I understand that by the "prohibition on mixing policy considerations" you are really addressing rabbis, telling them to distinguish for themselves between substantive considerations and policy considerations, but not in the publication of every halakhic ruling, since it would be absurd for a rabbi to publish that in principle the Jewish law is A, but for policy reasons he rules B. The blend between the body of the Jewish law and policy has to be formed within the rabbi, and he does not always need to tell the masses all his considerations. I agree with your usual approach regarding "holy lies" in general, but in my opinion there is some minimum line where a rabbi takes responsibility for the public beyond dry halakhic data. I don’t see room to feel more enlightened than the Sages or the scholars of the generations who acted this way, and of course everything has its limits.
Moreover, policy considerations may be an integral part of the Jewish law. More than trying to do the "Jewish law," people are trying to do what is proper and right, and the Jewish law also recognizes such considerations. And again, everything has its limits.
Isn’t that so?

Definitely yes. In every halakhic ruling it is important to make that distinction. The question of how much to spell out and explain is a different question, but one must distinguish between Jewish law and policy. By the way, according to Maimonides, one who does not do this violates the prohibition of "do not add."

Moshe wrote:
A. After all, by your definition we are talking about a change in the bottom line, not a change in the Jewish law itself, so what do you mean when you say "Reform," and why would these things lead there?

B. So you are basically appealing to rabbis not to mix the considerations, since it is obviously absurd to expect a rabbi to say that in principle the Jewish law is A, but because of policy X he rules B.

C. Not that I expect us to get into the long topic of "holy lies" now, but does a rabbi really have no public responsibility that should lead him to a ruling that mixes in policy considerations? Of course he himself knows clearly how he constructed his blend, but the masses who are exposed to all the considerations may, because of their lack of experience and judgment, take it in directions that are not foreseeable.

Me,
A. That is exactly my claim. They are mistaken when they think this is Reform. But that is how they think.
B. In your eyes it is absurd, and in my eyes the opposite is a lie, a violation of "do not add," and foreseeable damage.
C. His responsibility interests me as much as last year’s snow. "What have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One?" Do what you were commanded and do not lie. The mistakes that result from mixing Jewish law and policy are more severe than the opposite mistakes. And that is aside from the fact that this is a lie.

In practice my two comments were two versions of the same question, because of a glitch on my end of the site. To the first you responded with a certain indifference: "The question of how much to spell out and explain is a different question, but one must distinguish between Jewish law and policy." And to the second you already responded more sharply: "His responsibility interests me as much as last year’s snow. What have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One." I don’t really understand why, if it does not interest you, it should not interest the rabbi too. This is not the hidden things of the Merciful One at all; it is entrusted to teachers of halakhic rulings what and how to rule. Again, I agree that there are limits here, but it is not at all far-fetched that there are additional considerations, for better and for worse [there are nice stories about rabbis who understood things from the question and therefore were more accommodating, or on the contrary were stricter when they realized there was ugly exploitation of the rabbi. And there is also the rabbi who gave money for the Passover seder meal after being asked whether one could fulfill the four cups with milk, etc., etc. Rabbis are attentive to the questioner and take the overall picture into account, even though there is no doubt that for themselves they know what the pure Jewish law is and what is "around it."].

"The mistakes that result from mixing Jewish law and policy are more severe than the opposite mistakes." I understand that serious mistakes can result from the mixing, but to the point of being "more severe than the opposite mistakes"? Could you give an example?

"And that is aside from the fact that this is a lie" — I assume most ordinary people rely on the rabbi’s judgment, so it is not necessarily a lie.

