Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 26
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Acherim and a space of four by four
- The ukimta of the basket and the difficulty from the language of the Mishnah
- A basket in the public domain, Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, and the distinction between above and below ten
- Methodology: the structure of the sugya as a source for a halakhic implication
- The parallel sugya on page 101: lower the partition, the Rabbis exempt, and the implication of the comparison
- The possibility that the sugyot disagree, and a proposed alternative reading of “above/below ten”
- The nature of a partition: “what blocks from outside” versus “what encloses from inside,” and kids passing through
- A pillar in the public domain, Rav Mordechai’s question, and Rashi versus Nachmanides
- Sukkah page 4 as a source for the question of extend upward and visible partitions
Summary
General Overview
The sugya searches for a tannaitic source for understanding the Mishnah’s rule that the homeowner’s hand is considered a private domain even though it does not contain an area of four by four handbreadths. It raises the view of Acherim as possibly holding that such a four-by-four space is not required, but rejects the proof because the placement could be interpreted indirectly as having been on a four-by-four area. It then proposes an ukimta that the Mishnah is speaking about a basket in his hand in order to create a four-by-four area and a valid placement, but this gets complicated both because of the status of the basket in the public domain and because of the wording of the Mishnah. From there, a methodological-halakhic discussion is built from the structure of the sugya and the parallel passage on page 101 regarding the basket, “lower the partition,” the dispute with the Rabbis, and whether the distinction between above ten and below ten is merely a forced interpretation or an independent rule. The discussion then broadens into the definition of a partition, “extend upward,” and the dispute between Rashi and Nachmanides regarding a pillar and the rule that a private domain extends upward to the sky.
Acherim and a space of four by four
Acherim say: if he stood in place and received it, he is liable; if he uprooted himself from his place and received it, he is exempt. From here arises the possibility that Acherim hold that one does not require placement onto a four-by-four area. The Talmud rejects this by saying that perhaps only placement does not require a four-by-four area, but uprooting does; and even the placement itself is not necessarily a proof, because it could be interpreted as “he spread out the edges of his garment and received it,” meaning there was in fact placement on a valid area. This is presented together with the background that Acherim is Rabbi Meir, and that this title is connected to the tension surrounding Rabbi Elisha ben Avuyah, whose name was omitted from the Mishnayot.
The ukimta of the basket and the difficulty from the language of the Mishnah
Rabbi Abba explains the Mishnah as dealing with a case where one removed the object from a basket and placed it onto a basket, “so that there is also a valid placement.” The difficulty is: but the Mishnah says “his hand.” The Talmud proposes: read it as “the basket in his hand,” meaning that the hand is holding a basket that has walls and an area of four by four, and thus there is a valid four-by-four place. Rabbi Abbahu objects in the end: does it say “the basket in his hand”? It says “his hand.” The lecturer highlights the return to the linguistic issue after a long clarification as proof that the ukimta is not accepted as an interpretation of the Mishnah.
A basket in the public domain, Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, and the distinction between above and below ten
The Talmud asks: that works for a basket in the private domain, but is a basket in the public domain itself a private domain? It proposes connecting this to the dispute with Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: if one stuck a reed into the public domain and placed a basket on top of it, and someone threw an object and it came to rest on top of it, he is liable. The Talmud shows that if a basket in the public domain is considered a private domain, then in the case where the homeowner stretched out his hand outside and placed something into the poor man’s hand, it is difficult why he should be liable, since he is transferring from private domain to private domain. The Talmud answers: you can even say it follows Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda — there, it is above ten, and here, below ten. So a basket above ten handbreadths forms its own separate domain, but below ten it is considered part of the public domain. In the end, Rabbi Abbahu’s objection is presented, that the ukimta does not fit the language of the Mishnah, and the lecturer suggests that the whole discussion was inserted in order to teach the law of the basket and the distinction of heights, even though the interpretation of the Mishnah is rejected.
Methodology: the structure of the sugya as a source for a halakhic implication
The lecturer argues that the structure of the sugya teaches that the distinction between a high basket and a low basket is not just a desperate answer to an interpretive problem, but an intentional rule that remains as Jewish law, because the Talmud “insists” on bringing it even though it already knows the ukimta will be rejected for linguistic reasons. He explains that the discussion looks like a “chronicle of a failure known in advance,” designed to teach a rule through question and answer as a form of didactics, and that halakhic conclusions can be drawn from stylistic nuances in the redaction.
The parallel sugya on page 101: lower the partition, the Rabbis exempt, and the implication of the comparison
On page 101, Rav Nachman’s statement is brought regarding the boats of Meshan and the question “why not say: lower the partition?” He brings proof from Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the basket: evidently we do say “lower the partition,” so here too let us say “lower the partition.” Rav Yosef objects and brings that the Rabbis exempt. It emerges that there is a Tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, and that the general rule of decision is that Jewish law follows the Rabbis. The lecturer combines the two sugyot so that a basket below ten has the status of public domain according to everyone, and above ten there is a dispute between Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, with Jewish law following the Rabbis. From this he raises a new difficulty: if the Rabbis exempt and the basket is not a private domain, it would have been more convenient to explain the Mishnah according to the Rabbis, if not for the linguistic obstacle of “it says his hand.”
The possibility that the sugyot disagree, and a proposed alternative reading of “above/below ten”
The lecturer suggests that the gap between the sugyot may indicate that our sugya does not assume the framework of page 101, and therefore there is no necessity to combine them. Perhaps here the basket itself has walls ten handbreadths high. If so, “above ten and below ten” could be interpreted as referring to the height of the basket’s own walls rather than to its location above the public domain, and then there is no need to base the law of the basket on “lower the partition.” He mentions that Meiri brings among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) a view that the basket itself was ten handbreadths high, and shows how changing the basic assumption alters the entire picture of the sugya.
The nature of a partition: “what blocks from outside” versus “what encloses from inside,” and kids passing through
The lecturer suggests that the definition of a partition for purposes of private domain is what separates between the public domain and the inside, and what stops those in the public domain from entering, rather than what appears as a partition to someone standing inside. Therefore it is enough that from the outside there is an obstacle of ten handbreadths. He strengthens this from the argument about kids passing through, which teaches that a partition is evaluated according to whether penetration from outside is possible. Alongside this, he presents another possibility according to which, by combining “lower the partition” and then “extend upward,” one also gets an “internal partition” visible from the inside, and he connects this to the dispute whether one says “a legal construct built upon another legal construct.”
A pillar in the public domain, Rav Mordechai’s question, and Rashi versus Nachmanides
On page 99, Rav Mordechai’s question is brought about a pillar in the public domain that is ten high and four wide, and someone threw an object and it came to rest on top of it. Rashi explains the doubt in terms of the object’s passage through the airspace above ten, which is an exempt zone. Nachmanides objects that this could have been resolved from the baraita of the basket and from the baraita of the pillar, and suggests that the doubt is not about “passing through” an exempt zone, but about a case where even after coming to rest, the object still remains in the airspace of an exempt zone — because in his view, a private domain extends upward to the sky only in the airspace of a courtyard enclosed by partitions, not on top of a solid pillar. He distinguishes that in the case of the basket there are walls that place the object “within the partitions,” and therefore it is not similar to an object protruding above the roof of a pillar. The lecturer explains that according to Nachmanides, “extend upward” depends on partitions visible inward, whereas according to Rashi we apply “extend upward” even to a pillar.
Sukkah page 4 as a source for the question of “extend upward” and visible partitions
The Talmud in Sukkah says: if it was higher than twenty cubits and one built in it a pillar ten high that has the minimum valid size of a sukkah, Abaye thought to say: “extend upward the partition,” and Rava replied: we require partitions that are visible, and here there are none. The lecturer presents two interpretations: the standard interpretation, that the problem is that “extend upward” is not a visibly recognizable partition for sukkah; and the interpretation of Meiri, Baal HaIttur, and Nachmanides, that this is a rule within the laws of “extend upward” itself — that we apply it only to a partition visible from the inside, and therefore with a pillar there is no “extend upward,” neither in sukkah nor on the Sabbath. From this the implication is built for understanding the basket and the pillar, and for the dispute between Rashi and Nachmanides regarding whether “a private domain extends upward to the sky” in the case of a pillar.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, we’re in the sugya of the basket. The Talmud — right, the context is that we’re looking for an explanation of the Mishnah’s rule for why the homeowner’s hand is considered a private domain. After all, there’s placement in the private domain here, but there’s no area of four by four, so we’re looking for a Tanna who is the source for the approach that you don’t need placement and uprooting on an area of four by four. We found various suggestions that were rejected, and now we’re proposing Acherim. Right, so I’m sharing the file here. “Rather, Rav Zeira said: whose view is this? It is Acherim. As it was taught: Acherim say, if he stood in his place and received it, he is liable; if he uprooted himself from his place and received it, he is exempt.” If he stood in his place and received it, he is liable? But we require placement on an area of four, and there isn’t any — right, we don’t have that. So conclude from this that we do not require an area of four. So you see that Acherim — Acherim is Rabbi Meir. They call him Acherim because of various tensions around his teacher Rabbi Elisha ben Avuyah, who became heretical, went off the path, and Rabbi Meir continued learning from him — “he ate the fruit and threw away the peel” — but still, he didn’t completely detach from him, so he somehow got what you might call a warning label, and they omitted his name from the Mishnayot. In any case, Acherim is saying — meaning, Acherim is a source for the approach that you don’t need an area of four by four. The Talmud says, as it rejected the previous options too: but maybe it’s only placement that doesn’t require it, while uprooting does require it? And as for placement too — here it’s even worse — maybe you can’t even prove that placement doesn’t require four by four, because perhaps “he spread out the corners of his garment and received it,” in which case there was also placement. Maybe he received it with his shirt or something like that; he held it in a four-by-four place, and so there actually was a four-by-four area even for the placement. So in fact we have no proof from the words of Acherim. So the Talmud says: Rabbi Abba said, “Our Mishnah is talking about a case where he removed it from a basket” — I’m already putting in the Bach’s version here — “where he removed it from a basket and placed it onto a basket, so that there is also placement.” In other words, the Mishnah, where the homeowner’s hand is treated as a place of four by four — that’s because there was a basket there, and placing something on a basket counts as placement. But it says “his hand”! Didn’t we learn that it’s his hand? “Teach: the basket in his hand.” That means: his hand was holding a basket — of course, a basket like this has walls and an area of four by four — and the hand is holding that basket, so in fact there is an area of four by four here. Then the Talmud asks: that works for a basket in the private domain, but is a basket in the public domain itself a private domain? Meaning, if you say that in the Mishnah, when it speaks about a hand it really means a hand holding a basket, then for the basket in the private domain you solved the problem. Why? Because in terms of domain, it’s a private domain, and in terms of place, it’s a place of four by four, so both conditions are fulfilled. But when a person is holding a basket in his hand in the public domain, then true, the basket is a place of four by four, so you solved the place problem — but this isn’t placement in the public domain at all, because the basket constitutes its own separate domain. When the basket is in the public domain, it basically has the status of a private domain. So you solved the four-by-four problem, but you created a domain problem. You solved the place problem and created a domain problem, because what’s happening here is that we transferred from one private domain to another private domain. So what do I care if the other private domain — the basket — has a four-by-four area? There’s no carrying from private domain to public domain here. Tosafot notes here, right, that going from private domain to private domain by way of the public domain is a case of passing across, and maybe there would be a prohibition here, so there are various answers. But here the Talmud assumes that in such a case there would be no prohibition. The Talmud says: shall we say this is not like Rabbi Yosi…
[Speaker B] Sorry, Rabbi Mikhi — is someone else’s private domain also a problem from private domain? From mine to someone else’s private domain? No?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No? No. Ownership doesn’t determine it here. The question is what kind of domain it is.
