The Golden Chapter – Silver and Monetary Acquisition – Lesson 7, Part A
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
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Table of Contents
- [0:23] Introduction to interest and a se’ah-for-se’ah loan
- [2:20] The conception of a loan: money versus wheat
- [4:53] A doubtful inevitable consequence and the difficulty of prediction
- [6:26] A rise in price and whether that counts as interest
- [15:05] Rabbi Chiya’s view on coinage and produce
- [19:17] Gold dinars and their value in silver dinars
- [27:58] Beit Shammai’s restriction on converting silver sela’im into gold dinars
- [30:18] The definition of silver and gold according to Beit Shammai
- [31:44] Rabbi’s youthful and older views regarding coinage and produce
- [33:37] Rules of halakhic ruling — when we rule like Beit Hillel
- [36:01] The example of Rabbi Yehonatan and the rule of following the majority
- [37:34] Produce for dinars — can one redeem onto them?
- [41:45] The question of a demai dinar — is it coinage?
- [45:01] The status of gold according to Rabbi Chiya — coinage or produce?
Summary
General Overview
The text defines the prohibitions of interest and places a se’ah-for-se’ah loan in the category of a rabbinic prohibition out of concern for a rise in market price, while presenting two conceptual understandings of whether this is a loan of monetary value or a loan of the wheat itself. It distinguishes between fixed interest, which is prohibited at the Torah level, and early or late interest, which is prohibited rabbinically, and develops a distinction between a secondary form of interest and something that merely appears like interest, similar to the two kinds of rabbinic restrictions in the laws of the Sabbath. It then moves to the topic of gold and silver as coinage versus produce, asks how one can infer from Rabbi Chiya’s instruction to Rav regarding a loan of gold dinars, and brings Tosafot and the Ritva to resolve the issue. Finally, it touches on implications for the world of banking and index-linking, and ends with a hint toward the topic of neshekh and tarbit in the chapter “Which Is Neshekh.”
Fixed Interest and Rabbinic Interest
Fixed interest is prohibited at the Torah level when, at the time of the loan, it is agreed that repayment will be higher than the amount loaned. Interest that is not fixed is called late interest or early interest, and it is prohibited only rabbinically. A se’ah-for-se’ah loan is defined in the Talmud as a rabbinic prohibition because when one repays a se’ah of wheat, it may be worth more on the market, and then there is an aspect of interest here; therefore they prohibited it even without regard to what the price will actually be at the time of repayment.
A Se’ah-for-Se’ah Loan and Preservation of Value
Se’ah-for-se’ah means that the lender gives a se’ah of wheat and the borrower returns a se’ah of wheat, and the concern is that a rise in price will make the repayment worth more than the loan. The only permitted way to loan commodities is to return an amount whose value equals the se’ah that was received — in other words, to preserve the value rather than the quantity. The text presents that two different conceptions of the nature of the loan will yield different explanations for why the prohibition is rabbinic rather than a Torah-level doubt.
Two Conceptions of the Nature of the Loan: Monetary Value Versus Wheat
The first conception sees the loan as a loan of monetary value, so that a se’ah of wheat worth one hundred shekels is really a loan of one hundred shekels given in the form of wheat, and repayment of a se’ah of wheat functions as a condition that repayment be in that same type. According to this, if the price rises and the returned se’ah is worth one hundred and ten, there is non-fixed interest here and therefore it is rabbinic. But the text asks that in such a case there is similarity to a “doubtful inevitable consequence” and to a Torah-level doubt that should be treated stringently, so it is not clear why the Talmud assumes so simply that the prohibition is not at least a Torah-level doubt. The second conception says that the loan is literally a loan of wheat, and therefore returning a se’ah of wheat is returning the same thing, so there is no interest at all, and the rabbinic prohibition is explained as concern for something that looks like interest rather than as a secondary form of interest.
Secondary Interest and the Appearance of Interest, and the Parallel to Rabbinic Restrictions in the Laws of the Sabbath
A secondary form of interest is described as a rabbinic extension of the Torah concept of interest, similar to a rabbinic restriction that extends a prohibited labor — such as selecting edible food from waste, where the act resembles the Torah prohibition but with weaker force. Something that merely appears like interest is described as a rabbinic prohibition in which there is no interest at all, only resemblance to interest, similar to the prohibition against riding a horse on the Sabbath, which was prohibited lest one break off a branch, and is not an extension of the labor of harvesting. This distinction is presented as a key point for understanding se’ah-for-se’ah: whether it is a secondary form of interest or only appears like interest.
Reservations in the Permission of Se’ah-for-Se’ah: When a Market Price Exists and When the Borrower Has Such Produce at Home
The text notes two reservations that were stated regarding the prohibition of se’ah-for-se’ah: if a market price has already been established at the time of the loan, it is permitted; and if the borrower has produce of that kind at home at the time of the loan, it is also permitted even if the amount at home is insufficient. It argues that both reservations fit better with the conception that this is a loan of wheat rather than a loan of money, because if it were a money loan, the existence of a market price would seem to reinforce the concern for interest rather than ease it. It explains that if the logic is that it only appears like interest, then once the market price is established everyone understands the nature of the transaction, so the concern for appearances is reduced.
Banking, Index-Linking, Shares, and Working in a Bank
The text connects index-linking in banks to changes in value that may appear like interest, and notes that halakhic decisors discuss this a great deal, raising the question of whether every bank loan involves a prohibition of interest. It distinguishes between buying a share, which is not a loan and therefore an increase in value is not interest, and lending shares and receiving shares back, whose law is like any other commodity. It raises a question about a bank employee who does not personally collect interest but participates in the action, and places the discussion in the framework of assisting and “do not place a stumbling block,” with the possibility of a Torah-level or rabbinic prohibition. It returns to the conception that depositing money in a bank is a deposit of value rather than a loan, despite the rule that a loan is given for spending, and compares this to purchase money.
Gold and Silver: Coinage and Produce in the Mishnah and Talmud
The text explains that the Mishnah deals with exchanging gold dinars for silver dinars, and the practical difference is on whose side one performs meshikhah in order to finalize the transaction, depending on which side is coinage and which is produce. It describes Rabbi’s position in his youth that gold is coinage and silver is produce, and in his old age that gold is produce and silver is coinage, linking this to importance versus sharpness/liquidity as possible lines of reasoning. It emphasizes that the discussion is not a general definition of what counts as money versus merchandise, but a local decision within a currency-for-currency transaction, because fundamentally both are coins and each one by itself is coinage.
Rav’s Loan of Gold Dinars and Rabbi Chiya — and the Difficulty: What Proof Is There Here?
The Talmud is brought in which Rav borrowed gold dinars from Rabbi Chiya’s daughter, the dinars increased in value, and Rabbi Chiya instructed him, “Go pay her good and weighty ones,” meaning to return the gold dinars he had received. The Talmud presents that if gold is coinage, it is understandable that there is no concern for interest; but if it is produce, then this is like se’ah-for-se’ah and should be prohibited. The text asks that in any case a loan of gold against gold is not a transaction of gold against silver, so there is no reason to bring in the relationship to silver, since even one who holds that gold is produce says so only relative to a gold-for-silver transaction and not with respect to gold standing on its own.
