Answer 2
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Table of Contents
- General Overview
- Existential commandments, conditional commandments, and the commandment of repentance
- The contradiction between Sefer HaMitzvot and Mishneh Torah and the roles of the two works
- The ninth root principle, duplications, and a general prohibition
- Law given to Moses at Sinai, rabbinic expositions, and the definition of a “command” in Maimonides
- Two aspects in every commandment and transgression: obedience and repair
- Law, natural law, and positivism as a halakhic illustration
- A transgression for its own sake and preferring content in extreme cases
- “And you shall return to the Lord your God,” Nachmanides and Maimonides, and the absence of a command to repent
- Why it is impossible to command repentance, and character refinement as a parallel example
- Acceptance of God, serving for its own sake, and love and fear in Maimonides
- Talmud Torah, reciting the Shema, “it shall not depart,” and the gap between the formal definition of the commandment and “the truth”
- The laws of repentance as the foundation of serving God
Summary
General Overview
The text argues that one must distinguish between an existential commandment, a conditional commandment, and a full obligation, and it presents the commandment of repentance according to Maimonides as a unique example in which there is both a condition and fulfillment without any transgression. It proposes a resolution to the contradiction between Sefer HaMitzvot and Mishneh Torah by arguing that Sefer HaMitzvot counts only explicit Torah commands, whereas Mishneh Torah includes everything one is obligated to do from any source. It develops a criterion in Maimonides according to which a Torah-level commandment requires both a command and unique content, and explains that every commandment and transgression includes an aspect of obedience and an aspect of repair or damage. From this it argues that repentance itself is not a commandment in the sense of an explicit command, but rather a fundamental obligation that precedes the whole system of commands, and therefore Maimonides “persuades” a person to repent and places in the laws of repentance matters such as free choice, Torah study for its own sake, love of God, and reward and punishment as foundations of serving God.
Existential commandments, conditional commandments, and the commandment of repentance
The text brings an example from Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, according to whom the commandment of settling the Land of Israel is a commandment such that if you do it, you have fulfilled a positive commandment, and if you do not do it, nothing has happened. It argues that most examples people call an “existential commandment” are really parts of commandments or actions beyond the threshold of obligation, like charity beyond the required amount or Torah study beyond one chapter in the morning and one in the evening according to some opinions. It defines the commandment of repentance according to Maimonides in Sefer HaMitzvot as a conditional commandment: “when one repents from his sin, he should confess,” so the obligation is to confess when repentance is done. It cites the Minchat Chinukh, who argues that one cannot say that someone who repented but did not confess has “neglected a positive commandment” more severely than someone who did not repent at all, and therefore concludes that the commandment of repentance is both conditional and existential, such that failure to confess is not a transgression but only a missed fulfillment.
The contradiction between Sefer HaMitzvot and Mishneh Torah and the roles of the two works
The text points out that in Sefer HaMitzvot Maimonides counts confession but not a commandment to repent, whereas in Mishneh Torah Maimonides writes that there is “one commandment” with two details: to repent and to confess. It proposes that the difference stems from the fact that Sefer HaMitzvot includes only what the Torah explicitly commanded as part of the 613 commandments, whereas Mishneh Torah gathers together “all of Jewish law” and everything one is obligated to do, including rabbinic obligations, law given to Moses at Sinai, logical inferences, and rabbinic expositions. It explains that because of this broader scope, things that are not counted among the 613 can still appear in Mishneh Torah as practical obligations. It illustrates this through Maimonides’ wording regarding Yom Kippur: “Therefore everyone is obligated to repent and confess on Yom Kippur,” and interprets the “therefore” as indicating that this follows from the logic of a time of atonement and forgiveness, not from an explicit command.
The ninth root principle, duplications, and a general prohibition
The text cites Maimonides’ ninth root principle, which deals with duplications in counting the commandments, and describes two models. It says that with commandments such as the Sabbath, where the Torah commands it “twelve times,” we count one commandment because the content is identical. It then presents the opposite model of a “general prohibition,” such as “Do not eat over the blood,” from which several different prohibitions are derived, and yet in Sefer HaMitzvot it appears as one prohibition. It raises Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla’s question about the contradiction: does Maimonides follow commands or content? It offers a solution in the form of a complex criterion: a Torah-level commandment exists only when there is both a command and unique content not included in another commandment. When there is a command without unique content, or content without a command, the matter is not counted as a Torah-level commandment.
Law given to Moses at Sinai, rabbinic expositions, and the definition of a “command” in Maimonides
The text says that when there is content without an explicit command in the Torah, such as law given to Moses at Sinai, the matter is not counted in Sefer HaMitzvot. It notes that Maimonides even calls this “rabbinic law” in certain contexts. It also explains that laws derived from rabbinic expositions are not counted according to the second root principle, because Maimonides understands such expositions as extensions of the verse rather than as uncovering an explicit command hidden inside it, and therefore there is no “verse that commands this.” It gives the example of “You shall fear the Lord your God” being expanded to include Torah scholars, as a case where there is no direct command to fear Torah scholars, only an extension of the spirit of the verse.
Two aspects in every commandment and transgression: obedience and repair
The text cites Rabbi Elchanan in his essay on repentance, quoting the Ramchal, that every commandment accomplishes two things: responding to a command and achieving the repair that the content of the commandment is meant to produce. It argues that a transgression also has two aspects: rebellion against the command and damage in the content for whose sake it was prohibited. It illustrates this with the case of “he intended to eat pork but ended up eating lamb,” where there is rebellion without damage in content, and the case of an unintentional sin, “he intended to eat lamb and ended up eating pork,” where there is damage in content without rebellion. It uses this to explain the rabbinic statement, “Greater is one who is commanded and does than one who is not commanded and does,” as the advantage of someone who fulfills both obedience to the command and the repair itself, as opposed to someone who performs the repair without being commanded.
Law, natural law, and positivism as a halakhic illustration
The text uses the example of a red traffic light at midnight to illustrate the tension between obeying the law because it is law and obeying it for reasons of benefit. It presents the debate in legal theory between “natural law” and “positivism,” and argues that a legal system includes both content and an element of command. It describes situations of conflict between law and morality, including the idea of “manifestly illegal” orders as an attempt to avoid making the conflict explicit. It compares this to halakhic structures, and distinguishes between intra-halakhic conflicts, like saving a life, and situations presented as an exception justified by broad principles such as “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have nullified Your Torah.”
A transgression for its own sake and preferring content in extreme cases
The text cites the Talmud in Nazir about “A transgression for its own sake is greater than a commandment not for its own sake,” and discusses examples such as Yael, the wife of Heber the Kenite. It describes Lot’s daughters as people who thought the world had been destroyed and that there was a need to preserve human seed, and according to the Talmud’s presentation, it says the sages praise their actions. It uses this to argue that there are extreme situations in which “natural morality” overrides formal Jewish law. It presents this as a possible conflict between command and content, while emphasizing that this claim concerns extreme exceptions, not a standing rule.
“And you shall return to the Lord your God,” Nachmanides and Maimonides, and the absence of a command to repent
The text says that Nachmanides learns from “And you shall return to the Lord your God” that there is a positive commandment to repent, but notes that Maimonides, in Laws of Repentance chapter 7, writes, “The Torah has already promised that Israel will ultimately repent,” and therefore reads the verse as a promise rather than a command. It concludes that according to Maimonides there is no verse commanding the act of repentance, and therefore in Sefer HaMitzvot there is no commandment to repent, only the commandment of confession. It explains that Mishneh Torah includes what one “needs to do” even without an explicit command, and so repentance appears there as a practical obligation.
Why it is impossible to command repentance, and character refinement as a parallel example
The text argues that some things do not enter the count of the 613 commandments not because they are minor, but because they are too fundamental, and because commanding them might destroy their content. It gives an example about character refinement through a matchmaking story and humility, to show how “checking the box” on a commandment can distort the trait itself. It attributes to Rabbi Kook the idea that there are areas which, if turned into a formal command, would lose their essence. It applies this to repentance and argues that if repentance were a written commandment, a person would repent “because it says so,” and in that way repentance would fail to repair the root disconnection that led to the transgression.
Acceptance of God, serving for its own sake, and love and fear in Maimonides
The text connects Maimonides in the laws of idolatry, about one who serves out of love or out of fear, with a foundation of “acceptance of God” as an unconditional commitment to do what God says. It explains that “for its own sake” is not identical to “commandments require intention,” and distinguishes between doing something for the sake of preparing an object for a commandment and Torah study for its own sake as an intermediate concept. It cites Maimonides in Laws of Repentance chapter 10, who defines proper worship as doing the truth “because it is truth,” and stresses that this does not depend on reward, punishment, love, or fear in their simple sense. It presents this as the foundation of serving for its own sake, in which love may accompany it but is not the motivation.
Talmud Torah, reciting the Shema, “it shall not depart,” and the gap between the formal definition of the commandment and “the truth”
The text cites the Talmud in Menachot 99, that one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, or even reciting the Shema morning and evening, fulfills “it shall not depart,” but “this may not be said before the unlearned,” or according to another opinion, “it is a commandment to say it.” It interprets the gap as one between fulfilling the formal definition of the commandment and the true content of Torah study as a foundational process that cannot be reduced to the framework of a minimal obligation. It brings Ben Dama’s question to Rabbi Yishmael about studying Greek wisdom and the answer, “Go and find an hour that is neither of the day nor of the night and study it then,” as guidance directed toward something beyond the formal boundaries of the commandment. It also mentions the opinion that “this verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment but a blessing,” and the phrase “words of Torah should not be upon you as an obligation, yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them,” as presenting Torah study as a foundation that is not merely a formal command.
