Q&A: One Does Not Derive Punishments from Logical Inference
One Does Not Derive Punishments from Logical Inference
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I saw in a previous responsum that you wrote there is a dispute whether, in a kal va-homer of the type "if two hundred is included, then one hundred certainly is included," we apply the rule that "one does not derive punishments from logical inference" or not.
My question is: how can one say that in this type of kal va-homer the rule of "one does not derive punishments from logical inference" does not apply, when the whole basis of that rule itself is learned from a case of "if two hundred is included, then one hundred certainly is included"?
As brought in tractate Makkot 5b:
"You have taught us, our Rabbi, that one does not derive punishments from logical inference, as it was taught: 'If a man takes his sister, his father's daughter or his mother's daughter' (Leviticus 20:17) — I only know his father's daughter who is not his mother's daughter, and his mother's daughter who is not his father's daughter. From where do I know his mother's daughter and his father's daughter? Scripture says: 'He has uncovered his sister's nakedness' — before Scripture would say this, I could have derived it by logical inference: if Scripture punished for his father's daughter who is not his mother's daughter, and for his mother's daughter who is not his father's daughter, then for his father's daughter and his mother's daughter all the more so. From here you learn that one does not derive punishments from logical inference."
Now, a sister who is both his father's daughter and his mother's daughter includes within it a sister who is only his father's daughter or only his mother's daughter — in other words, "if two hundred is included, then one hundred certainly is included." Even so, according to the baraita this is the source for the rule that one does not derive punishments from logical inference?
Answer
Indeed, and there are other such sources as well (like the kal va-homer from opening to digging that I mentioned). My understanding is that according to those who hold that one does derive punishments from this kind of kal va-homer, this is treated as an "if it is not needed for that matter" derivation. There is a textual redundancy here that teaches us that one does not derive punishments from logical inference. But even though the kal va-homer from which it is learned is of the "if two hundred is included, then one hundred certainly is included" type, we apply it to a regular kal va-homer because of the logic.
And similarly in Gittin 30a, in the statement of Rabbi Elazar ben Gamla, where a verse stated about the tithe-offering is applied to the great terumah because it does not really pertain to the tithe-offering. And there are more examples along these lines.