Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 10

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[Speaker D] Because to the same extent, it would have been possible to assume that this is the case; it would have been possible to assume, what happens if the hand stopped, and then it would have to say that he is liable. So how does the Mishnah not address that case if it misled us?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. It wants to tell me when he’s exempt, not when he’s liable. That’s not a question. Is the Mishnah coming to tell me when he is liable? If the homeowner lifted it and set it down, we all know he is liable; that doesn’t need to be said. Here it’s only teaching me cases where he is exempt. When is he exempt? When he only did the lifting and the poor person did the setting down. So that’s all. That’s what the Mishnah says. It’s just that I’m now going into a higher resolution. What does it mean that he only did the lifting and the poor person did the setting down? There’s no choice but to say that the hand did not stop in the public domain. But that’s only a technical detail.

[Speaker D] Once the poor person took it from him, it’s hard for me to picture a situation where the poor person takes it and the hand doesn’t stop.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? Why not? The hand doesn’t stop and the poor person takes it. What’s the problem? I don’t see any principled problem with that. It’s an interpretive setup; in that sense, of course, it’s a bit forced. But there is no fundamental problem with that picture. By the way, other medieval authorities (Rishonim) discuss this here too; Tosafot in our passage even mentions it, whether the hand came to rest or did not come to rest. We’ll get to that later. The point is that according to the Rash of Shantz, it seems to me there is no choice but to interpret the Mishnah this way, otherwise it’s simply a frontal contradiction to what he says based on the Mishnah.

[Speaker G] Is it possible to say that the statement, “and his hand is not like his body,” actually comes from the question itself? Meaning, that the Rash of Shantz would say: as for me, the question really is only about liftings, and why? And that statement kind of follows from the question, from the very dilemma.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning—I didn’t understand. And what will be with settings down? Settings down. About settings down there was never any dilemma. Why? Because it’s obvious that setting down is always effective. There are no questions about that, no distinctions. His body, his hand, whatever you want. Everything the Gemara dealt with was only liftings, and there it said that lifting of the body is considered a lifting, but lifting of the hand is not considered a lifting. But all that is only with liftings. As for settings down, it’s obvious that he is liable, meaning that there is no difference at all. The Sefat Emet writes like this: in Rashi on the Mishnah it implies as a matter of Jewish law that the poor person has to set it down in the public domain. And according to this, one must consider whether the poor person also has to lift the basket from the ground? Because seemingly the two depend on each other. Right?

[Speaker C] Because really it’s not from the hand but from the ground?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. And from Tosafot later on it seems that they disagree with all of this against Rashi. See the Tosafot of Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the old Tosafot later on. And see the wording of the Rosh, from which it seems that he holds as we wrote in Rashi’s approach, that merely lifting the hand is not considered a lifting. And Maimonides wrote explicitly not like Rashi, that one need not place it on the ground, and so on. So why doesn’t he ask—

[Speaker C] —anything against Rashi?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t ask anything against Rashi. From Rashi it implies as a matter of Jewish law that the poor person must set it down in the public domain—with an exclamation point, not with a question mark like Rabbi Akiva Eiger. And why? Exactly because of what I noted earlier: because according to Rashi’s own approach, it is clear that in the conclusion one really does have to set it down in the public domain. That’s not an objection; it’s a determination. He really brings here—look at Maimonides, chapter 13, halakhah 12: “A person’s hand is considered for him like a four-by-four space. Therefore, if one took an object from the hand of a person standing in one domain and placed it in the hand of another person standing in a second domain, he is liable”—it doesn’t matter. “And similarly, if he was standing in one of these two domains and stretched out his hand into the second domain and took an object from it or from the hand of a person standing there and brought his hand back to himself, he is liable, even though he did not place the object in the place where he is standing.” You see? Against Rashi. “Since it is in his hand, it is as though it were resting on the ground.” Against Rashi. Because Maimonides apparently learns like Tosafot.

