Answer 1

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You stopped making kiddush. So have I disconnected myself from the Revelation at Sinai, and now I need a new Revelation at Sinai? No. But that still needs a source. Fine, so it needs a source. Right, so I think that in fact the simple approach—there really aren’t many other options—is that the source is a source based on reasoning. I’m just saying, contrary to what was said here earlier, I don’t think that reasoning comes from the commandment itself. From the very fact that I’m obligated to keep commandments, it does not automatically follow, by pure reason, that I also have to repent if I didn’t keep one. I don’t think that’s the same reasoning. Because that’s not reasoning—at least in my view, it’s not reasoning. There’s no particular logic there. You have to keep it from here on out. What, is there some logic that says I must regret all kinds of things that happened in the past? The past is dead. From now on, whatever comes, I have to observe it—that’s all. I don’t think that’s the obvious reasoning. The obvious reasoning is really some kind of existential or spiritual reasoning: not because of the commandments, but because if I distance myself from the Holy One, blessed be He, then there is a simple logic that I ought to draw close to Him again. And maybe I’ll come a bit closer to the formulations that were said here earlier—I’ll return in repentance to the formulations that were said here earlier—and for that purpose I’ll give one more short introduction. Maimonides, in… always teaches us how to worship idols according to Jewish law. So in Maimonides it says as follows. Usually this is in chapter 3, Jewish law 6. I don’t know what this business is. Oh—here it’s Jewish law 11 and 6; there are several versions. Doesn’t matter. Fine. It says as follows in chapter 3, Jewish law 6 usually: “One who worships idols out of love”—right, we said that here we’re learning how to worship idols—“one who worships idols out of love, for example, if he desired an image because of its craftsmanship, because it was especially beautiful,” he enjoyed it מאוד, this worship is really attractive, “or if he worshiped it out of fear of it, lest it harm him, as its worshipers imagine that it does good and evil—if he accepted it upon himself as a god, he is liable to stoning. But if he worshiped it in its usual manner, or by one of the four modes of worship, out of love or fear, he is exempt.” So if anyone wants to worship idols, gentlemen, don’t do it out of love or fear, because otherwise it doesn’t count as idol worship—you haven’t fulfilled your obligation. So how should you do it? Accept it as a god. But what is that? What is this thing? What could be more elevated than worshiping idols out of love or fear? Intellectual apprehension? What? That this is what’s right? Okay. So in fact the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—the source is a dispute between Abaye and Rava in tractate Sanhedrin. They disagree over whether one who worships out of love and fear is exempt or liable. Maimonides rules that one who worships out of love and fear is exempt. I think that’s Abaye’s opinion there, if I remember correctly, against Rava, I think—I’m not sure, I don’t remember right now. In any case, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there really struggle with this: what does this mean? What else could there be besides worship out of love or fear? That’s the deepest kind of religious worship there is. If it’s not worship out of love or fear, then what kind of worship is needed in order to count as an idol worshiper in the most scrupulous sense? So Rashi there writes, and I think Tosafot too, that the intention is love and fear of a person. Meaning, the one who is exempt is someone who worships the idol out of love for a person or fear of a person. In other words, he worships the statue because he really loves some person and wants to make him happy, so let’s go worship together—even though he doesn’t really think much of this statue, doesn’t love it, isn’t afraid of it, and doesn’t really believe in it. It’s love of a person or fear of a person: he’s afraid that that person will harm him if he doesn’t worship idols, so he is exempt. So don’t ask me why there’s “be killed rather than transgress,” because after all this is worship out of love and fear—that is, I’m worshiping because they’re threatening me—so why, in the case of idol worship, must one be killed rather than transgress? In such a case I’m exempt, right? Fine, we’ll leave that; that’s a question to think about. In any case, that’s how most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain it. But Maimonides apparently learns otherwise. Maimonides writes that one who worships out of love or fear is exempt. What does that mean? On the face of it, love or fear of that lady, of that image. Right? He says: “One who worships idols out of love, for example, if he desired the image because of its craftsmanship, because it was especially beautiful.” In other words, he loves this worship, and therefore he’s exempt. So who is liable? Maimonides indeed, as was pointed out here earlier, says that the one who is liable is the one who “accepted it upon himself as a god.” What does “accepted it upon himself as a god” mean? That is the antithesis of love or fear. So now let’s shift for a moment to the side of holiness. On the face of it, “God made the one corresponding to the other,” right? Worship of God and idol worship are supposed to operate in the same patterns. Meaning, in order for idol worship to be idol worship in its full sense, it has to be what we are supposed to do toward the Holy One, blessed be He—but instead we do it toward another god. Okay? So that’s really what the criteria for idol worship are supposed to teach us: something about the worship of God as well. So regarding the worship of God, usually we too are accustomed to think that worship out of love or fear is the pinnacle of worship of God that can exist. Love and fear are actually themselves two commandments: love of God and fear of God are two commandments—two of those six I mentioned earlier. So what, then? Does someone who serves God out of love or fear not actually serve God? But that’s what it says here. That one who serves God out of love or fear is not a servant of God.

