Preparing for Passover – Lesson 1
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- A minor or a convert between the two Passovers as an indicator of the nature of Pesach Sheni
- The dispute between Rabbi, Rabbi Natan, and Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya
- Compensation versus repair, and the implication for karet
- Distinctions between intentional and unintentional cases
- The model of “melting individuals into a community” and understanding compensation
- Understanding Rabbi: Pesach Sheni as an independent obligation from which one is exempted by Pesach Rishon
- The people who came to Moses: not to remain outside
- A logical note: correlation is not causation
- The verses of the Paschal offering: communal by definition and individual in performance
- Yearly repetition and the spiral model
- Women’s obligation in Pesach Rishon and optional status in Pesach Sheni
- The rule of time-bound positive commandments and its exceptions
- Children, belonging to the community, and karet as a concept of being “cut off from the community”
- Communal commandments and neglecting a positive commandment even though the community fulfilled it
- A contemporary implication: community and corona
- Conclusion and participants’ comments
Summary
General Overview
The text presents a tannaitic dispute about the nature of Pesach Sheni: whether it is a commandment in its own right or compensation for Pesach Rishon, and whether performing it also repairs the karet incurred by not performing Pesach Rishon. From the passages, a conceptual model is built of the Paschal offering as an act that dissolves individuals and creates a community, so that Pesach Rishon constitutes the community and Pesach Sheni enables one to join a community that already exists without completing the original constituting act. On that basis, various laws are explained, such as the case of a convert or minor who became obligated between the two Passovers, the distinction between compensation and repair, and women’s obligation in Pesach Rishon as opposed to their optional participation in Pesach Sheni. A methodological note is also added about the difference between correlation and causation.
A Minor or a Convert Between the Two Passovers as an Indicator of the Nature of Pesach Sheni
The situation of a minor or convert who became obligated between the two Passovers serves as an indication of whether Pesach Sheni is an independent commandment or compensation. Someone who was not obligated in Pesach Rishon, such as a non-Jew before conversion or a child before reaching majority, does not create any problem needing completion if Pesach Sheni is only compensation. Someone who was impure on Pesach Rishon is not exempt but prevented, and therefore remains obligated in the commandment and there is room for completion.
The Dispute Between Rabbi, Rabbi Natan, and Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya
The Talmud states: a convert who converted between the two Passovers, and likewise a minor who came of age between the two Passovers, must perform Pesach Sheni—these are the words of Rabbi. Rabbi holds that Pesach Sheni is “a festival in its own right,” and therefore once a person is obligated at Pesach Sheni, he is obligated in it even though he was not obligated in the first. Rabbi Natan holds that “the second is compensation for the first,” and therefore “whoever is subject to the first is subject to the second; whoever is not subject to the first is not subject to the second,” so one who was not obligated in the first does not need the second. Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya holds that “the second is a repair of the first,” meaning that Pesach Sheni repairs the first.
Compensation Versus Repair, and the Implication for Karet
The difference between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya is expressed in karet: according to Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya, performing Pesach Sheni repairs the first and also cancels the karet incurred there. According to Rabbi Natan, Pesach Sheni completes the obligation in terms of performing the commandment, but it does not repair the punishment for intentional failure in the first, and therefore the karet remains in place until repentance. The text sharpens the point that the system of commandments is not merely a mechanism for escaping punishment but for fulfilling a commandment, and that performing Pesach Sheni is not itself repentance for intentional failure in the first, even though it is compensation in terms of function.
Distinctions Between Intentional and Unintentional Cases
The text brings the distinction: if he acted intentionally in both, all agree he is liable; if he was unintentional in both, all agree he is exempt. If he was intentional in the first and unintentional in the second, according to Rabbi and Rabbi Natan he is liable, while according to Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya he is exempt. If he was unintentional in the first and intentional in the second, according to Rabbi he is liable, while according to Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya he is exempt.
The Model of “Melting Individuals into a Community” and Understanding Compensation
The text proposes that the role of Pesach Rishon is to take the collection of individuals who left Egypt and melt them together into a community, and one who did not perform Pesach Rishon remains outside the community. Pesach Sheni is presented as an option for entering back into the community by bringing an individual offering that joins the “mixture” of the community already formed. According to Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya, this joining repairs everything and cancels karet, while according to Rabbi Natan it brings one into the community but the punishment for not acting at the proper time remains until repentance.
Understanding Rabbi: Pesach Sheni as an Independent Obligation from Which One Is Exempted by Pesach Rishon
Rabbi does not present Pesach Sheni as a make-up date, but as an independent category, such that everyone is obligated in Pesach Sheni and only one who performed Pesach Rishon has already fulfilled the function of Pesach Sheni and is therefore exempt. The text formulates this as a reversal of ordinary causality: not “whoever did not bring the first must bring the second,” but rather “everyone is obligated in the second, and whoever brought the first is exempt.” The conceptual explanation given is that Pesach Rishon performs the double function of a communal offering and an individual offering together, whereas Pesach Sheni fulfills only the function of the individual offering and does not complete the communal offering.
The People Who Came to Moses: Not to Remain Outside
The text describes the problem of one who did not perform Pesach Rishon as two separate problems: failure to contribute to the constitution of the community, and remaining outside the community that was formed. Moses our teacher offers Pesach Sheni in order to solve the problem of remaining outside and to bring the person into the community, but this does not erase his non-participation in the constitution of the community. Within this framework, it is explained how Pesach Sheni can be meaningful without being considered a full repair of the first Passover.
A Logical Note: Correlation Is Not Causation
The text presents a methodological lesson: a correlation between two things does not require a causal relation. The central example is that only someone who did not bring Pesach Rishon brings Pesach Sheni, but according to Rabbi this is not causation but exemption for one who brought the first. Examples are given such as “it’s not worth going on a diet because everyone who goes on a diet is fat,” and two clocks that show the same time without either causing the other, as well as an example involving coffee and illness in order to emphasize the possibility of reverse causation or a third factor.
The Verses of the Paschal Offering: Communal by Definition and Individual in Performance
Verses are cited such as “Speak to all the congregation of Israel” and “the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it,” to show that the Torah depicts the Passover as a communal commandment. In practice it looks like an individual offering because each person offers his own animal, unlike ordinary communal offerings such as the additional offerings of Sabbath and festivals, which are offered as a single animal on behalf of everyone. The explanation given is that the Paschal offering is a unique communal offering that creates the community by means of the parallel bringing of many individual offerings, and not an offering brought by a community that already exists.
Yearly Repetition and the Spiral Model
The text argues that there is a need to experience the same result anew each year, and therefore the timeline is circular-spiral: one arrives at the same point but in another place along the line. Mention is made of the spiral model heard from Rabbi Shagar, and the speaker notes that he wrote an article on the subject, “On the Third Root,” and showed its halakhic implications.
