Tractate Shabbat, Chapter One – Lesson 51
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
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Table of Contents
- Methodological framework and approaches to prohibiting electricity
- The definition of creating and its connection to the act of Creation
- The Beitzah passage: creating scent and perfuming
- Maimonides’ ruling and the debate over omitting creating scent
- The Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Shulchan Arukh versus the Rema
- The Magen Avraham and Shulchan Arukh HaRav: adding scent and distinguishing between scents
- Implications for electricity: reducing and increasing current
- Professor Lev’s criticism of creating current and the lecturer’s response
- Conclusion regarding creating current
- The labor of kindling in electricity: incandescent filament, Maimonides–Raavad, and Rabbi Kook
Summary
General overview
The lecture continues the discussion of electricity on the Sabbath מתוך a methodological framework of “fitting” a new reality into existing categories of Jewish law, mainly stringently, and presents three central approaches for prohibiting closing an electrical circuit: molid zerem, mav’ir, and boneh, while noting that the Chazon Ish is identified with boneh and is considered by most halakhic decisors to be a puzzling and lone position. The discussion focuses mainly on clarifying the prohibition of molid re’ach in tractate Beitzah, on the question whether it was ruled as Jewish law and what that means for molid zerem, and on examining the positions of Maimonides, the Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, the Shulchan Arukh, the Rema, the Magen Avraham, and Shulchan Arukh HaRav. Later, Professor Lev’s critical arguments against Beit Yitzchak’s comparison between scent and current are presented, and the lecturer offers sharp reservations about those arguments, then moves briefly to the approach of mav’ir through the dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad and to Rabbi Kook’s innovation, which expands mav’ir beyond an incandescent filament.
Methodological framework and approaches to prohibiting electricity
The lecture assumes that the question of electricity on the Sabbath is an attempt to dress a new prohibition in an existing halakhic framework, and that a change in the stringent direction is easier to accept socially. The three main approaches brought to prohibit activating an electrical circuit are molid zerem, mav’ir, and boneh, with the Chazon Ish identified with boneh, while most halakhic authorities reject it as puzzling and unique, even though collectors of opinions quote it. The first chronological direction among the decisors is attributed to Beit Yitzchak, who grounds the prohibition in molid zerem by force of the passage of molid re’ach in Beitzah, emphasizing that if there is a prohibition of molid, it is rabbinic, since there is no primary category of labor like that among the thirty-nine labors.
The definition of creating and its connection to the act of Creation
The lecturer defines molid as creating “something new that wasn’t here before” from the human point of view, even though in a physical sense there is no creation ex nihilo by human beings and the thing was always there potentially. He wonders why the prohibition of creating is not Torah-level and not even the “first primary labor,” and suggests a theoretical possibility of connecting this to “a remembrance of the act of Creation,” in which the cessation is from processes of formation rather than processes of creation ex nihilo. He cites Nachmanides in a neo-Platonic context of prime matter, explains the distinction between creation and formation, and argues that the six days mainly describe formation and not the initial creation ex nihilo that preceded the Torah’s description. During the discussion, a reservation is voiced that “creation = ex nihilo” is not explicit language in the Torah but a common interpretation, and it is said that the concept of “creating” for human beings is the appearance of an essential change between a previous phase and a new phase, even though the material itself already existed.
The Beitzah passage: creating scent and perfuming
The lecturer describes the flow of the passage in Beitzah as beginning in the context of extinguishing and kindling in fumigation, and then “in the middle” the prohibition of molid re’ach enters regarding earthenware, in a dispute among Amoraim, and later the Talmud seems to treat the prohibition as given. He states that in the plain meaning of the passage there are two kinds of prohibitions: creating scent “from nothing” in the air, and adding scent to an object like a garment or utensil in such a way that the object itself becomes “perfumed,” where the perfuming is the “bringing into being” of the object according to Rashi. He emphasizes that when adding scent to an already existing scent in the air, the Talmud permits crushing myrtle, but a question remains regarding adding scent in perfuming a garment and the precise boundaries of the definition of “what counts as creating” within a rabbinic prohibition.
Maimonides’ ruling and the debate over omitting creating scent
Maimonides, in the Laws of Festivals (chapter 4, law 6), prohibits burning incense because of extinguishing, distinguishes between bodily need that is not equal for everyone and fumigating a house or utensils, which is not bodily need, and permits smoking under fruit for the sake of food preparation. The lecturer argues that there is no trace in Maimonides of the prohibition of molid re’ach, and that if he had ruled it, one would expect him to bring explicitly the distilled case of “dragging a perfumed cup over garments is prohibited,” where there is no extinguishing or kindling, only perfuming. The Maggid Mishneh argues that all the Talmudic laws about creating scent are “included” in Maimonides’ prohibition on fumigating a house and utensils, and the lecturer calls this strained because the halakhic context in Maimonides is the pushing aside of extinguishing for food preparation, not creating scent. Professor Lev is presented as strengthening the reading that Maimonides omitted creating scent, and the lecturer suggests that Maimonides probably ruled like the Amora who does not accept the law of creating scent despite the continuation of the passage.
The Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Shulchan Arukh versus the Rema
The lecturer notes that the Rif and the Rosh also apparently omitted the law of molid re’ach, and concludes that this likely means that the Shulchan Arukh too would not rule creating scent in keeping with the rule of the “three pillars of ruling,” even though that rule is not absolute. In the Tur (section 511), there appears a prohibition of fumigation over coals, and permission to place scent in fruit to improve it for eating, with language broad enough to include both earthenware and a coal; this raises a difficulty, because mentioning earthenware seems related to creating scent, since there is no extinguishing there, and the lecturer suggests the possibility that the context is a rabbinic form of kindling done unusually rather than creating scent. In the Shulchan Arukh there is mention of “scattering spices on the coals” and permission “even… on top of a coal of fire,” and the lecturer reads the word “even” as a hint to the background of earthenware, but stresses that a law book is not supposed to work by hints and that there is no formulation there of a prohibition of creating scent. The Rema explicitly adds: “And it is forbidden to drag a perfumed cup over garments because he creates scent in them,” and the lecturer presents this as the first direct position in the chain of these decisors that assumes a prohibition of creating scent and corrects the perceived omission in the other sources.
The Magen Avraham and Shulchan Arukh HaRav: adding scent and distinguishing between scents
The Magen Avraham writes that even a garment that already smells may not have scent applied to it in order that it smell stronger, and he brings permission to return an etrog that had been placed on a garment before the Festival and then removed from it, “because it does not smell more because of that.” The lecturer points to a first difficulty, that the Magen Avraham seems to contradict the Talmud, which permits adding scent in the case of myrtle, and a second difficulty, that the factual claim regarding the etrog, “that it does not smell more,” seems simply incorrect. He brings Professor Lev’s solution and that of Shulchan Arukh HaRav: that the prohibition is to create a “new scent” of a different type in the garment, but adding the same scent is permitted, and therefore an etrog returned to the garment does not add a different scent. The lecturer also presents an alternative interpretive possibility, according to which the Magen Avraham distinguishes between adding scent in the air, which is permitted, and adding perfuming to a garment, which is prohibited even when the scent is of the same type, and suggests the reasoning that in a garment the change is perceived as a change in the object itself, and therefore even “more perfumed” counts as an additional creation.
Implications for electricity: reducing and increasing current
The lecturer presents the direct implication of the dispute between the Magen Avraham and Shulchan Arukh HaRav for the question of increasing and reducing current in a circuit: if molid zerem parallels perfuming a garment, then increasing current may resemble adding scent. He notes practical discussions such as using a rheostat, electric doors in hospitals where the current is lowered and then increased for opening, and claims about Sabbath elevators in which going up with additional weight requires more current even though the action looks the same. He distinguishes between a case where changing the current actually changes the operation of the device and a case where the change is not noticeable in the device’s operation, and suggests that in unnoticeable cases there is great doubt whether there is room to prohibit because of “perceptibility,” while noting that going down in an elevator is less problematic than going up.
Professor Lev’s criticism of creating current and the lecturer’s response
Professor Lev raises arguments against Beit Yitzchak’s comparison between molid re’ach and molid zerem, and the lecturer summarizes them and disputes their core. A central argument of Professor Lev is that closing a circuit is not an action on the source of the current but only “allows” it to flow, like opening a faucet, and the lecturer replies that electric current is not parallel to the flow of water, because current is an entity different from stationary charge, including the creation of a magnetic field and distinct physical properties; therefore creating current is creating something new and not “the same thing moving.” Another argument is that the change does not endure for any meaningful time because it can be shut off immediately, and the lecturer argues that the result endures as long as the switch is closed, and only an additional action returns the situation to its previous state, so this counts as enduring. There is also a claim about perceptibility, that current is not experienced by the senses, and the lecturer says that the relevant perceptibility is through the operation of the electrical device and not necessarily seeing the current itself, and that in the context of changing current in a way that does not change the operation there is room for doubt. Professor Lev also argues that one should not add new “nolad” prohibitions beyond the Talmud, and the lecturer rejects this as confusing the addition of a new prohibition with interpretation of what is included in the scope of an existing prohibition.
Conclusion regarding creating current
The lecturer concludes that the basis for prohibiting electricity on the grounds of molid zerem is dubious, because most halakhic decisors do not rule the prohibition of molid re’ach at all, and only the Rema and those who follow him give it real weight. Even within that approach there are internal disputes as to whether the prohibition is creating scent in the air or only perfuming an object, and whether it is permitted to add more of the same scent, which creates additional doubts in the analogy to current. He describes a trend in halakhic ruling in which “it’s obvious that it has to be prohibited,” and so people look for the halakhic “hook” to hang the coat on, and argues that if one began from independent analysis of the passage of creating scent it would not be simple to build a prohibition of electricity on that, especially when we are dealing with a double doubt in a rabbinic prohibition.