The laws of repentance as the foundation of serving God
The text argues that the content of Maimonides’ laws of repentance includes chapters on free will, reward and punishment, the World to Come, Torah study for its own sake, and serving for its own sake because these are not technical details of a commandment but foundations of serving God. It says the discussion of choice belongs here especially because repentance means “to return to being one who chooses,” and to go back to the foundational point at which a person chooses to serve God unconditionally. It presents the Book of Knowledge as introductions, and the Book of Love as the beginning of Jewish law in the sense of a system of commands, while the laws of repentance are a concise concentration of the root of serving God. It concludes that the first chapters define the need to return, and the remaining chapters define “where to return to”: to serving for its own sake, to Torah study as truth, and to renewed acceptance of God as God.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One example—someone drew my attention to this some time ago—one example: Rabbi Moshe Feinstein claims that the commandment of settling the Land of Israel is of that kind. If you do it, good; and if you don’t do it, nothing happened. Meaning, if you did it, it’s a positive commandment—you fulfilled a positive commandment—and if you didn’t do it, then not. Doesn’t matter; he has proofs, not important right now. The only commandment—and even that, of course, is disputed—but the only commandment where this even comes up, at least that I found, is this one. All the other notions of an existential commandment—those are commandments, those are parts of commandments, or things from a certain threshold of obligation onward. Someone who gives charity beyond what he’s obligated to give, someone who studies Torah beyond one chapter in the morning and one in the evening according to some opinions. In other words, these are kinds of commandments that are existential commandments. Conditional commandments, of course, there are quite a few of. Now what happens with the commandment of repentance according to Maimonides’ wording in Sefer HaMitzvot? It’s also, as I said, both conditional and existential. Why? The fact that it is conditional—that’s Maimonides’ formulation: when one repents from his sin, he should confess. Meaning, if you repent, you have to do it in this way. What happens if someone repented and didn’t confess? Seemingly he neglected a positive commandment, no? It’s like tzitzit. Someone who put on a four-cornered garment and didn’t attach tzitzit to it neglected a positive commandment. The Minchat Chinukh says that can’t be. Why can’t it be? Because then it comes out that someone who repented and didn’t confess is worse than someone who didn’t repent at all. Right? Someone who didn’t repent at all—nothing happened, there’s no commandment to repent. But someone who repented and didn’t confess—then he neglected a positive commandment. That’s not reasonable, right? Therefore he says, what’s really implicit here is that this is a commandment that is conditional and existential. Meaning, you are obligated to confess only if you repented—that’s why it’s conditional—but even if you did repent, if you didn’t confess, you have no transgression; you just didn’t fulfill the commandment. So it’s existential. Meaning, it is conditional and existential together. That really is a unique example. It seems to me that last time I didn’t say this. Fine. In any event, that’s Maimonides in Sefer HaMitzvot. In Mishneh Torah Maimonides says there is indeed one commandment, but it has two details: to repent and to confess. So I said that I think the resolution to this contradiction—I don’t know a good resolution to this contradiction—I think the most reasonable resolution I can think of, and this too needs to be checked more systematically, I haven’t done that, but it seems to me the obvious explanation is that in Sefer HaMitzvot Maimonides writes what we are obligated to do by the Torah, what the Torah commands us to do. And in Mishneh Torah Maimonides writes everything we are obligated to do, no matter from where, right? Rabbinic commandments—in Sefer HaMitzvot they won’t appear. That’s not part of the 613. But in Mishneh Torah, yes. Law given to Moses at Sinai—in Sefer HaMitzvot it won’t appear. It’s not one of the 613 commandments. But in Mishneh Torah, yes. Why? Because in Mishneh Torah all of Jewish law appears, everything we are obligated to do appears in Mishneh Torah. In Sefer HaMitzvot appears only what we were explicitly commanded in the Torah. Only what the Torah commanded us. The 613 commandments that the Torah itself commanded us. It reminds me that there is Maimonides’ ninth root principle—I also didn’t say this—Maimonides in the ninth root principle says… there is a contradiction in Maimonides’ words in the ninth root principle. Maimonides has fourteen root principles, which are the rules of how he counts the commandments, how he classifies the commandments, how he arrived at the number 613. The ninth root principle deals with duplications. But it has two types of duplications. The first part of the ninth root principle deals with one kind, and the second part deals with the other. The first part of the ninth root principle deals with commandments like the Sabbath. There are twelve times that the Torah commands us to observe the Sabbath. How many commandments do we count? One. Why? Because these are twelve commands with the same content. Right? So there’s no point counting them twelve times. It’s one commandment. That’s the first part of the ninth root principle. And in the second part Maimonides talks about the opposite situation. We have a general prohibition: “Do not eat over the blood.” What in Sanhedrin? “Do not eat over the blood”—several prohibitions are derived from this. The wayward and rebellious son—this is a warning for the wayward and rebellious son. It’s a warning not to eat before prayer—by the way, implying that this is Torah-level. Not to eat when judging capital cases. Never mind, all kinds of things—five, I think, are there; five or six, if the one about not eating before prayer makes six. It appears elsewhere in Berakhot and Maimonides includes it here, so it sounds like he understands it as truly Torah-level. Never mind. But there are six different prohibitions learned from this verse. How many such prohibitions appear in Sefer HaMitzvot? One. Only one. This is basically the wayward and rebellious son: “Do not eat over the blood.” Rabbi Yerucham Perla asks—right? Sefer HaMitzvot of Saadia Gaon, you know it, with Rabbi Yerucham Perla’s commentary; Rabbi Yerucham Perla’s Sefer HaMitzvot with short notes from Saadia Gaon. So he writes there that there is a contradiction in the ninth root principle. Why? Because it’s not clear whether Maimonides follows the commands or the contents. In the first part Maimonides says: we follow the contents, not the commands. There are twelve commands with the same content—how many do we count? One commandment. So what determines it? The content, not the command, right? What happens in the second part? There are five different contents from one command. How many commandments does Maimonides count? One. Why? But you go by the contents. There are five contents here, not one. Suddenly Maimonides goes by the commands. Well, if you go by the commands, then let’s go back to the first part—why don’t you count twelve commandments there? Why one? So what do you say?
[Speaker C] We go by the contents when they are identical.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously when the contents are identical, that’s what I’m talking about. But in the second part the contents are not identical, and Maimonides still doesn’t count them.
[Speaker C] We go by the command, but you can’t understand twelve commands with the same content as twelve commandments.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then what is the determining criterion?
[Speaker C] I don’t know what the determining criterion is. It’s the command. I didn’t understand—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the determining criterion is the command, there are twelve commands here.
[Speaker C] I don’t understand. The determining criterion is the combination.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Both. Why are all our conceptual analyses always either this or that? Either you pay for damage caused by your property because it’s your property that caused damage, or because I was negligent in guarding it—maybe it’s both? Why do we always decide in these analyses that it’s either this or that? It’s both. Maimonides’ criterion—and then there’s no difficulty at all—Maimonides’ criterion is that a Torah-level commandment is only a commandment regarding which we have a command and that also has unique content, content not included in another commandment. If both those conditions are met, that is called a Torah-level commandment. If one of the conditions is not met, then it is not a Torah-level commandment. When is one of those conditions not met? For example, when there is content and no command—which is exactly “Do not eat over the blood.” There are five different contents, but we have only one command concerning them, so you can’t count more than one, right? In the first part of the ninth root principle there is one content with twelve commands—again, you can’t count twelve commandments because there is only one content. You need both content and command. Okay? More examples: what about law given to Moses at Sinai? There is content there, right? But there is no command; no command appears in the Torah. No command in the Torah appears, so Maimonides doesn’t count it. More than that: Maimonides calls it rabbinic law, by the way. Commandments learned through rabbinic expositions—the same thing. Why doesn’t Maimonides count those either, in the second root principle? Why doesn’t he count them? There is some content, there is some reason why we do it, but there is no command in the Torah, because Maimonides understands the expositions as an expansion of the verse, not an uncovering of what is inside it. So in essence the command doesn’t exist there; there is no verse that commands this. We understand from the spirit of the matter that it is an extension: “You shall fear the Lord your God”—to include Torah scholars. The verse “You shall fear the Lord your God” does not command us to fear Torah scholars. We expand this command and understand that apparently we are expected, in the spirit of the matter, also to fear Torah scholars. But there is no command about that, so Maimonides doesn’t count it. And that too, by the way, Maimonides calls rabbinic law—laws that emerge from rabbinic expositions.