[Speaker B] But Maimonides, in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah and Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance, specifically says that a person is supposed to love God and fear Him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just a second, just a second. He’s supposed to love and fear—I didn’t say otherwise. And that’s the way. Wait, we’ll see in a moment. So is it dependent on something? No? Yes? It seems to me that that’s the simple explanation. Namely, when I serve God because I love Him or because I fear Him, that is not worship of God. I’m simply doing something because I want to do it for various reasons.

[Speaker B] The love he’s talking about toward idol worship is love of the ritual, because of the act of worship.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And fear is fear of the ritual. What?

[Speaker B] No, the fear—he says it’s because he’s afraid that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so it’s an analogy, but all in all it seems to me it says—let’s say—

[Speaker B] that I love putting on a tallit, and that’s why I put on a tallit—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But—

[Speaker B] that’s not love toward God.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But again, take the side of fear—what difference does it make? On the side of fear, though, it really is fear of the idol itself. So at least there it’s difficult. Even with regard to love there’s room to discuss it. Awe of exaltedness? Awe of exaltedness before the idol? Well, maybe. Why not? No, he says regarding the idol, the question is: what is worship out of fear, for which one is exempt? So it seems to me that what Maimonides is really saying here is that worship out of love or fear is not worship of God. Let me give an example of this—a common Leibowitzian mistake, common in his case, I mean. Leibowitz would usually say—he wrote this in several places—that when one goes to the synagogue in the morning to pray, one should go because there is a scriptural decree to pray. Because there is a scriptural decree—or a rabbinic enactment, doesn’t matter right now—to pray. Not because I want to ask for my needs, or healing, or livelihood, or redemption, or I don’t know exactly what. Rather, one must mutter what is written in the prayer book because there is a commandment to mutter what is written in the prayer book, and one should intend to fulfill one’s obligation. That is the intention in prayer. Now in practice, Leibowitz here takes a step that he often used to take: he takes a correct point, but takes it one step too far. Meaning, his point is a correct point. Someone who comes to pray because of love or fear or because of requesting needs—that is not prayer. He has not fulfilled his obligation. What is needed in order to fulfill the obligation is to come to prayer because there is a commandment to pray. Commandments require intention. But that does not mean that if I say these words—which are requests for needs—and I also intend to ask for needs, or I want those things, that disqualifies the prayer, Heaven forbid. That already sounds to me like outright stupidity. I mean, the sages instituted for us an entire prayer book—not the whole prayer book, never mind, the parts of the prayer book that they instituted—and they didn’t mean at all what those words say? They could just as well have put some random text in there, so long as we mutter something? It’s simply absurd.

[Speaker B] The sages also, first of all, say that there are specific times maybe—I don’t know whether he said this—but they say that if a person has nothing to request for his needs, he shouldn’t pray, as it were. There’s someone who says that here. I don’t know; I’m not familiar with such an exemption from the commandment of prayer. Not exemption—I’m not talking. But I’m talking about the commandment of prayer, not about prayer that isn’t a commandment. That’s what I mean. There are all kinds of other prayers.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can also pray beyond the commandment; there’s no prohibition of adding.

[Speaker B] You can pray beyond—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right? There, if you have no needs, then don’t ask. But regarding the commandment of prayer, there is no exemption if you have no needs. You don’t omit the relevant blessings in the Amidah because you have no needs. That’s not how it works. So what’s the point here, practically speaking? The point is something like what is written in the introduction to Eglei Tal. I said this in the previous class—I don’t remember, I think in the first meeting. In the introduction, Eglei Tal writes that some people are mistaken and think that one may not study out of enjoyment. Right? The Lithuanians—in declarations at least, not in practice. In practice it seems they do enjoy it, but in declarations they’re supposed to suffer. So one must not enjoy study. Then he says: there is no greater mistake than this. Every morning we bless, “Please make the words of Your Torah pleasant in our mouths, Lord our God”—we want the words to be pleasant for us. But there is a continuation in Eglei Tal, and he writes—it’s usually quoted less—that if someone really studies because of the enjoyment, then he truly does not fulfill the commandment of Torah study. You have to study because one ought to study. That doesn’t mean it’s also forbidden to enjoy it. But an indication would be this: if you’re not enjoying it, do you still study? You still study. You very much want to enjoy it too, but the enjoyment is not the reason why you study. You study because one ought to study. Besides that, you also want there to be enjoyment—“please make it pleasant”—and that creates some kind of connection, and as Eglei Tal writes there, that is a higher level; it is even part of the parameters of the commandment to enjoy it. But that cannot be the reason for doing the commandment.