[Speaker B] Because I don’t know, that’s how I understood it on page 101, but maybe not. Fine, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, the Talmud says: shall we say this is not like Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda? As it was taught: Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says, if one stuck a reed into the public domain and put a basket on top of it, and someone threw an object and it came to rest on top of it, he is liable. So Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says: if someone stuck a reed, some kind of little post, into the public domain, and on top of it put this sort of basket, and someone threw an object and it landed in the basket on top of the post, then he is liable. So what do we see? That this basket, when it is placed on something in the public domain, itself constitutes its own separate domain; it’s considered a private domain, an extraterritorial zone within the public domain, and it basically has the status of a private domain. So if so, here too, if you explain “hand” as holding a basket, you haven’t solved the problem, because in the public domain there was no placement in the public domain, even if there was placement on an area of four by four. If so, according to Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, if the homeowner stretched out his hand outside — right, what is this addition in the Talmud meant to do? One could have said: fine, so we’ll split the Mishnah. When it talks about the homeowner’s hand inside, or the poor man’s hand inside, it doesn’t matter — there it means the hand is holding a basket. And when it talks about a hand that is in the public domain, that means the hand itself, not a basket. True, the Mishnah refers to both this and that as “hand,” but okay — in the private domain, where we have a problem, we solve it with a basket, even though it’s really a hand, in order to solve the four-by-four problem. In the public domain we’re talking without a basket. To that the Talmud says: that won’t help, because the Mishnah also contains cases that deal with a hand standing in the public domain. And if there you won’t explain it as a basket, then there’s no area of four by four there. And if you do explain it as a basket, then it’s a private domain. So bottom line, in the public domain you won’t manage to get a hand that is both considered part of the public domain and also considered a place of four by four. You won’t manage it. If you solve the place problem, you create a domain problem. If you solve the domain problem, you create a place problem. And that’s what the Talmud adds here: “for if it is according to Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, if the homeowner stretched out his hand outside and placed it into the hand of the poor man, why is he liable? He is transferring from private domain to private domain!” He’s taking it out from his own private domain, the homeowner’s, to the basket on the hand of the poor man, which is itself also a private domain. Okay? So apparently it doesn’t work. You can’t explain it as a basket. The Talmud says: you can even say it is Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda — there, it is above ten, and here, below ten. In other words, the basket in the public domain is a private domain if it is above ten. But when the basket is below ten, then it is part of the public domain. So the Talmud says: here, in our case, it was below ten in any event, because it’s in the public domain, and therefore you can explain that the poor man standing outside is holding it in a basket. And when the homeowner puts it into his hand, you solved the place problem because the basket has four by four, and there’s no domain problem because below ten handbreadths even a basket is considered part of the public domain. Okay, so you solved the problem. In the end the Talmud rejects this. It says: Rabbi Abbahu had a difficulty with it — does it say “the basket in his hand”? It says “his hand.” What’s written in the Mishnah is that he placed it in his hand; it doesn’t say he placed it in the basket in his hand. So he says: linguistically, it isn’t reasonable to explain the Mishnah that way. What’s interesting is the structure here, because notice — we already saw this above. Rabbi Abba had said: our Mishnah is dealing with a case where he removed it from a basket and placed it onto a basket, so that there is also placement. The Talmud asks: but it says “his hand”! What does that mean? In the Mishnah it says he placed it in his hand, not in a basket, so how can you explain that it means a hand holding a basket? The Talmud answers: it means the basket in his hand. And then suddenly, after we finished the whole story, explained everything, we go back to the same question.
[Speaker C] Can I ask something?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, let me just finish the sentence. Rabbi Abbahu had a difficulty with it: does it say “the basket in his hand”? It says “his hand.” Well — but we already asked that above. We already asked it above, and we said yes, the basket in his hand. What do you mean, the basket in his hand? But it says his hand. It’s like this odd insistence — you still haven’t solved the earlier question for me. If you think the earlier question wasn’t solved, then you should have taken the line I marked here and put it here, later on — right? You should have written it like this: but it says “his hand” — teach: “the basket in his hand.” And then after that — take this line, skip all this whole clarification that was done here, there’s no need for it, and right here write — I’m adding it here, you see? — Rabbi Abbahu had a difficulty with it: does it say “the basket in his hand”? It says “his hand.” And that finishes the story. So why do you need all this whole clarification about how to arrange the basket issue, only to come back to the first question and say: yeah, but this whole story is nonsense? It doesn’t help us at all. So if it doesn’t help us at all, say so from the outset and don’t get into all this analysis. It seems to me that what the Talmud wants to say here is that it wants to teach me the law of the basket. Methodologically, the Talmud already knows that this can’t really be the explanation of the Mishnah. But it can’t be the explanation of the Mishnah because of a linguistic consideration — the Mishnah says “his hand,” not “the basket in his hand.” But in terms of the law, it really could make sense of the Mishnah. And the Talmud wants to teach us the laws. It wants to tell us that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, who spoke about the basket as a private domain, that’s only when the basket is high. But if the basket is low, then it is not a private domain, it is the public domain. In order to teach me that law, what it does is — let’s say, as a literary device — it presents this as if it were a suggestion for explaining the Mishnah. Even though we already know in advance that this suggestion won’t stand, because the question of how this fits the Mishnah was already asked above, and in another moment that question is going to come back and throw this interpretation out the window. So why insist on stating this interpretation at all if we know from the outset that it won’t survive? Because we want to state the laws that are contained in that interpretation. We’re not actually trying to explain the Mishnah; explaining the Mishnah is a rigged game here. The editor of the sugya already knew from the outset that this interpretation wouldn’t help explain the Mishnah. But he wanted to teach me the law of the basket, because the law of the basket really appears nowhere else. Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a basket is a private domain, doesn’t say that this is only above ten and not below ten. And the Mishnah here wants to tell me this distinction between below and above ten. One of the implications of this is: what happens now? Suppose we failed to explain the Mishnah by means of a basket. Does this distinction between a basket above ten and below ten remain as Jewish law or not? Seemingly, this whole distinction was stated only so that we could explain the Mishnah. After all, there’s no independent source for this distinction. On the face of it, this distinction was said only because we were in a bind here. There was a difficulty in how to explain the Mishnah, because Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says that a basket in the public domain is itself considered a private domain. So the Talmud says: we have to say that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda was speaking about a high basket, whereas our Mishnah is speaking about a low basket. But in the conclusion, that’s not the explanation of the Mishnah. The explanation of the Mishnah — we’ll bring a different explanation later, one second — this explanation doesn’t work in the Mishnah. If so, then there is no reason now to say that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda was speaking only about a high basket and not a low one. We don’t need this distinction, because it won’t be the explanation of the Mishnah anyway. So seemingly the whole distinction the Talmud proposes here falls away even as Jewish law. Not only as an explanation of the Mishnah — it’s not a valid legal distinction either. And here it seems to me that this stylistic nuance is saying something else. And this is an illustration of why it’s important to pay attention to the stylistic nuances of the sugya. It has halakhic implications.
[Speaker D] Even if it’s not Jewish law? Seemingly the conclusion of the sugya is that above ten it’s a private domain, below ten it’s public domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re already getting back to what I said — I’m not there yet. That’s what I’m going to say at the end in another moment. First I’m saying: if you read the Talmud straightforwardly, without this stylistic sensitivity that I pointed out earlier, then what the Talmud says is: “teach: the basket in his hand.” So we have a proposal for how to explain the Mishnah. The Talmud says: fine for a basket in the private domain, but a basket in the public domain doesn’t work, because Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says that a basket in the public domain is a private domain. So what follows? Then I have a problem with the Mishnah, because the Mishnah treats it as public domain. No choice — apparently we have to say that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s rule is only about a high basket, not a low basket. Right? Good. Now we get to: but Rabbi Abbahu had a difficulty with it. Right? It doesn’t fit the Mishnah. Fine, so we drop it and look for another explanation of the Mishnah. If so, then I no longer have a difficulty from the Mishnah against Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda. So the distinction between above ten and below ten is no longer needed either. After all, I invented this whole distinction only to reconcile the Mishnah. But if I can’t reconcile the Mishnah this way at all, then the whole thing drops out entirely. I’m left with Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement about a basket in the public domain that is itself considered a private domain. I have no difficulty with it and no pressure, so there’s no reason to distinguish between above ten and below ten, and therefore this distinction really falls away as Jewish law. This whole distinction was invented only so that we could resolve the Mishnah against Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda. But if in any case we don’t resolve the Mishnah that way, because in any case it doesn’t work there, then who says this legal distinction is correct at all?
