Tractate Shabbat, Chapter One – Lesson 6

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are size thresholds, but there is no prohibition for less than the threshold. Indeed, in Rashi later on, page 74, it is explained that even for Sabbath prohibitions, less than the threshold is prohibited by Torah law. And in Lechem Mishneh, chapter 21 of the Laws of Sabbath, less than the threshold involves a positive commandment. He says that there is a positive prohibition regarding less than the threshold, a positive prohibition of ceasing on the Sabbath. “And on the Sabbath day you shall cease” — yes, that is a positive commandment. And see Mishneh LaMelekh and Pri Megadim for what they wrote from the words of the Tur there. In any case, he brings several medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) who argue that even with prohibited categories of labor on the Sabbath there is a law of less than the threshold. So he says that according to the Chacham Tzvi, his question is not difficult, because with Sabbath prohibitions the prohibition of less than the threshold does not apply. But according to Rashi and the Lechem Mishneh on Maimonides, Mishneh LaMelekh, and others — all those who say that there is a prohibition of less than the threshold with Sabbath prohibitions — the question remains: why, in a case where two people do it together, should the one who uproots and the one who places not each have a Torah prohibition of less than the threshold?

[Speaker G] But the “less than the threshold” he’s talking about here, that Rashi says is prohibited by Torah law — he’s not talking about less than the threshold in the labor itself, but about transferring an amount smaller than an olive-bulk from one domain to another?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is less than the threshold in the labor.

[Speaker G] That’s not less than the threshold — it’s not a case where one uprooted and one placed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not one uprooted and one placed; it’s less than the threshold in the labor. A labor done on less than the threshold.

[Speaker G] But you can’t infer from that regarding uprooting and placing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a good question. That’s the answer of the Sefat Emet; in a moment we’ll see. That’s the answer of the Sefat Emet. So now, notice something else — what does he bring? He says: one can say that specifically regarding eating prohibitions — or this is the passage I read earlier — that specifically regarding eating prohibitions, less than the threshold is prohibited from the verse “any fat.” Why does he suddenly move to “any fat”? What about “it is fit to combine”? Because if the basis is “it is fit to combine,” then on the face of it that exists in all prohibitions; that’s a logical argument. There’s no reason to limit it only to eating prohibitions. But if this is a derivation learned from “any fat,” then you can say: like fat, only eating prohibitions. Okay? So it’s not for nothing that he switched here to the second source.

[Speaker D] Maybe I didn’t understand something, but didn’t he also say that in all Sabbath labors I haven’t seen that “fit to combine” applies? Right, he says it doesn’t seem to me that this is a rule that works for labors.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what he said above. Above, yes. But afterwards he says: but in Rashi you see that it does. In the Gemara he didn’t see it, but in Rashi you see it, in the Lechem Mishneh you see it, and in others as well. Okay? And then he says, in the end — by the way, another parenthetical remark — apparently the Sefat Emet understands that “fit to combine” and “any fat” are complementary sources. These are not two different laws. Rather, “fit to combine” explains the logic behind the prohibition of “any fat.” And therefore he says: if “any fat” is classified only for eating prohibitions, then I don’t care that there is a logic of “fit to combine” that could also be said about other prohibitions. That logic was stated regarding eating prohibitions. That is what the verse “any fat” teaches me. We talked about the fact that these two sources can be understood in several ways — what the relationship between them is. Does one explain the other? Are they conflicting sources, and that is a dispute? Or maybe there are two sources here and they yield two different laws of less than the threshold? Three possibilities. The Sefat Emet understands that they complement one another. The Sefat Emet understands that we learn this from “any fat,” and the explanation is the reasoning of “fit to combine.” All right? It’s basically one prohibition whose definition is this. So what does he say in conclusion? “However, it seems” — this is his answer, which you already raised earlier — “that here this is not called less than the threshold; it is not called less than the threshold, but rather half a labor, and that was never prohibited at all. Unlike half an olive-bulk of fat, where the prohibition exists, but the measure is lacking.” What is he saying? When I eat half an olive-bulk of fat, I performed the prohibited act in full; I just did it on a smaller quantity. By the way, the same is true in Rashi on page 74 that he cited above. Rashi is speaking there about someone who transfers from a private domain to a public domain less than the required measure. So he did an uprooting, he did a transfer, and he did a placing. He did the entire act. He just did the entire act on a quantity smaller than the measure. That is called less than the threshold, and on that the prohibition of less than the threshold was said — and according to Rashi, even on the Sabbath. But if we are talking about this one uprooting and that one placing, then the prohibited act was never done at all. Because uprooting alone is not the prohibited act at all; no transferring out was done here. Transferring out exists only when there is uprooting, transfer, and placing. If you only did all that with less than the required measure, then you did the prohibited act on less than the threshold — that is the prohibition of less than the threshold. But if you didn’t do the prohibited act at all, what sense does it make to prohibit it? Therefore he argues that there is a difference between less than the threshold and half a labor. Think, for example, about the logic of “fit to combine.” Does the logic of “fit to combine” apply when we are talking about half a labor? On the face of it, no. Remember what I explained also in Kovetz Shiurim, and that also seems to be the implication in Rabbi Shimon Shkop — what is the logic of “fit to combine”? Let’s say I ate half an olive-bulk of fat. Then they tell me: look, if you were to take that exact same thing and eat another half olive-bulk, you would have violated a full prohibition. And the whole difference is only quantity. That means that already in the first half there was the qualitative character of the prohibition; only the quantity was lacking. Therefore it is a prohibition; only the quantity is lacking, and therefore you are not punished, as we discussed earlier. But there is still a prohibition. But you can’t say that if I uproot, that contains the whole prohibition, because after all, I could then place it down and that would become a full prohibition. The placing is something else. Uprooting plus placing creates something different from two uprootings. If what was needed were two uprootings, then you could say that one uprooting is less than the threshold. Because then you wouldn’t need to add anything except quantity in order to have a complete labor. So clearly in every tiny bit of uprooting there is already the qualitative character of the prohibition, and therefore it is prohibited. But if, after I did the uprooting, I still need to add placing, then you can’t say that this proves that within the uprooting itself there is already the qualitative character of the prohibition. Why on earth? A substantial part of the quality is missing, not just quantity. This is not a quantitative difference. You simply did not perform the act of transferring out at all. Why should there be a prohibition on that? All the more so if we understand that the prohibition of less than the threshold is not an independent prohibition, but is really the original prohibition itself, an expansion of the original prohibition. If so, then what the Sefat Emet says is very clear. Because the original prohibition is to transfer out. “To transfer out” means to uproot, transfer, and place. That is called transferring out. So if that is the prohibition, and with less than the threshold that too is the prohibition, only the quantity is lacking, then it is obvious that this cannot apply to half a labor. In half a labor I didn’t do the prohibited act at all. How can you say I violated the prohibition of transferring out when I didn’t even transfer and place? Yes.

