Dedicated to the memory of Rafael Kauders, of blessed memory, and to his dear family,

especially little Hillel, whose name accompanied me—through his grandmother Chayuta Deutsch—while writing the trilogy,

and whose eulogy at the funeral broke my heart.

Rafael, of blessed memory, was a reservist and a precious man who fell on Jerusalem Day

and was laid to rest yesterday in Kfar Etzion.

This weekend a rabbinic advertisement calling to draft all Haredim is being published:

The initiative comes from a former student of mine (Chagai Friedler of the Zionist Alliance initiative) at whose request I wrote a detailed halakhic ruling demonstrating that, according to halakha, there is no exemption from the army—neither for those studying nor for anyone else—even if he fears “spiritual deterioration.” The rabbis received the ruling and signed the call.

It is astonishing how, for roughly eighty years, thousands of Haredi Torah scholars have been misled by partial quotations taken out of context, while ignoring explicit sources over which there is no dispute. It’s not that they chose one interpretation among several; there is no such interpretation. Truly like children captured among the nations.

What is most infuriating is that the government, together with the Haredim, extends reserve duty days for everyone while exempting the Haredim themselves. Even the Haredim have not, until now, sunk to such moral lows. Shame!

The following ruling is based on Column 609, which dealt with this, but since a halakhic ruling was requested here, I elaborated more on the halakhic aspects. I bring it here in full, and it is also attached as a Word file for the convenience of anyone who wants to download and/or print and distribute.

“Shall your brothers go to war while you sit here?”

A Halakhic Ruling on Drafting Haredim and Yeshiva Students to the IDF

“Know that this matter did not warrant elucidation… but we were prompted to do so because many have erred in it…”

(Maimonides, beginning of Root 1)

Abstract. It will be explained here that there is a complete obligation upon every person of Israel, without exception, to participate in a war to save Israel from an enemy at hand. Thereafter, four principal categories of exemption-claims raised against this obligation are discussed, and we will show that they are baseless in themselves and, in any case, insufficient to remove the aforementioned obligation.

These days the public discourse turns to the question of drafting the Haredi public into the IDF, together with the question of drafting yeshiva students (these are, of course, two different questions). Because it is a sensitive political matter that touches all of us, the public discussion proceeds turbulently and often without focus. Some attack and others defend, this way and that, while the issue itself is left in the corner. People form positions on this grave matter by slogans and gut feelings, without grounding and without arguments that address the matter itself. For some reason, few decisors have dealt comprehensively with this issue and with a systematic examination of the arguments raised within it.

In this booklet we will conduct the discussion on the halakhic plane and in a focused manner, as is the way of Torah. We expect that readers will also treat the arguments substantively and examine them on their merits, as ought to be done with every halakhic and worldview question. Our belief is firm that every reader can and should examine the matters, agree or disagree, and arrive at his own conclusion. However, that conclusion should not depend on whether one defines oneself as “Haredi,” “Religious-Zionist,” or otherwise, but rather on a straight analysis of the arguments, sources, and sugyot in and of themselves.

The obligation to participate in defense and rescue

The starting point of the discussion is the moral and civic obligation of every person or group to bear the burden together with the other components of society, including the military burden. This is true for any society, Jewish or otherwise, for it is a basic moral principle. When Moses rebukes the tribes of Gad and Reuben for wishing to remain east of the Jordan, he does not mention the commandments of conquering and settling the land or any other halakhic duty; rather, he focuses on the moral obligation to shoulder the military effort of all Israel and not to shirk it and stay behind. He addresses them on the moral plane and says (Numbers 32:6): “Shall your brothers go to war while you sit here?!”

This obligation returns in the words of Deborah the Prophetess, who curses the people of Meroz for failing to join Israel in its war against Sisera (Judges 5:23):

“Curse Meroz, said the angel of the Lord; curse, curse its inhabitants, because they did not come to the aid of the Lord, to the aid of the Lord among the warriors.”

Rashi there (from the Mekhilta, Beshalach, Shirata §6) writes:

“To the aid of the Lord” — as it were: whoever helps Israel is as one who helps the Shekhinah.

This is explicit in Scripture, and of course it is also established in halakha. The obligation to save another person in danger is an absolute halakhic duty, derived from “Do not stand by your fellow’s blood.” Thus writes Maimonides (Laws of Murder 1:14):

“Anyone who can save and did not save transgresses Leviticus 19:16, ‘Do not stand by your fellow’s blood.’ So too one who sees his fellow drowning in the sea, or bandits coming upon him, or a wild beast coming upon him, and he can save him himself or can hire others to save him and did not save; or he heard that gentiles or informers are plotting evil against him or laying a trap for him, and he did not make it known to him; or he knows of a gentile or a tyrant who is bearing a grievance against his fellow and he can placate him on his fellow’s behalf and remove what is in his heart, and he did not placate — and all such things — anyone who does them transgresses ‘Do not stand by your fellow’s blood.’”

And of course, in the law of the pursuer (rodef), one is obligated to save the pursued from the hand of his pursuer, and he thereby violates also a negative commandment and a positive commandment if he fails to act (ibid. 1:15):

“One who sees a pursuer chasing his fellow to kill him, or after a prohibited sexual act to violate it, and he can save and did not save — he has nullified a positive commandment, namely ‘you shall cut off her hand,’ and transgressed two negative commandments: ‘your eye shall not pity’ and ‘do not stand by your fellow’s blood.’”

And in §16 there Maimonides writes about the weight and severity of the matter:

“Even though lashes are not administered for these negative commandments because they lack an act, they are severe; for whoever destroys one Jewish soul is considered as if he destroyed an entire world, and whoever sustains one Jewish soul is considered as if he sustained an entire world.”

All this concerns another who is being pursued. All the more so if you yourself are within the danger—for in our case the war is to defend the entire people dwelling in Zion (including, of course, the Haredim)—then a fortiori you are obligated to take part in the rescue.

And if the danger is to all Israel, this obligation is even more severe, to the point that although, as a rule, it is ruled that a person may not endanger himself to save another (see Hagahot Maimoniyot, Laws of Murder 1:14, and the commentators there; also Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat §426; Sema ad loc.; Responsa Radbaz III §1052, and many more), for the rescue of the public it is certainly permitted and even obligatory to do so. On this basis some later authorities explained the great praise of the “martyrs of Lod,” who gave themselves over to death to save Israel (see Pesachim 50a; Bava Batra 10b; Rashi to Ta’anit 18b; and others). This is the foundation of war to save Israel from an enemy at hand, for which every person of Israel is obligated to risk his life for the sake of the collective (as the Minchat Chinuch, Commandment 425 §1, writes that by the very nature of war there is danger and this does not exempt us, and this is not the category of “be killed rather than transgress”), as will be explained.

The starting point of the discussion

The very resort to sources and the multiplication of pilpulim in them is like one who asks about the laws of saving a life, where the very deliberation and inquiry is reprehensible (Jerusalem Talmud, Yoma 8:5):

“We desecrate the Sabbath for saving a life. One who is quick is praiseworthy; there is no need to seek permission from a court. One who asks is reprehensible, and one who consults is as if he sheds blood.”

Yet since these matters arise in public debate, there is no choice but to address the arguments and the sources themselves. We begin by explaining the very obligation to go to war, and thereafter we will discuss the exemption-claims and examine whether they have substance.

At the outset, it appears that the obligation to mobilize for a defensive war to save Israel from danger is a full obligation without dissent—by Scripture, reason, and halakhic sources—and in principle it applies to every Jew without exception. From here onward, one can adduce various sources and halakhic arguments to discuss this obligation in practice: who is obligated and who is exempt. But it is crucial to understand that the starting point of the discussion is that such an obligation exists; thus, the burden of proof rests upon one who wishes to exempt himself, not upon one who calls for fulfilling it. One who wishes to exempt himself must justify his position and behavior that depart from the aforementioned duty and show that his interpretation and rationale are indeed correct, for his claim is like one who says “I do not know whether I repaid you,” not “I do not know whether you lent me” (see Bava Kama 118a; explanation, e.g., in the Rif there and Taz, Choshen Mishpat end of §75, and others). This is a very important framing point, for it means that even if there is a halakhic or philosophical source or a rationale that can be interpreted in several ways, or if there are conflicting sources on some point, one cannot rely on them—“a doubt does not uproot a certainty.”

Dina de-malchuta and communal enactments

Background to the matter are also claims about the duty to obey governmental directives (Knesset, government, and army). Simply, there is an obligation here of dina de-malchuta,[1] for the king can send the people to war. As Nachmanides writes at the end of his additions to the negative commandments Maimonides counted, that a “king” for this purpose is “one in whose hand the people lie, to send them to the army,” and not necessarily a monarch in the strict sense (and similarly implied in Maimonides, Laws of Tithes 1:2).