[Speaker D] But no one said it isn’t correct either. It’s a discussion that stands on its own, unrelated to the Mishnah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, but the fact is that there was…
[Speaker E] No, it’s a kind of ukimta.
[Speaker D] Right. But where did they get this distinction from? They didn’t just invent above ten and below ten for no reason. Meaning, there is some initial thought here for a distinction in the basket case.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain again, Chani, look…
[Speaker D] No, I understood the whole move, that part.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, read it… I’ll explain to you from the flow of the Talmud why you’re not right. Because when the Talmud asked, it explained the Mishnah as dealing with a basket. Then the Talmud asks: but Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says no. Now I say: what is the difficulty? Because the Talmud assumed in its question that according to Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda it makes no difference at what height, right? Otherwise what’s the question? In the answer, the Talmud said: no, he was speaking only when the basket is high, not when the basket is low. Meaning, the starting point when we read Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda is not to distinguish by height. He said something and didn’t distinguish. Why make a distinction? Because we had a difficulty from the Mishnah, so we created a distinction. Which means that a plain reading of Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, without the pressure from the Mishnah, would not distinguish between high and low. So now that the pressure from the Mishnah has dropped away, why keep the distinction?
[Speaker D] Because it doesn’t work out — if we go without the distinction, we have a problem, because then why is he liable if he’s transferring from private domain to private domain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No — we had a problem when we thought that’s how the Mishnah is explained. But in the conclusion, the Mishnah isn’t explained by a basket.
[Speaker D] Fine, but if I were now constructing another Mishnah that did involve a basket?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then you would write that he is exempt, because it’s a private domain even below. The Mishnah is about a hand, not a basket. In a basket case it really is a private domain even below. What’s the problem?
[Speaker C] Can I ask a question? I got it. Yes. Maybe this is a naïve question because I didn’t manage to get into the beginning of the lecture — maybe you already said this — but it doesn’t sound logical to me that a basket below would be public domain. Why wouldn’t it still remain a private domain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that just strengthens what I noted here. I argued that when the Talmud distinguishes between a high basket and a low basket, that really goes against the simple logic of the sugya, and it does so only to reconcile the Mishnah with Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda. And therefore I’m arguing precisely that once we already understand that this is not the Mishnah — you can’t explain the Mishnah with a basket — then we have no pressure to do this, so there’s no reason to make distinctions within Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda between a high basket and a low one. He spoke generally about a basket. Why assume he was talking only about a high basket? That’s exactly the point I’m making. Okay. So according to that reading, apparently I would expect there to be no distinction between a high basket and a low basket. Right.
[Speaker C] Okay. So basically the essence of the basket is the issue, not its location. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I still want to explain why I think that’s not correct. In terms of the flow of the Talmud — forget the logic, in terms of the flow of the Talmud. I’m arguing that if that were really true, this whole section in the Talmud is unnecessary. Simply unnecessary. It should have said — after all, you raised a possibility here that was actually incorrect and then it fell, right? So why raise it at all if what made it fall was a difficulty already presented earlier? The difficulty that toppled this possibility already appears in the previous section. So you’re doing a kind of rigged-game move, and then you come back and say: wait, wait, actually stop, this whole story is irrelevant because in any case it doesn’t fit the Mishnah. If it doesn’t fit the Mishnah, then why did you do all this intermediate clarification? I’m arguing that the redaction of the sugya teaches us that this clarification was inserted here even though they already knew in advance that it would not be the explanation of the Mishnah. And why? Precisely in order to tell me that it is also correct in its own right. It’s not just a forced distinction in order to explain the Mishnah; rather, the distinction between a high basket and a low basket is also a valid distinction in the view of Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, and the practical implication is that it remains Jewish law even if we conclude that the Mishnah is not interpreted that way. So the redaction of the sugya teaches me the Jewish law itself. And that’s an interesting point, because notice: this whole discussion is just a matter of stylistic redaction. What difference does it make — okay, a difficulty here, a difficulty later — but I think that when you activate your instincts a little and see that there’s something slightly illogical in this redaction, then the answer, in my opinion, is obvious: that the distinction between a high basket and a low basket is a correct distinction, and therefore the Talmud insisted on bringing it simply in order to teach us that distinction. It already knew that for the Mishnah this wouldn’t help, because the difficulty that explained why it doesn’t help in the Mishnah had already come up earlier in the sugya. They didn’t invent a new difficulty here. They just did this exercise because, didactically, it was convenient to show me the distinction between a high basket and a low basket through a question-and-answer format. It’s simply a didactic decision about how to teach me that law, but it isn’t really an attempt to explain the Mishnah. The attempt to explain the Mishnah — the attempt to explain the Mishnah was destined to fail in advance. It’s a chronicle of a failure known in advance. And therefore it seems to me that this is — if I had to draw a conclusion from this sugya, and someone asked me as Jewish law: is there a difference between a high basket and a low basket? My answer would be yes. Because from the structure of the sugya it looks like the sugya wants to tell me that it remains the law.
[Speaker D] I have to say that I would also have said that and wouldn’t have gotten tangled up with the first assumption you raised. Because when I read it, it was obvious to me. Fine, they brought a discussion here, they knew what they were saying, it’s Jewish law, and then someone else says, excuse me, I don’t accept it because it doesn’t say that in the hand case.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not someone else. The sugya itself concludes that this whole business is not correct.
[Speaker D] It’s not someone else, it’s not a dispute. No, it’s like a discussion inside the study hall, but they didn’t make up the basket story out of nowhere. I don’t think they made it up. They knew this law, and that’s why they discussed it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but then I say again — then explain the structure of the sugya to me.
[Speaker D] I completely saw that the structure of the sugya is problematic, but I’m saying maybe there’s some sort of recording — I don’t know — a recording of the discussion, and they put it in the wrong place.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what’s called proof by negation. If according to your view the structure of the sugya is problematic and you have no answer, that’s the proof that my view is correct. What do you mean? You can’t say, no, I think otherwise even though there’s a problem in what I’m saying — I still think otherwise. Based on what? If there’s a problem in what you’re saying, then apparently it’s not right. Unless there’s no other option. Fine — but I’m offering you another option, which works. Why?
[Speaker B] Maybe one can ask why they saw fit to insert it specifically in this sugya here and not somewhere else where they were really talking about…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because didactically they thought it was better to teach it here through a question and answer. Very often that’s the Talmud’s way, you know — it’s like the Passover Seder, doing things through question and answer. The child asks and the parents answer — it’s a method of question and answer because didactically that teaches better. So the Talmud too basically doesn’t teach us laws directly; it gives us a back-and-forth, there are questions and answers, and we derive the laws from that. So the Talmud apparently has some assumption that a didactics of give-and-take is preferable to a didactics of blunt declarations with exclamation marks. Okay? Therefore it chose to teach us in this way. But it seems to me that this is the obvious conclusion: that this distinction between a high basket and a low basket is a valid distinction in Jewish law as well. Fine, that was just a remark about the style of the Talmud. These comments — I’m trying to show you that many times you can draw halakhic conclusions from questions that look like just plain, prosaic questions of how the sugya was edited. Fine, they edited it this way or that way. But sometimes that can give hints. Very often the laws are hidden between the folds of the sugya. They’re not explicitly written there, and you have to read firmly and sensitively to extract them, to uncover them from between the folds. Okay, let’s move on to page 101, the parallel sugya. Rav Huna said: these boats of Meshan — fine, I’m not going to get into all the details here, but there are these boats there in which one may carry only within four cubits. These are boats that have a pointed bottom, right? Two walls that come together below in a point, like a triangle. Okay? “One may carry in them only within four cubits, and we said that only when there is not within less than three a width of four; but if there is within less than three a width of four, we have no issue with it; and if one filled them with reeds and branches, we have no issue with it.” Right, the question is whether below there has to be a floor area of four by four, and whether the width of four by four is created at a height above three handbreadths or below three handbreadths. Right? The question is whether the slope here — the tangent of the slope — has to be 0.75. Okay? Because a height of three handbreadths creates a distance of four handbreadths — sorry, one and a half, because that’s two handbreadths to each side. That’s the question: what has to be the angle of the boat’s slope. In any case…
[Speaker G] But I also thought that at first, but the Ritva that pointed me there says it’s not only about the slope, but also about the actual bottom area.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the bottom area is zero.
[Speaker G] Zero, it comes together completely, it’s like that. Ah, so slope, yes — then it could be much more than four, right? As I thought at first. A height greater than four, eight for example or something?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It can be any height you want, depending on the slope.
[Speaker G] Great, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there’s a…
[Speaker B] It will be called a private domain only
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if that happens within the three. Fine. Now, here at some stage there is a width of four handbreadths. Okay? The question is at what height that width of four handbreadths is created — whether that height is three handbreadths or less. Okay? So if it’s three handbreadths and here it’s four, then… then from here to here is two, so the tangent is three divided by two, right? This angle, its tangent is one and a half. Fine, doesn’t matter — that’s the Talmud’s question here. And if it is filled with branches, right — filled here with all kinds of branches — then of course there’s no problem, because then it’s as if the boat has a floor. Fine? Good. But that’s less important for us. Right now I’m interested in the basket context in the sugya, not the boat context; that’s just the background. Okay, Rav Nachman objects: why not say, “lower the partition”? Why don’t we say here “lower the partition,” right? That the upper walls should be extended downward and complete the partitions so that these walls will be like full walls from the floor upward. There’s a strange story here with “lower the partition,” because basically — right, good, the drawing is still here. “Lower the partition” means, after all, that this is really the wall of the boat, right? This part. So he says: let’s project it downward by “lower the partition.” Then you have a wall — that’s the wall, okay? All this is the wall, and here you have this wall, and then you’ve got a boat, everything’s fine, because we say “lower the partition.” The question is: when you have a wall like this, why project it down like this and not like this? Right? Seemingly, if I’m extending the wall downward, I should extend it along its own line. But the Talmud here proposes that if the wall is built like this, we project it like this.