Women’s Obligation in Pesach Rishon and Optional Status in Pesach Sheni
The text asks why women are obligated in Pesach Rishon even though it is a time-bound positive commandment, and cites from tractate Pesachim 91 the words of Rabbi Elazar: “A woman, in the first it is obligatory, and in the second it is optional, and it overrides the Sabbath.” The proposed explanation is that Pesach Rishon is a communal commandment, and therefore the relevant question is not “is the woman obligated” but “is the community obligated,” and whoever belongs to the community is obligated even in a time-bound commandment. In Pesach Sheni the community already exists, so the woman can be included in the community without an active act on her part, but if she wishes to bring Pesach Sheni that applies to her as an option, and it is not ordinary non-sacred slaughter in the Temple courtyard, because “optional” means that the Torah allows her to bring it.
The Rule of Time-Bound Positive Commandments and Its Exceptions
The text quotes from Kiddushin 33 the rule that women are exempt from time-bound positive commandments, and the Talmud’s challenge from matzah, rejoicing, and Hakhel, in which women are obligated. Rabbi Yochanan’s answer is brought: “One does not derive from general rules, even in a place where an exception is stated,” and it is interpreted that the exceptions are commandments that are communal at their root, and therefore being time-bound does not exempt. The text clarifies that Sabbath is explained in a different way, through “Observe and Remember were spoken in one utterance,” and not through communal character.
Children, Belonging to the Community, and Karet as a Concept of Being “Cut Off from the Community”
A question is raised about children who are not obligated in commandments, and the answer is that they are part of the community and enter it through their parents, and there is a special verse on this matter. Karet is presented as a mystery that even the medieval authorities (Rishonim) struggle with, but it is proposed that it is an expression of the person’s being “cut off from the community” and not necessarily merely a technical punishment. The text notes that there are two positive commandments for which there is karet—circumcision and Passover—because both are connected to belonging to the covenant and to the community.
Communal Commandments and Neglecting a Positive Commandment Even Though the Community Fulfilled It
The text cites Sefer HaChinukh on the commandment of Hakhel: if most of the community went up and fulfilled the commandment, it was fulfilled, and yet one who remained at home is still considered as one who neglected a positive commandment. The explanation is that in communal commandments each individual bears responsibility to contribute to the communal fulfillment, and therefore non-participation creates a claim against the individual even when the community in practice performed the act. This parallels the karet of one who did not perform Pesach Rishon, because the community was formed but the individual did not contribute to its constitution.
A Contemporary Implication: Community and Corona
The text refers to column 284 on the speaker’s website about “the war on corona,” in order to show that mistakes in understanding the guidelines stem from a mistaken conception of the relation between individual and community. He presents the community not as a collection of private obligations but as a collection of each individual’s obligations to contribute to the proper functioning of the community.
Conclusion and Participants’ Comments
The speaker promises to send by email the lecture summary and the page that was shown, and notes that an offering with a fixed time, even if it is an individual offering, overrides the Sabbath. A participant suggests a parallel to the daughters of Tzelofchad, who said “Why should our name be diminished,” in the context of belonging to inheritance and to the community, and the speaker accepts this as an example of a process in which, when there is no way to be included through the father or husband, the women themselves are brought in. The text ends with a request to send a question by email and coordination for ending the lecture.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’m recording in the meantime, though I don’t know how much it’ll help. Okay. In any case, the situation of a minor or a convert who came under obligation between the two Passovers basically gives us the indication whether this is a commandment in its own right or compensation. Why? Because let’s say someone like that still wasn’t obligated in commandments on the first Passover. Okay? So if he didn’t do Pesach Rishon, that doesn’t require any compensation, right? He wasn’t obligated. Someone who wasn’t obligated and didn’t do it—no problem was created. Agreed? Yes. So there’s no reason he should be obligated to do Pesach Sheni, because he wasn’t obligated in the first one. If all Pesach Sheni does is just serve as payment, so to speak, to complete your obligation from Pesach Rishon, then if you had no obligation in Pesach Rishon, there’s no reason you’d need to complete anything. Agreed?
[Speaker B] Yes, yes. Okay.
[Speaker C] But even someone who didn’t do it—if he was, like we said, impure—then supposedly he also wasn’t obligated at that time at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, someone impure was obligated.
[Speaker C] Why? He’s exempt, an impure person is exempt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he just can’t do it.
[Speaker C] He’s prevented,
[Speaker B] He’s not exempt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s obligated in the commandment, he just can’t fulfill it, exactly—for that very reason there is a make-up. But someone who isn’t obligated in the commandment at all—he’s a non-Jew. The convert before converting is a non-Jew. A non-Jew isn’t obligated in the Paschal offering. Or a minor who hasn’t yet grown up—he isn’t obligated to bring the Paschal offering. So once he converts or grows up, he enters the realm of obligation in commandments, and the time of Pesach Sheni arrives. Does he need to complete an obligation he failed to fulfill? No, because he wasn’t obligated at all. So someone who thinks Pesach Sheni is compensation for Pesach Rishon—in these situations he will exempt such a person from Pesach Sheni, right? But someone who thinks Pesach Sheni is a commandment in its own right, an independent commandment, then obviously it doesn’t depend on what my status was on Pesach Rishon. Once I’ve reached Pesach Sheni and I’m already obligated—now I’m an adult Jew, now I’m obligated in commandments—I have to bring Pesach Sheni. So let’s read the Talmud again.
[Speaker D] But that’s conditional on the fact that I didn’t do Pesach Rishon, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, that’s already Maimonides; we’ll see in a moment. What the Talmud says here is as follows: “And they follow their reasoning, as it was taught: A convert who converted between the two Passovers, and likewise a minor who came of age between the two Passovers, must perform Pesach Sheni—these are the words of Rabbi.” What does Rabbi say?
[Speaker B] That these are two separate commandments.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that these are two separate commandments. Therefore when Pesach Sheni arrives, even though he wasn’t obligated at all in Pesach Rishon, he has nothing to complete, but since he has now reached Pesach Sheni and is now obligated, he must perform Pesach Sheni. Meaning, Rabbi sees it as a commandment in its own right. Rabbi Natan says: “Whoever is subject to the first is subject to the second; whoever is not subject to the first is not subject to the second.” So Rabbi Natan says Pesach Sheni is a completion of the first. Someone who wasn’t obligated in Pesach Rishon has no reason to do the second; he doesn’t need to complete anything. Okay? “What is the basis of their dispute?” asks the Talmud. The Talmud itself explains the basis of the dispute. “What is the basis of their dispute? Rabbi holds that the second is a festival in its own right. Rabbi Natan holds that the second is compensation for the first. It does not repair the first.” Okay? It is compensation for the first, and someone who wasn’t obligated in the first doesn’t need to repair anything. And Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya holds: “The second is a repair of the first.” Meaning, Rabbi Natan says the second is compensation for the first, while Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya holds that the second repairs the first. What’s the difference between them? The difference concerns karet. If you did the second, then according to Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya you repaired the first, right? You no longer owe anything for the first, because it’s been repaired, everything is fine now. Okay?