[Speaker C] His hand is a setting down, a setting down.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s in the place where he is standing, the poor person is taking the object to himself. Now the hand is in the same place as the body. In such a case, placing it in his hand counts as a setting down. Only when the hand is in a different place from the body does placing it in the hand not count as a setting down. Therefore here he doesn’t need to place it on the ground, exactly as we said—the conclusion according to Tosafot. Maimonides apparently learned like Tosafot. And the Pnei Yehoshua here also says, under the heading “or he took from within it and brought out an object,” and similarly wrote nearby “or he placed into it,” and so on: it would seem, apparently, from his words explicitly, that where the poor person did not place it in the public domain but it is still in his hand, it is not called a setting down. Like the Sefat Emet, against Rabbi Akiva Eiger. And it is possible—and now, unlike the Sefat Emet, he also explains—that he follows his own approach and his text later, on the following page, our passage on page 3, where the text reads: “his body is at rest, his hand is not at rest,” and we do not read: “his hand is drawn after his body.” Rashi does not have that reading. Because Rashi explains that this has nothing to do with where the hand is located; placing something in the hand is not a setting down, period. Consequently, according to his approach, he also says in the Mishnah that the poor person has to place it on the ground, because I don’t care whether the hand is in the same place as the body. He doesn’t have that reading. So that’s exactly what he explains in Rashi, and that’s exactly why I asked about Rabbi Akiva Eiger: why are you questioning Rashi? Rashi is following his own approach and everything is fine. But according to the approach of Tosafot and their reading later on, it follows that even if the poor person did not place it on the ground, but merely brought it out and it remained in his hand, that too is called a setting down. It’s called a setting down. For placing it in his hand is also like placing the object itself, since his hand and his body are in one domain, his hand is drawn after his body. And just as the resting of his body is called a setting down when he stops, so too the resting of his hand, once he has stopped. So according to Tosafot it indeed turns out that there is no need to place it on the ground, against Rashi. So he really ties this to the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot here. That’s exactly how it should also come out regarding the Mishnah: Rashi on the Mishnah claims as Jewish law that the poor person must place it on the ground; Tosafot there would not say so, consistently with their approach here. And so too Maimonides wrote, what we just read, that even though he did not place the object down but it remained in his hand, it is considered as though it were placed on the ground. Thus, apparently, one should explain the approaches of Rashi and Tosafot, each according to his version. However—now look how he adds—however, by the way, the Pnei Yehoshua lived before Rabbi Akiva Eiger—however, even without this there is no need for it, and we do not multiply disputes in Jewish law beyond necessity between Rashi and Tosafot. And Rashi too agrees as a matter of Jewish law, as he noted in his place on the following page even according to his own reading. What is he saying? He says we don’t increase disputes beyond what is necessary. That’s his mantra. We don’t increase disputes beyond what is necessary, and therefore what? It’s possible that Rashi does not disagree with Tosafot here, and that Rashi too distinguishes between whether the hand is in the place of the body or not in the place of the body, like the Rashba understood in Rashi, right? That Rashi in fact does not disagree with Tosafot. And Rashi too agrees as a matter of Jewish law—yes, he agrees with Tosafot that all Rashi said was only when the hand is not in the same place as the body, but if the hand is in the same place as the body, he agrees with Tosafot that this is indeed called a setting down. Except that in that case, of course, Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question would be difficult. I said that Rabbi Akiva Eiger questioned Rashi because he goes—but why? Why would it be difficult? Because if according to Rashi, when the hand is in the same place as the body, placing it in the hand does count as a setting down, then why does Rashi say one has to place it in the public domain? The hand is in the same place as the body.

[Speaker G] Not the homeowner who brings it out, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question on Rashi would indeed be difficult, as I said there: Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who questioned Rashi, probably understood him the way the Rashba understood him, all right? So that’s exactly what the Pnei Yehoshua says. I’m telling you that Rashi means what Tosafot mean, and if so, then it really is difficult why Rashi writes here that one needs to place it on the ground. So he says, no big deal. Rather, in any case, since later on we raise the dilemma whether lifting of the body is like lifting of an object, and it seems that the same dilemma applies to setting down and was not resolved, and our Mishnah here, which teaches “or he brought it out,” must therefore be explainable as a case where he placed it on the ground, as Tosafot write later on. Therefore Rashi too preferred to explain the Mishnah in a clear-cut way. That’s exactly Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s answer—it’s amazing. Everything Rabbi Akiva Eiger said is written in the Pnei Yehoshua, and he doesn’t mention the Pnei Yehoshua; he just notes it as though it were his own new comment.

