Halakha and Morality: The Theoretical Picture (Column 541)

If there really is a disconnect between the planes, then we need to go back and explain how in practice there is almost complete inclusion, as you noted. Clearly all the main moral laws are included in the Torah, and the exceptions are edge cases and rabbinic enactments. According to the disconnect approach, it is quite astonishing that there is such a large overlap, and that the Torah as it stands already covers to a very great extent the conditions required for reasonable conduct and an adequate social order. That seems like a strong argument against the disconnect approach (in the eyes of one who accepts the commandments of the Torah and in the eyes of the Sages).
Regarding positive and negative commandments: when you separated categorically between the almost overlapping planes of positive commandment/negative commandment and arise-and-act/sit-and-refrain, then you did offer a certain idea for how in practice there is such a great overlap (namely, that in the physical world, achieving gains generally requires getting up and doing something). In the distinction between substantive and formal authority, the meaning of the practical overlap is self-evident. But in the distinction between halakha and morality, the dissonance remains.

Thank you for another excellent article.

I think all the perplexity and confusion stems from mistakes in basic concepts.

You have argued—though not here but in other columns as well—that our obligation to morality also derives from the basic assumption that God's will is that we be moral, and therefore when there is a contradiction, it is a contradiction between two commands of God—sometimes decided this way and sometimes that way according to judgment.
Many people recoil when they hear this concept of taking morality into account, because in their minds it sounds as though a person is saying: even if God forbade such-and-such or wants such-and-such, on the other hand there is also our human will, and we need to compromise. If one interprets things that way, it sounds as though there is idolatry by way of association here, as you yourself pointed out. And indeed the perplexity stems from a conceptual error. But it twists and continues because of a certain fundamental disagreement. After all, even the most fundamentalist scholar will admit that among the Rishonim and Acharonim too there are cases where human ethics override a halakhic prohibition (saving life on Shabbat; supporting the poor of the gentiles together with the poor of Israel so that enmity not break out—all this involves two principles of preserving Jewish lives that override halakhic prohibitions such as “you shall not show them favor” and the laws of Shabbat observance; searching for grounds to permit mamzerim, and the like). But what do they say? They argue that ethics can override a halakhic command when the greatest Torah or moral principle is one that God explicitly announced in the Torah itself. And they wonder about those to their left, where the big question is: why should we take moral doubts and moral hesitations into account when Rambam, Rashi, and Raavad were not troubled by them?! That would mean we are adopting foreign norms, not brought in the Torah, and from here it is rebellion against the kingdom of Heaven. This principled approach from the right, and on the other hand the apologetics from the left, prevent an objective discussion of moral norms that have arisen in recent times. In my humble opinion, the right way to discuss them is to classify them into two categories: if God did not express opposition, and nowhere throughout the Torah, Oral Torah, and halakha is there even a hint of opposition to some new ethical idea, it is very reasonable to define it as neutral from an ethical-religious standpoint, and to determine that if it is correct intellectually, then as human beings it is worth adopting. On the other hand, if there is opposition to a certain ethical idea in the Torah itself (equality, for example, is contradicted by the sources much more than it is supported), but there is reason to think that in some cases this is due to specific circumstances and not as an eternal principle, then each case must be examined on its own merits.
There is also a point once raised by Prof. Nadav Shenkar: one cannot truly, one hundred percent, connect to the concepts of the Sages and enter the minds of Amoraim and Tannaim. Interpretation necessarily happens, against our will, through the mindset we have become accustomed to thinking with. (That is, the very intellectual angle of vision—and not necessarily the intuitive or instinctive one as such—is also “tainted by the spirit of the times.”)

Two final comments:
A. In the view of many, there really is a difference between Jewish morality and gentile morality, and they do not mean a linguistic mistake, but the literal sense. Rav Shach, I heard, once wrote that the Enlightenment movement and liberation from religion are a wonderful thing for the gentiles, who need that, but on the other hand poison for the people of Israel. True, here we are speaking more about something religious than ethical, but still. And in the book Torat HaMelekh there is an explicit statement like this: we conclude that a gentile may not harm a gentile, and may not harm a Jew. Nothing can be concluded from this regarding the attitude of Israel toward gentiles, because the former are equal and the latter are not. And generally speaking, surely you too have heard people—whether more educated or less educated—who wish for a painful death upon Iranians, Ukrainians, and other historical enemies of Israel; who repeat the statement that it is morally impossible for a Jewish heart to express sorrow for them or help them even indirectly, and on the other hand are shocked to the depths of their souls when those same barbaric and cruel gentile rulers lose all human semblance and massacre their own civilians… (How can they sink to such a low point?!)
B. In my opinion, when Rav Kook, for example, speaks of a higher Jewish morality, he simply does not distinguish between the categories. He assumes that God's command is good, period. And therefore when there is some misunderstanding about that command, one simply has to know that in the end everything God does is for the good of the people of Israel, humanity, and justice—which is presumably true. And therefore, from a broader perspective, killing an Amalekite child, for example, is ethically just like helping an old woman cross the street.

