Approaching Passover – Lesson 2

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even with the prohibition of “it shall not be seen,” there are minimum amounts. You don’t violate “it shall not be seen” for every tiny crumb. There too there is a minimum amount. But right now we’re talking about the prohibition of eating. Still, in principle, the Talmud later on—we won’t get there—but later in Beitzah, in that same passage, it really shifts the whole discussion to “it shall not be seen,” not to the prohibition of eating. But at the moment we’re dealing with the first part of the passage. You know, this reminds me of a responsum by Rabbi Ben Zion Abba Shaul. The rule is that leaven on Passover is forbidden even in the tiniest amount. Meaning, with regard to leaven and “it shall not be seen,” one must be careful; it is not nullified by a majority. Okay? Even if there is a majority of food that is not leaven and only a little leaven, it is not nullified. So people once asked Rabbi Ben Zion Abba Shaul: how can you drink water from the Kinneret? Some fisherman threw a slice of bread in there, and some crumb like that could make its way into the water we drink. How can you drink the water? And in fact there are people who put some cloth over the faucet to prevent crumbs from entering—an excessive stringency. So Rabbi Ben Zion Abba Shaul said yes, but even the tiniest amount has a threshold. Meaning, there are things that are not considered even the tiniest amount. That’s just an anecdote; I’m saying it parenthetically.

In any case, for our purposes, that is the view of Beit Shammai. Now this is strange in Beit Shammai’s view, because Beit Shammai’s a fortiori argument is really odd. First I asked: even if leavened bread is forbidden, why assume that sourdough starter would be forbidden? Why should starter be forbidden? After all, it isn’t fit for eating. Now Beit Shammai not only ignore this problem—that starter is unfit for eating—they even think starter is easier to forbid than leavened bread. I would have said the opposite: if the Torah had written leavened bread, I would have thought only leavened bread and not starter, because leavened bread is fit for eating and starter is not. Beit Shammai are not only untroubled by that question; they actually reverse it. Meaning, in their view, since starter is more intensely fermented, then obviously it should be more prohibited than leavened bread. And what about the fact that it isn’t fit for eating? That doesn’t bother them in the slightest. Why? Very strange.

That’s why I brought this passage—so you can see that the question I asked about the verses actually comes up in the Talmud itself. The Talmud itself is not bothered at all by the fact that starter is unfit for eating, to the point that it brings an a fortiori argument according to Beit Shammai that if leavened bread had been written, I would have learned by a fortiori reasoning that starter too is forbidden. But there’s an objection to that a fortiori argument: starter is unfit for eating. What kind of a fortiori argument is that? The Talmud itself is not bothered at all by this issue, by the fact that starter is unfit for eating. To the point that it brings an a fortiori argument that according to Beit Shammai, if leavened bread had been written, I would have learned by a fortiori reasoning that starter too is forbidden. But there is an objection to that argument: starter is unfit for eating? What kind of a fortiori argument is that? Beit Shammai are not bothered by this; for them it is not an objection. Okay?

Now let’s see Beit Hillel. And Beit Hillel—I marked it in the Talmud, look—And Beit Hillel. Meaning: so where exactly do Beit Hillel disagree with this line of Beit Shammai? After all, Beit Hillel say that both starter and leavened bread are measured by an olive-bulk. So where, in this whole line of argument, does Beit Hillel disagree? The Talmud says: both are needed. Meaning, the fact that starter was written—it needed to be written; it is not superfluous. Therefore the entire discussion of Beit Shammai, which is based on the assumption that the word “starter” is superfluous, is incorrect. Because the word “starter” is not superfluous. Why? Because it would have been impossible to write only leavened bread and learn starter from it, and impossible to write only starter and learn leavened bread from it. The Torah had to write both. Why not? This is what in Talmudic language is called a necessary dual formulation. When we make a necessary-dual-formulation argument between two things, we show why both need to be written; it is not enough for one to be written and the other learned from it.