The labor of kindling in electricity: incandescent filament, Maimonides–Raavad, and Rabbi Kook
The lecturer states that many halakhic decisors ground the prohibition of electricity in mav’ir, but emphasizes that this is significant mainly where there is glowing metal like an incandescent filament, whereas in many devices there is no metal that becomes incandescent, so the prohibition from the standpoint of mav’ir is narrower than the prohibition of molid zerem. He describes a framework in which many combine the two: a Torah-level prohibition of mav’ir where there is an incandescent filament, and a rabbinic prohibition of molid zerem where there is no filament, in order to prohibit modern electronics as well. The discussion connects to the dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad in the Laws of the Sabbath, chapter 12, law 1, about someone who heats iron in order to temper it in water, where Maimonides defines this as a subcategory of kindling and the Raavad objects that perhaps it is cooking or tempering, with tempering being rabbinic; the lecturer explains that there is no contradiction if Maimonides also brings it in the framework of other laws, because he arranges things by categories of labor. Rabbi Kook in Orach Mishpat is presented as one who broadens the concept of mav’ir so that significant heating or an electric spark would also count as kindling even without visible fire, out of a motivation to apply a Torah-level prohibition even in cases where there is no incandescent filament, and the lecturer presents this as a major innovation aimed at preventing the prohibition from being narrowed to a technological reality that is gradually disappearing.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, in the previous lecture we started dealing with the issue of electricity on the Sabbath, after all the methodological introductions—what the meaning of the issue is, how it should be thought about, to what extent it’s even possible to insert a new prohibition into the existing halakhic framework. In this case, it’s a change in Jewish law, but a change in the stringent direction, not the lenient one, so it’s easier for people to digest changes like that. So we began. I said—you also saw this on Wikipedia—that the main approaches that prohibit activating an electrical circuit are based either on creating current, on kindling, on building, and maybe some other more marginal things. Those are the three central approaches. I said that the Chazon Ish speaks in terms of building, and it’s viewed as a puzzling, lone opinion; meaning, most halakhic decisors don’t agree with him, except for those decisors who just quote opinions. People who quote opinions always quote the Chazon Ish too, but those who actually have a position—most of them claim that the Chazon Ish’s view is puzzling and isolated, and there’s no reason to take it into account. And we started dealing with creating current, which chronologically at least was the first direction that came up among the decisors, with Beit Yitzchak, and we saw there that in a relatively marginal remark he writes that one should prohibit activating the electrical circuit because it counts as creating current. He brings as the source for this the passage in tractate Beitzah about creating scent, and argues that from there one can learn that creating current is also prohibited. Of course, in the background we need to remember that creating scent, and as a result also creating current—even if there is a prohibition—it is a rabbinic prohibition. There is no such primary labor as creating; it doesn’t exist among the primary categories of labor. By the way, as a side note, it’s actually interesting why. Why? After all, if we’re looking for the various forms of creation and listing them among the thirty-nine primary labors and their derivatives, the most creative thing I can think of is to produce something from nothing. So creating should perhaps have been the very first primary labor, and specifically that remained only a rabbinic prohibition; it doesn’t appear in the list of primary labors.
[Speaker B] Maybe because creating scent—scent has no substance?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s something else. Meaning, creating in principle would be Torah-level, and because scent has no substance, that’s why it would only be a rabbinic prohibition. That doesn’t seem to be how the decisors understand it, and you also don’t see in the list of primary labors any creating of something substantial. There isn’t any.
[Speaker C] It’s not something from nothing. Creating isn’t something from nothing. If I take an orange and squeeze it, I get juice out of it. If I take myrtle leaves and crush them, I get the scent out of them. It’s obvious—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that there’s no something-from-nothing here in the physical sense. No person can create something from nothing; we don’t have the ability to do that. But what is defined as creating is always when something new has appeared here that wasn’t here before—that’s the definition of creating. When you squeeze the orange, we don’t see that earlier there was juice inside and now the juice is outside. Rather, before there was a fruit here, which of course also contains juice, and now I have juice. That’s something else. So basically I created something from nothing here. I didn’t turn the orange into juice; rather, there wasn’t juice here—there was an orange—and now suddenly there is juice, therefore this is… why?
[Speaker B] With an orange it’s not like that. The juice was inside and now it’s outside. It’s like squeezing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said that physically of course you’re right, nobody—
[Speaker B] No, but that’s not creating. For example, you could say—what about ice, when I freeze water? Same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That too would be… why not?
[Speaker B] Because here I changed its state. With the orange I didn’t change its state.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, I didn’t say it’s the same thing. That’s also water and this is oranges—what does that have to do with anything? I’m talking about the question of whether it can fall under the heading of creating, not whether melting ice is like squeezing oranges. Obviously not. Those are two different actions. But the claim is that creating means producing something new that wasn’t here before—that’s the definition of creating. Whenever we’re talking about human beings, there’s no meaning to this in the sense that we don’t do hocus-pocus and create something that wasn’t there at all. We don’t have that ability. It will always be something that in some potential sense was present in the earlier state, and still the Sages define such a state as creating, because from our perspective it’s like producing something from nothing.
[Speaker D] And if—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If that’s so, then I would have expected this to be a Torah-level primary labor and not a rabbinic prohibition—maybe even the first primary labor. It may be that this is also somewhat connected to the opening lectures we gave at the beginning of the year. After all, we do this as a remembrance of the act of Creation. Okay, a remembrance of the act of Creation—but in the end, the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world from nothing. But during Creation—and of course this depends on interpretations—for example, Nachmanides brings this in a neo-Platonic approach. Nachmanides on Song of Songs, and also a little in Genesis, talks about this: that what came before was prime matter, from Greek philosophy. Prime matter is matter without form. And then form was given to that matter, and thus all the creatures, all the objects that we know in our world, came into being. Now, that prime matter—some say that this is—
[Speaker E] “In the beginning God created—”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “—the heavens and the earth,” and before that the Torah says there was “chaos and void.” What is chaos and void? So several medieval authorities say: chaos and void is prime matter.
[Speaker E] It’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —as if it’s matter without form, just matter itself without any form. That’s of course a kind of abstraction. We can’t really imagine something that is just matter with no form. Everything we see has some kind of form. There is no matter without form. But in that world, the claim was that there was such an intermediate state, in which the very substance of matter was created, even before the particular objects made out of it. And then forms are imposed on it. That’s the difference between creation and formation. Creation is something from nothing. Formation is something from something. Okay? So now the claim is that the six days of Genesis describe only the stage of formation and not the stage of creation.
[Speaker B] With the Big Bang that fits perfectly. What do you mean? With the Big Bang this theory fits perfectly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, it depends how you relate to the singularity point that was there.
[Speaker B] Let’s say the first three seconds. After the first three seconds, everything is already formation, apparently.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, after the first three seconds the world as we know it came into being, but even during those three seconds there were things—just not things of the kind we know today. So let’s not get into all these apologetic issues right now. What I’m trying to say is only that the act of Creation as described in the Torah actually relates to the stage of formation and not the stage of creation. The original something-from-nothing—that’s the stage before the Torah begins. The prime-material stage. Then the Holy One, blessed be He, takes the prime matter and starts forming from it everything we know in our world: inanimate things, animals, plants, and so on, human beings, and so on. So when we cease on the seventh day, what did the Holy One, blessed be He, cease from? He didn’t cease from creation ex nihilo; He ceased from the six days of formation.
[Speaker E] But wait, there are two things that it actually says were created: the great sea creatures and man.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in the language of creation—you mean—
[Speaker E] That it uses the language of creation about them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It uses the language of creation regarding them. But essentially they too were formed from prime matter.
[Speaker E] Why specifically them? There was some certain aspect there that really was creation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand—that specifically in the Torah it doesn’t say—
[Speaker E] —about man, from nothing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, one at a time, one at a time, just a second.
[Speaker E] Apparently within them there was some component that really was creation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be. Doesn’t matter. But practically speaking this was a stage of formation. I’m not going into the question right now of why the Torah uses the word “create” in precisely those two contexts. Apparently because there really was something there that was more novel relative to the other things. But still, in essence these are six days of formation, not of creation. Creation was earlier. And therefore the cessation on the seventh day is a cessation from processes of formation and not from processes of creation. And because of that, creating—which for us at least is basically the reflection of an act of creation—specifically that is not prohibited on a Torah level; it is only rabbinic. Okay, maybe. A possibility. Whoever wanted to comment earlier?
[Speaker C] I wanted to say two things. One, to Ruti—that maybe the part of creation is putting a divine soul into the material.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, that in man there is something new compared to everything else—that’s obvious. What about the sea creatures?
[Speaker C] What about the sea creatures?
[Speaker B] I just want to say two things. One, to Ruti: the fact that we’re used to saying that creation means something from nothing—that’s not written in the Torah. The Torah uses the word “create” without explaining what it means. That’s an interpretation we’re used to.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tell me, is there a single concept in the Torah that it does explain?
[Speaker B] But it’s something we’re used to.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah doesn’t explain any concept it uses, just like anyone using language doesn’t explain every word he says to everybody; he assumes understanding.
[Speaker B] But there are people who claim that creation is not something from nothing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The accepted interpretation is that creation is something from nothing, but again, that’s not important to me. As far as I’m concerned, don’t call it creation—call it something else—but it was before the six days. That’s what I want.
[Speaker B] Assuming we’re talking about formation—assuming we’re talking about formation—then on the contrary, according to that, creating, if creating is like what happened in the six days of creation, then on the Sabbath—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not like what happened. The opposite. Creating is most similar to creation, not to formation. Therefore there is no Torah-level prohibition on the Sabbath against creating.
[Speaker E] But why is creating—
[Speaker B] —similar to creation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because creating is producing something new. Something from nothing. Not giving form to something existing.
[Speaker E] No, but Rabbi, the creating here isn’t creating like creation, because it really does come from something else. The scent is not being created—sorry, it exists potentially within the material from which you produce the scent.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They asked that earlier and I already answered. I’ll answer again. With human beings, there is no such thing as creation from nothing. In general there isn’t such a thing for us—we can’t do that. Therefore if you want to define creation for human beings, it will always be some kind of something-from-something. But what? In a place where the new thing I see before my eyes is not connected to the thing from which it was produced, from which I made it—that, for us, is what’s called creation. The Holy One, blessed be He, can produce something from nothing; we cannot. So for us, what it means to create is when the new thing is essentially different from its previous phase. As opposed to, say, selecting, or I don’t know what, or writing, or something like that, where basically it was there before and I only changed its form, its mode of appearance, but it’s not essentially different from what it was before. Fine, we could keep splitting hairs about this, but I’m not—
[Speaker E] Why not compare it to milking?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, with milking too there’s really room to discuss this. The Talmud in Ketubot talks about it. Is the milk located inside the breast or is it absorbed? There are two concepts there—I forgot the two terms the Talmud uses—Talmud in Ketubot on page 8, I think. Doesn’t matter, I don’t remember. The claim is that the milk is in general considered part of the body. And in that sense there really is some kind of creating here. But from the standpoint of creating in milk, that too would only be a rabbinic prohibition.
[Speaker C] There’s a question whether it’s from the standpoint of milking and from the standpoint of extracting.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Threshing. It’s basically taking the grain out of the husk. But that’s the formative aspect, not the creative aspect of the thing. The creative aspect maybe adds a rabbinic prohibition, if at all, but there’s no point, because there is already a Torah-level prohibition here. Okay, let’s continue.
[Speaker F] But there’s room to discuss in what case it even appears to us that something new was created here. Where are the boundaries? Why here does it look to us like something new was created and there not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a good question. And that discussion is conducted in relation to the rabbinic prohibition of creating. In those places, that’s exactly where this discussion is conducted, and it’s conducted by the medieval authorities and the later authorities.
[Speaker F] If it’s rabbinic then it’s obvious that they define the boundaries.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obvious. And still, even in a rabbinic prohibition of creating, you have to define what counts as creating. The definition is a Torah-level definition; the prohibition is rabbinic. The definition is in the reality itself—what counts as creating? For example, when they spoke earlier about squeezing fruit: if you squeeze fruit, but you squeeze the lemon into sugar or into water or into something like that, then there’s really no prohibition. Why? Because you didn’t create anything new. It was food before and it’s food now. Okay? So we look at the connection between—
[Speaker F] Meaning the boundaries—the rabbinic boundaries determine it, like the measures.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even in Torah prohibitions, the rabbis determine the boundaries. Always the rabbis determine them.
[Speaker F] Torah prohibitions—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even the definitions of Torah-level categories of labor were determined by the rabbis. So in every case it has to be defined, whether it’s a rabbinic prohibition or a Torah-level prohibition. I’m only saying that the definition of what counts as creating is discussed—there are discussions about it. And those discussions are conducted in the context of the rabbinic prohibition.