[Speaker C] The final washing of the hands too has no source. Where is it written? Where?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t have it here. From here? Well, if you understand it as a command, then eruv tavshilin is Torah-level. If you understand it as something that is not a command, then no—then it’s rabbinic. Not for nothing—I don’t know what he counts, I think he does. Anyway, so we see in Maimonides that a Torah-level commandment is indeed a commandment for which there is a command and that has unique content. Why really? What does that mean? Why do we need both these criteria? To understand that, we need to understand what it means to perform a commandment or not to commit a transgression. There is an essay by Rabbi Elchanan—I didn’t mention it, right?—in Rabbi Elchanan’s essay on repentance he writes, quoting the Ramchal, that anyone who performs a commandment is really accomplishing two things: he is also obeying the Holy One, blessed be He—responding to the command—and he also reaches the repair that that commandment is meant to achieve. Someone who honors his parents—there is a reason why the Torah commanded honoring parents, right? It fixes something; there is some sort of benefit, spiritual, whatever. So he has achieved that benefit if he performed the commandment. But besides that, he also fulfilled the command. Two things. Someone who did not commit a transgression—someone who did commit a transgression—there too there are two aspects. One aspect is that he rebelled against the command; he went against the command. The second aspect is the reason why we were commanded—apparently it damages something, it corrupts something—so he also caused damage. Right? So every commandment and every transgression has two aspects. Someone who intended to eat pork and ended up with lamb—what happened there? The bad content did not—
[Speaker B] happen,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the bad content wasn’t there, but rebellion against the command was there, right? And what is the opposite case? He intended to eat lamb and ended up with pork—what is that called in ordinary language? Unintentional sin, right? What is the status of unintentional sin? In essence he performed the prohibited act. But he didn’t rebel against the command; he didn’t know he was going against a command here. Okay? So there are different situations in which only one of the aspects of the commandment appears. But a commandment or a transgression in its full sense is when both things are there. By the way, the Talmud says, “Greater is one who is commanded and does than one who is not commanded and does.” Why? So we always talk about psychology, right? One who is commanded and does has a stronger evil inclination, he has to overcome more, all kinds of explanations of that sort—that’s for ethical literature. But why really is he greater? He is greater because there are two aspects here, right? If he is commanded and does, then when he does it he both accomplishes the repair in the commandment and responds to the command. One who is not commanded and does—the repair is there, but there is no response to a command. So therefore he is less great. That’s all. So these are the two aspects in every commandment and every transgression. Now we can understand why for Maimonides a Torah-level commandment is only a commandment for which there is a command and that has unique content. Why really? You need a command so that there will be the aspect of responding to a command. Content, of course, so that there will be some benefit from the commandment. Why did He command us in this commandment? There needs to be something that this commandment says. Okay? There has to be some distinct benefit, a special benefit in the commandment, or a distinct harm in the transgression. Only where both those things are present is it a Torah-level commandment. And therefore every commandment has both this and that: response to a command and repair. Therefore Maimonides says: that’s the only thing—this is what defines a Torah-level commandment. Why? What is the significance of this? In fact, this significance exists in every legal system. Right? I think I mentioned this, right? If we go through a red light at twelve at night—the Bnei Akiva activities. So why, if you’re there at twelve at night, nobody sees you, there isn’t a single car there, nothing, but the light is red—do you go through or not?
[Speaker C] Fine, so I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I won’t tell you what I would or wouldn’t do in such a situation, but what is the dilemma?
[Speaker C] The habit—if you always go through, you’ll go through. No, that’s psychology.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what is the dilemma? The principled dilemma. The question is whether one must obey the law because of—yes, because of the command, by virtue of the very fact that there is a law—or whether I obey the law because I want to achieve the benefit for which it was intended. Here there is no benefit, so why should I care that there is a command? In other words, but the truth is that this is actually a dispute in legal theory, a dispute that existed at least, between a conception called natural law and a conception—let’s say the opposite extreme approach—called positivism. Positivism is basically the conception that says the law obligates not because it is just, not because of the benefit or morality in it, but because it was legislated properly, in due form. That is the reason the law obligates. And the natural-law conception says: no, I am obligated because it is right to act this way, because it is proper to act this way, because it is moral, whatever—various reasons. Common sense, natural law. Today it is pretty clear that you can’t understand it only as natural law. The law certainly—say, even before the law against going through a red light was enacted—it was dangerous to go through a red light. And still there is a difference between the situation before enactment and after enactment. Why? Because the added value of the fact that it is a law is the fact that there is a command here. Besides the fact that it’s not okay—that was true beforehand too. A legal system is a system that contains something beyond what is right and what is not right; rather, the very fact that this was legislated means it requires you to obey it. You can decide that you don’t want to, but what is the significance of the fact that there is a law here? So even law in its general sense, not specifically halakhic, has these two aspects. There is of course the content aspect, the aspect of what this is meant to achieve, and there is the aspect of the very fact that there is a command, that there is a law. By the way, there are situations where there is a conflict between these two aspects, right? Things that today perhaps are called manifestly illegal, because they are trying to find a positivist solution to the problem. But really this is a situation of conflict. There can be a situation where the law tells you to obey your commander, say in the army, and morality tells you that under no circumstances may you do it. Natural law, natural justice. What do you do in such a situation? That’s the dilemma; it depends on the weight of the two sides. How immoral is it, how problematic is it. If it really crosses some red lines, then today it is accepted to think that positivism—the law in that matter—does not override natural morality. And therefore the law is set aside in favor of natural morality. These tricks like “a manifestly illegal order” are meant to avoid the conflict. To tell you that here there isn’t even a law, so you don’t need to violate the law because morality overrides it. No—morality never overrides the law, but here there simply is no law. Why is there no law? The Knesset legislated it. It’s just a way of getting around the problem, but never mind.
[Speaker B] But there is a law that allows you to violate the law… okay, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] These are formulations, but practically, in short, what that means—no matter what all the pilpulim say—is that in extreme cases natural law overrides. Saving a life is a conflict between two commands or between two contents. It’s not a conflict between command and content. It’s an intra-halakhic conflict. There’s no—Jewish law itself handles it and reaches a halakhic conclusion about what to do. The rationale of the verse?
[Speaker C] The rationale of the verse is not a conflict.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why—
[Speaker C] is it a conflict?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The rationale of the verse, for example, in a place where the law—say, not to take a widow’s garment as collateral—so there one of the disputes between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon is whether—
[Speaker B] we interpret—
[Speaker C] the rationale of the verse.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One who does not interpret the rationale of the verse says this applies even to a wealthy widow, right? So what is he really saying? That not taking a widow’s collateral means every widow; it’s not because she is poor or something like that. One who does interpret the rationale of the verse says that this is what the command tells you: don’t take the collateral of a poor widow. So the dispute is an interpretive dispute; there is no question of conflict here. The question is simply what the command means. Okay?
[Speaker B] “It is a time to act for the Lord”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe that comes closer—“It is a time to act for the Lord; they have nullified Your Torah”? What? Prozbul maybe too, although formally that is a rabbinic enactment. They can uproot something from the Torah in monetary matters. There are halakhic mechanisms there that make it possible. And the best example is perhaps “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have nullified Your Torah.”
[Speaker C] “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have nullified Your Torah” is also, like the Rabbi said before, like saving a life. It’s written in the Torah: there are times when one has to act according to “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have nullified Your Torah.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Saving a life overrides the Sabbath—it is written in the Torah that you must preserve life, and it is written in the Torah that you must observe the Sabbath. So that is a conflict between command and command. But “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have nullified Your Torah” is not a verse in the Torah, not a commandment. It is a principle we use, a linguistic expression we use, to tell you that here we are operating through violation of the Torah. It is not one commandment overriding another; it’s not an intra-halakhic thing. Now it’s true that “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have nullified Your Torah” is a situation in which the sages act—Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi made the decision—so perhaps that too is not entirely this, because the sages also have authority; after all, the Torah itself granted them authority. But there are such situations. What about a transgression for its own sake? Talmud, Nazir 23. The Talmud says: “A transgression for its own sake is greater than a commandment not for its own sake.” Right? It brings several examples there. One of the examples is Yael, the wife of Heber the Kenite, which is a bit hard to understand as a transgression for its own sake. But later the Talmud talks, for example, about Lot’s daughters, and it’s not brought there as an example of this explicitly, but from the context I think it is pretty clear that the Talmud sees that too as connected to the issue of a transgression for its own sake. What happened with Lot’s daughters? It says explicitly in the Torah that Lot’s daughters were basically living in Plato’s cave. They saw that the whole world around them had been destroyed. Okay? They were sure that the entire world had been destroyed, which is exactly Plato’s cave metaphor—you think that what is happening in the cave here is the whole world. Maybe there is also something outside. Fine? So they thought the whole world had been destroyed, nothing remained. So they said: no, we have to preserve seed; there is no man left to preserve seed from. So what can be done? There is no other way; humanity is about to become extinct. There is no other way except to violate the prohibition of incest. That is the only way. And the sages praise them for this there in the Talmud. They praise them for it.
[Speaker B] Was there even a prohibition for them?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud, at least as it presents it—we’re not engaged in historical clarification—the Talmud presents this situation as one that is praised, even by someone who does know the prohibition. Fine. So the Talmud praises it. Why? It’s a prohibition, after all. Where is it written anywhere in the Torah that I am supposed to worry about preserving human seed? “What have you to do with the hidden decrees of the Merciful One?” Let the Holy One, blessed be He, worry about that. Am I supposed to worry about it? They made a calculation and decided yes, and the Talmud praises them for that. Meaning, there are situations in which natural morality—let’s call it that—what Rabbi Amital always liked talking about, cannibalism, which for some reason was his favorite example, I don’t know why. In any event, this example of a transgression for its own sake is a situation in which natural morality, in very extreme cases, overrides formal Jewish law. Meaning, even in Jewish law there can be a situation where there is a conflict between the command and natural justice.