[Speaker B] The comparison between prayer and Torah study isn’t so clear, because in prayer the essence of prayer is requesting needs.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The essence of prayer is the enactment to pray, or the Torah-level commandment to pray. I’m saying maybe it’s possible—this is a counted commandment according to Maimonides.

[Speaker B] You could come and say—let’s put it this way—if this commandment is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] an existential commandment: if I have needs, then I ask for them, and if not, then not.

[Speaker B] What does that mean—were you commanded to ask for needs?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no needs.

[Speaker B] And in Torah study, if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Would you say I was commanded to have needs? What—if I have no needs, I have no needs. What can I do? I don’t have them, I don’t have them, everything is perfectly fine, I don’t want anything, everything is fine, excellent. The Jewish people, each under his vine.

[Speaker B] But you were commanded to ask for your needs.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I don’t have any.

[Speaker B] You can come and wonder—what do you mean, but I don’t have needs?

[Speaker C] But you were commanded to feel that you have needs.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I don’t—I have no needs. What does it mean to feel that I have needs? To fool myself?

[Speaker B] Fine, who said you were commanded—

[Speaker C] I’m not committing myself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying there is a possibility—

[Speaker B] that you were commanded—you were commanded needs, you were commanded to go pray.

[Speaker C] Yes, maybe that’s how one could understand it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can understand lots of things, but what does reasonable logic say?

[Speaker B] For a person to request needs? You can expect a person to do some action, but you can’t—

[Speaker C] expect a person to go and pray in a synagogue, but here—

[Speaker B] the logic is a kind of discussion right now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that is the discussion—that is the discussion.

[Speaker B] The logic here is to request needs, just as one understands.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—that’s the claim.

[Speaker B] And in Torah study, for example, what Eglei Tal says about Torah study—he says it about joy, but if he had said: there are people who say that one should study Torah without knowing the content of what one is studying, or without understanding, or without reaching certain conclusions—if he had said that was certainly a mistake, then yes, but here I think he also wouldn’t rule out…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s just a question about the parameters of the commandment. Are the parameters of the commandment to know or to study? Usually it is accepted that there are two commandments, and therefore it isn’t a mistake. There are two commandments: to study and to know. That’s what is accepted, at least by some commentators, but that doesn’t concern us.

[Speaker B] In the end, the commandment of Torah study—why does one need to study Torah? In order that we know the Torah. The Torah said, in a certain sense—fine, so that’s the definition of the commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—and in the definition of the commandment regarding prayer, it is that you request needs.

[Speaker B] Right, and that is the object of the commandment in prayer—that’s what you’re supposed to do.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and therefore what? What is the claim?

[Speaker B] And Torah study is that you’re supposed to know, and prayer is that you’re supposed to request needs. It’s not to mutter words. There is meaning to the concept of the commandment, not only because of what the Rabbi said earlier—that it’s strange that the sages would institute things for us to request needs and not mean it. Rather, what they instituted—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re saying there is no proof from Torah study to prayer. I didn’t mean to bring a proof; I meant to bring an example. Not a proof—maybe I…

[Speaker B] The principle—the principle is an example. An example, but the nuance is that in prayer there really isn’t at all—what the Rabbi said—that what is commonly assumed is that a person just does the commandment like a robot. One has to think, okay, what does this commandment mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but you request needs. I accept everything you’re saying—you request needs. But why? Not because you need the needs, but because there is a commandment to go and request needs. I’m just saying that this is the Leibowitzian plane. And on top of that there is the substantive plane, that I also really want to ask for those needs. I want them too—out of love and fear and all kinds of intentions of the Ari afterward as well. All kinds of higher levels. I accept what you’re saying; I’m only saying I’m not bringing a proof from Torah, I’m bringing an example from Torah. It’s not… I didn’t mean to make a comparison and prove from there. So what does this actually mean? It means that there is the basic motivation—I’m still going back to Torah study. There is the basic motivation: I study because one ought to study, not because of enjoyment. But that doesn’t mean I’m not supposed to enjoy it, or that it’s not good that I enjoy it, and maybe Eglei Tal argues that it’s even part of the commandment’s very definition to enjoy it. That too is a big novelty, but that’s what he claims. So the same thing applies to prayer: I can come because there really is a commandment to pray—and by the way, that is true—that one needs intention to fulfill one’s obligation, like with any other commandment. Also in the commandment of prayer one needs intention to fulfill one’s obligation. The rule that commandments require intention applies to prayer too. Besides that there is the famous Rabbi Chaim, right, with several kinds of intention in prayer. So the first intention is to fulfill one’s obligation. Besides that there are also the further intentions—the intention of the words, to intend what the words mean—which is level two. The fact that there is a level one does not negate the existence of level two or three. All right? That’s what people say. That’s what I mean to say here. So also in the worship of God, if we go back to those two—they were just examples—if we go back to the worship of God, then in the worship of God, why do I really serve God? Not because I love Him and not because I fear Him, but because one ought to serve God. Someone mentioned earlier some kind of intellectual recognition? Something like that—that’s more or less the idea. In another moment I’ll sharpen it further. Because one ought to serve God, that is why I serve God. On top of that, does this mean that it is not okay to fear or love Him? Of course not. There are two commandments: to love God and to fear God. But those are level two and level three. Even if I don’t love Him and don’t fear Him, I still have to serve Him, and I should try to improve the love and fear because those too are commandments. But by the way, love and fear are two commandments—two out of the 613. They are not the root of the entire Torah. They are two commandments out of the 613. The foundation—the obligation to serve God—is the foundation of everything; it is not one of the commandments. It is the foundation of all the commandments, the obligation to serve God. Therefore there is a big difference. That is the most basic obligation. Love and fear are level two, level three; there are endless levels on top of that. But that doesn’t replace the basic level. So we ask ourselves why we are supposed to serve God. The answer is not because we love Him and not because we fear Him, but because one ought to serve God. And since Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance, chapter 10, was mentioned earlier, Maimonides defines there what love is. What is love? “To do the truth because it is truth.” I would not define my love for my wife that way, for example. I don’t remember in which numbered Jewish law it is—look there—but that’s what it says in chapter 10. So what? Maybe that is a Torah foundation for an entirely different topic, and there we will still discuss the relationship between the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah and the Laws of Repentance. I’m talking about chapter 10 of the Laws of Repentance. Therefore, in essence, the foundation because of which one serves God is because one ought to serve God. There is nothing else. Love and fear are above that—

