Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 41

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle, if there’s such a possible case. A neutral area is usually small. Right, right. But in principle you can carry there. The only thing… what’s left is a karmelit. So in the end what comes out is that on top it’s a private domain, and below it’s a karmelit. But what does it mean that below it’s a karmelit? Below it’s a karmelit means that on the Torah level it’s a neutral area. Because we only saw that in a karpef of two se’ah, the karmelit originally, on the Torah level, was a private domain. Ordinary karmelits on the Torah level are neutral areas. And therefore here, what is really written is that on the roof of the house it’s a private domain, and inside the house it’s a Torah-level neutral area which is a rabbinic karmelit. Wait, wait, that’s not clear. Why can’t it be a private domain that rabbinically is a karmelit? There’s no such thing. Other than… other than a karpef there’s no such thing. All karmelits are originally neutral areas. I referred you to the Bi’ur Halakhah; the Bi’ur Halakhah does raise such a possibility here too, but the later authorities reject it. They argue that it’s forced; it’s not clear why he raises that possibility at all. In another moment I’ll comment on that.

So those are the two laws, and we’ll need to clarify both of them. Why is the top a private domain, and why is the bottom… a karmelit? And notice that when I say the top is a private domain, I’m saying that with respect to the top there are partitions here. And when I say that the bottom is a karmelit, then I’m saying that with respect to the bottom there are no partitions here. So there’s really a kind of double aspect here, when we’re relating to the very same partitions. After all, the walls of the house are the partitions. It turns out they count as a partition with respect to the roof, and therefore they make it a private domain, but they do not count as a partition with respect to the interior space, and so there it remains a neutral area and not a private domain.

By the way, the Bi’ur Halakhah I mentioned earlier basically says: wait, if these are partitions that make it a private domain, then below too it’s a private domain. Because if they’re partitions, they’re partitions; we’re talking about the same walls of the house. They’re not different partitions. Okay, but that’s just his comment.

Now regarding the roof, I have a question. Yes. I’m saying, I admit I didn’t understand why the upper part is a private domain. Meaning what, because it’s below ten? Because it’s… No, the opposite. It’s ten. The opposite, because it’s above ten. But we said that above ten—oh no, above twenty we said it becomes a neutral area, right? No, no, no, that depends on the area. It depends on area and height. Above a public domain, the public domain reaches up to ten handbreadths. Above ten handbreadths it’s a neutral area. But if, for example, there is a mound or a fence sitting in the public domain and it has an area of four by four, then it won’t be a neutral area, it will be a private domain. Why is it a private domain? Because the partitions around it count as partitions also for the person standing on top of it. Okay, so someone standing on the roof—but if I’m standing on the roof, beyond the fact that I apply “extend upward”… meaning only on condition that I apply “extend upward” does it become… And we already discussed this; whether you need “extend upward” or not is a dispute. But in principle, in principle, the partitions below, which are ostensibly underneath you, count as partitions for this purpose.

Where do we see that? We see it in the baraita with which our whole discussion begins. After all, the baraita says: what is a private domain? The Talmud says a valley… no, not a valley, what was it there… a mound, a sea? No, no, not a sea. A fence, and a trench. A trench, yes, exactly. Okay. So we said: what is a fence? At least according to how Rashi explained it; the Vilna Gaon there derived something else. According to how Rashi explained it, a fence means like a mound. Meaning something elevated that has an area of four by four on top of it; the walls that surround it from all sides, even though I’m standing on the roof, count as walls. Either because of “extend upward” or even without “extend upward”—I already noted that—but on the basic level they count as walls, and therefore this is one of the possibilities of a private domain.

That’s exactly what’s happening here. The roof of the house is like that fence there. Therefore the walls of the house, which indeed are underneath me when I’m standing on the roof, still count as the four walls of a private domain; the roof is a private domain because of that. All this as long as I’m below twenty cubits. No, no, why below twenty cubits? Ten. No, why? Why twenty? But didn’t we say that above twenty it becomes a neutral area? No, what are you talking about? Above ten handbreadths, when you are in the public domain and there is no mound, then it’s a neutral area. But if there is a mound and its height is ten handbreadths, or twelve handbreadths, because above ten handbreadths, then it is a private domain. Because it is enclosed on four sides by partitions. From the place where I’m stepping? From the base I’m standing on? Yes. Ah, so we said… okay. Second floor. Fine, okay, I got it. A private domain rises up to the sky. A public domain reaches a height of ten handbreadths. Fine. Because in the public domain, if I put some mound in the middle that has an area of four by four and has four partitions, it becomes a private domain, and from there upward all the way to the sky that is a private domain. Yes. Fine. Okay. Thank you.

So here in the Talmud it basically says that above it is a private domain, inside it is a karmelit, which apparently originally is a neutral area if you don’t accept the Bi’ur Halakhah. Okay. Now as for the area, of course we’re talking about a house whose area is four by four handbreadths. Because otherwise it couldn’t be a private domain at all; it wouldn’t be relevant, right? And on the roof too there wouldn’t be an area of four by four handbreadths. Although there is a place of four by four cubits. Huh? I can’t hear. It’s four by four cubits. No, handbreadths. Handbreadths? Yes. In area? In height it’s handbreadths, no? What? When we’re talking about height it’s handbreadths; when we’re talking about area isn’t it cubits? No. Wait. You know what? Now I’m confused too… yes, if we’re talking about four cubits. Yes, yes. Wait, I got mixed up. One second. It’s in cubits. Of course when they say four by four and not four by four—no, I think it’s handbreadths, because no, cubits. Of course they say four by four and not four by four. Handbreadths, handbreadths. Four by four. Okay, so indeed in many places the minimal area accepted for many contexts in Jewish law is four by four cubits, so for a moment I really lost track. But no, no, here it’s handbreadths.

In short, we’re dealing with something that has an area of four handbreadths; that’s clear. Why? Because otherwise on the roof it could not be a private domain. Granted, there can be a situation where on the roof there are four by four handbreadths, but the thickness of the walls causes the area inside the cavity to be less than four by four handbreadths. But we see that the law is, after all, that one may carry in it only within four cubits. Meaning, once they speak of a prohibition on carrying beyond four cubits, that means inside there is an area large enough. Right? It’s clear we’re talking about a case where the inside area is large enough. And certainly not just four handbreadths. Yes, no. Four cubits is much more than four handbreadths. So the size of the house is of course large. Meaning, what is “large”? Four cubits is also only about two meters; it’s not something very big. But the point is that it has the required measure.

More than that: later on they also talk about carving out four by four. The Talmud later discusses what happens when it does not have a height of ten handbreadths, but rather nine handbreadths, and then I dug a pit of one handbreadth. So together a space of ten is created, right? From the bottom of the pit to the roof a space of ten is formed. But if the pit is four by four, then obviously there are also the sides; meaning the area is more than four by four inside the house. Simply from the continuation of the Talmud it is clear that the area here is large enough.

But on the Torah level, we said, it is not a private domain but a neutral area—not because of the area. In terms of area it could have been a private domain; after all, on the roof it is a private domain. Rather, it’s because of the height. Okay? Why does this neutral area become a karmelit? Because any neutral area that has a minimum area basically becomes a karmelit. The only neutral area that remains a neutral area and was not turned into a karmelit is a neutral area whose space is small. Okay? So therefore the laws are that on the roof it is a private domain; inside it is a karmelit.

Here I brought you the Bi’ur Halakhah on 345:15. He says: apparently the meaning of “if one carried from it into the public domain he is not liable” is that if he carried from inside the house to the public domain, he is not liable. Why not? Because on the Torah level it is a neutral area, and from a neutral area to the public domain. But in truth, says the Bi’ur Halakhah, “I am uncertain.” Perhaps on the Torah level it is a private domain, but the rabbis decreed that it should be a karmelit stringently, that one should carry in it only within four cubits even if it is very wide. And that is as the Talmud concludes. “And what the author wrote, ‘its interior is a karmelit,’ that means that it is forbidden to carry out through the roof opening upward onto the roof or into an adjoining private domain.” Yes? If it’s a karmelit, then through the skylight you want to carry it to the roof, and the roof is a private domain, so that is forbidden.

But he is uncertain here that perhaps inside the house this karmelit is really, by Torah law, a private domain and not a neutral area as we saw with a karpef. So why does everyone always say that only the karpef is the exception? Only there is it a karmelit whose original status was private domain; all other karmelits are originally neutral areas. Apparently the Bi’ur Halakhah means to say that really the interior of the house is not a karmelit. There is a carrying prohibition there. It is a carrying prohibition that is a special rabbinic decree, but it is not really a karmelit.

But if that were so, then the question is what happens with this “karmelit” if I want to carry to a private domain? Then it would be forbidden. Wait, sorry—if I want to carry to a private domain, maybe they did not forbid that, because it isn’t really a karmelit, but rather it is in essence a private domain; originally it’s a private domain. Still, the sages established that we do not move four cubits within this domain, but they did not turn it into a karmelit. So if in truth this is a specific prohibition not to move four cubits inside that domain, one could have said that carrying from it to a private domain would still remain permitted; that they did not forbid. If they turned it into a karmelit, then it is a karmelit in every respect: not only is carrying within it forbidden, but taking from it to a private domain is also forbidden. But if it isn’t really a karmelit—if it’s a private domain, just a special kind of private domain in which they forbade carrying—then maybe they forbade carrying there but did not forbid carrying from there to a private domain and from a private domain into there. And the Bi’ur Halakhah says yes.

And what the author wrote, “its interior is a karmelit,” means that it is forbidden to carry out through the roof opening upward. That is, he says: so why is he uncertain? He’s uncertain why the author wrote that it is a karmelit and did not write that it is a private domain in which carrying four cubits is forbidden. That is really the truth according to his view, right? In essence according to his view it’s not a karmelit. It’s a private domain upon which a special prohibition was decreed regarding carrying four cubits within it. But it’s a private domain; it isn’t a karmelit.