Already in the words of the Sages we find Jewish laws that "one does not instruct the public to follow," and also rabbis who forbade in certain places things that are permitted because of the people’s ignorance, so it is clear that the commenters are right that the rabbi is not supposed to provide the "Torah" answer but the "halakhic" one — the one that takes all the factors into account, and that is the practical conclusion. Only when the rabbi is asked what the Torah’s conclusion is on a given matter should he answer with his own view.
Still, I have struggled greatly with how one can rely on very many of the rulings brought in the words of the Sages when they rest on estimation of people’s attitudes and habits, which in most cases have changed, or it is reasonable to worry that they have changed — from reasonings in the legal part of Jewish law about when a person protests over his property and the like, to reasonings in the laws of marriage about the wording of betrothal, cases of bills of divorce, attribution of sexual relations, and so forth. And I have found no rest in this.
I would ask to receive the link to the lecture referred to in the question.

Moshe, I strongly suggest that you read the article by my friend Nadav Shnerb, The Jewish Closet of Lies:
<a href="http://woland.ph.biu.ac.il/?page_id=146" rel="nofollow">http://woland.ph.biu.ac.il/?page_id=146</a>

Eliezer,
to you as well I suggest the above article. As for your questions, you will find extensive discussion in my trilogy, which is nearing the end of editing.
The link to the lecture:
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SVdPzsI9Cw" rel="nofollow">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SVdPzsI9Cw</a>

Shnerb writes amazingly and fascinatingly as always. From a logical standpoint it sounds excellent, but historically he did not succeed in convincing me. It seems to him from the words of responsa literature, from medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim), that they never added extraneous considerations to their rulings, but I am not convinced of that. Of course one cannot infer that from their words, and that is exactly the point.
In any case I accepted and understood both sides.
Just if possible, I would still like an example of "mistakes that result from mixing Jewish law and policy that are more severe than the opposite mistakes."
Thank you

It’s not a matter of examples, but of a general principle. For example, when decisors explain to women that they are halakhically forbidden to take part in the synagogue — for instance, Torah readings honors or a women’s Megillah reading. This is a mixing of policy with Jewish law, and the result is that people lose trust in the decisors for two reasons: this is a stringency they do not accept. In our global age it is immediately revealed that the decisor lied and that in fact there is a halakhic possibility to do it, and then they do not listen to him even where he states agreed-upon and straightforward Jewish law.

Well, you know, everything has its limits. I’ll answer in two parts. On the one hand, if religion were more inclusive and everything were on the table, maybe we would have many more religious people, at least by definition. On the other hand, I don’t see that those who want an updated Jewish law (for progress, for feminism, for postmodernism, etc.) are careful about the Jewish law in its purity even without the rabbis’ political additions.

You are living in a stereotype that I too once lived in — identifying liberalism with sloppiness. You are mistaken.

"All stereotypes are validated in the end. That’s the frightening thing about life. All those things you fought
against in your youth — you begin to understand that they are stereotypes because they are true" (D. Cronenberg).
I’m speaking from the field, not from imagination. Maybe I haven’t seen enough data for an empirical study, but from what I know among those who want updated Jewish law, you don’t see great halakhic observance in the main dry principles of Jewish law. I would be happy to be wrong about this.
Thank you

I’m copying here things I wrote to the honorable Nadav Shnerb about his important article. In the last part there is a point that especially touches your claims that Jewish law always has to be "distilled" and that there is no room for additional considerations.
I would be glad for your response.

…Your article on The Jewish Closet of Lies really grabbed me. I spoke about it with a good friend who answers questions of Jewish law, and he divided it into two parts. Regarding the point that the decisor sees himself as responsible for, or a babysitter over, the questioner and hides the naked Jewish law from him — he agrees completely. He made use of several rabbis and left those who behaved like masters over the Jewish law. He claims there is a wide range of rabbis on this spectrum, and many times the questioner does not want all the clean sides and wants a firm and clear ruling that will suit him, and he also relies on the rabbi to arrange for him what is good in God’s eyes, but clearly in principle the rabbi is not the master of the house and he must be fair and transparent. In any event, on this point he agrees completely.
The second point he mentioned is that one word is missing from this whole article: humility. We have become very used to the idea that we decide everything and understand everything through our own judgment, but that is not accepted in the tradition. The important statement mentioned by both Rabbi Yosef Karo and Rabbi Moshe Isserles in their introductions is a spirit of humility that gripped them when they understood that they could not definitively decide matters already decided by earlier medieval authorities (Rishonim). This is something that today has disappeared for many people. Some look at the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and decisors as equal to us, and that we must fully understand every reasoning and opinion of theirs and that the ruling depends on our understanding. Historical reality proves that the decisors of the generations conducted themselves with this kind of humility and did not decide arbitrarily even when they did not fully understand. If all our Jewish law rests so heavily on Rabbi Yosef Karo and Rabbi Moshe Isserles, it is hard not to accept at least somewhat this approach of theirs. End of his words.