True, some decisors cite the Ran (Nedarim 28a) and other commentators who wrote that dina de-malchuta does not apply in the Land of Israel, and this is commonly believed in the Haredi public. But as is known, these words are not agreed upon. I will not lengthen where many already have; I only point to Rabbi Ovadia Yosef (Yechaveh Da’at V §64), who brought many proofs that the decisions of the Knesset and Government of Israel have the force of dina de-malchuta. So wrote also Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv in the Rabbinate Court Rulings (vol. 6, p. 376ff.). Moreover, to rely on that Ran here is quite puzzling, for surely also kings of Israel had authority to send the people to war and levy taxes—otherwise how did the kings of Judah and Israel rule in their days?!

Further, even if there were no dina de-malchuta in this matter, communal enactments certainly apply everywhere. If the city leaders and community representatives decide to go to war when there is danger, they certainly have the authority and one must obey them even without dina de-malchuta. Therefore, even if there is no dina de-malchuta for the Israeli government, surely it is no less than communal enactments. One must remember that all citizens (including the Haredim, of course) receive services from the state, and therefore every citizen is obligated to obey its laws. One cannot demand the rights the state grants its citizens while not fulfilling the duties it imposes in return. Beyond all other problems, this is theft from the public.

At present the legal situation regarding drafting Haredim is indeed unclear, so perhaps one could have argued that there is no dina de-malchuta or communal duty to enlist, since the government itself exempted them. But about a year ago the previous Draft Law expired, and thus for about a year there has been a full legal duty to enlist, which the Haredim were unwilling to fulfill (and they even pressured the government to violate the law). Moreover, Haredi spokespeople announce that they will not obey any draft law the legislature may pass if it is not to their liking. Furthermore, even if a valid law is passed that discriminates among populations, decisors have written that dina de-malchuta does not apply when the regime discriminates among people, and they even called this “dina de-ḥamsanuta” (its source in the Ran, Gittin 10b, and many others), not dina de-malchuta, and of course it has no halakhic force.

Beyond all this, even if there were no monarchy and no halakhically legitimate authority in Israel, in fact there is now a situation of danger to life and we must defend ourselves. Therefore, discussions about authority are beside the point. Could one imagine that when Israel is in danger and has no halakhically authorized leadership, they must refrain from war and surrender themselves to death?!

In the Haredi public there are also claims of distrust in the regime (even though all Haredi parties are currently in the coalition and government) and in the army, and therefore they are unwilling to enlist and fight under their directives. The question is whether a public that refuses to enlist because it does not trust the government is also willing to forgo the protection of the army and security forces. Are they certain in their judgment that despite the experts’ opinions and the government, there is no current danger? Or perhaps they think the war will not help to escape it? Or maybe they have another way to confront the dangers? If not, then there is no room to refuse to join the fighting within the IDF and under government directives. At present this is the only way we have, and therefore even if they are right that the chosen path is not ideal, the alternative is inaction and surrendering ourselves to death. Can anyone seriously accept such a claim?! Never has there been a perfect and ideal government, but this is what we currently have. Just think—were the kings among the nations throughout history guided by better and more trustworthy motives? Was King Ahab a better king? And yet, dina de-malchuta gave all these rulers the authority to send their peoples (including the Jews living there) to war.

The status of our current wars: Are they a milhemet mitzvah?

Many discuss whether our wars are considered a milhemet mitzvah (commanded war) or not. This has consequences for who must go out and fight (for example, Torah students), and who sends the nation to war. It is occasionally claimed that nowadays we lack a Sanhedrin, the Urim and Tumim, and a prophet, and therefore it is questionable whether we can go to war. But for a milhemet mitzvah the king need not consult the Sanhedrin; he sends the people based on his judgment (see Maimonides, Kings 5:2), unlike a discretionary war that requires an approval process.

At the beginning of Kings and Their Wars, chapter 5, Maimonides enumerates three kinds of milhemet mitzvah:

“A king does not first wage war except a commanded war. And what is a commanded war? The war against the Seven Nations, the war against Amalek, and saving Israel from an enemy who comes upon them. Thereafter he wages a discretionary war, which is war with other nations to expand Israel’s borders and increase his greatness and renown.”

If indeed saving Israel from an enemy at hand is a milhemet mitzvah, then the kingdom sends the people to war according to its understanding. Indeed, Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (leader of the Haredi public until not long ago), in a response to Rabbi Yoel Bin-Nun, wrote about the Yom Kippur War: “And are we not engaged in a milhemet mitzvah?” (Kovetz Teshuvot I §243).

If it is a milhemet mitzvah, then all must go out and fight, as the Mishnah (Sotah 44a–b) teaches about those who return from the ranks, concluding:

“In what case are these words said? In discretionary wars. But in commanded wars, all go out—even a groom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy. Rabbi Yehudah says: In what case are these words said? In commanded wars. But in obligatory wars, all go out—even a groom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy.”

This is brought to halakha in Maimonides (Kings 7:4):

“After all those who return from the ranks have returned, they arrange the formations, appoint army officers at the head of the people, and station behind each formation strong and valiant officers with iron rods in their hands. Anyone who wants to flee from the war, they have permission to cut off his leg, for the beginning of defeat is flight. In what case are these words said—that these people are returned from the ranks? In a discretionary war. But in a commanded war, all go out—even a groom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy.”

And in Sotah 10a in the margin, the Arukh is cited regarding Asa, who took out a groom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy: “All the more so Torah scholars.” True, the passage there criticizes Asa for imposing corvée, but it seems clear that, if it is permitted to take out a groom and a bride, then surely Torah scholars as well. And so writes plainly the Keren Orah on that Mishnah, after citing the Arukh:

“It is implied here that in a commanded war all go out, and even Torah scholars must suspend their learning.”

So it appears also in the Jerusalem Talmud, Yoma 8:10 (“There is no ‘Rabbi’ and ‘great one’”), and so wrote several commentators on the Prophets cited in Shabbat Ha’aretz 13:12 and note 5 to 13 there in the Torah VeHa’aretz edition (Malbim; Metzudat David; Ralbag; and Radak to Judges 5:14–15).

It is fitting to add here the words of two leaders of the Haredi community in Israel—the Ḥazon Ish and Rabbi Yitzchak Zev (the Brisker Rav)—in their glosses on the Talmud (not polemical writing).

The Ḥazon Ish, Orach Chayim §114 subsec. 3, wrote:

“It seems that what the Mishnah states—that in a commanded war even a groom goes from his chamber—does not speak of a time when their help is needed for victory in war, for it is obvious that for danger to life and saving the people, all are obligated; rather, even when there is need only for a certain number (and most of their wars were such that there was room among the fighting forces only for a certain number), it is permitted to take from them even a groom from his chamber, for those who return have no right in a commanded war. So too, in a discretionary war they are exempt only when Israel’s victory does not depend on them, for the number of soldiers required is sufficient without them; but if there is need of them for victory, they are obligated to come to their brothers’ aid, and the matter becomes like a commanded war. But this is only when they have already entered the war; at the outset, one does not enter a discretionary war if it is impossible to fight without those who would otherwise return. And after they have entered a discretionary war with a given force, if they see they need to add soldiers, they do not take those whom we were commanded to send back if the required number can be met without them. And even though now enemies have come upon us—and had they come upon us initially, it would have been considered a commanded war—since we entered initially into a discretionary war, those who return have their right so long as we can fight through others. But if their participation is required for victory, even a groom from his chamber goes out, even though they had entered initially a discretionary war.”

According to him, in any war once we are already in it—even if it is, in definition, a discretionary war—if victory requires taking those who were otherwise exempted and everyone else (including a groom and a bride), we take whoever is needed. The difference in a commanded war is that everyone is taken even if they are not required for victory.

True, the Ḥazon Ish speaks about those who return from the ranks and about a groom and a bride, but he does not explicitly address Torah scholars. One could say that we never found any exemption for Torah scholars, and thus he did not need to address them. Moreover, he writes that where there is danger to life we do whatever is necessary, without distinction between persons, which is obvious by reason. Below we will return to the discussion about the exemption of Torah scholars, but first we will discuss the participation of the tribe of Levi in war.

Maimonides writes at the end of Laws of Shemitah and Yovel (13:12):

“Why did Levi not merit a portion of the Land of Israel and its spoils with his brothers? Because he was set apart to serve the Lord, to minister to Him, and to teach His upright ways and righteous judgments to the many, as it says: ‘They shall teach Your judgments to Jacob and Your Torah to Israel.’ Therefore, they were set apart from the ways of the world: they do not wage war like the rest of Israel, nor do they inherit or acquire for themselves through the strength of their bodies. Rather, they are the Lord’s legion, as it says: ‘Bless, O Lord, his army (ḥeilo).’ And He, blessed be He, provides for them, as it says: ‘I am your portion and your inheritance.’”

We have found that, according to him, the tribe of Levi “does not wage war like the rest of Israel.” But it has already been noted that he did not write that they never wage war, rather that they do not wage war like the rest of Israel. That is, when they are needed, they certainly participate in war (but the order of precedence is that they are the last to go).