[Speaker D] But according to Rabbi Natan, you did something, but you’re still liable for karet.
[Speaker B] Exactly, that’s the difference between the obligation and the karet. Exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, I answered in English—I’m recording at the same time. Okay. The point is that according to Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya, if you did the second, you repaired the first. If you repaired the first, then of course the karet you incurred there is also canceled, because it was repaired. According to Rabbi Natan—and this explains what you kept asking earlier—according to Rabbi Natan the second is compensation for the first: someone who did not do the first can complete it through the second. That does not mean that if you did the second, you repaired everything that happened. If you intentionally failed to do the first, you are a sinner, and if you are a sinner, then the karet is still upon you. True, you have some possibility of completing things through the second, so do the second.
[Speaker E] What for? If it doesn’t help him with karet and it’s also not a separate commandment, then what good does doing the second do at all according to Rabbi Natan?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The second—the question is how you understand the system of commandments. The system of commandments is not there in order to avoid punishment, but in order to fulfill the commandment. I want to do the commandment.
[Speaker E] If he intentionally didn’t fulfill it, then apparently he’s not such a great righteous person, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so if he still doesn’t fulfill it, he’ll continue not being such a great righteous person. But if he wants to repent and suddenly become righteous, then he’ll perform the commandment of Pesach Sheni. The karet still hasn’t been repaired—what can you do? What’s lost is lost. By the way, there are also ways to repair karet.
[Speaker F] He’ll repair the karet when he repents,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When he repents for Pesach Rishon, it may be that he’ll be freed from karet. Two different things. But doing Pesach Sheni in and of itself does not repair that.
[Speaker E] Isn’t doing Pesach Sheni itself basically repentance—repenting for Pesach Rishon that you intentionally didn’t do?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but it is still compensation for the first. It fulfills the function that the first was supposed to fulfill, but it doesn’t exempt you from the punishment for not fulfilling that function at the proper time. Okay? That is basically what is written according to Rabbi Natan. So these are three levels. And now the third paragraph gives the implications. I’m not going into the details right now, again. “If he acted intentionally in both, all agree he is liable. If he was unintentional in both, all agree he is exempt. If he was intentional in the first and unintentional in the second, according to Rabbi and Rabbi Natan he is liable; according to Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya he is exempt. If he was unintentional in the first and intentional in the second, according to Rabbi he is liable; according to Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya he is exempt.” If you work it out in light of what we said, you’ll understand this paragraph very simply; there’s no need to go through the calculation again. That’s what it’s saying. There is a difference here between the question whether this is compensation and the question whether it repairs. Those aren’t the same thing. Rabbi Natan says it’s compensation, but it doesn’t repair. Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya claims that it also repairs. Rabbi says it is neither, because it is a commandment in its own right—it is not a repair and not compensation and none of that; it is a commandment in its own right. And for our purposes, we now need to understand—I’ll explain compensation again instead of typing, because Iris is asking. Compensation means the possibility of fulfilling the function of the Passover. Let me just say directly what I’m proposing. I said earlier—and this will also answer you, Iris—I said at the beginning that I propose the following: the role of Pesach Rishon is to take the collection of individuals who left Egypt and melt them together into a community. Okay? That is the purpose of Pesach Rishon. Now, someone who did not do Pesach Rishon, whether intentionally or unintentionally, bottom line, he didn’t do it, so he is not part of the community. Right? Pesach Sheni is an option to enter back into the community. Now the question is how I relate to Pesach Sheni. You can say, like Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya, that Pesach Sheni repaired everything. I’m now inside the community, and it’s as if there was no problem with Pesach Rishon, even if it was intentional. Why? Because the whole problem was that you committed a transgression by not entering the community. So what do you want? In Pesach Sheni I came back and entered. The problem is repaired. No karet, nothing, everything has been repaired. That’s Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya. Rabbi Natan says: when I entered through Pesach Sheni, by offering it, I entered the community. That’s true. But I still deserve punishment for having intentionally failed to do it at the proper time. Karet is a punishment. That punishment you still deserve as long as you haven’t repented for the intentional sin you committed in Pesach Rishon. True, Pesach Sheni brought you into the community; it fulfilled the function that you should have fulfilled in Pesach Rishon. In that sense it is compensation according to Rabbi Natan. It fulfilled that function. But it did not exempt you from karet, because in the end you were a sinner on Pesach Rishon, and for that you deserve punishment—as long as you haven’t repented. Rabbi claims not even that. Meaning, when you did Pesach Sheni, not only does the karet from Pesach Rishon remain in place, but even the function of Pesach Rishon was not fulfilled. How can we understand that—Rabbi’s position? And here I get to what Iris pointed out earlier; this is the answer to you, Iris.
[Speaker F] Wait, can we go over Rabbi again?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi, when you brought Pesach Sheni, not only does your karet for the first remain in force, but it’s also not compensation—you also did not fulfill the function you were supposed to fulfill in Pesach Rishon. It has a double function. No—the first Passover has a double function, which goes like this: when I offer Pesach Rishon, I do two things. I bring a communal offering, and I also bring an individual offering. I do both of those together. When I bring Pesach Sheni, Pesach Sheni fulfills the function of the individual offering. But I did not bring the communal offering. Therefore, according to Rabbi, it is also not compensation for Pesach Rishon.
[Speaker E] But according to that understanding, what worried the people who came to Moses really hasn’t been solved at all. It doesn’t solve it, it doesn’t help them. Meaning, they came out of concern, I think—that’s how I understand it at least—that they had missed a commandment that was a communal commandment. Like we said, they don’t come about every individual commandment, like Grace after Meals, as you opened the class with. Meaning, what bothered them was indeed the loss of the communal commandment. So according to Rabbi, we basically didn’t do anything. We basically did nothing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With Rabbi, there really is a subtle point here. Look. Maybe in order to define it better, I’ll keep going for a moment. The question is how Rabbi can actually define the relation between Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni. After all, he too agrees that only someone who didn’t bring Pesach Rishon is obligated to bring Pesach Sheni. Everybody agrees on that. But it’s not compensation. So what is it? Apparently Rabbi says that the definition is: everyone is obligated to bring Pesach Sheni. Everyone. It’s just that someone who brought Pesach Rishon has already done it. That’s all.
[Speaker E] That’s strange. That makes Pesach Sheni much more important than Pesach Rishon. Let me explain—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because I can’t move forward here. The point is this. The compensation approach says the following: there is an obligation of Pesach Rishon. You didn’t do it? There’s a make-up date. Do it on Pesach Sheni. Okay? That’s the compensation view. Rabbi does not understand it that way. Proof: he obligates even someone who wasn’t obligated at all on the first occasion—he obligates him on the second occasion. So you see that it’s not a make-up date. So what is it? Rabbi says the opposite. This occasion is an independent occasion. It’s just that someone who did the first occasion is exempt from it. Not that it is more fundamental. You have to do the first occasion. But the second occasion also has to be done. Also. It’s the same obligation. Someone who did the first occasion is considered as if he already did the second occasion too. So the definition is the reverse. It’s not that Pesach Sheni is compensation for the first; rather, someone who did the first is simply exempt from the obligation to bring the second. That’s not the same thing.