To show that both are necessary, to show a necessary dual formulation between two things, I have to show two points: first, if A had been written, why I could not have learned B from it; and second, if B had been written, why I could not have learned A from it. So that is what the Talmud now does. Both are needed. For if the Merciful One had written starter—I’m reading in the Talmud—one might have said it is because its fermentation is severe, but leavened bread, whose fermentation is not severe, I might say no. Therefore it is necessary. Meaning, if only starter had been written, I would not know that ordinary leavened bread must also be forbidden. Up to this point it is really just like Beit Shammai. Because leavened bread alone could not be written—sorry, if they had written starter alone and not leavened bread alone—if they had written starter alone, I would think that starter, since it is so severe, that is what the Torah forbids. But who says it also forbids leavened bread, which is less severe, whose fermentation is milder?

And once again there is a kind of ignoring here of the fact that starter is unfit for eating. The assumption here, for now, is that starter is much more forbidden than leavened bread, right? So far this is like Beit Shammai. Beit Shammai too say that starter alone could not be written. What Beit Shammai say, however, is that leavened bread alone could have been written, because if leavened bread had been written, then I would infer starter by a fortiori reasoning. Right? Up to here that is Beit Shammai. And that is what Beit Hillel need to answer. What Beit Hillel have said until now is also accepted by Beit Shammai.

But now Beit Hillel explain where they disagree, because Beit Hillel argue: and if the Merciful One had written leavened bread—I’m reading here—And if the Merciful One had written leavened bread, it would be because it is fit for eating. But starter, which is not fit for eating, I might say no. Therefore it is necessary. Aha—now the rabbit comes out of the hat. Suddenly Beit Hillel say: wait a second. True, there is one scale of severity according to which starter is more severe than leavened bread, but there is also an opposite scale: leavened bread is more severe than starter. Why? Because leavened bread is fit for eating and starter is not fit for eating. Therefore neither of them—neither starter nor leavened bread—if it alone had been written in the Torah, would have been enough for me to learn the other. Consequently the Torah had to write both starter and leavened bread. And if so, then the whole reasoning of Beit Shammai that led them to distinguish between the quantities collapses, because their reasoning was based on the assumption that the word “starter” is superfluous. Beit Hillel say: what do you mean? It’s not superfluous. If they had written leavened bread and not written starter, I would have said that starter is unfit for eating and therefore was not forbidden. So the Torah had to write starter. You can’t infer anything from the Torah having written starter. That is basically what I marked here in the Talmud—the last line is the point of disagreement between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai.

Now let’s see what this actually means. What this basically means is the following: Beit Shammai are not bothered at all by the fact that starter is unfit for eating. For them, starter is much more severe than leavened bread. Why? Because its fermentation is stronger. The more intense the fermentation, the more prohibited the thing is. They don’t care that it is unfit for eating. That is Beit Shammai. And we rule Jewish law in accordance with Beit Hillel. So what happens with Beit Hillel? Notice that Beit Hillel’s first a fortiori argument is perfectly fine—or rather, sorry, their second a fortiori argument is perfectly fine. Meaning, if leavened bread had been written, I would not know starter, because it is unfit for eating. But they also made the first a fortiori argument: that if starter had been written, I would not infer leavened bread by a fortiori reasoning. Why? Because leavened bread is less fermented. Meaning, in that sense they accept Beit Shammai. Which means that according to Beit Hillel, it is true that if the Torah had not written starter but only leavened bread, I would not have learned to forbid starter, because starter is unfit for eating. But Beit Hillel also agree that once the Torah did in fact write starter, then clearly it too is forbidden, right?

Meaning, the question I asked earlier is valid according to both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. It is only that with Beit Shammai it is much stronger, because Beit Shammai claim that I would forbid starter on my own, by pure reasoning, even without the Torah writing it, simply because it is more fermented than leavened bread. Beit Hillel do not say that. Beit Hillel argue that without the Torah I would not forbid it, but once the Torah wrote it, now I do forbid it. But even so, the question remains: fine, the Torah wrote it—but that too has to be understood. Why did the Torah write it? Why does the Torah forbid starter as well, even though it is unfit for eating? So in the final analysis, the problem that starter is unfit for eating challenges both Beit Shammai’s method and Beit Hillel’s method. Not only that: Beit Hillel themselves raise this point. That is why they explain that it was not enough for the Torah to write leavened bread; it also had to write starter. Meaning, they are aware of this point. So then how do they themselves explain that the Torah nevertheless tells us to forbid starter?