Two observations for Michi:

A. Regarding the beautiful captive woman—
The reason there is no discussion in the Sages about the moral issue is that apparently in the past it was considered, by everyone, “relatively moral” compared to raping the enemy's female captives outright.
Just as in our day it seems to everyone “relatively moral,” for example, to perform very painful experiments on animals (say, for the sake of a vaccine), or to plunder the enemy's spoils during war.
In our day, what is called “human nature has changed,” and something like the rape of a female war captive is indeed horrifying.
Therefore, apparently the Torah also permitted it (in very, very specific situations), because they knew it would be hard for the human psyche to be weaned from it entirely.

B. Regarding the issue that there is a moral problem in separating a priest's wife who was raped from her husband: I don't understand your answer to someone who responds that there is a deeper moral layer.
You simply write, “it doesn't seem so,” or “it's an empty statement,” without explaining anything beyond that.
But precisely you, who believe that there are additional layers of reality, should find it easy to accept that there are other layers which naturally are not grasped by our intellect.
From my perspective, your statement that this is an empty argument (the claim that there is a deeper moral layer) is exactly like saying about the soul (that there is a deeper spiritual layer) that this is “an empty statement” or that “it doesn't seem right to you.”
Why is a deeper spiritual layer fine, but a deeper moral layer is an empty statement?

The Sages said: “Had the Torah not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat and theft from the ant,” etc. But I heard in the name of the Rabbi of Brisk that he was precise and said that this was only “had the Torah not been given.” But now that the Torah has been given, we learn all character traits only from the Torah.
What do you think about that?

And what if halakha does not command us to murder Amalekite children or to rape the beautiful captive woman (as per the view of the Re’em)?
I do not oppose your move. On the contrary, I very much agree with it, but there is no need to multiply disputes.

Yesterday a guest from Africa landed at my house, a remnant of a magnificent cannibal tribe [he came here because some religious-Zionist rabbis are convinced that he is from the Ten Lost Tribes]. He read the article with great enjoyment, but at the end he asked me what morality is. Would the honor of the great rabbi kindly answer him [and me as well]?
And in a less serious tone…
You wrote that “it is clear to each of us what is moral and what is not.” Do you really believe that joke? Do you think that a hundred years ago it was clear to everyone that morality requires women's suffrage, that two hundred years ago it was clear to everyone that slavery is immoral, that five hundred years ago it was clear to everyone that it is immoral to kill heretics?

I was waiting to see when the question about the cannibals would finally arrive, and I also knew it would be phrased in a mocking, condescending tone, with complete confidence, as though some unexpected rabbit had just been pulled out of a hat. A real knockout. And so here it is—it came pretty quickly, to my disappointment. I thought that here on the site the readers were more intelligent. But still, since I assume there will nevertheless be a few more readers here who wonder about this (as I said, I anticipated in advance that this question would come), I will answer it anyway.
There is a very broad agreement regarding moral principles, such as murder, theft, helping others, and the like. This agreement cuts across places and periods. Even when there are disagreements, they are mainly about applications and not about the principles themselves. Every Nazi or cannibal will tell you that murder is forbidden. But they will make exceptions for creatures who, in their eyes, are not considered human beings (Jews and Gypsies), or those who threaten your existence (Jews), or enemies from neighboring tribes when they are hungry (the cannibals). Therefore, relying on differences between places and periods to prove moral relativism is ridiculous and demagogic, even if common and predictable. The very fact that moral arguments take place is the best proof that at the base there is very broad agreement. Otherwise there would be no point in arguing, because there would be no moral system at all and no basis for discussion.
But all this is irrelevant to the discussion. Whoever is troubled by problems of halakha and morality assumes that there are moral principles to which halakha ought to conform. This column is addressed to him. If someone like our master the great Rabbi Aryeh, may he live long, thinks that separating a woman who was raped from her husband, failing to save lives, or murdering babies are moral acts, then he is apparently not among the intended audience of this column.
By the way, if the first paragraph you wrote counts, in your view, as writing in a serious tone, I would not want to read a non-serious paragraph.
Good tidings.

By the way, according to your logic about women's voting rights and slavery, there is also no correct physics, since if you had asked someone two hundred years ago about relativity and quantum theory, he would have chuckled to himself dismissively.

I think we already talked about this. First, the overlap may be incidental. It is not all that great. Perhaps the inclusion is great, but not the overlap. Beyond that, when I say that the prohibition of “You shall not murder” is religious, that does not necessarily mean something that in practice differs from morality. It is entirely reasonable that a moral or anti-moral action in itself has religious consequences, and that is why there is overlap. That is exactly what creates for people the mistaken identification of religious values with morality.