Second Tithe: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, and Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish
The text brings the dispute in tractate Ma’aser Sheni: Beit Shammai say that a person should not convert silver sela’im into gold dinars, while Beit Hillel permit it, regarding the conversion of silver coins into gold coins in order to make the trip up to Jerusalem easier. It brings one amoraic explanation according to which Beit Shammai hold that silver is coinage and gold is produce, and therefore “one does not redeem coinage onto produce,” while Beit Hillel hold that silver is produce and gold is coinage, and therefore “one may redeem produce onto coinage.” It quotes the distinction made by the Talmud that according to Beit Hillel, even though silver relative to gold is produce, relative to actual produce it is coinage; and parallels this to gold according to Beit Shammai — even though gold relative to silver is produce, relative to actual produce it is coinage — to show that the definition of produce versus coinage depends on context.
Rules of Halakhic Ruling and an Explanation of the Side Remark about Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel
The text raises a conceptual difficulty in that Rabbi in his old age seemingly comes out like Beit Shammai, and suggests that rules of halakhic ruling function as defaults only when there is no substantive conceptual resolution. It argues that someone who has a compelling position according to his understanding rules accordingly even if it aligns with Beit Shammai, and that rules such as ruling like Beit Hillel or like Rava except for the YA”L KGM cases are intended for situations of doubt or lack of resolution. It illustrates this through the parable of “incline after the majority” and through applications in Maimonides, who sometimes rules like Abaye beyond the six exceptions.
Dinar for Dinar, Loan Versus Redemption, and the Stringency of a Loan
The text brings the statement of Rabbi Yochanan: “It is forbidden to borrow a dinar for a dinar, just like se’ah-for-se’ah,” and clarifies that this refers to a gold dinar for a gold dinar, not a silver dinar for a silver dinar, since relative to itself that is coinage. It presents the Talmud’s rejection that the prohibition in a loan stems from the fact that with regard to buying and selling the rabbis treated it as produce, and therefore with regard to a loan as well it is produce, even though concerning redemption of second tithe it was said that one may redeem onto it. It quotes: “Even though they said it is forbidden to borrow a dinar for a dinar, one may redeem second tithe onto it,” in order to establish the distinction between different areas of Jewish law.
Tosafot and the Ritva on Rabbi Chiya’s Proof and the Explanation of the Asymmetry Between Silver and Gold
Tosafot asks how they proved above that Rabbi Chiya held that gold is coinage — perhaps that is only with respect to itself and not with respect to silver — and answers that the earlier passage follows the conclusion that with regard to buying and selling it is produce, and with regard to a loan as well it is produce. The Ritva answers differently and proposes an asymmetry: silver is more liquid, so it is not reasonable for it to be considered produce relative to itself, whereas gold, which is less liquid, can be considered produce even relative to itself when it is defined as produce in relation to silver and copper. He suggests that in this direction one can understand why the Talmud sees the return of gold dinars as raising a concern of se’ah-for-se’ah if gold is defined as produce.
Connection to Understanding Se’ah-for-Se’ah and the Implication for Reading the Passage
The text proposes that the question whether a loan of gold for gold is similar to se’ah-for-se’ah depends on how one interprets se’ah-for-se’ah: as a loan of value or as a loan of the item itself. It notes that if se’ah-for-se’ah is understood as returning the same type without essential interest, then the connection to gold is weak; but if it is understood as taking account of changing value, then it is easier to understand the rabbinic decree and the concern. It concludes that the direction emerging from the passages and the reservations leans toward understanding se’ah-for-se’ah as a loan of commodity where the main prohibition is the appearance of interest or a decree, and not necessarily actual interest.
Neshekh and Tarbit in the Chapter “Which Is Neshekh”
The text quotes from the Talmud at the beginning of the chapter “Which Is Neshekh” the question whether neshekh and tarbit are two distinct prohibitions or “one matter,” and brings the wording: “Since it leaves aside Torah-level interest and explains the rabbinic level, this implies that at the Torah level neshekh and tarbit are one matter.” It notes that the Torah uses different expressions such as “interest on money and increase on food,” and raises the question “Can you really think there is neshekh without tarbit and tarbit without neshekh?” as it appears in the quotation, as an opening to the continuation of the analysis.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Last time we talked about matters of interest, about a se’ah-for-se’ah loan. That was mainly an introduction to the concept of interest, Torah-level and rabbinic prohibitions of interest. Fixed interest is prohibited at the Torah level — that’s interest where, at the time of the loan, you stipulate that the repayment will be greater than the loan. Interest that isn’t fixed is called late interest or early interest, and it’s prohibited only rabbinically. And the Talmud says that se’ah-for-se’ah is a rabbinic prohibition. Se’ah-for-se’ah means I loan you a se’ah of wheat and you have to return to me also a se’ah of wheat. Now, the basic problem is that when you return to me the se’ah of wheat, it may be that its market value will be higher, and then there’s some kind of interest here, and therefore they prohibited it rabbinically. And more than that, they prohibited even making a se’ah-for-se’ah loan regardless of what the market price will actually be at the time of repayment, at the time it’s paid back. Because of the concern that maybe the price will rise by the time of repayment, they prohibited making a se’ah-for-se’ah loan altogether. Meaning, it is rabbinically prohibited to loan someone a se’ah of wheat on condition that he return a se’ah of wheat. What he needs to do is return such an amount of wheat as will be equal in value to the se’ah he received. That is permitted. The only way to make a commodity loan is in that way — meaning, to preserve the value. We saw that I suggested two explanations for why there is no Torah-level interest here, why it is prohibited only rabbinically. And these two explanations really assume two different conceptions of this loan. When I loan you a se’ah of wheat, what exactly happened here? Meaning, what did I loan you? So the first conception is that this is a loan of monetary value. Let’s say a se’ah of wheat is worth one hundred shekels, so really I loaned you one hundred shekels. I gave it to you in equivalent value, in wheat — what difference does it make? But practically speaking, this is a loan of money. Maybe there’s even room to say that a loan in its essence is always money. Meaning, even if you do it in wheat, that’s only because equivalent value counts as money, but in principle a loan is always a loan of money. Because unlike a borrowed item — when I lend you a particular object, the object itself returns to me intact. In a loan, the object I give you doesn’t come back to me intact. Even if you return a se’ah of wheat, it’s not the same se’ah of wheat you received, it’s another se’ah. So it’s natural to translate this and say: okay, then really I didn’t loan you the se’ah of wheat, because clearly I didn’t deposit that specific se’ah of wheat with you — you can use it. You have to return to me different wheat. So really what I loaned you was value. In other words, loaning value is basically loaning money, right? Money is really the expression of value. Why do you have to repay me specifically in wheat? We also saw this two lectures ago. Apparently there is some kind of condition here: I want you to repay me the hundred shekels you owe me also in wheat. Even though in principle you owe me money, you owe me one hundred shekels, I make it a condition that you repay me in wheat. You don’t want that? No problem, then I won’t loan it to you. Meaning, it’s a conditional loan. That’s legitimate. So that’s one possibility for understanding this se’ah-for-se’ah loan. And then it comes out that if the price of the se’ah, the rate of the se’ah, rises — let’s say now it’s worth one hundred and ten shekels — when you return to me the one hundred and ten shekels, you have in fact given me interest, because I loaned you one hundred shekels and you returned one hundred and ten. That’s interest. Why is it not Torah-level interest? Because it wasn’t fixed. Because we didn’t stipulate in advance that you’d return one hundred and ten. You were supposed to return a se’ah of wheat. The market changes led to the fact that the se’ah of wheat you returned is worth one hundred and ten. It’s not that we fixed in advance that you receive one hundred and