[Speaker D] Can you go over that again? I didn’t understand this. What was the conclusion here? Why don’t we need to multiply disputes? How does he understand that Rashi learns like Tosafot?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—he says he will explain that in the passage on page 3. The Pnei Yehoshua here is on the Mishnah on page 2. The Pnei Yehoshua on page 3 explains that Rashi too does not disagree with Tosafot, the way the Rashba explained Rashi, and that Rashi too is speaking only about a situation where the hand is not in the same place as the body, for his own reasons there; that’s not important right now.

[Speaker D] But in the Mishnah that’s not the case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Wait—now he says: but according to this, apparently there is still a difficulty in Rashi on the Mishnah, because Rashi on the Mishnah says it has to be placed on the ground, and if I am right that Rashi holds like Tosafot, then he should not have required an actual setting down on the ground. So he says, no problem, that doesn’t trouble me. Why? Because it may be that Rashi interpreted it as being placed on the ground only in order to preserve the dilemma as it stands. As a matter of Jewish law, you don’t really need that, but if he hadn’t explained the Mishnah that way, I would have had trouble understanding what this dilemma was about. We could have resolved from the Mishnah that placing it in the hand or the body’s coming to rest counts as a setting down. So Rashi says no: the Mishnah can be explained as a case where he placed it on the ground, and therefore the dilemma remains in place. True, in the conclusion, when we say that setting down counts as a setting down when his hand and body are in the same domain, then indeed there is no need to say that he placed it on the ground. But Rashi’s explanation here is meant to keep the dilemma alive. Exactly what Rabbi Akiva Eiger answered, okay? Now what is the advantage of the Pnei Yehoshua over Rabbi Akiva Eiger? That the Pnei Yehoshua also explains it. Rabbi Akiva Eiger apparently assumed in Rashi’s view what the Pnei Yehoshua assumes, namely that Rashi does not disagree with Tosafot, and therefore he challenges him. But Rabbi Akiva Eiger didn’t say any of that, which is strange. But apparently I’m bringing the Pnei Yehoshua so we can see that Rabbi Akiva Eiger probably understood it this way too. The reason he questioned Rashi was that he assumed Rashi does not disagree with Tosafot, and then he answered: fine, so what Rashi explained here is only to preserve the dilemma, to keep the dilemma alive so that it cannot be resolved from the Mishnah. Clear?

[Speaker D] Is there some problem with their disagreeing with each other? Who? Tosafot and Rashi—that they have to justify saying they are really saying the same thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The principle—that’s what he mentioned here—is what is called: we do not multiply disputes. What does that mean? We don’t increase disputes beyond what we are forced to. Very often in the Gemara, when we—we know what? I’ll give you an example. We have a little time, so I’ll give you an example; I won’t start the next passage.

[Speaker F] “I’ll give you an example”—okay, for instance—sorry, I wanted to ask about the explanation he gave for Rashi not disagreeing with Tosafot. Is he supposed to say that Tosafot are not bothered by the dilemma, or do we need to explain that maybe they assume that hand and body are nevertheless different things, and we still need to ask about the body? I didn’t understand. According to Tosafot, why do we need a dilemma if it could be resolved from the Mishnah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t. You can’t resolve it from the Mishnah.

[Speaker F] Why? If Tosafot can’t resolve it from the Mishnah, then Rashi too will say that it’s unnecessary. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what he says. Because it may be that they interpreted it as having placed it on the ground.

[Speaker F] No, but Tosafot don’t say it was placed on the ground.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—it could be that he placed it on the ground, and therefore you can’t resolve it.

[Speaker F] They simply—Tosafot don’t say that, but they too can assume that maybe there he placed it down.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly the same. Whatever you say about Rashi, same thing. He holds like Tosafot.

