Q&A: Questions on The Science of Freedom
Questions on The Science of Freedom
Question
Hello Rabbi,
After reading the book The Science of Freedom, my understanding is that the main reason to believe in the existence of the power of will comes from the basic intuition of it. (Though of course there are other reasons and paradoxes, this is the foundation.)
But I didn’t understand how you answered the famous claim about the stone—that even a stone thrown into the air, if it were suddenly to gain consciousness, would see itself as the source of its movement, because it would not be aware of the real cause of its flight, and therefore would conclude that it is falling solely because of its own will.
So if we have such a wonderful explanation for why the feeling of choice is fundamentally mistaken, then why not stick with what is familiar and understand that all our decisions stem from a prior cause?
Of course, that would be instead of having to assume that there exists a mechanism that isn’t really a mechanism at all—which is really, really implausible.
Noam
Answer
I explained this issue. There is no argument here at all, and certainly not a “wonderful explanation.” First, who said that every conscious stone would feel that way? Second, you can challenge any claim and any thesis like this: if a stone felt the way you do, then it too would feel the way you do. Alternatively, if an illusion were implanted in you, you would also feel this way. So what? Do you trust your eyesight? After all, if a stone were endowed with eyes, it too would be convinced that they are reliable. So do you stop trusting your eyes?
Discussion on Answer
Hello Noam. Apparently we’re moving in two opposite directions. I don’t see an argument in your words, and you don’t see an answer in mine. All I can do is repeat once again that I see not the slightest reason in the world to assume that every conscious being lives under an illusion of choice (even if it has none). That is begging the question, exactly like assuming that everyone endowed with eyes assumes they are reliable. Indeed, if we assume what we seek to prove, we will arrive at what we seek to prove. The only question is why assume it.
Beyond the fact that this is begging the question, the assumption itself seems patently unreasonable to me. Simply baseless.
This argument is discussed toward the end of the first chapter of my book.
Thanks for the reply,
Look, I agree that not every conscious body in the world will feel that it is endowed with choice. For example, a stone standing still.
But if there is a complex being that acts independently, like an animal—one that thinks, reflects, moves right and left, and so on—there is no reason it would not develop a trait of choice out of the many dilemmas it goes through at every moment, while following only one of the options available.
That’s what I meant by a self-evident premise.
And I claim that absolutely not. A computer or a cat does not necessarily perceive itself as having choice. And even if someone has self-awareness, I do not see why he would not also be aware that he does not choose. Alternatively, someone who has awareness but makes no decisions at all (I mean not even in a deterministic way)—why shouldn’t he feel that he does? It’s exactly the same argument. And as I wrote, someone endowed with eyes is sure that there is a world outside and that the eyes reflect it. Why shouldn’t we challenge the reliability of the eyes as well (say that they present us with an internal movie)? After all, anyone whose eyes presented him with a movie would feel that he “sees.” I see no difference at all.
So in my opinion this is not a self-evident premise, nor even a fifth-evident one. You assume that a person lives in illusions and conclude that he lives in illusions. Don’t assume it, and don’t conclude it. But it seems to me we’re repeating ourselves. We’ve exhausted it.
The reason that someone with self-awareness will most likely not be aware that he does not choose is because he really does cause the result! For example, the brain’s inference is what produces the move to the right. But if the “choice” to turn right were external to his consciousness—if there were some other creature openly pulling him to the right—then there is no reason he would assume that he himself chose to do so. So in your case of a person who makes no decisions at all, not even deterministic ones, it is indeed possible that he would feel that he chooses, so long as the decisions come from him and not from outside him.
In your analogy with the eyes, again, it may indeed be an internal movie, and maybe that is merely a claim of doubt. I am not aware of any mechanism that produces internal movies, so there is no reason for me to assume that such a mechanism exists—certainly not in my case.
But self-consciousness is a mechanism that produces the feeling of choice. Here there is indeed very broad room to think that this is only an illusion.
Everything has already been answered. We’re repeating ourselves.
So maybe repeat it one last time ::——))))?
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Thanks for the reply,
Where did you explain this? (Around which chapter?)
As I understand it, the idea that every conscious entity probably also feels that it has free choice is a clear and simple idea. I don’t see any need to prove such a self-evident premise.
As for the second part of what you wrote, I didn’t understand your argument at all; I don’t see any real analogy here.
The reason I don’t assume that my vision is illusory is that I simply experience it as not being so. And the burden of proof is on the one making the claim.
But when we understand that the concept of “consciousness” includes, as a common side effect, the illusion of choice, then there is no reason to assume that I really do have choice—after all, I am aware of the existence of such a demon, “consciousness,” and I know it is likely that this demon will deceive me too, and lull me with a comfortable feeling of choice.