Okay, so this just sharpens the question with which I opened from the verses: how can it be that starter is forbidden? According to Beit Hillel, the question remains in its plain form: why does the Torah forbid starter as well even though it is unfit for eating? With Beit Shammai the question is even stronger, because Beit Shammai tell us that even if the Torah had not forbidden it, I myself would have forbidden it by logic alone. Why? What do you mean? Doesn’t it bother you that it is unfit for eating? Okay, so that is the question.

Let’s look at Maimonides. In the first two laws in the Laws of Leaven and Matzah—by the way, the laws of Passover in Maimonides are divided into two collections of laws: the Laws of the Passover Offering, which we dealt with a bit in the previous class, and that is in the Book of Sacrifices; and then there are the Laws of Leaven and Matzah, which are in the Book of Appointed Times, that is, in the laws of the festivals. Those deal with the Passover offering and its Temple service, and these deal with the laws of Passover—leaven and matzah and the retelling of the Exodus—all the laws of the festival as we know them today. So now we are reading the beginning of the Laws of Leaven and Matzah. I marked it—let’s read it inside.

Law 1. Anyone who eats an olive-bulk of leaven on Passover from the beginning of the night of the fifteenth until the end of the twenty-first day of Nisan, if deliberate, is liable to karet, as it is said: “For anyone who eats leaven… that soul shall be cut off.” If accidental, he is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering. This applies both to one who eats and to one who dissolves it and drinks it. Yes, the karet that we discussed in the previous class regarding failure to bring the Passover offering also exists regarding eating leaven on Passover. And I spoke about this in the previous class. Whoever pointed out—and I no longer remember who it was—how I moved from the Passover offering to leaven, I said that with leaven too there is this idea that it turns all of us into a collective, into one public body, and therefore the karet that accompanies the point—that accompanies the idea that someone who did not include himself within the public is cut off from it—that karet appears both in the prohibition of leaven and in the prohibition for one who did not bring the Passover offering. Except that regarding leaven, of course, this is a prohibition, not a positive commandment. So it is not unusual in that sense. Positive commandments that carry karet are only the Passover offering and circumcision; among prohibitions there are others, and leaven is one of those prohibitions.

Anyway, that is Maimonides’ first law: anyone who eats an olive-bulk of leaven on Passover during the days of Passover is liable to karet if deliberate, and if accidental must bring a sin-offering. Law 2. Leaven on Passover is forbidden for benefit, as it is said: “Leaven shall not be eaten”—there shall be no permission for eating it. Meaning, he derives this from the wording of the verse. It says “Leaven shall not be eaten”; it does not say “Do not eat leaven.” This teaches—and in a moment we’ll see this in the Talmud—that not only eating is forbidden, but deriving benefit as well. And one who keeps leaven in his possession on Passover, even though he did not eat it, violates two prohibitions, as it is said: “No starter shall be seen with you in all your borders,” and it is said: “Starter shall not be found in your houses.” And the prohibition of leaven and the prohibition of the starter with which dough is leavened are one and the same.