[Speaker B] Or below that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Love and fear are level two and level three. Above or below—that’s a tricky question. Nachmanides, in the portion of Yitro, writes regarding a positive commandment overriding a prohibition. So Nachmanides there, in his commentary on “Observe the Sabbath day” in the Ten Commandments, writes—he has a contradiction. On the one hand, a positive commandment overrides a prohibition; it is stronger than a prohibition. On the other hand, in order not to transgress a prohibition one must spend all one’s money, while for the sake of fulfilling a positive commandment only up to a fifth. Why? If a positive commandment is more important than a prohibition, I should have to spend all my money in order to fulfill a positive commandment. So he explains there something—the Sdei Chemed spells it out more—and I think this is also Nachmanides’ intention: that the fulfillment of a positive commandment is greater than refraining from transgressing a prohibition. Putting on tefillin is greater than not desecrating the Sabbath. But desecrating the Sabbath is more severe than not putting on tefillin. On the positive side, the positive commandment is greater on the side of fulfillment. On the side of transgression, on the negative side, the prohibition is greater. All right? And why? That’s not contradictory at all—it’s two sides of the same coin. The more elevated something is in the spiritual sense, the more exalted it is to do it—but refraining from it is a lesser transgression, because okay, I’m not at that level; I’m at a lower level. But someone who does not do something basic—that is a more serious transgression, right? Therefore there is a difference between what is important and what is basic. I’m answering your question.

[Speaker B] The basic thing—and danger is more severe than prohibition—but that’s not because the body is more important than the soul.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s simply a condition for fulfilling the commandments. Yes, right. Meaning, the basic thing and the important thing often are not only not the same, they sometimes even conflict. What is most basic is not necessarily the most important, but clearly it is the condition for everything. All right? So we’ve discussed—

[Speaker B] Can we say here that “not for its own sake” and love and fear are “for its own sake”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—“for its own sake,” we’ll see in a moment. That is, I haven’t yet mentioned the concept of “for its own sake” here, and not by accident. The obligation to serve God because that is what one ought to do—because one ought to serve God—that is the most basic thing. You asked whether it is the most important? I don’t know. The highest on the conceptual plane—it may be that love, when you also have at least love and fear, is certainly higher, more meaningful. If it’s only this versus only that, I don’t know. But certainly if you have all of them, that is certainly higher. But the most basic thing is the obligation to serve God. The very obligation to serve God, just like that. All right? In Nefesh HaChayim—so wait, what were we saying? Let’s just close the circle here regarding the laws of idol worship. In the laws of idol worship, when Maimonides says that one who worships out of love or fear is exempt from idol worship—why? What does one need to do in order to be an idol worshiper in the most scrupulous sense? To accept it as a god. What does that mean? To do the truth because it is truth—to do falsehood because it is truth, yes? Meaning, to believe in it the way we believe in God. That is called accepting it as a god. Understand: I see a police officer on the road. All right? I immediately slow down, of course, so that he won’t stop me and give me a fine. Right? Am I worshiping idols? I’m afraid of him, that he will harm me, and therefore I obey his commandments. Is that idol worship? Why is that idol worship? What—must a god specifically be a statue? Can’t it be a person with two legs? Even with a hat, as the comedy troupe said.