[Speaker F] Wait, but Rashi—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —said it explicitly; Tosafot don’t say it. Right. Tosafot don’t explain every word; Tosafot just illuminate their comments. Here, on this point, he understood it like Rashi—yes, that’s clear. I’ll give you an example so you’ll see what “we do not multiply disputes” means. Today we’re a bit in methodological territory, so I’ll allow myself to drift a little more. There is a dispute—well, there are complicated examples of this, I’ll try a simple one. There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who discuss the question of a sick person on the Sabbath—time-out, this has nothing to do with our topic. There is a sick person on the Sabbath, and we have two options. He needs to eat meat; the doctors say he must eat meat in order to recover. Now he has two options: either non-kosher meat, pork, whatever; or to slaughter an animal, to slaughter by kosher slaughter an animal and eat kosher meat. What is preferable to do? You need to desecrate the Sabbath. What is preferable to do? Okay? So there are discussions about this among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). There is a long Rosh that brings many views—the Ra’avad, the Ba’al HaMaor, and the Tashbetz—a lot of medieval authorities (Rishonim) talk about this issue. By the way, I once wrote a column about this on my website, and I said that it is litmus paper for identifying pseudo-scholarly householders. The layman, of course, will say: what do you mean? Obviously slaughter. Eat pork? Unthinkable. But eating pork is an ordinary prohibition, while slaughtering on the Sabbath is an offense punishable by stoning. So the simple intuition is, of course, that you should eat pork and not slaughter. That’s the simple intuition. In any case, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagreed about this, and the Ran explains there that it is preferable to slaughter rather than feed him pork or other non-kosher meat. Why? And that needs explanation, because this is the non-intuitive view. It’s the layman’s view, but it’s the non-intuitive view. Because pork is a much lighter prohibition than slaughtering on the Sabbath. Okay? So he says, very simply, because suppose he needs to eat a lot of meat—let’s say five olive-bulk portions of meat, okay? How many prohibitions will he violate? If he eats pork, he violates five prohibitions—on each olive-bulk portion he violates a prohibition. But if he slaughters, he violates one severe prohibition once, and from then on everything he eats is permitted. So it’s preferable to violate a prohibition once—a severe prohibition once—rather than many lighter prohibitions. That’s his claim. Quantity is preferable to quality—and a lot of ink has been spilled over this Ran. The thing is, when you look in the Shulchan Arukh, it does not rule according to this Ran in Jewish law. So how do all the later authorities (Acharonim) bring proofs from this Ran that quantity is preferable to quality—sorry, that quality is more important than quantity? After all, it wasn’t ruled that way in Jewish law, and they bring proofs from it in questions that arise in practical Jewish law. The answer is: very often people bring proofs from an opinion that was not adopted as Jewish law. Why? If the reason I did not rule like him in Jewish law is not because of this reasoning but for some other reason, then the assumption is that on this reasoning I do not disagree. I have a different dispute with him. So therefore even a line of reasoning that appears in an opinion that is not accepted as Jewish law can still be used to derive conclusions. Because even the one who disagrees probably does not disagree on that point, since he himself gave a side reason why he disagrees with the Ran. That implies that he did accept this reasoning. And that is exactly the reasoning, exactly the principle, of not multiplying disputes. What does that mean? If I found a certain dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim) or later authorities (Acharonim) or amoraim, there is no reason to assume there are additional disputes among them. As I said earlier to Noa, right? If Rav and Shmuel disagree about a labor not needed for its own sake and an unintended act, why assume that they also disagree about the classification of the cases—about the facts, not the laws? There is no reason to assume more disputes than those that already exist. Now, of course, you can take this principle as far as you like. You can say that therefore it’s better to reduce every dispute we see to the minimum required. Anything beyond that, I don’t assume there is a dispute unless we have proof of it. But if we don’t have proof, then we reduce the disputes as much as possible. Yes, this is a variation on Ockham’s razor, the principle that says: I choose the simplest explanation unless there is evidence—