So here in Law 2 Maimonides—in Law 1 Maimonides dealt with the prohibition of eating; in Law 2 he deals with the prohibition of benefit. And he himself apparently senses this point, that there is here a prohibition both on leaven and on starter, and from his wording it seems that he even means to explain this matter. Because he says: “And the prohibition of leaven and the prohibition of the starter with which dough is leavened are one and the same.” What does he mean by “the starter with which dough is leavened”? It seems to me that what Maimonides means to say is that he is trying to explain why starter, despite being unfit for eating, is still called leaven. If you take pork that is unfit for eating, it is not really pork anymore; it is just filth. Okay? Therefore it is not forbidden. If someone happens to eat it, even though it is not something normally eaten, he has not violated a prohibition; it is not pork meat. It has gone out of the category of food; it is now just dirt. But starter, says Maimonides, still has the status of leaven, despite being unfit for eating. Why? Maimonides explains: because it is that with which other doughs are made to ferment. You cannot say that starter is not leaven. It is the father of all leavens. It is what creates the fermentation in ordinary doughs. So how can you say that the thing that creates fermentation is itself not leaven? Such a thing is impossible. After all, all the fermentation that reaches the dough comes from the starter. In other words, starter is the source of the fermentation. So you cannot say that because it is unfit even for a dog’s consumption, it is not called leaven at all. At least that seems to be what Maimonides intends to explain.

And look—I brought here just one example, from Maimonides in the Laws of Sabbath regarding the labor of dyeing. There are one or two other examples. “One who makes dye, this is a subcategory of dyeing and is liable.” Meaning, if someone prepares dye, mixes the pigment with water to produce dye with which one dyes cloth or paper or something like that, he is liable. That is called dyeing. And on that the Raavad asks—in his gloss there is an underlined section emphasizing the line important for us—“I would not have thought that one is liable for dyeing until he dyes something in which the work of dyeing is completed. But coloring water, which is not for its own sake, no.” Yes, the Raavad basically says: when you prepare dye, that is not called dyeing. What are you dyeing—the water? I have no interest in the water being colored. I am preparing dye in order to use it to dye other things, to dye paper, to dye cloth, or something like that. So why should the preparation of the dye itself be called dyeing? But that is the Raavad’s objection. What does Maimonides say? Maimonides says that even such a thing is called dyeing. Why? Because according to Maimonides, apparently, the thing that constitutes the source of the matter certainly itself bears the name of the matter. Meaning, when I prepare the dye, you cannot say that I am not performing the labor of dyeing. I am literally preparing the dye with which one dyes. How can such a thing not be called dyeing? And therefore I brought this as an example of the same reasoning Maimonides says here regarding leaven. The starter with which doughs are made to ferment—you cannot say that it itself is not leaven. After all, it is with this very thing that one produces leaven in the other doughs. Therefore it too is certainly called leaven.

Good. There are a few other examples, but I think this is what Maimonides means to explain. Except that this is still problematic, because at most I am willing to accept what Maimonides explains here—that starter too is called leaven. It has not left the category of leaven despite being unfit even for a dog’s consumption. But the fact that it is called leaven is not enough. Fine, it is called leaven, but it is still unfit for eating. So why is it forbidden? Why should I care that it is called leaven? When I eat it, that is not called eating. After all, what is the problem with something unfit for eating? With something unfit for eating, the meaning is that if I eat pork that is unfit for eating, that is not called eating pork at all, because such a thing is not eating in any sense. To eat something disgusting is not called eating at all. So why, when I eat starter—fine, I understand, I am convinced, starter too is called leaven—but still, it is unfit for eating. So when I eat it, that act is not eating leaven; it is not eating at all. So why should I be liable for such a thing? Maimonides, when he gives us this explanation here, gives only a partial explanation. He explains why starter is called leaven, but he does not explain why it still does not matter that it is unfit for eating. So what if it is leaven? I ate leaven in a way that is not eating. So why is this forbidden? That Maimonides did not explain. And the question is how to answer this point.