[Speaker C] So in a case where two people do it together, is there less than the threshold? I didn’t understand. If two people do it simultaneously? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One of the practical ramifications — and this is what I asked you about concerning the passage on page 93 and Tosafot — because there in fact we are dealing with less than the threshold in Sabbath labors in the sense we are discussing here. Say two people take an olive-bulk and transfer it out together, holding it together in their hands from a private domain to a public domain. Okay? About that, the Sefat Emet would say that there could indeed be a prohibition of less than the threshold.

[Speaker E] Rabbi, I wanted to ask about other Sabbath labors. Suppose they take the measured quantity of something and cook it, bake it, but only for five minutes. Is that half the threshold of a complete labor?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is whether that is half a labor or less than the threshold. On the face of it, that is half a labor, not less than the threshold.

[Speaker E] Is there such a thing as half a labor?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like uprooting without placing. It’s cooking, but it doesn’t reach the status of cooked; it didn’t reach the stage of ben drusai or whatever the case may be. So in essence I didn’t perform the act of cooking — it’s not that the quantity I cooked is lacking; I didn’t cook.

[Speaker E] Right, right, I’m talking about the labor and not the quantity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that is half a labor, not less than the threshold.

[Speaker E] And that’s the same as only uprooting?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. You are right that it is a bit more similar to less than the threshold, because the continuation of all this is just to keep the fire going, but in terms of what happens to the thing, it is still something different. What happens to the thing is that it becomes actually cooked. A cooked item is something different from an uncooked item. And in the process that happens to the thing, what is happening here is not just more of the same thing; something else is happening here.

[Speaker H] Rabbi, I have a question. Yes. Is the amount of what is being transferred significant, or the volume?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, as I said, there is a threshold in the labor of transferring, and therefore if someone transfers… what is that threshold? There is a whole list of thresholds depending on what it is. For food there is one threshold, for objects there is another threshold; there are Mishnahs that deal with the thresholds for the labor of transferring. Yes.

[Speaker H] So how do we know that all these passages didn’t perhaps mean this issue of less than the threshold in terms of quantity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand — which passages?

[Speaker H] The ones we’re talking about now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All these passages are talking about a full measure, not less than the threshold.

[Speaker H] No, maybe when they suggest less than the threshold, maybe they mean less than the threshold in terms of quantity and not half a labor?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, that’s exactly what we’re… I didn’t understand — that’s what the Sefat Emet says: that less than the threshold is only when the “half” is half the quantity. If the half is half the labor, that is not less than the threshold.

[Speaker H] I understood him as simply distinguishing between half a labor and less than the threshold in eating, and saying those are different things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t know he was speaking specifically about transferring. No, the opposite. Not specifically eating. After all, if the prohibition exists only in eating, if less than the threshold was said only regarding eating prohibitions, then his question would need no answer; it wouldn’t arise. But he showed above that according to Rashi and the Lechem Mishneh and others, there is less than the threshold also in prohibitions that are not eating prohibitions, such as Sabbath prohibitions. And then the question returns: so why is there no prohibition of less than the threshold for the one who uproots? And to that he answered that here we have half a labor and not less than the threshold. Exactly.

[Speaker B] But is uprooting alone a labor?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is half a labor. Half.

[Speaker B] No, not in terms of transferring out… the uprooting itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then in what sense? What do you mean, “is it a labor”? She’s asking in terms of what…

[Speaker B] No, okay, I went somewhere else. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the Sefat Emet basically wants to argue that there is a difference between less than the threshold and half a labor. I’m saying that it is much easier to understand this — it’s not necessary, but much easier — if one understands that the prohibition of less than the threshold is an extension of the original prohibition and not a newly created prohibition. Because then you are basically telling me: after all, the prohibition of transferring has a halakhic definition; you need uprooting, transfer to the public domain, and placing. That didn’t happen here — you only uprooted. How can this be prohibited under the law of less than the threshold? You simply didn’t do what the Torah prohibited. Maybe when I took the first step, moved my hand in preparation for uprooting, that too should be less than the threshold? Or when I breathed, or ate breakfast, should that too be less than the threshold, because without that I wouldn’t have had the strength to uproot the object and transfer it to the public domain? That makes no sense. In other words, there is a definition of the act that the Torah prohibits. If you didn’t do that act, then there is no prohibition of less than the threshold. It’s somewhat similar to what I mentioned in the previous lecture in Rashi in tractate Sanhedrin, where he says that half a perutah has no prohibition of theft, not even under the law of less than the threshold. And I said there why: because half a perutah is not a small amount of money; it is not money at all. It has no purchasing power. So it is qualitatively different from a perutah. The difference between half a perutah and a perutah is not quantitative; it is qualitative. You simply did not steal money. Because half a perutah is not money, so the logic of “fit to combine” does not apply; you cannot say that the prohibition of theft is already present here and only the quantity is small. There is no prohibition of theft when what I took is not money. The same thing here: there is no prohibition of transferring if you did not perform the act of transferring; you only uprooted. The act of transferring is defined as uprooting, transfer, and placing. If you only uprooted, you did not perform the act of transferring. How can you say there is a prohibition of transferring here? And that is different from a situation where I uprooted, transferred, and placed a small quantity. I did the entire act that the Torah prohibited — I transferred it out — only the quantity is lacking. That is the prohibition of less than the threshold. According to Rashi. The Chacham Tzvi says there is no prohibition of less than the threshold except in eating prohibitions, but according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say there is… can I ask something?

[Speaker D] Yes. Something basic — maybe I missed it. Still, we are talking about looking at the act of uprooting in the context that it was part of a transfer and placing. It doesn’t matter who uprooted and who later placed. But if someone just uproots, just lifts the flowerpot casually in the house when I’m not taking it out or intending to take it out, and it has no continuation, then you can’t really say that it contains any element of prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you remember, that is exactly what Tosafot said, and therefore he argues against Rashi… I didn’t hear… If you remember, we brought Tosafot who says exactly that — Tosafot argued against Rashi that clearly an uprooting that is not followed by a transfer without placing — uprooting and transfer — only that can count as the rabbinic prohibition of two people doing it together. But if you just uproot in a private domain and then put it back or something like that, that is just ordinary moving about, Tosafot says; it is not at all a case of two people doing it together, and you are right that it would also not be less than the threshold. Okay. The only thing the Sefat Emet argues is that even if I uprooted and then transferred, that still would not be less than the threshold because placing is missing. All right? Now the Sefat Emet goes on: “And from the wording of Maimonides, chapter 12 of the Laws of Sabbath, law 9, it seems that uprooting alone or placing alone has the status of less than the threshold; see there, for he brought everything together at once. And so it also appears somewhat from the Tur and from the wording of the SeMaG,” and so on. Let’s look at Maimonides for a moment. Ah, this is chapter… yes, they pointed out to me here, it is chapter 12, law 9.

[Speaker E] You reversed the chapter and the law, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I reversed it. Chapter 12, law 9: “One who transfers from domain to domain is not liable until he transfers the useful measure from the private domain to the public domain…” Again, here Maimonides establishes that there is a measure for the labor of transferring, or from domain… “from the public domain to the private domain, and he uproots from this domain and places in the second domain.” But that is the definition of the Torah prohibition. “But if he uprooted and did not place, or placed and did not uproot, or transferred less than the required measure, he is exempt.” The Sefat Emet says: Maimonides gives here in one bundle, as one list, also one who uprooted and did not place, one who placed and did not uproot, and one who transferred less than the measure.