[Speaker D] But that doesn’t mean it’s built like this; it could be built differently too. You drew it as if everything slopes. It could be that after three handbreadths it starts becoming straight.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it starts becoming straight, then you don’t need “lower the partition,” because then the boat is built properly.
[Speaker D] No, above the height of three handbreadths — up to three handbreadths it doesn’t have four by four, and above that it does have four by four, just not on diagonals.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning it’s built like this.
[Speaker D] Like this? Yes. And then it goes down below.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Interesting suggestion. Could be, although you’d need to know those boats and see whether that’s really how they were built.
[Speaker D] I think that’s how they were built.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Actually, it could be you’re really right, because a boat really is built that way. It’s broad like this, not pointed, but still, a boat really is built like that. Yes. Good, interesting, I hadn’t thought of that. Could be.
[Speaker C] Boats do have a point, but first of all they’re shaped like an egg and then curve inward.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but they have walls that really rise straight upward — no, it doesn’t all keep going sideways.
[Speaker C] Not sideways, but they curve.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A kind of circle that straightens out. Right. Fine. In any case, for our purposes that’s less important; it’s only because then he suggests that here we should apply gud achit. And gud achit, once again—what is gud achit? It’s the opposite of gud asik. Gud achit means that I have some partition that is above the ground, and I extend it downward. Gud means a wall; achit means it goes down, descends. So the wall descends to the floor—now of course it doesn’t actually descend, it extends. The wall itself stays where it is, remains where it is, and I extend it down to the floor, okay? Not that the wall itself physically comes down. That’s called gud achit. That is different from gud asik, which is also a wall that rises, that ascends. It’s a wall that is here, and I basically regard it as continuing upward. So gud achit and gud asik are two laws that are laws given to Moses at Sinai regarding the laws of partitions. Whoever learned tractate Sukkah with us a few years ago—we studied Sukkah—so there we dealt with this quite a bit. So with Sabbath partitions and with Sukkah, people sometimes talk about gud achit and gud asik, and that can complete the required size of the partitions. So Rav Nachman says here: why shouldn’t we say gud achit of the partition? Let’s say that the partition goes down to the bottom, and then in effect we have a simple domain here, and it doesn’t depend on less than three or more than three; everything is fine. So he says: wasn’t it taught, Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says: if one stuck a reed into the public domain, and at its top there was a basket, and someone threw something and it landed on top of it, he is liable. Apparently, then, we do say gud achit of the partition; here too let us say gud achit of the partition. Here a new player enters and pulls a rabbit out of the hat. When we read Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda in our passage, there was no hint that this was about gud achit. We were talking about a basket with walls, and that thing counts as a private domain. Who mentioned gud achit? Nobody. Nothing. The basket itself simply counts as a private domain. Here suddenly another parameter appears. Everything Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says—that this basket, when it is placed in the public domain, counts as a private domain—that is only because, in his opinion, there is a rule of gud achit here. Let’s go back to… yes, basically what Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says is this. We have a reed, and on top of it there is this basket—that’s the basket—and what is placed here is considered to be placed in a private domain. Right? There is something placed inside the basket. This is even worse than the drawings I make by hand, because here I’m doing it with the mouse, but at least I have an excuse; it’s better you don’t see how I draw by hand. In any case, the Gemara is basically saying that here, since we have such a partial wall, I bring the wall down here with gud achit, bring this wall down here too with gud achit, and therefore what is placed here—do you want? Make a kind of straight basket shape, it’s easier to see it that way. So what you see here as a private domain is not because of the wall of the basket itself, but because it’s the wall of the basket that also continues down to the bottom, and all that together is ten handbreadths. And that is really the wall of the private domain, including the gud achit. Clear? Okay? So that is basically the Gemara’s claim here, and truthfully, seemingly there’s no way around it. Why? Because if we didn’t say that, then if the story really were like this—here there is a basket placed on a reed—if this were considered a private domain here, then I would ask: where are its walls? A private domain needs walls ten handbreadths high; that’s the rule. This is considered a private domain according to Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda—where are its ten-handbreadth walls? The basket itself, the height of its wall, is not ten handbreadths, right? Here the height is two handbreadths, I don’t know how much, something small, okay? So how does this private domain have walls ten handbreadths high? We have to say that the situation is not that one, but this one. Right? That there is a basket here, but the walls include the gud achit that goes downward. It’s not only the wall of the basket, but also the continuation going down below, and all of that together is the basket’s ten-handbreadth wall. And accordingly, when we talk in our passage about a basket under three handbreadths, under ten handbreadths, and over ten handbreadths—you remember? The Gemara in our passage distinguished between a high basket and a low one, and I said that also remains the Jewish law. What do less and more than ten handbreadths mean? Does it mean this height? Up to here, to the bottom of the basket? I think it means this height,
[Speaker C] the upper height.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The upper height, why?
[Speaker C] Because that is the essence of the partition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s less—exactly—if it’s less than ten handbreadths at its upper height, okay, this is the basket—I’m just not erasing the other drawings because after erasing I don’t know how to restore the pen mode so you can draw again. This thing is a mystery to me, so I’m not erasing. Sorry for all the mess here. In any case, if the drawing were like this, okay? And this was ten handbreadths—sorry—and this was less than ten handbreadths, let’s say it was eight handbreadths, then here if there are another two, then altogether we have walls ten high. Why wouldn’t that be a private domain? Therefore, above ten and below ten probably means this height—sorry—it means the height from here down to the bottom. And less than ten and more than ten means this. The upper part of the basket wall has to be above ten handbreadths, then it’s a private domain because it has a ten-handbreadth wall; and if it is below ten handbreadths, then even including the gud achit, the wall is still not ten handbreadths, and therefore it is not a private domain. And by the way, that answers Yael’s question from before, when she said: what difference does it make if the basket is up high or down low? After all, if what’s inside it is considered partitioned off from everything outside—meaning it is separated from everything happening outside and it counts as a private domain—then why does its external height matter? Now the answer is very clear, right? Because the basket in itself is not a private domain. This basket is not a private domain; only together with this gud achit that we apply to it on both sides is it a private domain. So that means the height matters, because I need here a total partition of ten handbreadths. Okay? And therefore now it’s also clear why the distinction between ten, above ten handbreadths, and below ten handbreadths in our passage is a distinction that is correct also in practical Jewish law. Now it is also clear that this is not just some distinction made in order to reconcile the Mishnah, but that from an understanding of Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s law, this is also the necessary difference. And if so, then even in the conclusion, when we do not explain the Mishnah in accordance with Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, this distinction remains, because it is a distinction that is correct by virtue of Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s actual law itself; it was not only said as an answer to explain the Mishnah. Okay?
[Speaker C] Wait, then if so, the basket in itself is not a private domain and not a public domain, right? Does it have the halakhic status of a vessel? Is it considered a vessel?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is a vessel. It’s just that if you place it in such a way that together with gud achit it will have walls of ten handbreadths, then it will be a private domain.
[Speaker C] Is every vessel discussed according to that logic?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, a vessel that has an area of four by four and has some walls.
[Speaker H] Wait, but in the public domain—can you hear me? In the public domain, above ten handbreadths is basically an exempt area, right? Yes. So if there were some kind of basket there with sufficient walls, and I don’t know, somehow it was hanging in the air or on a string, would that not be a private domain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, if it wasn’t resting on a post that stands on the ground? Yes. No, seemingly it would be the same thing. What difference does it make? There are some medieval authorities (Rishonim) here who want to argue that because of the post—maybe I’ll get to that later—but on the basic level, no. What I’m
[Speaker H] asking is whether you have to say there is gud achit here in order to say it is a private domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Gemara says. Otherwise the basket has no walls ten handbreadths high. How would it be a private domain?
[Speaker H] And suppose it does? Suppose it has more—suppose upward it has walls high enough?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it would perhaps be a private domain even without that.
[Speaker H] But it’s in the air.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? No, then—
[Speaker H] so then it doesn’t need the—so it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it doesn’t need the gud achit. The airspace above the public domain is an exempt area. But there is no rule that a private domain cannot be in the air. If there’s an airplane flying in the air, and it doesn’t have a post holding it down below, and it has an area of four by four and walls ten handbreadths high, then it would be a private domain.
[Speaker H] So basically only because of the post do we say this is gud achit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. It could be that even with an airplane we would say gud achit. The walls of the airplane go down all the way to the bottom, to the floor below.
[Speaker H] So why—but that’s the question—why do you need it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? No, you don’t need it, but we would still say it.
[Speaker H] If in the airplane itself—why do you need gud achit if you can define it as a private domain in its own right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If in the airplane itself the walls are not ten handbreadths high—say the airplane’s height is only eight handbreadths for the sake of discussion, okay?—then here, without gud achit, it would not be a private domain, right? So we say gud achit. Now suppose the airplane’s walls are in fact ten handbreadths high, then true, you don’t need gud achit—but there is gud achit. We say it there too. True, even without it it would work, fine, but there is still gud achit in such a situation.
[Speaker B] So if that’s the case, Rabbi Mikhi, then if so, say the homeowner or the poor person who are taking out and it’s outside—taking from the private domain to the public domain—then really, if so, you don’t need four by four, it completes it because the basket… No, the opposite, the basket has four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? The basket has four by four.
[Speaker B] But it still isn’t a private domain because it doesn’t have ten handbreadths, so you can’t infer from here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it depends. If it is below ten handbreadths, then it really is considered public domain because it has no walls. But if it is above ten handbreadths, then altogether the walls including the gud achit add up to ten handbreadths, and then it will be a private domain. And then indeed, if the homeowner gives to the poor person, and in the poor person’s hand there is a basket, and that basket’s upper edge is above ten handbreadths, the homeowner will be
[Speaker B] exempt, because he is
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] transferring from a private domain to a private domain. But if the basket is below, then he transferred from a private domain to a public domain, and the homeowner would be liable. In the Mishnah that doesn’t come up, because the Mishnah says it’s a hand and not a basket, but the law itself is correct.