So he says: then why did the author in the Shulchan Arukh call it a karmelit? That’s also the language of our Talmud, right? That inside it is a karmelit. He says: why call it a karmelit? It is really a private domain. So he answers: they called it a karmelit in order to tell you that it also has the law of a karmelit regarding transferring from a karmelit to a private domain, and not only the law of moving four cubits. If they had told you that it is a private domain in which they forbade moving four cubits, you would have thought: fine, but regarding carrying it to another private domain, it remains a private domain and that is permitted; all they forbade is carrying four cubits. Therefore he says the author called it a karmelit, even though it is not a karmelit.

But what difference is left, then, to say that it’s a karmelit? Good question—what is left? So here I think one can maybe say this. We saw in the previous class, or the one before that, I don’t remember, what happens when carrying from one karmelit to another karmelit. Remember that? When there was a karpef, we said it is permitted. Right? We said it is permitted. We said it is permitted on the Torah level but forbidden rabbinically. No—permitted, completely permitted. They fully permitted it so people would not come to think it is a public domain, but that was a special permission they made. From a karmelit that is a karpef to an ordinary karmelit they permitted it, even though in principle it should have been forbidden rabbinically. Remember that? From the sea to a rock, from the rock to the sea, in siman 397.

So now I ask: what happens from this domain to a karmelit? Since on the Torah level this is a private domain, you can’t carry from it to a karmelit. Right? Here apparently it should be forbidden, and here we did not find some special leniency because of karmelit considerations, because the special leniency we found was regarding a karpef of two se’ah. After all, you need a source to permit that; in principle it’s forbidden, right? So here we didn’t find such a source. So that could be the implication of what the Bi’ur Halakhah says. Meaning, apparently all the laws of this thing are like a karmelit. So if it’s green on the outside, red on the inside, and has watermelon seeds—then it’s a watermelon, no? Meaning, what do you mean it’s not a karmelit? It’s a private domain in which one may not move four cubits and one may not carry from it to a private domain?

Except here the question goes the other way around, because they didn’t say “green inside”; here they said “karmelit,” so I don’t understand the Bi’ur Halakhah. They explicitly wrote that. Right, and that’s exactly what troubles the Bi’ur Halakhah. So he says: then why did they call it a karmelit? It’s not really a karmelit. So he explains: because if they had not said “karmelit” but instead… I understand that. So why was it ever a possibility in his mind to think that it’s a private domain? Why didn’t he say from the outset that it’s a neutral area and they turned it into a karmelit? That’s a different question, which I hinted at before. And indeed, for example, Birkat Avraham says he doesn’t understand the Bi’ur Halakhah—what does he want? There’s no reason to say such a thing. The plain sense of the Talmud is not like that. “Karmelit” ordinarily means a neutral area by the essence of the law, so why invent this possibility—which even he himself, the Bi’ur Halakhah, is not sure of; he just raises it as a possibility, he says he is uncertain, okay? But why be uncertain at all? What is the point?

So the claim is what I explained earlier. I said: after all, there are partitions here. Regarding the roof above, they are good partitions; they make it a private domain. So the Bi’ur Halakhah says: if these are good partitions, then why is the inside not a private domain? It’s a private domain. After all, there are partitions here that are good, so apparently inside too it is a private domain. Why not? What’s the difference? They are the same partitions. And apparently he does not accept the distinction—and what we will see in a moment on the Torah level, only rabbinically. Therefore he says that on the Torah level at least it seems possible that this truly is a private domain. But then the question arises: why did the Talmud and the Shulchan Arukh write that it is a karmelit and not that it is a private domain with a prohibition on carrying four cubits? So he says: that is only to tell you that it is also forbidden to carry from it into another private domain.

Then we asked: so in what sense does it nevertheless remain not a karmelit, and how is it still different? After all, it’s red and green and has watermelon seeds, so it’s a karmelit—what do you want? No—maybe carrying from it to an ordinary karmelit would be forbidden. And in that sense it is not like a karpef and not like an ordinary karmelit, because from an ordinary karmelit to an ordinary karmelit you certainly may carry. From a karpef to an ordinary karmelit, in principle it should have been forbidden, but they permitted it. From such a house to an ordinary karmelit it would be rabbinically forbidden, according to the Bi’ur Halakhah. I’m saying that in practical law that’s probably not accepted, because his view is a lone view and is not accepted. But I’m saying that according to his own view there could be a rabbinic prohibition here. And that would be the implication. Okay?

Now let’s see the explanation of this law. Rashi writes as follows: “Since the partition is not ten high, it is a karmelit.” Rashi is also on 7a, in the first appearance of this statement, not in “the body” of the sugya, but that’s what he writes. What does he make it depend on that it has the status of a karmelit? On the fact that the partition is not ten high. Is that coming to explain why it is a karmelit, or is it coming to explain why it is not a private domain? It comes to explain why it is not a private domain. The simple sense is that he is not coming to explain why it is a karmelit; he is coming to say why it is not a private domain but rather a neutral area, and consequently rabbinically they turn it into a karmelit. But the explanation is not why it is a karmelit. What he is explaining here is why it is not a private domain. Right? That’s really the explanation.

And if that’s so, then that is directly against the Bi’ur Halakhah. Because the Bi’ur Halakhah essentially wants to say that in essence, on the Torah level, it is a private domain; rabbinically it is a karmelit. According to that, how do you read this Rashi? Then Rashi would be explaining here that since the partition is not ten high, therefore they turned this private domain into a karmelit rabbinically. So that is an explanation of why it is a karmelit, not of why it is not a private domain. After all, according to the Bi’ur Halakhah, if you read Rashi here, then Rashi is explaining why this domain is a karmelit, not why it is not a private domain—because it is a private domain. In terms of partitions everything is fine; it is a private domain according to the Bi’ur Halakhah. So why did they nevertheless rabbinically decree karmelit laws upon it? Because the partition is not ten high. That’s how you would have to read Rashi according to the Bi’ur Halakhah. A bit forced, but that’s how you’d have to read Rashi according to the Bi’ur Halakhah, right? That the explanation is not why it is not a private domain—because it is one. The explanation is why, despite that, they nevertheless imposed laws like a karmelit upon it.

And the answer is: according to the Bi’ur Halakhah there is some rabbinic law here. There is some rabbinic law saying that all in all these partitions are, in essence, ten-high partitions and they are good partitions. But practically, when I look from inside, I see partitions that are not ten high, and then a person will come and think to himself: wait, does that mean that even something that is not a private domain may be carried in? Because this isn’t a private domain—he’ll be mistaken of course, it is a private domain—but he’ll think: after all, there is no partition of ten here, so it’s not a private domain, how can one carry here? So maybe in the public domain too one may carry? Therefore the sages say: forget it, I forbid carrying even though it is a private domain, because people get confused; people are not Torah scholars. So rabbinically they turned it into a karmelit because the partitions are not ten high. That’s how this must be read according to the Bi’ur Halakhah.

The simple reading of Rashi is of course not like that. The simple reading of Rashi is that he is explaining why inside it is really a neutral area and not a private domain, because it does not have partitions of ten. And then according to the Bi’ur Halakhah he is basically claiming that for a neutral area to become a karmelit it needs some sort of partitions? Because otherwise, if there are no partitions at all… No, no—that’s not a neutral area according to the Bi’ur Halakhah; it’s a private domain. It’s not a neutral area at all. It’s a private domain that was given karmelit laws. Ah, I understand, I understand. So when we read Rashi, how do we read him? Directly against the Bi’ur Halakhah. What Rashi is coming to explain when he says the partition is not ten high is why it is not a private domain, because it has no ten-high partitions and a partition needs to be ten high. Consequently it also becomes a karmelit, but Rashi does not need to explain that. Every neutral area that is large enough is turned into a karmelit.

According to the Bi’ur Halakhah, you have to read Rashi this way: the explanation is not why it is not a private domain, because it is one. The explanation is why, despite being a private domain, they gave it karmelit laws. “Since the partition is not ten high, it is a karmelit.” In truth, Rashi’s language does look a little bit like the Bi’ur Halakhah, because from his wording it seems that he is explaining why this is a karmelit, not why it is not a private domain. He should have said: “Since the partition is not ten high, it is not a private domain.” He doesn’t write that. He writes: “Since the partition is not ten high, it is a karmelit.” And then it looks as though on the Torah level according to Rashi it is really a private domain. If we infer that way—and I’m saying that apparently the Bi’ur Halakhah read Rashi that way. We also read him that way, yes? Well, no, no, no—we did not read Rashi that way. The simple reading is not like that. The simple reading is that Rashi is explaining why it is a neutral area and therefore turns into a karmelit.

Does the Bi’ur Halakhah say that also regarding a regular partition lower than ten, even without the whole house case? I understand. One second, Noa. I’m asking whether according to the Bi’ur Halakhah’s view, this would also apply to an ordinary place surrounded by partitions lower than ten, without the house story. Of course not, what do you mean? An ordinary place surrounded by partitions less than ten would not be a private domain; it’s an ordinary karmelit. Everything the Bi’ur Halakhah says is only because here, together with the roof of the house, there are ten. So this is only about a house. Obviously. Because no—what he says, that it is a private domain, is only with respect to the house. What he says, that it becomes a karmelit, that’s simple, that’s obvious. Fine, that’s clear—that’s what Rashi explains. No, again. If Rashi is talking in every case, it doesn’t have to be a house. No, wait a second. What he says is a private domain is only in the case of a house. A place surrounded by walls of nine will not be a private domain, even according to the Bi’ur Halakhah. What enters here that now makes it a private domain is that externally there are ten-high partitions, only inside there aren’t. But regarding… but regarding karmelit, yes, it would be. But regarding karmelit that’s something else. It becomes a karmelit if the partition… if it’s without a house, then it becomes from a neutral area into a karmelit. And if it’s inside a house, then it becomes from a private domain into a karmelit.

