both fall under the same Torah prohibition, but that is only because one cannot exist without the other—just as there is no prostitute without an adulterer, no lender at interest without someone paying interest, no drug dealer without an addict. Therefore it is obvious that any claim about an “uncontrollable urge” regarding homosexuals is fake.
One could suggest a model like this: indeed, the passive partner is in the category of one acting under duress, like a borrower at interest who desperately needs money, or an addict. But the active partner is just a sadist. (A fact is that in all languages—every one of them—the expression “I will perform male intercourse on you” is identical to “I will humiliate you,” “I will punish you,” “I will take revenge on you.”)
Therefore, anyone who wants to forbid sadistic tendencies must also forbid the passive partner, just as one cannot permit dealing without permitting use, permit prostitution without permitting adultery, etc.
Indeed. I see that Oren already corrected it. Thanks.
I agree, but I think that usually this is not stupidity but lightness that does not understand the complexity and the religious constraints, and therefore raises problematic criticisms like this one, which to a religious person look like a lack of understanding. Really, it is probably a lack of concern for halakhah and Torah.
Are you sure you want to leave this collection of nonsense under your real name and not under a pseudonym?
1. Assuming homosexual orientation is a broad spectrum and not a binary orientation (there are also bisexuals, who are attracted to both sexes), the rabbis’ all-out war specifically against homosexuals more than against Sabbath desecrators is understandable. In order to preserve the act as illegitimate in conservative societies, so that many people on the spectrum too will go in the “positive” direction, and those who are compelled will do so only as a last resort and not proudly declare that they are such.
2. You criticize the tactic of attacking the hardalim because it only plays into their hands, but you don’t offer an alternative that aligns with the liberals’ motivation. They want to legitimize homosexuals—to legitimize the act itself. You do not provide a midrashic conservatism that answers this need. Therefore this is not a good issue for illustrating the divergent paths of the third way.
In my opinion, the correct response is similar to what you wrote at the beginning of the article (the paragraph that begins, “The question of inviting such an artist”). Your halakhic analysis can be disputed, and I’m not sure I agree with it either. What matters is that this is a non-issue. It doesn’t matter what the world will say if they don’t invite him, and it also doesn’t matter whether what he does at home contradicts halakhah. A singer is, for these purposes, no different from an air-conditioner technician. The only thing that matters is whether he sings well or not, and all this background checking should disappear from the world.
1. I wrote that it doesn’t seem plausible to me, because a religious guy certainly would not do this if he had another option. The opposite concern is weightier. They themselves also usually don’t say this. From their perspective, it seems everything is sin and impulse.
2. Someone who wants to dismantle halakhic commitment is not “light.” He is a heretic.
It takes two to tango, and so too with male homosexual intercourse. I am not knowledgeable in this, and I also do not know whether research has been conducted from which one can understand who prefers to be the passive partner and who the active one, and perhaps there are also role reversals. In any case, if this is indeed an innate orientation and not some sexual curiosity or mere lust, then it is not at all comparable to lending at interest or to prostitution and adultery. And in general, regarding the issue that the Torah does not place a person in a trial he cannot withstand, which is learned from the beautiful captive woman, after all only righteous men went out to war; if so, whichever way you look at it, if you fear you will not withstand the trial you can exempt yourself with the claim of “the one who is fearful and fainthearted,” and nevertheless the Torah permitted it. And one should investigate whether in that person it is something innate, for when it is not wartime, licentious intercourse was not permitted to him. Therefore people who truly have an innate orientation are in the category of those acting under duress.
What about the point that it is possible that Eden Hason does not engage in male homosexual intercourse at all?
Do you accept Polisuk’s argument regarding the distinction between shared life and the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse?
What active/passive partner, prostitute/adulterer, drug dealer/addict, lender at interest/borrower have in common is that in all these pairs one can identify one side as being in distress, perhaps even arousing compassion, and the other as exploiting that distress and beyond that arousing revulsion. And there is no escaping criminalizing the one without criminalizing the other.
Wow! What depth of reasoning! A model of philosophical thought! Not only am I sure I want to leave this response and your reply under my name, I’m also taking a screenshot to immortalize this philosophical discussion.