[Speaker B] If you slow down because you understand it’s dangerous—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and forbidden, then that’s idol worship. Say that again? If you slow down because you understand it’s dangerous… No, no—I slow down because of the fine. I don’t want him to fine me.

[Speaker B] Then it’s because you’re afraid; it’s idol worship that is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the question is whether that is idol worship. I’m asking whether this is idol worship or not. Isn’t it because it’s out of fear?

[Speaker B] If you’re afraid, out of fear, I need to point out—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I need to slow down for the sake of Heaven. Then it will be full-fledged idol worship. Meaning, if I slow down because I think I ought to slow down, that is complete idol worship. If I slow down only because I’m worried about the fine, that is idol worship out of fear, and in that case I’m exempt. It is forbidden, yes? Exempt but forbidden.

[Speaker B] Meaning, yes, it’s clear that that’s not right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is that not right? Because when I slow down, I slow down—the policeman standing in front of me is not at all in the position of a god, I hope at least. Meaning, I am not accepting him upon myself as a god. What does it mean to accept someone as a god? Whatever he says, I do. Or I am obligated to do—not that I always manage it, but the conception is that I am obligated to do it. Not because of this and not because I love him or fear him, but because he has some kind of natural, self-evident authority over me; my decision is that whatever he says, I do. That is called a god. If there is someone in the world or something in the world toward whom you feel that way, know that you are worshiping idols. Worshiping idols. Huh? Someone who accepts the law of the state because the law of the state is binding, period—that person is worshiping idols. Halakhically—not as a metaphor, halakhically. So—

[Speaker B] In the army… so one needs to accept the law of the state because…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it leads to all sorts of important things, I don’t know—such-and-such benefits. One should act out of fear or out of love, not by accepting it as a god. No, no—so you said, since here there simply cannot be any worship of acceptance as a god, then it also won’t count as worship not for its own sake. Worship is defined through the primary layer. After there is worship, then there are also possibilities of worshiping out of love or fear.

[Speaker B] Like a road of a god, something cultic?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Something like that, yes. If I take medicine, I take the medicine so that it will heal me, because otherwise it will hurt me. Is that idol worship? It is not idol worship. I do what I need to do in order to get the benefit that comes out of the act.

[Speaker B] But the state and I are not in a relation of a god or something belonging to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so here there is room now to discuss whether an abstract god is also a god. I think we talked about this. Whether an abstract god is also a god or not—I tend to think yes, but there is room to discuss it. I don’t think there has to be some wooden doll in order to transgress idol worship—to commit idol worship. But that’s another topic. In any case, so what… wait, I still didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] Why, why if I slow down because a policeman tells me to stop, why isn’t that “exempt but forbidden”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why… because of what I just answered. Because the option of worshiping him by accepting him as a god does not exist. Since he is not a god in anyone’s eyes, one cannot worship him not for its own sake either. Once something is defined as a god, if you worship it not for its own sake, you are exempt. But this whole commandment, or this prohibition, is defined in relation to entities that are somehow defined as gods. But if there is no room at all to define them as gods—I don’t know—putting on the brakes to stop, is that idol worship? I press the pedal because I know the pedal will stop me if I press it. I’m activating some mechanism whose results I want. That is not called idol worship. I’m not obeying the brake’s instructions because it is the brake. “The truth because it is truth,” right?

[Speaker B] I don’t know if it has to be defined as idol worship…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As a god. I have no idea. Don’t ask me now for the precise halakhic definitions; we can talk about that another time. It’s not important for our matter. I’m just trying to define the basic mechanism. Yes. What the Rabbi said—