[Speaker B] I want to ask something else. Right, in the previous lecture we said that one of the criteria of labor is that it’s important independent of the Tabernacle, and then you can add more labors, and we have three spare ones with winnowing and… Did the Sages in the Talmud add a labor?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They added all the labors.
[Speaker B] No, from all the lists there are—out of the existing list there—was another labor added later?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s Rabbi Yehuda, for example, who adds a fortieth labor. There are a few things at the margins; there are discussions about additional labors. But again, it’s the same group. After all, what were they concerned about?
[Speaker B] Concerned about adding. It could be that from a certain point they were concerned about adding, and then they didn’t add creating.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but that’s not the issue—what does concern have to do with it? The question is why they didn’t include it from the outset. After all, this isn’t some new reality that came into being. With electricity you can discuss it—it didn’t exist in their time, so they couldn’t have added it. But there we’re not talking about extraordinary technological developments that nobody had thought of before, so why wasn’t it in the original list from the beginning? Okay, let’s continue. That’s really just a side note. So I want to continue what we discussed last time. We saw the passage in tractate Beitzah. We saw that basically it begins with a prohibition of extinguishing and kindling: someone who fumigates things, so the prohibition is really extinguishing and kindling. And suddenly, in the middle of the process, the prohibition of creating scent comes in, regarding earthenware. There it’s a dispute among Amoraim; the prohibition of adding scent or creating scent appears. And afterward the Talmud assumes as if it’s obvious that there is such a prohibition, and we saw that from the plain meaning of the passage—contrary to what Professor Lev claims—it seems that there are two kinds of prohibitions. One prohibition is creating scent from nothing, and the second prohibition is adding scent to a garment or to a utensil or to fruit. In other words, perfuming—let’s call it creating scent and perfuming—where the perfuming too is a kind of creating, but it’s not the creation of the scent; rather it’s the creation of the perfumed object. Okay? It’s not the scent in itself. That too is called creating scent, but really it’s the coming-into-being, as Rashi explains there, of the perfumed object. Okay. And regarding creating scent, we know that the Talmud—at least with regard to creating scent—the Talmud says that if I add to an existing scent, there is no prohibition in that, with crushing myrtle and what we saw there. But that’s all about adding to scent as such. What happens when you add to the perfuming of a garment? That’s an interesting question that appears in the Magen Avraham and we’ll talk about it in a moment. In any case, so what is the Jewish law? So in practice, I’m sharing the file with you. Maimonides, Laws of Festivals, chapter 4, law 6: “One may not fumigate with incense on a Festival because he extinguishes, even if it is in order to smell it,” meaning even if he’s doing it in order to smell, it’s prohibited. “And needless to say, to fumigate the house and the utensils is prohibited”—why? Because that’s not even a bodily need. To smell is a bodily need, but not one equal for everyone. But to fumigate the house and the utensils is not bodily need at all, so they did not permit the prohibition of extinguishing for a need like that, which is not food preparation, which is prohibited. “And it is permitted to smoke under fruit in order to make it fit for eating”—why? Because that is a need of food preparation, just as it is permitted to roast meat over the fire, meat over coals, what we saw in the Talmud. “And one sweetens mustard with a metal coal, but not with a wood coal, because he extinguishes.” Meaning, interestingly, with a metal coal there is no extinguishing according to Maimonides, and if you saw Maimonides later when he talks about kindling in metal, that exists. “And one may not extinguish the fire so that the pot or the house should not become smoky.” In short, the whole context of—what are you saying? Does Maimonides rule the prohibition of creating scent or not?
[Speaker E] No. No.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the face of it, it seems—
[Speaker E] —that he doesn’t, only kindling.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Do you hear?
[Speaker E] Only because of kindling or extinguishing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Meaning, all the categories of labor Maimonides is dealing with here are kindling or extinguishing; in this case he’s dealing only with extinguishing. But in principle it’s only in the context of kindling or extinguishing. The whole continuation of the passage, which starts introducing the creation of scent here, has no hint in Maimonides. How could it have appeared in Maimonides? Two answers. First, he should have said that there is such a prohibition, though for food preparation they permitted it. He doesn’t mention this prohibition in any way. But beyond mentioning the prohibition as such, he could have brought the case that reflects the prohibition. What is that case?
[Speaker B] With the earthenware or with the fumigation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With the cup over the silk garment, right? The cup with the scent, that you pass over the silk garment. Why is that the most distilled expression of the prohibition of creating scent? Because there there is no extinguishing and no kindling and nothing. The scent is in the cup. There’s no fire and nothing at all; we’re not dealing with fire. You simply take the cup with the scent and place it on the garment. There there is no extinguishing, no kindling, nothing. It’s only the prohibition of creating scent. So if Maimonides had ruled the prohibition of creating scent, I would have expected him to bring this prohibition of perfuming garments with a cup, because even if he doesn’t say it’s because of creating scent, if he had brought that prohibition it would have been clear to me that he also rules the prohibition of creating scent. And there only that thing would make sense. But here, in the laws he brings, there is extinguishing and kindling, and creating scent is not mentioned. There is no reason to assume there is a prohibition of creating scent here. Now, because of the difficulty that this seems to go against the Talmud, the Maggid Mishneh there comments that he thinks there is. “One may not fumigate with incense,” etc., in the chapter Festival that falls—Beitzah 22. In the Mishnah Rabban Gamliel said, and the Sages prohibit. Rav Assi said: The dispute is regarding smelling, but to fumigate, everyone agrees it is prohibited. And there the Talmud proves that even a utensil already fumigated may not be turned over onto garments so that the garments absorb the scent, because this creates scent in the garments. And so too the authorities wrote. And this is what they said there: dragging a cup over silk garments is prohibited. Up to here, that’s the Talmud. “And all this is included in what our master said, that fumigating the utensils is prohibited.” That last sentence—that last sentence is the important one for us. Meaning, according to the Maggid Mishneh, there is creating there in Maimonides too. Yes—the Maggid Mishneh claims that according to Maimonides there is a prohibition of creating scent. It’s not mentioned because it is included in the prohibition of fumigating the house and the utensils. Okay, that’s very strained. Very strained. Because it’s clear in Maimonides that the whole discussion here is a discussion of the labor of extinguishing—that’s the context. The whole question is whether this counts as a need of food preparation or not. So Maimonides says one may not fumigate the house and the utensils because it is not a need of food preparation. And then what? Why is it prohibited if it is not a need of food preparation? Because of the labor of extinguishing. It has nothing to do with creating scent. There is no hint here of creating scent. If Maimonides had wanted to include the case of the cup over silk garments, then he should have brought only the cup over silk garments, not the house and the utensils. Since the cup over silk garments is the purest expression of the prohibition of creating scent. After all, with fumigating utensils and fumigating the house, you really can’t know whether Maimonides is talking about creating scent, because there’s also extinguishing there.
[Speaker B] But if he had brought that sentence, it would have been enough for him to say, “One may not fumigate with incense on the Festival—”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “—because he extinguishes.”
[Speaker B] Why did he bring all the rest? It’s unnecessary. I get it—again? Why did Maimonides bring all the rest? It would have been enough to write, “One may not fumigate with incense on the Festival because he extinguishes.” That’s it. There’s a prohibition of extinguishing here. Why does he start bringing all the rest?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what are you talking about? The opposite. That’s obvious. It’s obvious that there is a prohibition of extinguishing; that’s not the novelty—there are thirty-nine primary labors.
[Speaker B] So why does he need to say “even in order to smell it” if there is a prohibition of extinguishing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m explaining.
[Speaker B] Why should it matter what I’m using it for?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’m explaining. The whole discussion in the Talmud was exactly about that. What counts as a need of food preparation that overrides the prohibition of extinguishing? It has to be a bodily need and it has to be a need equal for all. And there are discussions about that: does fumigating utensils fall under that? Does smoking the house fall under that? Does smoking fruit fall under that? And that is what Maimonides is ruling: that all these needs are not needs that override the prohibition of extinguishing. Maimonides in this law is not coming to teach us the prohibition of extinguishing. That is written among the thirty-nine primary labors. He is coming to teach us that the prohibition of extinguishing is not set aside in these situations, because these are not acts of food preparation. Therefore he has to bring all these examples. Got it? Okay. So Professor Lev here indeed writes—and rightly, in my opinion—“and it seems to me that this is not implied by the words of Maimonides,” because in the passage there are levels of several rabbinic prohibitions—I gave this to you on the sheet. And basically what he says is what I just said. In the course of the passage it’s very clear that the discussion begins with the prohibition of extinguishing and kindling. Only in the middle does the creation of scent suddenly enter. Maimonides basically brings only the beginning of the passage. The entire continuation about creating scent, including the cup over silk garments, Maimonides does not bring. So to invent that Maimonides intended that too—that’s a very strained invention. There is no reason in the world to assume that.
[Speaker B] But in the Talmud there’s no dispute about it. Is there a dispute in the Talmud?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, in the Talmud there is a dispute about it, because after all there is a dispute among the Amoraim whether this also applies to earthenware. Right? And then it says, even with earthenware because he creates scent. So what does the Amora who says this applies only to coals and not to earthenware hold? He apparently understands that there is no law of creating scent.
[Speaker B] No creating scent. So Maimonides basically ruled that there is no creating here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Apparently. If I understand correctly, that’s probably the intention. Because when you look at the continuation of the Talmud—sorry—when you look at the continuation of the Talmud, the Talmud basically assumes it as if it’s an agreed and obvious prohibition. And therefore everyone is puzzled why Maimonides omitted it, and the Maggid Mishneh pushes it into Maimonides anyway. Because it’s obvious to him that according to the conclusion of the passage there is a prohibition of creating scent. But that’s not entirely simple, because there is a dispute among the Amoraim in the Talmud. True, later in the passage they somehow continue discussing it as if there is a prohibition of creating scent, and usually our rule is that if the anonymous voice of the Talmud continues to discuss according to one of the opinions without noting that there is another opinion, then apparently it also ruled like that opinion. But here Maimonides, for his own reasons—I don’t know why—decided otherwise. The Jewish law follows the Amora who does not accept it. But still, there is an Amoraic opinion—it’s not an invention. In the end Professor Lev also indeed writes, therefore—the line before the last—“therefore it appears that Maimonides does not hold that there is a rabbinic prohibition of creating scent, and it should also be noted that the Rif omitted the law of creating scent, and apparently the Rosh as well.” Meaning that the Rif and the Rosh omit it, and Maimonides too. Do you understand what that means?
[Speaker E] That the Shulchan Arukh would also rule that way? That it’s kindling and not creating? There?