To answer it, let’s go down to the Talmud in Pesachim. I marked it, and we’ll see there the dispute that underlies Maimonides’ words above. In Pesachim 21a, Chizkiyah said: From where do we know that leaven on Passover is forbidden for benefit? As it is said: “Leaven shall not be eaten”—there shall be no permission for benefit from it in the form of eating. Meaning, if it had said “Do not eat leaven” or “You shall not eat leaven,” then there would have been a prohibition of eating. But since the Torah wrote it in passive language, “Leaven shall not be eaten,” this comes to hint to us that there is also a prohibition of benefit and not only a prohibition of eating. Rashi explains that the intention is that even if it is eaten by a non-Jew, but the non-Jew paid me for it or somehow I benefited from the leaven through that, then by the very fact that the leaven was eaten and benefit came to me from that, I violated a prohibition. So that wording hints to the fact that there is also a prohibition of benefit and not only a prohibition of eating. Not important right now, but the point is that Chizkiyah learns that because the Torah used a unique expression here, a passive expression, it comes to hint that there is also a prohibition of benefit and not only a prohibition of eating. Even though it does not say that benefiting from leaven on Passover is forbidden—it says that eating is forbidden. But if the Torah had written “do not eat,” I would have said this is only a prohibition of eating. But if the Torah wrote “shall not be eaten,” then it hinted to me that there is also a prohibition of benefit.

The Talmud then says as follows. The reason is that the Merciful One wrote—I’m reading now—the reason is that the Merciful One wrote “Leaven shall not be eaten.” But had He not written “shall not be eaten”—if He had written simply “do not eat” or “do not eat,” not in passive language—I would have said it implies a prohibition of eating; it does not imply a prohibition of benefit. Yes, correct—that is what seems from Chizkiyah’s words. Had the Torah written in the ordinary formulation, there would only be a prohibition of eating, not a prohibition of benefit. Only because the Torah changed its wording do we understand that there is also a prohibition of benefit. And this, says the Talmud, goes against the view of Rabbi Abbahu. “And it disagrees with Rabbi Abbahu.” For Rabbi Abbahu said: Everywhere it says “shall not be eaten,” “do not eat,” or “you shall not eat,” it implies both prohibition of eating and prohibition of benefit, unless the verse specifies otherwise, as it does in the case of a carcass. As it was taught: “You shall not eat any carcass; to the stranger in your gates you may give it, and he may eat it, or sell it to a foreigner,” and so on.

What does that mean? The Talmud is basically saying that Rabbi Abbahu argues with Chizkiyah. Rabbi Abbahu argues that even when the ordinary expression is written—“Do not eat leaven” or “You shall not eat leaven”—even then I would understand that it means not only prohibition of eating but also prohibition of benefit. The Torah does not need specially to alter its wording to tell me that this is a prohibition of benefit. In any formulation whatsoever, when the Torah forbids something as food, that includes within it a prohibition of benefit. Chizkiyah obviously does not accept that. Therefore Chizkiyah says: if it had said “do not eat,” I would understand only a prohibition of eating, not a prohibition of benefit. Only because the Torah altered its wording does it tell me that there is also a prohibition of benefit. Okay?

And in fact Rabbi Abbahu brings proof for his words. I’ll just say this parenthetically. “Unless the verse specifies to you”—you see, I marked it—“as it specifies in the case of a carcass.” Because there is a verse regarding the prohibition of a carcass. It says: “You shall not eat any carcass; to the stranger in your gates you may give it, and he may eat it.” The “stranger” here of course means a non-Jew. A non-Jew who lives among us is called a resident alien, and he is not forbidden; he may eat non-kosher meat. So the carcass you may give to a non-Jew. Meaning there is no problem. You are forbidden to eat it; if you want to give it to a non-Jew, please do. Rabbi Abbahu asks himself: why does the Torah need to write that? Why does the Torah need to write that permission? Fine, I am forbidden to eat it. Obviously I can give it to a non-Jew. The non-Jew is allowed to eat it. What is the issue? Rabbi Abbahu says: the fact that the Torah had to write permission to give it to a non-Jew apparently means that without that verse I would have understood that it is forbidden to give it even to a non-Jew. Why? After all, the non-Jew is allowed to eat carcass. Because when the non-Jew pays me for that meat, I benefit from the carcass. And that would be a prohibition of benefit; I would have violated a prohibition of benefit. Rabbi Abbahu says: from here we see that every time the Torah writes a prohibition of eating, it includes within it a prohibition of benefit—unless the Torah explicitly writes otherwise, as it does here. But where it does not explicitly write otherwise, any expression like “do not eat,” “shall not be eaten,” “you shall not eat” always includes both prohibition of eating and prohibition of benefit. That is Rabbi Abbahu’s claim. So far so good. Okay.