[Speaker D] I’ll see what to do because there’s an internet problem for the rabbi.

[Speaker I] Apparently they can’t hear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand?

[Speaker D] You had…

[Speaker E] interruptions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Can you hear me now? Yes.

[Speaker E] Yes, if you can start again from Maimonides. Okay.

[Speaker I] Wait a second, Rabbi Michael, can I ask a quick question? Basically, does the Sefat Emet say that there is no less than the threshold here because there is half a labor? Is that what he relies on?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Half a labor is not considered less than the threshold. Less than the threshold is only when he performed the entire labor on a smaller measure. All right? Are you with me? Are you with me? Was there another interruption?

[Speaker C] Yes, all the time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yiska asked that, right? Yiska, are you with us? Where did she go? I don’t know what’s going on here with these interruptions.

[Speaker C] Because of the weather.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right, so I’ll continue in the meantime until Yiska comes back; I see she still hasn’t returned.

[Speaker C] She’s here, she’s here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think she’s actually still connected. Only her square is there.

[Speaker C] I can see her.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also with a picture? Yes. Okay.

[Speaker B] Now I think there’s no picture here either.

[Speaker C] Now I don’t see her.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, well, let’s continue. So in Maimonides, Maimonides first of all gives the definition of the Torah prohibition of transferring. “One who transfers from domain to domain is not liable until he transfers the useful measure.” He establishes that there is a measure for the labor of transferring. Without that, one does not violate it. “From the private domain to the public domain, or from the public domain to the private domain, and he uproots from this domain and places in the second domain.” But now there are several possibilities in which there is no Torah prohibition: “If he uprooted and did not place, or placed and did not uproot, or transferred less than the required measure, he is exempt.”

[Speaker E] He doesn’t accept the distinction of the Sefat Emet. What? He doesn’t accept the distinction of the Sefat Emet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Sefat Emet himself notes this. The Sefat Emet himself notes that Maimonides seems not to hold that way. Why? Because Maimonides puts uprooting without placing, placing without uprooting, and less than the threshold all on one list. Somehow it looks as though, according to Maimonides, all of these are less than the threshold. But actually I don’t think he is right, because Maimonides is simply saying that all of these are only part of the labor, and therefore there is no Torah prohibition. What prohibition is there, then? It depends. It could be that transferring less than the measure is the prohibition of less than the threshold, while only uprooting or only placing is the prohibition of two people doing it together. I don’t see any necessity to infer that from Maimonides. The fact that he brings them in one list simply tells us: whenever one of the components is missing — are you with me? Yes. Yes. I no longer know when… whenever one of the components required for the Torah labor of transferring is missing, then there will not be a Torah prohibition. What will there be? It depends on what is missing. If the measure is missing, it will be the prohibition of less than the threshold. If there is uprooting without placing or placing without uprooting, then it will be the prohibition of two people doing it together and not the prohibition of less than the threshold. So that inference from Maimonides, in my view, is incorrect. There is another point that later authorities (Acharonim) raise here: Maimonides writes about all of these that he is “exempt.” Right? Also one who uprooted and did not place, one who placed and did not uproot, and one who transferred less than the required measure — about all of these Maimonides says he is exempt. Now in the language of Maimonides — I referred you to this — in the language of Maimonides, the word “exempt,” Maimonides said in the Laws of Sabbath, means a rabbinic prohibition. Here I brought the relevant laws, you see? Maimonides here — every place, this is chapter 1 in Maimonides — every place, law 2: “Wherever it is said in the Laws of Sabbath that one who does this act is liable, behold he is liable to karet, and if there were witnesses and warning, he is liable to stoning, and if unintentional, he is liable to a sin-offering.” That is the Torah prohibition. Law 3: “And wherever it is said that one who does…”

[Speaker C] Wait, but you’re getting cut off again. And Yiska isn’t here either. Yiska really dropped off.

[Speaker E] Wonders of the weather. Rabbi, can I ask something before you read Maimonides to us?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, is it okay now? Can you hear me?

[Speaker E] Yes, yes, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I changed something now; I hope it will work.

[Speaker E] Okay. Can I ask for a second before you start reading about “exempt but prohibited”? Because explicitly in Maimonides, in the definition of what he called earlier, what is the measure of the labor? “The useful measure.” Now he didn’t write a quantity measure; he said “the useful measure,” so that could also mean a small amount that is useful.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what are you talking about? The opposite. He is speaking only about the measure, and the measure must be — how do we determine the prohibited measure? When what you transferred is something significant, something useful to have in the public domain.

[Speaker E] Maybe it’s some kind of reinterpretation? Maybe one could say that Maimonides is saying there is a useful measure of labor?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, clearly not. Look at his wording. Let’s read it again: “One who transfers from domain to domain is not liable until the following things are fulfilled: that he transfer the useful measure, from the private domain to the public domain or from the public domain to the private domain, and he uproot from this domain and place in the second domain.” That means that all the definitions of the act appear afterward, and “the useful measure” speaks only about the measure of what is being transferred. All right? Now, however, here in the laws, in chapter 1,

[Speaker B] in the laws…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] laws 2 through 4, Maimonides is basically speaking about the meaning of the terms exempt, liable, and permitted. So in law 2 he speaks about a Torah prohibition. He says: “Wherever it is said in the Laws of Sabbath that one who does this act is liable, behold he is liable to karet. And if there were witnesses and warning, he is liable to stoning, and if unintentional, he is liable to a sin-offering.” That is a Torah prohibition. Law 3: “And wherever it is said that one who does this act is exempt, behold he is exempt from karet and from stoning and from the offering, but it is prohibited to do that act on the Sabbath, and its prohibition is by the words of the Sages, as a safeguard from labor, and one who does it intentionally is given disciplinary lashes. And likewise wherever it is said ‘one does not do such-and-such’ or ‘it is prohibited to do such-and-such on the Sabbath,’ one who does that thing intentionally is given disciplinary lashes.” So here he says that when it says “exempt,” it means a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker E] And then he…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] says in law 4: “Wherever it is said ‘it is permitted to do such-and-such,’ behold it is permitted from the outset” — meaning that there is not even a rabbinic prohibition; it is completely permitted. Okay? So according to this, if I go back to the law we just read, Maimonides here speaks both about one who uproots alone and one who places alone, and also about one who transfers less than the required measure, and about all of them he says “exempt.” That means a rabbinic prohibition. Now in one case — where someone only uprooted or only placed — that really is the rabbinic prohibition of two people doing it together. But one who transferred less than the measure is a case of less than the threshold, and less than the threshold is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic prohibition. So why does he write “exempt”? And that is how quite a few later authorities infer from Maimonides that in Sabbath prohibitions, in his opinion, there is no prohibition of less than the threshold. He too agrees with the Chacham Tzvi, that this applies only to eating prohibitions, and for Sabbath prohibitions there is no prohibition of less than the threshold. Otherwise he would not have written here “exempt,” but rather “prohibited by Torah law.” I do not agree with that inference. In my opinion — or at least it is certainly not necessary — because I think that when Maimonides says “exempt,” he means exempt from punishment. There can still be a prohibition without punishment. Maimonides is saying: even when there is no Torah prohibition because the exemption is due to there being no prohibition at all, there is still a rabbinic prohibition. But that doesn’t mean there are no situations in which one is exempt from punishment yet a Torah prohibition still remains. As in less than the threshold. Because exemption, as he himself explains, after all “wherever it is said…” Come, look at the beginning of the section. “Wherever it is said that one who does this act is exempt” — what does exempt mean? The term “exempt” itself — what is its meaning?