[Speaker C] And what about when the reason is gone, the enactment is gone? Right, here the reason for the matter is gone, but you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] remain with the command because of the command.
[Speaker C] Okay, so what does that mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That means that the halakhic principle itself tells you that enactments, even when their reason is gone, remain binding. It’s not a conflict. We’re not saying that automatically this means the law overrides the reason; rather, it means the law determines things. The law does not derive from that reason; it stands even where that reason does not exist. Rabbi, in Sefer HaMitzvot, regarding the question whether there is coercion in bills of divorce or not, and then the judges bring why there is coercion in bills of divorce—they say because of modest women and because of promiscuous women.
[Speaker C] And then what does the Talmud ask there? It says, “By Torah law, this is a valid bill of divorce,” and you’re telling me that because you have some emotional reason, because of modest women and because of promiscuous women, you can’t say that; you have to say that they annulled it. Why is that a clear example? Because you can’t, due to a certain emotional reason, negate a law. It says, “I had to come to the idea that they annulled it; I can’t say that it isn’t a bill of divorce.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Unless, unless this really isn’t an extreme enough case. After all, one who said that natural justice can override the law did not say that it always overrides the law. Even in ordinary morality, it doesn’t always override the law, at least in legal theory. In a place where it is very, very extreme, where it crosses very clear red lines, there it overrides. Maybe here it isn’t mamzerim? Fine, who said it doesn’t cross? Maybe that law is more important? It’s not clear. You can’t prove from the fact that once they told you the law overrode natural morality that this means—after all, the opposing claim is not that natural justice always overrides, but that sometimes there can be a situation where natural justice overrides. Now we have to understand where the line is. Fine. So in any case we see that both in Jewish law and in legal systems there are two aspects. Every commandment and every transgression has them, and therefore a commandment needs both command and content in order to be a Torah-level commandment. Because otherwise it is a good thing; it is not a commandment. A commandment has to have a command as well, not only content. Fine. So if that is so, we return to our issue. We explained that the contradiction in the definition of the commandment of repentance is solved by saying that in Sefer HaMitzvot Maimonides tells us what the Torah commanded. And the Torah did not command repentance. Where did it command repentance? It says, “And you shall return to the Lord your God.” That is how Nachmanides learns that this is a positive commandment to repent. But Nachmanides himself there brings Maimonides in chapter 7 of the Laws of Repentance, where Maimonides says, “The Torah has already promised that Israel will ultimately repent.” Meaning, Maimonides reads that verse as prophecy, as a promise, not as a command. So from Maimonides’ perspective there is no verse that commands the act of repentance. Ah, if there is no verse, then certainly in Sefer HaMitzvot the commandment to repent will not appear. There is no verse, no command. After all, you need both command and content, right? But in Mishneh Torah—in Mishneh Torah all the laws that we need to do appear, not only those that we are commanded by the Torah to do. Also rabbinic law, also law given to Moses at Sinai, logical reasoning, rabbinic expositions—whatever you want, everything appears there. Why? Because there it is meant to summarize everything we are supposed to do. Do we need to repent? We need to repent. So if we need to repent, it will appear in Mishneh Torah. Therefore this contradiction really disappears on its own. There is perhaps only Maimonides’ wording—why—
[Speaker C] does it appear there under the title of the commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? It doesn’t appear—it appears as confession; there is no commandment there to repent. Yes, there is no commandment to repent. Maimonides writes regarding Yom Kippur—
[Speaker C] What is the verse from which confession is derived?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? “And they shall confess their sin that they have sinned.” Maimonides writes like this: Yom Kippur is a time of repentance for both the individual and the community, and it is the end point of pardon and forgiveness for Israel. Therefore everyone is obligated to repent and confess on Yom Kippur. You know, that “therefore” is a very important word. “Therefore” always requires attention—notice this—wherever there’s a “therefore,” pay close attention, because it means that B is because of A. Okay? Tosafot on “therefore” at the beginning of Bava Batra—there’s a lot of discussion about that. So with Maimonides too, every place it says “therefore”—not every place, but in several places where it says “therefore,” it’s worth paying attention. What is the “therefore” here? Since this is a day of pardon and forgiveness and repentance for all Israel—for Israel—therefore everyone is obligated to repent. That’s not right. They’re obligated to repent because there’s a commandment to repent. There is no commandment to repent, right? So why do we still have to? After all, Maimonides says that we do have to. There’s no commandment, but we still have to. Why do we have to? Because if it’s a time that is a time of repentance for Israel, then one must repent. Why? By simple reasoning. Because if it’s a time of repentance and it’s possible to draw close to the Holy One, blessed be He, then what do you mean? Of course one should draw close to the Holy One, blessed be He. Not because there’s a commandment. If it were a commandment, he wouldn’t need “therefore.” It’s an appointed time for repentance, and so maybe because of that the Torah commanded—but not therefore Israel has to do it; maybe therefore the Torah commanded. Then that would be telling me the rationale of the verse—that I can understand. But not that therefore we ourselves have to do it. We… Grace after meals is a wonderful commandment, therefore one should recite grace after meals. Does Maimonides write that way? Or redeeming a firstborn donkey is a tremendous commandment—some people stand in line for the bus just to merit redeeming a firstborn donkey—and therefore all Israel must redeem a firstborn donkey. No, he doesn’t write that. Why not? Because there we are commanded. What difference does it make whether it’s a tremendous commandment or not a tremendous commandment? One must redeem a firstborn donkey because it says you have to redeem a firstborn donkey. That’s all. But repentance—it doesn’t say that. There is no commandment to repent. So Maimonides has to explain to me why one should repent. And “and you shall return to the Lord your God”—that doesn’t count? No. As I said earlier, in chapter 7 Maimonides treats that as a promise, not as a commandment. Nachmanides treats it as a commandment. But Maimonides treats it as a promise, a prophecy. In various places Maimonides tells us how beautiful this person is—once he was distant and detestable and abominable, and today he is close to God, and so on—all the poetic language he writes about them in the Laws of Repentance. What happened—did a poetic spirit suddenly descend on him here? Why, in the laws of grace after meals, doesn’t he tell me what tremendous spiritual repairs grace after meals accomplishes, and therefore look how wonderful—a person who doesn’t bless is a disgusting person, and a person who blesses is a marvelous person, so it’s very worthwhile to bless? He doesn’t write that. Why not? Because the Laws of Repentance are coming to persuade us to repent. They’re not coming just to explain the laws of repentance. It says therefore do it. If it’s written, then that’s it—what more is there to tell you? Read books of poetry about the importance of repentance. Here Maimonides is trying to persuade us to repent. Why is he trying to persuade us? Because there’s no commandment, no directive, no verse. So why really should one repent? Maimonides has to explain to us where this comes from—why. So Maimonides says it comes from some simple, clear reasoning that one must repent. Why? Because this is the way to draw close to the Holy One, blessed be He, so one must repent. True, there’s no commandment, and therefore it doesn’t appear in the Book of Commandments. But in the Mishneh Torah he does bring it, so he has to explain why. Because, because, because—it’s a time of pardon and one can draw close to the Holy One, blessed be He, and therefore one must repent. Okay? So that’s basically the idea of repentance.
[Speaker C] So now the real question is: why doesn’t he bring “and you shall return to the Lord your God”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said that he does bring it.
[Speaker C] In chapter 7, he brings the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s in chapter 7, he brings it there. But it’s a promise, and that it’s a good thing—why from there? Ah, he brings it in chapter 7, he brings it there. What?
[Speaker D] What is Maimonides’ attitude toward commandments found in the Prophets? But he does accept the verse, right? He just doesn’t count it as a Torah-level commandment, because there are places—for example, priests drinking wine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are places where there’s a revealing clarification from the Hebrew Bible. Then it could be that it simply reveals to you the meaning of a word or a phrase in the Torah. But in the end it has to be in the Torah; without that there is no Torah-level commandment. There was Tzidkiyah son of Kena’anah with the iron horns, at the beginning of Bava Kamma. So they learn from there about “horn,” and they want to learn from there detached horn, attached horn, all kinds of things like that. What is that? That’s from the Prophets. Yes, but the Prophets are teaching you what the word “horn” means. Okay? Fine. What the word “goring” means—maybe it’s not horn. Anyway, it comes out that the commandment of repentance is a commandment without a command. It’s not really a commandment. It’s a matter of obligation—you have to do it—but it has no source in an explicit command in the Torah. Rather, it has to be done because it’s simply obvious that it has to be done. And we did talk last time about the laws of idolatry, where Maimonides writes that one who worships idolatry out of love or fear is exempt—unless he accepted it as a god. We discussed that, right? Unless he accepted it as a god. What you see there is that even things that are written in the Torah—I brought there Rabbi Shimon Shkop, if I remember correctly—Rabbi Shimon Shkop asks there about what he brings, that there is a doctrine of law, there are things we are commanded to do, and we need to do them even beyond Jewish law, even without the Jewish law. Then he asks why. For example: “do not steal.” He says that this should really be forbidden even without a verse saying “do not steal.” It should be forbidden. A practical difference: stealing from a gentile. There are opinions that stealing from a gentile is not forbidden by Torah law. Rabbi Shimon Shkop says: there are no such opinions. There are opinions that stealing from a gentile is not included in “do not steal.” That, yes. But even if it’s not included in “do not steal,” the very fact—
[Speaker C] the fact that that money belongs to the gentile automatically means that you may not steal it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is Torah-level, it’s not anything else. Maybe you could call it natural morality? Call it that—the law of nature, maybe more properly natural morality.
