Q&A: Dealing with a Skeptic
Dealing with a Skeptic
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask whether there is a good argument to make against someone who is a skeptic—aside from the claim that, on his own view too, his approach has no advantage over any other approach, since it also saws off the branch it sits on.
Moreover, one can perhaps show, from a theological angle, that insofar as the skeptic asks for proof, this itself shows to some extent that he assumes on a theoretical level that an explanation can be supplied. And if so, that shows he assumes some regress-stopper for the chain of explanations that will arise. Could one then present to him that an idea like self-evidence, as a kind of obvious fact, can serve that role? (Just as, on his own view, he accepts the skeptical idea that everything requires an explanation, and as long as it does not have some further explanation, then in his eyes it is not correct or not worthy of trust. If so, it seems one can understand where that comes from and give the rest of the axioms equal standing in his thinking, or as a kind of lex specialis.)
And besides, we do not really have many options other than relying on intuition and plausibility. Also because, in terms of the weight of arguments, every discussion will take place within that framework; and in the essential sense too, discussion takes place within a certain set of assumptions and not "in a vacuum" (as the cogito shows), just as a discussion about thought itself is conducted using the very tools of thought.
So in short: are there arguments other than the branch-sawing type, or showing use of another assumption, or saying there is no choice?
I was also thinking a bit about methodological arguments—such as thinking about how we ought to accumulate information about the world, and if so there is no reason to give equal weight to every philosophical possibility, even if it is logically valid but has no real grounding. But I am not sure that is persuasive if it is only on the methodological plane and not one of substantive plausibility.
Answer
You cannot answer a skeptic. What you can do is try to show him that he himself is not really a skeptic, contrary to what he thinks. A real skeptic does not ask for proofs of anything, because a priori he holds that there are none. Of course, there can be proofs that are based on foundational assumptions that are themselves unproven.
Discussion on Answer
A person does not always interpret himself correctly. A person may declare that he is an atheist, and it can be shown to him that he is actually a hidden believer (unconsciously). For example, one can point to implications he accepts that reflect belief. The same applies to skepticism. A person can declare himself a skeptic, and yet you may find things about which he does not cast doubt and ask him why; perhaps that way he will discover that he is not a skeptic. One argument in this direction is to tell him that skepticism too is an axiom, and ask whether he does not doubt that itself as well (though of course he can say that he does).
As for proofs—that is exactly what I said. If the skeptic asks for proofs, then he assumes that from his perspective there is some argument that would count as a proof even though its assumptions are unproven. And if not—then there is nothing to do with him.
Sorry I did not reply earlier. Thank you for the response.
You raised the option that a skeptic might not treat skepticism as an axiom—for example, by arguing that he also doubts the skeptical approach itself. As a result, he could continue to be coherent in his claim that he accepts nothing without grounding.
But do you not think there is something strange about that? I cannot quite put my finger on it. I still have some feeling that there is a certain contradiction here. Suppose in the end he still assumes some implication on the basis of that double doubt; then that assumption—that a double doubt has some force—is itself an axiom. For example, if he really had absolutely no axioms, we would not expect him to cast any doubt at all, but simply to remain silent.
Following what I wrote here, I thought further: can there even be a true skeptic who assumes no axioms at all? It seems that thought itself already assumes many axioms, and even the act of doubting takes place within that framework. If I understood your claim correctly, then in this case one can say to him: why should an axiom about A (such as memory, thought, the laws of logic and negation) be any different from an axiom about B, such as perceptual realism or intuition?
But even this conclusion does not seem entirely intuitive, because it does seem that there is some range of possibilities in doubting, and there are things that would already sound meaningful. For example, doubting hearing sounds more possible than doubting the memory of this thought in my mind, but according to what I wrote, that seems unreasonable.
He really is silent in principle. The talking is just because he feels like it. There is no point in hairsplitting over this.
Thank you very much!
I would be glad to know whether I understood the main part of the move correctly.
There are certain kinds of questions, like brain in a vat (BIV), that raise a hypothetical possibility explaining our understanding in a conspiratorial and non-intuitive way. For example, that the brain is inside an electric device that creates stimuli that would explain our experience, so that in fact the 'real' reality is only the brain lying on the operating table.
Of course, one can propose countless underground possibilities for every one of our understandings of the world in a way that is coherent and logically possible—like Descartes' demon.
If so, as I understand it, the response here implicit in what you suggested is that since, from my point of view, the correctness of the 'sense data' is simply an axiom, just as I think my eyes are generally functioning properly,
then I simply know that external reality exists, and those possibilities are therefore not correct. (That is, I conclude that those possibilities are not correct from the fact that I assume that I simply know that I see.) It is not because I have a good argument for it, but simply because I do not need to give it any further explanation by the very definition of the matter as a foundational assumption—and that does not mean it is groundless.
That is exactly how I answered someone, so I would be interested to know whether I understood correctly. Thank you!
Seems to me that yes. I would only sharpen the point: although I do not have an argument that proves my position, I still think it is correct (and not merely that I live by it). The axiomatic status here is not arbitrary, but a truth that is self-evident.
Thank you very much, but I am not sure I understood what you meant.
What does it mean that one can show him that he is not a skeptic? After all, he claims in our hearing that he is.
So did you mean that one can show him that skepticism too is a kind of axiom, and if so there is nothing preventing him from holding a different axiom, and following that, to show him that he certainly believes in other axioms as well—regarding understanding, memory, the senses, and so on?
And I also did not fully understand the last sentence, that *of course* there can be proofs that are based on foundational assumptions that are themselves unproven.
Is that not precisely one of the points at issue in skeptical theory? Or in any case, regarding the 'reliability' of the feeling of self-evidence—whether it is fit to serve as a sufficient basis?