[Speaker C] Exempt from…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] karet, from stoning, from an offering. Exempt from karet, from stoning, or from an offering. Exempt from punishment. Right? “Exempt” does not mean there is no prohibition. “Exempt” means that if you did it, you are exempt from punishment; that is the literal meaning. Therefore I say that the inference from Maimonides is not necessary. It may be that he does hold of less than the threshold, and that less than the threshold is a Torah prohibition even on the Sabbath, and the fact that it appears in the same list does not mean that uprooting or placing are also less than the threshold. I disagree, in short, with both inferences.

[Speaker C] But here he says that this is a rabbinic prohibition because it is an extension of the Torah prohibition, because he says it is “a safeguard from labor.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but still it is rabbinic according to his view, and I’m saying it is not necessarily rabbinic.

[Speaker F] Why? But he writes explicitly, “its prohibition is by the words of the Sages.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Its prohibition is by the words of the Sages” means also in a place where there is not a Torah prohibition because “exempt” is written due to there being no prohibition, not only no punishment. Still, know that a rabbinic prohibition certainly exists there; at least a rabbinic prohibition will exist. But he does not mean to say that every place where one is exempt is necessarily only a rabbinic prohibition. “Exempt” means exempt from punishment, period. What remains is a prohibition — if not a Torah prohibition, then at least a rabbinic prohibition. I think that is what he means to say.

[Speaker G] That isn’t clear from the plain sense of his words. It’s not simple. The plain sense of what he says is that when they say “exempt,” there is no such thing as it still being prohibited by Torah law. “Exempt” means prohibited rabbinically.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I disagree. But fine.

[Speaker G] But that is the plain sense of what he says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think so. I think what he means to say is, “but it is prohibited to do it on the Sabbath.” Then he means to say: what does it mean that they prohibited it? If the original prohibition remained and only the punishment was removed, then there is no need to say that though exempt it still remains prohibited. What he wanted to say is only that even where the exemption stems from the fact that there is no Torah prohibition, there will still be a prohibition here, and its prohibition is by the words of the Sages. In my view that is reasonable; one can definitely read it that way too. That is also why he says “behold he is exempt from karet and from stoning” — why doesn’t he simply say that wherever someone who does this act is exempt, it means that its prohibition is by the words of the Sages? Why all this length? “Behold he is exempt from karet, and from stoning, and from the offering, but it is prohibited…” Let him say: wherever “exempt” is written, it means exempt but prohibited by the words of the Sages, that’s all. Because he is coming to explain the literal meaning. The literal meaning of the word “exempt” is exempt from punishment. Period. That is what “exempt” means. And it is obvious that this is the literal meaning.

[Speaker D] Then why does he need to add that it is prohibited by the words of the Sages?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He comes to tell you: know that even when “exempt” is written and the reason he is exempt from punishment is because he did not violate the prohibition, that does not mean there is no prohibition, because there is a prohibition by the words of the Sages. But that’s how he should have said it, more precisely.

[Speaker D] He wasn’t precise.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that is odd. But there are cases where exemption from punishment is not because there is no prohibition, but simply exemption from punishment, as with less than the threshold. In such a place there is no need to create a rabbinic prohibition; it is prohibited because a Torah prohibition exists. I didn’t understand the intermediate point at all.

[Speaker G] Maybe one can understand it from law 4, because in law 4 he writes that there is such a thing as “permitted from the outset,” that “permitted” means permitted from the outset, and therefore when something is prohibited it could mean prohibited from the outset even though there is no punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that is obvious. The question is whether the prohibition from the outset is rabbinic or Torah-based. It can also be Torah-based.

[Speaker G] That’s why I’m saying maybe from law 4 you can see that he does make…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It may be that there is a distinction. No, I don’t see any proof from law 4. Law 4 says that anything permitted is permitted from the outset, meaning as distinct from “exempt.” But what is “exempt”? “Exempt” can mean only a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker C] I’m claiming it is not necessarily rabbinic, but that’s another debate; I don’t see why law 4 changes anything here. Maybe one can see from the fact that he is given disciplinary lashes that this refers to a rabbinic prohibition and not a Torah one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t agree with that either, and there are proofs for this. In Maimonides — and this is exactly my next point — “he is given disciplinary lashes.” The later authorities usually say: here is proof that this is rabbinic. Not true. In several places Maimonides writes that there are disciplinary lashes wherever there is no Torah punishment. A rabbinic prohibition, or for example a positive commandment — someone who neglected a positive commandment has no punishment; punishment exists only for violating a prohibition. For neglecting a positive commandment there is no punishment, so he is given disciplinary lashes. Or a prohibition that does not involve an act, or all kinds of such prohibitions that carry no punishment — one is given disciplinary lashes. On the contrary, this strengthens even more what I said earlier: that here Maimonides does not mean specifically words of the Sages. He means: this is at least by the words of the Sages, if not Torah law. There will be disciplinary lashes here; only punishment in the formal sense there is not. You are exempt from the offering, from karet, and from stoning. From that you are exempt. Beyond that — it depends: Torah law, rabbinic law. In my view this is not an inference at all. And also the inference of the Sefat Emet, who infers from Maimonides because it is all in one list — one who only uprooted, one who only placed, and one who transferred less than the required measure — that too is not an inference. Because these three examples only come to tell us that in each of them one component is missing, a component required for the prohibition to be a Torah prohibition. Therefore there is no regular prohibition, no regular labor prohibition. Rather what? There is some other prohibition for which one is not liable to stoning, karet, or a sin-offering. What is that prohibition? It depends. If it is only uprooting or only placing, it is the prohibition of two people doing it together. If it is transferring less than the threshold, it is the Torah prohibition of less than the threshold. It does not have to be the same prohibition. The reason they appear on the same list is because that list is coming to say that in all these cases there is no Torah labor prohibition that incurs stoning and karet. In that sense it is one list, that’s all.

[Speaker F] Yes, but could one maybe say that transferring from domain to domain is some kind of labor such that… in terms of less than the threshold, once one doesn’t transfer the useful measure, it’s not even called labor? Meaning it’s not like when I cook half a threshold or sort half a threshold.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then why is there a rabbinic prohibition there? What rabbinic prohibition is there?

[Speaker F] No, and therefore there is no prohibition there of less than the threshold.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then what prohibition is there? After all, Maimonides says “exempt but prohibited.”