I only want to say regarding the Bi’ur Halakhah: when he explains the Talmud and says that they didn’t mean exactly karmelit but rather two specific prohibitions, to read Rashi that way—Rashi is no longer the Talmud. When Rashi says “karmelit,” he means karmelit; he does not mean that they bundled together two prohibitions here. Why? Who says so? He is using the Talmud’s language. What difference does that make? If the Talmud called it a karmelit, then Rashi also calls it a karmelit for the same reason. What’s the problem? You can explain the Talmud, you can explain it. I don’t know, it seems to me a little hard to read that way. Fine, maybe he reads the Talmud that way, but to read the medieval authorities that way too? I don’t see a problem. If in the Talmud you understand that “karmelit” means a private domain that received karmelit laws, then what’s the problem with Rashi using the Talmud’s terminology? He’s explaining the Talmud. But the Talmud doesn’t actually write “karmelit”; it just says what one may carry. It says “karmelit.” Why? It says it. In this sugya it doesn’t. Wait, Rabbi. Ah right, sorry—it doesn’t say “karmelit.” “Inside it one may carry only within four cubits.” You’re right. I was mistaken. In the Talmud itself the term “karmelit” doesn’t appear here. Later it appears. Right. Here in the Talmud itself the term “karmelit” does not appear. Okay.

Rabbi, wait—what, if in the public domain there is some area called a karmelit, what turned it into a karmelit? In the public domain nothing turns it into a karmelit. But a valley, or a field, or a sea—that is a karmelit. Wait, but then according to what Noa said, if the Talmud doesn’t write that it’s a karmelit, then Rashi isn’t writing “karmelit” because of two laws. Rashi certainly means karmelit. And therefore in my view the Bi’ur Halakhah does not read Rashi correctly. So I’m saying: clearly the simple reading is not like that, neither in the Talmud nor in Rashi. But if we assume the Bi’ur Halakhah’s assumption, then apparently that’s how he read both Rashi and the Talmud. You can disagree with him—that’s perfectly fine. I’m just explaining how he read. Whether he’s right or not? Let each of you decide what you think. Okay?

In any case, according to Rashi’s view—I’m setting the Bi’ur Halakhah aside for now and going with the simple reading. After all, he himself is only uncertain. So the simple reading is that this is an ordinary karmelit, and on the Torah level its basis is a neutral area. According to Rashi, why indeed is it not a private domain? I’m leaving the Bi’ur Halakhah aside for now. It really is not a private domain because it does not have partitions—it does not have partitions of ten. And indeed, the Talmud in tractate Sukkah, I referred you there to 5a–b, learns there that there is a law that a partition must be ten handbreadths high. It brings two sources for this, which apparently depend on a tannaitic dispute, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah. One source learns it from some calculation in verses, which doesn’t matter now, and in the end it is rejected because perhaps the roofing joins or does not join; and then a law given to Moses at Sinai is brought. The famous statement: “Measures, interpositions, and partitions are a law given to Moses at Sinai.” Okay? And indeed, in the end it is generally accepted that the measure of a partition as ten handbreadths is a law given to Moses at Sinai.

Now, it is true that according to Rabbi Yehudah the Talmud says there that this is a law given to Moses at Sinai, and according to Rabbi Meir then “partitions”—yes, after all there are three kinds of laws given to Moses at Sinai there—what are “partitions”? “Extend,” “join,” and “curved wall.” All these strange laws of walls are laws given to Moses at Sinai under the heading of partitions. But there is still the law given to Moses at Sinai of “measures”; all Torah measures were given as a law to Moses at Sinai. And it could be that the ten-handbreadth measure of a partition can also be learned from the law to Moses at Sinai of “measures,” not of “partitions.” Yes, because in that law to Moses at Sinai there are three sections: measures, interpositions, and partitions. The Talmud there explains “measures”—it doesn’t matter now—those are all the measures we know, an olive-bulk, ten handbreadths, and so on. “Partitions” are “extend,” “join,” and “curved wall,” or “extend,” “join,” “curved wall,” and ten handbreadths according to Rabbi Yehudah. And “interpositions” is regarding immersion, as the Talmud says there.

So even someone who does not see the ten-handbreadth measure of a partition as learned from the law to Moses at Sinai of “partitions” could understand that it is from the law to Moses at Sinai of “measures.” It could be, because for him “partitions” are only “extend,” “join,” and “curved wall.” But it could still be a law to Moses at Sinai under “measures.” Within the framework of all the measures we received as a law to Moses at Sinai, we received that the measure of a partition is ten handbreadths. In the Talmud itself it seems that this is not so, but rather that they learn it from verses. Okay? In any event, I’ll come back to this in a moment because there is some significance to it, but for our purposes for now at least, one needs to know that there is a clear law that a partition must be ten handbreadths. Okay? And Rashi is basically saying that what is written in our Talmud is simply the result of that law. There isn’t a measure of ten handbreadths in the partition here; therefore it is not a private domain. That’s all. It’s simply an application of that law to Moses at Sinai, of that measure, the measure of a partition.

Rabbeinu Chananel here in the sugya writes: “Since it is not fit for dwelling, the partitions are ineffective, and it is as though there were no partitions there.” What is Rabbeinu Chananel saying? Like Rashi? No, he goes straight to saying the cavity is unfit for dwelling. Right. And therefore it’s as though there are no partitions at all. Exactly. Meaning, his claim is that this does not stem from the measure of ten handbreadths that was said regarding a partition and is lacking here. In that respect, he thinks, it would have been fine. The problem here is that in the cavity there are not ten handbreadths. In the cavity there are not ten handbreadths; you can’t live in something whose height is ten handbreadths. Ten handbreadths, by the way, is a meter, just so you understand, according to the larger estimates of a handbreadth. It’s a meter. Living inside a meter is crazy. Okay, but the Talmud says that is still possible.

But didn’t we have some seventy centimeters in sukkah, something? Didn’t we get to some measure that was less than a meter? The area of a sukkah. The area of a sukkah is seven by seven handbreadths, seventy centimeters by seventy centimeters. Okay. But the height is a meter. And that is called a dwelling that is not rotten, yes? Seventy by seventy centimeters at a height of a meter—inside that a person can live. Okay. I don’t know who this person is. It’s true that in those times people were shorter; that’s obvious. But I don’t think by that much. They weren’t a meter tall.

Once we did archaeological digs in Herodium, back when I was in Bnei Akiva. We went to summer camp and dug in Herodium, so when you go touring there remember that I dug it for you. In any event, I cursed those dwarf Bar Kokhba fighters there, because we were crawling on all fours to dig those tunnels, and no normal person can live in such a thing. The people there were shorter, but I don’t think by that much; they weren’t a meter tall. You didn’t dig deeply enough. What? I can’t hear. You didn’t finish the work and dig deep enough. No, we finished, we finished—that was the real height. Deeper. That was the real height. It could be that some of the tunnels… Anyway, for our purposes—there are, for example, places where you can sleep in Japan or somewhere, a very tiny compartment where a person enters and there’s only a bed. Okay, those are called capsule hotels. Yes, but still that’s not seventy by seventy centimeters at a height of one meter. How can you fit a person in there? It isn’t seventy by seventy, but the height is even less than a meter. Less than a meter high. Yes, but that’s what the Talmud says here; I’m not getting into the practical side of this right now.

In any case, Rabbeinu Chananel offers a different interpretation from Rashi, and that’s the important point for our purposes, the starting point of the class. Rabbeinu Chananel is basically offering a different interpretation from Rashi. It recalls the concept of a “rotten dwelling.” Those who learned Sukkah with us surely remember that. And it’s lacking habitation; that also reminds me of the karpef, because there too they said it lacks habitation. Yes, and there it lacks habitation because people don’t live there. Here it lacks habitation because you can’t live there. Exactly. So in any case it lacks habitation. Right, but the difference is that there we said that the definition of domains for Sabbath depends only on physical definition, and not on whether the public has access or not. Here, when they speak about lacking habitation, it is a physical definition. There, lacking habitation was not a physical definition, but simply that people do not live there. Here, “lacking habitation” is a similar phrase, but with a completely different meaning. In the case of the karpef it’s a physical definition.

Rabbi, may I ask regarding Rabbeinu Chananel? Would it be too forced to say that according to him we could say as follows: theoretically, in terms of dimensions he doesn’t care, it could be a private domain, but—I mean, maybe on the Torah level it really is a private domain, but I can’t live there and therefore it’s forbidden? According to the Bi’ur Halakhah maybe he would read Rabbeinu Chananel that way, maybe. But the simple reading, both in Rabbeinu Chananel and in Rashi who said there are no partitions—as though there are no partitions at all—then certainly if there are no partitions it can’t be… Once the cavity is not fit for dwelling, then there are no partitions. Partitions have to enclose a cavity. If there is no significant cavity, then the partitions are not partitions. So that means his definition of a cavity is not geometrical but whether it is fit for dwelling. Meaning that on the Torah plane, on the Torah plane, the fact that it is not fit for dwelling is not important to him. No problem. But why is it not important to him? It could be. But why is it not important to him? Because the physical conditions are fulfilled: there are four by four with a height of ten. That is still a physical definition.

But Rabbi, regarding sukkah—regarding a rotten dwelling—there it says it is not comfortable for dwelling, and here it says it is not fit for dwelling. I’m asking what the difference is. I don’t see the difference. “Not fit” is impossible, but “not comfortable” is basically possible, just not so comfortable for me. I don’t see the difference between thorns hanging down and a ceiling. In both cases it is not comfortable to live there. After all, someone who crouches and so on can do it, but people don’t live that way. I don’t see a difference; I don’t think there is a difference here.