Even if there is a contradiction between the morality of the Sages and ours, there is no necessity to accept their morality. Their authority is only in the realm of halakha. Of course, if they established a halakhic obligation, that is binding, and then one must see whether perhaps it can be circumvented if it is immoral.
Even from the Torah itself it is hard to learn values. Even equality—it is not true that it is contradicted. There are certain exceptions. But there are several hints in the Torah to the value of equality (“you shall not show deference to a poor man in his dispute,” and others). I have written more than once that one cannot learn very much from the Torah on this plane.
A. I did not understand that comment. Clearly there are those who think there is a different morality, but in my opinion they are mistaken and confused. Moreover, even someone who thinks there is a difference between Jew and gentile does not necessarily say that morality changes. In their view too, a gentile is forbidden to harm a Jew no less than another gentile.
B. Indeed, and this lack of distinction is a mistake. See the reasons he offers in To the Perplexed of the Generation, where he tries to explain moral reasons for the commandments of the Torah, and he does so in terms of what we call morality. But I think consistency in Rav Kook arises only among his interpreters, not in him.

A. It is certainly possible. I too suspected this. But of course morality remains what it is. I have written more than once that the morality of the Sages is not binding. Their authority is in the realm of halakha, not in the realm of morality.
B. I did explain it. The concept of morality is very familiar to us. To say that there are deeper layers of morality means that they are not the morality that we know. So that is what I call halakha, just with a different name. Mere word games. By contrast, when I speak of repairing deeper layers of reality, that is a logical result of the facts and does not contradict anything that I know. There is a difference between contradiction and lack of understanding/knowledge, or between a difficulty and a question. When I do not understand something, there is no problem in that. Clearly I do not understand and know everything. But when I do understand something and they tell me something contradictory, I do not accept it without clear proof.

It seems to me I just wrote a column about this, didn't I?

Exactly right. I gave examples for illustration. Indeed the commentators/decisors do everything they can to reduce the dissonance between halakha and morality, and that is perfectly fine. I wrote that. At least as long as it is persuasive on some level (holds water). I hope to touch on this in the next column.

I did not understand why you feel compelled to say that the Torah operates on a completely different plane from morality. You showed that there are commandments that “contradict” morality, and therefore there is a dimension in the commandments that is not “moral,” and you called it “religious.” But your proof from the fact that there are halakhic details within moral commandments that do not seem so right to you is a very weak proof (in my opinion) that there is no connection between Torah and morality.
Why can one not say that even the commandments that seem immoral are immoral in a specific, local way (a particular priest's wife will be harmed, one baby will die, etc.) but are still right and therefore also moral in the overall picture? Therefore, even if the commandment is not moral in itself, that does not mean it is “not moral,” because a more general need overrides it, as you yourself pointed out.
It is hard to think of a non-controversial issue, but suppose killing innocent people in order to prevent greater harm later on: that is doing something “immoral” for tactical considerations, and therefore I actually regard the act as moral. So what is the problem with saying that the commandments of the Torah include moral considerations within them (“halakha contains morality”), but when there are overriding considerations that does not mean the command is not moral, because it is moral in the overall picture?

I built the argument in stages, and therefore it is not right to focus on one detail within it. First of all, I proved (from the second category) that the Torah has values that are not moral but religious. Second, if so, there is no obstacle to there being a clash between these and those. On the contrary, it would be very surprising if there were not, since even among moral values there are clashes. From there I went on to argue that there is no need to find a resolution for the non-moral laws (the third category). And I concluded that even in the moral laws (the first category), the differences from morality can be explained in the same way, and therefore there is no need to resort to non-existent apologies.
For some reason, with regard to the third category you prefer the thesis that they want to achieve a moral value in a general sense even if the details contradict it (because they come to achieve a religious value), but there is no need for that at all (in light of the earlier stages of the argument), and it also does not stand the test of logic. What moral value is achieved by separating a priest's wife from her husband or by not saving a gentile on Shabbat? This is clearly a religious value.
To make general statements about an overall picture is obscurantism. If you have an alternative proposal, be concrete.

On the contrary, I very much agree with you that it may come to achieve a religious value and not a moral one. I just do not understand why there has to be an absolute distinction between them. It seems to me as though you are forcing a separation. Why not say that in every commandment all the moral and religious considerations were taken into account, and the conclusion sometimes comes out moral and sometimes religious, according to what God saw as more important in that commandment?

Think of it like my remarks about global correspondence. For example, correspondence between the plain meaning and midrash, or between the laws of nature and the laws of theology. God created the world to operate according to fixed natural laws. But He also has some theological goals (for example, that the righteous should not suffer), and the laws of nature are meant to achieve them. So why does that not always happen? Because global correspondences are prone to topological defects (local mismatches). It is impossible to achieve perfect global correspondence. I gave as an example the correspondence between a Cartesian and a polar coordinate system, where the correspondence breaks down at the origin (there are infinitely many polar points corresponding to the origin of the Cartesian coordinates). That is what creates a topological defect.
The same applies to the correspondence between moral values and religious values. God created His world with the aim that religious goals be achieved in a way that accords with the rules of morality. But this is a global correspondence (because not every moral law corresponds to a religious value or vice versa), and therefore mismatches necessarily arise. This is the deviation that we find in the moral laws, and it is also the source of the anti-moral and a-moral laws beyond the general correlation you described regarding morality. Small mismatches are enough to show that these are two different categories. The overlap stems from the divine will that there be a correlation between the categories, but not from their being the same category.