Indeed, in the Ḥiddushei HaGriz to Sotah 44b (from the notes of his son, Rabbi Dov), he proves this from the gemara there:

“‘These do not return…’: one who remarries his divorcee, a widow to a high priest, a divorcee or chalutzah to a common priest, etc. Maimonides (Kings 7:8) rules like the Mishnah that one who betroths a woman prohibited to him, such as a widow to a High Priest and a divorcee or chalutzah to a common priest, etc., does not return. It is evident that priests go out to war. And here we speak of a discretionary war, for in a commanded war all go out, as the Mishnah later (44b) says: all go out—even a groom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy. Therefore, it is evident that priests go out even in a discretionary war.”

Maimonides himself rules that priests go out even to a discretionary war, and of course to a commanded war. All the more so for the rest of the tribe of Levi. This can be reinforced from the Hasmonean wars, which were led by a family of High Priests who went to war and led it. Another proof comes from Kiddushin 21b:

“It was asked: A priest—what is his status regarding a beautiful captive? Is this a novelty that applies equally to a priest and an Israelite? Or perhaps priests are different, since more commandments were increased upon them? Rav said: permitted; Shmuel said: prohibited.”

Here too, the simple assumption is that priests participate in war; otherwise the question of a beautiful captive would not arise for them.

How does this conclusion fit with Maimonides’ words above, that the tribe of Levi does not go to war? The Brisker Rav explains:

“It seems that when Maimonides wrote that the tribe of Levi does not wage war like the rest of Israel, his intention was not to remove them entirely from going to war. It appears that when they are needed during a time of war, they too would go out. His main intent is that they are not sent out initially to enter war like all Israel, since they are the Lord’s legion and were set apart to serve the Lord and to minister to Him and to teach His ways and judgments. But certainly, if priests are needed for waging war, they too would go out. If so, nothing is difficult about what Maimonides wrote—that a High Priest who betroths a widow and a common priest who betroths a divorcee do not return from the ranks—because indeed they are not removed entirely from going to war.”

Thus, his words accord with the Ḥazon Ish above: whenever they are needed for victory, certainly the tribe of Levi—including the priests—go out to fight. And what about Torah scholars? We will now explain.

Are Torah scholars exempt from war according to Maimonides?

First, it seems that someone who neglects the commandment of war for the sake of Torah study is no different from someone who neglects other commandments in order to study. Regarding that, Maimonides writes (Laws of Torah Study 3:3–4; source: Bavli Kiddushin 40b):

“3. There is no commandment among all the commandments that is equal to Torah study except Torah study itself, for study leads to action; therefore study precedes action in every place.

4. If one had before him the performance of a commandment and Torah study—if the commandment can be performed by others, he should not interrupt his study; but if not, he should perform the commandment and return to his study.”

At first glance, this is puzzling: since Torah study is greater than all commandments, why should it be deferred to them? The early authorities already addressed this and explained (see, e.g., the Meiri ad loc.; Kehalot Yaakov, Shabbat §11; and others) that the purpose of learning is to fulfill; thus it is not reasonable that because of learning one would refrain from fulfilling. There is more to elaborate, but this is not the place. In any case, we learn that Torah study exempts from other commandments only when others can perform them. That is not our situation. And about one who refrains from a commandment because he is learning, it is said (JT Shabbat 1:2):

“One who learns not in order to do—it would have been preferable had he not been created. And Rabbi Yohanan said: One who learns not in order to do—it would have been preferable had his placenta been turned over on his face and he had not come into the world.”

Indeed, we find that Joshua bin Nun and his disciples, and likewise King David and his men, went out to war, and they did not think that their learning exempts them from war. And about Joshua, the Sages expounded (Megillah 3a) in the rebuke of the angel of the Lord to Joshua in the Jericho war: “Yesterday you neglected the afternoon tamid; and now, you have neglected Torah study.” Rashi explains: “And now, which is night, you should occupy yourselves with Torah, since you do not fight at night.” From this, Rabbi Zevin deduced in his well-known letter published during the War of Independence: crystal-clear words—“since you do not fight at night”! Thus, when they are fighting, it is obvious that Torah study is suspended when needed. Also in the war against Midian it is said: “And Moses sent them, a thousand from each tribe, to the army—them and Pinḥas” (Num. 31:6). The Sages say: “Them—this refers to the Sanhedrin” (Sotah 43a). And in the Sifra it is brought that the tribe of Levi went to the war against Midian.

True, in Megillah 16b we find: “Rav Yosef said: Torah study is greater than saving lives.” But decisors have already written that this does not pertain to the obligation to suspend Torah study to save lives (see Drisha, Yoreh De’ah §251; Taz ad loc. §6), for we suspend study for any other commandment—how much more so for saving lives.

In the next halakha there (Shemitah and Yovel 13:13), Maimonides writes:

“13. Not only the tribe of Levi, but any person from among the inhabitants of the world whose spirit moved him and whose mind understood to set himself apart to stand before the Lord, to minister unto Him and to serve Him, to know the Lord, who walked uprightly as God made him, and cast from his neck the yoke of the many calculations that people seek—this person is sanctified as holy of holies. The Lord will be his portion and inheritance forever and ever; He will provide his sustenance in this world sufficiently, as He provided for the priests and Levites. As David, peace be upon him, said: ‘The Lord is my allotted portion and my cup; You support my lot.’”

Many have cited this as the source for the great novelty that all Torah students and scholars have the status of the tribe of Levi, and from here they sought to exempt all those studying Torah—yeshiva students and kollel men—from going out to war. But even these words are refuted from within, at least for four reasons:

* First, Maimonides’ practice is to insert aggadic passages at the ends of sections of halakhot, and it is perilous to derive halakhic conclusions from them. On this point see the words of Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein in his book By His Light, who writes regarding this passage in Maimonides (pp. 210–211):

“It is reasonable that we have here a moral exhortation—parallel to the endings of several books in Mishneh Torah—worthy, of course, of its full weight as such (after all, note who signed it); but it is not to be defined as a clear halakhic ruling. The passage presents an awe-inspiring and colorful appreciation of a sublime personality, but it does not dictate how she and others must act. Let us ask ourselves honestly: would a God-fearing ben Torah rely upon such a passage to exempt himself from tzitzit or shofar? … Even if we were to assume that Maimonides’ words unequivocally imply a clear and sweeping exemption, their practical import would still be quite limited. We have not yet clarified who is eligible for it. A Levite is defined by a well-documented lineage; but a ben Torah compared to him is defined by an array of spiritual traits, for which Maimonides set a very high bar. He paints an ideal portrait of a man entirely free of personal ambition and any trace of self-interest… To what segment of the Torah community… does this exalted depiction apply? … Can a person who negotiates terms of employment—perhaps even a dowry or ‘kest’—look in the mirror and declare to himself that he ought not enlist because he has been ‘sanctified as holy of holies’ in Maimonides’ sense?”

* Second, Maimonides wrote this only about those “whose spirit moved them” and who “cast from their neck the yoke of the many calculations that people seek.” Can one say that every kollel man or yeshiva student deserves such lofty crowns?! How many of them do not go to the doctor when a family member is ill? How many do not worry about their livelihood but place their trust solely in God? How many do not call the police when attacked or when a burglar breaks in? How many do not bring someone to a rabbinic court when their rights are violated? This is what I would expect of one who has cast off all worldly calculations and only engages in Torah and is protected by it. Of such a person, perhaps one could say that he is not obligated in the hishtadlut of fighting in the army even when he and all of us are in clear and present danger.

* Third, in this halakha Maimonides wrote nothing about waging war (as he did above regarding the tribe of Levi); rather, he wrote that God will provide his sustenance in this world like the priests and Levites. So explains Ner Mitzvah to Commandment 11, note 55 (cited in Shabbat Ha’aretz ad loc., note 6).

* Fourth, we have seen above that even the tribe of Levi itself is not exempt from war when they are needed to achieve victory. Regarding Torah scholars who are likened to the tribe of Levi we apply the rule: “It suffices to derive as much as is in the source.”

Incidentally, it seems that Maimonides’ intent here is even to gentiles, for he wrote “any person from among the inhabitants of the world” (see, e.g., Laws of Tefillin 10:11; Laws of Sanhedrin 12:3; and Bavli Menachot 86a). So at the end of Shabbat Ha’aretz, Rav Kook concludes, and so in Rabbi Kafih’s commentary on this halakha. If so, it does not appear to refer specifically to Torah learners, nor to an exemption from Israel’s wars.

Beyond all this, if indeed the law is that Torah scholars are exempt from war, Maimonides should have brought this law in Laws of Kings, where he deals with the laws of war, and not in Laws of Shemitah and Yovel as a merely aggadic note. True, one might note that he also did not bring there the (previous, clearly legal) halakha of the tribe of Levi’s not “waging war like the rest of Israel.” We saw that they are not entirely exempt, but there is a law that they are not sent like others. Seemingly, this law should have been in Laws of Kings and was not. This requires investigation.