[Speaker C] That’s Torah-level? If it’s Torah-level, then it’s already in the category of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so Maimonides didn’t count it as a commandment, but the force of it—the degree to which we are obligated to do it—he claims that is Torah-level.
[Speaker C] Where is that written in the Torah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is it Torah-level? It’s written in the place where it says that a person has property. It says, “If a man’s ox gores his fellow’s ox.” Meaning, a person has an ox. He has one—he has an ox.
[Speaker C] So if he has an ox, that means it’s forbidden to take it from him. Yes, but the Torah can’t write every single thing and every specific situation, which the Talmud later—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —examines case by case. Why? But the very fact that a person has property—the very fact that a person has property is an obvious assumption in the Torah. Right? A person has property. There is ownership.
[Speaker C] Right, but there are discussions in Bava Kamma, for example, about what exactly property is, what it means to belong—it’s not clear.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, no, no. I’m not talking about the damaging property, I’m talking about the damaged property. I have property—property belongs to me. If you damage it, you have to pay me, right? Meaning, I have ownership of property. What does the concept of ownership mean? What does it mean? Possession maybe? Yes, but if I can just take it from you, then what kind of possession is that? So clearly I cannot take it from you. But there is no command. It’s the kind of thing you see by implication, you see it from within the text. Going even further, Rabbi Shlomo Fisher criticizes him on this point. He argues that you don’t need the Torah at all. The very law—the doctrine of law, that’s what he calls it—says that if something belongs to someone, then obviously it’s forbidden to take it from him. Rabbi Shlomo Fisher argues you don’t even need to get that far. The very fact that the Torah recognizes someone’s property means that it cannot be taken from him. Yes.
[Speaker C] Maybe you could say that the reason Maimonides doesn’t count the commandment of repentance as part of the 613 commandments is because of its greatness. What do I mean? Take the Land of Israel, settling the Land of Israel—Maimonides doesn’t count that. Could anyone imagine that Maimonides doesn’t think settling the Land of Israel is a commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s one person I know well who can imagine that. What? There’s someone I know well who can imagine that.
[Speaker C] He simply sees the process of repentance as something natural that doesn’t even need—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So look, regarding settling the Land of Israel, that’s certainly not true, what you’re saying, even though great and worthy people have written that. In my humble opinion, it doesn’t even get off the ground. It doesn’t get off the ground because when they explain it, they say basically it belongs to the category of general commandments, and therefore not. Now, general commandments in Maimonides—that’s the fourth root. And whoever looks there sees what Maimonides calls a general commandment. A general commandment is “and you shall keep all My commandments,” “you shall be holy.” Repeating once again the very obligation to keep all the commandments and refrain from all transgressions—that is called general commandments. Foundational commandments—that isn’t written there in the fourth root. Okay? It’s not written there, so there’s no source for that at all. More than that: is the commandment of faith a foundational commandment or not? What do you say? Of course it is, yes. Positive commandment number one in Maimonides. Maimonides writes it. So then, is the commandment of the Land of Israel even more foundational? Settling the Land of Israel? There are maybe people who think so. And someone who fulfills the commandment of settling the Land of Israel even without faith is holier than someone who believes but doesn’t fulfill the commandment of settling the Land of Israel. But I’m not sure I agree with that. Okay? Anyway, I will say something somewhat similar later on, I think. We’ll see. In any case, so there is a commandment here—where was I? The commandment of repentance: this is something Maimonides is persuading us to do even though there is no command. Why? Because it’s something that ought to be self-evident. I began with Maimonides in the laws of idolatry—out of love or fear. Maimonides writes there that in essence one is liable only if he accepted it as a god, and we explained there that the meaning of serving God is basically to serve God in a way not conditional on anything—not even on love or fear. But because one must serve God—that is a basic principle. And I started with Rabbi Shimon Shkop, I’m just rolling the last few minutes together now. Rabbi Shimon Shkop—I brought his example there of the doctrine of law. So when Rabbi Shimon Shkop wants to explain to us why I have to obey these principles of the doctrine of law, he asks: why do I have to obey principles that are in fact written in the Torah? The Holy One, blessed be He? So what?
[Speaker C] Not because of reward. That’s a reason.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can command you all kinds of commands too. Fulfill them. I hope not. So what? Is that a reason? Rather, what? My reasoning, my clear intuition, tells me that what He commands, I do. There is a kind of very fundamental decision like that—that’s called accepting Him as a god. A very fundamental decision like that: whatever He says, I do. That’s called accepting Him as a god. Okay? Not because I love Him, not because I fear Him, not because of paradise and not because of reward, and not because of anything else. Rather because there is an unconditional obligation to do what He says. That is called a god. That’s why judges are called “elohim.” Why are judges called “elohim”? Not because they’re important people, as you always hear. Rather because one must obey them. Even if they’re not right. Someone whom you obey simply because he spoke—that is called a god. Meaning, not because he is right—not natural law. Pure positivism, yes? Because there is a basic principle that says I have to obey what this thing says to me, what this being says to me. So in practice there is a very, very fundamental source for all our obligation in the commandments, and it derives neither from love of God nor from fear of God—that’s what I spoke about last time—not from love of God and not from fear of God, but from accepting Him as a god. I accepted Him upon myself as a god—that is the foundation that obligates me in the commandments. In essence that is the meaning of the concept of doing something for its own sake. The concept of serving God for its own sake. What does “for its own sake” mean? Some people confuse this with the concept of intention.
[Speaker B] But that’s not correct.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not the same thing. “Commandments require intention” is a rule stated in contexts that are part of fulfilling the commandment. When you fulfill the commandment, you need to intend to discharge your obligation. That is the rule of commandments requiring intention. Even according to the one who says commandments do not require intention, ideally they do—just not in a way that invalidates. Okay? That’s the rule of intention. What is the rule of “for its own sake”? That’s something entirely different. “For its own sake” means, for example, that I bake matzah for its own sake, guard the matzah for its own sake, make tzitzit for its own sake, sacrifices for their own sake—the offering is slaughtered for six purposes; those are the six things that make up the “for its own sake” of the sacrifice. What is “for its own sake”? There it means preparing an object for a commandment. That is “for its own sake.” Okay? Preparing an object for a commandment—when I make the matzah for its own sake, it is valid matzah. When I spin the tzitzit or tie the strings for their own sake, then the tzitzit are valid. It’s not something that accompanies the performance of the commandment; it is the preparation of objects for a commandment.
[Speaker B] When you study Torah for its own sake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah. Now the question that arises here is: what does it mean to study Torah for its own sake? Studying Torah for its own sake would seem to be more connected to “commandments require intention” than to these concepts of “for its own sake,” right? Because it basically means studying Torah with some kind of intention that is supposed to accompany the learning. No—it’s not preparing the object for use in the commandment. Why?
[Speaker D] It’s to know the will of God. What? It’s to know the will of God. I mean, I’m learning in order to know the will of God—the Holy One, blessed be He—what do You want from me? So that’s preparation. You’re preparing yourself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re not preparing yourself. You’re learning—it accompanies the learning. It’s not preparation of something. “For its own sake” is always about objects, by the way. Always—tzitzit, matzah, sacrifice—always something you are meant to work on for its own sake. It has to be done for its own sake. Okay? Even writing a Torah scroll—not Torah study, writing a Torah scroll. With Torah study it really is some kind of intermediate state—it’s neither this nor that, it’s a third concept. It’s not intention, because it’s not merely the intention to fulfill one’s obligation, but it’s also not “for its own sake” in its usual halakhic meaning. So what is it? What is serving God for its own sake? Maimonides explains it in chapter 10 of the Laws of Repentance. Maimonides writes: A person should not say, I will perform the commandments of the Torah and involve myself in its wisdom in order to receive the blessings written in the Torah, or in order to merit the life of the world to come; and I will separate myself from the transgressions against which the Torah warned us in order to be spared the curses written in the Torah, or in order not to be cut off from the life of the world to come. It is not fitting to serve God in this way, for one who serves in this way serves out of fear, and this is not the level of the prophets nor the level of the sages. And one only serves God in this way among the ignorant masses, women, and children, whom we educate to serve out of fear until their knowledge increases and they will serve out of love. So apparently—not out of fear, but only out of love. Okay? But in idolatry we already saw: neither love nor fear—accepting Him as a god, that’s what it should be. So let’s see. One who serves out of love, law 2: One who serves out of love occupies himself with Torah and commandments and walks in the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world. Not because of anything in the world—not out of fear of evil and not in order to inherit good, but he does the truth because it is truth, and in the end the good will come because of it. That is called serving out of love. To do the truth because it is truth. What does that have to do with love? Love would mean I love God and therefore I serve Him. Love of truth? Love of truth, yes, but it’s not love of God in the sense we usually mean by love and fear of the Holy One, blessed be He. You can call it love of truth—it doesn’t matter—but I do the truth because it is truth, even if I don’t love it. Doesn’t matter—I do it because one must do the truth. I do it that way. Because that’s what has to be done. We spoke about the concept of value, I don’t remember anymore. Yes, the concept of value is that same basic concept for which I don’t need arguments. It justifies other things. For me, truth is the basis of all values. I do the truth just like that, because it is truth. Okay? That is called serving for its own sake.