That is unrelated to the question of whether to invite him. There it is an educational question, not sanctions against an offender.
Live and let live.
Just a truly innocent question: how do you know, Michi, that someone who has no possibility of actually fulfilling the commandment to be fruitful and multiply or the conjugal duty is considered under duress? Have you ever heard of “the man Moses,” who separated from his wife? I don’t recall anything happening after the separation.
Have you heard of Ben Azzai, who said, “What shall I do, for my soul desires Torah”? And he did not marry because of this (and some say he married and immediately divorced). Michi, I suggest you delete this line, because you are disgracing yourself here in public, since you are supposedly asserting things with certainty that you have not researched or examined, and since this assertion has no basis whatsoever, what is the public left to think? That you are actually giving us here a subtle hint, as subtle as an elephant, about what your own situation would be if you were unable to have sexual relations—namely, that you would be compelled to commit some kind of sexual-release transgression whose law is “be killed rather than transgress” (in polite language). It is not fitting that in the very same post you published about “righteous and foolish” {“wicked and wise”} you should publicly present yourself as such. I am writing this solely for your benefit. You do not have to type yourself to death every time some issue blows up in your third-way WhatsApp group (especially in matters of sexuality—how do you always say? pas nisht) and share the threads with us and turn it into a post.
I am moved by your sincere concern for my welfare. Perhaps when I recover from this, I’ll try to examine whether there is nevertheless something in the collection of nonsense written here.
If a person is sexually aroused and satisfied only by pedophilia, would we also say that he is under duress, since he cannot guard himself forever and abstain from sex?
Why not adopt another alternative: even if this is indeed his only sexual solution, he should still restrain himself in another way, for example through castration?
Thank you very much!
Or let him devote his head and most of himself—better yet, all of himself—to Torah like Rabbi Akiva (if 25 years worked, it can also work for 95 years).
Indeed, a pedophile too can be under duress. But here there is harm to others, and therefore it is not comparable to our case. Like a kleptomaniac.
The question of castration is interesting. On first thought, I am inclined not to go in that direction. A person is not supposed to castrate himself, and certainly not because of the prohibition; and if in his existing state he is under duress, then he is under duress. Perhaps with regard to a pedophile there is justification because of the harm to others.
I think the reason the rabbis draw Sabbath desecrators close but not LGBT people is because they really think, like the rabbi, that this is a state of duress and not of choice. But they are afraid to give it legitimacy because people will think they are, as it were, granting permission for it. They don’t know what to do with this creature, but I hope that will change over time.
I didn’t understand what the third way’s position is.
General statements like “we are committed to halakhah, but we are liberals but lightweights…”
But I didn’t understand practically what the innovation is.
In addition, the argument that conservatives are not concerned about contact with ordinary secular Sabbath desecrators is not precise. It is true that there is inclusiveness toward secular people, but even with secular people they are sometimes careful about contact.
And regarding the idea that “you can invite a singer who desecrates the Sabbath, but a gay singer is problematic,” that is probably because homosexuality is seen as a moral defect (a completely legitimate opinion) beyond the halakhic issue. With a singer who desecrates the Sabbath there is no real moral problem.
That’s called ignorance, in short.
In my opinion, what deters conservatives is not a scenario of a religious young man deliberating which direction to go on the spectrum, but rather a young teenager who is not settled in his sexual identity, and legitimacy for homosexuality will give him a push in the homosexual direction (which is sometimes irreversible in many respects).
Therefore it is different from an artist who desecrates the Sabbath.
First, in my view, this is a very important article, and I wish many people will be exposed to it.
Second, I have a question: how do we know that male homosexual intercourse is included among the forbidden sexual relations regarding which it is said “be killed rather than transgress”?
And really this is a general question: how do we know which forbidden sexual relations are included in “be killed rather than transgress”? Because to the best of my knowledge, the Gemara does not specify.
Obviously. See Rambam, Forbidden Intercourse 1:4.
How exactly would a push in that direction cause someone to become fixed in homosexual attraction? Attraction does not depend on external legitimacy, though perhaps the decision to act on it does.
