The Golden Chapter – Money and Monetary Acquisition – Lesson 7, Part B
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- [0:03] The Talmud: neshekh and tarbit — two names
- [1:30] The definition of neshekh according to the Talmud
- [3:27] The reverse example: value rises without neshekh
- [4:36] Halakhic assumption: do we follow the initial point in time?
- [6:05] A loan of goods versus a loan of value
- [8:03] Summary: the relevance of choosing the time of the loan
Summary
General Overview
The Talmud learns from the fact that the Torah calls the prohibition of interest by two names, neshekh and tarbit, that apparently there could be situations of neshekh without tarbit, or tarbit without neshekh, even though usually these are two sides of the same phenomenon. It tries to sketch cases in which the number of coins returned differs, while the value at the time of repayment ends up equal, and rejects the possibility of separating them because you cannot follow the initial point for one aspect and the final point for the other. The Ran rules that we follow the initial point, and therefore stipulating one hundred to be repaid as one hundred and twenty is Torah-level neshekh and tarbit even if the rate changed so that in practice the value became equal. From this emerges a fundamental understanding that the discussion is built on viewing the loan as a loan of goods, not a loan of value.
Neshekh and Tarbit as Separate Concepts
The Talmud assumes that from the division into the two names neshekh and tarbit, there is an initial assumption that a person could violate neshekh without tarbit, or tarbit without neshekh, even though on the face of it any increase in the lender’s money necessarily involves taking from the borrower. It searches for a scenario in which the definition can be split into two planes that do not always overlap, and proposes an attempt to build cases in which the number of units is returned in excess or deficit while the value does not change.
An Attempt to Depict Neshekh Without Tarbit, and Its Rejection
The Talmud depicts a case of lending one hundred and receiving one hundred and twenty in copper perutot, where initially one hundred stood at a silver dinar, and in the end one hundred and twenty stood at a silver dinar, so that at the time of repayment the one hundred and twenty are worth what the one hundred had been worth at the time of the loan. It says that in such a case there is neshekh, because he lowers him, since he takes from him something he did not give — that is, the lender takes more coins than he gave. But there is no tarbit, because he has no profit in terms of the dinar: he lent a dinar and takes a dinar back, since the total value did not increase. The Talmud rejects this and says: in any case, if you follow the initial point, then there is both neshekh and tarbit; and if you follow the end, then there is neither neshekh nor tarbit. Therefore this is not a stable case of neshekh without tarbit.
An Attempt to Depict Tarbit Without Neshekh, and Its Rejection
The Talmud presents the reverse: he lends one hundred for one hundred, initially one hundred stood at a silver dinar, and in the end one hundred stood at a dinar and a fifth, so that the number of coins returned is identical but the value rose. It tries to say that here there would be tarbit without neshekh, just as the previous case was presented as neshekh without tarbit, but it rejects it in the same form: if you follow the initial point, there is neither neshekh nor tarbit, and if you follow the end, there is both neshekh and tarbit. It presents the two pictures as mirror images, one involving a stipulation of one hundred against one hundred and twenty with the rate falling, and the other one hundred against one hundred with the rate rising, and in both the possibility of separation is rejected.
The Ran’s Ruling and Its Implication for Understanding the Type of Loan
The Ran, in Chiddushei HaRan, rules: as a matter of law, we hold that we follow the initial point. Therefore, where he lent one hundred for one hundred and twenty, even though the perutot became cheaper and the one hundred and twenty came to stand at a dinar, nevertheless there is Torah-level neshekh and tarbit. He defines this as Torah-level interest even though in practice the value may become equal, because he understands that a loan of copper perutot is a loan of the perutot themselves, not a loan of value; and therefore the demand to return one hundred and twenty for one hundred is a real addition to the very object that was lent. From this he also projects to a parallel case of a se’ah of wheat and a se’ah and a half: even if in the end the rate changes so that the value becomes equal, the very demand for a se’ah and a half in return for a se’ah defines Torah-level interest when we are dealing with a loan of the wheat itself and not its value.