[Speaker D] But what about love? Is someone who hates the truth and does it greater than someone who loves the truth and therefore does it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. That’s a mistake that I don’t remember whether I discussed. There’s the Aglay Tal in the introduction. I mentioned it, right? So it’s the same thing. Someone who does the truth because he loves the truth is worse than someone who does the truth without loving the truth. But someone who does the truth because it is truth and also loves it is greater than both of them. The question is whether that is the motivation or whether it is simply also present. The fact that I love the truth can also be there, but the question is whether I do the truth because I love it. If it’s because I love it, then it’s already because of something. It needs to be unconditional, like accepting Him as a god. Meaning: I do it because this is my basic value. If I love it, then there is already something even more fundamental explaining why I do it. Okay? So essentially when Maimonides presents here an antithesis to fear in chapter 10 of the Laws of Repentance, he is not presenting love in the sense we usually understand. What he calls love here is what we earlier called doing it for its own sake. You do it for its own sake—you study Torah in order to study Torah. You do the truth because it is truth. That is called serving for its own sake. In fact, why were we not commanded to repent? We were not commanded to repent because it is impossible to command repentance. If they were to command it—let’s say I mentioned the example of the commandments that are equal to all the others, right? Rabbi Wolbe has the book The Weighty Commandments, where he says there are about seven commandments, and regarding each of them the Sages say that it is equal to the whole Torah. Okay? So I asked, what does that mean? It can’t be, mathematically. It can’t be that each one of these seven is equal to the other 612, when within those 612 there are six more that are also each equal to the whole. That obviously can’t be. So what, then? The point is that there are seven commandments that contain some aspect that is not really a commandment. It’s not a commandment. It’s an issue, a matter—it’s not a commandment. That matter is as great as the whole Torah—I said this. As great as the whole Torah. There are apparently seven commandments—or maybe more, but seven that the Sages told us about—seven commandments that contain some aspect equal to the whole Torah. The commandment within them is a commandment like any other; it isn’t equal to anything, at least not necessarily. It’s one of the 613 commandments. What is so great about Torah study that it outweighs them all? Not the commandment of Torah study. What’s great here is Torah study. Torah study—the matter of Torah study—is equal to the whole Torah. But the commandment of Torah study is just one of the 613 commandments; there’s nothing especially unique about it.
[Speaker C] And that’s the locomotive that pulls the other commandments after it. What? It’s the locomotive that pulls them after it. Wait, I’m going to get to that point too. Not the commandment—the matter itself is the locomotive.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So—
[Speaker C] I—
[Speaker B] So now I want to explain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So look, there really are certain things that are matters so great—and here I’m returning to what you wanted to say—they are matters so great that they were not inserted into the 613 commandments precisely because of their greatness. There are two reasons why things don’t enter into Jewish law. One reason is because they’re too small. They’re not important enough—they’re an especially preferred way to do a commandment, going beyond the letter of the law; it’s not obligatory. Whoever wants to—blessing upon him. There are things that don’t go in because they are too foundational. Like what we discussed about character refinement. Character refinement—with that fellow and matchmaking, did I not mention that? A nice example. Someone was meeting girls for matchmaking. A yeshiva student. He rejects all of them—they’re not suitable for him.
[Speaker B] They don’t fit him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. After the list gets longer, the spiritual supervisor comes to him and says: my friend, who do you think you are, the greatest sage of the generation? No one is in your league? Sit down and work on your character traits for a year. After you work on your character for a year, come back to chapter “A man can betroth.” Fine. He works on his character enthusiastically for a full year. After a year he comes back, and they start again, meeting girls. Again they come one after another, and again he rejects them outright. After the spiritual supervisor sees one, two, three—the whole list is repeating, nothing has changed—he calls him in and says: tell me, what did you do all year? I worked on my character. Today I’m wonderfully humble. So he says to him: what do you mean? But then no one is suitable for you? So what happened here? What’s the difference between how things were and how they are now? He says: what do you mean? A year ago, when I was arrogant, no one was suitable for me. Now that I’m also humble, all the more so no one is suitable for me. Simple enough, no? What does this symbolize? It symbolizes someone who works on his character because there is a paragraph in the Shulchan Arukh saying one must work on character traits. He checks the box. So character refinement is something the Torah does not want to insert as a commandment. It doesn’t want to, because if it inserts it, then the humble person will look like that. So it doesn’t want to put it there—not because it isn’t important enough. Because if it puts it there, it will ruin it. Rabbi Kook writes this: that there are things—character refinement—if there were a command about it, it would ruin the whole concept of character refinement. It destroys it, so it is impossible to command such a thing. There are things that are so foundational that they must come—as we discussed earlier regarding one who is commanded and performs being greater than one who is not commanded and performs. And we said, according to Maimonides, why do we need commands? So there will also be an aspect of command and not only the aspect of content. And the greater person is the one who has both—who does both things: he both responds to the command and also produces the improvement inherent in the commandment. But there are things where, if you respond to the command, the content gets missed. So what do you do in such a case? If you write it in the Torah, the command will be there, but the content won’t. So there’s no choice—you can’t. So you don’t write it. You don’t write that; you leave it outside. There are other things like that too. The commandment of repentance is probably one of those. The commandment of repentance was not written because if it had been written, then it would have become just one of the 613 commandments. And the Torah does not want us to think it is one of the 613 commandments. It is something much more foundational. If we do it because the Torah says one has to repent, we’ve done nothing. What are we repenting for? We are repenting for the fact that when the Torah says things, we don’t fulfill them. So what’s the way to deal with that? To write in the Torah that one has to repent? Fine—then I also won’t fulfill that.
[Speaker C] Why isn’t it confession?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because confession really isn’t the point. Confession is one of the 613 commandments, nothing special about it. Repentance is the basic point.
[Speaker C] Maimonides says that everyone who—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, because the commandment of confession is one thing, and the idea of confession as a component of repentance is another thing. It’s a different passage. Confession is the practical part on which the Torah commanded us, out of the process of repentance, and that really is just a matter of command. The matter of repentance is everything beyond that. That is exactly the difference, and I’ll sharpen it even more. Yes.
[Speaker B] Faith, for example, is something foundational but it’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that really is a big question, and in fact all the later authorities ask it about Maimonides, and I don’t know—we need to understand what Maimonides means there. But it’s clear that there is no command there to believe, and not only because of the absurdity that you can’t command such a thing; it’s not because it would ruin it. It’s because someone who doesn’t believe won’t accept that command either. It’s not because commanding it would ruin it, and all that we said about character traits. It’s simply self-contradictory. Okay? Anyway—yes—so repentance: the Torah did not command us to repent, because we understand that we need to repent. Not because it says in such-and-such a paragraph or such-and-such a verse that one must repent. Because if someone does it because it says so in such-and-such a paragraph, then what happened? Then he’s already keeping commandments, so he’s already a penitent even before he did it. Meaning, it’s not… We are speaking to someone who has some disconnect between himself and the obligation to serve God. Even things that are written he doesn’t keep. So the way to fix that—when they want to command me, I talked last time about this example—if they want to tell me to obey the law, why do I obey the law? Because there is a law to obey the law? Of course not, right? Because otherwise I also wouldn’t obey that law. It cannot be that the reason to obey laws is because there is a law commanding that. Rather what? Clearly, that reason has to precede the legal system in question. Right? So when the Torah says—what is the commandment of repentance? The commandment of repentance is to return and accept upon myself the Holy One, blessed be He, as a god. That is called the commandment of repentance. Now, because someone who sins probably does not accept the Holy One, blessed be He, as a god. When you commit a sin, what is sin? Sin means that basically you do not fulfill this commandment because there is something else because of which you decided not to fulfill it. Ah—so your decision to keep commandments is not unconditional; it’s because of something, and if that something is absent then you don’t do it. Repentance means to return and accept upon yourself the Holy One, blessed be He, as a god—not the commandments, as a god. Meaning: to fulfill what He says unconditionally. That is called repentance.
[Speaker C] Because this commandment of repentance—it applies to inadvertent sin, when I transgress a command.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The assumption is that in inadvertent sin there’s also some element of compulsion. Why do you bring a sacrifice? What’s the difference between inadvertent sin and compulsion? Because apparently there is some dimension of negligence in inadvertent sin too, and therefore you still need to repent. But in the case of pure compulsion, no.
[Speaker D] Maybe one could say that with Maimonides, where this principle appears—doing the truth because it is truth—that may be the knot because of which the Torah didn’t command repentance. Because essentially the essence of repentance—why does a person repent? Because he loves God, not because it’s… maybe not because there’s this kind of focus. We see many people whose process of returning to repentance is not because it’s the truth, but because they love God, they feel they love God.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the difference between that and truth? That already is love of that sort. What—they love God but it’s not truth?
[Speaker D] No, they love God, but the command itself as such—to do the truth because it is truth—to do the 613 commandments because each and every one of them is true, not because the Holy One, blessed be He, is the one who commanded us.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what I just said. Exactly.
[Speaker D] Okay, but the commandment of repentance—why does a person come and fulfill it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because he understands that he has to accept the Holy One, blessed be He, as a god—to return and accept the Holy One, blessed be He, as a god. That’s what he returns to.
[Speaker D] Or because he feels a powerful burst of love.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he is repenting in a way that is not essential. I’m talking about repentance as it ought to be done. I think that’s not repentance as it ought to be done. Again, if it is accompanied by a burst of feeling, that’s perfectly fine. But if the burst of feeling is the reason for it, then it’s not repentance. Then he’s serving himself, not God.