That is completely equivalent to what I wrote. Just a change of wording.

Is the claim that “it is entirely reasonable that a moral or anti-moral action in itself has religious consequences” not basically the claim that halakha contains morality? Then the questions return to their place from the cases where morality is stricter than halakha, like one who kills indirectly and is exempt, or exemption from returning a lost object after despair.

[The claim that the inclusion is incidental—that by mere chance all the important moral laws and world-repair principles (like do not murder, do not steal, do not commit adultery, do not bear false witness, honoring parents, food-clothing-conjugal rights, tort law, rape, fraud, bribery, charity, judges) found their way into halakha—seems to me completely implausible (far more problematic than all the problems in the other approach, namely the thesis that in the eyes of God and the Sages halakha contains morality). The earlier discussion you mentioned is here https://mikyab.net/posts/73558#comment-55131, but there no non-incidental explanation was offered for the connection between halakha and morality. One possibility that comes to mind is to say that halakha contains the laws of social order but does not contain the laws of morality—but if halakha bothered to go beyond the boundaries of purely halakhic values and decided to deal with additional subjects, then it is even stranger that it did not also decide to deal with morality.]

My comment below (beginning “Is the claim”) was sent before I saw this response of yours.
I understand that according to your view, the abstract principles of morality and halakha preceded the world, but God, within His freedom to choose the structure of the physical world, chose a world in which the principles would almost coincide in practice, and this is the best of possible worlds in terms of the fit between morality and halakha? (I have no direct arguments against this speculation, though I am not sure I have fully digested it yet.)
[I find it hard to accept the methodology you summed up with “small mismatches are enough to show that these are two different categories.” An explanation needs to explain the whole picture, both the correspondence and the mismatch. I understand that the idea is that explaining a mismatch between two identical categories is impossible, whereas explaining correspondence between two different categories is open to proposals; that I understand. But the correspondence really does need to be explained. And if there is no explanation for the correspondence, then all we can conclude is that something is defective—perhaps there is an error in halakha, perhaps we are mistaken in morality, perhaps the Sages erred, perhaps this and perhaps that.]

A. “This does not mean that the Torah or God are indifferent to moral values. Surely morality is important in their eyes (‘And you shall do what is right and good,’ etc.), but the religious value overrides the harm to the moral value.” But God, as an omnipotent, good, and perfect God—why would He not arrange things so that we could attain the religious value without harming the moral value?

B. Once action x is moral because God gave it validity, it follows that now that He wants action y (in order to attain the religious value in it), which contradicts action x, x no longer has validity—so can one still say that it remains moral?

Hello!
The full verse is “And you shall do what is right and good in the eyes of the Lord…” Why do you choose to turn the meaning of the words “right and good” into synonyms for morality as you understand it? In my opinion, the verse can be understood as “good in the eyes of the Lord,” meaning fulfillment of His commandments, and therefore one cannot assume there is here a command to be moral.

Since most of your reply concerns style, I will answer that first, and when I have time I will address the substance.
A. There is such a thing as emotional intelligence; for example, the ability to distinguish between humor and mockery is emotional intelligence.
B. Where did you see confidence and condescension in my words? I truly meant to say that the discussion lacks the initial definition of what morality is.
C. I accept the a priori assumption that one who disagrees with you or belittles your words is not intelligent [yes, that is mockery].
D. The fact that I ask what morality is does not mean that I do not recognize its existence or am not troubled by halakha's failure to match it, just as if I ask what physics is, that does not mean I do not recognize the existence of physics [that is already intellectual intelligence, and yes, that is mockery].
E. Regarding the “serious tone,” I already mentioned that there is a concept called humor. Besides, the wrapping was humorous, but the question itself was serious, namely: what is morality, which is the conceptual framework for the whole discussion? To that you answered that there is broad agreement on moral principles, but you did not answer what morality is. Let me sharpen my point: what is the moral imperative, not what does it command?
F. As far as my lack of intelligence reaches, it seems to me that the Nazis called universal morality degenerate Jewish morality, while they championed
natural selection in which the strong survive; that is, in their abominable opinion, the murder of the weak by the strong is moral.
H. To my surprise, it appears from your blunt response that you were hurt by my words, so I sincerely apologize; I truly did not intend that.

Not at all. The claim is that if a person murders, there are two problems in it: a moral one and a religious one. The moral one is the harm to society or to another person, and the religious one is damage to Netzach within Hod, as a metaphor. So this דווקא means there is no dependence between the categories.
I explained that there is no need to talk about incidental inclusion, so there is no point discussing that.