As for myself, I really tried to understand rabbinic history as you presented it. I saw that you got a bit tangled with the biblical period and the period of the Sages, but regarding the medieval and later authorities it seemed to you that the Jewish law is naked and that policy considerations are not mixed into it. And you wrote this hesitantly. If your article was, in its essence, very convincing, from the historical part I was less convinced. You can see in many responsa of major later authorities that in public questions they always added policy considerations and added reasonings and aspects and a "long-term view" and a sense of responsibility in a great many issues, not only purely halakhic ones. So there is a choice here: whether to go by reason, as seems logical to us, and therefore not accept the entire mode of conduct of most respondents, or to worry that perhaps tradition is what determines things even when it is not fully understood. This is a very painful and difficult doubt for rational people, but if one walks according to tradition, it is very hard to separate the tradition of "dry" Jewish law from the conduct of those transmitting Jewish law from generation to generation. Not that I am settled on this, but I am presenting to you my struggles on the subject.
In any case, the article is fascinating and amazing, and its main arguments are very correct, and would that the situation improve.
Thank you!

It seems to me that neither he nor I proposed not mixing policy considerations in, but rather clarifying what in the ruling is Jewish law and what is policy. And even if the questioner wants a decision — we do not work for him.
As for what was done in the past, I completely agree that the situation today is no different from what it was in the past. But in my opinion (and I have written this here several times), today continuing this policy is destructive, because in the age of databases and the internet everyone loses trust in rulings when they discover that this is a subjective matter. Therefore it is preferable to work transparently.

In connection with the lecture attached here:
You claim that one can and should cast doubt on every law and commandment that appears in the Torah as to whether it is still valid in our time, and if reasoning suggests there is a basis for saying it has been nullified, then it should be nullified, and if there is doubt about that, this law should from now on be treated only as a doubt.
And according to your words, if a person thinks, based on his reasoning, that the entire Torah was only intended to oppose the idolatry that existed in the past, but today, when the world has advanced, it is enough for him to uphold morality and local culture and there is no longer any need for religious commandments, you would not reject his words, but would agree with him that according to his reasoning he is indeed exempt from observing the laws of the Torah.
It seems to me that every legal system must be based on the obligation to prove a change from it, and one cannot come along and say that the reason for the law is "not to wear warm clothes in summer" and on that basis change the law without proof, because in this way the law has no existence at all, since anyone can get up and invent definitions or new conditions for a commandment based on his own reasoning, and there is no way to refute him.
Therefore every writer of a constitution must establish rules for when it is changed, and if he did not write such rules, then necessarily he intended that his words be understood and observed in their plain sense — even at the cost of distorting his intention — because without that there can be no continuity or persistence of anything. Anything can be changed and declared no longer relevant, etc., just as the Reform movement does today; they too think they are doing the right thing [in the eyes of the Creator], namely that their way is the legitimate way to fulfill the spirit of the Torah [as I understand it].

Not nullify but change. The claim that anyone can interpret however he likes is no argument. If it seems to him that this is indeed the interpretation, then that is what he must do. If he is just making things up or inventing, then he has a problem. He could also simply choose not to observe. As for the burden of proof, that is a vague claim. The question is what strength of proof is sufficient. I am willing to accept that in a balanced case we leave the Jewish law as it stands (and even that depends on the cost).