[Speaker B] Well, from not for-its-own-sake one comes to for-its-own-sake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I didn’t say it’s worthless. That’s another topic. But it’s not service for its own sake. So the picture that emerges is this: the foundation that brings us to an obligation to serve God, as with any other normative system, is some very basic foundation that is hard to define—certainly impossible to reduce to a formulated principle—which says: this is my God. Meaning, I must—obviously one must serve Him because this is my God. I accept Him upon myself as a god. That is the root of everything. What happens when a person sins? When a person sins, he disconnects from that root, right? It is no longer unconditional. Sometimes it is conditional. He is no longer doing it because the Holy One, blessed be He, is God, but because it suits him. And if it doesn’t suit him, then he really doesn’t do it. That is the root of sin. What does it mean to return—repentance? Where does one return to? One returns to that first point. The point on which everything is built. So the commandment of repentance is to return to that point which is the root of serving God. That is called the commandment of repentance. Clearly, such a thing cannot be commanded. It can’t be grasped otherwise. Anyone who says there is a commandment about this probably does not understand repentance this way. Apparently not. Someone who understands repentance this way cannot say there is a commandment to repent. It cannot be. It simply cannot be. So therefore it seems to me that Maimonides’ words here are clear and simple. Maimonides does not count the commandment of repentance because there is no command about it. There is an obligation to repent—that is why it appears in the Laws of Repentance. Why is there an obligation to repent? Maimonides persuades us because this is the truth, because one must do the truth because it is truth. Where does he persuade us? In the Laws of Repentance, of course. And he explains to us that in fact one must do this even though there is no command. And there could not have been a command about it. Since the commandment of repentance is the highest expression of serving for its own sake—to return to serving for its own sake—that is called repentance. To serve unconditionally. For its own sake. Not because of love, not because of fear, not because of reward, not because of punishment, but because of truth, because it is truth. To return to serving for its own sake—that is called repentance.
[Speaker C] It’s not quite precise. A person who commits transgressions many times—it’s not necessarily because he stopped serving the Holy One, blessed be He, exclusively, so to speak, but because he serves in partnership, so to speak. There is the Holy One, blessed be He, and there is this too.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. That partnership means that “God” here means a monotheistic God. Meaning, if there is partnership, that means something is lacking in his acceptance of Him. He is not exclusive, not unique. Maybe we’ll still talk about the mechanism of sin—I think I spoke about it last year, I don’t remember. Maybe we’ll talk about that a bit one of the next times. Let’s now look at the Laws of Repentance through these glasses and we’ll see various things here that also point in the same direction. What appears in the Laws of Repentance? What is the content of the Laws of Repentance? At the beginning, a relatively small part deals with repentance. A relatively small part—maybe half, even less. Fine. The Laws of the Foundations of the Torah are the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah. What appears there? Leaf through and see. Chapter 4, 5 deals with… 6, sorry, deals with choice. Right? Free choice. After that there is chapter 8—there is some character refinement, there is reward and punishment, the world to come. Chapter 10 is service for its own sake, Torah study for its own sake, love of God—but love in this sense, love of God. Anyway, all these—this is more or less the content of… What is the common denominator? Why does Maimonides repeat this here? The laws of love of God appear in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah. Why does he suddenly repeat it here? Torah study has laws of Torah study. Choice? Why isn’t this written in the laws of redeeming a firstborn donkey? You have to choose freely to redeem the firstborn donkey; don’t choose not to redeem it, choose to redeem it. Every commandment depends on choice. Why specifically in the Laws of Repentance does Maimonides deal with the point of our choosing, with this aspect of choice? The answer is that the Laws of Repentance—the answer to that—is that the Laws of Repentance are the laws of serving God. That’s what the Laws of Repentance are. They aren’t really laws at all. They’re not laws. We are not commanded to repent. This is what comes before the beginning of service. The Mishneh Torah in fact begins with the Book of Love. The Book of Knowledge is all the introductions. First of all you have to define who the Holy One, blessed be He, is. Okay? Who the Holy One, blessed be He, is; idolatry—who is not the Holy One, blessed be He. After that, you have to define the dispositions, what character traits a person should attain. We said traits are not a command. They are the infrastructure that precedes command. You have to work on your character. Rabbi Chaim Vital writes: why were we not commanded regarding character refinement? Because someone who is not a human being—there’s nothing to command him anyway. Meaning, the infrastructure that turns you into someone capable of receiving a command, someone whom one can command, is character refinement. So that’s the Laws of Ethical Dispositions, right? The Laws of Repentance are the laws of serving for its own sake, the laws of serving God. All these are foundations before they begin talking to me about Jewish law. Jewish law begins in the Book of Love. Now, the Laws of Repentance—I think to some extent they are even the concentration, the greatest essence, the root of serving God, especially from our perspective. The definition of divinity—what is God—that’s in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah and so on. But from our perspective, in terms of what is required of us as servants of God, that is the Laws of Repentance. And let’s see what appears here. So we said, love of God appears both in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah and here. Why the duplication? The answer, as I said earlier, is that love of God is one of those commandments equal to all the others. And I think this is from Rabbi Wolbe, though there are several sources for it—that this is a commandment equal to the whole Torah. Why? Because it has some aspect beyond the commandment of loving God. When I serve the Holy One, blessed be He, out of love—not because of the love, but out of love, also accompanied by love, okay—what does that actually mean? That I fulfilled the commandment of loving God? Even if I didn’t do that, I fulfilled the commandment of loving God. Loving God—I love God. Who said I also have to love Him when I’m fulfilling commandments, and… when else? Also when I’m eating breakfast. I love Him. I’ll invest two minutes of meditation every day and love God. Love of God is a much more foundational concept than the commandment of loving God. Love of God is a process that is supposed to accompany us both when we do commandments and in every other situation. It is part of serving God. It is not in order to fulfill the commandment of loving God. That is the small part—it is one of the 613 commandments. It is part of serving God that should be out of love or accompanied by love. That is why it appears in the Laws of Repentance, because these are the laws of love of God, the laws of serving God.
[Speaker B] Love appears as a command and not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because here too there is a command. Here indeed the Torah says there is also a command, and it really is not as foundational as serving for its own sake. We already said that doing it for its own sake is more foundational than love and fear. Doing it for its own sake is the most fundamental point. Love is less fundamental, but still, in love too there are aspects that go beyond the command—more foundational aspects that are not just the command. The command—you might perhaps fulfill it in more limited ways, but there is also a matter of serving God out of love not because of the command. That is the Laws of Repentance, not the laws of loving God.
[Speaker B] It should have been treated the same way with the commandment of repentance, which also—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] includes the whole because of confession. Confession is the formal, commanded part within the commandment of repentance. Exactly—that’s the point I made earlier. Okay?
[Speaker D] Well, you have this in many commandments, like the commandment of the Sabbath, where there is cessation from labor and all the rest, that one should honor the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because there too there are actually commands about that. By received tradition, or cessation—even according to Maimonides in the section of Emor, it’s Torah-level. But there are commands about that there. Apparently it’s not foundational enough to be considered in this category. The commandment of Torah study as well—why does it appear here? What does that have to do with this? There are laws—there are laws of Torah study, a whole section in Maimonides. Why repeat it here? Studying Torah for its own sake and all sorts of things like that. Because in Torah study too, as I already mentioned, there is Torah study of one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening. Yes—one who says, “I will study this chapter,” has made a great vow, a vow to the God of Israel—the Talmud in Nedarim. Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav, yes? So the medieval authorities there discuss why. After all, a vow cannot take effect on an oath, and one is already sworn from Sinai? So there’s a dispute among the medieval authorities. The Rosh and the Ran disagree there, and the Ran says that this is only by rabbinic exposition, or by interpretation—not by received tradition, sorry, by interpretation—and the Rosh says that only reciting the Shema morning and evening is obligatory; the rest is not obligatory. You are not already sworn from Sinai regarding that. So if you do something beyond that, it is a great vow that you vowed to the God of Israel—a voluntary matter. So then what is the concept of neglect of Torah study, according to the Rosh? What is neglect of Torah study? But in the Torah it says—in the Talmud it says. Not in a dispute among the medieval authorities—it says in the Talmud.
[Speaker C] If you see someone who—neglect of Torah study doesn’t have to mean anything in the sense that if right now you’re not learning. Rather if you see someone studying and you interrupt him—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. Neglect of Torah study is when you are not learning. That’s what it means in the Talmud at least. When you’re not learning, you are called to account for neglect of Torah study. How are you called to account? I recited Shema morning and evening, everything is fine—what’s the problem? Because Torah study is something so foundational that they cannot and do not want to force it into the mold of a commanded obligation. The command is reciting Shema morning and evening, as with love of God. There is some minimum boundary—do that and you have fulfilled your obligation. But someone who does only that does not understand what Torah is. And in the Laws of Repentance Maimonides writes that one must study Torah for its own sake—not because of the command, but because you have to understand what Torah is. And if you understand what Torah is, then you understand that you have to study as much as you can. And if you don’t study, that is neglect of Torah study.