[Speaker F] It means that the Shulchan Arukh will probably also rule that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. The hint is heading toward the Shulchan Arukh, because as is known, in his introduction the Shulchan Arukh says that he rules according to the majority of the three pillars of halakhic ruling, which are Maimonides, the Rif, and the Rosh. So if Maimonides, the Rif, and the Rosh all do not rule the prohibition of creating scent, it is reasonable to assume that the Shulchan Arukh too will not rule creating scent. Even if Maimonides did rule it, if the Rif and the Rosh omit it, that is still a majority. But again, this rule is a somewhat shaky rule in the Shulchan Arukh; sometimes he goes with Maimonides even against the Rif and the Rosh. Like any rule, it has to be taken with a grain of salt. Okay, so the Tur in section 511—when we move to practical Jewish law, the Tur preceded the Shulchan Arukh. He also basically set the order of the sections and the four Turim: Choshen Mishpat, Orach Chayim, Yoreh De’ah, and Even HaEzer—all those divisions are the Tur’s divisions. So the Tur says this in section 511, in the laws of Festivals: “One does not make fumigation,” meaning he scatters kinds of spices on the coals, whether his intention is to smell them or whether his intention is to fumigate the house or the utensils. “But if he does it in order to give a good scent to fruit, to improve it for eating, it is permitted. It makes no difference whether he scatters them on top of earthenware or on top of a fire-coal.” What is he talking about?
[Speaker E] But if it’s on earthenware, then there’s no issue of kindling and—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no creating fragrance here at all, nothing of the sort. The whole question is what?
[Speaker E] I’m saying, if it’s on the fire, I understand that there’s kindling or extinguishing here, but if he added the words “on top of a shard,” that’s already a different story, because there’s no issue of extinguishing there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, but it could be that there’s… you’re right, that’s a good point, but it could be that there’s no law of kindling here. There is a law of kindling, sorry; in the Talmud it says there’s extinguishing here because the kindling is done in an unusual manner. But even kindling in an unusual manner is a rabbinic prohibition. So it could be that the shard you’re right, I hadn’t thought of that it could be that the shard he brings here is not because of creating fragrance but because of kindling in an unusual manner. Because otherwise I would have expected him to bring the case of meat over coals, and he doesn’t bring it.
[Speaker E] But the shard itself isn’t burning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand?
[Speaker E] The shard isn’t burning; it doesn’t itself burn.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, right, not the shard. The shard kindles the frankincense that they put on it. But yes, so the medieval authorities (Rishonim) already comment on this in the Talmud; they just say it’s apparently kindling in an unusual manner, and therefore the Talmud doesn’t address kindling, only extinguishing. But even kindling in an unusual manner is a rabbinic prohibition. So if we’re talking only about whether it is forbidden or permitted, not whether it’s Torah-level, then a shard is also forbidden, because it’s a rabbinic prohibition. So if it’s not for food preparation, then it’s forbidden. But you’re right, that’s an interesting point, it needs checking. It could be that some will hang the addition of the shard here on that, in order to say that the Tur holds there is a prohibition of creating fragrance. Still, he doesn’t bring the case of meat over coals, and in that sense that point still needs explanation. In the Shulchan Arukh, interesting, notice this: “One may not make incense smoke,” meaning to scatter kinds of spices on the coals, whether for smell or to perfume the house or utensils. “But if one does so in order to give a good smell to fruit, to improve it for eating, it is permitted even if he scatters them on a coal of fire.” So only kindling?
[Speaker E] Only kindling and extinguishing? I didn’t understand. There’s no creation here, only kindling or extinguishing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Now here, for example, no shard is mentioned. Since you already pointed it out in the Tur, here no shard is mentioned. But when he says “even if he scatters them on a coal of fire,” what does “even” mean? What’s with this “even”? The shard. That he shouldn’t scatter… on a shard is obvious, and even if he scatters it on a coal of fire it is permitted. The word “even” hints that the shard is really implied in the Shulchan Arukh too, not only in the Tur. He permits it even if one scatters it on a coal of fire.
[Speaker B] I think maybe he deliberately omitted the shard so people wouldn’t get confused and think there’s a prohibition of creating fragrance here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be, absolutely could be. I only noticed that now because of Ruti’s comment on the Tur. But really here too it’s clear that in the background there’s this idea that it’s permitted on a shard, and even on a coal of fire. Okay? Now here I’ll say again: it makes no difference whether one scatters them on a shard or on a coal of fire. In both cases it’s permitted, of course, not forbidden in both. Regarding the prohibition, he didn’t bring the shard. Regarding the permission, the Tur brings either a shard or a wood coal. And the Shulchan Arukh hints at the shard and says “even a wood coal.” Meaning, nowhere is there any prohibition of creating fragrance. It appears neither in the Tur, nor in the Shulchan Arukh, nor in Maimonides. A prohibition of creating fragrance does not appear. At most, even if Ruti is right, then in the Shulchan Arukh there is a hint that they permitted putting it on a shard, as if perhaps there were room to say there is some prohibition here that needed to be permitted. But a Jewish law book isn’t supposed to work with hints. If you want to say there is a prohibition of creating fragrance, then say there is a prohibition of creating fragrance. And in fact the Rema there on the Shulchan Arukh writes as follows: “Gloss: It is forbidden to drag a perfumed cup over garments because one thereby creates fragrance in them,” Maggid Mishneh chapter 1, Hagahot Ashiri, etc. Meaning, the Rema understands that something was omitted in the Shulchan Arukh. In Piskei Ashiri? No in the Shulchan Arukh, in the Tur, in Maimonides, in all of them. And he adds it. Why does he add it? Apparently because he feels this addition is not just more of the same. There is a prohibition of creating fragrance here. The Shulchan Arukh spoke only about extinguishing and kindling, and so did Maimonides and the Tur. Meaning, the Rema is the first among these halakhic decisors in this chain of decisors to put the prohibition of creating fragrance on the table. And here it’s clear. He states the prohibition, not that they permitted it on a shard and all the hints we talked about earlier. He writes it explicitly, and he also brought the same law that appears in the Talmud about a perfumed cup on garments. And when decisors omit a law that appears in the Talmud, that itself is noteworthy. Why did they omit it? And I think the answer is that they do not rule in accordance with the prohibition of creating fragrance the Tur, the Shulchan Arukh, and Maimonides. And the Rema adds precisely that. So for our purposes, it shows there is a dispute among the decisors. The Rif, Maimonides, the Rosh, the Tur, the Shulchan Arukh say there is no prohibition of creating fragrance. The Rema writes that there is. Now on this the Magen Avraham writes as follows, section 26: “Even a garment that already smells may not be given more [fragrance] so that it will smell more. But in any case, an etrog that had been placed on the eve of the holiday on the garment and was removed from it may be returned, because it does not smell more because of that.” He says two laws here. One law is that if there is a garment that already smells, one may not add more smell to it; that is forbidden. That’s the first law.
[Speaker E] So what did he say about creating fragrance?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, one second, one second. We’ll get there; I’m coming back to it. First I’m just saying what he writes. There is a prohibition on adding fragrance to a garment that is already perfumed. Second law: an etrog. They used to keep it inside some kind of garment, like today we put it in some kind of container to preserve the etrog. In the past they would put it inside a piece of cloth or a garment or something like that. And the garment, of course, absorbs the smell of the etrog. So he says then seemingly it should be forbidden to return the etrog on a holiday into the garment, because you are adding more smell to the garment. He says no, it doesn’t smell more. Meaning, when you add the etrog, it doesn’t add smell to the garment. That’s his claim. Now to me there are two difficult things here. First of all, what Ruti asked earlier. Adding smell onto existing smell is permitted. The Talmud says exactly that: someone who rubs myrtle has not violated a prohibition. Why? Because he is only adding to an existing fragrance. So how does the Magen Avraham here write that if a garment already smells, then it is forbidden to add more so that it will smell more? That directly contradicts the Talmud.
[Speaker E] No, with rubbing myrtle he adds fragrance to the air, and it isn’t absorbed into some object, into some vessel. So then what? So then what? So apparently he holds that creating fragrance…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he’s not going like Professor Lev. Because he says the opposite, he says there’s a prohibition even on producing fragrance in the air, right? That’s clear. More than that, he even goes further and claims that even adding fragrance to the air sorry, sorry, sorry, mistake. He’s talking about a garment, not about the air.
[Speaker B] That’s exactly the point maybe he doesn’t accept that there’s creating fragrance in something tangible.
[Speaker E] Maybe in the air there’s nothing tangible.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then what? Then what happens with myrtle? No, but with myrtle, adding fragrance is permitted.
[Speaker C] He isn’t doing anything external; it’s like a closed system. The fragrance already exists inside the leaf and he’s bringing it out. It’s not that he’s adding fragrance.
[Speaker E] He’s bringing out…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In rubbing, he’s releasing what already exists. Wait, one second, one second, one at a time. Idit, if you make that distinction, then really it should have been that in general… not that adding fragrance from myrtle would be permitted, but that bringing fragrance out of myrtle would be permitted. The Talmud does not imply that. The Talmud says that only because he is adding fragrance is it permitted, implying that creating fragrance is forbidden, even if he is not perfuming a garment. That’s what I asked Lev: what is forbidden?
[Speaker C] But here you’re mistaken, because there’s no myrtle that doesn’t have fragrance. Myrtle is a category unto itself; it has fragrance in it. I can’t imagine something that has no fragrance and then I do an action that causes it to emit fragrance.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, I can cause a certain thing to smell when it had no smell. When I burn something and bring out a smell from it say meat, okay? When I put meat on the fire, like the Talmud’s example, meat over coals, okay? In the meat there isn’t the smell that the fire produces from it. The fire doesn’t extract from it a smell already inside it. It creates that smell.
[Speaker B] I want to say something, but with myrtle it isn’t like that; it’s there already.
[Speaker F] I
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not at all sure that with myrtle it isn’t like that; we argued about this in the previous lecture. I think with myrtle too it’s like that.
[Speaker F] There are two we said there are two possibilities. What? And with meat it’s the fire that creates the smell, or it’s different, but here you’re sort of opening the bottle of perfume.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So here I’m rubbing it, which also heats it up by the way, and there the fire heats it up; what’s the difference?
[Speaker F] No, it’s not, and here it becomes…
[Speaker E] Here the Magen Avraham is talking about a garment to which they add fragrance, not fragrance spreading in the air.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is he talking about the smell of myrtle?
[Speaker E] He mentioned the smell of myrtle, so he won’t say because when the Magen Avraham… what won’t he say?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What won’t he say, Ruti?
[Speaker E] Let me say it for a second: when you bring a smell out, create a smell outward into the air, then nothing is created…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then would it be permitted even when you aren’t adding fragrance but creating the fragrance?
[Speaker E] No, that’s not what I’m saying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then what’s the difference? In both cases, in the air—
[Speaker E] It’s permitted in the air and forbidden in a vessel.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking again: if you’re saying there is a prohibition on creating fragrance in the air?
[Speaker E] No, I didn’t say that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Adding fragrance to the air is permitted, but creating fragrance in the air is forbidden. So what’s the difference? In both this case and that case, in the end he is only bringing the smell from inside outward.
[Speaker B] There could be two possibilities.
[Speaker E] A garment serves me as a vessel. Once it’s perfumed, it serves me as a vessel to perfume in other places too; I can take it. In the air it dissipates and no vessel is created.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then it should also be permitted to create fragrance when you aren’t adding to existing fragrance. But the assumption is that this is forbidden.
[Speaker B] I want to say something for a moment. I think there are two possible solutions here. We said that creating fragrance has two options. One option is actually creating fragrance in the air, and the second option is not that the fragrance is created in the garment, but that something new is created here a perfumed garment. It could be that he doesn’t accept… after all, Maimonides himself doesn’t rule that there is creating fragrance, so maybe he doesn’t accept creating fragrance in the sense of fragrance in the myrtle yes, with myrtle there’s no problem bringing out fragrance even if previously there was theoretically no fragrance.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And with a garment he doesn’t accept the second part. The Talmud no, that’s what Professor Lev says, that’s how Professor Lev learned it.