[Speaker F] There is a rabbinic prohibition there, like someone who only uprooted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What rabbinic prohibition is there? Where is the labor? No — where does it come from? Where does it come from?

[Speaker F] From someone who only uprooted or only placed? Some law of half a labor like that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that is two people doing it together. But with less than the threshold, there is no two-people-doing-it-together. You need a source. You can’t invent a rabbinic prohibition without a source. And after all, that is what the Sefat Emet said: in the Gemara there is no source for saying that less than the threshold is prohibited on the Sabbath.

[Speaker F] But if someone sorts half a threshold, that is prohibited rabbinically. Who said? That’s what is written in the Gemara. It was written on 74. Meaning, who said it’s permitted? That’s what is written in the Gemara.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, that every…

[Speaker C] the whole labor, just on a smaller quantity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once there is no threshold, then it should be permitted, because there is no prohibition. You want to introduce a prohibition — where does it come from? Either from the law of less than the threshold, in which case it is a Torah prohibition, or from two people doing it together, or from who knows what category. But there is no such category. So where does Maimonides get that it is “exempt”? Exempt but prohibited.

[Speaker F] Wait, less than the threshold in sorting, for example? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That…

[Speaker F] is prohibited rabbinically?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Clearly — Maimonides says it is prohibited rabbinically. The question is only where he gets that from. How do you know? What is the prohibiting category? So it is either less than the threshold or two people doing it together; I don’t know of any other categories. You can freely make up rabbinic categories, but then show me that there is such a decree. Therefore I say it has to be less than the threshold; there is nothing else here. But if it is less than the threshold, then it should be a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic one. So why did he write “exempt” here? He wrote “exempt” because he is exempt from punishment, that’s all.

[Speaker F] And on 74, when they speak about less than the threshold, is that less than the threshold by Torah law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Who said they are talking about less than the threshold? Rashi says there less than the threshold.

[Speaker F] Right, but it’s also very clear from the Gemara there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, for example the Chacham Tzvi would not agree.

[Speaker F] Not that it is the law of less than the threshold, but that on the Sabbath it is prohibited rabbinically to sort less than the threshold.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so it may be that there is a special decree regarding sorting less than the threshold, but there is no general law of less than the threshold for Sabbath labors. But they did not establish…

[Speaker F] Exactly!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear.

[Speaker F] They speak generally about baking too, both about baking and about this. Again…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I said earlier. I say that according to the Chacham Tzvi, there is no choice but to say this, because he said that there is no law of less than the threshold in prohibitions that are not eating prohibitions. So he will have to explain the Gemara there as some kind of special decree, I don’t know.

[Speaker F] And anyone who does not follow the Chacham Tzvi has to explain it as less than the threshold.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like Rashi there. And therefore Rashi — why does Rashi say it is under the law of less than the threshold? Let him say it is simply a law of less than the required measure in the laws of Sabbath. Because Rashi understands that if it is prohibited, it must be because of less than the threshold. There has to be some category because of which it is prohibited — where does it come from? So Rashi says it is under the law of less than the threshold. So also when Maimonides says that it is prohibited, it is presumably because of less than the threshold. From where else? But if it is less than the threshold, then it should be a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic one — only exempt from punishment.

[Speaker F] And throughout the Laws of Sabbath, does Maimonides speak about less than the threshold as rabbinic? Meaning, does he write “exempt”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Wherever he writes it already — here, for example, he writes it. Yes. All right? So now regarding… so what comes out for us? With regard to two people doing it together, the Sefat Emet asked: why should this not also be prohibited under the law of less than the threshold? And what does he answer? He basically answers that under the law of less than the threshold, one cannot prohibit half a labor. And that means, first of all, that someone who uproots and that’s all — he only uprooted — or someone who only placed, did not violate the prohibition of less than the threshold, nor the prohibition of two people doing it together. Meaning, someone who only uproots or only places, that would seemingly be completely permitted. Notice — that is a practical ramification. Completely permitted. Okay? If one person uproots and the second places, then under the law of two people doing it together both violate a rabbinic prohibition. Under the law of two people doing it together. But the law of less than the threshold does not apply here, because each of them individually only uprooted or only placed, and with that there is no law of less than the threshold. So only the law of two people doing it together. But if someone transferred out — both uprooted and placed — half the threshold, then he violated the prohibition of less than the threshold. Of course not two people doing it together — he violated less than the threshold. All right? That is what comes out in conclusion.