But do we really want people to keep halakhah because of social pressures? In my opinion, that is a bad approach that causes more harm than benefit.
I think there is room to distinguish between a gay singer who does not make an issue of it, and a singer who publicizes himself as such and even composes songs for pride parades.
Still, that does not mean he should be barred from performing, but in my view the comparison to a singer who desecrates the Sabbath is a somewhat naïve comparison…
That is, there is a difference between a sinful singer and a singer who takes part in an industry that normalizes sins.
Why do you assume a homosexual is under duress?
It does not seem reasonable to me that the Holy One, blessed be He, would command a person to refrain from a certain act and at the same time bring him into the world with an inability to overcome it. It seems simply absurd to me to assume that God would prohibit something on pain of karet, and bring a person into the world with an inclination that cannot be overcome. It is obvious to me that everything prohibited here is because of lust, not because of an inclination that cannot be overcome.
Presenting gay people as acting under duress is, in my view, very problematic, because according to this, all prohibitions toward which the impulse is sexual would turn out to involve duress. It is ridiculous to say that the Torah’s commandments in matters of forbidden sexual relations and the like were said to a person who has no desire for these things, and if every person who has a sexual urge is called under duress, then there are no prohibitions of forbidden sexual relations—unless one says that the prohibition was stated where a person has no preference between the option of marrying a woman and the option of having forbidden intercourse with her, and the Torah tells him to marry her, and that would be very strange indeed, that Torah prohibitions were not stated in places of impulses. Certainly there is a situation of impulse that would make a person under duress or close to duress, but one cannot treat the concept of impulses as a state of duress. Therefore, a person who declares about himself that he has no obligation to try to cope with impulses cannot be called under duress. In this I agree with the rabbi that he is no worse than a Sabbath desecrator, but certainly not better than him, as the rabbi presented it. A Sabbath desecrator also has impulses; the proof is those baalei teshuvah who fight with all their strength to keep the Sabbath and do not always succeed. As for the substance of the matter, male homosexual intercourse has the concept of “abomination,” in the language of the verse. I do not know exactly what the Torah means by these words; it is a broad topic whether the Torah’s use of “abomination” is because of the prohibition or whether it is the reason for the prohibition. But in any case, as far as I know, “abomination” means distancing, and in that sense the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse is different from the prohibition of Sabbath violation; with male homosexual intercourse there is indeed an element of distancing, whether because of the Torah’s command or prior to it. Practically, one must understand whether that distancing is carried out through observance of the Torah’s law on the matter or through other things. Just a side remark.
We are talking about people who have no other option. What does that have to do with all the other forbidden sexual relations? If a person has relations with his sister or with a married woman, he has other options for permitted sexual relations. A homosexual has no possibility whatsoever of having relations permissibly.
And one more thing: there are quite a few prohibitions about which “abomination” is said.
The fact that he has no other option does not mean he is under duress.
It means that the price he has to pay in order to keep halakhah is very high.
Who said the price is high enough to define it as duress?
Obviously, the fact that he has no other option does not necessarily mean duress. Someone who has no choice but to lose ten agorot is not considered under duress. But a level of difficulty like this for an entire lifetime, with no alternative, is duress in the highest degree. Who said that evil inclination in clothing is duress? And who said that lashes for a lifetime are duress? And who said that if someone threatens you with a gun that is duress? What a reasonable person cannot withstand is duress. That’s all. There is logic and common sense, and it is worth using them.
The fact that he has no other possibility for sexual relations does not mean he is obligated to have sexual relations. Again, there may be a specific impulse that causes him to be under duress, but his condition as a person who from the outset does not overcome his impulses is not a state of duress; that is obvious. And another thing: what does it matter that there are other prohibitions about which “abomination” is written? The word “abomination” itself requires study. What difference does it make if it is written elsewhere too? Apparently it contains some content of a certain distancing that applies to the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse and not to the prohibition of Sabbath violation. I would be glad to hear your opinion about explaining the content of “abomination,” and not to hear that there are other places that also need explanation.
I have completely exhausted this discussion.