[Speaker B] Right, so he accepts the second part, and therefore he says—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That with a garment there is a problem of adding fragrance. I understand. But I’m saying that in the Talmud itself it seems not so, because the Talmud permits myrtle only because you are adding. That implies that creating fragrance ex nihilo is forbidden.
[Speaker B] Yes, but the fact is that Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh and the Tur ignored that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they ignored everything, because for them there is no prohibition of creating fragrance at all. That’s unrelated. I’m talking about the views that rule there is a prohibition of creating fragrance. Not related to Maimonides and the Tur.
[Speaker B] Now the second possibility here may be I think perhaps he meant that adding fragrance maybe he means, though he didn’t write it, adding a different fragrance. Meaning, if a garment has one smell and you add a second smell to it, then it’s forbidden. That’s how Professor Lev explains it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the claim is basically this; let’s move on. First question on the Magen Avraham: the first law he brings is against the Talmud regarding myrtle. Because he says that adding fragrance is also forbidden, whereas the Talmud says that adding fragrance is permitted. That’s the first point against him. The second point against him is that regarding the etrog, factually speaking, it doesn’t seem right. After I put the etrog into the garment, clearly it adds smell to the garment. How can one say that it doesn’t add smell? Both of these difficulties can be resolved in the same way, by saying what Professor Lev proposes in light of the first difficulty. He doesn’t discuss the second one, but what he essentially proposes is that the Magen Avraham is talking about adding a different smell to the garment. The garment already smells, and you are adding not more of the same smell but a different smell; that is forbidden. Then it doesn’t contradict the Talmud regarding myrtle, because there it is talking about adding more of the same thing. But adding a different smell is forbidden. By contrast, in the case of the etrog, when I return the etrog to the garment, it is the same smell. Wait, so I’m adding the same smell into the garment, just more of it. And therefore he permits it. No what he means when he says “it does not smell more” is that it does not smell a different smell; rather it smells the same smell with greater intensity, and since it is the same smell, that is permitted. Meaning, if we understand it this way, then it resolves both statements of the Magen Avraham. And this is indeed what the Shulchan Arukh HaRav also writes in siman 514 that’s Rabbi of Liadi, yes, the first Rebbe of Chabad. He writes: “For it is forbidden to create fragrance on a holiday in something that had no fragrance, because one thereby creates a new thing, and it is close to doing a new labor. But if this kind of spice had already been placed on the garment, such that the fragrance of the spice had already entered the garment, it is permitted to place more of this same kind of spice on it on the holiday in order to increase this fragrance of spice in the garment. But it is forbidden to place a different kind of spice on that same garment, because he thereby creates a new fragrance in the garment on the holiday.” Okay? That is basically his argument.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, yes, can you hear me? I wrote a question. If you can’t hear well, why doesn’t anyone compare this to moisture sufficient to make something else moist with regard to liquid? Because it’s really similar.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why should one compare it?
[Speaker D] Because it’s really the same thing. What more do you want from a comparison? It’s something that creates, something that is a measure for creating a new thing. Meaning, if something is perfumed, so then it can basically perfume something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who says it can?
[Speaker D] I mean, maybe it really is the same kind of creating.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A perfumed garment can perfume something else? I’m not sure. No, it doesn’t have the source of the fragrance. The fact is that in order to perfume a garment you don’t take another perfumed garment; you take something that has this incense-like smoke of spices. I don’t think there is perfuming here that can… this definition doesn’t even appear here at all, this criterion of being able to perfume something else with it. The question is whether you are adding more perfume on top of what already exists or not. So in that sense I think the Shulchan Arukh HaRav really goes in the direction Professor Lev uses to explain the Magen Avraham. But that’s of course according to their approach, because according to them there is really no prohibition at all on creating a new smell, only on perfuming a garment, as Professor Lev learned in the Talmud. Therefore he says all of this Magen Avraham, from his perspective, contradicts the Talmud, because in the Talmud it says adding fragrance is permitted and the Magen Avraham says it is forbidden. So one must say that it is probably talking about a different type of fragrance. But let’s return for a moment to how I learned the Talmud. The way I learned the Talmud, I learned it differently, and I think that is the plain meaning of the Talmud: that there are two kinds of prohibitions in the Talmud. One prohibition is to create fragrance ex nihilo fragrance in the air, ex nihilo and the second is to perfume something. Okay? Now if that’s so, another possibility opens up, and what I can say is this: indeed, adding more of the same fragrance adding more fragrance to a garment, more of the same thing wait, adding more fragrance to a garment of the same thing would be forbidden. That’s what the Magen Avraham says. Why doesn’t that contradict the myrtle case? Because what is written about myrtle is that if you add fragrance on top of fragrance already present in the air, not in a garment, that is permitted. But regarding the prohibition of perfuming a garment, the Magen Avraham says that there even adding fragrance is forbidden. The question is what is the rationale for making that distinction. I’ll say honestly, although one could say the opposite too. But what about the etrog? What?
[Speaker B] The Magen Avraham says that with the etrog there’s no problem, so how does that work out? What about the etrog?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, he says it doesn’t add fragrance.
[Speaker B] How doesn’t it? But we asked ourselves how it doesn’t add?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the Magen Avraham says it doesn’t add fragrance. So if I go in the direction that this is talking about a different type of fragrance, then with the etrog too one can say that the Magen Avraham means it does not add a different type of fragrance. And that’s not the plain meaning of the Magen Avraham’s language, but one can disagree with the Magen Avraham on the factual point that it doesn’t add fragrance, yet that’s what he says. Now I’m trying to explain the Magen Avraham according to his own view, regardless of whether I agree with him. And what the Magen Avraham plainly says is what I’m saying now. This is the plain meaning of the Magen Avraham’s language: that he learned the Talmud the way I learned it, that basically there are two prohibitions in the Talmud. And what the Talmud says, that adding fragrance is permitted, applies only when you add fragrance to the air. But adding fragrance to a perfumed garment the Magen Avraham says that was not said; that is forbidden. Why? Here I say I can give a rationale, though one could also say the opposite. But I can give a rationale and say this: when there is fragrance in the air, then if I added more of it I haven’t done anything different, there is just more fragrance in the air. But a garment is still a garment even without perfume. Clearly the perfuming does something to the garment. So if you do more perfuming, then it makes even more change, so it’s a different garment anew; it’s now an even more different garment. So here one could say that you really created something new as compared to a less-perfumed garment, because the new thing is not the fragrance; the fragrance is only more perfumed versus less perfumed. The new thing is the garment. And when the garment is slightly perfumed and heavily perfumed, those are two kinds of garments, just as a garment not perfumed at all and a slightly perfumed garment are two kinds of garments. But if I’m talking about the fragrance itself, then in the fragrance itself, when there is a little fragrance and a strong intensity of fragrance, that cannot be considered two different things. And therefore there the Talmud said it is permitted. A possible rationale. And dyeing an already dyed garment. I can’t hear. Dyeing it more, dyeing it more strongly.
[Speaker B] A garment that is already dyed strengthening the color.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same thing, yes. I mean, what’s the difference? Even before it was dyed it was still a garment, so why do I dye it? Because I want a dyed garment. Fine, so now I want a garment dyed more strongly. So why do you say that doesn’t count as producing something else? I certainly did produce something else a garment dyed the way I want it. If it’s only the color in itself, then weak or strong doesn’t matter. But if it’s a garment, then when the garment is dyed this way or dyed that way, that’s a difference; it’s a different garment. So maybe that’s the explanation in the Magen Avraham. Now what does this actually mean? There are two ways to understand this and notice, I’m putting it in context. The overwhelming majority of decisors do not rule in accordance with the prohibition of creating fragrance at all. The Rema adds it; the Magen Avraham follows him that there is a prohibition of creating fragrance. But even there we see that there is a dispute. First of all on the question, say, between what Professor Lev says and what I say, or what the Shulchan Arukh HaRav says and what I say: is there a prohibition on creating fragrance in the air, or only on perfuming garments? That’s one dispute. A second dispute: is there a prohibition on adding fragrance? Regarding the creation of a new fragrance, clearly there is no prohibition on adding to it, but with perfuming garments there may be room to say, according to the Magen Avraham as I presented the explanation, that there is a prohibition on adding fragrance to a perfumed garment. Okay.
[Speaker E] The intention is the same fragrance. What? The intention is the same fragrance that was already there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, yes, he’s talking about the same fragrance that was already there. So that is basically the dispute between the Shulchan Arukh HaRav and how I understand the Magen Avraham. What practical implication could this dispute have, for example? I referred you to the chapter in Professor Lev where he discusses decreasing and increasing current. If I understand that generating current is basically parallel to creating fragrance, then adding current into a wire, yes, into the device, say with a rheostat, adding more current, is basically parallel to adding fragrance to a garment. And now the question is whether such a thing is permitted or forbidden. According to the Shulchan Arukh HaRav it is permitted, because you did not add a different kind of fragrance, only more of the same fragrance, and that is permitted. According to the plain reading of the Magen Avraham it is forbidden, because adding to a garment, even if it is the same fragrance, is forbidden. With myrtle it is only because you create the fragrance in the air. And then there is a major implication from all these discussions. You see, side discussions that deal with other topics can suddenly produce a very practical halakhic implication in our issue of electricity on the Sabbath the question whether adding current to a wire would be permitted or forbidden.
[Speaker B] I thought about that, but there’s a problem with the issue of adding current according to what Professor Lev says. Professor Lev says that the point of creating is that, say, the electrical device that now has electrical current in it has become a different device in a tangible way for example, the device starts operating, and that is the creation. Now if very, very low current is put into the device in such a way that it can’t begin operating, then the moment I increase the current and turn it into a device that does operate, I really have created something.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s obvious, but I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about a situation where the device is operating all along.
[Speaker B] Why am I asking this? Because Rabbi Dovev he talked about this, Rabbi Dovev talked about it in the lecture, if you remember, about decreasing and generating current with the electric doors in hospitals. He talked about the story where they lower the current. So I’m asking myself whether here, once we rely on the idea that current is basically if it is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Low, then it doesn’t create a problem. But that’s exactly what I’m talking about. If you’re talking about increasing or decreasing current in a way that isn’t noticeable in the operation of the device, that’s one thing, and that too needs discussion. For example, Sabbath elevators. There is an argument against using Sabbath elevators, because if we get onto the elevator, more current is needed for it to do the same work, because it is carrying weight; the energy required is greater, more power is needed, more current is needed. Okay? But on the other hand, the elevator operates in the same way. So here there really is a question whether such a thing is called adding current, not called adding current, and so there are discussions. By the way, going down in an elevator is less problematic than going up in an elevator. That’s interesting, and convenient in that sense, because going down in an elevator isn’t such a big deal. The trick is that we mainly want to go up, not down. But in any case, there that is true. But think about a light bulb, where the bulb shines according to the strength of the current. So there increasing and decreasing current can be significant. Okay? On—
[Speaker B] That’s what I mean, because he really did talk about the electric doors, where basically in order for it to open they only leave it at low current and then just increase the current, but according to Professor Lev there is creating fragrance here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right. Because the action itself changes as a result of the added current. The issue, the visible manifestation of the matter, is in the action, not in the current itself. But we’ll get to that later on. Let’s continue. The dispute is basically over the question whether there is a prohibition in creating fragrance. The dispute I had with Professor Lev there in the actual passage in Beitzah was whether there is a prohibition in generating the fragrance itself, not in perfuming a garment. And what is the reason to say there should not be a prohibition? Fragrance has no substance. Therefore, perfuming a garment is something tangible, but creating fragrance that floats in the air that is something that has no substance.