So in the Talmud itself in Sukkah—this is an interesting note—the Talmud says: if it was higher than twenty cubits and twigs—some sort of overhanging branches of the roof covering—descend within twenty cubits, if their shade exceeds their sunlight, it is valid, and if not it is invalid. Because in a sukkah, it has to be up to a height of twenty cubits, and the roofing has to provide more shade than sunlight. So if its shade exceeds its sunlight, then we have a sukkah that is less than twenty cubits high and has valid roofing because its shade exceeds its sunlight, so that is fine. But if the sunlight exceeds the shade, then the real roofing is above twenty cubits and therefore the sukkah is invalid.

If it was ten handbreadths high—this is now the height, that was the maximum height—regarding the minimum height, ten handbreadths, and twigs descend into the ten, Abaye thought to say the same thing. Abaye thought to say the same thing as with twenty cubits: if their sunlight exceeds their shade, it is valid. Rava said to him: “That is a rotten dwelling, and a person does not dwell in a rotten dwelling.” Here clearly the discussion is about the cavity and not about the walls, right? That means that the Talmud there understands that there are valid walls. There is no invalidity in the walls. The problem is only in the cavity. Agreed?

Now apparently that is evidence for Rabbeinu Chananel against Rashi. Because we see that if the roof comes down low, that does not invalidate the walls; it still counts that I have walls of ten, only the cavity is a rotten dwelling. So I would have expected that here too the explanation would be like Rabbeinu Chananel and not like Rashi. But not necessarily, because it seems that this is something unique to sukkah, where we want “you shall dwell as you ordinarily dwell,” and not something that invalidates the walls. No—but start from the opposite side. I’m not looking at why the sukkah is invalid because it is a rotten dwelling; I’m asking why without that it would have been valid. Because there are ten-high walls there. Well, then here too there are ten-high walls. The question whether to invalidate it or not because of a rotten dwelling is another question. Maybe in that respect it differs from sukkah, but regarding whether there are ten-high walls here, the answer is yes—and this sukkah’s walls do count as ten-high walls.

By the way, I don’t have to read Rabbeinu Chananel that way. I could say that he says it is not fit for dwelling not because of the height but because of the partitions. He doesn’t say why it’s not fit for dwelling; he doesn’t explain. But after all, we are talking about the problem of the… If there are ten-high partitions, what does it mean “not fit for dwelling”? “Not fit for dwelling” meaning that if the partitions are too low, then a person needs to… Those aren’t low partitions; the partitions aren’t low, only the twigs come down. No, I’m talking about Rabbeinu Chananel on Sabbath. Ah, so? Rabbeinu Chananel on Sabbath writes that it’s not fit for dwelling, but he doesn’t explain why. Well, obviously why. I can say it’s not because of the cavity; I can explain Rabbeinu Chananel as being because the partitions are low. What do you mean? What does that have to do with fitness for dwelling? Why is it unfit for dwelling just because the partitions are low? Because it’s low, what do you mean? It’s because of the cavity. Because if we say a person needs partitions in order for it to be a private domain—a person needs to feel… Well, in order to dwell, not in order for it to be a private domain. We’re talking about what a person needs in order to dwell. To dwell, he doesn’t care what kind of partitions there are. What matters is the height. The fact that it is not a private domain is the result. Once it’s unfit for habitation, the result is that it is not a private domain. But it starts from the fact that it is unfit for habitation.

Look, the proof from sukkah to our case is not a proof. Why? Because in sukkah even Rabbeinu Chananel can agree that there are ten-high walls there. Because the ten-high walls there are also inward-facing, not only outward-facing. Because what I have above is not a roof descending, but twigs. Now when the twigs descend, they are just some leaves hanging down; it may be that this does not count as reducing the wall. I have a ten-high wall both inward and outward. Rather, it is simply not comfortable to live there because the twigs make me crouch. Therefore that is not proof against Rashi, because Rashi would agree that if, say, in a private domain, twigs were descending—it was not a house roof, it was a ten-high structure but twigs descended downward—or you know what, let’s speak about the sukkah itself, the sukkah on page 4. What is its law regarding private domain for Sabbath? I claim that according to Rashi it could be a private domain. Because after all, there are partitions here. Rotten dwelling—I don’t know whether regarding private domain there is a concept of rotten dwelling. The Rosh claims there is; Rashi isn’t necessarily in agreement. Therefore regarding sukkah it may be invalid because it says “you shall dwell as you ordinarily dwell,” so it has to be comfortable for habitation. But in private domain the definitions are physical definitions. If four walls of ten surround me, then it is a private domain. Why should I care whether it is fit or unfit for habitation?

With the roof, according to Rashi the problem is not that it is unfit for habitation, but that there aren’t ten-high walls, because the roof is something rigid; it reduces the height of the walls. The walls de facto go only up to the underside of the roof. But with twigs, the walls go all the way up; it’s just that there are leaves hanging down. So there is no difficulty for Rashi from the Talmud there.

If its shade exceeded its sunlight? Rabbi? If the shade of the twigs exceeded their sunlight, then that would be the place to discuss it. If we regard “its shade exceeds its sunlight” as a roof, then there too there is room to discuss. Because it’s not certain that for Sabbath that would count as a roof. For sukkah it is enough, but for Sabbath they are still leaves. What does Rabbeinu Chananel say about the case of the Mishnah? Wait a second, Ruti. In a multi-story apartment building where every apartment meets the required measures, then the roof of one apartment, above which there is another apartment—does that roof interrupt the private domain up to the sky? I didn’t understand a word. In a multi-story building there is an apartment on the first floor, right, which meets the required measures, and there is another apartment above it on the second floor. Does the roof divide the private domain up to the sky? Does the apartment on the second floor also have the required measure? Yes, yes, all the apartments do. So why should I care about that roof now? It’s like one floor. On the roof that too is a private domain, and it rises to the sky. No, but does it rise to the sky for the one who lives below too? What do you mean “for whom”? There is no “for whom.” A private domain is for everyone. A private domain is not determined by ownership; it is a status. If it is a private domain, it is a private domain, no matter for whom.

Rabbeinu Chananel—after all the problem is carrying from apartment to apartment to apartment to apartment. Right, if there were an eruv, say. Or through the stairwell. Right. Yes, Chani. Rabbeinu Chananel basically does not accept that ten handbreadths is a law given to Moses at Sinai? No, we’ll soon see—I haven’t spoken about that yet. I’m only saying that from the Talmud in Sukkah, which mentions Rabbeinu Chananel’s idea, one could have challenged Rashi, because in the Talmud there we see that the walls do count as ten-high walls. The whole problem is only rotten dwelling. So why here is it not considered a private domain? So I said no, that’s not difficult. Because Rashi might say that if here it had been like there, then here too it would have been a private domain. It’s just that for sukkah you also need it not to be a rotten dwelling, while for Sabbath there isn’t that issue.

Why indeed, according to Rabbeinu Chananel, is he not satisfied to say simply that there isn’t a measure of ten handbreadths and agree with Rashi? Here you can already see the first hint. In the Talmud in Sukkah you see otherwise. In the Talmud in Sukkah we see that even though the dwelling is rotten, the walls still count as ten-high walls. So Rabbeinu Chananel says: what do you want? Here too there are ten-high walls; it’s just a rotten dwelling. In other words, Rabbeinu Chananel is apparently unwilling to see a difference between descending twigs and a ceiling, the way Rashi would distinguish between the sugyot. Meaning, Rabbeinu Chananel does accept the ten handbreadths—but according to the gross measure, not the net measure. From his perspective, even if in the gross measure there are ten handbreadths, that counts as ten handbreadths. Exactly so.

Wait, but one second—I want to ask regarding if the roofing’s shade exceeds its sunlight. It is clear to the Talmud, both to Abaye and to Rava in Sukkah, that this is invalid. Okay. And there there are no partitions, so why would Rashi say otherwise on Sabbath? It is invalid not because there are no partitions; there are partitions. Rather, the height of the sukkah is not ten handbreadths. There are partitions, because the height of the sukkah is determined by the underside of the roofing whose shade exceeds its sunlight. But why assume there is no partition? Why not say that it is because there are no ten-high partitions? Why say that? You want to raise a difficulty based on why not say? So I ask: why should one say that? Because in sukkah the obligation of ten is an obligation of walls and not an obligation of height. What are you talking about? Rotten dwelling is exactly what you learn there—that beyond the requirement of walls, there is also a requirement of height. True, but maybe that comes from the word—maybe not before that. That comes afterward; Rava says it. But it’s clear to everyone that when we’re talking about shade exceeding sunlight, we’re talking about a case that is invalid because there isn’t enough—because there aren’t walls. At the beginning, before Rava spoke, we didn’t know there was such a law of rotten dwelling, so clearly the whole picture is different.

But wait a second, he says that only regarding the case of twigs whose sunlight exceeds their shade. But what difference does that make? You still see the idea. The idea is that there are ten-high walls and nevertheless the sukkah is invalid. Why is it invalid? Because you don’t have enough cavity. So if the shade exceeds the sunlight it will certainly be invalid too; that’s even less adequate cavity. Without any connection to the walls. Wait, for sukkah I have an obligation that there be a wall of ten handbreadths even if the roofing is much higher than ten handbreadths. I still have an obligation that there be at least three walls ten handbreadths high. True, but that is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. Even if there are ten-high walls, that still doesn’t mean the sukkah is valid, because if it is a rotten dwelling it is not valid. Right, but in the case where I have walls of ten and roofing that comes down low and its shade exceeds its sunlight, then clearly everyone here agrees that I don’t have the law of walls here. Not true, not true. The sukkah is invalid even though there is a law of walls. So why don’t they discuss that at all? After all, apparently Rava’s argument should have come even earlier, before his response to Abaye. The opposite. Why? What? Rava says to you: even if its sunlight exceeds its shade, it’s invalid because it’s a rotten dwelling. So if its shade exceeds its sunlight, all the more so it would be invalid; it is an even more rotten dwelling. But he doesn’t say that. That’s what he should have said and closed the whole story. He doesn’t need to close the whole story; he says what he has to say, and that’s it. What story is there to close? I didn’t understand. He said what he had to say, and all the rest of the story is our story, not his.