return one hundred and ten. Therefore this is not Torah-level interest, because it is not fixed. I said that this conception is a bit difficult, first of all because I brought the example of a doubtful inevitable consequence, if you remember. There’s a difference between saying I’m not sure about something and saying it will definitely happen, I just don’t know whether the reality contains the relevant condition or not. Closing a box when I don’t know whether there’s a fly inside it or not. Assuming there is a fly inside it, closing it necessarily traps it, right? If there’s a fly inside and I closed it, I definitely trapped it. Except what? I don’t know whether there is or isn’t a fly there. That, at least according to Rabbi Akiva Eiger — this is a dispute between Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Taz — but at least according to Rabbi Akiva Eiger, such a thing is not called an unintended act without an inevitable consequence. It is called a doubtful inevitable consequence. Really, because if there are flies there, then it is an inevitable consequence; it’s just that you are in doubt whether there are flies there or not. What is called not an inevitable consequence? Not an inevitable consequence is when you drag a bench and you don’t know whether a furrow will be made or not. It’s not that you’re missing some information — you know, here is the ground, you’re dragging the bench, everything is fine. It’s not that there’s some information already out there and you just don’t know it. No — you don’t know, a furrow may be made and may not be made, depending on how you drag it, depending on the weight of the bench, depending on the method you choose, whatever. Therefore in such a situation it’s called not an inevitable consequence; that’s an unintended act in the laws of the Sabbath. But the case of the flies is called a doubtful inevitable consequence, and a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently, and therefore it is prohibited. Okay, I wanted to claim the same thing here. When I loan you se’ah-for-se’ah, I loaned you a se’ah worth one hundred shekels. You have to return me a se’ah. Now, if the price rises, then you’re returning one hundred and ten. If not, then not. Now why isn’t this certain? Because I don’t know whether the price will rise. But if the price does rise — the rise in price doesn’t depend on us. It’s a given. I don’t know it because it’s complicated to predict what the market will do. But in principle, let’s treat it as a deterministic process — in the end it will either happen or not happen. I just don’t know in advance whether it will happen. And therefore in such a case this is basically parallel to a doubtful inevitable consequence. So one could have said that there is a Torah-level doubt here, and one should be stringent, not just because of rabbinic interest but as a possible Torah-level prohibition of interest. And therefore it isn’t clear why the Talmud — or according to this conception, that this is a loan of equivalent monetary value — why it is so obvious to the Talmud that this is not Torah-level interest, at least as a doubt.
[Speaker C] According to which conception was the Jewish law determined? That it’s monetary value, or that it’s wheat?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There isn’t a final ruling here — these are two conceptual possibilities for understanding the passage. I’m going to try to discuss them here. I think the straightforward conception is that it’s wheat; it’s not equivalent monetary value. But that’s our topic.
[Speaker D] In banks there’s this whole issue of index-linking, and it seems like that changes the value all—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —year long, so yes, it’s supposed to be something like that. Yes, certainly, certainly. There are definitely not-simple problems of interest there.
[Speaker D] So does that mean every bank loan is an interest prohibition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly yes. Halakhic decisors discuss this a great deal. The question is whether you treat it as a loan when you buy a share. When you buy a share, that isn’t a loan; you bought it, and now its value rises while it’s in your possession. That’s not interest. But if I loan you, say, shares and you return shares or the same type, then certainly it would be the same thing. Shares are a commodity like any other commodity.
[Speaker E] And what if I’m in a company that charges interest, but I don’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —collect it personally, I’m just a clerk there?
[Speaker E] What do you mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m in a bank, I’m not the company that charges the interest, I’m just a clerk there. Let’s say you work in a bank, you’re a bank clerk. The bank has a policy that if it lends you one hundred shekels, after a week you have to return one hundred and ten. And you are the clerk. So there are questions of assisting, of “do not place a stumbling block.” You are not the one collecting the interest — the bank is collecting the interest — but still there is a prohibition against taking part in an act of transgression. Even if the transgression is done by someone else, you are causing him to stumble. And then it could be that there is a Torah-level prohibition here, or a rabbinic prohibition. But again, I’m saying, with banks the story is more complicated. I think in the introductory lecture I spoke about my view that in banks, interest doesn’t really apply at all. I think it’s not — the money I deposit into a bank is a deposit, not a loan. It’s a deposit of money, which is a bit of a strange concept. Usually when I transfer money, they obviously don’t return the same bills I deposited. So ostensibly that’s not a deposit, it’s a loan, because a loan is given for spending. And I explained: no, it’s a deposit of value. And value by its essence can be embodied in different bills each time, but it’s still value, like purchase money as opposed to a loan, if you remember. Good. So that is one conception. According to this conception, a se’ah-for-se’ah loan is really non-fixed interest. You received one hundred and returned one hundred and ten — that’s interest, it’s just not Torah-level because it wasn’t fixed. The second conception says no: the essence of what I loaned you here isn’t one hundred shekels; I loaned you a se’ah of wheat. So in fact I loaned you a se’ah of wheat and you return a se’ah of wheat. So what if it’s worth more? So what if it’s worth more? I loaned you and got back exactly what I loaned you. How does interest even enter here? So what if it’s worth more? “Worth more” is a question of what I can buy with it, but if I loaned you the wheat and not the value, then who cares? Why should I care how much the wheat is worth? I loaned you a se’ah of wheat and got back a se’ah of wheat. What interest is there here? According to this conception, it’s clear that the rabbinic prohibition on se’ah-for-se’ah is not a rabbinic prohibition of interest. There is no interest here at all. It’s only maybe something that appears like interest, and it looks like interest. People may think there’s some kind of permission for interest and get confused, and so on, therefore they prohibited it. And I told you that the difference between these two conceptions — whether I am loaning equivalent value but simply transferring it in wheat, or whether I am loaning wheat — the difference between these two things is in the question whether the rabbinic interest prohibition here is a secondary form of interest, meaning non-fixed interest, where there really is interest, it’s just not fixed, or not — there is no interest here at all, it’s what’s called the appearance of interest. There is secondary interest and there is the appearance of interest — these are two types of rabbinic prohibitions surrounding interest. In a certain sense — I don’t think I mentioned this, so I’ll mention it now — in the laws of the Sabbath we distinguish between two types of rabbinic restrictions. A rabbinic restriction means rabbinic prohibitions concerning Sabbath labors. We distinguish between two types of rabbinic restrictions. There are restrictions that are an extension of the Torah-level labor. For example, if you select waste from food, that’s a Torah prohibition of selecting. If you select food from waste, that’s a rabbinic prohibition. Why? Apparently because essentially you did an act of selecting here, it’s just probably not significant enough, not similar enough to the Tabernacle, that doesn’t matter right now, and therefore it’s not Torah-level. So that is a rabbinic extension of the Torah prohibition, but the essence of selecting is present here too, just with weaker intensity, and therefore it is prohibited rabbinically. But for example, someone riding a horse — they prohibited riding a horse on the Sabbath lest one break off a branch. While riding a horse you pass by a tree and break off a branch. So what, can we say that one who rides a horse is harvesting rabbinically? He doesn’t break off the branch. Lest he break off a branch. What they prohibited is riding the horse, not breaking off the branch. Now when I ride a horse, can we say that what I am doing in this riding is rabbinic harvesting? What connection