[Speaker E] So then why does perfuming add fragrance? I didn’t understand. So why raise the point of adding fragrance?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so there isn’t. That’s what I’m saying. That’s my comment on Professor Lev. But how did he learn the Talmud? He learned the Talmud that in principle creating fragrance in the air is not forbidden not only adding it, even creating it is not forbidden. I asked against him that the plain meaning of the Talmud does not seem to support him. And now I’m speaking according to his approach. So according to his approach, that means: why indeed should it be permitted to create fragrance in the air? Fragrance has no substance; you haven’t created anything. When you perfume a garment, a garment is something tangible, but when you create fragrance, fragrance has no substance. But this dispute has far-reaching implications that I can’t get into because of lack of time. Still, I referred you in the summary I sent. In the summary you’ll see a reference to my article on intellectual property. Intellectual property the issue there, when we talk about copyright, is this: can there be ownership over an idea? A new technology I thought of, or a song I created, or something like that, a painting. Okay? That is basically the issue of intellectual property. The claim is that according to Jewish law one cannot own intellectual property because it is something that has no substance. After all, we aren’t talking about the disc the disc is of course tangible we are talking about the information encoded on the disc. And that information, I take it, you can take back the disc; I copied the information, not the disc. The question is whether such a thing can be owned. The accepted approach in Jewish law is no, and I wrote an article arguing yes. Because my claim is that when Maimonides writes in the laws of sale that there is no ownership over something that has no substance, I argue that Maimonides speaks only about intangible things that are attached to tangible things. For example, the smell of the apple or the appearance of the honey. And there Maimonides says that you cannot own the smell of the apple. Why? Because the owner of the apple is the owner of the smell of the apple. The smell of the apple follows the apple. But if there were an apple smell not attached to the apple, just hanging in the air, then it could be that I really could own it, because the problem is not ownership of an intangible thing in itself, but rather that ownership of that thing is determined by ownership of the tangible thing it is attached to; it is dragged along after it. But if it is not connected to anything tangible, then perhaps I can own it in itself. For example, information. Information is ownership over an idea; it is not attached to anything. And there I argued that on a Torah level there may be intellectual property. And I distinguished between something intangible that is a property of a tangible object, such as smell, form, color, and the like, and something intangible that stands on its own and is not attached to a tangible object, such as an idea or information. And I argued that such a thing can be owned. You understand that this is exactly the dispute here. Because essentially what Lev is claiming wait, wait what Lev is basically claiming is that fragrance floating in the air has no substance. And if it has no substance, you didn’t create anything. And I say, what are you talking about? If it’s the smell of an apple, then as fragrance in itself it has no substance because it is attached to the apple. But if the fragrance stands in the air, it has already left the myrtle, that’s it, now you have fragrance standing in the air there that is indeed something of which you can be considered the creator, and then there could be a prohibition. Okay, yes, Nechama.
[Speaker F] Fine, so it isn’t connected to the object, it’s just an analogy, so it doesn’t have to be exactly the same. I was talking about ownership. I thought it could be that ownership follows what society accepts. What is considered ownership in that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s obvious, but we won’t get into that here.
[Speaker F] That’s the explanation… so then it doesn’t really matter whether it’s connected to the apple or not connected to the apple; society can decide yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a discussion about intellectual property; we won’t get into it here. I’m only saying that among the decisors there is a dispute about it, because of what is called a commercial custom acquisition. A commercial custom acquisition means that what is accepted in the community as an acquisition is valid according to Jewish law as well. But there are medieval authorities (Rishonim), like the Rosh for example, who say that a commercial custom acquisition is not effective for something that has no substance, or for something not yet in existence. Because there the problem is not social agreement, but that there is nothing over which to have ownership. Social agreement can help where I am looking for what act can effect acquisition. So one says: the act the Sages mentioned is X, but in our society it is accepted that another act, Y, can also effect acquisition. Fine, that is called a commercial custom acquisition. But if there is something over which acquisition cannot take effect, not because of one act or another act, but because it is simply not a thing there is nothing there to own then in such a case custom won’t help. Because in such a case Jewish law does not recognize acquisitions over such a thing in principle, not because of a problem with the act of acquisition. So it’s a major dispute among the decisors.
[Speaker E] The author of Akedat Yitzhak sued Abarbanel in a religious court because he took his interpretations and wrote them as though they were Abarbanel’s interpretation. No, he took them there was a court case about that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. There have been quite a few court cases on this issue. And there are major disputes whether even if there is intellectual property in Jewish law because on a rabbinic level many decisors say there is encroachment on livelihood or things like that. But even so, there are decisors who argue that with words of Torah there is no ownership in any case.
[Speaker C] There was one of the later authorities (Acharonim) who wrote to his heirs not to publish his novellae after he died, and then they went to a rabbinic court and it said yes, it’s not his, it isn’t his property, publish it. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I heard that for example with Rabbi Chaim, famously Rabbi Chaim of Brisk. He didn’t publish anything, and writings of his come out after his death, and among the Briskers that’s considered a terrible sin. You must not publish anything. They’re these Yekkes, these perfectionists; anything that didn’t go all the way through and that he himself didn’t decide was fit for publication must not be published. And they publish, they publish things, and there were lawsuits and rabbinic court cases and all kinds of things like that. And there are decisors who claim that regarding words of Torah there is no ownership, no rights. You bring them out into the world, but you are only the conduit; in the end it is the inheritance of the public.
[Speaker E] It’s like a prophet who suppresses his prophecy. Yes, exactly. We have that today too with the writings of Rabbi Kook; someone should tell them that.
[Speaker F] No—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It won’t help to tell them anything.
[Speaker F] Rabbi Kook wasn’t against publishing; he himself simply…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even worse, then there’s even more reason to publish, but there are those who object.
[Speaker F] Exactly, that’s what I’m saying: that someone deciding he has ownership over Rabbi Kook’s books is problematic.
[Speaker C] I know better than he did what was good for him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. In any event, let’s return to our subject. They also know what he thought not only do they know better than he did what was good for him, they determine what he thought, they censor his books. Fine. In any event, what I want now is just to finish with a few comments of Professor Lev, where he discusses how to apply this to electricity. We’re done with generating current. Let’s assume there is a prohibition of generating current, at least according to the Rema, although according to most decisors there is no prohibition of creating fragrance and therefore there is also no basis to forbid generating current. One has to pay close attention now to the practical halakhic implication. According to most decisors it basically comes out that there is no basis to forbid electricity on the Sabbath, because there is no prohibition of creating fragrance. Only according to the Rema, and following him the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah and all those who follow them some will say this is only for Ashkenazim because they follow the Rema and the Shulchan Arukh is for Sephardim never mind in any case, only according to that approach is there anything to discuss. And even according to that approach, Professor Lev in chapter 4 raises a whole series of arguments I asked you, I told you to go through it a whole series of arguments against the Beit Yitzhak’s comparison between generating current and creating fragrance. I’ll summarize the arguments briefly. First argument: closing the circuit does not act on the source of the current. The current is already there. Closing the circuit only enables it to flow in the wire; that is like opening a faucet. You have water inside, you open the faucet and allow the water to flow. So would opening a faucet also be forbidden because of generating wetness or I don’t know what? In other words, that doesn’t sound plausible. It’s not similar to rubbing spices, for example, or incense over fire, because there I am dealing with the source of the fragrance itself. I take the fragrance and throw it out, not merely open the path for it. By the way, that in itself is an argument I’m not sure is correct, because when I rub myrtle there is room to hesitate how to view that action. Is it merely opening the pores so the fragrance can come out from inside? That’s the argument we had earlier. Or is it really an action on the source of the fragrance, creating the fragrance here? The question is whether I am only opening the path for the fragrance or actually creating it. I don’t know. One can discuss it. This is not a matter of chemistry, of course, but of how normal people from the street, ordinary folks, idiots, okay? see it logically. That’s one point. But beyond that, I think he has an argument here with which I completely disagree, and I’ll return to it when we get to the Chazon Ish. His argument is that the current basically exists already beforehand, only it isn’t flowing. But current doesn’t exist; charge exists. There is standing electrical charge. Standing electrical charge is not current; it is charge. Electrical current is created only when the charge begins to move, okay? But unlike water, with electrical current, current is a completely different entity from standing charges. It’s not simply the same charges only moving. Anyone familiar with electromagnetism knows that current has a magnetic field. When the charges are standing still, there is no magnetic field. Meaning, when the charges begin to move, this is a different entity. It’s not the same charge just moving. Exactly like a perfumed garment and much more so than a perfumed garment. When I cause charges to move, that is much more than perfuming a garment. It activates devices, it creates a magnetic field around it, it is an entirely different world from charges that are standing still. There is no room at all to compare this to water in some reservoir where I open a faucet and allow it to flow. It’s the same water, only now it’s moving, that’s all. But current, in an essential sense, is something else. And by the way, in physics, for example, current and electrical charge are different physical parameters; they appear differently in equations. Current is denoted by I or by J, current density, and charge is denoted by Q. There is no connection. Therefore, although we know that current is ultimately just moving charge, that doesn’t matter. From our point of view it really is a completely different entity. Causing charges to move is really creating something new. The comparison to water is a purely formal, technical comparison that misses the main point in essence. This is an important point, because a rationale of this kind is, for example, a commonsense rationale. You can argue with me about it, just as one could have argued with the Talmud, which saw a perfumed garment as a completely different garment from an unperfumed garment. Someone could have come and said: what do you want? It’s the same garment, it just has a little smell, so what did you create here? You created fragrance, but fragrance has no substance. So why is creating a perfumed garment considered creating something else? Because the Talmud itself already understands this. Ask ordinary people simple folks, not physics and not formal comparisons how they relate to a regular garment versus a perfumed garment. Clearly they see it as a different type of garment. So if that’s true, ask people whether current is merely charge moving or whether it is really something else. There is no doubt that it is a thousand times more “other” than a perfumed garment, a thousand times.
[Speaker E] But people aren’t aware of that, of the magnetic field.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you talk about it—
[Speaker E] If you’re talking about how people see it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course they are. Take people a wire with no current flowing through it and show them a wire with current flowing through it and of course also activating a circuit will they not say that something different has been created here? Obviously they will.
[Speaker F] You don’t see it with the eye.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t see the charges moving with the eye either. That’s another argument; we’ll get to it in a moment.
[Speaker F] We don’t see a magnetic field.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And electrical charge you can’t even—
[Speaker F] feel it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s another argument he raises; we’ll get to it in a moment.