[Speaker C] Wait, I still have a problem with the issue of a basket below ten cubits. Ten handbreadths. If the homeowner put the object he wants into the poor person’s basket, right? And the basket is below ten handbreadths—why, why is that considered public domain if the poor person is also in the private domain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the poor person is in the public domain—what do you mean?
[Speaker C] No, that’s fine. But if the poor person is—if both of them are in the private domain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If both of them are in the private domain, then it’s a private domain. We are talking about
[Speaker C] transferring into the public domain. I understand. That’s what—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] what the Gemara itself says: while he is still in the private domain, even if there is a basket there, it has the status of a private domain. But in the public domain it depends whether it is at the height of ten or below ten.
[Speaker C] Now I understand, okay, thank you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that is what the Gemara—so in short, Rav Nachman asks: why shouldn’t we say gud achit of the partition? So the Gemara says: Rav Yosef challenged him: and have they not heard what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, and they transmitted it in the name of Rabbi Chiyya, and it was taught concerning it: and the Sages exempt? Another novelty emerges there in that passage, and this always teaches you that when you see some statement, baraita, Mishnah, whatever, brought in a passage, it’s worth looking at parallels. In the parallel passages that deal with that same statement or Mishnah, things will sometimes emerge that do not come up in our passage. In this case, for example, we discovered, first, that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s rule that this is a private domain is based on the rule of gud achit—in our passage there is no hint of that. Second, we discover here that there is a tanna who disagrees with him. In the Mishnah in our passage that does not appear. In the passage there it appears that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda is one statement, and the Sages disagree with him, and more than that, if it is the Sages against Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, the rule—you surely already know it—is that the Jewish law follows the Sages. Whenever in a baraita or a Mishnah there is a named tanna and one opinion appears anonymously, then the anonymous opinion is the Jewish law, because the editor of the Mishnah presented it as the opinion of the majority—the Sages say—even though that “Sages” may actually be one specific person, but it is presented as “the Sages say” in order to teach me that this is the law. That is why it is presented in language as though it were a majority opinion. Okay? So practically it comes out, then, that the Jewish law is not like Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda. Meaning this basket is not a private domain. Now, not a private domain where? Below or above? Above. Above, right? Because below there is no discussion. Even Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says it is not a private domain. Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s whole claim that a basket is a private domain is only when the basket is above. That we know from our passage; it does not appear here. From our passage we know that. So let’s combine the two passages. What do the two passages together actually say? That with regard to the basket there is a dispute above ten handbreadths. Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says—I’m talking about a basket in the private domain—it is a private domain; that doesn’t matter because around it too is a private domain. A basket in the public domain depends: if it is below ten handbreadths, then it has the status of public domain according to everyone. If it is above ten handbreadths, then there is a dispute. Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says it is a private domain; the Sages say it is a public domain, and in practical Jewish law we rule that it is a public domain. Okay? And if that is so, then I return to the discussion I had in our passage. The discussion in our passage ultimately is not practical Jewish law. The pendulum swings for the third time, because the whole discussion in our passage is what remains in Jewish law within the view of Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, but in this passage here it suddenly becomes clear that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s view is not ruled as practical Jewish law at all; in practical Jewish law we rule like the Sages. So true, in the conclusion Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda said his words only above and not below, but all the words of Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda are not practical Jewish law. Okay? So here you see yet another demonstration of why it is important to combine information emerging from different passages regarding some statement or baraita or some such opinion; it is always worthwhile to look at the parallels when we study a passage. Okay? Good. And then they raise the question of a pillar in the public domain, of its narrow top—I won’t get into that whole complicated passage, and the passing of kids, and all those things. For our purposes, this is what matters. For us, what matters is the law of the basket. So I have now summarized the laws of the basket, and what emerges is that in our passage—in our passage, once again—they are basically trying to establish the Mishnah not in accordance with the Jewish law. And we already saw that with Rabbi Akiva it was like that, and with Rabbi it was like that. All the opinions brought until now are opinions that were subject to dispute. And we are trying to establish the Mishnah according to an opinion that is not the practical Jewish law. And I already noted at the beginning of the series dealing with this passage that this whole story is strange, because you take a plain Mishnah and establish it according to an opinion not ruled as practical Jewish law.
[Speaker D] Why? But if the basket is called public domain, then we have no problem; it works fine with the Mishnah. It has an area of four by four. You need an area of four by four. And how do we resolve the Mishnah? Why is he liable? Because he transferred from a private domain to a public domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then you could establish the Mishnah like the Sages. Yes. Even worse. So why does the Gemara want to establish it like Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda? So like…
[Speaker D] So that’s what I’m saying: like Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda it doesn’t work, but like the Sages it does work.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I agree too. But I’m saying, that only sharpens the difficulty I asked about. Because I’m asking: the Gemara tries to establish our Mishnah contrary to the practical Jewish law; it brings Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s view as the basis for the Mishnah, when Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda is not practical Jewish law at all. But—and you add even more—the Gemara also didn’t need to abandon it; on the contrary, it had a much better option. It could have established the Mishnah like the Sages and stayed with the idea that this really is the law—we are dealing with a basket. Right? Now true, in the end you can’t remain with that, because in the end we reached the linguistic conclusion that in the Mishnah we are not willing to establish it as a basket, because it says “hand,” not “basket.” On the linguistic level, in the end it falls away. But at the first stage, when they try to establish it like Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda and get into the distinction between above ten and below ten—what is the whole story for? Establish it according to the Sages; that too is the practical Jewish law, and there is no distinction between below and above, it solves all the problems, and there is no need for all these answers, and everything is fine. After that, reject it and say: true, but it says “hand” and not “basket.”
[Speaker D] So why did the Gemara really bring this whole discussion?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Seemingly this hints that our passage does not necessarily agree with the passage there. It could be that our passage understood Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda differently, and it did not know or did not think that there was a tanna who disagreed with him. After all, the one who brings the dissenting tanna here is an amora, Rav. It could be that the amoraim in our passage did not think there was a dissenting opinion, and therefore they needed this. But if that is really so, that casts a big question mark over all the combinations I made between the passages. Because it could be that our passage, which makes a distinction between below and above, is not accepted by the passage there. It could be that the passage there says that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda says it is a private domain both above and below, and the Sages disagree with him. So now the question is, of course, how far the disagreement between the passages goes. If these are two passages that did not learn Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s words the same way, then you can no longer know what I am allowed to connect between the passages and what not. Because, for example, I learned two things in the passage—the whole passage really is formed out of three facts. One of them I learned in our passage, and two I learned in the passage there. In our passage I learned that there is a distinction between above and below in Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s view, right? Between above ten and below ten. In the passage there I learned two new things: that there is a tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, and that practical Jewish law even follows him—the Sages—and I also learned that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s rule depends on gud asik—on gud achit—which does not appear in our passage. In our passage it is presented as though the basket is simply a private domain, period. Okay? So now the question is: once I already reach the conclusion that the passages disagree—and there is a good basis for reaching that conclusion, because otherwise it is unclear why our Gemara did not try to rely on the Sages, why it chose Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda, who is both problematic and not practical Jewish law—take the view of the Sages, which is also ruled as practical Jewish law, and which also does not distinguish between below and above ten, and establish the Mishnah like them; much more convenient. Why don’t you do that? Apparently because you don’t think there is such an opinion, unlike the Gemara on page 101. Meaning, the passages understood Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s words differently; maybe they didn’t know another opinion existed, maybe they didn’t think it was correct that there was another opinion, it doesn’t matter—but our passage understood the story differently. And if that is so, then maybe I am not allowed at all to connect the passages. It could be that in our passage gud achit is not mentioned because our passage really did not make it depend on gud achit. And there the distinction between above ten and below ten is not mentioned because perhaps the passage there does not think there is a difference between above and below ten.
[Speaker D] But how can you solve it without gud achit? How is the basket considered a private domain without gud achit? There is no solution.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, it could be that I treat the basket as a private domain by force of its own walls too, even if it does not have ten-handbreadth walls. But I’ll say more than that: it could be that the basket in our passage is itself ten handbreadths high. Its walls themselves are ten handbreadths high. Then what happens is, for example, when we say below ten and above ten, what does that mean? It means the height of the basket. The height of the basket. The height of the basket, and a basket whose walls are less than ten, and it is placed in the public domain—actually on the public domain floor, it doesn’t matter—it would not be a private domain. But a basket whose wall height itself is ten handbreadths—even if it is placed on the floor—would be a private domain, because it has walls ten handbreadths high. So the whole reading of the passage of below ten and above ten could be speaking about the basket’s height, or about the height of the basket’s walls. Then it is clear why there is no need to get to gud achit, because there is no need at all; the walls themselves are ten handbreadths even without gud achit. And there really is no gud achit in our passage, and if there is no gud achit in our passage, then it’s no wonder our Gemara does not think the Sages disagree with Rabbi Yosi. Because if they did not make it depend on gud achit, then who says the Sages disagree? Therefore our passage also thinks the Sages do not disagree with it. Okay? So you see how the whole picture changes if we really understand that the passages disagree. Then I don’t think one can learn anything from there to here. It could be that the height of the basket’s walls really is ten handbreadths. If you saw the Meiri, you saw the Meiri I brought you from the passage there—the Meiri brings such an opinion among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), that the height of the basket’s walls was ten handbreadths. Now that seemingly does not fit with our passage in any way, because if the height of the basket’s walls was ten handbreadths, then the basket that is below—no question would arise. Okay, why is a basket that is below ten handbreadths not a private domain? It has walls ten handbreadths high on its own; it doesn’t need gud achit. So how can our passage distinguish between below ten handbreadths and above ten handbreadths? Necessarily, in our passage one has to say that the height of the walls is ten handbreadths, and the distinction between above and below ten is a distinction in the height of the walls—not the height at which the basket is resting, but what height of walls it has. Clear? Silence. Are you with me? I understood. Yes yes, clear, thank you very much.
[Speaker H] I’m muted.
[Speaker D] Yes, not—
[Speaker C] Not the height of the walls it has, but up to what height the walls reach.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but from the floor of the basket, not from the floor of the public domain. What is the height of the basket wall itself?