[Speaker G] No, sorry, I didn’t understand. If there was only an uprooting and in practice no placing happened, then he did not violate even the law of two people doing it together. But if there was an uprooting and someone else did the placing, then he did violate the law of two people doing it together?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. They both violated the rule of two people doing it together, which is a rabbinic prohibition. Why? What the Talmud says here is that, after all, the labor came out from between them. In the end, a labor was actually carried out by the two of them together. So the rabbis say: both of you are responsible for what happened here, therefore you violated a prohibition. But if one person lifted it and afterward there was no placement at all, then no labor came out here, even if you combine several people. The prohibited labor was not done at all here, so what’s the problem? There’s no Torah-level prohibition here, no rabbinic prohibition, nothing. But if someone carried out, lifted and placed less than the minimum measure, then he violated the prohibition of half a measure. According to Chacham Tzvi, no, but according to the… okay? And that is a Torah prohibition. Now there is Pnei Yehoshua, who takes us one step further. Pnei Yehoshua writes in two places that in the law of two people doing it together, he prefaces by saying that in the law of two people doing it together there is a Torah prohibition, just like with half a measure. The exemption is only an exemption from punishment. And of course he understands the law of two people doing it together the way I presented it in the first approach in the previous lecture. What? That when the Talmud asked, “after all, the labor came out from between them,” what does that mean? It means that in actual reality, in the world, the problematic act was done, right? A full act of carrying-out was done in the world. It’s just that there are two people here who are together responsible for it. I don’t have one single person to punish for what happened here. So what comes out of this? A prohibition was committed, but there is an exemption from punishment. There is an exemption from punishment. And that is exactly what Pnei Yehoshua says: if so, in the law of two people doing it together, the prohibition that applies to each of the two is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic prohibition. It’s just that they are exempt from the punishment, from stoning, karet, a sin-offering, and the like. That is basically Pnei Yehoshua’s claim. And he brings Rashi. Rashi on the Mishnah. Rashi writes, “two that are four.” Rashi says that there are not four; rather, by rabbinic enactment they added two to forbid ab initio, and if one did it, he is exempt. Okay? A rabbinic prohibition, by rabbinic enactment. “By rabbinic enactment” is rabbinic language. Okay? And here too, “two that are four outside,” so Rashi says, “and two are by rabbinic enactment.” Further, two are by rabbinic enactment, for which one is exempt, because the labor is done by two people. And on that Pnei Yehoshua says: apparently this is not necessary. What Rashi says is not compelling. For we can say that by Torah law too it is forbidden in the case where this one lifts and that one places. And “this one lifts and that one places” would be a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic prohibition, the prohibition of two people doing it together. For from the fact that we needed a textual exclusion for “this one lifts and that one places”—after all, from the fact that we needed the verse “when one does it,” which teaches us that in the case of this one lifting and that one placing there is an exemption—from here it follows that there is reason to say that each act by itself is also called labor, since presumably that is how it was in the Tabernacle, as Tosafot wrote on the nearby page on “when one does it,” etc. And if so, we can say that the verse excludes “this one lifts and that one places” only from karet and a sin-offering, since the verse “when one does it” is speaking about that, but with regard to the prohibition itself, it remains in force. It remains as it stands. Since that was how it was in the Tabernacle, and it is included in the verse “you shall not do labor” as it was there. He is making the following claim—pay attention, this has to be followed carefully. He wants to say that from the fact that a verse was needed in order to exempt two people from punishment in the case of “this one lifts and that one places,” it is obvious that there was some initial assumption to obligate in such a case. Therefore the verse was needed to exempt. What was the initial assumption to obligate? Now pay very close attention to what he writes. This is not what I said. I said what the Talmud said. What was the initial assumption to obligate? Because the labor came out from between them, right? After all, between the two of them a labor was in fact done. There was lifting, transfer, and placement. So practically speaking, what the Torah forbade was done here. That is the reason to obligate. And then the Torah comes and says: yes, but there is no punishment, because here both of them are responsible for it; there isn’t one person who is responsible for this labor. Pnei Yehoshua does not say that. Pnei Yehoshua claims that the initial assumption—the reason why I thought to obligate even for lifting alone—is because I ask myself: was lifting present in the Tabernacle? Lifting alone. Obviously it was. After all, when I took the beams, say, from the wagon to the public domain and so on, one person lifted and placed it on the wagon, someone else received it. So that means there was one person who lifted and one person who placed, and that was in the Tabernacle. So that means lifting alone existed in the Tabernacle, right? Except what? Apparently that is not important enough. We talked about this—that in order to be a primary category, or in order to be prohibited labor, it also has to be significant; it’s not enough that it existed in the Tabernacle. People also walked in the Tabernacle, right? So the fact that someone lifted—that was in the Tabernacle. So there was an initial assumption that maybe even that would actually count as labor. Then the verse comes and says no. Lifting by itself is not labor; you need lifting and placement—lifting, transfer, and placement. Okay? Pnei Yehoshua says: fine, but since it was in the Tabernacle, then it certainly counts as labor. There is only an exemption from punishment. That is what the verse “when one does it” exempts—from punishment. And therefore there will be a Torah prohibition here. What is the difference between his formulation and mine? In his formulation he claims there is a Torah prohibition here because it was in the Tabernacle! After all, in the Tabernacle too there was someone who only lifted. So in the case of two people doing it together, where one lifts and one places, each one is liable simply because one is liable for lifting alone and one is liable for placing alone, and therefore both are liable. But the basic liability is not for lifting and placement together; the basic liability is just for lifting and just for placement.

[Speaker I] So what, someone who lifts on the Sabbath violates a prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what comes out.

[Speaker I] So if that’s the case, according to his view, then really according to his view there isn’t any issue here specifically of carrying-out. The very act of lifting, placing—really anything, any simple labor act that was done, even if it seems like a weak or deficient labor, would be called a Torah prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. There is a Torah prohibition, but among the primary categories of labor for which one is liable to stoning and a sin-offering, that is only when everything is done together—carrying-out, transfer, and placement. The verse “when one does it” teaches us that punishment—that is, a full-fledged prohibited labor—exists only when there was also… that’s why the labor is called carrying-out. The labor is called carrying-out because one is liable for it only when there was a complete act of carrying-out. But a Torah prohibition exists even in a place where someone did only the lifting or only the placement.

[Speaker F] So what, we’re all violating a Torah prohibition all the time?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. That’s why here it is obvious that we have to say what I said earlier: we are talking about lifting and transfer, not lifting alone. Lifting alone is obviously not a Torah prohibition.

[Speaker E] Was that the way you tried to explain Maimonides? What? Based on Pnei Yehoshua—that it’s not an exemption meaning it is only rabbinically forbidden, but rather that it is forbidden by Torah law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I changed it. Regarding Maimonides I said that about half a measure; now one could say it in Maimonides also about two people who did it.

[Speaker E] About half a labor, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker F] What do you mean? But if someone lifts and just stands there like that until after the Sabbath ends?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, someone lifts and transfers but does not place.

[Speaker F] And no one else takes it, because otherwise that would be two people doing it together.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right.

[Speaker D] So also someone who transfers and places—the same thing, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if he does transfer and placement without lifting, yes, same thing. I’m only saying that lifting alone and placement alone obviously would not involve a Torah prohibition; there wouldn’t be any prohibition at all. There has to be transfer here as well; there’s no other way to explain it. Right. So I’m saying—but pay attention to his wording. I don’t agree with him at all, because when I argued that in the case of two people doing it together there is a Torah prohibition, it was not because the lifting existed in the Tabernacle, but because a complete labor was actually done here. There was lifting, transfer, and placement. The only problem is that two people did it, so you can’t punish them. But the labor was fully done. But to do only lifting—so what if it existed in the Tabernacle? People also walked in the Tabernacle. Where do you get such a thing from? What he says is extremely strange. So his reasoning for saying it is a Torah prohibition means that the difference between us would be what happens if I did lifting and transfer but there was no placement. According to my approach, there is no prohibition. No prohibition at all—it would be permitted ab initio; there wouldn’t even be a rabbinic prohibition. You would have half a labor; there is no prohibition at all. There is no half-measure here because this is half a labor. The whole prohibition is the prohibition of two people doing it together. But that is when there is a complete labor, except that each one is responsible for half of it. But the labor came out from between them. The Talmud itself says that. Why does the Talmud want to obligate in the case of two people doing it together? Not because of Pnei Yehoshua’s reasoning that lifting too existed in the Tabernacle. Otherwise the Talmud should have said: why are two people doing it together exempt, after all lifting too existed in the Tabernacle? It does not ask that. It asks why two people doing it together are exempt, since after all the labor came out from between them. After all, in the end a complete labor was done here—lifting, transfer, and placement—only there are two people who did it. So what? To that the Talmud brings “when one does it”: the verse teaches that if two people did it, then you cannot punish them because the responsibility is not on one person. But still, the problematic thing was done here—the full act of carrying-out. That is the more correct reasoning. That is how I would explain that in the case of two people doing it together there is a Torah prohibition. So here I do not agree with Pnei Yehoshua. But I do accept Pnei Yehoshua’s basic claim, that in the case of two people doing it together there is room to say that when it says “exempt,” that means exempt from punishment, but the prohibition is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker I] Pnei Yehoshua, by claiming that lifting was done in the Tabernacle, is essentially rejecting both the argument of two people doing it together and half a measure—in his view there isn’t really such a…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he says: but after all, one is not liable to stoning for that, so it is not a complete labor prohibition—even he agrees to that. For lifting alone one is not liable; the Talmud says that. You need lifting, transfer, and placement. Therefore he says there is a Torah prohibition here, but it is not a labor prohibition in the full sense. It is like half a measure: a Torah prohibition, but without the punishment—not a full Torah prohibition. Right. Okay?