The comparison between LGBT people and Sabbath desecrators is unfair. The LGBT community does not quietly commit transgressions as such; it holds parades of desecration of the Torah, and many of them also intentionally show contempt for the Torah.
By contrast, Sabbath desecrators do not hold parades of Sabbath desecration. They desecrate it publicly, but not as a matter of principle. (Of course there are some who do, but they are a negligible minority.)
Hello and blessings.
I would like to note that indeed it requires examination what the distinction is between Sabbath desecrators and people who violate the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse. It seems the answer is not essential but educational. Sometimes one has to look from the point of view of an educator who knows the level of 14-year-old boys and girls: going to a performance by someone who desecrates the Sabbath will not cause them to ‘like’ Sabbath desecration, whereas going to a performance by a person who engages in male homosexual intercourse will encourage them, and because they do not understand complexity very well they will say, ‘Wow, the Torah is bad, so we need to be secular,’ etc. Therefore, in my opinion, it is indeed not advisable to invite such people to performances that attract youth…
Remarkably tendentious indeed. Why do you think seeing an artist who desecrates the Sabbath does not normalize Sabbath desecration? On the contrary, it normalizes it much more, because it is an option for everyone and not only for homosexuals. And in fact today the feelings toward Sabbath desecrators are completely dulled, whereas for homosexuals the taboo remains.
More power to you for these important words. The issue came up in two lines, and I would be glad to know your opinion about a struggle that operates through extremism against another extremism (something that exists today on many political and religious fronts). I have always thought that in most cases creating balance is a goal that does not sanctify the means, especially after I saw that even Rambam, with his famous approach of the middle way, writes somewhat differently in the Guide for the Perplexed.
Thank you.
The question is too general.
I can offer the Michi-bot’s answer:
One must distinguish between two planes:
Public tactic: “to become extreme against extremism” in order to “balance” things—this is usually a mistake. It preserves extremist language, fosters fundamentalism, and obscures substantive discussion. The proper alternative is not counter-extremism but presenting an orderly halakhic argument and opening a third path: to criticize in the language of halakhah and method, not through moral shaming or “breaking the market.” That is exactly the spirit of “the third path”: to ground criticism “in halakhic terms” and raise the flag of a Torah-halakhic alternative, instead of a counter-extremist campaign.
“Does balance sanctify means?” There is no sweeping answer to that. It is a question that sounds profound, but without a concrete context it is “almost empty of content”; one must always descend to the specific case, to the weighing of values and the precise framing, and only then discuss it.
And what about the Rambam and the “middle way”? It is important not to err: the “middle way” in Rambam is a measured norm in character traits, not a license to create counter-extremism in the name of balance, and not a “hesitant middle.” Rabbi Michael Abraham emphasizes that Rambam speaks about measurement and calibration that bring one precisely to the middle—not about being tossed between poles or about “balances” that sanctify any means.
Beyond that, the attempt to “educate through extremism” feeds exactly what one seeks to curb: fundamentalism that nullifies doubt and criticism. Therefore, on the level of culture and discourse as well, the recommendation is to prefer rational, complex, and precise argument—not to replace one extremism with another.
Bottom line: you do not fight extremism with extremism. You fight it by offering a substantive halakhic alternative and by insisting on conceptual and methodological precision. “Balance” is not a supreme value that justifies crooked tools; our goal is truth and halakhah, not counterweight games.
Regarding sexual orientation, I do think it is more of an innate tendency. I am not convinced that it is completely irreversible. In my opinion, the claim that it is completely irreversible is a new religion, intended to legitimize the abomination. In my view, it is more a matter of percentages of inclination.
What is the difference between a transgression that involves harm to others and one that does not? Can one not say that the whole difference is simply that one is an offense between man and God and the other between man and his fellow? Just as you do not exempt a kleptomaniac or a pedophile from punishment, why here do we exempt the homosexual with the claim of duress? I am asking from a halakhic perspective and not necessarily a moral one.
Who said there is a difference? There is no difference whatsoever.
Eden Hason is a singer, not a stand-up comedian (Shahar Hason is the stand-up comedian, and he isn’t gay).