On the margins of the matter we note Maimonides’ well-known words in Laws of Torah Study (3:10):

“Anyone who resolves to occupy himself with Torah and not do work and thus be supported by charity profanes the Name, disgraces the Torah, extinguishes the light of religion, brings evil upon himself, and forfeits life in the World to Come; for it is forbidden to benefit from the words of Torah in this world. The Sages said: Whoever benefits from the words of Torah forfeits his life in the world. They also commanded: Do not make them a crown with which to magnify yourself, nor a spade with which to dig. They further commanded: Love work and hate rabbinic authority. Any Torah that is not accompanied by work will end in neglect and lead to sin; and in the end, this person will rob others.”

True, the Kesef Mishneh there writes that many tried and it did not succeed for them—meaning that it is appropriate to grant an exemption from livelihood, and perhaps also from the army (see below), to learners so they can grow in Torah. But clearly, even he agrees this is only a bedi’avad (after the fact) arrangement. Regarding exempting learners from service so that they may grow in Torah, as per the Kesef Mishneh, see below §3.

One might wonder how these words of Maimonides themselves accord with his words in Shemitah and Yovel. It seems simple: In Shemitah and Yovel he speaks about people like Ben Azzai or Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai, who were exempt from commandments because they clung to Torah (regarding marriage and procreation, see Maimonides, Marriage 15:3; Shulḥan Arukh, Even Ha-Ezer 1:4; and regarding prayer, see Shabbat 11a; and in the JT it seems even for Shema—which all agree is a Torah obligation. See also Tosafot s.v. kan to Mo’ed Katan 9b). This is because they truly cast off all worldly calculations, do not engage in livelihood and hishtadlut, and hand themselves over entirely to God. They are exempt from commandments, and for them even a passing commandment does not override their Torah study. Of such people Nachmanides also wrote his well-known words (Leviticus 26:11): “When the Lord is pleased with a man’s ways, he has no business with physicians.” But, as stated, such people scarcely exist—neither then nor now. This is merely an abstract statement and an ideal model. By contrast, in Laws of Torah Study Maimonides speaks of those who are not like Ben Azzai and Rashbi—who do in fact engage in livelihood and hishtadlut, like all of us—but think to derive their livelihood from Torah study. These, in his view, profane the Name, disgrace the Torah, and extinguish the light of religion, and in the end they will rob the public; and on this the Kesef Mishneh also comments as above.

Thus, it seems very difficult to rely on his words in Shemitah and Yovel for all learners today and in general. Who among them—if any—deserves the lofty descriptions cited above?! And only such are included in Maimonides’ words in Shemitah and Yovel. Moreover, even if they are included, we saw that even the tribe of Levi itself has no absolute exemption from war. See also Responsa Tzitz Eliezer III §9, ch. 1.

The definition of “saving Israel from an enemy at hand”

There is another type of milhemet mitzvah: war to conquer the land (per Nachmanides’ addition to the positive commandments omitted by Maimonides). One might challenge this according to Maimonides, especially in our time. But our concern here is not a war to conquer the land, but a war of rescue from threat—i.e., saving Israel from an enemy at hand. This is the war being waged today in Gaza (“Swords of Iron”), and so were most of our wars in the past.

Regarding a war to save Israel from an enemy at hand, one must ask whether this is indeed a regular milhemet mitzvah. We saw above that at the beginning of Kings 5, Maimonides includes it as a commanded war together with the Seven Nations and Amalek. But in the next chapter he lists only the other two types and does not mention it (6:4):

“If they did not make peace, or made peace but did not accept the Seven Noahide Laws, we make war against them and kill all their adult males, and we plunder all their property and their children. We do not kill a woman or a minor, as it says, ‘and the women and the little ones’—this refers to male minors. When do these words apply? In a discretionary war against other nations. But for the Seven Nations and Amalek, if they do not make peace, we leave no soul alive, as it says, ‘so shall you do to all…’—‘only from the cities of these peoples’—‘you shall not allow a soul to live.’ And thus it says regarding Amalek, ‘You shall blot out the memory of Amalek.’ And from where do we know that he speaks only of those who did not make peace? As it says, ‘there was no city that made peace with the Israelites, except the Hivites from Gibeon—everything they took in war—for it was from the Lord to harden their hearts to go out to war against Israel, in order to destroy them.’ From this we infer that they sent them for peace and they did not accept.”

Why is saving Israel from an enemy at hand not mentioned here as well? It seems that even there, we do not call to them for peace since there is no time and we must strike first. Still, Maimonides does not address it here at all, and this is likely not by chance.

By reason, even according to Maimonides, saving Israel from an enemy at hand is not a discretionary war, of course, but it is also not the same as a commanded war—at least not in the same sense as Amalek and the Seven Nations. First, only these two types are cited in the Talmud as commanded wars; saving Israel from an enemy at hand was added by Maimonides (perhaps on his own). By reason, there is a big difference between these two and the third. The purpose of the wars against the Seven Nations and Amalek (and also the conquest of the land) is the fulfillment of a commandment; the entire motivation to wage them is the command and the Torah’s instruction. Without it, we would not have thought to do so (except perhaps as a discretionary war). Therefore, in those wars, the Torah sets the parameters—whether, how, and when we go out, who goes and who does not, and how the war is conducted. And therefore when the halakhic parameters are not met, we forego the war. But in a war to save Israel from an enemy at hand, the war is undertaken to defend and protect our lives, and of course we would do so even without any commandment. The motivation to fight here is not to fulfill a commandment but to defend our lives. Certainly, there is an aspect of safeguarding life and “you shall live by them,” and also rescuing the pursued, as above; but the war is not conducted for the sake of the commandment and by its force. Unlike the wars of Amalek and the Seven Nations, here—even if there were no commandment—we would fight to defend ourselves. Consider: before the Hasmonean court expounded, “‘Until it is subdued’—even on Shabbat” (Shabbat 19a), did Jews not fight on Shabbat and instead surrender themselves to death?! It is most implausible. When there is danger to life, one fights—even on Shabbat.[2] But when it is not Shabbat, and after the Hasmonean court’s exegesis even on Shabbat, surely we go out to fight to defend ourselves without any other parameters and without any command.

Indeed, in the Jerusalem Talmud (Sotah 8:10) it appears that they interpreted “obligatory war” in Rabbi Yehudah’s words in our Mishnah thus:

“Rabbi Yehudah would call ‘discretionary war’—such as when we go against them. ‘Obligatory war’—such as when they come against us.”

When the nations come upon us, this is an obligatory war; it is more stringent than a commanded war and all go out to it (and according to the Sages, all go out to it as well, of course).

A supporting indication comes from Maimonides’ introduction to the Book of the Commandments, where he writes:

“It is also known that warfare and conquest of the land are only through a king and by the authority of the Great Sanhedrin and the High Priest, as it says, ‘He shall stand before Eleazar the priest’ (Numbers 27:21). And since all these matters are well known to most people, therefore any positive or negative commandment dependent upon sacrifices or services, or the judicial executions, or the Sanhedrin, or a prophet and king, or a commanded war or a discretionary war—I will not need to say in each: ‘This commandment applies only when the Temple stands,’ since this is clear from what we have mentioned. But anything in which there might be doubt or error, I will note it, if God wills.”

From his words we see that a commanded war does not apply in our time. If saving Israel from an enemy at hand is a regular commanded war, by reason it is obvious that it applies also now when Israel is under threat. We saw that Nachmanides wrote that whoever can send the people to war has the status of a king. Seemingly, it follows that saving Israel from an enemy at hand is not a commanded war; thus Maimonides can write that the law of a commanded war does not apply in our time. But the laws of saving life certainly do.[3]

The conclusion is that saving Israel from an enemy at hand is not exactly a regular commanded war, but an act of saving life. Consequently, it is clear that its parameters are determined by the necessities of saving life, not by the laws of war. Hence, everyone needed for victory certainly goes out to fight. There is no need here to resort to sources about “a groom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy,” discussions of who goes to war and who is exempt, the disputes among the Tannaim (obligatory war or commanded war), or who sends Israel to this war. Whatever is needed to be saved is done, and anyone needed to be saved goes out to war. The Ḥazon Ish and the Brisker Rav, cited above, spoke of this: anyone needed for victory goes out—even in a regular commanded war—despite their dealing with Amalek or the Seven Nations, where there is also the possibility of foregoing the war (and not fulfilling the commandment) when certain halakhic conditions are not met. But in our case—war to save Israel from an enemy at hand—we have no option not to fight. Our lives are in danger, and we are compelled to fight by the laws of saving life. Thus the case resembles saving the life of an individual that overrides the entire Torah without any fence or restriction: whatever is needed to be saved. And when it is the saving of the many—how much more so—that everyone needed for victory must go out to fight. Here, there is certainly no room to speak of exemptions for those who return from the ranks, the tribe of Levi, Torah scholars, a groom and bride, etc. At most one could speak about the order of mobilization—who before whom—but in the end, the needs of the war determine who goes out to fight; and if all are needed, all go. As noted above, here there is no room to speak of conditions for going to war (Sanhedrin, kingship, Urim and Tumim, etc.), for even in the absence of these, we have the right and duty simply to stand for our lives, to fight, and to do whatever is necessary to be saved. No one would demand of us to surrender ourselves to death because certain halakhic conditions are not met.