The Meaning of the Discussion of the Initial Point and the End, and the Connection to Se’ah-for-Se’ah, Produce, and Coinage
The concluding claim is that the very fact that the discussion is conducted around whether we follow the beginning or the end shows that the passage sees the loan as relating to the object itself and not only to value. Because if this were only a loan of value, one could simply say: I gave value and received value, so there is nothing to clarify. This remark is integrated with the context of se’ah-for-se’ah and with the distinction whether the thing is considered produce or coinage; and simply speaking, when copper is measured against silver, the copper is considered produce. The conclusion is that the main goal is to understand the nature of a se’ah-for-se’ah loan — whether it is goods, coinage, or produce — even if the discussion drifted into the laws of interest beyond the initial goal.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says that from the fact that the Torah calls this by two different names, neshekh and tarbit, apparently that implies there are situations in which I violate neshekh without tarbit, and situations in which I violate tarbit without neshekh. Usually that doesn’t work, right? If I increase my money, I took from you. And if I took from you, then my money increased. Meaning, these are two sides of the same coin. So the Talmud looks for a case where it could be that I violated neshekh but not tarbit, or the reverse. So the Talmud says: what is a case of neshekh without tarbit? If he lends one hundred for one hundred and twenty, right? He has copper perutot, I lend you one hundred copper perutot and I want you to return one hundred and twenty. Notice, this is the opposite case from se’ah-for-se’ah. I’m giving you — lending you — one hundred copper perutot, and from the outset I stipulate with you that you’ll return one hundred and twenty. Okay? But initially one hundred stood at a dinar, and in the end one hundred and twenty stood at a dinar. Meaning, in terms of value in silver dinars, the one hundred are worth the same as the one hundred and twenty at the time of repayment. In other words, in terms of value I didn’t take interest. Even though from the outset I wanted to stipulate interest with you — I gave you one hundred copper coins and said, return one hundred and twenty — so that’s interest. But somehow the market arranged things so that it’s worth the same. The one hundred and twenty are worth what the one hundred had been worth. So there is no interest here. Wait, in a second we’ll see tarbit. There’s no interest here. Right now, in a moment, we’ll see neshekh and tarbit. So the Talmud says there is neshekh here. Why? Because he diminishes him by taking from him something he did not give. All in all, you’re taking from him extra coins beyond what he received. One hundred and twenty — he received one hundred and you took one hundred and twenty, you took another twenty from him, you bit him. Tarbit is not here, because he has no profit in terms of the dinar; he lent a dinar and takes a dinar back from him. Tarbit isn’t here because your wealth did not increase. In the end, at the end of the day, it was a dinar and remained a dinar. Your wealth did not increase. There’s some assumption here that for tarbit, value determines things. For neshekh, value determines things. Okay? And therefore there is no neshekh here. For tarbit, value does not determine things. So that’s what the Talmud says. Then the Talmud rejects it. It says: after all, if you go after the beginning, if you go by the starting point at the time of the loan, then there is both neshekh and tarbit. And if you go after the end, then there is neither neshekh nor tarbit. If you go after the point in time of the loan, then there is neshekh and there is also tarbit; after all, you don’t know that the rate will change. When you stipulated with him that he should return one hundred and twenty against the one hundred he received, then there is both neshekh and tarbit here. In practice, at the time of repayment, he is really returning the same value he received, so in that case there is neither neshekh nor tarbit. So it says, whichever way you look at it, you can’t say that for neshekh we’ll go after the beginning and for tarbit we’ll go after the end. Make up your mind: if you go after the beginning, then there is both neshekh and tarbit. If you go after the end, then there is neither neshekh nor tarbit. Bottom line, you won’t manage to find a case of tarbit without neshekh. Okay? That’s what the Talmud says. And the same thing the other way around: and further, what is a case of tarbit without neshekh? If he lends one hundred for one hundred — right, now I lent you one hundred perutot and said you’ll return one hundred. Like se’ah-for-se’ah, but in copper perutot, which is money. Right? Initially one hundred stood at a dinar, and in the end one hundred stood at a dinar and a fifth. Meaning, the value of those one hundred perutot rose. The opposite of before. Now you’re returning to me the very same perutot you got — one hundred for one hundred — but the value is greater. So about that the Talmud says that here specifically there would be tarbit without neshekh; there it was neshekh without tarbit, here it’s tarbit without neshekh. And the Talmud rejects it in the same way. It says, not true: if you go after the beginning, then there is neither neshekh nor tarbit; if you go after the end, then there is both neshekh and tarbit. The reverse of our case. In our case, if you go after the beginning, there is both neshekh and tarbit, and if you go after the end, there is neither one nor the other. There it’s the reverse, but it doesn’t matter, because the picture is the reverse. We stipulated one hundred against one hundred and the rate rose; there we stipulated one hundred against one hundred and twenty and the rate fell. Okay, so