is there? This is not an act of harvesting, just an act that isn’t Torah-prohibited — there’s no harvesting here at all, there is a concern that I may come to harvest. Okay? So the act of riding itself is another kind of rabbinic restriction. It’s not an extension of an act prohibited at the Torah level; it’s an act with no Torah-level source at all, nothing, no connection to anything. They prohibited it lest I come to do a Torah-level act. That’s a different kind of rabbinic restriction, one which in itself is not an extension of any Torah-level labor. I’m saying the same thing here. Non-fixed interest is an extension of the Torah concept of interest. Torah-level interest is fixed; what is not fixed is still interest, but not to the same degree, and therefore it was not prohibited at the Torah level, only rabbinically. Something that merely appears like interest is not an extension of the Torah concept of interest. There is no interest here at all. It’s not that there is interest here but it isn’t fixed, so it’s a weaker form of interest. No — there’s no interest here at all. It just resembles interest, looks like interest. Therefore they prohibited it. That’s similar to riding a horse, not to selecting food from waste. We saw in the lecture two reservations regarding the prohibition of se’ah-for-se’ah: if a market price has been established at the time of the loan, then it’s permitted. Why? Because if a market price has been established, then receiving the se’ah of wheat is de facto like receiving — I could have gone to the market, sold the se’ah of wheat, and gotten money; it’s basically money. Because a market price has already been established, it’s fully interchangeable with the concept of money. The second reservation is what happens if he has produce of the same type in his house. If he has produce of the same type in his house at the time of the loan, that’s also permitted, even if the amount of produce is not the same amount he needs in order to repay. It is enough that he has produce of the same type. I said that these two reservations fit better with the conception that a se’ah-for-se’ah loan is a loan of wheat and not a loan of money. Because if it were a loan of money, then why should I care? On the contrary: if a market price has been established, that’s even worse, because if a market price has been established, then that means you really received one hundred shekels and are returning me one hundred and ten. That’s even more interest, not less. But if you say this is se’ah-for-se’ah and it only looks like interest, then once a market price has been established everyone understands that it isn’t really interest, and therefore it doesn’t even look like interest anymore. So these two reservations are interpreted much better according to the conception that a loan of a se’ah of wheat is a loan of wheat and not of money. Good. Now let’s see the Talmud. The Talmud here — up to this point was the introduction. “And Rabbi Chiya also held that gold is coinage.” Yes, you remember that the Mishnah deals with someone buying gold with silver dinars, exchanging gold dinars for silver dinars, and the discussion is which of these two sides is the merchandise, the produce, and which is the coinage, meaning the money. And the practical difference is that when I take possession of the gold, I thereby acquire the silver, and when they take possession of the silver, they acquire the gold. Because in a sale transaction, with the legal mechanism involved, you need to take possession of the merchandise in order to finalize the transaction. Taking possession of the money has no significance; the transaction isn’t finalized that way. Therefore, when we buy gold with כסף or silver with gold, the question is which side is the coinage and which side is the produce. And we saw that in the Talmud it says that in Rabbi’s youth he thought that gold was the coinage and silver was the produce. And in his old age he reached the conclusion that gold is the produce and silver is the coinage. And the practical result, in the conclusion, is that if I take possession of the gold, then the silver is acquired and the gold is the merchandise. Okay? That’s the merchandise. Gold is the merchandise. I also said something else, which will come up today too: that the discussion in this passage speaks about liquidity and importance. Yes, silver is more liquid. Therefore in Rabbi’s youth he thought that importance is the criterion — sorry, in Rabbi’s youth he thought that importance is the criterion, so gold is more important and therefore gold is the coinage because it is more important. In his old age he says, what are you talking about, liquidity is the criterion, marketability. That also really makes more sense. Therefore gold is specifically the produce and silver is the coinage. But I mentioned that, straightforwardly, the discussion in the Talmud here is not a discussion of the general definition of money versus merchandise. We discussed that in the introductory lecture. That is determined by the question of what the parties intend. What they specifically want from this transaction is the merchandise, and what they don’t care whether it will be this or something equal to it is the money. Because then it’s clear that I receive that thing only as equivalent value. I don’t really need that thing in itself, and therefore it is the money in this transaction and not the merchandise. So that is the criterion for money versus merchandise. What’s the problem here? The problem here is that both gold and silver — both of them in their real definition are actually money; both are coinage. These are gold coins and silver coins, and both are in fact coins, coinage. But because of formal considerations we have to decide, in a transaction like this where gold dinars are exchanged for silver dinars, which side is the merchandise and which side is the coinage. But that decision is not going to be according to criteria of what money is. It is a local decision here just in order to define the transaction correctly. In principle we could even define it arbitrarily; it doesn’t make such a difference. Therefore it’s not correct to take the criteria that come up here in the passage and see in them the fundamental definition of the concept of money. They are not that. This is simply a distinction between gold coins and silver coins, each of which by itself is certainly coinage. When they stand opposite each other, the question arises which of them is the produce. But obviously, in principle, each one by itself is coinage. Okay. So the Talmud says like this — up to here is what we saw in the passage until now. “And Rabbi Chiya also held that gold is coinage.” How do we know that Rabbi Chiya held that gold dinars are coinage? Because Rav borrowed dinars from the daughter of Rabbi Chiya. We said she was his cousin, right? Rav was Rabbi Chiya’s nephew. “In the end the dinars became more expensive.” Meaning, Rav borrowed gold dinars — let’s say ten gold dinars — from his cousin, and the gold dinars rose in value. Originally each dinar was worth twenty-five silver dinars. That was the standard rate. A gold dinar is worth twenty-five silver dinars. Let’s say it became more expensive and now it’s worth thirty silver dinars. Now Rav is wondering whether to return to his cousin ten gold dinars, or to return slightly fewer gold dinars such that in total it comes out to the same value of twenty-five silver dinars per dinar. So he goes to Rabbi Chiya, his cousin’s father, his uncle, and asks him what to do. “He came before Rabbi Chiya, and he said to him” — so Rabbi Chiya answers him — “Go pay her good and weighty ones.” Give her the ten gold dinars you received from her. Okay? But did he also add some extra things, as it were? No, no — give ten. Don’t worry about questions of interest; everything is fine. You received gold dinars, return gold dinars. You’re returning what you received. We can already see how this connects to se’ah-for-se’ah. So the Talmud says: “Granted, if you say that gold is coinage, that makes sense.” If you say that Rabbi Chiya holds that gold, in a transaction like gold versus silver, is the coinage — which is Rabbi’s youthful position, right? That’s what Rabbi said in his youth — then fine, I can understand why he gave this instruction to Rav. Why? Because you need to know: when the price of some commodity changes, we don’t say that the money became cheaper. We say the commodity became more expensive. Meaning, price changes are always measured only relative to commodities. Money is considered to have a fixed value. If a loaf of bread now costs two shekels instead of one, we don’t say that the money became cheaper, that its value declined. We say that the loaf of bread became more valuable. Money always determines the value. There is no inflation in the Talmud at this stage. Okay?
[Speaker G] Like the dollar exchange rate against the shekel, where the dollar got stronger?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Inflation, inflation is generally affected by relationships between foreign currencies, between the shekel and the dollar. If this were a self-contained economy where everything ran internally, it seems to me — I’m not an economist — but it seems to me there wouldn’t be inflation here.