Now let’s see how Maimonides rules. In chapter 8 of the Laws of Forbidden Foods, law 15, Maimonides rules like Rabbi Abbahu. I marked it—look: Everywhere the Torah says “do not eat,” “you shall not eat,” “shall not be eaten,” it implies both prohibition of eating and prohibition of benefit, unless the verse spells it out for you as it does in the case of a carcass, as it is said: “To the stranger in your gates you may give it, and he may eat it,” and in the case of forbidden fat, where it says: “It may be used for any work,” or unless the Oral Torah explicitly explains that benefit is permitted. If we have some oral tradition, then that works too. But the default is: once the Torah forbids something in eating, it is also forbidden for benefit. That is the default. So Maimonides very, very clearly and unequivocally rules like Rabbi Abbahu.

Let’s go back up for a second to the Maimonides we read, just to recall it. I marked Maimonides—look in law 2: “Leaven on Passover is forbidden for benefit, as it is said: ‘Leaven shall not be eaten’—there shall be no permission for eating it.” That is exactly Chizkiyah, right? But in the dispute between Chizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu, Maimonides rules like Rabbi Abbahu, as we saw earlier in the Laws of Forbidden Foods. But here, in the Laws of Leaven and Matzah, Maimonides gives Chizkiyah’s reasoning. There is a prohibition of benefit regarding leaven, and the reason for it is Chizkiyah’s teaching. Let me remind you again: both Chizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu agree that there is a prohibition of benefit from leaven. They both agree. The whole question is only why. According to Rabbi Abbahu, every prohibition of eating written in the Torah includes a prohibition of benefit. There is no special reason to ask for. Every prohibition of eating is also a prohibition of benefit, unless the Torah explicitly permitted it. But if not, then benefiting is forbidden. According to Chizkiyah, it too is forbidden for benefit; there is no practical legal disagreement. According to Chizkiyah too, leaven is forbidden for benefit. But it is forbidden for benefit because the Torah used passive language. Meaning, there is a textual source in the Torah for this specific point. Without that, it would not have been forbidden for benefit. So there is no practical legal disagreement, yes? Someone asked me in an email yesterday—I think it was Hannah—she asked me yesterday what the problem is with Maimonides, since there is no legal disagreement regarding the prohibition of benefit. Wait. There is no legal disagreement regarding the prohibition of benefit because both Chizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu forbid benefit. Correct. But in Maimonides, the rationale he gives for the prohibition of benefit is Chizkiyah’s rationale, not Rabbi Abbahu’s. And the question is why. Because after all, he rules like Rabbi Abbahu.

[Speaker B] Even according to

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Chizkiyah it’s

[Speaker B] forbidden. Don’t you hear? Even according to Chizkiyah it’s forbidden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but why does he need to bring that? The law follows Rabbi Abbahu. So that is more or less what the Kesef Mishneh says, what Nechama suggested here. We’ll see it in a moment. I’ll skip the Commentary on the Mishnah for a second—maybe we’ll see it later—because the points are stated more explicitly below in the Book of Commandments, negative commandment 187. Look, I marked the continuation of Maimonides; I’m reading:

Commandment 187 is that we were warned against eating meat cooked in milk. And His statement as well, “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk,” the second time—it intends by it the prohibition of eating. And in the Talmud in Chullin they said: for meat cooked in milk one is lashed for cooking it and lashed for eating it, and so on. In short, regarding the prohibition of meat cooked in milk there are three prohibitions: it is forbidden to cook meat in milk, it is forbidden to eat them together, meat cooked in milk, and it is forbidden to derive benefit from a mixture of meat and milk. Okay? Three things are prohibited. And from where do we learn this? From the fact that the Torah wrote three times, “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” Twice is superfluous; that comes to include also the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit.

