Yes, I understand. One could add that your point is reinforced by other passages in the Talmud, where one can apparently get the impression that the Sages really held that nature is open.
But really my main intention was to solve the practical problem—meaning, to preserve prayer within the updated conception. To adopt Rabbi Akiva Eger’s third doubt-case (the one discussed in the lecture), and through that solve the problem.

I just don’t understand the logic of it. If the Holy One, blessed be He, does intervene in nature and it is also permitted to ask Him for that, then why is it permitted only when His intervention is not noticeable? Moreover, even if the intervention is noticeable to people, as with a fetus after 40 days, nobody knows whether God really intervened or not.

Good question, but the gates of explanations have not been locked. One can always offer some possible conceptual explanation.

And in general, why indeed is it that “one does not pray for a miracle”? In the conventional view, according to which the Holy One, blessed be He, does intervene, it is still forbidden to pray for a miracle—why? The simple explanation is that for some reason God does not desire prayer that breaks physics. So in light of the above, one would have to update this and say that the Sages understood that specifically a break that is tangible to the reasonable person is the problematic thing, but a break in a closed nature that is not tangible (Rabbi Akiva Eger’s doubt-case mentioned above) is indeed possible.

A possible explanation: the greater the miracle is (the more tangible it is, such that there is a break in physics), the more merits or special standing are required for it—somewhat like what is brought in the Talmud, that a miracle deducts from one’s merits, etc. Therefore, the rule is that “one does not pray for a miracle,” meaning a miracle that breaks nature in a tangible way (that requires many merits, and for the reasonable person there is no point in praying for it. Indeed, we find among the later authorities that a miracle for the public is permitted, and perhaps that is connected to this reason). By contrast, a miracle whose break is not tangible—the magnitude of the miracle is not all that noticeable, and therefore one may indeed pray.

That’s a dirt-cheap explanation for a Sabbath seven blessings meal, but I mean that explanations can be supplied from here to kingdom come, even if they are strained.

There is an interesting ruling by the Maharsham of Berezan related to the above issue. For the questioner’s benefit I’m copying it here (for now I found it in the book Torat HaUbar):
“Word spread in the study hall of a novel ruling from the prince of Torah, the Maharsham, regarding the parameters of prayer, following an incident that came before him. The incident itself was as follows: in a certain city they learned that the military camp was supposed to pass through their town on its way to war, and if they did indeed pass through, then the soldiers would plunder and impoverish the townspeople for many long months. The townspeople went to ask a certain great rabbi to save them, that the military camp should not come to their city. The rabbi told them to give him money for charity and he would pray for this. The townspeople brought him the money as requested. The rabbi prayed, and already the next day a telegram arrived instructing the soldiers to leave the city. The townspeople then came to the rabbi claiming that he should return their money, because the telegram had been sent two days before he prayed. It follows that it was not the rabbi’s prayer that saved them, since in any case the telegram was already on its way. But the rabbi argued that he need not return the money, because he did as requested, and in the end the soldiers did not come to the city.

And they came for Torah adjudication before the Maharsham, who claimed that the rabbi was correct and need not return the money. His reason was that since the cancellation of the decree was revealed only after the righteous man’s prayer, even though it later became clear that it had already been canceled from the outset, this is considered as if the decree had been canceled from the beginning on the basis of, and on condition that, the righteous man would pray.

And as proof for his words, the Maharsham brought the following: when the Ark of God stayed in the house of Oved-Edom the Gittite, it says: ‘And the Ark of the Lord remained in the house of Oved-Edom the Gittite three months, and the Lord blessed Oved-Edom and all his household’ (II Samuel 6). And it is explained in the Talmud, Berakhot 63b: What was the blessing with which he was blessed? That his mother-in-law and his eight daughters-in-law gave birth, each bearing six in one womb. Now, the Ark stayed in the house of Oved-Edom the Gittite for three months. If his mother-in-law and his eight daughters-in-law gave birth while the Ark was in their house, each bearing six in one womb, then it must be said that the pregnancies had already begun at least six months before the Ark arrived in their house. It is explicitly proven from this that the blessing of the Ark already took effect long before the Ark was actually there, and worked retroactively even before it blessed them. The explanation is that because the Holy One, blessed be He, knew in advance that the Ark would stay in Oved-Edom’s house, God preemptively blessed, retroactively, the pregnancies of his wife and daughters-in-law, in the sense of ‘Before they call, I will answer.’ And if this is indeed the explanation of the Talmudic passage, then it follows that since salvation comes from Heaven on the basis of what a person is going to do in the future, then also in our case, where the townspeople brought money to the rabbi so he would save them, the salvation took effect long before the townspeople brought the money to the rabbi, by virtue of the fact that in the future they would bring him money and the rabbi would pray on their behalf. And therefore the Maharsham ruled that the rabbi need not return the money.” End quote.
And as a support for this there is what is stated in the Talmud, Ta’anit 8a, that in the days of Rabbi Zeira they decreed a decree, and it was further decreed that they should not fast, and Rabbi Zeira said: Let us accept a fast and complete it after the decree is annulled, see there.

“And I saw that the words of the Maharsham have already been brought in several books, among them in Nefesh Shimshon by Rabbi Shimshon Pincus, Order of Prayer, p. 337; in Bnei Re’em by Rabbi A. Gankhovsky, sec. 50; and in Chashukei Chemed, Pesachim 50, and others.”

Nice. It reminds me of my discussion in column 463-4.

I just listened to the first half of the fourth lecture, and with your permission, three remarks:

[A] As I wrote above, there may be a theological rationale for not praying for a breaking of the laws of nature (it requires a great spiritual level and abundant fear of Heaven). If so, it is understandable that even if a person does not know whether the Holy One, blessed be He, intervened on his behalf (prayer for a pregnant woman after 40 days), it would still be forbidden. You assume a different explanation for why it is forbidden to pray, and therefore you do not accept this possibility.