Any claim that if some condition is not met we are forbidden to go out and fight, or forbidden to do what is necessary to win; and any claim of exemption for certain persons because of the Torah’s laws of war—contradicts the core law of saving life, which overrides the entire Torah. And as our teachers taught (JT Yoma 8:5):

“It was taught: One who is quick is praiseworthy; one who asks is reprehensible; one who consults is as if he sheds blood. It was taught: In any matter of danger, do not say: ‘Let gentiles or minors perform it’; rather, even adult Israelites [must do it].”

So too in Bavli Yoma 84b; and this is brought to halakha by Maimonides (Shabbat 2:30). These things are ancient.

After all this, the determinations of whether there is danger to life here and what is required to address it are factual–security assessments, not halakhic ones, and they establish the duty to fight and upon whom it falls. These determinations are entrusted to the political and security leadership. In our approach, the traditional sources and arguments commonly invoked regarding mobilization are not relevant to a war of saving Israel from an enemy at hand. This seems also to underlie the reasonings of the Ḥazon Ish and the Brisker Rav that we saw—and the matter is simple.

Note that even for rescuing property in towns near the border one desecrates Shabbat, as ruled in the Shulḥan Arukh (Orach Ḥayim §329:6; source: Eruvin 45a). One can discuss whether this is due to future risk to life or even for the property itself; this is not the place. Rabbi Bin-Nun added in his letter: “Everyone knows what happened in the towns near the border—Sderot and Ofakim—on Shemini Atzeret of this year.”

Consequences: saving Israel from an enemy at hand—between saving life and commanded war

If so, our conclusion is that saving Israel from an enemy at hand is not a regular commanded war but an act of saving life. We saw one implication: all halakhic parameters are irrelevant here. Now we will see two more implications.

Is it permitted for a Jew living in the Land to flee because of the danger? One can criticize such behavior, but the question here is purely halakhic. If it were a commanded war, it would be forbidden to flee; he must participate with all Israel in the war as part of the commandment that obligates him. But if this is a matter of saving life, there is room to permit him to flee, as in any case of saving life. The law of the pursuer requires a person to save also his fellow, not only himself—but only when the rescuer himself is not endangered; a person need not endanger himself to save his fellow (and according to most decisors it is even forbidden). One could counter that the danger is to the public, and as part of the public he must remain and help fight; but this is not a necessary logic.

Now to the second implication. Must a Jew living abroad come to the Land and fight together with us in a war of saving Israel from an enemy at hand? If it were a commanded war, then clearly all must come. This would be the case, for example, in a war to conquer the land (per Nachmanides above). But if we are dealing with the laws of saving life, they obligate those who are in danger. As we saw in the previous implication, there is no obligation upon a person to endanger himself to save others. Indeed, we do not find decisors who claim that Jews abroad must come and participate in the war. From here is proof that even those who speak of saving Israel from an enemy at hand as a commanded war cannot mean it in its regular sense. The meaning is that it is not a discretionary war, but it is also not a regular commanded war; it is an act of saving life, and the laws of saving life apply. It was noted to me on my website that Rabbi Hershel Schachter, President of Yeshiva University in New York, instructs questioners that in such a situation every Jew abroad must go up to Israel and join the fighting. Even so, we have not seen such an instruction elsewhere, and this itself indicates that presumably decisors hold that today this is not a commanded war but a matter of saving life.

Present and future danger

Claims are raised that this is about preventing a future danger and therefore it should not be treated as saving life. When the risk materializes, we will need to enlist and confront it. This appears to be grounded in the continuation of the sugya in Sotah 44b:

“The dispute concerns reducing idolaters so that they will not come upon them. One master calls it a commanded war, and the other calls it discretionary. The practical difference: one occupied with a commandment is exempt from another commandment.”

This deals with a war we initiate against the gentiles in order to reduce the future danger they pose to us, and there is a dispute whether this is discretionary or commanded. But there the danger is not tangible; it is only a precautionary step. So too we saw in the JT Sotah 5:10 cited above, which distinguishes between when we go upon them (a preemptive war) and when they come upon us—which is an obligatory war to which all go out.

In our case, even if our situation were a future threat (which it truly is not), one who does not enlist and train now to prepare himself for war and to confront future threats will not be able to take part in the fighting when it arrives. A modern army and warfare are not conducted like battles of communities and tribes in antiquity. A modern army is a cumbersome and complex organization that requires long-term preparation, training, and organization, and constant readiness for any threat, especially when the threats facing us are very real. Therefore, enlistment must be ongoing—not only when the threat arises in practice.

It is fitting to cite Maimonides’ “Epistle on Astrology” (Iggerot HaRambam, ed. Rabbi Shilat, p. 480):

“And this is what destroyed our kingdom and ruined our Temple and brought us to this point … that we did not occupy ourselves with learning warfare nor with conquering lands.”

We note that in towns near the border, the common explanation for the permission to desecrate Shabbat is future risk. Hence, for tangible public dangers, even future dangers count as a threat justifying desecration of Shabbat.

Interim conclusions

We learn that according to all opinions, the wars in which we are engaged have at least the status of a commanded war to which all must go by law—and perhaps even more (as we saw, that they have the character of saving life, to which all go for reasons of saving life, irrespective of the laws of war). We saw that the claims for exemptions for this or that category are incorrect in themselves even regarding a regular commanded war, and are wholly irrelevant in a war to save Israel from an enemy at hand. We also saw that the obligation to bear the military burden is a moral obligation that appears in Scripture and a halakhic duty that appears in the Talmud and the decisors. It is clear that insofar as soldiers are needed for victory, all must bear this burden— including the tribe of Levi and Torah learners, and certainly those who are not such (ordinary Haredim).

One could argue in principle that we are not in a situation where the army needs all enlistees; hence, our discussion thus far would be irrelevant. But at present, all relevant bodies state that there is a severe manpower shortage and indeed all are needed. Reservists bear a very heavy burden and are called up again and again; they and their families groan under the weight, and many have even paid with their lives in the war. We have not even spoken about the enormous losses to the economy because workers are mobilized—this itself constitutes a kind of public saving of life. Simultaneously, Haredi parties—whose voters mostly do not enlist—see to it that their coffers are filled from the public purse, which is depleted precisely because they are not sharing the military and economic burden. The desecration of God’s Name cries out to Heaven. And all I have described is before a war breaks out on additional fronts beyond Gaza, such as Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, the Houthis and Iran, the territories and the Palestinian Authority, and an uprising of Palestinian citizens of Israel. If and when all this occurs, our small army will be stretched beyond the ability to cope.

But beyond all this, even if the army did not need everyone, that could perhaps justify exemptions for Torah learners, but certainly not a blanket exemption for all Haredim as is done today. If indeed only a portion of the youth is required, then let the army recruit that portion from across the population, but all segments of society must equally share this burden. This is the starting point: there is an obligation upon all to bear the burden.

Framework of the discussion: classifying the justifications for exemption

Having established the fundamental obligation to take part in the war, we will now examine the exemption-claims. I remind you of what we saw above: exemption-claims are like “I do not know whether I repaid you,” for they seek to release one from an obligation to fight that certainly exists. Therefore, the burden of proof is on the one claiming exemption.

The basic infrastructure of Haredi arguments against enlistment rests on four main components: 1) opposition to Zionism and the state (and distrust in secular leadership and command); 2) fear of spiritual decline (secularization, deterioration); 3) the value of Torah study (the need to cultivate “iluyim,” prodigies); 4) Torah as a substitute for defense: “Rabbanan la tzrichi netiruta” (sages do not need guarding— for themselves) and “Torah protects and saves” (they also protect the public).

It is important to understand that these different types of arguments aim to justify the non-enlistment of different groups and to different extents. The first and second arguments are the broadest, for they try to base the non-enlistment of all Haredim. The third is the narrowest, for it concerns only “iluyim” (a common term in this discourse, meaning a screened minority among learners who will grow in Torah and become spiritual and halakhic leadership), who should be exempt. The fourth concerns a group of intermediate size—all those studying. Needless to say, the latter two arguments are not specific to Haredim. We will now discuss each in turn.

1. Ideology and theology

The basis of this argument is ideological and theological: the attitude toward the State of Israel and Zionism. As noted, it concerns all who adopt Haredi theology, not only learners. This indeed was the discourse before the state’s establishment and in Haredi ideological polemics, especially in its early years; but today it is usually not raised in external discourse (with rare slips by certain Haredi politicians and rabbis). Many think that even if it exists somewhere in the background, it does not factor into the reasoning for non-enlistment.