[Speaker G] Rabbi,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe—
[Speaker G] Could one say that on Pesach Rishon one also fulfills the commandment of remembering the Passover of Egypt? Sorry. They can’t hear me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We can’t hear.
[Speaker G] Pesach Sheni is only for joining the community.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying without—I don’t want to get into the reason for the verse right now. I want to define the logic before I get into explanations. What is the logic? How can Rabbi be understood in a way that isn’t compensation, but still fits the verses?
[Speaker H] Why not say that it’s a condition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What she’s saying—that’s exactly what I’m saying, it’s conditional. That’s exactly the claim. What I’m really saying is this. According to Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya, it’s like first date and second date—like the first and second exam dates. There is no reason whatsoever to do the second date if you did the first one. It’s not that doing the first exempts you from the second. Someone who did the first has no reason at all to be obligated in the second, right? He’s already taken the exam. That’s the view of Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya. Rabbi’s view is the opposite. Everyone is obligated to do Pesach Sheni. It’s just that someone who did Pesach Rishon has thereby already fulfilled the function of Pesach Sheni as well, and therefore he is exempt—that’s all. But there is a function to Pesach Sheni. In the definition I gave earlier, Pesach Sheni is an individual offering. Pesach Rishon is a communal offering. Someone who brought the communal offering thereby already fulfilled his obligation as an individual too, because the individual is included within the community. But—but that does not mean that if you did Pesach Sheni, you completed what happened with Pesach Rishon. You did not bring the communal offering. If you did Pesach Sheni, you brought the individual offering, but you did not bring the communal offering. And therefore there is no completion here of what happened with Pesach Rishon. Okay? That is the definition according to Rabbi. Now there is—
[Speaker I] So like Ayelet said, what’s the significance of that? It’s like bringing another offering. What’s so important about Passover that makes it different from everything else that repeats itself? Why Ayelet’s question?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the contrary, what I said earlier is that what is important in Passover is—Chavi, right? Who asked that, Chavi? Yes. Yes. I’m flipping here between the pictures and the chats and everything while talking, so I don’t always keep track. The point is that—one second. The point is that Passover has a function. Karet is a result, a punishment, but Passover has a function. The function of Pesach Rishon is to melt us together into a community. That is done by means of two offerings—so to speak two offerings; it’s done simultaneously, but it’s two offerings: a communal offering and an individual offering. When I bring my Paschal offering, it actually performs two functions: a communal offering and an individual offering. When I did not bring the first offering on Pesach Rishon, then I missed two things: the communal offering and the individual offering. A month later comes Pesach Sheni. I can bring the individual offering. Pesach Sheni is by its essence an individual offering, so I bring the individual offering. Okay? That individual offering does not make up for the communal offering that I missed.
[Speaker I] But what they asked for—we said at the beginning, as Ayelet said, we opened and said that they came to Moses because they felt that there was something very special here. And that special thing isn’t like Grace after Meals, which is individual, but because of this communal aspect. So if the solution is Pesach Sheni, which is like an individual offering, then what kind of solution is that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying because this individual offering is also not detached from the formation of the community. Now I’ll sharpen it more, because later on we’ll see this. After all, Pesach Sheni is only for someone who didn’t bring Pesach Rishon. Pesach Rishon means that it performs two functions, both the communal function and the private function. How does it do two functions? It’s one offering. Obviously the two functions are connected to one another. There are two ways I can join the community. One possibility is that I take part in founding the community. I bring an individual offering, you bring an individual offering, everyone brings an individual offering, and all together this creates here, together, melted, all the individuals are melted down and become a community. That is Pesach Rishon. Obviously if I did that, then I fulfilled my duty in establishing the community, and I am also part of the community, right? When I get to Pesach Sheni, I did not fulfill my duty in establishing the community—certainly if I did it intentionally; if I didn’t do it intentionally. But I do have the possibility of joining the already existing community. How do I do that? I bring an individual offering, Pesach Sheni, and that offering joins me into this pot of the community. So I’m not part of the establishment of the community; I took no part in creating this collective, but I can join it. If I bring Pesach Sheni, which is an individual offering, I join myself to the existing community. So you can’t say that by this I fulfilled the obligation I missed on Pesach Rishon.
[Speaker J] Because it simply corresponds to Rabbi’s definition. Exactly.
[Speaker F] From the standpoint of the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), from what’s written in the book of Numbers, those impure people who came to ask for Pesach Sheni—or to ask what we’re supposed to do—they weren’t subject to any karet punishment for not managing to do Pesach Rishon.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because they weren’t intentional. Depends on which opinion, but let me—these questions don’t let me move forward. Give me just a second to move on. After I finish explaining, if there are questions then ask, okay? Because all the questions you’ve asked up till now are questions I was planning to explain in the next few sentences. That’s fine—if this were in a classroom it would be fine—but here it’s just hard for me because I can’t get to presenting the full picture. Let me present the full picture for a moment. The claim is the following—I’m just jumping ahead because I see I’m not managing to build the picture gradually. The claim is as follows: when I bring Pesach Rishon, it’s an individual offering that I bring, but since the whole community, every single individual, brings an individual offering, the whole thing together melts together. And we become a collective. What I did in that state is that my individual offering took part in the creation of the community, in the melting pot, yes, in the crucible—it took part in that crucible that actually created the community. The obligation on each person is to contribute his share to the creation of the community. Now there was someone who didn’t do that. So what happens? Two things. First, he did not fulfill his obligation. There are a lot of chats here, I’m not looking at them right now because I’m just trying to complete the picture; afterward I’ll also see what’s going on there and whether I haven’t answered something. What happened if someone didn’t bring this Paschal offering? If he didn’t do it, then two things happen. First, he did not fulfill his obligation in establishing the community. Second, he remained outside the community. Two different things. First, he did not fulfill his obligation—he didn’t contribute his share to the creation of the community. Second, the community was formed, but without him; he stayed outside. Those are two problems. Now when the people come to Moses our teacher and say to him in the verses—thank you, Yael Elkaim, yes—when the people come to Moses our teacher in the verses and say: how can we be included in the community? It may be that we were sinners, it may be that we were impure, all fine—but we don’t want to remain outside. How do we join the community? Moses our teacher says to them: bring Pesach Sheni. Pesach Sheni will bring you back into the community. That does not mean that you repaired the wrong you did on Pesach Rishon, because you had an obligation to take part in the creation of this community, and that you did not do. But I don’t want you to remain outside, so if you bring Pesach Sheni, Pesach Sheni will bring you back into the community. And now we’ve solved the problem. So now you can see how Rabbi works out. Someone who brought Pesach Rishon obviously fulfilled two obligations: the obligation of the individual and the obligation of the community. The individual obligation is basically to be an individual within the framework of the community; he both took part in establishing the community and of course also became part of the community. Okay? But someone who didn’t do that has those two problems. Does Pesach Sheni solve both problems, in which case it is compensation? Rabbi says no. Why not? You were a sinner, you didn’t take part in establishing the community—for that they don’t forgive you; you have karet for that. On the other hand, if from now on you do want to be considered part of the community, then bring Pesach Sheni, and by that you jump into the boat, you join yourself into this mixture that was created here on Pesach Rishon called the community, the Jewish people. And that is what Pesach Sheni does. Therefore it does not repair Pesach Rishon, it does not constitute compensation for Pesach Rishon, but it is still true that someone who did Pesach Rishon doesn’t need to do this. That is what Rabbi says. Okay? Now I’ll look a bit at the chats to see what I haven’t answered, and well, there are all sorts of implications there for first and second exam dates—it’s hard for me right now to address all of that. I hope the picture I’ve presented right now is clear. Okay? It’s hard for me here to follow all the analogies to first and second exam dates.