[Speaker C] —otherwise.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? So here too, the Pnei Yehoshua says: in principle, the reasoning is like Tosafot. Now in Rashi it seems otherwise. If I can press Rashi and minimize his dispute with Tosafot—or reduce it to zero, to say they don’t disagree—that is preferable. We do not multiply disputes. We don’t increase disputes beyond what we must. Especially if the view of Tosafot seems to you the more reasonable view. Then to say that Rashi disagrees with it is less plausible. If I have another interpretive way out, I will prefer to explain Rashi so that he does not disagree with Tosafot. Now of course one can argue about this—what counts as simple and how far do we go with it? This is a criterion that is far from being sharp. But there is such an old line of reasoning: we do not multiply disputes beyond what is required. For example, the Gemara itself says in chapter Tolin in tractate Shabbat—the Gemara says that in the entire Oral Torah we do not find a dispute where one tanna says “liable” and the other tanna says “permitted.” It’s either “forbidden” versus “permitted,” or “liable” versus “forbidden.” But “liable” versus “permitted” we have not found. Now, there are objections to this; never mind. But what is the meaning of this principle? Usually there is some reasonable range. If one tanna says that in a certain act there is a Torah-level prohibition, the other tanna will not say that it is entirely permitted. He will say that it is a rabbinic prohibition. And if one tanna says that it is entirely permitted, the other tanna will not say that it is a Torah-level prohibition. He will say it is a rabbinic prohibition. Disputes are generally not from one extreme to the other, because there is some logic here. Nobody here is an idiot. Meaning: if the disputes are so far apart, that means that in my opinion the other one is simply talking nonsense. Not merely making a quantitative error—he is talking nonsense. That is generally not our assumption. Our assumption is usually that the views of intelligent people and Torah scholars will not be so far apart from one another. Okay? That brings us back a bit to things I spoke about at the beginning.

[Speaker C] Can there be “liable” versus “exempt”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, “liable” versus “exempt” can happen, and “exempt” versus “permitted” can happen, but not “liable” versus “permitted.” Again, there are other examples, and the Gemara itself asks about it, but the principle, the starting point, is that this is less plausible. Why? Because it is less plausible that Rabbi Yehuda thinks Rabbi Shimon is talking nonsense. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon on this point or that point, but it’s not that he is saying absurd things. Okay? To posit a dispute from one extreme to the other requires good evidence. The assumption is that disputes are not extreme, and as much as possible we assume there is no dispute at all. If we can interpret things in a way that there is no dispute at all, and that interpretation is still reasonable, then it is the preferable interpretation. Clear? That is basically the methodological starting point. Okay, back to our topic. What I still want to get done today—

[Speaker F] Sorry, if this principle in the Gemara is expressed in the fact that we try to say that a dispute among tannaim is simply talking about different situations, each one a different interpretive setup of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, yes. Now come, I’ll share the sources again. What I just want to finish is really the conceptual aspect of the issue. When the Gemara asks whether lifting of the body counts as a lifting or not, what’s at stake? What are the arguments both ways? Why is there a hesitation? Up to this point we’ve really just been doing bookkeeping—who goes with whom, who fits whom, and what the implications are according to each one. Now I want to ask the conceptual question: where does this come from? What is the reasoning behind the two sides—whether lifting of the body does count as a lifting or does not count as a lifting? What is the point around which this hesitation revolves? What point is it revolving around? So Rabbi Akiva Eiger, on Tosafot on page 2, writes as follows: “As it was taught: if one was loaded with food and drink while it was still day, and brought them outside after dark, he is liable, because lifting of his body is like lifting of an object.” And he says—and he quotes Tosafot—that this is talking about a case where he stopped to rest after dark; yes, we’re talking about a case where he stopped to rest after dark, because if he did not stop, he would not be liable, since the first lifting, which occurred while it was still day, was not nullified. And he mentions that he was loaded while it was still day—I move to the end of the parentheses—and he mentions that he was loaded while it was still day here, because if he had mentioned that he was loaded after dark—meaning, why is it talking there about a burden that was already on him while it was still day, before the Sabbath entered? Why not talk about a case where the load was put on him only after nightfall, on the Sabbath itself?