But this is not precise. First, the whole matter began with this, and also because for many Haredim it still depends upon it, mainly in internal discourse. Claims such as “what have we to do with them?” or “they are the ones who caused the problems; why should we fight and endanger ourselves because of that?” help the Haredi youth reconcile themselves with not bearing the burden. An atmosphere of alienation and lack of partnership leads to a quieted conscience regarding enlistment, even without formulating it as an ideological principle and without saying it explicitly.

As to the argument itself: it is hard to dispute theological claims, and this is not the place, but reality teaches its own way. At present, in practice, there is danger for all of us, and the question of who is to blame matters less. Even if Zionism is at fault for everything, ultimately all of us are now in mortal danger and therefore must do everything to fight and be saved—certainly if, factually, we all are needed in the war to win it. Thus, sending the “guilty” to fight for us—even if one is morally and theologically at peace with such a policy—is not a practical option. When in danger, there is no place to debate who is to blame. If someone bored a hole in our shared boat and cannot plug it, surely we must all help him. Therefore, we will not deal here with arguments for and against this (baseless) position on the ideological–theological plane.

Similar Haredi arguments rely on distrust of the secular government and of military command (and, of course, without si’ata diShmaya). I begin by noting that the government today includes all Haredi parties; thus it is strange to claim distrust in a secular government. Ministerial responsibility for all governmental actions was the basis of the long-standing Haredi policy of not joining the executive branch. Today they are in it. Beyond this, this claim is rejected exactly like the previous one. The alternative proposed is to surrender ourselves to death. Ultimately, we must choose between two bad options: fight under the current military and governmental framework (assuming we distrust its conduct) or not fight and die. The choice here is self-evident. On the contrary, when Haredim integrate into the army, they can influence its conduct and improve it. Either way, certainly sitting on the sidelines is not a reasonable choice between these two. And of course, leaving others to die for us— even if it sufficed for security and no Haredi soldiers were needed— is neither a moral nor halakhically correct solution.

2. Fear of spiritual decline

This line of argument also concerns every Haredi (and perhaps also religious) person, not only learners. In my assessment, at least these days (and perhaps it was always so), this is the principal argument. The distinction between learners and non-learners appears in the discourse, but it seems born of necessity: it is hard to defend a stance of not bearing the burden out of insecurity and weakness vis-à-vis others, and it is much easier to project strength and declare: we, the learners, protect you. As is known, the Haredi world fears the exposure of the Haredi youth who enlists—to people and ideas outside the Haredi camp, which threatens the “purity of outlook” and perhaps religious commitment altogether, and thereby threatens the Haredi society as a whole (without seclusion there is danger of attrition and disintegration). Ostensibly, this seems a reasonable claim from their perspective: they are not shirking but merely trying to preserve their way of life; if the army threatens that, it seems legitimate not to enlist.

But this argument is quite weak, for several reasons. First, it is possible to organize protected service tracks in various ways—such as Haredi “hesder” yeshivot (which already exist), Haredi pre-military programs to prepare enlistees for army life, rabbinic accompaniment during service, and ensuring Haredi norms in kashrut, modesty, etc. (without entering the question of whether these are indeed the proper norms according to Torah and halakha). The common claim is that the army has not done this adequately until now, and even in the existing Haredi tracks there are unresolved issues. But those who make this claim ignore two important points: first, they ignore their own part. If they cared to enlist and fulfill their duty, there is no doubt the army would look vastly different. Especially in recent years, when Haredi parties take an active part in governance and the executive branch, they can ensure this themselves—or at least shoulder with the army to advance it according to their norms. For some reason there is a feeling that this is society’s duty toward the Haredi community. They ignore that Haredim are part of Israeli society and they are not doing anyone a favor by bearing the burden like everyone else. Moreover, the fact that Haredi youth do not enlist dampens the army’s motivation to build such frameworks. No person or organization invests in hypothetical tasks before seeing that there is purpose and value.

Beyond that, they ignore the fact that even if there is a risk of spiritual decline for a Haredi youth who enlists, that does not exempt him from fulfilling his duty—certainly not when he is needed as a soldier to achieve victory. Does such a consideration permit one not to kill a pursuer? If I saw someone being pursued to be killed, could I say I will not save him because I am studying Torah—or because the street where I must fight is filled with immodest sights and I fear spiritual decline? If I see a fire in a neighbor’s house, may I remain at home studying because I am a learner or a Haredi who is not required to rescue? This is exactly our current situation. There is a fire and an actual pursuit—only it is on a wider scale (a danger to the whole country and some threats are future), and thus it is easier to ignore.

Professor Haneskeh wrote in his article:

“Were the army to remove its protection from the yeshivot and Haredi centers, and these were faced with an immediate choice—to be slaughtered, God forbid, by the enemy, or to fight—there is no doubt the instruction would be to enlist, and all the future concerns would be null and void, as in saving life that overrides all prohibitions in the Torah (except the well-known three), including all spiritual declines entailed therein.”

So too wrote Rabbi Zevin in his aforementioned letter:

“Consider this yourselves: a directive has been issued by ‘Civil Guard’ to paste cloth or paper over all windowpanes because of the danger of bombing. Could one imagine that Torah scholars would not do this, claiming that ‘sages do not need guarding’? Did any of those engaged in Torah shirk this instruction? And why did Torah scholars, together with all our brethren Israel, leave the frontline neighborhoods being hit by snipers’ fire and not rely on that segulah of ‘sages do not need guarding’?”

There is here a conceptual error regarding halakha as a whole (which indeed touches the broader Haredi outlook). Imagine: how many of us advocate fleeing to the deserts to avoid the sin of gossip and other prohibitions? We received a tradition that the Torah was not given to heaven’s angels nor to those who eat manna. The Torah is to be realized in our world with all its obstacles and challenges; if there are challenges, that is not a reason to avoid assuming life’s vital functions. There are values in halakha for which we must even die or, at least, pay a very dear price. Saving Israel from an enemy at hand is one of them. Army service involves danger to life, which is more severe than any fear of spiritual decline, and even so this is no excuse to avoid enlistment. It is inconceivable that an entire society would send others to risk their lives for it because of certain principles—however important they may be. Each of us has a very basic and important principle: he does not want to die. Does that justify not enlisting? Is eating only the Rabbanut’s kashrut or seeing a woman in pants (assuming the Haredi frameworks in the army will not be perfect) a justification for all of us to die? Surely everyone agrees that a person may not steal others’ money to heal himself or to cope with threats and challenges to his way of life and outlook. How, then, may one send others to die on his behalf because of these fears?

The threats and risks a Haredi youth faces are the Haredi society’s problem, exactly as the threats that a non-Haredi religious youth faces are the non-Haredi society’s problem. Therefore, each group or individual must address those threats as best they can; but that does not justify avoiding the burden and failing to fulfill so basic a halakhic and civic duty, and certainly it does not justify our all dying because of a lack of soldiers. As noted above, arranging frameworks that minimize harm is important and worthy of attention; but that should be, first and foremost, the Haredi society’s interest as it must fulfill its duty to society and the state, and it must ensure that it is done—not expect others to do it for it.

I wonder how many Haredim would refrain from taking a lulav or from eating kosher because of fear of spiritual decline. We saw that army service is a halakhic and moral duty no less than eating kosher. How many Haredim would avoid seeing a doctor for a serious illness or calling the police when they are violently attacked, if there were a fear of spiritual decline? Army service is the actual saving of all our lives. For some reason, the duty of army service receives among Haredim a different, more dismissive treatment—because there are those who do the work on their behalf. But now even that is false. As explained above, others can no longer bear the burden and do all the work; now we are all in tangible danger. There is no one to do the work.

3. The value of Torah study

The third argument is the value of Torah study. The claim is that halakhic growth requires full dedication, and thus enlistment would greatly hinder it. As support, they cite draft exemptions granted to outstanding athletes and artists, and the claim arises: “Shall the priest be like the innkeeper?” Surely Torah study is no less important than these pursuits; therefore, Torah learners should also be exempt. Note that this argument is also relevant to non-Haredi Torah learners. It is also important to note that, of course, this can justify an exemption for a much smaller number of learners—not a blanket exemption for Haredim or even for all Torah learners.

The arguments above—that the army needs Haredi soldiers—are not relevant to small numbers of exemptions. Therefore, this is a wholly legitimate and worthy consideration. I believe there is quite broad agreement among the Israeli public that it is appropriate to exempt a certain number of carefully selected learners, according to criteria of diligence and talent, who dedicate themselves to long-term growth in Torah (this is not an exemption until age twenty-six after which the learner can go into business, as is common today). Incidentally, this chosen group should also be properly compensated (not with the current meager stipends due to the large number of learners), to enable them to dedicate themselves and grow in Torah and to constitute a future spiritual and halakhic leadership. Of course, this includes worthy learners from all communities—not only Haredim. Needless to say, this exemption should be seen as one society grants out of appreciation for those learners—not as a right to which anyone is entitled and can demand. As we saw above, by law, no person has an exemption from a war to save Israel from an enemy at hand.