[Speaker C] Yes, okay, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Okay. Now, regarding this basket issue, if I say gud achit on page 101, if I say gud achit simply, then of course there the basket’s wall height is not ten handbreadths. It’s two handbreadths, say. And then I have another eight handbreadths of gud achit, together giving me ten handbreadths of walls. Notice: the object is resting inside the basket; around the—when that object looks around it, it will see walls of two handbreadths, not ten, right? Because as far as it is concerned, it is on a floor that is eight handbreadths above the public domain—the floor of the basket itself. And around it there are the walls of the basket, which are two handbreadths. Is the fact that the basket is elevated enough to define it as a private domain? Are its walls really ten handbreadths for purposes of a private domain? Seemingly from the Gemara it appears that yes. What does that mean? It means that it could be that—or probably—that the definition of a partition for a private domain is not what I see around me when I look while standing inside, but rather the question is what separates me from the public domain. You understand that this is not the same question? Meaning, think for example about a pillar—you know what…
[Speaker B] So it’s not according to the line of sight, whether it blocks the line of sight from private to public, but rather what… how… you—
[Speaker D] Can you open a new page? Please.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here, I did “clear all drawing,” okay. So, by the way, where do you open a new page here? Usually from the previous one.
[Speaker G] I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see where you open a new page here.
[Speaker G] Okay, never mind, in any case look.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Basically… think for a moment about an actual pillar, okay? Say I have a pillar like this that is eight handbreadths high. On it sits a basket of another two handbreadths. Okay? This is two handbreadths and this is eight. Now, if there is an object resting here, then according to Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda at least, it is resting in a private domain, right? So that means this thing is considered a wall ten handbreadths high. But notice, it is a wall ten handbreadths high only when you look at it from this side. Right? So I see before me a wall of ten… someone standing outside—there is a person standing in the public domain looking at this thing. So he sees in front of him a wall of ten handbreadths, right? But this object that is here, when it looks to the side and asks itself what the height of its wall is, sees only two handbreadths. And we see in the Gemara that at least according to Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda this is a partition. It makes this a private domain. That means that the definition of partition, from his standpoint, is what happens here, what is seen from the outside, not what is seen from the inside. Are you with me? That means that really the definition of a partition… is not what surrounds me but what separates me from the public domain. That is what defines the partition. That is basically the claim. Now the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda do not disagree with that either. What do they disagree about? Whether we say gud achit or not, right? They basically claim that the lower part does not exist because they do not accept the rule of gud achit. So from their standpoint there is only a wall of two handbreadths. But they have no disagreement with Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda on the question whether the wall should be measured from outside or from inside. Because if that were their disagreement, then they could say: we agree that one applies gud achit, and still such a thing is not a wall ten handbreadths high. They don’t say that, right? Meaning they have no principled problem with Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement that such a thing is called a wall. Rather, they simply claim that the lower part does not exist because we do not apply gud achit. Are you with me?
[Speaker B] Yes, that according to them gud achit does not apply here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. From the very fact that the Gemara explains the Rabbis this way—that they disagree with Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda because they do not have gud achit—I infer from here that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s actual claim, if there were gud achit here, would not bother the Sages. Meaning the Sages too agree that the perspective is from here and not from here. They just claim that even when you look from here, there are not ten handbreadths, because this wall does not exist, because there is no gud achit. So it comes out that this is not only in Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda’s view, but that this is the definition of a partition for purposes of a private domain. The definition is what separates the person inside from the public domain. And if there is a wall of ten that separates, I don’t care that the one inside sees only two handbreadths. Meaning the wall surrounding him is only two handbreadths, but the separation between him and the public domain is ten handbreadths. Meaning in order to go from the public domain to him, one has to climb ten handbreadths and enter here. So from our standpoint that is a partition. So this actually tells me something about the definition of a partition in a private domain. A partition in a private domain is not what surrounds the private domain but what separates it from the public domain, or what hinders people in the public domain from entering the private domain. And what hinders the people of the public domain is this whole height here, the whole ten handbreadths. Therefore there is a partition here. And now see further on in the passage why the Gemara says that according to the Rabbis of Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda we do not say gud achit, because goats pass through, right? What does it mean that goats pass through? That these creatures wandering around here can enter, penetrate this partition into the inside. Right? That exactly completes what I said now. It means that the definition of a partition is something that stops people of the public domain from entering the private domain. Therefore when it does not stop them, when there is passage of goats, then it is not a partition. So once again, that further strengthens what I said before: the definition of a partition is not what is seen from inside, but what stops those who come from outside and want to go inside. And this little fellow who wants to go inside will have to climb eight handbreadths here and another two handbreadths and then enter. So that means he has to climb ten handbreadths. If he has to climb ten handbreadths, then this domain has a partition ten handbreadths high.
[Speaker C] But why, in a virtual way, do we keep saying the
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] issue of gud achit?
[Speaker C] Meaning in any case it is an airy partition, not a real partition. The question is whether that bothers me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda claims that even a legal partition that is not a real partition counts as a partition. Let’s say it is measured by this: if there were a real partition here, it would place an obstacle of ten handbreadths before this little fellow if he wanted to enter, then the law tells me that such a virtual partition too is like a real partition. So according to Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda that is fine. The Rabbis who disagree with him say no, no—we need a partition that really stops the one who wants to come in, and therefore gud achit does not help us, because there is passage of goats here.
[Speaker B] What concrete example is there of this, with stairs or on pillars? Why? Of gud achit that applies, so to speak, and creates something that prevents people from entering.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the Gemara there speaks, for example, about a pillar in a situation like this, where the lower part is some kind of pillar and it has sufficient width here, so the Gemara says that although here I am applying gud achit and it is air, the goats have to squeeze through here, and therefore there is no passage of goats. The Gemara there discusses the various situations there—or a ship, yes, all those things.
[Speaker B] Passage of fish is not considered passage?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Passage of fish is not considered passage—that is regarding a ship. And with a pillar there is no passage of goats, so both the ship and the pillar are unlike the basket. Those are the examples. Exactly like you were looking for. Good. In any case, what we discover here is that the requirement of a partition is that it stop people of the public domain who want to enter, not that it stop the people of the private domain who want to leave. It is not what surrounds the private domain but what blocks the people of the public domain from entering the private domain. And here is the implication. Now at the end of the page I directed you to a Tosafot in tractate Sukkah, where he discusses many similar questions—five handbreadths of embankment and five handbreadths of partition; the Gemara is full of all sorts of such questions, a partition composed of a mound on top of which there is some wall, where from outside one sees ten handbreadths, from inside one does not see ten handbreadths. All sorts of such situations, and there one can investigate the matter, but we won’t get to it now. But there is another way to understand this. And the other way says: let’s return once again to the mound.
[Speaker C] The term “mound” here is indeed like what we understand today, a mound.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So my claim is that there may also be another conception. The definition of a partition could also be: the partition is what surrounds the private domain, not what stops the people of the public domain. So then how, in such a situation, is this thing called a private domain? Because here there is gud asik. And here too, of course.
[Speaker B] Does that mean up to the sky?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Meaning my claim is that once there are two handbreadths here, we say gud achit down to here, adding another eight handbreadths. Up to this point we now have ten, right? Once there are ten handbreadths here, the rule is that a wall of ten handbreadths rises by gud asik upward. And now, if you look from the perspective of the object here, when it looks to the side, it sees a wall of ten handbreadths, not of two. Or of more than ten—an infinite number of handbreadths.
[Speaker D] The rule of gud asik is that there must be ten handbreadths below, right? It can’t be less, otherwise every basket would be a private domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. And with gud achit, by the way—and that is the novelty of this passage—there is no such requirement. Because the proof is that when we apply gud achit from the basket, the basket’s physical wall has only two handbreadths, say, and that is enough for me to bring it all the way down and make gud achit out of it. With gud asik in such a case we would not do so. For example, if on the floor—say I have here, this is the floor, okay? Now on this floor I have a wall of two handbreadths. Two. In such a case we do not now say that this gud asik rises all the way up. This thing must be ten handbreadths; it must first itself be a wall, and only then do we raise it upward. That is the rule with gud asik. With gud achit, in our passage, we see otherwise. Because we see that this basket resting here, which has only two handbreadths, we bring it down by gud achit below and add another eight. Even though in itself it does not have ten handbreadths. And only after these ten handbreadths have been created here can we talk about having gud asik upward. Then even someone who defines the wall of the private domain as a wall that surrounds the object and does not block the public domain—he too has here a wall of ten that surrounds, right? Because together with the gud asik there are already ten handbreadths here. And therefore it is a private domain.
[Speaker F] So then you combine gud achit and gud asik together?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly yes. According to that conception, it should be yes. In the Gemara in tractate Sukkah there is a dispute about this between Tosafot and the Ran, on the question of whether one applies one legal rule on top of another legal rule. Meaning, do we make a rule of gud achit—like a fictitious wall—and on top of that add another fiction by raising it upward? A fiction built on top of a fiction—that is a dispute between the Ran and Tosafot whether we say such a thing or not. But I’m saying, according to the side that says yes, one can definitely see that you cannot force from the passage here that the definition of a partition is what is seen from the outside. It could be that the definition of a partition is what is seen from the inside, and here there is a partition of ten even when looked at from the inside, if I also take gud asik into account.
[Speaker D] But then we will have difficulty with the story of the pillar by itself, without the basket, without the basket on top.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second, we’ll get there. That is exactly what I directed you there for. Yael? Yael? She asked something, didn’t she?