[Speaker H] If you have too little money, okay—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what does “too much” mean? You always have to discuss this in terms of exchange rates against the dollar, for example. Okay? But if there are no other currencies, there aren’t any — there is one isolated island, the whole world is one isolated island and it has a self-contained economy, closed, functioning within itself — then I don’t think, in that situation, it seems to me — I don’t know, we’d need to ask economists — but I think in such a situation there wouldn’t be inflation. It’s always a question of a relationship between currencies. By the way, not even a relationship between gold and silver coins, which are currencies in the same economy. Yes, it’s like a shekel and ten agorot. A shekel is worth ten times ten agorot. Doesn’t matter right now; both can rise together or fall together. Okay? True, here it’s not exactly like that. But on the other hand, it’s clear that both the gold dinars and the silver dinars are currencies circulating in our market. This is not dollar versus shekel. So here we have a complicated situation. The relationship between the currencies does change, even though both are currencies and both belong to the same economy. And then the question really arises: when the relationship changes, and now one gold dinar is thirty silver dinars and not twenty-five, does that mean silver became cheaper or gold became more expensive? That’s a question that needs definition; it’s a matter of definition. I don’t think there’s a right and wrong answer here. You have to define it. So the Talmud says like this: if Rabbi Chiya holds that gold is the coinage, then he is right. You took ten gold coins, return her ten gold coins, don’t worry about interest or anything. Ten gold coins are always ten gold coins, and the silver is the merchandise that is now worth less gold than before. So what? Who talked here about silver? I received gold, I return gold. That’s if he holds that it is coinage. But if you say it is produce — if Rabbi Chiya held that gold coins are the produce and really silver is the coinage — then this is exactly se’ah-for-se’ah, right? When I take a se’ah of wheat — ten gold coins, which are the merchandise, the produce — that’s like a se’ah of wheat, and it was worth 250 silver dinars when I took it, and when I return it it’s worth 300 silver dinars. That’s exactly the interest problem of se’ah-for-se’ah. Right? This is exactly the case of se’ah-for-se’ah. So the Talmud says, “But if you say it is produce, then it is a case of se’ah-for-se’ah and it is prohibited.” This is a se’ah-for-se’ah loan. So that is the proof that Rabbi Chiya apparently held that gold is coinage and not produce, like Rabbi’s youthful position. Okay? The Talmud says — sorry, I want to make a comment. I remarked earlier, and we also saw this at the beginning of the passage, that the question discussed here is not a general question about the criterion that defines money. That is obvious; it has nothing to do with our passage here. Here it’s a specific question regarding transactions of currency versus currency — gold versus silver, copper versus silver, copper versus gold. These are different kinds of currency, and therefore it’s obvious that the definition of each one in itself — each one by itself is coinage — only when I make a transaction of one against the other do we need to define them. If so, then what does the Talmud want here? After all, the loan that Rav took from his cousin was a loan of gold dinars. There is no silver opposed to it here; this is not a transaction of silver dinars versus gold dinars like in the Mishnah, where I sell a gold dinar and receive silver dinars or vice versa. There one can discuss who is the produce and who is the coinage. But here this is a transaction done in gold against gold. Why are you now bringing in silver? Why not copper, why not dollars, why not whatever? What does it have to do with anything? And if you treat this as a transaction of gold against gold, then obviously gold is coinage. Nobody ever said otherwise. Even Rabbi in his old age, when he says gold is produce, says that only when you make a transaction of gold versus silver dinars, because then you need to define — since both are currencies — which currency is considered the merchandise and which currency is considered the coinage. But if this is not a transaction of currency versus currency, if you are dealing with one currency itself, whether silver dinars or gold dinars, it doesn’t matter — he borrowed gold dinars and returns gold dinars — why are you bringing in this whole issue of silver at all? Why should I care whether it got more expensive or not? Obviously gold, when standing by itself, is coinage. This is not like a se’ah-for-se’ah loan. And how is this different even according to Rabbi’s old-age position, where he says that gold is produce? He agrees that gold is coinage. That’s obvious — even in his old age he agreed to that. Only when you make a transaction of gold coins versus silver coins and need to define which side is the coinage and which side is the produce is there room for uncertainty, and in his old age he says gold is the produce. But if there is a transaction that does not exchange gold against silver, a transaction in gold coins themselves, then what connection is there to what Rabbi thought earlier and what Rabbi thought later? Here, according to everyone, it is coinage. You received ten gold coins, you return ten gold coins. What’s the problem? What interest, what se’ah-for-se’ah, nothing. What does the Talmud want at all? A very puzzling thing. What does the Talmud want? Okay, is the difficulty clear? Yes. In the continuation, the next section, the Talmud brings a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. “We learned there: Beit Shammai say a person should not make sela’im into gold dinars, and Beit Hillel permit it.” This is in tractate Ma’aser Sheni, and there the rule regarding second tithe is as follows: I have a tithe from produce that grew for me. The first tithe I give to the Levite, I give terumah to the priest, and the second tithe I take and eat in Jerusalem. I myself eat it — I don’t give it to anyone — but I have to take it to Jerusalem and eat it there. What happens when “the way is too long for you,” as the Torah says — it’s hard for me to carry these fruits to Jerusalem, they’ll spoil on the way, whatever, for all sorts of reasons — so I convert them, I redeem them onto coins. And I take the coins to Jerusalem. This is called redemption of second tithe. I take the coins to Jerusalem; in Jerusalem I use those coins to buy produce and eat the produce I bought in Jerusalem as if that were my second-tithe produce. That’s what happens with second tithe. Now, suppose a person has second tithe that was redeemed onto silver dinars. Fine — so now I have, say, one thousand silver dinars and that is my second tithe, and I want to bring it up to Jerusalem. The problem is that one thousand silver dinars are very heavy. It’s hard to carry that the whole way on foot to Jerusalem. So let’s redeem it or exchange it for forty gold dinars, right? One gold dinar is twenty-five silver dinars, so one thousand silver dinars are forty gold dinars. Forty gold dinars I can tie up in my pouch and take to Jerusalem, no problem. So I want to convert the silver dinars into gold dinars in order to go up to Jerusalem. Notice, this is already after I converted the produce itself into silver dinars. Now I have silver dinars that are basically second tithe in principle, and I want to redeem them onto gold coins and bring that to Jerusalem and buy produce there and eat it. There is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai say it’s prohibited. A person should not make sela’im into gold dinars — to take silver and convert it into gold dinars is prohibited. And Beit Hillel permit it. Beit Hillel do permit it. There are two opinions among the Amoraim about how to explain the dispute: Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. One said: “The dispute is about sela’im for dinars. Beit Shammai hold that silver is coinage and gold is produce, and one does not redeem coinage onto produce.” Yes, Beit Shammai basically hold that silver is coinage and gold is produce, and you can’t take coins and redeem them onto produce.