[Speaker F] So according to the view that it is permitted as long as there was no placement—it’s permitted—that’s exactly what Rabbi Shimon Shkop asks there: if I start eating half a measure, it’s permitted, and then suddenly retroactively it turns out that I ate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re going back to the Sefat Emet’s difficulty, and I’ll repeat his answer. It’s not the same thing. Because with half a measure, when I eat, the second half that I do is the same as the first half, just more quantity. I simply ate another half-measure. So that proves that already in the first half the quality of the prohibition was there. But here, when I lifted and transferred, what is missing is not more lifting and transfer. What is missing is something of a different type—not only quantitative, but also qualitative.

[Speaker F] But that’s even harder, because when I’m eating it’s obvious that I’m already eating a complete prohibition, and as long as I haven’t eaten it, then how does it suddenly become clear retroactively that I ate it? And here it’s like—it’s obvious that as long as I’m lifting and transferring I haven’t done a prohibition, and only when I place it does it suddenly turn out that I did.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Obviously. Obviously. Very logical, because lifting and placement together combine into something that is not just a greater quantity than lifting alone or placement alone; it is something else. You need another component here. And if that component is missing, then you simply do not have the labor of carrying-out at all. But when I eat—say I lifted and placed, but only a half-measure—then nothing is missing. I completely performed the labor of carrying-out; I just did it with too small a quantity. That is similar to eating half a measure. That is exactly the difference between a case where the second thing I am adding is the same thing as the first, only quantitatively different. Then one can make the argument of Rabbi Shimon Shkop and Kovetz Shiurim, who say: fine, if it is only a quantitative difference, then the quality of the prohibition already exists from the beginning. But here that is certainly not true. Maybe when I got up in the morning and ate breakfast, that too was a prohibition, because if I hadn’t eaten breakfast I wouldn’t have had the strength to carry this out. What are you talking about? That has nothing to do with it. I did not begin the prohibited action. Okay? After that he brings from Maimonides, and indeed it would seem at first glance from the wording of Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah, where he explicitly wrote that both of them are exempt in the Mishnah—that what it says, that both are exempt in the Mishnah, means exempt from death, karet, and a sin-offering. But they are liable to lashes. That implies as I explained—that this is a Torah prohibition. And for this prohibition one is liable to lashes—that’s an interesting novelty. For this prohibition one is liable to lashes. There is no stoning here, because it was excluded from the punishment of stoning, but since there is a Torah prohibition here, one is liable to lashes. If you remember the Lechem Mishneh that we saw, he said that this is a positive commandment, and therefore there are no lashes here either. But the truth is that Pnei Yehoshua is not right. In the text of Maimonides that we have before us, if you look in the Commentary on the Mishnah on our Mishnah, you will see that Maimonides explicitly writes that we are talking about disciplinary lashes, not biblical lashes. It is disciplinary lashes. Disciplinary lashes are either for a rabbinic prohibition or for a Torah prohibition for which one is not formally punished, but it is not biblical lashes. He simply had a different version, or he didn’t notice—I don’t know exactly. Also on the Talmud on page 3a—

[Speaker C] No, he didn’t have a different version. What? He had the correct version, because later on he speaks about disciplinary lashes. Does he speak later about that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he says maybe it’s disciplinary lashes, but he says that in Maimonides it says lashes.

[Speaker C] But here it is. That’s what he meant in his commentary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In his code he wrote explicitly that they are liable to disciplinary lashes.

[Speaker C] He wrote explicitly that they are liable to disciplinary lashes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “His code” means the Mishneh Torah. And in the Commentary on the Mishnah too it says disciplinary lashes, and there he said it says lashes. When he says “his code,” he means the Mishneh Torah. Also on the Talmud on page 3a he repeats that this is a Torah prohibition and not merely a rabbinic prohibition, only that it is exempt from punishment. Okay? That is his claim there as well. We won’t read it again; it’s the same idea. The Rashash here on the spot brings Rashi. Rashi says: exemptions that can lead to a Torah prohibition. Therefore in the Mishnah they spoke only about liftings and not about placements, because they were speaking only about liftings—only about half-prohibitions that can lead to a Torah prohibition. “It seems to my humble opinion,” says the Rashash, “that according to what we hold, namely that half a measure is forbidden by Torah law—according to the way we rule in practice, that half a measure is forbidden by Torah law—and even in Sabbath prohibitions, as Rashi explains later on page 74, the Talmud calls such a case a half-measure, and in Yoma it explains the reason, that it is fit to combine; and this applies only to liftings. Therefore the placements of our Mishnah are not counted, because it only counts Torah prohibitions.” The Rashash is basically bringing here the answer that the Sefat Emet rejected. Right? He is basically saying that someone who lifted and did not place violated the prohibition of half a measure, and this would be a Torah prohibition, just as Rashi writes that even in Sabbath prohibitions there is a rule of half a measure by Torah law. And therefore, according to Rashi, the Mishnah spoke only about liftings and not about placements, because the Mishnah spoke about situations where there is a Torah prohibition. Why is he not right?

[Speaker G] Because the lifting—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is half a labor, not half a measure. And what Rashi writes on page 74—Rashi there is not speaking about half a labor. He is speaking about a complete labor done with half a measure: lifting and placement of half a measure. Therefore you can’t bring proofs from Rashi there to our issue. Rashi there really does say that there is a rule of half a measure in the laws of Sabbath. That is true, but when the problem on the Sabbath is only a quantitative lack in the required measure. And when there is something missing in the labor itself, it is very implausible to apply here the rule of—

[Speaker G] half a measure. I didn’t understand what the Rashash is saying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Rashash is basically saying what the Sefat Emet rejects. The Rashash argues that since in Sabbath prohibitions there is a rule of half a measure—we see this in Rashi on page 74—therefore it is obvious that here in our Mishnah, when it says one person lifted and the second placed, that person who lifted violated a Torah prohibition of half a measure. The person who placed violated a rabbinic prohibition. Why?

[Speaker G] Why does he write here, “this applies only to liftings”? No, “this applies only to liftings.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s it, that’s—

[Speaker G] What I was trying to understand is that it means “only to liftings.” In Talmudic style, you have to get used to that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Talmudic language, “only” is expressed that way. This applies only to liftings. I got confused whether it meant “just” or “only.” Yes, yes, you’re right—in our Hebrew it’s different, but in the language of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim), in Talmudic style, “just” means “only.” Okay? So that’s what the Rashash is basically saying. He disagrees with the Sefat Emet. In my opinion the Sefat Emet is plainly correct. The Sefat Emet is certainly correct, and therefore all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) here explain that this is a rabbinic prohibition. It is not a Torah prohibition on the one who lifted; it is a rabbinic prohibition of two people doing it together, not a rule of half a measure, because there is no rule of half a measure for half a labor. In my opinion the Sefat Emet is clearly right. In any case, now one final comment, which I’ll really go through briefly because it’s a side issue. In the Talmud on page 92—the Mishnah on page 92 and the whole Talmudic discussion there—let’s just look at the Mishnah for a moment, just to get a taste of it. The Mishnah on page 92 says as follows: one who carries out a loaf into the public domain is liable; if two people carried it out, they are exempt. What is the case there? Two people are holding one loaf together, they lift it in the private domain, go out to the public domain, and place it there. Okay?