Sometimes to change [that Torah scholars are disqualified from testimony, women are permitted], and sometimes to nullify. It is an argument to compel the conclusion that the lawgiver intended to fix his laws in place, and not to hand over the Torah of every person into his own hands to decide what he thinks the reason is, and whether according to that the law is still valid. No religion or constitution could survive that way, and clearly God, who gave Torah to His people, could not allow Himself such possibilities of change.
Why indeed should you not question the validity of many, many more commandments? Let us take commandment by commandment and start philosophizing about what we think its reason is, and whether it does not make sense that it was said only in adaptation to the culture and needs of the third millennium BCE, and whatever seems fitting to me to change I will change.
Note that according to your view, new Torah-level laws would also be born. For example, if reasoning were to require that rest on the Sabbath is not refraining from the thirty-nine prohibited labors but something else, then all those things that reason indicates fall under "rest" would have the status of Torah law, since that is the soul of the commandment.

Isn’t this very discussion the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages over whether one expounds the reason of the verse? According to Rabbi Shimon one may indeed raise reasonings about the lawgiver’s intent and accordingly change the law, but the Sages disagreed with him, and Jewish law follows them.

We are repeating ourselves. In my opinion no constitution can function as you propose. But beyond the question of functioning there is the question of truth.
I do not take a commandment and ask whether it is relevant. I ask how it should correctly be implemented today. This applies mainly to the homiletical interpretations and interpretations of the Sages, and less to things that are explicit in the Torah. In interpretive derivations, the interpreter himself uses the reason for the matter.
As for the reason of the verse, this requires elaboration. Briefly I will say: 1. The Tosafot of the Rosh wrote that when the reason is clear, we do indeed expound the reason of the verse. 2. In interpretive derivations we certainly do expound the reason of the verse. 3. Many changes are based on definition, not on reason. 4. In practice the Sages expound the reason of the verse all the time.

I would appreciate an explanation of why, in your view, this applies mainly to interpretive derivations and the interpretations of the Sages and not to explicit commandments. Seemingly, with every commandment one can try to discuss whether, in the reality of our lives too, we would have been commanded in it, and in this form.

Two main reasons:
1. In interpretive derivations, the halakhic conclusion is always based on reasoning. Therefore there is no problem there of expounding the reason of the verse, because the derivation is from the outset based on some reason. In verses there is a problem of expounding the reason of the verse, although as I explained, even there it is not absolute.
2. It is difficult to tie a Torah command to a particular period (although some have done so), and therefore there it is hard to argue for halakhic change due to changed circumstances. But every law that emerged from the Sages’ interpretation of the Torah (I am speaking about Torah-level laws) can depend on circumstances and period, and then there is room for arguments of change.

This very discussion — why we are limited from expounding the reason of a verse — proves my point that the constitution must remain in its plain form and not be subject to change according to a person’s own understanding and his limited, present-day short-sightedness. [By way of analogy, if a low-ranking soldier decided to discuss the reason for an order according to his own understanding, what chaos he could bring about. And Solomon, who expounded the reason for the command and failed, proves it.]
You understand that the Sages made derivations according to the circumstances and the times. According to you, then, the Sages’ derivations were not interpretation of the Torah and extraction of laws from it, but dressing their logic and reasoning in the verses of the Torah, and if so it is puzzling how they called these laws Torah-level.
Seemingly, if they call the laws that emerge from derivations Torah-level — meaning that this is the intent of the writer of the verses [even though we do not understand exactly how these laws emerged from the verses cited, according to what rules; to say that the derivations are only mnemonic supports is very puzzling, but this is not the place] — then their law is equal to the other laws explicit in it, which it seems even you admit should not be "re-understood" [though I did not understand why]. Where did you find a distinction between explicit laws and laws that emerged from derivation regarding expounding the reason of the verse?