[Speaker B] Right, I wanted to ask something, but I see that Hani is saying exactly the… okay, I’ll wait to hear the answer, thank you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so now these are basically the two possibilities for understanding why inside the basket this is a private domain—and also according to the Sages, if there were gud achit, they too would regard it as a private domain. They just claim there is no gud achit. Okay? So therefore, in principle, it would seem to follow from here that the decisive perspective is the outside perspective. But I said that is not necessary, because if after this gud achit I apply another gud asik, then even from the inside perspective I have a wall of ten handbreadths. Therefore one cannot prove from the passage here that the definition of a partition is what we see from the outside. Because there is gud asik here. And that depends on the question whether we apply gud asik or not. Now for this purpose I really directed you to the passage about the pillar on page 99. The Gemara on page 99 brings an inquiry of Rav Mordechai. There it says as follows: Rav Mordechai asked Rabbah: a pillar in the public domain, ten high and four wide—of course four by four—and one threw something and it came to rest on top of it, what is the law? There is a pillar in the public domain. Notice, the pillar itself is not a reed with a basket on top of it; it is a pillar whose whole width is four by four. Here there is no need for gud achit or anything. This whole pillar is ten handbreadths high, and it has a width of four by four—a pillar, like a little mound. And someone throws an object, and the object lands on top of the pillar. What is the law? Do we say: after all, the lifting was from a prohibited place and the placing was in a prohibited place; or perhaps, since it came from an exempt area, no? Seemingly what is the doubt here? After all, I threw it and it landed on a place of four by four in a private domain, but it
[Speaker B] passed through an exempt
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] area, so it arrived from an exempt area
[Speaker B] to a private one, so that’s no longer…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I simply threw from the public domain into the private domain. So what’s the doubt? Rashi explains: the doubt is the following. When I threw it, and it landed on the pillar, it obviously came from above, right? Not from below. It can’t land on the pillar from underneath. So if it came from above, that means that in its flight this object passed above the height of ten handbreadths. But above ten handbreadths in the public domain is an exempt area. So it turns out that I threw the object, it passed through an exempt area, and only then reached the private domain. And the question is: in such a case, is that called transferring from the public domain to the private domain, or is it called from the public domain to an exempt area, and from an exempt area to the private domain? And then one would be exempt. That is the doubt according to Rashi. But Nachmanides challenges him from several places, including from our own passage here. And he also asks against Rashi: why didn’t it resolve it? If that is Rabbi Mordekhai’s question the way you, Rashi, formulate it, then it could have been resolved from our Talmudic passage on page 5a. Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda says: if one fixed a pole in the public domain, and on top of it there was a basket, and one threw something and it came to rest on it, he is liable. And we established that this is above ten. We explicitly said it was above ten. So then we see that he is liable. So what is Rabbi Mordekhai’s doubt? It’s the same case. And further, from what was taught: a pillar in the public domain ten high and four wide, but not four wide at its base—this is on page 101, yes, that’s the passage there. Then he suggests various answers, not important right now, and in the end he says: “And it seems to me to answer that for Rabbi Mordekhai it is obvious that anything which comes from an exempt area to a liable area, and comes to rest in a liable area, and while in the airspace of a liable area, in a case of throwing, one is liable. What he was uncertain about was a case where even now it comes to rest in the airspace of an exempt area, such as the vessel on this pillar, where its whole body stands in an exempt area—that is, above ten—except that it rests on top of ten. And since its body is above, even after it has come to rest, perhaps he is exempt, for the liability comes to him from an exempt area, since that domain is in any event airspace of an exempt area, as Rashi explained, of blessed memory,” etc. What is he saying? He is basically making the following claim. Let’s go back to the old drawing.
[Speaker B] So he’s basically distinguishing between a pillar—like a thin pole—and a pillar that has a width of four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says, let’s look here at a case like this. The pillar is ten high, and some vessel is resting on it. Now I threw something, and it got here and came to rest here. Nachmanides says: this thing is sitting in an exempt area. Why is it sitting in an exempt area? Because this vessel is resting entirely on a pillar, and that pillar reaches above ten. He says the top surface of the pillar itself is considered a private domain. But above that is an exempt area. And if an object is resting here, that object is considered as resting in an exempt area even if it is above. So he says as follows—let’s keep reading: “For it is not the airspace of the public domain, and neither is it the airspace of the private domain. For when we say that a private domain rises up to the sky, perhaps that means the airspace of a courtyard, but not of a pillar.” Meaning: a pillar standing in the public domain—its top is a private domain, Nachmanides agrees to that too. But we do not say that this domain rises all the way to the sky. Only a domain enclosed by partitions—say, in the public domain there is a hollow pillar, yes, with an area of four by four, a sort of sukkah-like structure, with an area of four by four and four walls around it—then inside it is a private domain and that rises to the sky. But, says Nachmanides, if the whole thing is solid, it’s a pillar, and it is ten handbreadths high, then the top of the pillar is a private domain. But an object resting on this pillar—only its bottom touches the private domain. The body of the object is in the air, and the air above the pillar is no longer private domain; it is an exempt area. Or in other words: the rule that a private domain rises to the sky applies only when it is a private domain of the type enclosed by walls. But a private domain that is built on a pillar does not rise to the sky. Only the actual top of the pillar is called private domain.
[Speaker D] But why? If we say there is “extend upward”—what? “Bring downward”—then there are walls!
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that doesn’t help him here; “bring downward” changes nothing here. We’re talking about “extend upward.”
[Speaker D] Why?
[Speaker E] It rises to the sky.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How does “bring downward” help? “Bring downward” only tells me that there are walls below. Walls below—I agree. But the object itself is above that. Now look. “And in the case of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda and the basket”—let’s continue reading Nachmanides—“and Rabbi Mordekhai would answer that it has walls, the basket, and it is resting in a private domain. And so too the case taught of a pillar ten high and four wide is likewise in truth where it has walls.” What is he saying? He says as follows. I’m not very strong in drawings.
[Speaker H] But if it’s a private—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —domain, sorry, Rabbi Mordekhai’s problem is this problem. And here an object is resting. Okay? Meaning, this is a private domain, but here the air—this air—is an exempt area, because here the private domain does not rise to the sky. A private domain rises to the sky only when it is built with walls like this and the object is resting here. Then we say “extend upward.” But here there is no “extend upward.” You don’t say “extend upward” on a pillar—that’s Nachmanides’ novelty. Now here he asks: what is the proof from the basket? What is the difficulty from the basket? Notice that the basket has walls of its own. Right? Only two handbreadths, no more. But the object sitting here is inside the walls of ten handbreadths. You don’t need “extend upward” for that, right? Right. And therefore it is a private domain. That is what Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda says.
[Speaker D] But the basket is resting on a pole. It’s not resting on a pillar.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With a pole there is “bring downward.”
[Speaker D] No, but we said that with a pole we have a problem saying “bring downward,” only with a pillar where there really are walls.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. I’m speaking according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda, not according to the Sages. Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda says: when an object is here on the basket, then I apply “bring downward” here and “bring downward” here, and now I have a partition like this that is ten handbreadths high. Right? That is Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda’s view, not the Sages’ view. And then I say—Nachmanides says—that in such a case, when the object is here, it is not like on the pillar. When it is on the pillar, it is above the height of the walls, so it is in the airspace of an exempt area. But when it is here inside the basket, then true, it is only two handbreadths into the matter, but I have no problem, because this entire wall of ten handbreadths up to here is private domain, and this object is below that; it is inside the walls. That really is private domain. Therefore Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda is no difficulty against Rabbi Mordekhai’s question regarding a pillar.
[Speaker E] Is there some minimum for the walls of the basket?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. As long as the object placed inside the basket does not rise higher than the height of the basket’s walls. Okay.
[Speaker E] Up to the height of the object.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So—
[Speaker B] So basically Nachmanides says that for a pole there would be “extend upward,” but for a pillar that has a width of four by four, there isn’t. You can’t apply “extend upward”; it is considered an exempt area.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s an interesting question you’re raising here. I’m not sure what the answer is. It could be.
[Speaker B] That’s how I understood it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s one possibility, but I’m not sure. Let me tell you why. What is Nachmanides really claiming? He is basically claiming that “extend upward” means to continue the walls upward. Now here he says: these walls are walls that are visible from here. Right? They are not walls visible from here. Walls like that I cannot continue upward, because when I continue upward I create here a wall that is visible from here. Impossible. But from the standpoint of what is visible from here, there is nothing—there is no wall height—so there is nothing to continue. What determines “extend upward” is what you see from inside, not what you see from outside. That is Nachmanides’ claim. Therefore here there would be “extend upward,” because here when I look from inside I see a wall of ten. Okay? Meaning, following what I said earlier: Nachmanides does not distinguish between what is visible from inside and what is visible from outside regarding the definition of a partition. The definition of a partition—even Nachmanides agrees—is determined by what is visible from outside. But regarding “extend upward,” Nachmanides says what matters is what is visible from inside. Do you understand the difference? Yes. “Extend upward” I only apply if I have a partition of ten that I see from inside and not merely from outside. Otherwise there is no “extend upward.” And if there is no “extend upward,” then what follows? That what is placed right on this actual top surface might perhaps be considered private domain, even though the partition is from here and from inside you don’t see a partition. Nachmanides agrees that it is still a partition. But regarding something placed here, which is in the airspace of the public domain, I need there to be a partition here in order for it to be private domain. And here there is no partition because we do not say “extend upward.” Therefore it is called an exempt area. So according to Nachmanides, the pillar is indeed a private domain, but it does not rise to the sky, because the rule that a private domain rises to the sky is grounded in the law of “extend upward,” and here we do not say “extend upward.”
[Speaker D] So why is a pillar a private domain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because its roof—only its roof—is a private domain. Not one centimeter above the roof.
[Speaker D] So when the object is actually resting—not thrown in the air—it is resting on a private domain or on an exempt area?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has no height at all. I didn’t understand.
[Speaker D] When we throw an object, the moment it is in the air above a pillar—not inside a basket, above a pillar—while it’s still in the air, it becomes in an exempt area because we don’t say that it rises to the sky. But the moment it lands on the pillar, there it is apparently no longer in an exempt area. So then that solves the question, because what happened is that it passed through an exempt area and then arrived at a liable area.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait one second—you’re raising a possibility I hadn’t thought of. Just a moment.
[Speaker D] That’s what I understood from this whole story from the start.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s read Nachmanides’ wording again.