[Speaker C] Because it also has no fixed measure. What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that has no fixed measure—that’s the point. The Talmud in Menachot—I brought the Talmud in Menachot here—look at Menachot 99. Rabbi Ami said: from the words of Rabbi Yosei we learn that even if a person studied only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled the commandment of “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” Fine, everything is fine. Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai: even if a person only recited Shema in the morning and evening, he has fulfilled “it shall not depart.” And this matter is forbidden to be said in the presence of the ignoramuses. Why is it forbidden to say it in front of ignoramuses? So they won’t do that. Why not? But that’s the commandment—what’s the problem? Let them do it. Rava said… why not? Is that really the commandment? Shema morning and night—that’s the truth. So what at most can an ignoramus do? He’ll recite Shema morning and evening and no more. Perfectly fine—he’s fulfilled his obligation. What’s the problem?
[Speaker B] The commandment, yes—but not the truth.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. There’s something here where we expect something beyond that, even though that is the commandment. That’s why it’s forbidden to say it in front of ignoramuses. And Rava said: it is a commandment to say it in front of ignoramuses. Why? Usually people understand “it is a commandment to say it in front of ignoramuses” to mean: to calm them down—don’t worry, you’re okay too, you also have a share in the World to Come. I think the explanation is the opposite. You have to say to the ignoramuses: listen, it’s true that the commandment is Shema in the morning and evening, but that’s only the commandment. But Torah study is not only the commandment of Torah study. For the commandment of Torah study, Shema morning and evening is enough. Ben Dama asked—look at the continuation. I’m reading you the Talmud in order. Look. Ben Dama, the son of Rabbi Ishmael’s sister, asked Rabbi Ishmael: if someone like me has learned the entire Torah, may he study Greek wisdom? He applied this verse to him: “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate on it day and night.” Go and find an hour that is neither day nor night, and in it study Greek wisdom. Fine—so it’s forbidden. So once in Yeruham they asked me: Ben Dama had learned the entire Torah, so he knew the entire Torah—so why didn’t he know this? He comes to ask Rabbi Ishmael a halakhic question, and he’s selling him stories that he knows the entire Torah. Well then, if you know the entire Torah, answer yourself—what do you want from me?
[Speaker C] Maybe he didn’t want to accept this as Torah, maybe it really isn’t part of Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. I understand it differently. I understand that it really isn’t part of Torah. He’s saying to him: look, I know the whole Torah. Everything written in the Torah—I’ve gone through it, I know all of it. And I also fulfill the commandment of Torah study, don’t worry—even if I study Greek wisdom, I’ll still recite Shema morning and evening. I’m not forgetting either—I calculate, I don’t forget. No problem, everything is fine, right? So he’s not coming to ask him a question in Jewish law; he’s coming to ask whether it is fitting to do this. So Rabbi Ishmael tells him: it is not fitting to do this. Why? Because the commandment of Torah study—you really have fulfilled that. But this question is not part of Torah, and that’s why you’re asking me. The Torah, you know. But I’m telling you what lies beyond Torah: one must not stop studying Torah, because someone who is not attached to Torah is not attached to the Holy One, blessed be He. This is not a halakhic determination. Rabbi Ishmael himself—everyone asks this—Rabbi Ishmael himself, with “and you shall gather your grain,” the whole dispute with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, “what will become of Torah,” Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai there in Berakhot—they reverse their positions here. Because here it says that Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says Shema morning and evening, and Rabbi Ishmael says what do you mean—only at an hour that is neither day nor night; that’s extreme. In Berakhot it’s the opposite. Rabbi Ishmael says: what do you mean, of course one has to work—“and you shall gather your grain,” and so on. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai is the fanatic: what do you mean, what will become of Torah—do nothing else, don’t eat, don’t do anything, just study. Wait—but now I saw that Shema morning and evening is enough, isn’t it? The point is that Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai is also telling you the parameters of the commandment, but he too understands that one has to do more than that. And Rabbi Ishmael is the same. He tells you: fine, all true, the parameters of the commandment can be minimal, but in principle, what one really ought to do is find an hour that is neither day nor night—you need to study all the time. Look at the continuation of the Talmud. “And this disagrees with Rav Shmuel bar Nahmani, for Rav Shmuel bar Nahmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: this verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing.” What is the difference between an obligation and a commandment? A commandment is not necessarily an obligation. An obligation is something more general like that, right? A commandment is something we are commanded in; an obligation is something beyond that. What does Rav Shmuel bar Nahmani say? It’s neither an obligation nor a commandment. So what is it? A blessing. “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth”—so it’s just a blessing, like repentance, like “and you shall return unto the Lord your God,” right? And Rav Shmuel bar Nahmani is not like Rabbi Ishmael. Why? Because what does Rabbi Ishmael think? That it’s an obligation, right? And some—like the Ran, for example—apparently think that this is a commandment, meaning that the commandment itself obligates you the whole day. And he thinks it’s an obligation, while Rav Shmuel bar Nahmani says: neither this nor that, but only a blessing. There is still of course some significance here, but it doesn’t turn it into a real obligation. The Holy One, blessed be He, saw Joshua, that words of Torah were especially beloved to him, as it says: “and his attendant Joshua son of Nun would not depart from the tent.” The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: Joshua, are words of Torah so beloved to you? “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” Then the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught—now this is strange—“words of Torah should not be upon you as an obligation, yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” And that goes against what we said a moment ago, that he said it was an obligation. So now he comes to explain. “They should not be upon you as an obligation”—what does that mean? When you fulfill this, don’t fulfill it because it is an obligation, but because it is necessary, because it is obvious—not because you were commanded, but because it is necessary. And therefore “you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” Maybe not regarding Shema?
[Speaker B] Yes, obviously.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And about that—don’t do it as something that is just a commandment, and yet don’t think it’s voluntary, because he disagrees with Rav Shmuel bar Nahmani. Don’t think it’s voluntary: “you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” That’s why he said to Ben Dama, his nephew, “go and find an hour that is neither day nor night.” That’s what this whole Talmudic passage is saying. That’s why Maimonides goes back over the laws of Torah study. Aside from the laws of Torah study, he speaks about Torah study for its own sake דווקא in the laws of repentance. Why? Why in the laws of repentance and not in the laws of Torah study? Because in the laws of Torah study he says what the halakhic definition of Torah study is, and from the words of the Sages maybe there is something beyond Shema morning and evening, based on interpretive expositions and so on, but by Torah law, no. And here he says what one truly ought to do—not because of the commandment. So the real thing appears in the laws of repentance because—and that is the subject of the laws of repentance. We asked earlier: why are there two chapters in the laws of repentance devoted to the laws of choice, to the discussion of choice, free choice? Why not in the laws of Grace after Meals, or honoring parents, or Sabbath observance? In all the commandments you need to choose to do them and choose to refrain from transgressions. Why specifically here? Because the most basic point of choice is here. In the laws of repentance. In the laws of repentance, what are you supposed to return to? To return to being a chooser. That is what you are; that’s what one returns there to. You are supposed to return to the place where you truly choose. You choose to serve God? Then do it; don’t commit transgressions. Return to actualizing what you choose; return to being a chooser. So this is not a regular commandment. You can’t locate it in a place where there is a commandment. In the laws of Grace after Meals they discuss the parameters, the halakhic parameters, of Grace after Meals. There they are not dealing with the foundations of Torah, with the infrastructure with which we come to Jewish law. There it is part of Jewish law. One of the 613 commandments is Grace after Meals. Here we are speaking about the infrastructure prior to that. Can one command a person to be a chooser? No—you can’t. It doesn’t make sense. If I don’t choose, then I also won’t choose to fulfill that commandment. What—how can one command me to be a chooser? Therefore it is obvious that the only place for a discussion of choice is in the laws of repentance, nowhere else. The laws of repentance are the laws of serving God. That’s why everything is here, all these topics that are here. Chapter 9 speaks about the World to Come. And of course that has nothing to do with commandments or transgressions. But what is the point here? The point is that you should have some trust in the system. If it tells you there is a World to Come, then there is; if not, then not. The point is that you should have trust in the system. It’s not a commandment—what sense does it make to command me? Either I believe it or I don’t believe it. If I don’t believe it, will it help if they command me to believe? Can you command someone to believe something? I’m returning to the question of commanding faith. That’s what everyone asks about Maimonides. You can’t command belief in something. They give you information—that’s the fact. There is a World to Come, there is reward, there is punishment, there is everything. This is part of the infrastructure with which you come toward fulfillment of the commandments. You need to make your decisions on that basis. It is part of accepting the Divine. Part of accepting the Divine is accepting what He says and fulfilling what He commands. Okay? That’s why all this suddenly appears here in the laws of repentance even though it really has nothing to do with it. And it all begins with the definition of repentance itself. And that, it seems to me, is what Maimonides is hinting to us in this contradiction between Sefer HaMitzvot and the Mishneh Torah. Because there is no command about it, but it still must be done. And in the repentance section Maimonides persuades us to repent because it is not a commandment. And all the other parts of the laws of repentance that do not deal with repentance—that is because in truth all the other foundations required for serving God are part of the commandment of repentance. The commandment of repentance is to return to that original point where I choose, where I serve for its own sake, where I study Torah because one should study, because—because I understand what Torah is, not because of the commandment of Torah study. Where I love God because I understand what God is and I love Him, not because there is a commandment to love God. All these things are part of the process of repentance. That is what one must return to. That is the definition of where to return. The first three or four chapters tell you that you have to return, and the remaining chapters tell you where to return to.