[Speaker C] Isn’t that at the end? Huh?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, only in Jerusalem. You’re only allowed to do that in Jerusalem; you’re not allowed to do it on the way. So therefore, the redemption that is defined in the Torah, the redemption of second tithe, is to take produce and exchange it for coins. You can’t take the coins and buy produce with them until you get to Jerusalem. In Jerusalem you can. Here, of course, he wants to do it where he lives in order to make things easier for himself on the road. Okay, the Talmud comes and says: there’s no such thing. Redemption is done from produce to coins, not from coins to produce. And if gold is produce, and Beit Shammai say that gold is the produce, then you can’t take silver sela coins and transfer their sanctity onto gold coins. If gold coins are produce, you can’t take money and exchange it for produce. And Beit Hillel hold that silver is produce and gold is the coinage, and produce can be transferred onto coinage. That’s a first suggestion for explaining the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. Okay? The question, in other words, is that they disagree over the issue of Rabbi’s youth versus Rabbi’s old age. When you have gold versus silver, which one is the coinage and which one is the produce. What comes out a bit oddly here is that specifically Beit Shammai corresponds to Rabbi’s old age. Why? Because on the face of it
[Speaker A] when there is
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel. And Rabbi is already from a later period. So Rabbi should have ruled like Beit Hillel and said that in his youth he still thought like Beit Hillel, and then in his later years he changed his mind and thought like Beit Shammai. Okay? So that’s strange; we’ll see more. But in principle, maybe I’ll still make a parenthetical remark. In general one can discuss—and this is just a side remark, not connected to the lecture, but related to this matter of ruling like Beit Shammai. We’re used to the idea that there are rules of halakhic ruling. In disputes between Shmuel and Rav, the Jewish law follows Rav in matters of prohibition and follows Shmuel in monetary law. Or in disputes between Abaye and Rava, the Jewish law follows Rava except for Ya’al Kegam, where the law follows Abaye, and so on. There are all kinds of halakhic rules in the Talmud. Also, between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel. And we find in several places, especially for example in the first chapter of Beitzah, that they ruled like Beit Shammai on several issues. Now this is after a heavenly voice came forth and said that the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel, and then the Sages also say, “The words of Beit Shammai in the place of Beit Hillel are not Mishnah.” They decided to wipe out the status of Beit Shammai completely. That’s it—you can’t rely on them, nothing at all. Yet in the Talmud you see that there are passages where the ruling follows Beit Shammai against Beit Hillel. And that’s a question: how can that be, after they’re telling you that the words of Beit Shammai in the place of Beit Hillel are not Mishnah, and a heavenly voice came out, and everything—the dispute was decided. So I think this is one indication—there are many others as well—for the question of how we’re supposed to relate to rules of halakhic ruling. End of parenthesis. Usually we understand that rules of halakhic ruling basically determine for us what we need to do. That’s not true. Rules of halakhic ruling are like the coinage-and-produce distinction of silver versus gold. Only when we don’t know what to do do we use rules of halakhic ruling. If you don’t know how to define which is the money and which is the commodity, then sharpness, importance—we find some rule that will help you define one side as money and one side as commodity. But if something is clearly money by its essential definition, I don’t care whether it’s sharper, more important, or whatever—all those criteria are irrelevant. They are meant only for situations where I can’t decide based on my own reasoning. All the rules of halakhic ruling are like that. That’s what I want to claim. The rules of halakhic ruling tell you this: if you have a position of your own, rule Jewish law the way you think—Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, it doesn’t matter, whatever you think. If you don’t have a position of your own and you want a halakhic rule to tell you what to do, then the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel. So in fact this is addressed only to someone who has no position of his own. If he has a position of his own—think, say, of someone who has his own position and he thinks it should be done this way, so because Beit Shammai also say that, now he’s forbidden to do what he thinks? Fine, the law doesn’t follow Beit Shammai against Beit Hillel. But suppose I have a position of my own, and not only that, Beit Shammai also agree with me—so what, does that make it worse? Because Beit Shammai also agree with me, now I’m forbidden to do it? What I think—that’s what I’m supposed to do. All you can say is that if I don’t have a position of my own, and I’m looking for a rule of halakhic ruling, and this is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, then I need to go like Beit Hillel. So for example, in the rules about Abaye versus Rava, we generally rule like Rava, except for Ya’al Kegam, except for six cases represented by the acronym Ya’al Kegam. Look in Maimonides and you’ll find additional cases where he rules like Abaye, not just those six. For example, regarding “do not form factions,” that one does not make two study houses in the same—two synagogues in the same city—there he rules like Abaye; Rava doesn’t accept that this is included in “do not form factions.” Or “if he did it, it is not effective” at the beginning of Temurah—there too, at least some of the commentators on Maimonides say that he rules like Abaye. How can that be? The Talmud explicitly says that the law is always like Rava except for six cases. Because Maimonides apparently understood that rules of halakhic ruling are meant for situations where you don’t have your own decision, but if you have your own decision, then do what you think. Rules of halakhic ruling tell you—yes, it’s like the well-known story about Rabbi Yehonatan Eybeschutz. A priest came to him and said: why don’t you do as we do? We’re the majority, the Christians are the majority; “follow the majority” is written in the Torah, so why don’t you do as we do? So he answered: I follow the majority when I’m in doubt. If I’m not in doubt, I don’t follow the majority. That’s not a joke; it’s a real answer. Meaning, if I find a piece of meat in the market, and there are ten stores and nine of them sell non-kosher meat and one is kosher, but this piece of meat has a top-level kosher seal on it, am I now supposed not to eat it because most stores in the city are non-kosher? No. Why not? Because I have no doubt about this piece, I know it’s kosher. If I had a doubt, then the rule is: follow the majority. If most stores are non-kosher, it’s forbidden to eat. But if I’m not in doubt, I don’t need decision rules. I know the truth. When I don’t know the truth, they tell me: go with this rule. And if I know the truth, I don’t need rules. Okay? That’s basically the claim. In any event, that’s how it comes out, so it may really be that what I asked earlier about Rabbi isn’t difficult. In his old age Rabbi came to the conclusion that Beit Shammai were right, that’s all. And therefore he really rules like them—what’s the problem? That’s what he thinks. If he didn’t think that way, then indeed he would have had to go like Beit Hillel, because the default rule, if you don’t have a position of your own, is that the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel. But if you have a position of your own, do what you think, okay? But the Talmud says: produce onto gold dinars—everyone agrees that we do transfer the sanctity. If you have produce and you want to transfer its sanctity onto gold dinars, what were we talking about earlier? I already transferred it onto silver sela coins, and now I want to transfer the silver sela coins onto gold dinars—that’s the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. But if your original produce of second tithe—you want to transfer its sanctity onto gold dinars—that according to all opinions is possible. That is certainly possible. Why? What is the reason? Just as silver is for Beit Hillel. Silver for Beit Hillel—after all, our discussion in Beit Shammai, that one does not transfer, I mean one does not transfer when you’re talking about silver coins and transferring them onto gold coins, and even Beit Shammai agree that produce you can transfer onto gold coins. But this is a discussion in Beit Shammai, and I have a proof from Beit Hillel that that’s how one should explain Beit Shammai. What’s the proof? The Talmud says like this: just as silver is for Beit Hillel—silver for Beit Hillel, even though silver relative to gold is considered produce, relative to actual produce it is considered coinage. What does that mean? When we have a transaction of silver versus gold, okay? When we have a transaction