No, but if Abaye says, basically—okay, let’s go with Abaye for a second—if I have… for Abaye it’s obvious that he doesn’t take “rotten dwelling” as an issue of walls. Right, right. It’s clear that it’s a matter of walls. So if—okay—then according to Rava, you’re saying he would have said this earlier, even before the… No, Rava responds to what Abaye said. Nobody spoke about the case where shade exceeds sunlight. That case is not mentioned here. Because it’s obvious to them that it’s invalid. No. Yes, it’s obvious to them that it’s invalid, but the question is why. So according to Rava it is invalid not necessarily because there are no walls but because there is no cavity. If twigs whose sunlight exceeds their shade are enough to say there is no cavity here, then if it is even denser above, all the more so there is no cavity—that’s a kal va-homer.

Maybe you can also infer from the phrase in Sukkah: it is a rotten dwelling, but it is still a dwelling. And here it is not a dwelling. Okay, that’s the same idea I said. It has ten-high walls; the invalidity is only because the dwelling is rotten—the cavity is lacking. But I’m saying this is not difficult for Rashi. And also the Ran on the Rif and the Ran in Chiddushei HaRan basically go in Rabbeinu Chananel’s direction; I’m not going to read them inside now.

Now in terms of practical ruling, the Rif and the Rosh ruled this law in practice; Maimonides omitted it, and it’s not clear why. The Bi’ur Halakhah comments on that. In the Shulchan Arukh he brings it as follows: “A house whose interior is not ten, and its roof completes it to ten, if it is four by four, its interior is a karmelit and its roof is a private domain.” As you correctly noted earlier, “its interior is a karmelit” is the Shulchan Arukh’s interpretation; the Talmud does not say that. It just says that one carries in it only within four cubits. And therefore the Bi’ur Halakhah is uncertain.

So the Mishnah Berurah says: “Its interior is a karmelit, because from the inside the partitions are not ten high.” Whom is he following? Rashi. Right. The problem is that he sees this as a problem in the partitions, not in the cavity. And he also gives us a hint. The hint is: why is there a problem in the partitions? Because although externally there are partitions, internally the partitions are not ten high. This already gives us some hint where Rabbeinu Chananel disagrees. Here he brings Sha’ar HaTziyun, and there Sha’ar HaTziyun writes “Rashi.” What does that mean? The ruling of the Shulchan Arukh—or at least the way I explained it—goes according to Rashi. But Rabbeinu Chananel and the Ran—here they are, the ones we saw—“since it is not fit for dwelling, because of the partition it is as though there are no partitions.”

I have to note that in our edition there was no period. There was a comma. No, there wasn’t one, and when I read it I said to myself: how can he read Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel in the same sentence? In the responsa project they put a comma there; maybe they punctuated it. I changed it to a period because I think a period is more accurate. Not “I think”—I think they may not even have punctuated it, at least in the responsa project we looked at, and I couldn’t understand how one reads that in one breath. Look again; I think there is a comma there. I copied it from there too; there was a comma and I changed it. Maybe when I copied—I don’t know, never mind. In any case, that’s how it should be read. That’s how it should be read anyway.

Now for our purposes, what basically emerges here? What emerges here in practice is that according to Rabbeinu Chananel, the issue of the partitions does not bother him, right? The obvious thing here would have been to say: why is the inside of the house not a private domain? Because there are no ten-high partitions. Rabbeinu Chananel is not bothered by the issue of partitions. But when he looks at the roof, he does take them into account as partitions. I didn’t understand. He looks at the roof, where it reaches ten handbreadths, so he does treat that as partitions. The Talmud—what does that have to do with Rabbeinu Chananel? The Talmud says there are partitions there with respect to the roof. The Talmud treats them as partitions, but they aren’t suitable partitions; still, for the roof that suffices. No, no—that is the Talmud already. And Rabbeinu Chananel—below there are no partitions, but suddenly when you get to the roof they do count. Of course, but that’s the Talmud, not Rabbeinu Chananel. The Talmud says that—one second—the Talmud says that on the roof it is a private domain. So regarding the roof there are certainly partitions here.

The whole discussion we are conducting is what happens inside the house. So with respect to the inside, Rashi says there are no ten-high partitions; the law to Moses at Sinai of ten handbreadths is not fulfilled. But Rabbeinu Chananel offers another explanation. I ask: why isn’t he satisfied with Rashi’s explanation? There are no partitions regarding the inside; regarding the outside yes. Because he argues, perhaps in line with what we explained in the previous class, that once the partitions are seen from outside that already counts as partitions. After all, we discussed whether the partitions are for the public outside or for whoever is inside. So for him it is not about the person inside but about the person outside. And here we’ve reached the main point of the class. Exactly. I think the dispute between Rabbeinu Chananel and Rashi is about how we define the partitions of a private domain. Are the partitions of a private domain defined as partitions with respect to one looking from outside—what stops him when he comes to enter that domain? Or is the definition of a private domain determined by the height of the partitions as perceived from inside?

Rabbeinu Chananel understands that what matters is from outside. And therefore Rabbeinu Chananel says: from the standpoint of partition height, I have no problem here. There is a ten-high partition here; someone looking from outside sees a ten-high partition. So why nevertheless is this not a private domain inside? The cavity is lacking—it’s not about the laws of partitions; the laws of partitions are fulfilled here, only the cavity is lacking, that’s all. Especially because according to Rabbeinu Chananel we know that these partitions are partitions with respect to the roof; regarding the roof it certainly counts as partitions. So Rabbeinu Chananel says: then you cannot say there are no partitions. There are partitions; it’s just a rotten dwelling. There is no cavity. Meaning that essentially the argument between Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel seems to be the question: how are the partitions of a private domain defined? Does what matters depend on what someone looking from outside sees, or what someone looking from inside sees? That’s the question. And the practical difference is: why is the inside not a private domain? Is it because there are no partitions, as Rashi says—and Rashi assumes that what matters is the view from inside—or according to Rabbeinu Chananel, there are partitions, and apparently one must say the cavity is not fit for dwelling, like a rotten dwelling.

But we only saw the definition of a private domain concerning partitions. Where does Rabbeinu Chananel get a definition of private domain in terms of cavity height? Rabbeinu Chananel is saying that even though there are ten handbreadths, even though the partitions are high enough, it still won’t be called a private domain because it is unfit for dwelling. Where does this criterion in the laws of Sabbath concerning private domain appear? Before this we read in the Talmud what a private domain is—like a trench, like a fence. There the issue of the cavity did not appear; what appeared there was simply that you need four partitions. What do you mean it didn’t appear? Of course it appeared. Four partitions didn’t appear there either. It says trench and fence. Now tell me: what characterizes trench and fence? That they don’t have a roof. No. What characterizes trench and fence is that they have four partitions and one can dwell there. Now decide which characteristics of trench and fence are the important ones. And then perhaps because of that—especially in light of the Sukkah sugya we just saw—Rabbeinu Chananel says: you see that a rotten dwelling is not a dwelling. So he explains the Talmud here regarding private domain in that way too.

But maybe that’s the reason the Talmud didn’t bring the example of a house? I mean, I thought that a private domain would first and foremost be a house. But with a house you immediately start getting entangled with the roof, whereas with a trench and a fence apparently there is no roof and it would be fit for dwelling. Here—you wanted to say a house that is ten handbreadths high. First of all, the opposite. If there is room for confusion there, then all the more reason why the Talmud should bring it, to clear up the fog and say: a house over ten handbreadths. But why isn’t Rabbeinu Chananel satisfied with saying that it is not fit for dwelling—why does he need to add “as though there are no partitions”? That’s an interesting question, and I don’t have an answer. But it seems from Rabbeinu Chananel that in the end for him too this comes down to partitions. It’s just that he argues that once there is no cavity, then the partitions do not count as partitions. I would say—in sukkah there is no such addition. There it just says that because it is a rotten dwelling, the sukkah is invalid. It doesn’t say that because it is a rotten dwelling, therefore the sukkah has no walls. Because a rotten dwelling is not a sukkah, even if it has walls. Here too Rabbeinu Chananel, who compares our case to sukkah, to a rotten dwelling, ends differently. That’s a good point from Ruti. He ends differently because he says: even though there is no cavity and it is not fit for dwelling, and therefore what would I have said here? It’s unfit for dwelling, so it is not a private domain. He says: no, if it is unfit for dwelling then the partitions are not partitions. Because partitions are only partitions that enclose a cavity fit for habitation. So in the end he disqualifies this domain because it has no partitions, not because it is unfit for habitation. He shifts over to the definition of a partition: that it must surround a cavity fit for habitation. And he also looks from two directions. Toward the cavity below he looks from inside, and toward the roof he looks from outside. No—he doesn’t look from inside. He looks from outside in both cases. Why? The cavity you see from inside; you don’t see it from outside. Exactly. What happens is that on the inside, since the cavity that they enclose is low, then regarding the inside these do not count as partitions. Regarding the outside there is no problem—you can live above, on the roof.