[Speaker F] Electrical current—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Mainly, he raises that argument, and we’ll get to it in a moment. That’s the first argument. The second argument of Professor Lev is that the flow does not change the wire for any significant length of time. It ends when the switch is turned off. This is not considered a long-term change like perfuming, where you can’t instantly stop the smell of the garment, okay? And the rule in the Sabbath labors is that this has to be a labor that endures. “Endures” means the result remains over time, like in writing, dyeing, tying in all those labors, that’s the rule. I think that argument too is not correct, because as long as I don’t turn off the switch, it continues, right? I can turn off the switch and thereby it will stop flowing, but for that I need to do an action. That is to change the device or the wire back to its original state. But when I turned on the switch, right now, with the switch closed, isn’t the wire now a different wire? Of course it is a different wire, and a different wire forever. As long as I don’t turn off the switch it will remain that way. So this is an enduring thing. Is it not something that lasts over time? Of course it is.
[Speaker E] Like when it’s forbidden to put a bottle of water in the freezer, even if I intend to take it out before it becomes ice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Big question. Not everyone forbids that.
[Speaker B] But what and what about a battery?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly, with a battery too before it becomes ice not everyone forbids that either. We’re talking about taking it out beforehand.
[Speaker C] But placing a frozen pita on the hotplate there are also those who permit that. What’s the question? Placing a frozen pita on the hotplate so it thaws.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s something else, because frozen pita isn’t liquid emerging from solid; that’s not creating.
[Speaker C] Even though the pita will become toasted, it will become toast, and still there are those who permit it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Toasting is something else; I’m talking about softening it, thawing it.
[Speaker C] And what about a battery?
[Speaker B] A battery?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s limited.
[Speaker C] In time.
[Speaker B] Seemingly the battery will run out on its own. It’s not lasting.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’ll run out on its own after days. Days counts as something lasting. A lasting labor.
[Speaker B] But there are batteries that run out very quickly—not Energizer, just regular ones.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, that does need discussion, but it’s still a lasting labor; it doesn’t end in the immediate term.
[Speaker B] Because I know there are halakhic rulings that with a battery there’s much less of a problem than with electricity from the outlet.
[Speaker F] For other reasons.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think that makes a difference.
[Speaker F] It’s because there aren’t electric-company workers working on the Sabbath there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s something else, that’s obvious. But I’m saying that in terms of the battery itself, there’s no such issue. In the very act of activating the circuit, there’s no difference whether it’s a battery or mains electricity. I haven’t heard of anyone who makes that distinction. And this counts as something lasting. Even if it lasts for a day, that’s considered lasting. Fine, I mean something you can immediately restore. If you can restore it by an action—not that it stops immediately. If it stops immediately, then it’s not something lasting. Can you, by means of an action, return it to its previous state? So that’s by means of an action—what does that have to do with anything? That’s not called something non-lasting. So I don’t agree with that claim either. His third claim is that smell and sound can be sensed by the senses, but current can’t be seen, so nothing perceptible has been created here. He himself rejects that; he says it is perceptible, because touch it and you’ll get electrocuted. But I don’t think we need to get there. It’s perceptible because of the electrical action performed by this circuit. The light, the device—you activate something, so it’s noticeable that current is flowing there. That’s the relevant perceptibility. In fact, if I send current through something in a way that doesn’t operate any device, then it could be that it’s not perceptible and doesn’t interest anyone. And therefore I think that regarding an elevator, for example, what we discussed earlier—that if I step onto the elevator then there’s more weight and therefore it needs more current, I’m increasing the current—since you don’t actually see that in the action itself with your eyes, it’s very doubtful how much room there is to forbid such a thing. It seems to me very far-fetched to forbid something like that.
[Speaker F] But no, I’m not sure that’s so absolute. Say at hydroelectric stations, right? Water—you open the water, it flows, it turns the turbines, and electricity is generated. There are things water does.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, perceptibility is a condition; it’s not the essence of the matter. The prohibition is generating the current. You’re saying to me, yes, but it’s not perceptible. I say yes, it is perceptible, because it activates an electrical circuit, activates a device.
[Speaker F] No, I said that we said it’s not similar to water. In this respect it could be similar to water, because water too can activate something.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain again. No, that’s not correct. That’s what I’m answering. Because with water, when I created the water flow, I didn’t create something new. True, the flow is perceptible, it can activate a device, but the condition of perceptibility is only a condition. First of all I ask: has something new been created here? If yes, then if it’s perceptible it will also be prohibited. But first there has to be something new created here. And I’m claiming that a flow of water is not something new.
[Speaker F] Certainly, but as long as water is standing still it’s incapable of doing work. When it flows, it is capable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So all in all, it’s just something different. As long as I’m standing and not walking, I won’t reach the other place. So because of that, is it forbidden to walk? What does that have to do with anything? In the end the question is whether walking creates a completely different person from the person who is standing. So flowing water is not essentially different from standing water, and therefore nothing new has been created. True, that not-new thing that was created can activate things and be perceptible—fine. But if it isn’t something new, then I don’t care that it’s perceptible. Perceptibility is not a condition that is prohibited in itself. Perceptibility is a condition: if there is something created that is new, then it is prohibited under the category of generating something new. Provided that it is perceptible. But first of all there has to be some generating going on here. Do you understand? I’m not claiming that the action of the electrical device is the thing that was generated. What was generated is the current. What you’re telling me is that the current is not perceptible; to that I say that through the electrical device it is perceptible. But first there has to be something significant that is created, and only after that does perceptibility come in. And with water, that first condition is not met.
[Speaker F] It seems to me circular. How do I know that something was generated here? Because there’s something by which it’s perceptible. Right. So how do I know something was generated? In the end, in the piece of metal nothing was generated; it’s just there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is how you define it; these are two completely different questions. Maybe how you know is through the action—correct. But the question of the definition of something new is another matter. I’m claiming that current is something completely different from stationary charge, irrespective of whether it activates an electrical device. It’s something completely different. It’s just that if it doesn’t activate an electrical device, then it’s something completely different that isn’t perceptible.
[Speaker F] But as a matter of definition, someone could define it as not new.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. That’s why I say—it’s all reasoning. And that’s exactly what I wanted to demonstrate to you in this topic: how everything is reasoning, where you can say it this way and you can say it another way; it’s a matter of perspective. That can create prohibitions, remove prohibitions, it changes the whole picture in the laws of the Sabbath. And that’s why it’s so beautiful to deal with this topic, because that’s what the Sages did with all the topics. And in the topic of electricity, we’re in the position of the Sages. We’re now formulating it and deciding those same foundational lines of reasoning on the basis of which this whole field is formulated. And you can see now that we have an argument. Someone can come and say: no, in my view current is like a stream of water, as Professor Lev says. That’s what he thinks. I think he’s mistaken. And immediately that has many implications. Okay, so that’s the third point. His fourth claim is that we can’t invent additional prohibitions of generating something new beyond what is mentioned in the Talmud. I don’t really accept that, because we’re not inventing additional prohibitions of generating something new. The prohibition of generating something new is the prohibition that appears in the Talmud. The question is what counts as generating something new—that’s an interpretive question. I’m not adding new prohibitions. It’s like saying: I can’t add new categories of labor on the Sabbath. So then how can opening bottles be forbidden under the category of building, or the final hammer blow, or whatever? Because here I’m interpreting the category of building; I didn’t add a category of labor. Building is one of the thirty-nine primary categories of labor. I’m interpreting bottle-opening as included in the category of building. That’s interpretation; it’s not adding a prohibition. Same thing here: if I claim that this is included in the prohibition of generating something new, then it is forbidden by the law of generating something new; it’s not a prohibition that I added. So I don’t think that’s a correct claim, that we can’t add prohibitions here.
[Speaker B] It’s like how you can’t add to the prohibition of kindling and say it’s because of kindling; so the same thing, you’d say, you can’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Add—same thing, a rabbinic prohibition. Yes, of course. Okay, so that’s basically the discussion about generating current. And in the end I’ll say again: if we want to summarize what emerges for our purposes, it’s quite clear that this is a shaky basis, let’s call it, for prohibiting electricity on the Sabbath. Why? First, because the prohibition of generating smell was not ruled by most halakhic decisors—the overwhelming majority—not ruled as Jewish law. True, in the Talmud itself it’s not really clear why, because the simple reading of the Talmud seems to be that the Talmud concludes that it is forbidden. But the fact is that most halakhic decisors did not rule that way. The Rema and those who follow him, the Magen Avraham, did rule that way. So if they’re right, then there is room to continue the discussion. And even on that side, there are all the arguments I just mentioned—my disagreement here with Professor Lev—whether this works or it doesn’t work. Therefore, to say that it is based on generating smell is a rather novel claim, let’s put it that way. And this illustrates what I said in the introduction to the previous class: that clearly there was some initial tendency to forbid this. It was clear to people that it had to be forbidden. Now the whole question is just what to hang my coat on—which hook I should hang my coat on. Okay, it’s forbidden, now let’s see under which category of labor or which prohibition I can dress it up. So they dress it up as generating smell. But if I had to come to this tabula rasa, and I did not assume that electricity really ought to be forbidden, it’s highly doubtful how much generating smell could serve as a basis for this matter. This is a double doubt regarding a rabbinic prohibition—come on, really. The whole thing is a rabbinic prohibition. You have a doubt whether there is any prohibition of generating smell at all; according to most decisors there isn’t. And even on the side that there is a prohibition of generating smell, the question is whether this is similar to generating current, with all the discussions we just had. Later authorities. Do you understand that this is a double doubt in a rabbinic prohibition? In a rabbinic prohibition, even one doubt is enough to permit, so a double doubt in a rabbinic prohibition is really far-fetched. And I think this sharpens even more the way the halakhic decisors were thinking: it was simply clear to them that it had to be forbidden. So all they did was find something to lean on. That’s all. But in the end it doesn’t begin with independent analysis of the topic of generating smell. It doesn’t begin there and it doesn’t end there. Okay. I’ll stop, at least to begin with—I see I didn’t get through much. Where did you get to on the page?
[Speaker B] We finished.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Finished? Okay. So I’ll briefly do the matter of kindling. On the topic of kindling, most halakhic decisors maintain that the prohibition of electricity is because of kindling. There is an aspect of kindling in it. But kindling—and here I’m giving away the ending—I asked you later on: even if there is a prohibition of kindling here, that’s only where there really is some glowing metal here, an incandescent filament. Now, that exists in incandescent bulbs, which today are even banned by law, or in places that operate through some wire that glows, or a radiant heater, or things like that. But there are very many electrical and electronic devices in which there is no metal that becomes incandescent. And there, to say that it is forbidden because of kindling is far-fetched. So even those decisors who say it is forbidden because of kindling—you need to understand that this is a much narrower prohibition than generating current. Because generating current would prohibit every electrical and electronic circuit where the current operates the device—turns it on. So that’s forbidden because it generates current. Even someone who forbids because of kindling—that’s not an equivalent alternative. Someone who doesn’t agree with generating current and goes with kindling instead—that has many implications, because it will prohibit only things that have a glowing wire. Unlike generating current, which would prohibit every electrical device that is operated by… every device that is operated by electricity. So there is a very big difference whether they forbid on this basis or on that basis. And indeed most halakhic decisors forbid on both grounds. On a Torah level, it is forbidden because of kindling, and on a rabbinic level because of generating current. Why do you need a rabbinic prohibition when you already have a Torah prohibition? Because there are places where the Torah prohibition doesn’t apply. In places where there is no incandescent wire, then the law of kindling doesn’t apply. There it would be forbidden because of generating current, and that is the position of most halakhic decisors. Most halakhic decisors say there is a combination here of kindling with generating current. In most cases it’s only a rabbinic prohibition. In places where there is a glowing wire, it could be that this would be a Torah prohibition. Okay? That’s the general framework.