[Speaker B] And what comes out—maybe in that last sentence you said about Rabbi—is that a point of similarity between him and Rabbi Natan? That there are two parts here, and basically Pesach Sheni makes some contribution, but the karet from the first still remains?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, Rabbi Natan also holds that, exactly so. Okay? I think that really explains the whole picture beautifully. And it’s based on a lot of evidence. Now I’ll really try to do this briefly, because this took me a huge amount of time, this issue. I’m no longer getting into all those details about karet. Just one lesson—one lesson that I also write here in the marked paragraph. In that paragraph, just look afterward in the summary I’ll send. Just a lesson, a lesson that statisticians like to bring. When we see a correlation between two things, we tend to think there’s a causal relation between them. But not so—not always is the relation causal; sometimes there’s a correlation that isn’t causal. Here’s an example: we see a correlation—only someone who didn’t bring Pesach Rishon brings Pesach Sheni. Does that mean that not bringing Pesach Rishon is the reason you’re obligated in Pesach Sheni? The answer is no. The reason is that everyone is obligated in Pesach Sheni; someone who brought Pesach Rishon is exempt from Pesach Sheni. Therefore, whenever you see a correlation between two things, you have to know not to jump rashly to a causal conclusion. It’s not necessarily the case when we say that whoever—yes, this is the example I always give in this context: it’s not worth going on a diet, because everyone who goes on a diet is fat. Which is true in principle, except for the fashion models. Okay, why? Why is that not correct? It’s not correct because there is a correlation here between being fat and going on a diet, but it is not that going on the diet is the cause of your being fat. That’s not a causal relation; it’s a correlation. In that case, causality is of course reversed. But there are cases where there is no causality in either direction, and still there is correlation. For example, there are two clocks that always show the same time. Is one the cause of the other? No. Is the second the cause of the first? Also no. So what is it? There is some desire on the part of the clockmaker that both of them point to the same time. There is a third factor that causes there to be synchronization between the two clocks. Neither one is the cause of the other. Okay, and this is a common mistake in public discourse, by the way, and in medical research, and in many places. When we see a connection between two things, that still doesn’t mean there is a causal connection. When we see that people who drink coffee develop a certain disease, that doesn’t mean that drinking coffee causes the disease. It could be that the disease causes us to drink coffee, for example, or that there is some third thing that causes us to drink coffee and also causes us to be sick. And this has a very important implication, because if coffee really is not the cause of the disease—if one of the other two options is correct—then stopping drinking coffee won’t help. It won’t prevent the disease. Therefore the analysis is very important; in statistics they do regressions in order to see what kind of relation there is between two parameters that are correlated. And the rashness that immediately jumps to a causal interpretation is not always justified. In this case, for example, Rabbi does not accept it. Rabbi says: even though the verse says that only someone who didn’t bring Pesach Rishon is obligated in Pesach Sheni, that does not mean that not bringing Pesach Rishon is the reason you’re obligated in Pesach Sheni. The reason is that everyone is obligated in Pesach Sheni. If you brought Pesach Rishon, you’re exempt—not that someone who didn’t bring it thereby becomes obligated, but rather someone who did bring it is exempt. Fine. That’s just a logical, methodological note, but let’s move on. The next stage.
[Speaker D] Can I ask? Are we assuming that all three opinions divide up what the first and second Passovers do in terms of the individual and the collective in this way?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, I didn’t understand.
[Speaker D] We made a distinction in what Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni do in terms of the act of creating the collective and joining the collective, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I claim that this applies to all three tannaim.
[Speaker D] And is that way of looking at it shared by all three tannaim, or does each one divide it up—or define it—the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Each one weighs the components differently.
[Speaker D] Right, I understand, but all the components are there…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think the picture is shared by everyone. The whole question is just what incurs karet and how the problem of karet is solved, but the overall picture is one everyone agrees on. Okay? Now here, chapter 2 that I’m starting here—I’m only going to do it quickly. The claim is, I show there—maybe let’s read the verses here—“Speak to the entire congregation of Israel, saying: on the tenth of this month they shall take for themselves, each man, a lamb for a father’s house, a lamb for a household,” and so on, “and the entire assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon.” That’s the verse that sets the picture. You can see that it’s a communal commandment. “Speak to the entire congregation of Israel,” and “the entire assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it.”
Now this is a sacrifice that is apparently a communal offering, but in various places you can see that it’s an individual offering. Not only that, its character is also the character of an individual offering. Communal offerings are usually offerings where one animal is brought for the entire community, like the additional offerings of the Sabbath or the additional offerings of a holiday. So a priest brings some offering in the Temple on behalf of all of us, on behalf of the entire community. With Passover it’s not like that. Every person offers his own animal. So it looks like an individual offering. And nevertheless, the Torah sees it as a communal offering.
One of the implications through which they discuss this question is the question of being overridden by impurity and overriding the Sabbath. Yes, there’s some question here why each person is obligated in the second Passover unless he was exempted through the first Passover, because second Passover means being part of the community, because an individual joins the community. If I created the community. So Passover is basically an offering that the Torah defines as a communal offering, but in practice it behaves like an individual offering. Essentially every person brings a sacrifice, unlike communal offerings where one animal is brought for the whole community. How does that work?
My claim is that what’s written here is exactly what I said before. The Paschal offering is a very special communal offering, because a regular communal offering is an offering that an already-existing community brings. We already exist, we are already the Jewish people. Now the Jewish people have to bring an additional Sabbath offering, so they bring an animal that is a sacrifice in the name of the community. The priests offer it on behalf of all of us. It’s one animal because we already exist, we are already a complete community.