That is very logical. If the world is in His hands, why would He create a world with conflicts in which the same act is a religious problem and a moral value, or vice versa? Clearly there is an aspiration to minimize the differences as much as possible, to whatever extent possible.
The correspondence does not need an explanation, as I explained. God would certainly want as much correspondence as possible.

Ramban interpreted it that way, and that is accepted by many. That is enough for me. I am not in the business of interpreting verses. I mentioned that regarding “You shall be holy,” there is indeed a dispute about this, but clearly Ramban is much more logical.

A. There are things that are impossible even for God. That is why natural evil exists in the world. You can search here on the site for “natural evil”; I have explained this several times.
B. You assume that an action is moral because God wants it. That is one side of the Euthyphro dilemma, and the less logical side (see at length in column 457).

He could avoid conflicts by creating a world in which the halakhic commands would be completely alien to the moral commands, where halakha would deal with when and how it is permitted to scratch one's third nostril, and morality would deal with its own affairs. To find such a magical world in which abstract halakha (the one from column 379) is particularized in such a way that it almost entirely contains morality—and that this magical world is actually our messed-up world—sounds strange to me.

(I did not understand the first paragraph, but I understand that this line of questions is no longer relevant, because you explained above that the correspondence is neither incidental nor essential, but rather that God arranged the world so that in practice there would be maximal correspondence. If that was also the intention in the sentence I quoted, that an anti-moral action has religious consequences, then what I asked is not relevant.)

On second thought, the more defects there are in this world, the stronger your hypothesis becomes that God (who in your view is good) had more and more constraints requiring Him to achieve maximal correspondences in various different areas. It is still strange that the world with a minimum of conflicts came out as one in which halakha contains morality rather than one in which halakha is alien to morality, and that there exists at all a world in which halakha contains morality. But the emphasis on how immeasurably defective the world before us is in many other respects as well (in my eyes) actually weakens what I had come to argue.

The Gemara asks in several places about “its ways are ways of pleasantness,” and from that concludes several laws. Does that not indicate that the Sages understood that the tendency of halakha is indeed toward pleasantness and morality (or should one distinguish between pleasantness/convenience and moral values)?

We find among the Rishonim arguments from morality, such as that Rambam rules that in the city led astray one must kill even the children, and Ramah asks: would God do wickedness? According to your view is there no place for such questions?

Do you think that Sefer HaChinukh, Rambam, and others erred when they explained the reasons for the commandments in terms of human moral values?

I still did not understand why the Torah permitted the beautiful captive woman, even if there is no religious problem in it. In any case, God does not want us to do this. What difference does it make whether that is religiously or morally? Why would He write that it is permitted? Why permit it (religiously, of course) if it has no practical implication in reality because it is morally forbidden?

First, the Torah did not permit it. Halakha permitted it. Independently of that, you can ask what the point is of distinguishing between the categories at all: if some act is morally forbidden, what is the point of permitting it halakhically? But that is not a question. There is a difference between the categories, and it also has implications.
The difference between the categories is important because we need to know whether there is a halakhic prohibition and whether there is or is not a moral prohibition. The practical conclusions we will draw afterward. The Torah does not come only to tell us what to do, but to teach us what the halakha is (see on this in detail my article on obligations and rights and the nature of Choshen Mishpat). Why does the Torah write the passage of the rebellious son or the city led astray, according to the view that they never were and never will be? In order to tell us that this is the halakha (“study and receive reward,” in the language of the Talmud). The practical implementation is a different sugya.
As for implications: for a prohibition one must spend all one's money, and for a positive command one-fifth of one's money. In the moral context there are no such rules. If he has relations with her unnaturally, that is halakhically permitted and morally forbidden. If he kills indirectly, likewise. There are situations in which the moral consideration is set aside because of circumstances, but halakha has its own ways. This has practical implications: if it were halakhically forbidden, there would be no room to permit it under any circumstances (except direct life-saving). But if it is a moral matter, there is room to permit it in certain circumstances (when it is needed for the fighters' morale).
And beyond all that, I explained that the Torah is dealing with the prohibition of relations with a gentile woman, and that is not a moral problem. There is only a halakhic aspect here. The question of rape is entirely a moral question, and therefore it is not discussed at all in the Torah or the commentators.

There is another possible relation between Torah and morality that you did not mention, and perhaps some of those expressing views in this area mean this—among them Rav Kook, apparently. According to this possibility, the purpose of the commandments is also social repair in addition to attaining closeness to God. This is not a heavenly system detached from reality, but a social repair that can be understood. On the other hand, it is not a system meant to nullify morality or contain it within itself. For example, in the case of a priest's wife, the explanation would be that in order to distinguish the priestly status and grant it prestige, a priest's wife who was raped is disqualified. Such a law is not meant to enter a moral system that a person would implement on his own judgment, but only to be realized in the limited sphere where God knows it will benefit society. It may be that we cannot explain every such law, because we do not have a good estimate of the social consequences. Alternatively, there could be a scenario in which there is a conflict with a law that has social benefit but causes great suffering in some of its applications.