A quote from your words on the site, showing an example of the chaos that your method would create:
"For example, if an easier method than ritual slaughter were found (one that causes less suffering), would you permit eating without valid ritual slaughter? I assume not. But if so, then you yourself are also not taking seriously the reason Maimonides gave for ritual slaughter. If in our opinion that really were the reason for the commandment, then we should act accordingly.
[Of course one can say that you would not do so because of doubt, but in my opinion that is not a sufficient explanation. If this is the reason for the commandment, then the Jewish law itself instructs us to act by the new method and not by valid ritual slaughter. If so, the doubt cuts both ways, for if you continue slaughtering as usual you are also acting wrongly. So why would you not take into account the reason you found and slaughter by the new method?]
And in general, if this is the reason for the commandment of ritual slaughter, it seems to me that you would have to forbid eating meat today for everyone. The suffering animals undergo today in breeding and on the way to slaughter completely negates the suffering involved in invalid slaughter."

I did not write that derivations are mnemonic supports. Quite the opposite. Mnemonic supports are brought for rabbinic laws, while derivations, according to most opinions (except Maimonides), are Torah-level. What I said is that in a derivation there is a component of reasoning. The Torah writes two identical words and we are supposed to make a verbal analogy between them. But in what respect are we to compare them? That is the interpreter’s decision, and he makes it from his own reasoning. Hence there is no reason not to change if the reasoning changes, since from the outset the law is founded on reasoning. And this is explicit in the Talmudic passage in tractate Pesachim regarding Shimon HaAmsuni, who would expound every occurrence of the word "et" in the Torah. Look there carefully, for it is explicit in the passage that the derivation is founded on reasoning, and without reasoning there is no derivation.
If I were indeed convinced that the reason for ritual slaughter is preventing animal suffering, then I would indeed support changing the Jewish law. That does not seem right to me. As for eating meat today, you are mistaken. This is a matter of assisting, not directly causing suffering to animals. The eater is not causing suffering directly but contributing to it. And indeed, for that reason it really does seem that eating animals today should be forbidden, entirely apart from the reason for the law of ritual slaughter. Rather, on the basis of the prohibition of animal suffering itself.

To Rabbi Michi
Still on that lecture (which if I try to summarize in my own sentence would be: "Jewish law is not the act itself but its implication for reality") — how far are you willing to stretch the line? The laws (that is, the "bottom lines") brought in the Talmud — it seems clear from the lecture that you think they should be changed. But what about Mishnah rulings? And maybe books of the Prophets and Writings? And maybe even explicit verses from the Torah? It is certainly plausible that the commandments written there were given in light of the reality of that time [such as the verse "Do not boil a kid in its mother’s milk," which in Professor Cassuto’s view (and Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed, part 3, also raised this possibility) referred only to excluding an idolatrous ritual practiced in those days, for which archaeological evidence was found in the city of Ugarit — which would mean that the whole matter of separating meat and milk in our time is mistaken]. From your approach it is clear that the commandments (which are only implications for reality and not the act itself) were given even in Moses’ period only in accordance with the reality of that time. It seems that we would also have to change laws learned from explicit verses [perhaps except for the Ten Commandments, which we could not change (as brought in Sefer HaIkkarim, discourse 3)].