[Speaker B] What is the electrical spark that Rabbi Kook talks about?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, with Rabbi Kook I’ll get there in a moment, because he has another innovation on top of this. In any case, the story starts with the dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad in chapter 12 of the laws of the Sabbath, law 1. I’ll read only the relevant part—everything is relevant, but the part that concerns us. “One who heats iron in order to refine it in water—this is a derivative of kindling and he is liable.” Yes, so the Raavad here is redundant. The gloss of the Raavad: “This is a derivative of kindling and he is liable.” Okay, several glosses that aren’t important. Avraham said: And why not because of cooking, like inserting a pin into the furnace, etc., and he brings all sorts of passages. He says that in the Talmud in Sabbath 42 there is a discussion of this: one who heats the coal and refines it in water—what does that mean? Someone who heats the iron and then throws it into water. That is usually understood as tempering the iron, right? He hardens the iron in such a situation, so it is not called extinguishing but rather the final hammer blow, since he completes its hardening. “And in any event, there is no liability in it, for refinement is rabbinic.” What is he saying? The Raavad claims that burning iron or metal is not called the prohibition of kindling. It is indeed forbidden, but not because of kindling. Because of what then? Either because of cooking or because of refining. And refining is a rabbinic law. About all these things there are disputes, as I told you in the source sheet too.
[Speaker E] Because there’s a difference between heating the coal and melting the coal or igniting the coal.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, of course, he means that it becomes incandescent. Not just warming it a bit.
[Speaker B] I don’t understand what—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s part—
[Speaker C] Of the process, it’s the first stage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. It’s part of the process; it’s part of the process required in order to refine the metal. So first they heat the metal and then throw it into water. So because of that, the heating too—
[Speaker B] And if I don’t want to throw it into water? If I don’t want to throw it into water?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that this would be a labor not needed for its own purpose. All right? So it would be a labor that you’re doing for a different purpose than the original one. Maybe the heating itself—
[Speaker B] What? I didn’t understand—is the prohibition of refining not an independent prohibition? Does it have a prohibition made up of two parts, say cooking and the final hammer blow? No, no, no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Refining—refining is not one of the primary categories of labor. Rather, “refining” is a term of the Sages; it’s not one of the primary categories of labor. The question is whether refining is rabbinic or Torah-level, and there are major disputes about that—which primary category it is a derivative of. But still, the claim is that if refining is forbidden, then the heating toward that refinement—according to some medieval authorities (Rishonim), that heating too is forbidden under the law of refining, since that is what is done in the refining process.
[Speaker C] It’s not “toward”; it’s the first part of the labor. It’s half a labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not half a labor.
[Speaker B] Also with cooking—would that be considered half a labor?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not half a labor. It’s a complete labor. When I refine the metal—that’s the labor. You’re only asking me why—sorry, when I heat the metal, that’s the labor. You ask me why that is a labor; why is it significant? I say: because by this I prepare it for refinement. And that’s all. And maybe he says the same thing about cooking too?
[Speaker C] And maybe he says the same thing about cooking too?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I cooked the food, and in the end I didn’t eat the food, did I violate the prohibition of cooking? Of course. Obviously. Why? The cooking is significant because after cooking it can be eaten. Correct—but the eating is only an indication that cooking is a significant process; the proof is that it prepares it for eating.
[Speaker B] So that’s what I wanted to ask: what is the difference between kindling and cooking and refining? Cooking and refining seem to include the whole thing, where the heating is part of the action. But kindling is separate, where he simply heats the metal?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. Everyone is talking only about heating the metal—everyone. The question is whether there is kindling in that, because it could be that kindling applies only to wood and not to metal; or perhaps this is refining, or only a rabbinic prohibition, or the final hammer blow, or something like that.
[Speaker B] What’s the difference between kindling and cooking?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Different primary categories of labor.
[Speaker B] Right, that’s what I want to understand—what’s different between them?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because one is kindling, and when I say cooking, the meaning is that I cooked the metal. Not that I made it incandescent. Making it incandescent was the way in which I did it. But in the final analysis, what prohibition did I violate? That I cooked the metal. By contrast, if I make it incandescent, then I created fire. To kindle is to create fire. Burning metal is fire. That’s a very big difference. For example, I’ll give you an example. If we go back to electricity, this is the implication for electricity. With electricity, suppose there is an incandescent filament, okay? Now, if you say that it’s because of kindling, then there’s literally kindling here. I made fire because I want the fire so that it will give me light. But if it’s because of cooking, do I care that the metal there be cooked? What difference does that make? So it matters a great deal whether it is because of kindling or because of cooking. As for application to electricity, for example, it is difficult to forbid it because of cooking. Because of kindling it probably would be forbidden. So the dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad here—whether it’s cooking or kindling or refining or whatever. Obviously I’m not going to refine anything either, because I’m not going to put it into water—it’s not intended to be put into water. So there is room to say that heating metal is not relevant to the application of electricity on the Sabbath. And therefore everyone ties it to the dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad. That’s the whole responsum of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman, and his whole discussion basically revolves around this point. Whether according to Maimonides one can say that activating an incandescent filament on the Sabbath is a Torah prohibition of kindling, and afterward he discusses whether even according to the Raavad it could still be forbidden or not forbidden. That is his discussion in section 2 and onward.
[Speaker B] But Maimonides—I did peek at… I don’t remember where I saw the cross-reference, but I saw one to chapter 9 law 6, where he writes that heating the metal is because of cooking and not because of kindling.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He writes that it’s kindling.
[Speaker B] In chapter 9 law 6?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, here. In the law we just read.
[Speaker B] Here. But in Maimonides there’s chapter 9 law 6, and there he writes that it’s cooking and not kindling.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think he writes that it’s not kindling, or he writes that it’s cooking?
[Speaker B] He writes that it’s cooking.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That doesn’t prove anything. So it’s cooking and also kindling.
[Speaker B] But then that does have implications for electricity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Because from the standpoint of cooking it doesn’t relate to electricity, but from the standpoint of kindling it does.
[Speaker B] So how, in one place—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides writes cooking, and elsewhere he writes kindling? With Maimonides, in several places, this is a common mistake of later authorities. With several things, Maimonides writes in one place one category of labor, and in another place he writes a different category of labor, and everyone asks about a contradiction. There is no contradiction. When he is discussing the laws of kindling, he brings it in the context of kindling because he is defining the category of kindling. When he discusses the laws of cooking, he brings it in the laws of cooking because it is also cooking. That doesn’t contradict. He doesn’t—Maimonides structures this according to the order of the categories of labor. If Maimonides were defining why this is forbidden, then there would be a contradiction here. But Maimonides is defining what kindling is, and he brings this only as an example. Then he defines what cooking is and brings it as an example. That’s perfectly fine; it doesn’t contradict. I just want to get in, in the minute we have left, what Rabbi Kook’s contribution to this matter is. In Orah Mishpat, he wants to make a very far-reaching claim: that even if this is done under the category of kindling—and I said before that if you forbid it because of kindling, that’s only when there is an incandescent filament—Rabbi Kook says no. Even if you forbid it because of kindling, it would be forbidden even when there is no incandescent filament. Any time it heats up, that is enough to forbid it because of kindling, even though no fire was created. And he has a very far-reaching argument, that basically the idea of kindling is to intensify heat greatly, greatly—of course the endpoint is that eventually fire is created, but that is only a result. If I perform an action somewhat similar to the discussion we had earlier about refining—that is, here too he says: if I heat something and it does not reach the point where fire is created, but I heat that thing, then in his view that is creating weak fire. And therefore that too is called kindling. In my opinion that is a very big innovation. But what does he want to gain by this innovation? Exactly what I told you at the beginning: otherwise, without Rabbi Kook’s innovation, according to most decisors, someone who forbids electricity because of kindling does so only where there is an incandescent filament. Then it really is a very narrow prohibition. And today there are hardly any incandescent filaments at all anymore; our bulbs are different now, everything is different. So in practice there is almost no prohibition because of kindling, and there would be no Torah prohibition; it would be only perhaps generating current. So Rabbi Kook wants to claim: no, there will be a Torah prohibition also in all the contexts of activating electricity on the Sabbath, because any heating can be considered kindling. By the way, there are activations of electronic or electrical circuits that do not heat up, or in any event only minimal heating, where it is hard to assume he was talking about that. Right—not a strong current but a weak current. Therefore in such a situation, what’s called electricity as opposed to electronics.
[Speaker F] And you could also say regarding the process of combustion that when you have, at a low level, oxidation of something, it also heats up and doesn’t burn—so would you say that’s also sort of fire? There’s some level of something where you know—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly, seemingly.
[Speaker F] That you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you heat something, in Rabbi Kook’s view you create fire. Now again, it could be that if, say, this is the final product—for example, if I heat up a cooked dish—I don’t think Rabbi Kook would call that creating fire just because the dish gets hot, because when I heat the dish I’m not creating a hot object here in order to use it; I just like eating it hot. Fine. But if you are creating a heat source, essentially creating a heat source, then he calls that creating fire. I think, again.
[Speaker B] There’s a claim that a cooked dish that is solid—when it is heated, it is considered a heat source, but not a liquid.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a heat source? What do you mean, it’s considered a heat source with respect to what?
[Speaker C] A solid mass, maybe the law of a solid block.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sure, with respect to mixtures and things like that, certainly it’s called something hot; that’s obvious. That’s a question of whether it absorbs or does not absorb, a factual question. But I’m not talking about that; I’m talking about the question whether I created fire here—whether this is called, in principle, conceptually, whether this is called that I created fire here. It seems to me that Rabbi Kook would not say his innovation regarding heating a cooked dish.
[Speaker B] He keeps talking about the electrical spark. What is that, exactly? It sounds from his words as though some kind of spark is created here and that is the fire.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A spark is something else. A spark is actual creation of fire. But again, that’s really not what persists, because it goes out after a moment. But in part of the responsum he also talks about the idea that when you heat something, that itself is the category of labor of kindling. That’s a very big innovation. But of course his motivation is very clear. His motivation is that someone who forbids because of kindling should not be limited only to cases where there is an incandescent filament, because otherwise nowadays it’s really just an anecdote—there are almost no such things anymore. And then someone who forbids electricity because of kindling is in practice hardly relevant anymore today. According to Rabbi Kook, it is relevant. Okay. So I’ll stop here again. As far as I’m concerned, I’ve also finished the category of kindling. It really was just a thumbnail sketch. But what about extinguishing?
[Speaker B] What? We’re not going to discuss extinguishing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Extinguishing—he discusses that there. In the simple sense, no, not the category of extinguishing, because extinguishing also has to be for the sake of making charcoal, and after that it’s a labor not needed for its own purpose. But that’s on the margins, I really don’t have time to get into it. I’m not going to get into it because I still want to get to the category of building. We have two more meetings; the third will actually be the last. So I want to get to the category of building and the implications, and that will take me two meetings.
[Speaker E] Okay, thank you very much. Sabbath peace. See you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank you.
[Speaker E] Very much, Sabbath peace.