[Speaker B] that one is less obligated—it’s a bit strange, because usually it is accepted that specifically “accepting the yoke” is something of one God, where there is obligation to one God, while in idol worship there is no obligation; there are many gods. There, specifically, the feeling is that you are not obligated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—obligation is not necessarily the monotheistic obligation familiar to us. There are all kinds of obligations. In the Far East too, there are obligations to as many gods as you want; there is complete pluralism. No, no, I don’t think so. That’s a somewhat Jewish form of thinking. Meaning, I’m not sure that’s right. There are other kinds of obligations. But let’s leave it; that really belongs to the laws of idol worship whenever we discuss them. Fine. In any case, then in practice worship—the worship of God—I’m now moving from idol worship to the worship of God. The worship of God means unconditional obligation. That is called worship of God. I do not serve Him because it’s best to serve Him, or because it benefits me to serve Him, or because I love Him, because I fear Him, because it resonates, because I don’t know what—all kinds of things like that. I serve because one ought to serve. That is the worship of God. On top of that, it may be that this is also the best thing; it may be that it isn’t. It may be that I also love Him and fear Him and a hundred thousand other things—level two, three, all the way to twenty-two. All right? But the first level has to be this. And don’t let your hearts wonder at this matter, because in practice—maybe just in two sentences—where are we with the time? When we come to justify various obligations—moral, legal, religious, all kinds—we always use some principles that justify that obligation. The obligation to obey the law—some justify it through gratitude, some justify it by some sort of implicit social contract, all kinds of theories in jurisprudence. And how do you justify the justifications? The obligation to obey the law, let’s say, is because of gratitude—just as an example. All right? And the obligation to show gratitude? Basic. What does “basic” mean? Fundamental. That’s just how it is, right? It seems self-evident to us. Not “that’s how it is” in the sense of arbitrary, like tossing a coin and deciding. Rather in the sense that it is self-evident. I’m not looking for a more basic principle to justify it. Let’s go back again to Leibowitz: this is how Leibowitz defined the concept of a value. A value is something that does not require justification in order for me to say that I am obligated to it. I simply know that I am obligated to it, period—not because of some more basic principle. In short, whenever we justify our various obligations, we use norms. A norm justifies some obligation. When I ask about the norm—why do I feel obligated to it?—then maybe I’ll bring another norm. And when I ask about that norm—why am I obligated to it?—then I’ll bring yet another norm. In the end, at the bottom line, assuming it isn’t turtles all the way down, then the answer to why I am obligated to the most basic norm will be: just because. But what does “just because” mean? One second—not a coin toss. “Just because” means because it is self-evident. I am not looking for a justification. It is simply self-evident to me that I am obligated to this, and that’s it. That thing, that basic stage, is what is called a value. In this language, I now say that the obligation to serve the Holy One, blessed be He, is a value. Just one more second: once there was a discussion in Yeruham, in the yeshiva where I once taught in Yeruham. There was some discussion there about why one should study Torah. One person said because it’s useful, and because it’s very important and deep and beautiful and wonderful, and all kinds of other things. Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, whom I had started mentioning earlier in Nefesh HaChayim, says one should study Torah for its own sake. What does “for its own sake” mean? For the sake of Torah. What does “for the sake of Torah” mean? Not for His sake—for its sake, right? What does “for the sake of Torah” mean? Its source is in the Ran on tractate Nedarim; he brings some Ran in Nedarim there. The intention is: just because. That’s really to say “just because” in other words. If someone asks me why I’m sitting on the chair, and I say because one ought to sit on the chair, that’s simply another way of saying “just because,” right? What does “just because” mean? It means that if you ask me why one should study Torah, you’re apparently assuming there is some other principle that is even clearer, and through it one can explain the obligation to study Torah. But if the obligation to study Torah is the most basic and self-evident principle in my eyes, then what explanation are you expecting from me? It is the principle by means of which I explain all my other obligations. Okay? So here too—I’m speaking now only by borrowed example—I’m speaking about the same point. The obligation to serve the Holy One, blessed be He, is not supposed to be based on some norm or principle more basic than it, such as love, fear, desire, I don’t know, this or that. Rather, one simply ought to serve God; that is what it means to accept Him as a god. A first cause, yes.

[Speaker C] But he says “for its own sake” means for the sake of Torah, meaning that Torah in itself is the value. Not God’s command.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, not the command.

[Speaker B] Like a sukkah commandment done for its own sake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—I’m talking about Torah study, not the commandment of sukkah.

[Speaker B] But then you’re saying that the definition of a value is that there is no commander. If Torah means I study Torah because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Recite Shema morning and evening and you are exempt—take it from me in writing.

[Speaker B] In writing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no command.

[Speaker B] Yes, there is a command—Shema morning and evening.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Shema morning and evening. Fine, I gave you authorization. Shema morning and evening—you fulfilled the obligation of the command. Everything is fine. Why do you study between morning and evening?

[Speaker B] So Torah is a value.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Torah is a value much broader than the commandment of Torah study. The commandment of Torah study is a very narrow part. Torah study and the commandment of Torah study are not the same thing. No. It parallels it, yes. But not because God commanded, but because I understand what Torah is, and it is self-evident to me that one ought to study it. That—that is a basic thing. All right. We’ll come back more to this particular aspect of Torah study. Yes. Because it’s very wise to be wise.

[Speaker B] According to this, there are no values, because every “just because” that we say—for example, in Western society it is customary not to murder people and not to eat them. Right? Because, I don’t know, if you go to a person and ask him why he doesn’t murder, he’ll try to explain it to you, and in the end, after you refute all his explanations, he’ll tell you, “No, because that’s how I was educated.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Shaknaz family, it depends.

[Speaker B] Go ask a person why you don’t murder, and in the end—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You attribute it to education.