[Speaker C] So the Gemara is coming to teach us that lifting of the body is considered a lifting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, one second. He said—I’m reading Tosafot; you’ve all seen this Tosafot. He said that if it had spoken of someone loaded after dark and then stopped to rest, it would not show that lifting of the body is like lifting of an object. Yes? If it had spoken about after dark and not while it was still day, it would be impossible to infer from that baraita that lifting of the body is like lifting of an object. Why? Because then lifting and setting down of the body would not count as lifting and setting down, and in any case he would be liable because of the first lifting. Right? If this happened on the Sabbath itself and not while it was still day, then even if lifting of the body is not considered a lifting, still he performed the lifting when he loaded himself up. So he would be liable anyway. Therefore that’s irrelevant. Therefore it had to be framed as a case where he was loaded while it was still day. That’s Tosafot; we already saw it, or you already saw it. And Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: “And this is difficult for me, because this is certainly proven from our Mishnah—that when it is resting in his hand, that counts as a setting down for the purpose that one who takes it from his hand has performed a lifting.” Right? We already saw that in Tosafot. Tosafot proved from the Mishnah that when something is resting in my hand and someone takes it from me, this certainly counts as a lifting according to everyone. Even though placing something in the hand is not a setting down, it is still clear that it is considered at rest in the sense that if someone takes it from there, that is called a lifting. That’s what Tosafot noted against Rashi; that was Tosafot’s question against Rashi. We saw that in the previous class. So he says: “Rather, the dilemma is only whether the lifting from the perspective of lifting his body perhaps does not make him liable, since he is not lifting the object from its place, and it remains in its original place.” That’s the key sentence, and I’ll stop here. What does he mean to say? What is the dilemma of lifting of the body? He argues that the reason lifting of the body might not count as a lifting is simply because I didn’t lift the object. It remained in the same place. What is its place? My body. The body. Exactly. Its place is not the ground, not the domain, but the body. And then if the body suddenly starts to move, the object was not lifted; it was on the body and remained on the body. That is to say, Rabbi Akiva Eiger understands that the dilemma whether lifting of the body counts as a lifting or not stems from the view that the place of the object is the body and not the domain. Therefore lifting of the body is not a lifting. That is the explanation of why there was a side in the Gemara that this would not count as a lifting. Clear? In the Gemara’s conclusion, lifting of the body does count as a lifting. Why? Because the object is considered to be resting on the place, not on the body. But the side that says it does not count as a lifting arose from the possibility that the object’s place is considered the body itself and not the ground. That’s how Rabbi Akiva Eiger understood this dilemma, right? Now I’ll ask you: according to Rabbi Akiva Eiger, is there room for Tosafot’s distinction between whether the hand is in the same place as the body or not in the same place as the body?

[Speaker E] No, because wherever the body is, that’s where the hand is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not relevant, right? It’s not relevant at all. Obviously if there is a dilemma where the hand is with the body, then there would also be one where the hand is not with the body; it makes no difference. Because what matters in the fundamental dilemma, in the question, is whether it is resting on the hand or resting on the ground. And I don’t care whether the hand is in the body’s place or not in the body’s place. Therefore it is clear that the way Rabbi Akiva Eiger understood the dilemma fits only Rashi’s approach, not Tosafot’s approach. Are you with me? According to Tosafot, it is clear that this was not the Gemara’s dilemma. Because if the Gemara’s dilemma simply arose from the question of where I think the object is resting—what counts as the place of the object, the body or the ground—then why should I care whether the hand is in the place of the body or not in the place of the body? At the end of the day, the object is not on the ground but in the hand. So there would be room for the same hesitation both here and there. It makes no difference; the connection between the hand and the body is not relevant according to that formulation. Now look at another formulation. Another formulation appears in the Maharal Tzuntz, to which I linked you because I didn’t print it.