of silver versus gold, then silver relative to gold is considered the produce, right? According to Beit Hillel. Silver relative to gold is considered produce. Beit Shammai is like Rabbi in old age; Beit Hillel is like Rabbi in youth. But what happens if I want silver versus produce? There too will it be barter, produce versus produce? No. Silver dinars versus produce—clearly the silver dinars will be the coinage. So why against gold are they produce? Exactly what I said before: because in principle both gold dinars and silver dinars are coinage. When they stand opposite one another, I have no choice—I have to define one of them as commodity and one of them as coinage, so I say here there is a dispute whether this is the coinage or that is the coinage. But obviously each one separately, in itself, when it stands opposite produce, is considered coinage. It is not considered produce. The Talmud says: just as for Beit Hillel, with silver dinars it is obvious that although they are considered produce opposite gold dinars, in themselves they are coinage—so too for Beit Shammai, gold dinars, when they are opposite silver dinars, are considered produce, but when they stand on their own—likewise for Beit Shammai, even though gold relative to silver is considered produce, relative to actual produce it is coinage. So here the Talmud explicitly says what I told you in previous lectures: that the whole discussion of silver coins versus gold coins is not about the question of what the real status of gold coins or silver coins is. Their real status is obviously money, coinage—both of them are coinage. The whole problem is when they stand opposite each other. They can’t both be coinage. A transaction of acquisition by money has to have one side that is produce and one side that is coinage. So there is a dispute which one is the produce and which one is the coinage when they stand opposite each other. But each one, when you look at it on its own, is obviously coinage. Okay, that’s basically what the Talmud says. Good. After that there is another approach to explain the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. I’m leaving that aside for the moment. And then the Talmud says: let us conclude that Rabbi Yohanan is the one who says we do not transfer the sanctity. Right—that it’s forbidden, forbidden to transfer silver dinars onto gold dinars. For Rabbi Yohanan said: it is forbidden to lend one dinar for another dinar, like a se’ah for a se’ah; dinar for dinar, you’re not allowed to lend a dinar in order to receive a dinar back. That’s what Rabbi Yohanan says. The Talmud asks: what kind of dinar? Which dinar are we talking about? If you say a silver dinar for a silver dinar—relative to itself, is there anyone who says it is not coinage? After all, a silver dinar in itself is obviously coinage. So if I lend you one hundred shekels, is it forbidden to lend you one hundred shekels on condition that you return one hundred shekels? That—that is the very concept of a loan. Money in itself is obviously coinage; the whole discussion of whether it is produce or not produce is only when it stands opposite gold, but when it stands by itself it is certainly coinage. Therefore the Talmud says: rather, obviously, a gold dinar for a gold dinar. So Rabbi Yohanan says that one does not transfer sanctity onto a gold dinar; it is forbidden to lend a gold dinar for a gold dinar. And the Talmud says: according to whom? If according to Beit Hillel, they say it is coinage—so why not? A gold dinar too is coinage, so why can’t I lend you a gold dinar against a gold dinar? Rather, is it not according to Beit Shammai? And learn from this that Rabbi Yohanan is the one who says we do not transfer the sanctity. Fine, so we see that Rabbi Yohanan is the one who holds that one does not transfer silver dinars onto a gold dinar because a gold dinar is produce. The Talmud rejects this: no, actually I could tell you that Rabbi Yohanan is the one who says we do transfer the sanctity, and a loan is different. Since for purposes of buying and selling the Sages treated it as produce—because we say that it is the one that rises and falls in value—so with regard to a loan too it is considered produce. The Talmud says there: the question of redeeming first tithe—redeeming second tithe is a separate question, but Rabbi Yohanan says that with regard to first tithe—tithe, second tithe—you can transfer the sanctity of silver coins onto gold coins. Here, regarding a loan, where he says it is forbidden to lend a gold dinar for a gold dinar, that’s only because with regard to buying and selling too gold is considered as produce, so with regard to a loan as well we view gold as produce; a loan of gold for gold is like a se’ah-for-se’ah loan. Even though from the standpoint of redeeming second tithe, no—from the standpoint of redeeming second tithe there is no problem, because in essence gold in itself is coinage. Right? But in loans they were stringent, as they were in buying and selling. So too it makes sense, because when Ravin came he said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: even though they said it is forbidden to lend one dinar for another dinar, one may transfer the sanctity of second tithe onto it. Learn from this. Fine, one may transfer the sanctity of second tithe onto it. In any event, for our purposes, what we see here in this passage is that coins of any sort—silver coins, gold coins, any coin of any sort—in itself is obviously coinage, there’s no discussion about that. The whole question of gold versus silver is when there is coin against coin and I’m debating which to define as the commodity and which to define as the produce. Okay. But obviously each one by itself is certainly coinage. Then the question returns, and the medieval authorities ask it on our passage, the previous passage that we saw—what? We see in the previous passage that Rav’s loan. The Talmud says that Rabbi Hiyya held that gold is coinage, like Rabbi’s formulation. Why? How do I know that? Because in fact he told Rav: return ten gold coins; you took ten gold dinars, return ten gold dinars, don’t worry about interest. If that were produce, then it would literally be like a se’ah-for-se’ah loan, right? That’s what the Talmud says. If gold were produce, then taking ten gold dinars and returning ten gold dinars would literally be a se’ah-for-se’ah loan, and that is forbidden. Therefore it is obvious that Rabbi Hiyya sees gold dinars as coinage, not as produce. We asked about this, and as the medieval authorities already point out from the passage we just read—what does that have to do with anything at all? Even if gold were produce, still, if I borrowed ten gold coins and I return ten gold coins, that’s not like a se’ah-for-se’ah loan, because a se’ah is genuinely produce. Gold isn’t really produce either; even one who says that gold is produce means that only in a transaction where it stands opposite silver dinars do I ask myself which side is the produce and which side is the coinage, and I say that gold is the produce. But obviously in a transaction of a loan of gold and I return gold, then it is coinage. I just took money from you and I’m returning the same money. What’s the problem? What interest is there here? What are you talking about? Okay. Therefore, the whole dependence in the Talmud—the Talmud proves from the words of Rabbi Hiyya that Rabbi Hiyya held that gold is coinage—what kind of proof is that? Even if he held it was produce, he would still say that you can return ten gold dinars. Because it’s produce when it’s opposite silver dinars, but when you borrowed the gold dinars and you return gold dinars, why should I care that it changed value relative to silver dinars? In this transaction itself there are no silver dinars here; no one gave silver dinars in exchange for these gold dinars. Why should I care if it changed value? So in truth the answer is almost demanded, and a number of medieval authorities really say this—that… Look at Tosafot, for example. “Relative to itself, is there anyone who says it is not coinage?” Tosafot says this on the next piece in the passage, what we saw earlier. “And if you say so, then how is it proven above that Rabbi Hiyya held that gold is coinage?” How do they prove from Rabbi Hiyya that Rabbi Hiyya holds that gold is coinage? “Perhaps that is only relative to itself and not relative to silver.” Gold in itself, when you borrow gold and return gold, is obviously coinage. No one would ever argue about that. Our question is what happens in a transaction of gold against silver—will gold there be coinage or produce? And from Rabbi Hiyya you can’t prove anything about that. What’s the connection? Tosafot says: “And one can say that above he held like the conclusion here, that with regard to buying and selling it is produce, and with regard to a loan too it is produce.” What does that mean? That we saw that with regard to buying and selling, when there is gold against silver, gold is considered produce, right? And the Talmud says that we are stringent to treat loans as we treat buying and selling, and therefore even in a loan of gold we view gold as produce: we do not transfer sanctity, and so on, and one does not lend a gold dinar against a gold dinar.