First, I do not agree with your summary. That is not what I claimed. It is certainly possible that there are commandments whose point is the result and others whose point is not. But in those whose point is the result, one must examine whether the result is achieved under changed circumstances.
Second, in order to change, one must be convinced that this is indeed a result-oriented commandment and that this is the desired result. If we are not convinced and are only in doubt, then the costs must be examined.
Third, there is no limit to how far I am willing to go. If this is indeed convincing, then one should change. I do not see what difference there is between the Ten Commandments and the rest of Jewish law.
Fourth, there are authority considerations. Sometimes even if we are convinced of everything needed, we do not have the authority to change.
Fifth, regarding the examples you brought: for example, I am far from convinced that this is indeed the purpose of the prohibition of meat and milk. Even if evidence was found in the city of Ugarit, that really does not seem plausible to me in light of the details of the Jewish law of meat and milk. Maimonides’ reasons in the Guide are testimony to the problematic intellectual level of the perplexed people of his time. If, from their perspective, all these strange explanations were helpful, then their perplexities really were not all that deep. In short, the fact that Cassuto or Maimonides raise one doubtful hypothesis or another does not seem to me enough to explain a commandment. I owe their hypotheses nothing.
Sixth, I have already mentioned here that my main comments are directed at laws that are not explicitly written in the Bible. In such laws the interpreter’s reasoning is involved, and therefore there is no obstacle to involving our own reasoning. Although, as I already mentioned, this is not categorical. In principle, this can also be applied to laws that even the Sadducees admit.

First, I would be happy for an example of a commandment that is the act itself and not the good result it produces in the world. Personally I have not found one.
Second, from the lecture I specifically understood that you do not necessarily need to be convinced; it is enough that there is no better argument around (after all, "maybe it’s not that" can be said about anything). For example, regarding ritual slaughter, as you were asked earlier, or regarding the separation of meat and milk, I do not find a better explanation than what was brought. Maybe it is not the most "satisfying" explanation, but it is the only explanation that can somehow be understood at all (as opposed to all kinds of "spiritual" explanations that one could even give for the custom of walking around in a bathing suit on Mount Hermon), and therefore we are obligated to accept it and apply the implications in reality.
Third, there is at least an initial thought to say that since the Ten Commandments were given to us at Sinai and were not given by an emissary but by God before the eyes of the whole people, they are something entirely different from all the other commandments in this regard. They are not on the plane of adapting the act to reality (an adaptation that takes place in the mind of the emissary), but are truly "eternal" norms valid for all times.
Fourth, I do not understand: if Jewish law is not the act itself but the "idea behind it," then in order to preserve the idea there is a need to change the act; that is not called a "change." On the contrary, those who leave things as they are are the ones making the change, and they are the ones who need an authoritative source in order to continue in their crooked way.

A. Love and fear of God. Faith. Honoring parents. Waving the lulav. The prohibition of eating pork.
For some of these you may perhaps find goals beyond them, but on the face of it I do not see such goals.
You can of course argue that the purpose of honoring parents is some psychological state it creates (the refinement of the soul of the one honoring), but even if that is true, I do not see on what circumstances it depends.
Beyond that, when you claim that a commandment should change because of changing circumstances, you have to show that in the past it indeed achieved its purpose in the optimal way and that now the circumstances have changed and that same purpose is achieved in some other way.
B. The fact that there is no better argument around means nothing. For the prohibition of eating pork I do not see a good argument around. So what? Should I accept any explanation whatsoever? What is implausible is implausible even if there is no better option. If there is an option that sounds plausible to me, I will prefer it over a hypothesis that perhaps there is some other option I have not thought of.
C. I did not understand the difference between the Ten Commandments and the other commandments. What practical difference does it make what we heard explicitly and what we did not? That is on the assumption that the whole Torah is phrased from the mouth of the Almighty. By the way, at least according to the Sages, even the Ten Commandments we did not hear from the mouth of the Almighty, but only the first two.
D. Here you are repeating what I said in the lesson. Very true. So what is the question? If you mean the lack of authority to change the act, and you are claiming that changing the act is not a change, that is incorrect. In the rules of changing laws, what is meant explicitly is a change in the bottom line. See, for example, in Maimonides, Laws of Rebels, on an enactment whose reason has lapsed, where a religious court greater in wisdom and number is required. And the Raavad also says a court is required (even if not greater in wisdom and number). Both see this as a change. In the authority discussion it makes sense to follow the bottom line. But in the logical discussion it is indeed not a change. And even there, the decisors have already written in many places that in fact one does change the bottom line. See my article on changing enactments and decrees:

ביטול ושינוי תקנות בימינו

To Rabbi Michi
Regarding the commandment to honor one’s father, it actually seems plausible that there is a direct psychological link between a bad family relationship and misery in life, so it seems reasonable to me to say that this is the reason. (Though Peterson in his book formulates this commandment the other way around and says: "Do not let your child do things that will make you not love him," and it needs investigation whether there is a principled difference here.) In general I hold that for every commandment [not including various "details of commandments" that were fixed because "something had to be fixed" (Guide for the Perplexed part 3)] one can find a "good" implication in reality. (Or simply: every commandment that affects reality, its effect must be good.) Otherwise we are saying that this commandment is purposeless or useless, and that is a disgrace to God (Maimonides), and therefore various rabbis trouble themselves to clarify the "reasons for the commandments."

And in general, does the Rabbi not think that this whole matter that "the Sages determined that one may not change the determinations of the Sages" is a little… problematic? I too will determine that the things I determine have divine validity (including this determination itself).

Well, I do not think so. And I certainly did not say that. When I say that a commandment has no goal outside itself, that does not mean it is an arbitrary and meaningless act. It is good in itself, not because of some goal outside it.
The Sages’ determination is not problematic at all. The Torah gave them authority to establish enactments and decrees, and within that they also determine the enactment that one may not change enactments. What exactly is the problem with that? And for the same reason, even if they interpret the Torah and say that by Torah law one may not change enactments — that too is not problematic.

The Torah gave them the ability to enact enactments only because they interpreted it as giving them that authority. After all, they could have interpreted that verse differently. There is already a dispute between the Jerusalem Talmud and Sifrei regarding how far "do not turn from the thing they tell you, right or left" goes [Sifrei — even if they tell you that right is left. Jerusalem Talmud — only when they tell you that right is right. But if they say that right is left (that is, they erred), you do not need to listen]. And in general, where did they get the authority to interpret the verses as they wished while we do not? And all this is before even entering the question whether they are that same "sage" of whom the Torah spoke.
And what is an act that is "good in itself" and unrelated to its effect on reality? A good act is an act that makes the world a better place… that is, a good effect on reality is required here.

Indeed, they interpreted it. So what?! In every system the highest authority also makes decisions regarding itself. Thus the Supreme Court makes decisions regarding its own powers, and the Knesset regarding its own powers. There is no escaping this, and therefore there is no problem with it. Especially since their interpretation of "do not turn aside" is plausible and logical (in my view). If you think their interpretation of "do not turn aside" is incorrect — then do not obey them (and argue this in the heavenly court; perhaps they will accept your claim).
All this has nothing whatsoever to do with an erroneous ruling and the sources you cited. If it is clear to you that they erred, then do not listen to them. Who told you otherwise? That is not the discussion here.
As for a good act: in my view, acquiring knowledge is a good act not because of any result it produces. An educated and wise person is a better person (humanly, not necessarily morally). No result is needed for that. A humble person is better, even if it has no practical result whatsoever. But we are repeating ourselves again and again. I see no point in it.

The highest authority in a system with divine authority is supposed to be God. If you did not hear Him say, "This is My emissary, listen to him" (or maybe it would have been better had He simply told me directly what to do), then where does the system get authority from? Of course that is how it is in every other human system too (though maybe it is possible to create a "circle," and this needs further investigation), but here we are talking about a system that is supposed to reflect God’s will. The sentence "There is no escaping this, and therefore there is no problem with it" sounds to me like the sentence "This is an insoluble problem, therefore it is not a problem." Or perhaps… this really is a hard problem for religion.
And regarding the heavenly court, I planned to ask you — in your opinion, does a religious Jew need to believe in the World to Come?

This is not a question in logic but in managing life. Therefore the fact that there is no alternative is an excellent argument.
As I wrote, in our system too the Knesset is sovereign and the High Court interprets its laws in a way that grants powers to itself. And anyone who thinks this can be avoided does not understand what he is talking about.