The Paschal offering is not an offering that the community brings; it’s the offering that creates the community. How do you create a community? Each and every person, who at that point is still a private individual, brings a sacrifice. The shared bringing of the sacrifices to the Temple—each person with his own sacrifice—now creates, fuses us into being a community. Therefore on the one hand it is perceived as a communal offering, but on the other hand it is carried out by each individual separately. Because here the individuals are fused and the community comes into being.
Regular communal offerings are offerings in which the community already exists and now brings a sacrifice. There are obligations imposed on a community; the community brings a sacrifice. The Paschal offering is a collection of offerings of individuals, where each one brings his own sacrifice, and that fuses us into being a community. From that point onward we can now bring regular communal offerings—one animal that the whole community brings. That’s the explanation, in my view, for the unique character of the Paschal offering. Now with this you can explain lots of things about the Paschal offering, and I’m not going into all those details now because I want to illustrate a bit what this thing actually means.
[Speaker K] But every year do you have to fuse the community all over again?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We already exist. Yes, the claim is that basically time here is sort of circular, and we keep returning and reliving this process within ourselves and recreating ourselves every year. In any case that’s true. Whatever Passover is supposed to accomplish, you can say—independent of all my little interpretations—Passover has to achieve something, okay? I don’t know what, it doesn’t matter what. Why do I need next year to do Passover again? I already did it last year. In any case we have to arrive at the idea that there is some circular axis here, where we are supposed to achieve the same result anew each year, however you explain that result. So it doesn’t depend on what I’m saying. What I’m offering is only a very specific interpretation of what the result is that we want to achieve, that’s all. The question of repetition is valid regardless of what I’m saying. And in this we see that the Torah asks us to live as though every year we recreate ourselves anew.
[Speaker B] You could suggest a model for the yearly cycle in which it’s linear מצד one side and circular on the other—in other words, we do progress, but spirally; it’s a spiral. We do get to the same point, but in a different place on the line.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I once wrote an article about that spiral model. I may even have spoken about it in one of the previous years; I don’t remember whether you heard it or not, Idit.
I heard it from Rabbi Shagar. Okay, so I wrote an article about it many years ago, on the third root, in my article in the book on the roots, and it also appears on my website under the third root. There I explained the spiral model exactly and showed its halakhic implications. And it’s definitely connected to this, but I’m not going into it here.
What I want is to explain the implications and maybe, in a sentence, connect it a bit to us. I’m now talking about women’s obligation—here I’m marking it, okay?
[Speaker B] So as an obligation, an additional indication.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Yes, the question is why women are obligated in the first Passover. First of all, why are women obligated in the first Passover? After all, the first Passover—Passover in general—is a positive commandment dependent on time. Women are supposed to be exempt. Why are women obligated? The Talmud says: “In accordance with whom is that which Rabbi Elazar said? They too were included in that miracle.”
[Speaker F] What? They participated in the Exodus from Egypt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? In every positive commandment dependent on time women participated too, so what does that prove?
[Speaker B] Like, “they too were included in that miracle.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that would be true of everything. So why aren’t they obligated in sukkah? “They too dwelled in booths,” in the booths that the Holy One, blessed be He, had us dwell in in Egypt. Almost every positive commandment dependent on time is a commemorative commandment, a remembrance of something that happened. So why are women exempt?
[Speaker L] There has to be a special reason.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Part of the community. So look at the Talmud that I marked here in Pesachim 91: “In accordance with whom is that which Rabbi Elazar said: a woman in the first is an obligation, and in the second it is optional, and it overrides the Sabbath. If it is optional, why does it override the Sabbath?” Okay, I’m not going into overriding the Sabbath now. But a woman in the first is obligated, and in the second it is optional. Why is it obligatory in the first Passover? The obligation in the first Passover is because we are dealing here with a communal commandment. In a communal commandment, the one obligated is not the individuals at all, but the community. Everyone who belongs to the community is obligated. We do not discuss each individual—whether he is obligated or not. I’ll give you an example that I brought here later.
[Speaker E] But what is a community? Because when we talk today about a community, at least in our world today, women are not “the community,” not part of the community—certainly not in the synagogue community, let’s put it that way. So why is this a community in that sense, but there not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Women are part of the community.
[Speaker B] Right, there’s a community and there’s a minyan; it’s not the same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Women are part of the community according to all opinions, in every respect. The question of what happens with a minyan is a separate topic in itself; we won’t go into it here. They are part of the community—no one disputes that. Look, for example, I’ll give you an example.
[Speaker B] For example, in sanctifying God’s name or in the Megillah, women do count because they are part of the community.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, for a group of ten. For a group of ten, yes. Look, for example, at the topic in Kiddushin 33. I mark here: “All positive commandments dependent on time, women are exempt.” The Sages taught: Which is a positive commandment dependent on time? Sukkah and lulav, shofar and fringes and tefillin, and so on. Right? Now the Talmud asks: Is that really a rule? But matzah, rejoicing, and Hakhel are positive commandments dependent on time, and women are obligated! These are positive commandments dependent on time, and women are not exempt—they are obligated. The answer—I’m skipping because I want to move quickly. Rabbi Yochanan said: “One does not derive law from general rules, even where an exception is stated.”
Do you understand what a striking proof this is? What does that mean? It says all positive commandments dependent on time, women are exempt—except A, B, and C. That sounds like very exact wording, right? All such commandments—they are exempt, except for these three. Now if I find a fourth one? That can’t be—after all, you already said “except.” If they had told me all positive commandments dependent on time, women are exempt, and I found one in which they are obligated, they could say fine, they stated the general rule but there is an exception. But when the wording also says “except”? All commandments—women are exempt except A, B, and C. So then I found D—it can’t be, because you already counted the exceptions too. The Talmud says: don’t make a big deal out of it. Even if I said “except,” okay, there’s also D. What does that mean? What is the point?
I think the point is this: these commandments—rejoicing, Hakhel, and matzah—are in their essence communal commandments. Matzah is because of Passover, and rejoicing and Hakhel are certainly communal commandments. So these are communal commandments. What does that mean? In commandments of individuals, each person is assessed as to whether he is obligated in the commandment or not. So for women there is a general criterion: is it a positive commandment dependent on time or not? If it is, the woman is exempt. But in commandments that the community is obligated in, the question is not whether I am obligated, or whether you are obligated, or whether so-and-so is obligated. The question is whether the community is obligated or not. Once the community is obligated, everyone included in the community is automatically obligated. So why should I care that it is time-dependent? Even if it is time-dependent, in the end they are part of the community.
And therefore—no, Sabbath is something else, I’m answering the chat here—I don’t think that’s because it’s a communal commandment; that’s something else. There it’s because “observe” and “remember” were said in one utterance; there is a special exposition there.
[Speaker E] And what is the commandment of rejoicing as a communal commandment? In what sense is rejoicing a communal commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Pilgrimage to the Temple on the festivals—you bring peace-offerings of rejoicing. And in the Temple, pilgrimage is a communal commandment.
[Speaker M] And why is matzah a communal commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said—matzah is part of Passover; that’s what I’m talking about today.