[Speaker D] I didn’t understand that inference. On the contrary: if the hand is in that place, then once the object is in the hand and the hand follows the body, wherever the body is, the object is there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the object is on the ground. After all, the basis of—

[Speaker D] Meaning basically it doesn’t matter whether it is—or isn’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The dilemma is only whether one needs to move the object from the ground, or whether the movement of the object should be defined in relation to the body or in relation to the hand, not important. But why should it matter whether the hand is in the same place as the body or not? The whole question is only whether, when an object is in the hand, it is considered to be resting on the ground or resting on the body or hand. So the relation between the hand and the body is not important for this.

[Speaker C] The hand is the body.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By contrast, in the Maharal Tzuntz—and that’s also what you see in the Hazon Ish—

[Speaker G] Maybe one could say that really the issue is the movement of the object relative to the first domain on which the body is standing. Exactly. Not relative—meaning, it’s like relative velocity with respect to the paving stone, to the ground he is standing on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Right. And therefore it doesn’t matter where the hand is relative to the body. The whole question is what determines things: is what determines them the velocity relative to the ground, or the velocity relative to the place where the object is physically located—the hand or the body or something like that? Why should I care whether the hand is in the same place as the body or not in the same place as the body? But the Hazon Ish, and also the Maharal Tzuntz, clearly understood the dilemma differently. They argue that—you see? I’ll read you the Hazon Ish. I’m marking the relevant section here. You see? “But here, lifting of the body is his walking and not an act of bringing out; and nevertheless, the dilemma concerns lifting specifically, because this is not the labor in its normal form, since he did not lift the object but only caused it to go out.” What is the dilemma? What does that mean? That’s the key sentence. What does it mean? The doubt whether lifting of the body counts as a lifting or not arises not from the question of relative to what I measure the movement as relative motion, as Noam said earlier, but from the question whether, when I moved the object, I did it directly to the object itself or only incidentally. I did the labor in an abnormal way, I performed the labor with a change. Clearly I brought the object out of the domain, but in essence lifting of the body is not called—basically, I moved the body, not the object, and the object moved on its own. So true, the object’s movement is measured relative to the ground, but why isn’t that considered a lifting? Because I didn’t grasp the object and lift it; rather, I simply started moving with the body and the object was lifted automatically. That is the problem underlying the side that says lifting of the body does not count as lifting. Do you understand the difference between the two explanations?

[Speaker F] But that’s relevant both to Rashi and to Tosafot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. This explanation can definitely fit Tosafot. In fact, more than that—it would apparently fit only Tosafot. Because according to Rashi it’s harder to say this. According to Rashi I would say that if so, then there certainly could be a difference between whether the hand is in the same place as the body—

[Speaker F] —or not in the same place as the body. Why? The main thing is that I did it with my hand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the hand is not in the same place as the body, then what’s the problem? I lifted it—so I lifted the object. What’s the problem?

[Speaker F] Fine, fine—with the hand. But with the body it’s not clear that it’s a lifting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Therefore I think this is almost—

[Speaker F] But for Rashi too there can be a difference, because it’s the difference between doing it with the hand in the normal way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For Rashi I think it’s more difficult, but never mind. In any case, it certainly also works for Tosafot. And the difference is the following: according to Rabbi Akiva Eiger, the side that says lifting of the body is not a lifting is because there was no lifting at all. The object was not lifted; it was in one place and remained in that same place. According to the Hazon Ish, it was certainly lifted—it was in one place and moved to another place, because place is clearly defined relative to the ground according to the Hazon Ish. Rather, what? It was lifted indirectly. I did not lift the object; I started walking and the object was thereby lifted. And that’s a question of doing labor in an abnormal manner, as it were—that’s the point. According to Rabbi Akiva Eiger, no act of lifting was done at all. According to the Hazon Ish, a lifting was done, but it was done in an abnormal way. Clear? And these are basically two formulations that can explain the Gemara’s doubt whether lifting of the body counts as a lifting or not: one of them fits Rashi better, the other fits Tosafot better. Okay, I’ll stop here. At this point we’ve only finished the previous class, but in the next class we’ll return to today’s passage. I’ll add a little more livelihood for you. Thank you very much.

[Speaker F] Thank you very much. Sabbath peace.