Do you think the verse “Its ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are peace” has any binding significance? (I assume not, based on your approach in the new Tanakh trilogy.)

“Its ways are ways of pleasantness” is a principle applied to esoteric cases. I assume these are cases where there are several interpretive possibilities and this principle chooses between them.
Ramah's question is not from morality. Halakha does not kill one who is not guilty. All the more so from exemption in a case of coercion.
As far as I remember, they did not explain all the commandments this way. Not all of them are based on morality in their view. Beyond that, as I explained here, one can understand commandments on a moral basis, except that the commandment adds a religious layer to that. The prohibition “You shall not murder” stems from the value of human life, and the commandment adds a religious prohibition to the moral prohibition.

I did not understand the question.

Radvaz brought the verse “Its ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are peace” in order to ground moral considerations in his ruling. In your opinion, can this verse be invoked in order to justify a ruling that would be more moral?

There is another possible relation between Torah and morality that you did not mention, and perhaps some of those expressing views in this area mean this—among them Rav Kook, apparently. According to this possibility, the purpose of the commandments is also social repair in addition to attaining closeness to God. This is not a heavenly system detached from reality, but a social repair that can be understood. On the other hand, it is not a system meant to nullify morality or contain it within itself. For example, in the case of a priest's wife, the explanation would be that in order to distinguish the priestly status and grant it prestige, a priest's wife who was raped is disqualified. Such a law is not meant to enter a moral system that a person would implement on his own judgment, but only to be realized in the limited sphere where God knows it will benefit society. It may be that we cannot explain every such law, because we do not have a good estimate of the social consequences. Alternatively, there could be a scenario in which there is a conflict with a law that has social benefit but causes great suffering in some of its applications.
Evidence in favor of this proposal may be brought from the evident relationship that exists between ancient culture and the laws of the Torah. For example: in the Code of Hammurabi it is written, “If a slave says to his master, ‘You are not my master,’ and they prove against him that he is his slave—his master shall cut off his ear.” But in Parashat Mishpatim it is written: “But if the slave shall plainly say, ‘I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go out free,’ then his master shall bring him to God, and shall bring him to the door or the doorpost, and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl, and he shall serve him forever.” It is hard to ignore the relation between the laws. On the assumption that the Torah's laws were intended to create a certain social structure, one can understand the need to create a different approach to slavery against the background of the accepted culture. But it is hard to say that the Torah's value, which is not aimed at repairing this world, points in just the same direction as Hammurabi's laws and other similar law collections.
I would be glad to read your opinion on this.

A question: how would you explain a daughter's inheritance—which is not inheritance—is this a religious command that a daughter not inherit? Does one violate the religious command by letting a daughter inherit? It sounds a bit far-fetched and implausible. Unlike returning a lost object, here the religious command also applies to the daughter, and ostensibly she is commanded not to inherit (in returning a lost object, the owner of the object supposedly has a moral claim on the object, and the religious command on its face merely allows the finder to take the object for himself; but in inheritance it seems that the religious command is that the firstborn receive a double share or that only the sons inherit, and if so it is also imposed on the party morally disadvantaged by it; otherwise it is completely emptied of content, like the rebellious son, which was only theoretical).

Just as there are prohibition and permission on the religious plane, there are right and obligation on the religious plane. A daughter has no right to inherit from a religious standpoint. So there is no commandment upon her here, and no prohibition upon me. She has no right to inherit. That is all. It is a definition, not a prohibition or commandment.

Morality, as I understand it, is not according to the understanding of most human beings. Definition of morality: right actions, and God knows what is right and what is not right, therefore everything is moral.

I read the column on Shabbat and wanted to note several things:

I think one should have added the insight you mentioned in the faith lecture series, that it is likely God wants to achieve something through creation that lies outside moral aims (otherwise why create something whose entire purpose is its own self-repair). That is, it is likely there are “religious” (or extra-moral) purposes to the world and to man even before we begin examining the Torah in relation to this question.
I think one can interpret the words of Maharal and Ran differently from how you presented them. It may be that they mean a distinction between legal reasoning and moral reasoning. That is, the laws of the Torah follow legal reasoning and not moral reasoning.

The daughters of a Canaanite maidservant are also maidservants, and it is forbidden to free them, as it is written: “you shall work them forever.” And with regard to such a daughter, it is understandable that there is in this “the tears of the oppressed,” etc. And seemingly one could free her by consensual injury to one of the extremities, such as a little finger. And from your approach it follows that halakha cannot permit moral prohibitions, but only obligate violating moral prohibitions; and where both can be upheld, the moral obligation remains. So in your opinion was there such an obligation to free them (subject to the other unknown factors there)? Presumably there were myriads of Canaanite maidservants whom people bequeathed to their sons (and one would need to check whether we have heard such good advice from the prophets and the Sages).
[There was the incident with Rabban Gamliel, who blinded the eye of his slave Tavi and was happy, etc., that “my slave Tavi is going free” (Rashi: he was a worthy slave and he desired to free him, except that one who frees his slave violates a positive commandment). And why did he not injure his finger with consent? If consensual injury does not free him, would a slave not desire to purchase himself with a finger? But as for the slave himself, one could say there is no moral obligation here because he sold himself lawfully; unlike his children.]