[Speaker C] They both lifted and they both placed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, both are exempt. If one person could not carry it out by himself, and two people carried it out, then they are liable. Meaning, if each one by himself cannot manage to carry this loaf—it is heavy—and therefore he needed the help of the other, in that case both are liable. And Rabbi Shimon exempts. Rabbi Shimon exempts even in that case. And then the Talmud brings a dispute among the Tannaim and discusses this: this one can and this one can, this one can and this one cannot, this one cannot and this one cannot—all the discussions there, and they make distinctions within the dispute. I’m not going into all of that because that’s not our topic. The interesting question is: why is that not our topic? First of all, it’s clear when you read the passages that it is not our topic, because in our topic the question never even arises whether this one can and this one can, this one can and this one cannot—all those discussions do not arise. Second, you can see in the Talmud there, when it brings the source for these two laws. And the Talmud says like this: from where are these things derived? From where are these things derived? Where do we know all these laws from? Let’s leave the context aside for now; it’s not important. “When one does it”—there is a verse, “when one does it”: one who does all of it, and not one who does part of it. And then, “if two were holding a pitchfork”—I don’t remember exactly there—and two do the whole labor together, okay? That’s the exposition they bring.

[Speaker C] Right, but that’s not similar to carrying-out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, just a second—exactly, it’s not similar to carrying-out, but hold on, now watch what comes next. “What are they arguing about?” Here—look at this—what are the Tannaim arguing about? Again, the opinions themselves matter less for us; just look at the passage. They are arguing about this verse. It says, “If one person among the common people sins unintentionally by doing it”—you see the word “one,” and we saw this verse here earlier. And Rabbi Shimon holds: three exclusions are written here. There are three exclusions written in this verse: “person,” “sins,” “one,” “sins,” “by doing it,” “sins.” One excludes this one lifting and that one placing; one excludes this one can and this one can; and one excludes this one cannot and this one cannot. Three exclusions that come to exclude three things, all of which are exempt. The first is this one lifts and that one places. The second is this one can and this one can. The third is this one cannot and this one cannot. What is the difference between the first and the other two? In the other two, two people are doing the whole action together, and the distinctions are whether each one by himself could have done it or could not have done it. That is the topic on page 92. But the first exclusion speaks about this one lifting and that one placing. Why do you need a different exclusion for that? Why do you need a separate exposition for that? Why do you need a different exposition to exclude that? Because it is not the same law. It is a different law. It is not the law of two people doing it together. Two people doing it together means two people together do the whole labor. This one lifts and that one places is not two people doing it together. Each one did half; it is not two people doing the whole labor. And from the fact that the Talmud derives a separate source for this law, you see that it is a completely different law. That is the Sefat Emet’s distinction. Here you see it. Why? Because this is exactly what the Sefat Emet says: half a labor is not half a measure. When two people do the entire labor, one could ask: maybe there would be a prohibition of half a measure here. But when one person does half a labor and the second does another half of the labor, what does that have to do with half a measure? Neither of them did a complete labor. It has nothing to do with it. It is not a complete labor on half a measure; it is half of the labor. That is exactly the Talmud’s distinction here. And Tosafot says this in our passage, and with that I’ll finish.

[Speaker D] Sorry, Rabbi, maybe it’s similar to the case where two people put leaven into starter dough, something like that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What did I understand?

[Speaker D] There they’re doing, as it were, the same thing. Each one does an action where he causes—I don’t know—the starter or something to ferment, and it happens.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When two people do the action and each one by himself contributes half, that is two people doing it together.

[Speaker D] But if one—even if each one does it separately, they didn’t carry the same box together, but still they did the same thing. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Since each one did the full action on half the quantity. Yes, then that is like half a measure.

[Speaker E] Is that like “this and that together cause it”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question of the connection between two people doing it together and “this and that together cause it” is a difficult question. I can’t answer it simply. Okay?

[Speaker F] It’s a little similar to how partnership in land is described. Is every grain fifty-fifty, or are we fifty-fifty in the land?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but here it’s even worse, because I’m talking about different grains of the same land.

[Speaker F] Yes, always grains.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you go with the fifty-fifty idea, then you divide—

[Speaker F] the courtyard into half and half.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I mean different—not identical. There is land of one type and land of another type. So it’s more similar to this one lifts and that one places.

[Speaker F] Different land? Why does the type matter?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The type matters because it’s like the fermenting case they mentioned earlier. Because if both of them ferment the same starter, and it is half of the same thing, then it’s the same thing as half a measure. Look in Tosafot.

[Speaker G] I didn’t understand what the other verse is. There’s only one verse about “when one does it”—what are we talking about?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are three derivations from it, right, and there are three different exclusions from it. Why do you need to exclude each such case separately? Each word in the verse excludes something else. So there are three expositions here that exclude. Why do you need a separate exposition? Is two people doing it together this? No, no—that’s not this; it’s something else.

[Speaker G] So two people doing it together is not connected to “when one does it”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is connected. “When one does it” excludes three things: this one can and this one can, this one cannot and this one cannot, and this one lifts and that one places. And these are three different laws. Each one separately needs an exclusion. Got it. Okay? And Tosafot says this in our passage on “when one does it.” In all the books the reading is: one who does all of it, and not one who does part of it; an individual who did it is liable, two people who did it together are exempt. This is connected to the discussion we had—whether one of these two laws is written here or maybe both are written. The plain meaning of the verse seems to be that “when one does it” refers to the person, but the Talmud expounds it about the labor. And I explained that in the previous lecture. Now he says: and you cannot say that it is speaking about two who did it together simultaneously—two people doing it together means simultaneously. You can’t say that. Why? Because in the chapter Ha-Matznia, page 93a, it implies that two verses are needed: one for this one lifting and that one placing, and one for two people who did the labor simultaneously. After that he brings further proofs. This is exactly what I said earlier. So he notices that the passage there brings two different sources. And that means you can’t mix the passages together. Our passage is not dealing at all with the law of two people doing it together. It deals with the law of this one lifting and that one placing. The topic of two people doing it together is the passage on page 92. And there it is talking about two people who together do the whole labor from beginning to end—for example, they lift and place together the required measure. About that, the Sefat Emet and Pnei Yehoshua could ask: why not forbid that too under the rule of half a measure by Torah law? And indeed, according to Rashi, that would apparently be a Torah prohibition of half a measure. But here half a measure is irrelevant, because this is half a labor and not half a measure. Okay? That’s it.

[Speaker C] Thank you very much. Sabbath peace.

[Speaker D] Thank you very much, Rabbi. I wanted to ask something. Yes, yes. I tried to send a chat message—a little summary of what the Rabbi also noticed in the reading, that there was confusion there between chapter and law, and it apparently didn’t go through. I wrote it in the name of—