If we adopt a new social compact that exempts a small cohort of learners who suit it, they can be considered, for this purpose, as the tribe of Levi. True, as we saw above, Maimonides speaks only of those who are like Ben Azzai and Rashbi—who, due to their clinging to Torah, were exempt from commandments, including the commandment of war and of saving Israel from an enemy at hand. But such an exemption can be granted also to those who do not reach these lofty criteria, since it is not a right that is theirs by law but a privilege that society grants them also for its own sake and not only for them; and society has the right to do so even in our spiritually impoverished generation, where we have no “sons of Levi” who have cast off all worldly calculations.

4. Torah as a substitute for defense

The last argument is that learners protect us all; therefore, they indeed contribute their share even without enlisting. This argument is broader than the previous and could perhaps serve as the basis to exempt all learners (again—not only Haredim). I already noted that this argument is more convenient for Haredi apologetics, for it does not request privileges but places those who do not learn on the defensive. Some go so far as to claim that the learners are the true protectors of Israel, and the fighters are only the necessary hishtadlut (human effort).

As we wrote at the outset, this section divides into two different claims: (A) Rabbanan la ba’u netiruta—sages do not need guarding; i.e., the army’s protection is only necessary for ordinary citizens, not for Torah learners, who are guarded by their Torah. Consequently, they are not obligated to contribute to defense, for they are not its “clients” (as if they were citizens of another state for this purpose). (B) “Torah protects and saves.” This can be understood similarly—that Torah protects and saves the one who studies it—and then we have returned to the previous section. But the way it is used in the draft debate is that Torah also protects and saves the public. That is, the claim is not only that learners are exempt because they do not need guarding; they also fulfill their part in the guarding by their studying and thereby protect us all.

In this discussion, we must first distinguish between aggadic and halakhic sources. “Torah protects and saves” is an aggadic statement, and any practical (certainly halakhic) conclusion derived from it is highly tentative. By contrast, “sages do not need guarding” is cited in halakhic contexts and has halakhic ramifications.

“Torah protects and saves”

In Sotah 21a, the gemara discusses the protective effect of commandments and of Torah study, and says both protect, but Torah more so:

“It was taught: This was expounded by Rabbi Menachem b. Yose: ‘For the commandment is a lamp and Torah is light’—the verse associates the commandment with a lamp and the Torah with light. The commandment with a lamp—to teach that just as a lamp protects only temporarily, so a commandment protects only temporarily. The Torah with light—to teach that just as light protects forever, so Torah protects forever. And it says: ‘When you walk, it will guide you…’—‘When you walk, it will guide you’—this is in this world; ‘when you lie down, it will watch over you’—this is death; ‘and when you awaken, it will speak with you’—this is the World to Come. A parable: A man was walking in the dark of night and he feared thorns, pits, and briars, wild beasts and bandits, and he did not know which way he was walking. A torch of light was brought to him; he was saved from thorns, pits, and briars, but he still feared wild beasts and bandits, and he did not know which way he was walking. When dawn arose, he was saved from wild beasts and bandits, but he still did not know which way he was walking. When he reached the crossroads, he was saved from all. Alternatively: a transgression extinguishes a commandment, but a transgression does not extinguish Torah, as it says: ‘Many waters cannot extinguish love.’ Rav Yosef said: A commandment, while one is engaged in it, protects and saves; when he is not engaged in it—it protects but does not save. Torah, whether one is engaged in it or not, protects and saves. Rava objected: But Doeg and Ahitophel—did they not study Torah? Why did it not protect them? Rather, Rava said: Torah, when one is engaged in it, protects and saves; when he is not engaged in it—it protects but does not save. A commandment, whether one is engaged in it or not—it protects but does not save.”

First, Rava concludes that even Torah, when one is not engaged in it, perhaps protects but does not save from an existing trouble (again the distinction between a present threat and preventing a future one). Throughout the sugya it simply appears that the reference is to protection of the learner himself, not of the public. One could perhaps adduce other sources that speak of the merit of learning and its benefit to those who support learners, and perhaps to society at large. But to rely on Torah as protection against an existing and tangible threat that has no solution in the natural order without fighting—this is truly a far-reaching conclusion. Moreover, in the decisors we cited, such as the Ḥazon Ish and the Brisker Rav, there is no mention of “Torah protects and saves.” They discuss whether soldiers are needed in the army for victory in the natural order, and they hinge the duty to enlist on that. Even if we rely on Maimonides’ comparison of Torah scholars to the tribe of Levi, that teaches an exemption for God’s servants; we addressed that above.

Either way, the meaning of that “protection” is no simple question. Are there not Torah learners who suffer all sorts of harms? This they themselves. What about others? Can others rely on the protection of the learners? The gemara itself wonders about Doeg and Ahitophel and offers answers. Our eyes see that Torah study did not protect the victims of the Simḥat Torah massacre or the soldiers who fall daily in Gaza. Rabbi Zevin asks: where was that protection for the victims of the 1929 Hebron massacre? And many others likewise. In any case, as is the way with aggadah, it is hard to derive clear halakhic conclusions: Even if Torah indeed protects the public, how much Torah must be studied for it to protect? How many learners are needed to protect against an enemy who rises to destroy us? To what extent does it protect, and whom? If I am ill, should I not go to the doctor because Torah protects me? If someone attacks me to kill me, shall I suffice with Torah study and not make efforts to be saved? Again, all this concerns the person himself. But even regarding protecting others, one must wonder: does anyone propose that I stop taking medicine or going to work because his Torah “protects and saves” me? Does he himself refrain from doing so?

Torah is, of course, extremely important to all of us. Moreover, our survival is not only a value in itself but also primarily to advance Torah. Part of the goal of war and survival is the ability to continue Torah study and transmit it to future generations. Therefore, it seems unreasonable to cancel Torah entirely for the sake of survival. But that is not the case here: this is not about wholesale cancellation of Torah, but about sharing the burden with society. All can study in the years when they are not in service—before and after—and each in his turn will contribute his share to Torah study. In the hesder yeshivot there is always Torah being studied by those in yeshiva while other cohorts are, in their turn, in military service.

It is unreasonable that those who demand exemption from military service on the grounds that their Torah protects us would make similar proposals in personal matters. On the general level, it is easier and less refutable, because there are those who do the work and die on their behalf; thus it is easy to say that we were saved by Torah. Where the learner would have to rely only on Torah without others’ hishtadlut for him—when his own life is directly endangered—he will not do so. This is precisely what is meant by “one must not rely on a miracle”; when action is needed, one must act and not rely on Torah’s protection, even if such exists. And certainly this applies when the danger is blatant and present—such is our situation now.

So writes the Rashba (Responsa I §1013):

“Even the pious among the pious have no permission to act in their affairs by way of trust [alone], but only in the manner of the world—that he should not say: I will light my lamp with water or wine and rely on a miracle… This is not a lack of trust; on the contrary, it is forbidden to rely on a miracle.”

“Sages do not need guarding”

The source is in the tax sugyot in the first chapter of Bava Batra. The structure of tax laws is complex; the main question is how to distribute participation in public needs among citizens. I note briefly that today we do not apply the tax laws that appear in those sugyot even in other contexts—not only in the state but also in wholly religious and Haredi communities. Therefore, any practical conclusion drawn from those sugyot is tentative. The sugya is quite involved; here we address it only as much as needed.

One principle the Talmud presents is that for certain matters, participation in public needs is according to the degree of benefit one receives. Thus, for example, a wealthy man benefits more from a city wall that protects against bandits; hence he should participate more in its costs than a poor man. Likewise, a family with many children benefits more from educational institutions, etc. According to this principle, a Torah scholar who is himself protected by the Torah he has learned and is learning is exempt from participating in security costs, since he does not need protection. Note that this exemption does not derive from his protecting all of us, but from his own being protected. The claim that he protects us all is a different claim, not raised in those sugyot (which itself is telling), and we addressed it in the previous section. The claim is that just as Torah scholars are exempt from guarding expenses because they do not need them, they are exempt by the same rationale from military service itself.

To be brief, we use Rabbi Yair Aton’s article, “Torah Considerations in Dividing the Tax Burden,” Mishorim 1, Yeruḥam 2004. In chapter 5 he discusses the exemption of Torah scholars from guarding expenses. He presents three arguments:

1. The exemption from guarding is because they do not need it. According to this, this is not an exemption for Torah scholars per se but an application of the general principle of participation according to need. Indeed, there the gemara explains that there are Torah scholars who do participate in expenses in cases where they too need guarding. The question is whether the learners we discuss truly do not need guarding. Do they not call the police when a burglar enters their house? Do they not worry about livelihood when in distress? How, then, can one employ this principle only with regard to military service?!
2. Moreover, even if we accept the assumption that one who does not need a service need not participate in its maintenance—what does that say about expenses for Haredi culture and education, mikva’ot, and more? Must one who is not Haredi fund those institutions? We have not heard of such a waiver on the Haredi side. The assumption underlying the Haredi claim “sages do not need guarding” is that each community should fund itself and its needs; but this is not the assumption of a modern state, nor of the Haredim themselves in other contexts.