[Speaker B] In Indonesia or I don’t know where—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In someplace over there—they eat people because that’s how they were educated. That’s an argument, that’s an argument, that’s an argument—the relativist argument commonly made against the objectivity of values. I don’t accept it on the personal level, because I think they do it because they think it’s right. And the proof is that if they were now to try to educate us over many years to eat and murder, I would bet it wouldn’t work. Why? In Germany, in Nazi Germany, it also didn’t really work so well. People vomited on the… or drank a lot of wine in order to be drunk before they shot Jews. Or they somehow managed, yes, to explain to them that Jews are not human beings. There is also something in the direction of progress—we talked about this once. Something in the direction of progress: somehow cannibals stop being cannibals. I have not found people who were not cannibals and then became cannibals. Meaning, yes, there are different places, but still there is some preferred direction. Meaning, I don’t think it’s entirely relative. But let’s leave that. Attributing it to education is an interesting move; I don’t accept it, I don’t think it’s correct. Fine. So for our purposes, the obligation to serve the Holy One, blessed be He, is in fact some kind of basic value. There is a whole series of such basic values; perhaps they are derivatives of this value, perhaps they are only second-order, I don’t know, but it’s more or less the same principle. And it seems to me that these things almost all—perhaps even all—appear in the Laws of Repentance. The obligation to repent stems from the fact that repentance is the path to draw close to the Holy One, blessed be He. That is a fact. And fact and command are of course two entirely independent things, at least in the philosophical sense. The fact that giving charity to a poor person improves his condition does not turn giving charity into a commandment, right? A fact can never be a sufficient basis to create a norm. Okay? In order to create a norm, you need a source for the norm. Meaning, a fact is a neutral thing. It is true by virtue of being true.

[Speaker B] Meaning, don’t fight the facts. What? Then facts come about a norm afterward? What is this? Are you objecting to legal positivism?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, natural law is… fine, the question is how to define it. I don’t want to get into that now. How did I get to this? So in short, our most basic obligations are in fact obligations that have no explanation; rather, they provide the explanation for secondary or derivative obligations. Our most basic obligations are the obligations that have no explanation. When we ask ourselves why to repent, there is no verse. If there is no verse, then why do it? The answer is that if there were a verse, this would be an ordinary obligation—but repentance is a more fundamental obligation. It is such a fundamental obligation that we are obligated to it even before verses, even without verses. And why? From the same source—maybe this is a little present in some of the things said here earlier—from the same source as the obligation to serve God. And again, not from the source of the obligation to a command—not that it derives from the command. I’m not going back to what Binyamin said earlier, that because there is a command not to desecrate the Sabbath, from that follows the obligation to repent if you desecrated the Sabbath—no. I mean at a more fundamental level. From the very obligation to serve God, from which I also arrive at the obligation to heed His voice and not desecrate the Sabbath, from that very obligation it also follows that I need to repent, because that is the way to be close to Him.

[Speaker B] And what—there is serving God and there is being close to Him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. That’s why I said it’s parallel. I didn’t say it follows from there, but rather there is… You can perhaps call it a kind of form of serving God that is closeness; you can view it as something parallel, just as there is some value that is supposed to be self-evident—of serving God—there is also a self-evident value of being close to Him. All right? And that value tells us that we really need to repent even without a command. More than that: if there were a command, that would only detract. It would turn it into a commandment. The commandment of Torah study is something lowly. It is something lowly because it is only a commandment; there are 612 more like it. Torah study is something far more exalted. Because Torah study is not connected to the commandment of Torah study. We study Torah because we—I at least, I don’t know about you—we study because I understand what this thing means, and it is self-evident to me that this is what one ought to do. Not because there is a commandment of Torah study. It’s not “the commandment of Torah study is equal to them all”; Torah study is equal to them all. Why and how can Torah study be equal to them all? I once saw that there is a book by Rabbi Wolbe called Mitzvot HaShekulot—do you know it? He collected some seven commandments, I think, about each of which the sages said that it is equal to the whole Torah. Which is of course bootstrap, right? Meaning, the commandment of the Land of Israel is equal to the whole Torah. The whole Torah—what, without the Land of Israel? It can’t be equal to the whole Torah including the commandment of settling the Land of Israel itself, right? Therefore it is equal to the other 612. But wait—among those other 612 there is also the commandment of Torah study, which is also equal to the whole Torah, and that already includes the Land of Israel. So what is happening here? The whole business is a bit unclear. So what is the plain meaning? The plain meaning is that all these commandments about which they said they are equal to the whole Torah—that is a mistake. In my opinion it is also a mistake in the book. What is equal to the whole Torah is not the commandment involved in it, but the value involved in it. The commandment is just commandments—like the 613 commandments, there are 613 commandments, all precious, all important, each one with its place. Something that is equal to the whole system is something that is not a commandment. It is something more fundamental than a commandment. That could be repentance. They could say settling the Land of Israel. They could say what—tzitzit?

[Speaker B] Equal to all the commandments. Why? What can there be in that value?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no idea. One can think—maybe it recalls the firmament, the Throne of Glory, I don’t know. But as a commandment, what does that mean? It’s clearer if you look at the commandment of tzitzit—

[Speaker B] You can say that it completes, but it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A kind of counterpart to all the commandments. But why? What is this, just arbitrary? They held a lottery and I won the jackpot?