Okay Rabbi, but maybe in general the requirement that it be a place fit for dwelling is clear in sukkah, because there too it says explicitly, “You shall dwell as you ordinarily dwell,” “You shall dwell in booths seven days.” Yes, but regarding private domain perhaps Rabbeinu Chananel thinks it also needed to be fit for dwelling; on the other hand maybe not. Which page in… But why is Rabbeinu Chananel compelled in the end to conclude with an invalidation of the partitions? Because he is unwilling to accept that private domain is determined by possibility of dwelling. We find that in sukkah because it says “You shall dwell in booths,” but in private domain the definitions are completely physical definitions. So therefore he says that the fact that it is unfit for dwelling simply invalidates the partitions, and therefore there are no partitions. But the question here is: who told him that? How do we know that partitions are not partitions if they don’t… When there are no partitions he can see the cavity. Yes, but who said there are no partitions here? He decides there are no partitions because the cavity is not large enough, and partitions that do not enclose a cavity of ten are not partitions. Who told him that? But that’s a correct observation. Meaning, this addition of Rabbeinu Chananel really does require explanation. And the explanation is probably what Nechama said: that he refuses to accept subjective definitions regarding the definition of a private domain. In sukkah, if you cannot dwell there, fine. In private domain, I’m not interested in whether you can or cannot dwell there. That’s not the point. The definitions are completely physical. And his claim is that if the cavity is a cavity in which one cannot dwell, then what surrounds it is not called a partition. And if it is a domain without partitions, then it is not a private domain. Again, it’s a somewhat roundabout definition, but that is what Rabbeinu Chananel writes there. But why? He simply defines the partitions according to the cavity. I didn’t understand. It is entirely a physical definition: he says the definition of a partition is one whose function is to enclose a cavity of ten handbreadths in height. I don’t know how to explain it. Never mind—you can call it a physical definition; I have no problem with that. But where does he know it from? Why, where did this reasoning come from that if a partition doesn’t enclose a cavity of ten, it isn’t a partition? You can tell me: it isn’t a private domain because it’s not like a house people live in. That reasoning I understand. But apparently he refuses that reasoning. He wants to claim the partition is not a partition. Where did he get that from? I don’t know. In any event, that’s what it says there, and that is, by the way, the view of most of the medieval authorities. The Ran in two places—yes, that’s apparently the more accepted explanation. But we saw that the Shulchan Arukh, for example, or at least the Mishnah Berurah, actually prefers Rashi’s explanation.

In any case, I only remind you that according to the Bi’ur Halakhah we saw above—what? I didn’t understand. In the end, the cavity of a private domain is what defines it. Meaning because carrying within the domain is what… I have no problem with that, but what does that have to do with partitions? Then say that if there is no cavity it is not a private domain. That I would understand, no problem. But Rabbeinu Chananel says that if there is no cavity, then there are no partitions, and therefore it is not a private domain. Why make that detour? Right, because the definition is in terms of partitions. I don’t know, it’s strange in short.

I’ll just make one more comment. According to the Bi’ur Halakhah we saw above, the whole story changes. Because according to the Bi’ur Halakhah we saw above, inside it is indeed a private domain. So there is no question why inside it is not a private domain. Everything the medieval authorities explain is why, although inside it is a private domain, they forbade carrying there. Why it is a karmelit, and not why it is not a private domain. Then the whole discussion is not relevant at all. In practice, both Rabbeinu Chananel and Rashi agree—and the law that the Bi’ur Halakhah states is said by him even according to Rabbeinu Chananel and Rashi. Everyone agrees that the determining height of partitions is the height from the outside, and therefore in principle this is a private domain. The whole discussion between Rabbeinu Chananel and Rashi is only the question why rabbinically they nevertheless forbade carrying inside, although it is a private domain. So it’s only a rabbinic dispute, not a principled dispute about the definition of partitions of a private domain. And that has implications. Everything I said until now is without the Bi’ur Halakhah. But according to the Bi’ur Halakhah there is no discussion why this is not a private domain; it is a private domain, and it has partitions. Everyone agrees that it has partitions—even Rashi agrees. Therefore both Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel understand the partitions according to how they are seen from outside, not from inside, and therefore there are partitions here according to the Bi’ur Halakhah. And their dispute is only about why they nevertheless forbade carrying inside. That’s all. Yes. But then their discussion really isn’t connected to the general definition of partitions in private domain, okay?

By the way, parenthetically I’ll add that maybe the dispute is a bit more limited here. Because maybe even Rabbeinu Chananel does not accept that the definition of partitions is what one sees from outside—not necessarily. Rather, here regarding the roof of the house these partitions certainly do count as partitions, right? Yes. So Rabbeinu Chananel says: in a case where these partitions do count as partitions with respect to the roof, I will also see them as partitions with respect to the inside of the house. But what would happen in a case where I have partitions that are ten from the outside and nine from the inside, but above there is no domain that is a private domain? It doesn’t matter—a point on top or whatever, however you define it. There perhaps even Rabbeinu Chananel would agree that below it would not be a private domain, that it would not be a partition. Do you understand what I’m saying? Meaning, it is not certain that one can derive from Rabbeinu Chananel here a general principle that for him the relevant height of partitions is determined by the view from outside. It may be that what he is saying is only specific to this case, because in this case with respect to the roof we do see these partitions as partitions, and only in such a case does Rabbeinu Chananel say: fine, if they are already partitions for the roof, then I cannot fail to see them as partitions for the inside as well. Then the whole problem is only the cavity. But that does not mean that generally the height of partitions is always what is seen from outside according to Rabbeinu Chananel.

If the roof protrudes, for example, as we’ll see later, and then one doesn’t see the partitions, then on the roof too it wouldn’t be called a private domain? And then according to him, inside the house too it wouldn’t be called a private domain. Right, yes. I’m saying: if I’m right about this, then he should have reasoned that way and not the way he did. Ah—you hear? He should have reasoned… he reasoned differently. He should have said: I cannot treat the same physical object as a partition in one context and not a partition in another, and because of that… why did he explain it at all? Again. What Rabbeinu Chananel does is explain why this is not a private domain, so he says: because there is no sufficient cavity. I ask Rabbeinu Chananel: what was wrong with Rashi’s explanation that there is no partition? Rabbeinu Chananel assumes there is a partition—he doesn’t write that at all, but that is what he assumes, it is clear from what he says. And I’m asking about what he assumes, not about what he writes. But so he assumes that because he cannot see the same physical object as a partition upward and not a partition downward. Fine, that’s what I’m suggesting now. Right, but I’m saying: he should have written that. No, because he doesn’t write at all why he assumes there is a partition. In Rabbeinu Chananel there is no explanation why he thinks there are partitions. He assumes it as self-evident, and then he explains why nevertheless it isn’t a private domain—because of the cavity. So I infer from his words—he doesn’t write this at all—that apparently according to him there are partitions here. So since he didn’t explain why there are partitions, there is no question why he didn’t explain it this way or that way. He didn’t explain it at all. He assumed it; he didn’t explain it at all. Now the question is why he assumes that. That’s all hypothetical; he didn’t deal with it.

The Talmud there in Sukkah on 5b—I told you it brings one source for ten as the height of a partition from verses, and then it rejects it and says: “And from where do you know that the cavity is ten apart from its roofing? Say that it includes the roofing.” Meaning, the Talmud says you cannot learn from there the measure of a partition of ten handbreadths. Why? Because if we had learned from there, we would have thought to validate a sukkah whose cavity is nine and the thickness of the roofing is one handbreadth, and we would not have known that you need a wall of ten. What is written here, basically? Apparently what is written here is that in sukkah there is a requirement on the cavity beyond the height of the partition. That is what the Talmud asks. The Talmud says: if I had learned from there that the height of a partition is ten, I still would not have known to invalidate a sukkah like our house. Let’s speak of our house as if it were a sukkah, okay? So I would not have known to invalidate a sukkah like our house. And why would I not have known? Because I would have thought that since such a structure has a ten-high partition it is valid, and I would not have known that the cavity must be ten. Okay? So apparently it seems that a structure like this really does have a ten-high partition, and the only reason it is invalid is because of the cavity. But that is of course not conclusive. The meaning could be that maybe not… I would have thought that a cavity of nine is enough if the total is ten, and the whole discussion is about the cavity and not about the height of the partition. So it is hard to bring clear proofs from there. Anyway, that is just a note.

Now in the Talmud on 7a, there are later authorities who want to claim that the dispute of Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel and the Ran here in our sugya is like the dispute of Rashi and Tosafot in the previous sugya. What happens in the previous sugya? In the previous sugya… wait: when Rav Dimi came he said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: a karmelit is never less than four. And Rav Sheshet said: and it extends up to ten. What does “and it extends up to ten” mean? What does it mean that the karmelit extends up to ten?

First possibility: shall we say that if there is a partition of ten, then it is a karmelit, and if not, it is not a karmelit? That cannot be. Meaning, I might have thought that there is a karmelit only if there are ten-high partitions around it; otherwise it is not a karmelit. That cannot be. What is his proof? From our statement of Rav Giddel. As Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav Chiya bar Yosef in the name of Rav: “A house whose interior is not ten, and whose roof completes it to ten—on its roof it is permitted to carry throughout, inside it one may carry only within four cubits.” What do we see there? That a karmelit can exist even without ten-high partitions around it, right? Right. Up to ten. Right. How do you see it? According to Rashi you see it; according to Rabbeinu Chananel you don’t. Because according to Rabbeinu Chananel there is a ten-high partition here. What invalidates it is because of the cavity. So what proof is there that a karmelit can also exist without ten-high partitions? Not true—this is a karmelit that has ten-high partitions. It is a karmelit because the cavity is not ten, but it has partitions, as Rabbeinu Chananel says. But Rabbeinu Chananel also added that in the end they are not partitions. Because of the cavity. Because there is no cavity, therefore they are not partitions. Wait, good question. Okay, nice point—I hadn’t thought of that.