In principle, yes (except that in those days they did not think there was a moral value in that). Of course, it is not certain that they would be pleased with injury to their limbs.
By the way, I do not understand the distinction you found between the maidservant and her daughter. The maidservant did not necessarily sell herself. There is also war captivity, etc.

Not that this is a real difficulty, but if it were proper, then God would instruct the prophets to rebuke people for it like other sins—what difference does it make whether it is halakha or morality? In war captivity, does she become a maidservant against the master's will?

In that period it was not perceived as a moral sin.
War captivity is against the will of the slave. The master is the conqueror.

In column 479, the three passages of “study and receive reward” came to teach about the entire rule that study is not only an instrument for a commandment but also a commandment in itself. And you elevated study so much as a commandment (with also the side, relative advantage of study as an instrument for a commandment) that one wonders why (the world was created such that) all the rest of the Torah is practical, and the main thing was subordinated to the secondary. Is this too a matter of global correspondence with a tendency to defects? (By the way, perhaps this could explain your remark there about how three verses come as one and teach.) Or here there is no need for that, because it is obvious that God wanted also to gain the virtue of study as an instrument for a commandment (and who says that is only secondary, etc.)?

The whole idea is that this is an abstract wisdom that is supposed to be implemented in the world. The world was created so as to be its reflection. Therefore of course there is also value to study as an instrument for a commandment, in order to know what to observe.

Is the wisdom implemented in the world at the time the commandment is physically performed?
If the point is to derive practical instruction from the emanated halakha (as you said about a non-realistic practical implication), then almost all of the Torah need not deal with realistic things; it is enough that it be conceptually graspable.

I did not understand. The idea is that the wisdom be implemented. And even if it did not have to be, what is the difficulty with the fact that it was done that way?

I am the one who did not understand what the words “that the wisdom be implemented” mean. Does it mean that the commandments can be physically carried out?

The difficulty is that in almost the entire Torah we see that everything is realistic matters; that is, in almost the entire Torah, Torah study is specifically about things that contain practical instruction capable of being realized. Therefore the claim that there are really two entirely separate things here—Torah study as a commandment, and Torah study as an instrument for a commandment, and that the special virtue of Torah study which the Sages so highly exalted is study for its own sake—this is a claim that explains the exception (the three passages of “study and receive reward”) but harms the explanation of the rule (all the rest, where the study is also practical). How is it that most commandments do not deal with hypothetical cases of an elephant swallowing an Egyptian chicken, but rather with everyday scenarios like “when you reap the harvest of your land” and “you shall not make gashes for the dead.” Regarding halakha and morality, my conclusion is that this problem of incidental inclusion weighs very heavily against the disconnect approach. And regarding Torah study for its own sake, which for some reason is almost always done in practical commandments, I am trying to understand that here.

I will repeat again, because I do not understand what the discussion is and what the misunderstanding is.
My claim is that the Torah concerns a system of abstract principles that is supposed to be implemented in actions in the world. There is value in studying it because it is God's will, and studying it is our cleaving to His will. And of course there is also value in implementing it, because that is the right way to conduct oneself in the world. What is unclear here?

And I am asking about this connection between “supposed to be implemented” and “to study because it is God's will.” Does the same value in study also exist in wills that cannot be implemented, like the rebellious son (and today also the red heifer and the daily offering)?

The rebellious son is also for implementation, except that the conditions imposed on it lead you to conclude that it will probably not happen in practice. Exactly like wiping out Amalek or sacrifices in our time. Still, this is God's will (and if such a situation existed, we would also have to implement it), and there is value in studying it.

Out of despair I am trying simply to ask point by point without going back again over the whole question.
The rebellious son is a non-realistic commandment (in the terms of that column), meaning possible but only under extremely extreme conditions. Why are all the other commandments realistic? Is that accidental? Why is there not a great deal of non-realistic Torah (because of technical impediments) that we could study and thereby cleave to the will?

I am in despair because I am unable to understand the question, and even less its connection to my claims.
The halakhot are meant to be implemented. There are a few that did not succeed, like the rebellious son, the city led astray, and others. Apparently because it was not possible to create a world in which everything is implemented. Alternatively, perhaps they are meant only to convey an educational message and not to be implemented in practice.
But why is this connected to my positions? How do you yourself or anyone else explain those exceptional laws?