[B] As I was listening, I thought about the meaning of the third doubt-case—“pseudo-ontic”—and I had an association with one of the arguments that came up in the lecture series on “mysticism.” There, a discussion came up that when there is a dispute between the Talmud and Kabbalah, we find that most halakhic decisors tend to rule like the Talmud, whereas the kabbalists rule like Kabbalah. The explanation given was that the decisor has to rule on the objective, tangible plane. But that plane differs from one person to another. For the overwhelming majority of people, Jewish law is itself the tangible plane. By contrast, for kabbalists of great stature, it may be that דווקא the hidden world is their tangible and immediate world. This could be developed at length.

In any case, from here it may follow that practical reasonings and rulings (halakhic ones) depend on the broader worldview of the one deciding. Is he a kabbalist or a decisor? Is the hidden world tangible or remote? This is a bit simplistic, but I’m writing the general direction. And I thought maybe this connects to the idea of the pseudo-ontic doubt-case. Here too, perhaps the ruling is ultimately based on the fact that reality is vague, while in fact reality is not vague. But the fact that reality is not vague is itself vague to the person. That is, this is the way a scientist or someone experienced in this mode of thought sees it—therefore it is not tangible for him! And consequently, truly the halakhic ruling would not be based on that—and rightly so.

In light of this, one should consider whether it may be possible to say that for scientists there is in fact no justification for adopting a “pseudo-ontic doubt,” since they know that reality is not vague, and therefore they cannot relate to it otherwise. In other words, is a “pseudo-ontic” doubt defined that way even for people who know that no such thing really exists, or is it only for those who genuinely have a pseudo-ontic doubt that there is really justification for this stance?

The connection to mysticism, of course, points to the second possibility (only kabbalists with a kabbalistic orientation rule in accordance with Kabbalah). But really there is also room for the second position [apparently: the other position]—that even experts who see worms through an instrument are allowed to eat. And perhaps that is even more plausible. It requires further thought.

[C] Another side remark not related to the substance of the matter: for some reason, there is a nice, pleasant fellow in the lecture named Eliav who attributed this thread here to himself (when you mentioned it in the lecture)—that is, that he wrote these things. But that is not so. My name (the writer’s) is “Avrimi,” not “Eliav.” Apparently there was some confusion here. In any case, it really doesn’t matter. But I just wanted to note it for the sake of accuracy.

Thanks for all the lectures and for the response!

[A] As stated, that explanation does not seem plausible to me. In any case, if we do not know whether the Holy One, blessed be He, intervened, what is the point of distinguishing between a situation in which laws of nature were broken and one in which it only appears so, apparently and mistakenly, that they were not? The person’s spiritual level neither adds nor subtracts here. I do not see any logic in this.

[B] It seems to me that I said that there myself: that for the kabbalists this is the world accessible to them, and therefore they rule in accordance with it in practice.

I also wondered what the law would be for a scientist who knows that the ground behaves in a deterministic way: is his view nullified relative to everyone else, and the Jewish law of an unintended act remains in place, or perhaps for him the law is different? I tend to think that the law is one for everyone. Especially since I showed that even experts make the same mistakes and treat epistemic doubts as though they were ontic.

[C] Fine. 🙂

[A] I agree that it is not plausible. But I thought that to abolish prayer—in practice that does not mean abolish it, but forbid it!—is a very major novelty. Maybe it is preferable to adopt an implausible explanation rather than a reform that is even more novel [and implausible?]. But I understand the difficulty.

[B] Very interesting. I think that with regard to worms, the position really is that since they are visible only through instruments, the Torah simply did not forbid that from the outset. Meaning, even after seeing them through instruments it remains permitted for everyone. But one can also distinguish between the cases. Interesting.

[B] I once saw people bring in the name of Rabbi Zalman of Liadi (I don’t know whether it’s true) that in his Shulchan Arukh he ruled according to the revealed tradition, whereas in his prayer book he ruled according to Kabbalah. Presumably the prayer book is more practically operative. So maybe in general, in practice, he conducted himself according to Kabbalah. And perhaps because in his eyes prayer belongs more to the kabbalistic domain.

By the way, I didn’t understand the Maharsham’s proof. If the Ark arrived and the next day there was a birth of six in one womb, then must it follow (or is it likely) that the blessing was during the pregnancy and not a moment before birth? Why? That isn’t similar to a telegram with a written date on it, where we really know that the salvation began before that rabbi’s prayer. (Perhaps the Maharsham understands that within the three months they all gave birth—his mother-in-law and eight daughters-in-law—and that itself is the blessing, in which case the pregnancies certainly began before the Ark arrived. But even that, it seems to me, can be rejected.)

[C] Avrimi, indeed, I mentioned that it was me, because I thought the Rabbi was about to speak about something else. And afterward, when I saw that he wasn’t, I wrote in the lecture chat that I was mistaken and that actually it wasn’t me. 🙂 I corrected it. Maybe the Rabbi remembers.

Tirgitz,

In the book Sha'ar HaKollel (section 1), it is brought that they once asked Rabbi Zalman of Liadi what the law is in a case where there is a dispute between Kabbalah and the Talmud, and it says there that he answered that presumably one should rule like the masters of Kabbalah. And when they asked him, since in his own Shulchan Arukh he wrote that in such a case one should rule like the Talmud, he answered that that is indeed what the decisors write, and he wrote the Shulchan Arukh with the aim of Talmudic ruling. However, the kabbalists write that one should rule like Kabbalah, and therefore in practice one should indeed conduct oneself like the masters of Kabbalah. See there.

EA,

All good, 🙂