The later authorities indeed want to make this claim, that this Talmudic passage is difficult for Rabbeinu Chananel. And therefore they say that Rabbeinu Chananel learned that passage on 7a as Tosafot learned it, not as Rashi did. How does Rashi read it? Rashi reads the Talmud there as I just read it: there was an initial assumption that a karmelit needs surrounding partitions; that is rejected, and then they conclude that the question is up to what height it is a karmelit—up to ten handbreadths like a public domain. Fine? And they reject that in light of our Talmud. And this is Rashi. Because according to Rashi indeed our Talmud says that a karmelit can exist without partitions, because here there isn’t a measure of ten-high partitions and nevertheless it is a karmelit. So you see a karmelit doesn’t require ten. According to Rashi’s reading of the Talmud there, it works very well. Rashi according to his own view fits perfectly. Rashi in our sugya fits with Rashi in that sugya. Right?

What will Rabbeinu Chananel do with our sugya? In our sugya Rabbeinu Chananel says that inside the house it is a karmelit, but around it there are partitions of ten. The problem is the cavity. Now if that is really so, then what proof is there that there can be a karmelit without partitions? Our karmelit has partitions. Therefore Rabbeinu Chananel cannot learn the Talmud on 7a the way Rashi learned it. So how can he? You saw the Tosafot, right? Tosafot learns it differently. Not like Rashi. It says: “And it seems to the Ri that this is the explanation: shall we say that when there are partitions of ten, that means airspace fit for partitions of ten, excluding an enclosed valley roofed at less than ten.” What is he saying? The initial assumption in the Talmud here was not that there cannot be a karmelit without partitions, as Rashi says, but that there cannot be a karmelit without a height of ten. And that is what they proved from Rav Giddel’s case, that there can be a karmelit whose height is not ten. According to Rabbeinu Chananel that is an excellent proof.

Wait—we said Tosafot and Rashi each goes according to his own view. The partitions must be ten, but the airspace can be less? The opposite, the opposite. According to Rashi, the Talmud there on 7a is trying to prove that there can be karmelits not surrounded by ten-high partitions, and according to Rashi that really is a good proof from our sugya. Because in our sugya the inside of the house is a karmelit, and around it there are no ten-high partitions. So they proved exactly what they wanted to prove. But according to Rabbeinu Chananel you can’t prove that from our sugya, because in our sugya this is a karmelit surrounded by ten-high partitions. So how can you prove from here that ten-high partitions are not needed? There are ten-high partitions. So the later authorities say: no, Rabbeinu Chananel learned the Talmud on 7a like Tosafot there. What does Tosafot say? That what they are trying to prove is not that there can be a karmelit without partitions, but that there can be a karmelit that is not at the required height. That isn’t about the height of the partitions. And that indeed can be proven from our case even according to Rabbeinu Chananel. Okay?

By the way, Tosafot here is also difficult for the Bi’ur Halakhah, because they really connect the whole issue to karmelit. And the Bi’ur Halakhah… Right, right. It’s truly difficult. Meaning that Rashi is not explaining why it is a private domain but why it is a karmelit, according to the Bi’ur Halakhah. Yes. But according to Tosafot’s explanation, we can say that when Rashi says it is a karmelit, he means that the partitions… No, no—according to Tosafot’s explanation we don’t need to explain Rashi. Rashi and Tosafot explain the Talmud differently. There’s no point in asking what Rashi explains according to Tosafot’s explanation. Rashi explains that there was an initial assumption there that a karmelit requires partitions around it. And that is what they proved from Rav Giddel’s Talmudic case is incorrect. Tosafot says the initial assumption was that a karmelit cannot exist at a height less than ten—not partitions, not about partitions. And they proved from our sugya that that’s not so. Here you see a karmelit that is less than ten.

Your observation is right: from the Talmud there it is clearly not like the Bi’ur Halakhah. Because otherwise you cannot prove from here the general law of karmelit, because here it isn’t a karmelit; it’s a private domain with a special stringency like karmelit. In other words, the Bi’ur Halakhah is indeed difficult in the plain reading, both in the medieval authorities and in the Talmud. And that really is an objection against him. Good point from Noa that came up earlier in light of your earlier point about the wording of Rabbeinu Chananel.

According to that, it turns out that Rabbeinu Chananel here fits with Rashi’s explanation there and not only with Tosafot. Why? Because what does Rashi there say? We want to prove that there can be a karmelit even if there are no surrounding partitions. Can this be proven from our Talmud? According to Rashi certainly yes. According to Rabbeinu Chananel can it? The answer is yes, it can. Why? Because Rabbeinu Chananel says that because there is not a height of ten, the partitions are not partitions—after all, he adds that because of that the partitions are not partitions. So in practice now around the house there are no partitions. So here is proof that there can be a karmelit without surrounding partitions. So the proof works also according to Rabbeinu Chananel. But according to the Ran and Chiddushei HaRan this is not so. That is my answer to you, Noa, do you hear? What I said can fit with Rabbeinu Chananel, but look at the Ran’s language. Why? He too writes “as if…” Wait, let’s first speak about the Ran on the Rif. “Inside one may carry only within four cubits, because since it is not fit for dwelling, it is a karmelit.” He does not go through the partitions. It is not fit for dwelling, like a rotten dwelling. The language of Chiddushei HaRan is not entirely clear: “Because since it is not fit for dwelling, the partitions are ineffective, and it is as though there are no partitions there.” He does not say that the partitions do not count as partitions, but rather that this is not a domain like a domain that has surrounding partitions. Therefore even here it is not certain that he says the same as Rabbeinu Chananel. It can be interpreted this way and it can be interpreted that way. But in the Ran on the Rif it is clear that it is not like Rabbeinu Chananel. He understands that it is literally a rotten dwelling. Okay.

So apparently, at least according to the Ran on the Rif, on 7a you really have to come to Tosafot’s explanation and not to Rashi’s explanation. Because according to Rashi we need to prove from here that there is a karmelit without surrounding partitions. But according to the Ran on the Rif you can’t prove that from here. There are surrounding partitions here; they just do not have the proper height. So what is your proof that there can be a karmelit without partitions? You can’t derive that proof from here. We are forced to come to Tosafot’s explanation there, that the proof is not that there is a karmelit without partitions but that there is a karmelit without a height of ten. According to the Ran on the Rif, that really is necessary.

According to Rabbeinu Chananel, not necessarily. Now I want to claim that even according to the Ran on the Rif this is not necessary. What is the claim? The claim is basically this: we explained that inside the house it is not a private domain but a karmelit. The dispute between Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel is about why it is not a private domain, not why it is a karmelit. I’m leaving the Bi’ur Halakhah aside. Why is it not a private domain? Rashi says there is a lack in the measure of partition. Rabbeinu Chananel says the cavity is lacking but there is a partition. What is the disagreement? The question is whether a partition is what appears from outside or what appears from inside. But when we ask why this is not a private domain, then the criterion of partition has to be the criterion of partition for a private domain. And on that Rashi says what matters is what is seen from inside, and Rabbeinu Chananel says what matters is what is seen from outside.

But what the Talmud on 7a is looking for is whether there is a partition regarding the question whether this is a karmelit. Not why it is not a private domain, but why it is a karmelit. The Talmud there is discussing something else entirely. After all, according to Rashi the Talmud there discusses whether there can be a karmelit without partitions. So I want to make the following claim: we said that according to Rashi it must be that there can be a karmelit without partitions. Why? Because these partitions are not partitions, and nevertheless inside the house this is defined as a karmelit. Right? Not necessarily. Maybe these partitions are partitions. Why? They are not partitions under the definition of partitions for a private domain. Because with respect to partitions of a private domain, what matters is what is seen… But with respect to the requirement for karmelit that there be surrounding partitions, maybe there what matters is what one sees from outside. And perhaps even Rashi agrees with that—opposite from Rabbeinu Chananel.

Rabbeinu Chananel, who says that what matters is the height of the partitions as seen from outside—that he says regarding the definition of partition in a private domain, which determines what is a private domain. But here in the Talmud there arises a possibility that a partition is needed to define a karmelit. Who says Rabbeinu Chananel also agrees that there too the definition of partition is according to what is seen from outside? It may be that for karmelit the definition of partition is according to what is seen from inside. And therefore I want to claim there is no connection between the sugyot. Why do they bring it as a proof? What? Why do they bring it as proof? They bring it—the Talmud brings it. I’m just arguing that even according to Rashi here, one can explain according to either Rashi or Tosafot there, and even according to Rabbeinu Chananel here one can explain according to either Rashi or Tosafot there. All the options exist; you can’t hang one on the other. Because when the Talmud links the two sugyot, I can say it links them because it is looking at the height even though there are partitions. And I can say it is looking for partitions. In short, this opens all the possibilities. You can’t force anything from anything. Each of the two explanations in our sugya can fit each of the two explanations in that sugya. Do you understand what I’m saying?

Because the whole point is this: if I really understand correctly the dispute between Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel as a question of how to define the relevant height of a partition—whether that is what is outside or what is inside—then who says that the definitions regarding a partition for defining private domain are the same definitions for a partition that would be needed to define karmelit? The initial assumption of the Talmud that you need a partition to define karmelit—this is rejected in the end; you don’t need it. But when the Talmud raised the possibility that a partition is needed to define karmelit, who says this is the same partition in the same definition that is needed to define private domain? These are two entirely different things. And the reasoning says this: one can say that in private domain the partition is determined by what is going on outside. Why? Because you need to stop the one who comes from outside to enter, and only then is it called a private domain. So what matters is the height seen by someone looking from outside—what stops him when he comes to enter. But regarding karmelit, you need the partition only to define the area and give you some sense from within, not in order to stop the one outside. After all, a karmelit is not the opposite of the public domain; it is the opposite of the private domain. So you don’t need to stop the public. On the contrary, a karmelit is a place where the public does move around. Therefore there the perspective is specifically from inside—or the reverse. Look at the summary afterward; I can offer such a rationale or the opposite rationale. Therefore I think the two sugyot should not be linked at all in any direction.