[Speaker D] That’s what I understood from Rashi’s wording altogether.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it could be that you’re right. I’ll tell you why. Because according to that, in the law of the basket too one should have to be exempt according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda. Because when I threw it into the basket, it still passed through the airspace above the basket. So it passed through an exempt area, and there he is in fact liable according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda. For a moment I thought I had no longer understood this correctly. But no, what I said is still right. Do you understand what I’m saying, Hani? Yes. So therefore Nachmanides’ claim is basically this: I don’t know, if you were to place a sheet of paper on the pillar, then perhaps you placed it in a private domain, let’s say its height is zero—
[Speaker C] Or—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —a thin little sheet, on a pillar, thickness of two millimeters, and you put a sheet of paper there, then you placed it in a private domain. But when the object that you place there protrudes into the air, then it is resting in an exempt area, and therefore that is not called placing it in a private domain. Okay? So that is Nachmanides’ claim. And then his understanding of the basket law is a very interesting one. He is basically saying: according to Rashi, then in the basket too we say “extend upward,” right? According to Nachmanides, no. According to Rashi, in the basket too we say “extend upward.” And then it comes out like this. This is the drawing of the basket, and according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda there is also “bring downward” here below. Okay? Now the object is resting here. Now according to Rashi there is “extend upward” even in such a case, right? Because according to Rashi you don’t need visibility from outside; even on a pillar you apply “extend upward,” so with a basket too, why wouldn’t you do the same thing there as with a pillar? Yes. Then according to Rashi one can say what I said earlier: that the partition is not only the “bring downward” downward, but also “extend upward” continuing upward afterward. According to Nachmanides, no. Because according to Nachmanides, here there is a wall of ten. Same thing, and according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda we continue it downward with “bring downward,” and now we essentially have a pillar. Right? But on a pillar you do not apply “extend upward,” Nachmanides says. Therefore here Nachmanides will not accept that there is a continuation of “bring downward” into “extend upward.” And according to Nachmanides it must be that a partition is determined by the question of how I look at it from outside. Because someone looking from inside does not see a wall of ten handbreadths, only two handbreadths. According to Rashi, where “extend upward” can apply upward, you cannot prove that the inside view is not decisive, because here too the inside view gives ten handbreadths.
[Speaker C] We said that Nachmanides thinks the inside view—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what I’m saying. Nachmanides says that regarding “extend upward.” Nachmanides says that what determines whether we apply “extend upward” is the inside view. Okay.
[Speaker C] But—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the very definition of a partition does not have to be specifically from the inside. And Nachmanides agrees that on a pillar like this, ten high, what is on top of it is private domain. Why? After all, here you do not see a partition of ten, because from outside, when I look, I do see a partition of ten. That is enough to define the top of the pillar as private domain. Meaning, Nachmanides specifically says that the outside view determines whether this is private domain or not. But regarding “extend upward,” what matters is the inside view. Okay? “Extend upward” I do not do here. But even though I do not do it here, after all this here is private domain, so you see that the partition—the definition of a partition—is what is seen from outside, not what is seen from inside. Regarding “extend upward,” what is seen from outside is not enough. That is Nachmanides’ argument.
[Speaker D] It seems to me that it will always pass through an exempt area when you throw something into something placed above ten handbreadths, because the stone necessarily first passes through an exempt area, whether it’s a basket or a pillar.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is how Rashi explains it.
[Speaker D] And therefore it will also always be—therefore he will always be—he won’t be able to be liable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is how Rashi explains it. But still, even according to Rashi, the fact is that what Rabbi Mordekhai says is only a question; he does not state it as a simple law. Because Rabbi Mordekhai himself is not sure that the fact that it passed in the middle through an exempt area exempts you. After all, you didn’t place it in an exempt area and then lift it from there and transfer it to the private domain. Rather, it merely passed through, something like “caught as if it had come to rest,” like that—so it is as though it stood, as though it was flying in an exempt area. Is that considered that the object passed through an exempt area or not? So Rabbi Mordekhai is uncertain about that even according to Rashi. Nachmanides claims that about such a thing there is no room for uncertainty; obviously one would be liable. Therefore the uncertainty is not that. The fact that it passes through an exempt area does not exempt. If it was resting in an exempt area and then I take it to the private domain, that would be an exempt act. But not when I throw it and it passes through airspace called an exempt area. I did not place it there. I don’t care that it passed through an exempt area. That is exactly Nachmanides’ argument against Rashi. Therefore he refuses to accept what Rashi says, that the exemption is because it passed through an exempt area. Passing through an exempt area does not exempt. Therefore he says no—the object has now come to rest in an exempt area; therefore I am exempt. Because when it came to rest on the pillar, the object itself is now in an exempt area. Therefore I am exempt—not because it passed through an exempt area. That is Nachmanides’ claim. Okay? Now the root of the dispute is whether we apply “extend upward” to a pillar or not. By the way, in Rashi here on page 6b—I referred you to that Rashi—Rashi says explicitly, in line with his own view of course, explicitly that one applies “extend upward” even to a pillar. Right? He says: “And likewise a fence, as we said, on four sides, we extend upward the face of the partition over its top, and its top is found enclosed on four sides, and its interior is four.” Meaning, Rashi says that even for a pillar or a fence—it doesn’t matter, some such thing, like a pillar—you enclose it on four sides by “extend upward.” And that is exactly the Rashi we saw in that other passage too. And the source of the matter—I referred you to Rabbi Chaim, but I already see I won’t have time to get there—the source is really in the passage on page 4, in Sukkah. The passage on page 4 in tractate Sukkah says as follows: if it was higher than twenty cubits—the sukkah, yes—if it was higher than twenty cubits, it is invalid, because a sukkah that is too high is invalid. “And he built in it a pillar ten high, and it has the minimum dimensions of a valid sukkah.” Back to the art of drawing. Here there is a sukkah higher than twenty cubits. This is twenty cubits. Okay? Now in the middle I build ten handbreadths—a pillar. A pillar ten handbreadths high—not cubits, handbreadths. So the height from here to here is less than twenty cubits, right? Twenty cubits minus ten handbreadths. Okay? So if it’s eighteen cubits, it’s valid. So I’ll say that the sukkah is this thing: this is the floor of the sukkah, this is the roofing of the sukkah, and the height is less than twenty cubits. The big question is: where are the walls of the sukkah? So here we say there is “extend upward” here and “extend upward” here, and those are the walls. Okay? Yes. Meaning, the Gemara—now I return to the Gemara—says as follows: “If it was higher than twenty cubits, and he built in it a pillar ten high, and it has the minimum dimensions of a valid sukkah”—the area of the pillar is enough—“Abaye thought to say: let us apply ‘extend upward’ to the partitions.” Let us apply “extend upward” and validate this pillar in the middle. It has walls too; everything is fine. Notice—one moment—Rava said to him: “We require recognizable partitions, and there are none.” It doesn’t help. Why doesn’t it help? Because for a sukkah you need recognizable partitions, and “extend upward” is not a recognizable partition. Right? You don’t actually have partitions when you are living on top of the pillar, which is your sukkah. You see roofing above you; you look around and you don’t see walls. Ah—but regarding the Sabbath, this is still considered a partition, right? We saw that earlier. Because when looking from outside there is a partition here, only when looking from inside there is no partition. Are you with me?
[Speaker D] Yes. Regarding the Sabbath there is “extend upward,” but regarding a sukkah it doesn’t work?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Up here this would be a private domain, right? Because when looking from outside there is a partition of ten here. But regarding a sukkah, we see here that this is not enough, because for a sukkah you need recognizable partitions, and therefore even if you apply “extend upward” here above, “extend upward” is not a recognizable partition. If you applied “extend upward” in a sukkah like this, that would be fine. Because here, when I stand in the sukkah below, there are recognizable partitions of ten handbreadths, and after that it continues upward by “extend upward,” but there are recognizable partitions here. But here, when I stand here, I do not see any surrounding walls at all, because the recognizable part is here and the unrecognizable part is the “extend upward,” so it is not recognizable. So I do not have recognizable partitions, and in sukkah—as opposed to Sabbath—you need recognizable partitions. That is what the Gemara says. Rabbi Chaim proves—and I showed you this also in the medieval authorities there, in the Meiri and the Baal Ha’Itur—they understood this differently. They argued that the problem Rava is talking about is not that “extend upward” is not a recognizable partition, but that the lower walls are not recognizable partitions, and therefore one does not make “extend upward” out of them. Do you understand what I’m saying? Yes. Rava’s statement is not that there really is “extend upward” here, but “extend upward” is a virtual partition and in sukkah I need a real partition. That is how the Gemara is usually understood. But the Meiri and the Baal Ha’Itur, and also our Nachmanides—and that is why I am bringing this—did not understand it that way. Rava’s answer to Abaye is not that there are “extend upward” partitions here but they are not recognizable; rather, that on a pillar one does not apply “extend upward,” neither for Sabbath nor for sukkah. Because the pillar’s walls are not recognizable—not recognizable inward, only outward. And on such walls one does not apply “extend upward.” That is the source of Nachmanides’ position here. That is how Nachmanides understood the passage there, and from there he learned the idea that on a pillar one does not apply “extend upward.” What Rava says to Abaye—“we require recognizable partitions, and there are none”—is not a law in the laws of sukkah, that sukkah requires partitions. It is a law in the laws of “extend upward,” that “extend upward” is only applied if you already have a recognizable partition that you continue. But if the partition you have is not recognizable, then you do not apply “extend upward” to it, neither in sukkah nor on Sabbath.
[Speaker C] Wait, does that mean that I always need to apply “extend upward” only if I see it from inside?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. And that is exactly the source for what Nachmanides says on page 99. And consequently, also regarding the law of the basket: according to Nachmanides, even with a basket there would not be “extend upward” above, whereas according to Rashi there could be “extend upward” above.
[Speaker C] Okay. Fine,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] today we played around a bit with drawings, but I hope at least the ideas are clear. The things I didn’t get to, look in the summary. We’ll try to bring it in again.
[Speaker C] No, it’s fine, the illustration illustrates, it illustrates, yes. The illustration is good; it’s a way of learning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right then, goodbye, Shabbat shalom.
[Speaker C] Thank you very, very much, Shabbat shalom. Shabbat—
[Speaker B] Peace, have a good month, see you in the morning.
[Speaker C] Have a good month.