I am asking only about your approach (and Nefesh HaChayim, and apparently every Torah scholar in the last thousand years) which says that the central point of Torah study is to study the Torah for its own sake as a commandment and not only as an instrument for observance, and we learned this from the rebellious son according to R. Israel Salanter. And the question is: if the greatest thing is to study Torah for its own sake even in matters that do not come up and for which there is no technical possibility of fulfillment, then why are there not many commandments like the rebellious son that cannot be implemented in practice? The whole world and the commands are instruments for the commandment of practical implementation, but then the study of those instrumental commands suddenly becomes a commandment in itself. One must study for its own sake things whose whole point is almost entirely to be practically implementable. So you posit a complex, emotionally satisfying law that the higher wisdom one studies must be implemented concretely through shaking a lulav (perhaps her lips move in Heaven). But from the standpoint of Torah study, why should there not also be many commandments that are not implemented, through which one could fulfill the commandment of Torah study day and night? Obviously one can solve this with side additions, but my feeling is that such a large phenomenon (the phenomenon being that almost all the commandments one is to study for their own sake and not merely as an instrument for fulfillment are ones whose fulfillment was near at hand for us) ought to follow from the theory from the outset.

What I am musing is that the Sages up to the Amoraim placed the main emphasis in study on the expectation that one would soon have the chance to do it physically, and not study for the sake of recognizing the Creator's wisdom and cleaving to His will and knowing Torah, and the like. There is only a side and minor virtue also in study that is not so given over to action, and even there they merely say that the expositor receives a little reward, a consolation prize.

The Sages said: “At the time of a person's passing, neither silver nor gold nor precious stones nor pearls accompany him, but only Torah and good deeds,” etc. I heard in my own name that I had inferred and said this proves that good deeds are not part of Torah.
What do you think about that?

You remind me of the inference I once heard in my own name from “for the righteous and for the pious,” from which it follows that the pious are not righteous.
“Torah and good deeds” can also be interpreted as Torah study and commandment observance. And even if these are not acts of commandment but just plain good deeds, they are part of the Torah: “And you shall do what is right and good.” They are just not part of halakha.
And in general, why do the commandments not accompany a person? Why only Torah and good deeds?

Hello Rabbi,
I just read this amazing column with a slight delay, but better late than never…
I wanted to ask,
1. According to what you say—that our morality too is part of God's will in addition to the halakhic commands of the Torah—how then can there be a halakhic instruction that contradicts morality? It is, as it were, a contradiction within God's own will, He being the source of both.
Take for example returning lost property. If according to morality one should return a lost object even after the owner has despaired, then why does halakha instruct us that there is no need to return it in such a case, in a way that contradicts morality? And how can the divine element apply here (in the words of Ran) when you act against the moral will of God which He implanted in us?!

2. In all the examples you gave, seemingly one can say that there is no contradiction at all between Torah and morality, but only between the Sages' interpretation and morality. For example, regarding a priest's wife who was raped, the Torah commands: “They shall not take a woman who is a harlot or profaned,” and the Sages interpret “harlot” to mean any woman who had forbidden intercourse, whether under coercion or willingly, and according to this a raped woman becomes forbidden to a priest. But according to the plain understanding of the verse, a harlot is a promiscuous woman who willingly makes herself available for intercourse, and on that interpretation it is very understandable why the priest must divorce her also morally, because she behaved that way willingly and profaned herself! Likewise in the example of returning lost property: the Torah does not explicitly say not to return it if the owners despaired, rather this is the understanding of the Sages according to the reality of their time. There is seemingly no frontal contradiction between an explicit command of the Torah and morality itself directly, but only between the understanding and interpretation of the Sages and morality. And because of that, one could resolve things and say that there is indeed harmony between morality and Torah, except that the Sages interpreted the Torah according to the morality customary in their time, while we have only interpretation according to the morality customary in our time (except that we have side constraints of lack of authority and the like).
Thank you, and more power to you!

1. I do not understand the question. That is exactly what the whole column is about. My claim is that from the standpoint of religious goals one should do X, but this harms moral goals. Therefore a conflict arises. God's will is that we enjoy ourselves and that we be healthy. So why did He create chocolate? Does He want us to eat it or not? From the standpoint of health—no; from the standpoint of pleasure—yes.
2. I assume the Oral Torah and do not deal with the “naked” plain meaning of Scripture. It also will not work for all the examples: killing Amalekite babies, mamzer status, and the like.

1. What I mean to ask is about cases where there is no direct contradiction, as in returning lost property. According to halakha there is no need to return a lost object whose owners have despaired; morality comes and says that even in such a case one should return it. Seemingly such a law ought to have entered the Torah, because it does not directly contradict halakha (halakha merely does not require returning it, but does not forbid doing so), and it expresses God's will. This is unlike the law of wiping out Amalek, for example, where it is dichotomous—either kill the Amalekite baby or not. There the Torah decided that the halakhic command overrides the morality that contradicts it.
2. Right, thank you.

1. There is no difference at all. This too did not enter halakha because, as I explained, halakha is not interested in morality. If it does not fulfill or violate a halakhic value, it will not enter there but will remain in the realm of morality.