You said that explains Rabbeinu Chananel, but Rashi has to be linked, because Rashi defines the concept of partition, and partition is not connected to what it gives me outside; I just need ten handbreadths. No, it is connected, it is connected. No, a partition is a height of ten handbreadths; that is a law to Moses at Sinai. But the question whether that height has to be visible from outside or from inside can definitely depend on what kind of partition we are talking about: a partition for a private domain or a partition for a karmelit. So even Rashi, who says that regarding private domain what matters is what one sees from inside, can agree that regarding karmelit what matters is what one sees from outside. And there would still be a partition here. But that explains Rabbeinu Chananel. No, I’m saying that according to both of them there is no necessary implication for either one, okay? Because Rashi is simply talking about the concept of partition; for him a partition is ten handbreadths. But the concept of partition only tells us that there are ten handbreadths. As for the question from where we measure those ten handbreadths, he says nothing. It could be that for private domain it is according to what one sees from inside, and for karmelit it is according to what one sees from outside. Right—the concept of partition is only ten handbreadths. But the function of that partition is not universal, or not necessarily universal. It could change. With respect to private domain it is like this. What? When I look from outside it will be a partition, I understand. Yes, regarding karmelit. When you look from inside it will be a partition regarding private domain. Or the opposite. And there are rationales in both directions; I brought the rationales here, you can look.

In the Shulchan Arukh there is the following law, section 16. He says there: if a roof protrudes beyond the walls of the house—and the source is a sugya in Eruvin—and in a case where the walls of the house are not recognizable to one standing on the roof, it is a karmelit, even if it is very high and very wide. We’re talking about the roof, not the inside. Okay? Now the question is why. So the idea is that he—the person—has to see it from inside, the… because on the face of it, if the definition for private domain is partitions as seen from outside, then this is not understandable. Because from the outside I see ten-high partitions here. Why should I care that they are not recognizable to someone standing on the roof? It should be directed to whoever is outside. No, but the one standing on the roof is supposed to apply “extend upward,” but if he doesn’t see it, he can’t do that. Wait, wait, wait—you’re already into the concept of “extend upward”; we’ll get there in a moment. You’re right, but we’ll get there in a moment.

When I read the Shulchan Arukh, he does not say a word about “extend upward.” He says that since this is not recognizable to one standing on the roof, it cannot be a private domain. What do we see? That what matters is what one sees from inside, not what one sees from outside, right? Like with the window too, and like Rashi, not like Rabbeinu Chananel. The fact is that he continues afterward with the window. The window is a different law. The window is a different law; it only means they connect together. Meaning—but I still think, because he doesn’t see the outside and he doesn’t see the inside either. Right? He does see. A person standing on the roof sees the partition. He sees the edge of the partition; never mind, he sees its edge. But it says here he doesn’t see. No—the issue is only because the roof protrudes. If the roof did not protrude, he would see. Only when the roof protrudes does he not see. So the partitions are recognizable; he doesn’t see them. No—if the roof does not protrude, then the Shulchan Arukh says he does see it, and therefore it is a private domain; that is our sugya. What the Shulchan Arukh is talking about here is where the roof protrudes and covers the top of the wall. So someone standing up here—someone standing up here does not see the top edge of the wall. It is enough to see the edge; that counts as seeing. To say that seeing from inside is required—yes.

So in the straightforward reading, the Shulchan Arukh rules that the function of the partition is inward, not outward. Like Rashi, against Rabbeinu Chananel. Just as we saw in the Mishnah Berurah on the previous law, that he indeed brings Rashi’s interpretation on the previous law. Now think carefully. Someone looking from outside according to Rabbeinu Chananel—for him, such a case should be a private domain in every respect. Because from the outside we basically see—we see a wall shaped like a reish. So what? Is a wall shaped like a reish not a wall? When I look from outside I see a wall here shaped like a reish, but there is still a wall ten handbreadths high that stops me from passing. According to Rabbeinu Chananel, the top here should be a private domain in my opinion. That is the practical difference between Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel. The Shulchan Arukh here goes according to Rashi, because according to Rabbeinu Chananel the top would be a private domain.

Except that in the Mishnah Berurah there, in the Bi’ur Halakhah—we’ll speak about the Bi’ur Halakhah because we’re running out of time—he brings dissenting opinions. And he wants to say, look: “The Magen Avraham, subsection 14, brought the view of Tosafot, that specifically when the roof protrudes outward by the measure of four handbreadths, for then on that area there is a karmelit, and consequently it is forbidden to carry on the entire roof because it is breached in its entirety to a forbidden place. But if it protrudes less than four handbreadths, it is permitted on the protrusion and certainly on the whole roof.” He also brings this in the name of the Rosh, and so on. What is he saying? Look: there is a roof like this. This protruding part beyond the wall—that protrusion has to be four handbreadths. Why? Because then on that section of the roof it is a karmelit, and then it blocks, because the inner part of the roof cannot be a private domain when it is surrounded on all sides by karmelits. Do you understand what Tosafot is saying? Yes. And why can’t it be? And what does that actually mean? It means that he learned like Rabbeinu Chananel. Why? Because he does not accept the Shulchan Arukh’s explanation. The Shulchan Arukh says that because the wall is not recognizable to the one above, it is a karmelit. But he claims that if it protrudes less than four handbreadths—even then, after all, the wall is not recognizable to one standing above—and there he claims it would still be a private domain. He says that because from outside it is recognizable that there are karmelits, therefore it is not. Yes—no, not because of one standing outside; there are karmelits. Once there are karmelits, that already blocks. But the point is different. Suppose the protrusion is less than four handbreadths—what is the law according to Tosafot? In a good place? The top is a private domain. Right. The top is a private domain, by the way. Why is it a private domain? After all, it is not recognizable to one standing inside. Why should I care that the protrusion is small? There is still a protrusion; it is not recognizable to one standing inside. Simply because the section over the protrusion is not a karmelit, right? That’s all. Meaning, you see that Tosafot learned like Rabbeinu Chananel and not like Rashi. The Shulchan Arukh rules like Rashi, and Tosafot learned like Rabbeinu Chananel. Because according to his view, if it is visible from outside, that’s enough; it will be a private domain.

By the way, if it protrudes four handbreadths, then how does it help me that it’s visible from outside? Above, the protruding part is a karmelit. So what comes after it cannot be a private domain. What comes after it is nullified to it and becomes a karmelit too. And can’t we apply “curved wall” here? What do you mean? Like in sukkah. There would have been “curved wall” here if not for the fact that above that “curved wall” there was a karmelit. If that weren’t a karmelit, there would be no problem at all. But what is the problem that a private domain should be surrounded by karmelits? What’s the problem? Because then it’s one area. So if around it it is necessarily karmelits, then what is inside is also a karmelit, because it is all one area. There is nothing separating the protruding part from the inner part. Facing the karmelit there is no wall here. Between the karmelit and the private domain there is no wall. So what would separate them and let you say this is a private domain and that is a karmelit? Therefore the whole thing is a karmelit.

So from Tosafot’s reasoning we see that he learned like Rabbeinu Chananel. Because from his perspective, in principle it is a private domain. If it protrudes less than four handbreadths, it is a private domain even though it is not recognizable to one standing inside. The only issue is that there is an interruption; if it protrudes four handbreadths, there is an interruption. A technical discussion. But in principle it really is a private domain. After that he says in the Mishnah Berurah: “I brought the view of the Vilna Gaon,” at the end of the highlighted section, “and Eliyah Rabbah, who permit in all cases.” An even more radical position. The Vilna Gaon and Eliyah Rabbah maintain that it is a private domain even if the roof protrudes less than four handbreadths—sorry, more than four handbreadths. Less than four handbreadths too; that’s a third position. And that is certainly like Rabbeinu Chananel. But he says when the protrusion is not four handbreadths wide. Right. So why are you saying even four? No—“the view of the Vilna Gaon and Eliyah Rabbah, who permit in all cases.” Period. Then the Bi’ur Halakhah concludes: “In any case, when the protrusion is not four handbreadths wide, one may rely…” But I ask: what is the view of the Vilna Gaon and Eliyah Rabbah? They permit whether the protrusion is small or large. What does that mean? First of all, they are certainly like Rabbeinu Chananel and Tosafot: if the protrusion is small, it is a private domain even though it is not recognizable inwardly. They just disagree with Tosafot and maintain that an interruption of karmelits does not bother me. The whole thing remains a private domain, including the area above the protruding section. That is an internal dispute within the Rabbeinu Chananel camp, so to speak. Okay? That is exactly the practical difference between Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel.

Fine. I’ll just conclude the class. What we saw in the previous class—I brought it here again, but we didn’t get to it—there too there is a dispute in the Bi’ur Halakhah that we saw, or rather that I referred you to in the handouts from the previous class. There is a dispute there between Tosafot and the Ritva. The question is whether, when I don’t see the partitions in a beit se’atayim because it’s far from me, that counts as a private domain. You understand that there too this is the same dispute. The dispute is whether the partitions need to be visible to someone standing inside, because that is their function, or whether that doesn’t matter; all that matters is that they stop the person coming from outside. The same dispute. You can see that this weaves through a great many disputes among the medieval authorities. And we will also see it later in the next sugya regarding carving, and that is also what comes out in the Tosafot I referred you to, Tosafot in Sukkah. Here we definitely won’t have time to get into it; maybe next class. Okay. Thank you very much. Sabbath peace.