[Speaker M] But we said that the offering makes us into a community and that that is the communal commandment, not the celebration of Passover itself and all the commandments, the leaven and the matzah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but I’m saying that since Passover is the festival of our being fused into a community, matzah too has a communal dimension. And therefore a woman is also obligated in matzah, even though it is a positive commandment dependent on time. Now why there are parts of Passover that are not like that and parts that are—I’m not getting into that now. But on the fundamental level, there may be a different explanation for matzah; it’s not important to me right now. What I only want to show—because I simply can’t go into this topic in detail here—is that when we speak about community, it is not relevant whether it is time-dependent or not, because the question is not whether the woman is obligated, but whether the community is obligated. Once the community is obligated, everyone who belongs to it is obligated. The same is true for the Paschal offering. Therefore, in the first Passover women are also obligated in the Paschal offering, even though it is time-dependent.
Why in the second Passover are they exempt? Actually it doesn’t say exempt; it says it is optional.
[Speaker E] I have a question. Children, who are not obligated in commandments—are they also part of the community regarding the Paschal offering?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They are part of the community, but they enter the community through their parents. Meaning, the parents create the community, and once the community is created the children also belong to it—like in conversion, where a minor is immersed on the authority of the religious court.
[Speaker N] Wait, but Rabbi, a woman is not obligated in pilgrimage, because it says, “all your males shall appear.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker N] Who’s speaking first?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, because they derive it from “your males.” For that there is a special verse. Why do you need a special verse? Because without it women would also have been obligated. Why? Because it is a communal commandment. Now this is connected to Torah study—it’s not important. Again, let’s leave the details aside for the moment; I just want to explain the principle. That’s the principle, and therefore I think this understanding of the Paschal offering also explains why women are obligated. That’s the root of the matter as well.
In the second Passover it is optional. Here it doesn’t say that they are exempt; it says that it is optional. Why? The community already exists. Once the community already exists, one can be included in the community even without doing an active deed. If you want to perform an active deed as well—bless you—but you are not obligated. That’s how I think one can explain this matter. I just want to explain what you said.
[Speaker E] Exactly the explanation from a few minutes ago—why there is in fact an obligation, what we explained according to Rabbi, if I’m not mistaken—why in the second Passover there is an obligation to bring the sacrifice. Because you failed the first time, but at least now come and be part of the community.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And now I’m saying: if the woman wants to do this, she can also do it; it’s optional. And this is still not unconsecrated slaughter in the Temple courtyard. You have to understand that if the woman is not obligated, she would be forbidden to bring this sacrifice—it would be unconsecrated slaughter in the Temple courtyard. So when they say it is optional, that means this does apply to a woman as well. A woman can bring this sacrifice, and then she too essentially does what the man does. True, she—wait, wait—true, she is not obligated. What does it mean that she is not obligated? It probably means, if I understand correctly, that a woman can be included in the community also through her husband, her father, in another way, without doing an active deed of her own. In that sense the Torah certainly does not see the woman in the same way as the man. I’m not trying to present an egalitarian picture here. Jewish law does not see the woman in the same way as the man, and it does see the woman as attached in some sense to the husband or the father, and therefore through them she too can be included in the community.
[Speaker E] So couldn’t you say the same thing about the first Passover? Huh? You could say the same thing about the first Passover, so why is she obligated in the first Passover?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in constituting the community—once the community already exists, she can join it through the husband or father. But in constituting the community, it may be that someone who did not help constitute the community is not a partner in it. In the founding itself she has to be an actual participant in order to take part. In order to be part of the community she can be part of it through the husband or father, but in order to contribute to the founding of the community, without any action you contributed nothing to the founding.
[Speaker B] Okay, that came out more feminist for you, Yael.
[Speaker E] No, it’s not a matter of feminism. I’m thinking in terms of simple mathematical accounting—it doesn’t make sense. Because if you want to constitute the people, the whole community has to come. If you weren’t there the first time, now you have a second chance—or according to Rabbi you have an obligation on the second chance—not a second chance, you have an obligation in the second Passover to come and join. That doesn’t exempt you from what you failed to do the first time, but at least you joined in some way, okay. So now what? Now we said that to constitute the community all the individuals in the people, including the women, have to come do it. A woman didn’t come on the first Passover, so now it suddenly isn’t necessary? That doesn’t work for me. There’s certainly a feminist issue here, but I’m saying that even in mathematical terms it doesn’t work for me—why one time is it like this and another time not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain, Yael—just a second, I’ll explain. I heard the question; listen carefully. I’m saying this: when one comes to do the first Passover, I said that the first Passover does two things—it constitutes the community, and then automatically I am also part of it. Okay? Now with regard to the constituting act, I have an obligation to take part in the constituting act; that is a halakhic obligation. Not only because without me it wouldn’t happen—it would happen without me too—but I have an obligation to take part in the constituting act.
If I came and did not do it, and then I get to the second Passover—I’m talking about a man now—the obligation to perform the constituting act I have already lost. I have karet. I can join; joining I still can do—that’s second Passover. That’s the man. Now the woman—the obligation to constitute the community is also imposed on the woman. Why? Because an act of constituting, if she didn’t do it herself, then she didn’t do it. What the husband or father can draw her into with them is the very belonging to the community. If you ask whether that woman is Jewish—yes, if her father is Jewish or her husband is Jewish, then she too is Jewish, okay? So in the sense of belonging she can attach herself after someone else, but the constituting act—if she did not do it, then she did not do it. Therefore in the constituting act she is obligated to do it. Regarding belonging, she has an option: if she wants, she can do an act, which is better, and then really bring herself into the community; but even if she doesn’t… On the logical level, I think…
[Speaker M] Rabbi, can I suggest another explanation? Yes. Maybe the woman herself never really leaves the community. Maybe that’s why Jewish identity is determined through the woman, through the mother, essentially. And therefore she has no obligation to perform the act of joining, because for her it is automatic. Not because she joins through the man or the father.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But before there is Jewish identity, then the woman isn’t Jewish either.
[Speaker M] Okay. So then the question is whether here we are looking at whether this constituting of the community… No, but that’s it—we’re saying, as we said before, that this is a spiral; we… It’s not that the concept of Israel disappeared completely from the world if we didn’t perform the communal sacrifice?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle, it did disappear. Every year מחדש.
[Speaker M] So how do we live today? How do we live today without the Paschal offering, without constituting the community every year?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—so Passover does… what we do on the Seder night replaces the Paschal offering. Again, someone who didn’t bring the Paschal offering—it does not mean that he is now a gentile. On the conceptual level he is not Jewish. It does not mean he is a gentile. Obviously I’m not now speaking in the simple halakhic sense that you couldn’t include him in a minyan now because he became a gentile. Someone who didn’t bring the first Passover, didn’t bring the second Passover, so he’s a gentile? No, he’s not a gentile. Obviously—we are not… Don’t take this conceptual statement and cash it out into halakhic small change. I’m trying to understand the idea behind the matter.