Incidentally, the sugya also presents an exemption for Torah scholars from all royal taxes. Rabbi Aton argues that this is only for gentile kings; but even without this, we have not heard a demand by learners to exempt them from taxes. Why is military service different?

3. The exemption from taxes is also tied there to the notion that calamity comes to the world because of the unlearned. That is, learners are not the source of the trouble and thus not obligated to address it. I already noted above (in the theology section) how strange this claim is. Beyond the theological novelty about who brings calamities upon us, and the diagnostic novelty that grants us the tools to determine who is a Torah scholar and who is an ignoramus and because of whom troubles come upon us—and beyond the halakhic conclusions derived from such a diagnosis—there is here the assumption that participation in expenses is determined by blame (who caused the expense), not by the degree of threat (i.e., who needs rescue). Note that this is not blame that justifies tort liability; thus, in itself, it is a substantial novelty. Beyond this, we could now enter questions of fault for various expenses in our state and set participation accordingly. Here too you will see that the Haredi public likely will not want to go this way.

Needless to say, all these claims concern exemption from taxes for guarding expenses (presumably primarily protection from theft, not necessarily danger to life). That is, we speak of monetary expenses for defense against a prospective danger from enemies who might come upon us (see also Rashi, Bava Metzia 108a). But as we saw, in our case we face an existing threat; and now the discussion is not about participating in financial security costs but about participating in the war itself, already underway. Hence, nothing can be learned for this from tax laws. As we saw, in a war to save Israel from an enemy at hand, there is no exemption—for learner nor Haredi nor anyone— even if we accept that from paying taxes they might be exempt.

I add generally: throughout those sugyot it is implied that Torah protects its learners—not the public. The discussion is exemption due to lack of need or lack of fault. I have not heard anyone among us claim that if we have Torah learners, there is no need at all to expend on security because nothing will happen to any of us. The very principle that “Torah protects and saves” is not raised in those sugyot—indicating it is not a factor there. The claim that learners protect the public cannot rely on those sugyot—and perhaps is even contradicted by them. But, as seen here, even regarding protecting the learners themselves, the claim is used very selectively.

Already the Radbaz mocked Torah scholars who request exemption from guarding taxes relying on the Talmudic maxim that they “do not need guarding,” yet reveal their hypocrisy by refusing in any way to be left without guards (Responsa Radbaz II §1392):

“The sages cry out: Appoint guards! They themselves admit that they need guarding. Is there, by law or reason, that they should compel the householders to appoint guards and not assist them? To compel them in such a matter—no one ever said such a thing. And if someone did, we do not obey him, for the attribute of justice has been stricken… Even though there is another reason, namely that I am in doubt whether there is anyone today who does not need guarding, I will not enter that inquiry now, for my words would grieve some scholars; therefore, silence is better than speech.”

Note: the midrash on “a thousand from each tribe”

Many cite as a source for exempting learners the midrash on Numbers 31:4—learning from “a thousand from each tribe” that Moses separated from each tribe a number of men who would pray for the fighters. But in light of all we have seen, this source is untenable for us, for many reasons.

First, this is an aggadic midrash that contradicts halakha; we do not derive halakha from it. In halakha we saw the rule clearly and without dispute. By this logic, we should send the head of the Sanhedrin alone to the war instead of the entire army (like Yair ben Menashe, who was equivalent to most of the Sanhedrin). This too is written in a midrash. Second, the verses themselves say that Moses took only a thousand soldiers from each tribe—apparently because that is what was needed there. Does anyone imagine that if soldiers are needed for victory, we will exempt someone because Moses separated a thousand to pray? We saw that, in a war to save Israel from an enemy at hand, we act under the laws of saving life; thus anyone needed goes out. Third, the midrash says that a thousand were also taken from the tribe of Levi (which does not align with the interpretation above of Maimonides’ words in Shemitah and Yovel). Fourth, this was not a war to save Israel from an enemy at hand; it was vengeance against Midian—not defense. Fifth, I already noted that the same midrash says that beyond the Levites, the Sanhedrin also went out to war. Sixth, it was Moses’ decision on his own—not a binding halakha. If the state decides to separate men to pray for the fighters, all is well. But learners have no vested right to be exempt. Seventh, the state indeed is willing to exempt some learners (and below we will support this), but the Haredim want to exempt everyone. Eighth, our learners do not engage in prayer for the fighters but in regular Torah study.

Conclusion and summary

The end of the matter, all is heard: There is a complete obligation upon every person of Israel, without exception, to participate in a war to save Israel from an enemy at hand. The four exemption-claims raised against this obligation are baseless in themselves; and as I noted above, it would suffice to show that they are not compelling to reject them, for the burden of proof lies on the one claiming exemption.

Since these claims are raised at times even by clear Torah scholars, it is indeed a wonder that they present arguments lacking any logical, moral, and halakhic foundation. It seems that fear of Haredi society’s disintegration underlies these claims; but we have received that there is neither counsel nor wisdom against the Lord. Halakha says here, unequivocally, that there is a duty to enlist, and all concerns—many of which should not be dismissed—must be set aside when there is an existential threat and when nationwide mobilization is required. This is a passing commandment, and even a learner is not exempt from it; likewise, one who fears spiritual decline is not exempt from it.

We note that in 2030 the Haredim are estimated to constitute about 25% of Israelis under twenty; among the Jewish public that enlists, this is far higher (about a third). Therefore, this is not about exemptions for a few dozens or hundreds of outstanding athletes or artists, but a dramatic blow to the size of the army and thus to the security of all of us. In a time of existential threat like ours, when professionals constantly say that every soldier is needed for the war effort, there is no justification to exempt such numbers for any reason whatsoever. The burden imposed upon the rest of the population is unbearable—especially when that burden is imposed by a government largely made up of Haredi parties. How terrible is the desecration of God’s Name caused by this.

Even if not all soldiers were needed, there would still be no justification to exempt a single sector. The burden must be shared by all. The claim that the enlistment rate across Israel’s population is low is irrelevant to exempting any person or group from this duty. First, because if one accounts for Arabs and Haredim, the rate is not so low (about 65% of the Jewish public; if one accounts for Haredim, it rises much higher). Moreover, regarding Haredim, this is a blanket exemption for a specific sector—not individual draft dodgers who should be dealt with separately. Here we address the basic duty to enlist, not the modes and quality of enforcement—which of course also need improvement. The same applies to the efficiency of the IDF’s conduct and manpower utilization, which also needs improvement. But none of this justifies granting exemptions to anyone. On the contrary, let Haredim enlist and take part in improving the army and its conduct. This is not an oppositional stance by the Haredi public against the state. Haredim are not doing anyone a favor. They are part of the state, and all existing problems lie at their doorstep as well.

Despite everything, we argued that it is indeed appropriate to grant a selective exemption to a small group of outstanding learners and even to ensure for them financial freedom for their growth in Torah. We also note the conclusion that it is appropriate to arrange proper military service frameworks suited to the Haredi public and its values, to minimize their fears of enlistment—but this task lies mainly upon the Haredim themselves (especially now, when they comprise a significant part of the government and coalition). When they will bestir themselves, it is clear that aid from all of us will certainly come.

[1] There is room to qualify the term “dina de-malchuta” with respect to Israel’s government, for in its original sense it concerns a gentile kingdom in the Diaspora. The foundation of a king’s authority in Israel may be different (see, e.g., Gershon German, Melekh Yisrael), though one must discuss what applies to a regime like ours that is not committed to halakha and Torah. In any case, here I used the common term “dina de-malchuta,” if only for simplicity; for our purposes, it suffices.

[2] I was alerted by Elḥanan Shilo to several sources indicating that there were groups and approaches that indeed surrendered themselves to death on Shabbat (see, e.g., 1 Maccabees 2; the end of the Book of Jubilees; Yaakov Gontschel, Another Land 35, on Ethiopian practices; Frontinus the Roman, Stratagems 2.1.17; Sefer HaShabbat, 1958, p. 196, from the Shabbat laws of a Damascus community in the Middle Ages). These are various sects, some of whom did so even after the Hasmonean court’s exegesis. But it is clear to me that this was never the general approach in any period—if only because otherwise we would not be here today. Even the gemara in Yoma, which discusses the law that saving life overrides Shabbat, opens with the question “From where do we know that saving a life overrides Shabbat?”—not “Does saving a life override Shabbat?” The gemara merely seeks a source; the law itself was clear from the outset (and at the end of the sugya there we see that even the law for a doubtful case of saving life was clear before the discussion).

[3] One could counter that his intent is only to say that not all the details of commanded wars apply in our time, and he need not state it explicitly. Still, perhaps there is commanded war in our time. But from his plain language it appears that, in our time, there is no commanded war at all. One could also say he refers to the era of exile, when there is no king over Israel in any sense. This too is strained, for saving Israel from an enemy at hand certainly applies in exile as well. But from his wording this does not seem to be his intent.