Q&A: Sha’arei Yosher, Chapter 5: The Two Aspects of Presumptive Status
Sha’arei Yosher, Chapter 5: The Two Aspects of Presumptive Status
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In Sha’arei Yosher, in the passage beginning “It further seems to me that one may explain Tosafot’s intention…,” there is a (second) explanation of why even according to the view that a case of two against two is a rabbinic-level doubt, in a situation where we know that the current state differs from what it was originally, and we are uncertain about some point in between whether the change had already taken place then—even that view would agree that when we have two against two, we do not follow the original presumptive status on the Torah level.
The explanation is based on the idea that an original presumptive status has two aspects:
1. “A doubt cannot override a certainty”—Rabbi Shimon defines this as a determination that is not based on rational judgment.
2. When we know that something changed, but it is unclear to us how much it changed (for example, in our case it is unclear when it changed), we maintain the presumptive status and say that it changed as little as possible—Rabbi Shimon defines this determination as one based on rational judgment.
It is not so clear to me why the first aspect is considered a determination that is not a rational judgment, while the second is considered a determination that is a rational judgment. As I see it, both have a kind of logic to them—a legal kind of logic. That is, it is not that there is some independent reasoning or estimation that this is in fact the case, but rather it makes sense that when we do not know whether, or to what extent, the situation changed, we say that it did not change, or that it changed only minimally.
The only thing I thought of saying is that perhaps the reasoning is that the nature of things is not to change, and therefore when it is known that something did change, we say that the nature of things is to change as little as possible.
I would be glad to hear the Rabbi’s opinion.
Answer
Hello.
First, it is worth mentioning the section as well, not only the chapter.
- “A doubt cannot override a certainty” is a very logical rule from a legal-halakhic perspective, but probabilistically it is not correct. That is what I called in the appendix to the Kuntres HaMigo a “legal reasoning.” Perhaps that is what he means by something non-rational.
- I do not know what “our case” is. If you want to discuss something, please present it.
Discussion on Answer
Number 2 is also not probabilistic reasoning, and I really do not see any fundamental difference between them.
Hello Rabbi,
First, thank you for the response.
1. I am referring to the section on presumptive status, Chapter 5.
2. The case in question is the one mentioned in the chapter in Bechol Me’arvin (35b), regarding pure terumah that was placed before the Sabbath in order to serve as an eruv, and was found to be impure. There is doubt whether at the onset of the Sabbath it was still pure (so there is a valid eruv) or whether it had already become impure (so there is no eruv). There are two witnesses claiming that the terumah became impure before the onset of the Sabbath, and two witnesses claiming that it became impure after the onset of the Sabbath.
Let me sharpen my question. In the passage I quoted above, two aspects are presented on which the law of presumptive status is based:
1. “A doubt cannot override a certainty”—Rabbi Shimon calls this an aspect that is non-rational, and the Rabbi defined it as “legal reasoning.”
2. When we know that something changed, but it is not clear to us how much it changed (for example, in the case of “terumah that became impure” that I mentioned, it is not clear when the change happened), we maintain the presumptive status and say that it changed as little as possible, and we push the change as late as possible.
According to Rabbi Shimon, this is considered a rational aspect—and from what I understood based on what the Rabbi explained, this would mean reasoning that is probabilistically valid.
What I do not understand is why saying that the reasoning of presumptive status is based on the rule “a doubt cannot override a certainty” means that the law of presumptive status is based on “legal reasoning,” whereas saying that we treat the thing that changed as having changed as little as possible is not “legal reasoning” but rather “probabilistic reasoning”?
Is it based on the claim that most things, probabilistically speaking, change as little as possible?
Thanks in advance.