[Speaker G] So
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] our passage goes like the conclusion of the Talmud there. In that passage, basically, what’s written here? It’s just a special stringency: they decreed loans because of sales, that’s all. But on the fundamental level, gold really is coinage in itself; there is just a special decree that they were stringent regarding loans just as in buying and selling. And several medieval authorities write this, for various reasons because of the severity of the prohibition of interest; Nachmanides… but the Ritva… Look at the Ritva, he goes in a slightly different direction. “And Rabbi Hiyya too held that gold is coinage,” and so on, “but if you say it is produce”—yes, then if it were produce, he couldn’t return ten gold dinars in a loan. Explanation: relative to silver, it would be a se’ah-for-se’ah case and would be forbidden. “And if you say: even if you say that relative to silver it is produce, nevertheless relative to itself it is coinage, as we say later regarding silver dinars: relative to itself, is there anyone who says it is produce? Meaning, even in Rabbi’s youth. So why don’t we say the same here regarding gold dinars?” Right, the same question Tosafot asked. “And one can say that silver, since it is readily marketable, one cannot say that it should be produce relative to itself, even according to Rabbi’s youth, who considered it produce relative to gold. For according to everyone it is considered coinage relative to copper. But with gold dinars, which are not readily marketable, according to Rabbi’s old age they are certainly so, since he considers them produce relative to silver and relative to copper; even relative to themselves it is possible that they are produce, as we are going to suggest later.” What is he saying? He says like this: there is an asymmetry between silver and gold. Silver—what is the basis for thinking silver is the coinage? Because it is marketable, right? It circulates more easily than gold. Gold is something major and not everyone will simply accept gold from you. Silver is the ordinary currency. Okay? Therefore it is marketable. So he says that silver—even if you say that it is considered produce opposite gold—obviously in itself it is coinage. That’s obvious. But with gold, what is the basis for saying that it is coinage? That it is important, right? Gold is important. Importance is not the same as being readily marketable. Meaning, being readily marketable, or tradable, really is an essential criterion for the question of what money is. Money is the thing that is most marketable there is, right? More marketable than chairs or some other commodity. That’s a good definition for the question of what money is. Now, silver coins are considered coinage because they are marketable. Therefore, in their essence they are coinage. And even if for some reason I define them opposite gold as produce, it’s obvious that in themselves they are coinage because they are marketable, they circulate. But gold coins are not like that. With gold coins you need a good reason to regard them as coinage. At most, when they stand opposite silver, you say they count as coinage because they are more important. But is the fact that something is important a reason to define it in itself as money? As coinage? Not at all. Therefore, he says, regarding gold coins, it could be that they are considered produce even when they are not opposite silver. In short, the comparison that the Talmud we saw earlier made—from silver according to Beit Hillel to gold according to Beit Shammai—is not a correct comparison according to our passage. That’s what the Ritva claims. Because regarding silver coins, that reasoning is correct: even if I define them as produce when they stand opposite gold dinars, it’s obvious that in themselves they are coinage. It’s money; it circulates. But with gold coins, even in themselves they are merchandise, not only opposite silver. Because the whole reason they were defined opposite silver as coinage is only because they are important. That’s not an essential property of money. They just decided to choose that as the criterion, because you need to decide whether silver is the produce or gold is the produce. So silver is the produce and gold is the coinage because it is the important one. Fine? But—but if someone says that gold counts as produce opposite silver, it’s not obvious that gold in itself would not also be produce. It may be that in itself too it is produce. Because gold, in its essence, is not really money. Gold is basically merchandise. Even gold dinars—those are merchandise in essence. When it stands opposite silver dinars, a question begins to arise as to how to regard it. But when it stands on its own, it’s like a se’ah of wheat: it’s merchandise. Only with silver does this consideration work. With silver coins, then I say silver coins truly are, in essence, coinage. It is something that circulates, something marketable; it is coinage in essence. So even if you say that when it stands opposite gold I will view it as produce, obviously in a transaction that includes only silver dinars, where it is not standing opposite gold, it will certainly be coinage. With gold it’s not like that. Therefore, he says, our passage basically disagrees with the comparison made by the next passage between silver dinars according to Beit Hillel and gold dinars according to Beit Shammai. Or alternatively, that this comparison is only within Beit Shammai, but according to Beit Hillel themselves, whom we follow in Jewish law, it is not correct. Therefore the Ritva says—and the Pnei Yehoshua says similar things—that in fact gold dinars really are produce. It’s not only that when they are produce opposite silver, only when they stand opposite silver they are produce. They are produce even when they stand on their own. Therefore the Talmud infers that if Rabbi Hiyya told Rav to return ten gold dinars, apparently he held that this was coinage and not produce, because if it were produce it would be forbidden, it would be like a se’ah-for-se’ah loan. Okay? That’s very reasonable conceptually, even the way he says it. The big problem is that the Talmud later seems to say not like that, because it compares the reasoning we use regarding silver dinars according to Beit Hillel to the reasoning we use regarding gold dinars according to Beit Shammai. Meaning, it does in fact see it as the same thing. It does in fact see gold dinars as money essentially, as coinage essentially, and only when it stands opposite silver—sorry—it is produce. Fine? But he says that in our passage they apparently disagree with that. I just want here—after that there are additional medieval authorities that I bring here, in one wording or another, fairly similarly. Maybe for our purposes: when I lend gold dinars in exchange for gold dinars, and I say that if gold is produce, then this is basically a se’ah-for-se’ah loan. Right? That’s what we infer from Rabbi Hiyya. If Rabbi Hiyya says that it’s permitted to return gold dinars, then apparently from his point of view this is not a se’ah-for-se’ah loan. Why? Because gold dinars are coinage and not produce. If they were produce, it would be a se’ah-for-se’ah loan and it would be forbidden. Now, seemingly, that would depend on how we understand a se’ah-for-se’ah loan. If we understand a se’ah-for-se’ah loan as a loan of the se’ah itself, then this whole discussion is irrelevant. So what’s the problem? Gold too is the thing itself; when you lend the se’ah and get back a se’ah, there isn’t really any interest in that. The whole point is that it’s worth more or worth less. But if gold itself really is coinage, then why should I care in itself? It isn’t standing here opposite silver. If I understand a se’ah-for-se’ah loan as a loan of value, then there is room for what we said earlier, that gold is merchandise and if its value changed then there is here a se’ah-for-se’ah loan. That seemingly points more in the direction that we’re talking here about a loan of merchandise, right? Okay, it’s a loan of merchandise and not a loan of value. Look at the passage later, the Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter “What is interest,” which also deals with interest. I just want to finish this today, so I’m jumping to the end of the summary; you can read the details I skipped afterward, I’ll upload it to the site. “From the fact that it leaves biblical interest and explains rabbinic interest, it follows that on the Torah level neshekh and tarbit are one matter.” The Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter “What is interest” brings that with interest there are two prohibitions: neshekh and tarbit. I mentioned this in the introduction in the previous lecture. Neshekh means biting the borrower, meaning as if harming the borrower, taking money from him, and tarbit means increasing my money unlawfully. These are two sides of the same coin. Whether I am biting him or increasing my own money. That’s neshekh and that’s tarbit. So the Talmud there discusses the question whether neshekh and tarbit are really two different prohibitions or whether they are two sides of the same coin, just another name for the same prohibition. The Talmud says there: “From the fact that it leaves biblical interest and explains rabbinic interest, it follows that on the Torah level neshekh and tarbit are one matter. But verses are written: ‘interest on money’ and ‘increase on food’!” “And can you really think that there can be neshekh without tarbit and tarbit without neshekh?” From the fact that the Torah uses two terms, neshekh and tarbit, and neshekh is about money and tarbit is about food—it doesn’t matter right now—but from the wording.