these are just mirror images of each other. Now what is ruled in Jewish law? Do we go after the initial point or after the end? The practical difference, of course, is that if we go after the initial point, then it’s forbidden to lend one hundred and demand one hundred and twenty, because that’s both neshekh and tarbit. If we go after the end, then I have no problem — even if in the end the rate rose, then I… I lent one hundred and asked for one hundred back, the rate rose, so it rose. The Ran, in Chiddushei HaRan there on the spot, writes as follows: as a matter of law, we hold that we go after the initial point. So we rule as Jewish law that in this matter we go after the initial point. Therefore, where he lent one hundred for one hundred and twenty, even though the perutot became cheaper and the one hundred and twenty now stand at a dinar, despite that there is Torah-level neshekh and tarbit, because we go after the beginning. Here this is Torah-level neshekh and tarbit. Why? Because you gave one hundred and stipulated one hundred and twenty. True, the rate may change. And notice, he says that this is called Torah-level interest. Why is this Torah-level interest? Maybe the rate will change. This is not fixed interest. If the rate changes, maybe there won’t be interest here; if the rate doesn’t change, then there will be interest. And after all, we saw in our case that with a se’ah-for-se’ah loan, because I have a doubt whether the rate will change or not, this is not fixed interest; it’s only rabbinic interest. So why does he say that here it is Torah-level interest? Because he understands that a loan of one hundred copper perutot is not a loan of value; it is a loan of the copper perutot themselves. And if you want one hundred and twenty copper perutot back, there is Torah-level interest here. Say, for example, if I were to tell you: take a se’ah of wheat and return a se’ah and a half. In the end the rate changed, and the se’ah and a half are the same value as the se’ah was at the time of the loan — what would happen there? The Ran says that’s Torah-level interest, even though it too depends on the question of whether the rate changed or didn’t change. Why is that Torah-level interest? Because I asked you for a se’ah and a half back. Right? Meaning, the Ran takes the view that a se’ah-for-se’ah loan is a loan of the wheat, not a loan of the value. If it were a loan of the value, then at most it would be doubtful interest, or it wouldn’t be fixed interest, because the question whether the value you’re required to return is the same value or not depends on what the rate will be at that time. There’s a doubt here. But if you understand that the loan is speaking about the wheat itself — I lent you wheat — then if I want a se’ah and a half for the se’ah I lent you, that’s Torah-level interest. Why should I care what the value of the se’ah and a half will be? I’m relating to the wheat, not to the value of the wheat. So in the Ran you see very clearly that he took this as a loan of goods, not of value. And therefore he says this is Torah-level interest. By the way, even if you take the loan to be a loan of value, there is still room to hesitate. It may not be Torah-level interest, but it would be a doubt concerning Torah-level interest, like a doubtful psik reisha. It would not be rabbinic interest. Okay? That’s what we discussed last time, but he says this is definite Torah-level interest: there is Torah-level neshekh and tarbit. He’s not talking about a doubt. So clearly he takes the loan to be a loan of value. Now let me make one more comment and with this I’ll finish, because I already need to leave. This whole discussion of whether we follow the beginning or the end — what relevance does it have at all? After all, if I’m talking about the loan as value, then I gave you value and got value back. Why should I care whether it’s the beginning or the end or whatever? I received back the same value I gave you. What’s the problem? This whole discussion shows that basically we’re talking about a loan of wheat and not of the value of the wheat. If you’re talking to me about wheat, then you can start discussing whether we follow the beginning or the end, and then maybe se’ah-for-se’ah is still rabbinic, but there is an interest problem here. After all, if we’re going by a loan of value, what do you want? What happened? Nothing happened. You lent a certain value, you got back the same value, and that’s it. There’s no interest here at all, nothing.
[Speaker B] Something that’s considered produce, no? What? Something that’s considered produce?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Simply speaking, if you’re measuring it by its value against money, then the copper is produce. Yes, that’s the continuation of the Mishnah, by the way — that copper, relative to silver, is produce. Okay, look, after this there are still more details here, but I really can’t get into it, I need to leave. Look afterward in the summary, but that’s the claim. The very discussion we’re having — whether we go after the beginning or after the end — is seemingly a discussion that speaks to me about value. If it weren’t about value, why conduct it? On the other hand, when the Ran says that if we go after the initial point then there is definite tarbit and neshekh here, then he’s speaking about a loan of goods. So maybe that itself is the discussion: is this a loan of goods or a loan of value? If it’s a loan of value, then I don’t care whether it’s the initial point or the end. If it’s a loan of goods, then I do care. And then if we go after the initial point, there will be Torah-level neshekh and tarbit here. Okay, we’ll stop here. This is where I finish the topic of se’ah-for-se’ah. We got a little into interest, even though the goal wasn’t the laws of interest, but only to understand what a se’ah-for-se’ah loan is — whether it’s goods or coinage or produce.