[Speaker B] This commandment is important.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why is it important? It represents something, right? So therefore that is the value. That’s what I’m talking about.

[Speaker B] I don’t know if you can define that value as the value of

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As a commandment, to say

[Speaker B] that that’s how it is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, with the commandment of Torah study it’s certainly like that. With the commandment of Torah study it’s certainly like that. Because there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say that with the Shema in the morning and evening you fulfill your obligation. So then why do you study everything else? What is neglect of Torah study?

[Speaker B] Neglect of Torah study is when a person could do more.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He could do more, but he’s not obligated. There is Shema in the morning and evening, so what’s the problem? It’s an existential commandment. Okay? And that’s the point of what the Rabbi

[Speaker B] was precise about: Torah study, not the commandment of Torah study, or settling the Land of Israel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not a linguistic precision. I’m explaining it. It’s not—even if it had said “the commandment of Torah study,” I would erase it.

[Speaker B] So why does the fact that someone just does more take away from it so that it becomes

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because there is always a minimal standard. At that standard it really is a commandment. That’s all. And at that standard you have to meet it like any other commandment, and commandments also require intention. You have to intend to fulfill your obligation. In the Torah you’re studying now, you don’t need intention if you already said Shema in the morning.

[Speaker B] Is it obvious that this commandment, that minimal standard, is equal in weight to the whole Torah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. Because it’s such a fundamental thing that it doesn’t fit into the framework of a commandment. There are many things that weren’t included—we spoke earlier about what gets included in the Book of Commandments. There are things that weren’t included in the Torah’s commands because they’re not important enough? They’re less important?

[Speaker B] If the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] this, you still need

[Speaker B] to do it because of the value.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone who understood would probably say yes. Right, because if the Torah had not commanded it, okay,

[Speaker B] that’s why it commanded it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And up to this point it’s a commandment, not a value. No, there is also a value in it beyond the commandment. There is also a value in it. In this case it could be that it overlaps. In Torah study it doesn’t even overlap in terms of content. In many things—also in love of God—it doesn’t overlap, what I hinted to you earlier about Foundations of the Torah and the Laws of Repentance. So in fact the most basic values, which are starting points, you can’t weigh them against something else. Because they are starting points. Precisely for that reason it is said about them that they are equal to the whole Torah. They have no defined weight that you can place somewhere—this is less than that, this is more than that. These are foundational things that do not stand on something more fundamental. You can’t weigh them. Consequently, they are equal to the whole Torah. Repentance—I don’t know whether there is a rabbinic midrash like this—so now I’m expounding it: repentance is equal to the whole Torah. Okay? My own midrash—what, is it forbidden to expound? Why shouldn’t I expound? I think that within the Laws of Repentance there appear several values, maybe all of them, that are values of this kind. Within the Laws of Repentance there appear values like Torah study in chapter 10 there, serving God for its own sake, maybe even character refinement appears somewhere, love of God appears somewhere. All these things—it can be shown either that they are non-halakhic values, or that even if there is some command, it does not include the entire scope of the value. And the Laws of Repentance speak about the value, while elsewhere it speaks about the commandment. For example, with love of God, what was mentioned earlier: love of God was mentioned in chapter 10 of the Laws of Repentance, but it was also mentioned in the Laws of Foundations of the Torah. Why does it need to write it twice? And also, look, these are not the same definitions. These two sets of laws are not repeating themselves. It’s a different description. Because in the Laws of Foundations of the Torah it is Jewish law, and there we are commanded—there is a commandment to love God, like any other commandment. It has definitions, and you need to know what that means. In the Laws of Repentance, what is written about love of God is to do the truth because it is truth. It is not a commandment to do the truth because it is truth—how can there be a commandment to do the truth? If I do it because it is truth, then I do it, and if not, then not. You can’t command that. Rather, what is it? It is the non-commanded, non-legal value. That is what one ought to do. The whole essence of the Laws of Repentance, I think at least, is this. And the father of them all is of course repentance itself. Repentance itself is this kind of fundamental value that did not enter the halakhic category because they did not want to put it there. And in Maimonides’ Laws of Repentance it pulls along with it several other values that Maimonides wants to tell us also belong to some basic platform of serving God, and not specifically to the halakhic platform, which is discussed elsewhere in the legal rulings. And therefore, in practice, the Laws of Repentance in Maimonides—under a different heading you could say these are the Laws of Serving God. They are not the Laws of Repentance. And of course the basic service of God, perhaps almost the most basic of all besides the very obligation of serving God—which is not written anywhere, maybe that is the commandment of faith / belief, I don’t know—is the obligation to return, to draw close to the Holy One, blessed be He, to aspire to be close to the Holy One, blessed be He. And from this there are attached all kinds of other aspects of serving God, which also appear here in the Laws of Repentance. Okay, we’ll continue next week.