[Speaker E] Maybe one really has to explain what exactly this karet is? What does the act of karet do? What does it really do? What really…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, karet is an expression—that’s what I want to claim. Karet means that if you are not part of the community, you remain outside; you are cut off from the community. It’s simply a result, not a punishment. But what is the meaning?
[Speaker E] You’re cut off from the community—and then what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Are your children no longer Jewish? You won’t sit with us around the same bonfire, the tribal bonfire. I don’t know what it means. But you are cut off from the community. Karet is a mystery; no one knows what karet means. Even the medieval authorities struggle with it. But you are cut off from the community. What exactly that means, I don’t know.
The point is this, look: there are two positive commandments for which there is karet. Normally karet is for prohibitions. There are only two positive commandments for which there is karet: circumcision and Passover. Why? Because circumcision too is about belonging to the Jewish community, right? It is our covenant to enter into the covenant. Therefore, precisely in these two commandments, if you did not do it, you are cut off. You are cut off not as a punishment but because you are not there. You are simply uncircumcised; you are like a gentile. Just as the uncircumcised person who did not circumcise is called uncircumcised—he is not really a gentile, but he has a certain aspect of gentileness; he is a little bit gentile. In other words, this sharpens the point that with Passover too…
[Speaker I] Rabbi, according to what comes out… what? It comes out, I’m saying, that according to Rabbi Hananya, a woman has no way to atone for the karet of the first Passover, while a man has a way to atone for the first karet?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi, no. That’s what I’m saying. I’m discussing everything according to Rabbi because we rule in Jewish law according to Rabbi. According to Rabbi, that is exactly the point. In that sense the man is also lost. Meaning, if he deliberately did not perform the first Passover, he is cut off. The second Passover can do something here that joins him to the community, but the non-participation in the constituting of the community imposes karet on him—because you did not participate in the constituting of the community.
[Speaker J] Again, that whole year is lost according to Rabbi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only according to Rabbi—but we rule in Jewish law like Rabbi. That is the law. Now just one last sentence, or a few last sentences if you’ll allow me—we’ve already gone a bit over—but a few final sentences.
You need to understand that I’m talking about a communal commandment. For example, take the commandment of Hakhel. The commandment of Hakhel is a communal commandment in which women are obligated, even though it is a positive commandment dependent on time. And in the commandment of Hakhel there is a very interesting phenomenon in Sefer HaChinukh. On the one hand, if most of the community went up and fulfilled the commandment of Hakhel, then the commandment was fulfilled. Now I stayed home. So the Chinukh says: I neglected a positive commandment. How? How can it be that I neglected a positive commandment if the positive commandment was fulfilled? Do you know an example like this? That someone violates by neglecting a positive commandment when in fact the body that is obligated in that positive commandment fulfilled it? After all, who is obligated in this positive commandment? The community. And the community fulfilled it. So what’s the problem? I stayed home, but I am not the one obligated—the community is obligated. So why did I neglect a positive commandment?
[Speaker H] We learned this. What? Yes, we learned this in sukkah—that we actually have to be responsible to make the commandment exist, and if we didn’t do that then basically…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Queen Helene there on page 3—I gave a class on this, and there I argued that neglecting a positive commandment means the responsibility of the individual to produce the communal fulfillment. If Hakhel is a commandment on the community and everyone stays home and says, it’s a commandment on the community, what does it have to do with me? I’m staying home. Then obviously the community also won’t fulfill this commandment, right? The community is the collection of people who make it up. Therefore what the Torah does with communal commandments is impose responsibility on each individual within the community. If you do not contribute your part to the fulfillment of the communal commandment, then even if the community is in Jerusalem and fulfills it, you are considered to have neglected a positive commandment. Even though the positive commandment was fulfilled. Why? Because in a communal commandment there is something unique: you, as a private individual, are responsible for the community’s fulfillment. If you did not constitute the community or did not create the fulfillment of the commandment, then true, the commandment was fulfilled—in that sense the enterprise succeeded—but there is still a claim against you: why didn’t you participate?
That is exactly parallel to the karet of someone who did not do the first Passover. The Jewish people existed, and in the second Passover I even join the Jewish people myself, so why is there karet on me? There is karet on me because I did not do what I was supposed to contribute in order for this thing to happen. That I did not do. Now I’ll stop here. I just refer you, if you want, to my website, in the last column—
[Speaker F] Wait a second, here you…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] See column 284—I’m showing it on the screen—“War on Corona,” and it deals with current issues. I write there about the point that people do not properly understand the guidelines in the war on corona, and it is connected to the concept of what a community is. What is the relationship between the individual and the community. And there are very, very typical mistakes here, and it’s very easy to fall into them. It’s connected to the categorical imperative; I have another column on that that I refer to. If you want, you can read it there. That is the meaning of the fusion of individuals into a community. People think it is a collection of obligations of individuals, but that is not correct. It is a collection of obligations of each individual to contribute to the community behaving properly. And this has very large practical implications in our issue too, the corona issue. Look here if you want—there are implications. Okay, so I think we can—
[Speaker F] Could you send us by email the page you showed us?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes—it’s a summary of the class, I’ll send it. I’ll send the summary of the class.
[Speaker F] Very good. Thank you very much.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, thank you. Are we done? Yes, we’re done.
[Speaker B] Regarding overriding the Sabbath—that a communal offering overrides the Sabbath and an individual offering does not? She’s asking whether that’s the issue, that an individual offering does not override the Sabbath and a communal offering does.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle yes, although an offering that has a fixed time, even if it is individual, overrides the Sabbath. Look in the summary—I address it there.
[Speaker B] Okay, thank you. And now a comment, with your permission. You said it at the beginning and I didn’t want to because it’s a bit of a digression from the topic of the class. You spoke about this uniqueness of “why should we be diminished” and all that. It is very parallel to the daughters of Tzelofchad, who also say “why should our father’s name be diminished,” and there too it is communal belonging—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the inheritance of commandments and in the inheritance of the Land of Israel. What did the daughters of Tzelofchad say? “Why should it be diminished?”
[Speaker B] I want to say that we have here a very similar move both with the impure people on Passover and with the daughters of Tzelofchad, where both ask “why should we be diminished,” and Moses understands and refers their question to the Holy One, blessed be He. Meaning, there is some issue here of communal belonging—here it is in inheritance of the land and the tribal portions.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but there too they are essentially included in the community through the father or the husband, and when that is severed and they have no one through whom to be included, then they themselves are brought in. A very nice example—that is exactly an example of what we were talking about before. There is another question here in the email—Iris’s question, wait, about one who was coerced there? Wait, one last question—what is the last question? I don’t recognize which question this is, Iris, so send it to me by email and I’ll answer you in writing, okay? Okay.
[Speaker I] Okay, thank you, goodbye, Sabbath peace, thank you very much.