Now I’m reading below—and I won’t go into all the details here because this is a complicated Maimonides, very interesting by the way but complicated. I’ll mainly read what concerns us. I marked the continuation of Maimonides; I’m reading: “And here it is fitting for me to allude to a great principle which no one before me mentioned.” Meaning, no one before me explained this interesting idea. Namely, that His statement, may He be exalted—God writes in the Torah—“You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” is repeated in the Torah three times. And the masters of interpretation taught us, yes, the Sages taught us, that each prohibition is for a separate matter; each one teaches me a different matter: eating, cooking, and benefit. Yes, one for the prohibition of eating, one for the prohibition of benefit, and one for the prohibition of cooking.

And “to the objector who asks and says: for what reason did you count the prohibition of its eating and the prohibition of its cooking as two commandments, but not count the prohibition of deriving benefit from it as a third commandment? Let the objector know that the prohibition of benefit should not be counted as a separate commandment.” Yes, Maimonides, in the enumeration of the commandments, surprisingly counts the prohibition to cook meat and milk and counts the prohibition to eat meat and milk, but he does not count the prohibition of benefit from meat and milk. Maimonides asks: why? He is asking this about himself. You are surely asking about me, says Maimonides, why I counted only two and not three. Here I explained to you that there are three prohibitions. So Maimonides says: “Let the objector know”—this is the answer he gives to that difficulty—“let the objector know that the prohibition of benefit should not be counted as a commandment in its own right, because it and the prohibition of eating are one matter.” Meaning, with a prohibition of benefit generally, when there is something forbidden both in eating and in benefit, Maimonides says it should be counted as one commandment, not as two prohibitions but as one prohibition. Why? And here is the key sentence—I’ll emphasize it because it is the key sentence—“because eating is one species of benefit.” And His statement, may He be exalted, regarding something that “shall not be eaten” is in fact one of the examples of benefit, and the meaning is that one may not benefit from it, neither by eating nor in any other way.

What is he saying? He is saying that the prohibition of eating always includes within it the prohibition of benefit. Why? What is the idea? We saw this in the Talmud; he rules like Rabbi Abbahu. So we already know that every prohibition of eating includes a prohibition of benefit. What Maimonides adds here is the explanation. Why does every time the Torah says a prohibition of eating, that include also a prohibition of benefit? The answer is: when the Torah says not to eat, it is really just giving us an example. Its intention is to say: do not benefit. Only instead of speaking generally, it gives an example. What is an example of a very common, widespread kind of benefit? Eating. Therefore the Torah says: do not eat. Just as when the Torah says, “If one man’s ox gores his neighbor’s ox,” then one must compensate the injured party—but it doesn’t mean only when my ox gores. What if my dog bites him? I must pay then too. So why did the Torah say “ox”? Because one common form of damage is when my ox gores, so it uses an example to speak about an entire category. The same here, says Maimonides: when the Torah says “shall not be eaten,” “do not eat,” “you shall not eat,” it does not mean to forbid eating; it means to forbid benefit. Eating is simply one common example, one species of benefit. Therefore it used that example, but really its intention is to forbid all forms of benefit.

So Maimonides has a very interesting innovation here. Maimonides explains Rabbi Abbahu’s words for us. Look, I’m immediately reading the next sentence after that—I’ll mark it for you: “And their statement, may peace be upon them: every place where it says ‘do not eat,’ ‘you shall not eat,’ ‘shall not be eaten,’ it implies both prohibition of eating and prohibition of benefit, unless the verse specifies to you as it specified in the case of a carcass.” Meaning, says Maimonides, this is the explanation of Rabbi Abbahu, whose statement we read in the Talmud in Pesachim. The explanation is: why does Rabbi Abbahu say that every time the Torah says not to eat, it also means not to benefit? This is the explanation. What I just told you is what is written in Rabbi Abbahu’s words. When the Torah says not to eat, that is just an example; its real purpose is to forbid us all forms of benefit, and the common example is eating. Therefore every place where eating is mentioned, it includes benefit as well. The continuation of Maimonides’ discussion is very complicated; I won’t go into that. So that is what is important for our purposes. I’ll just in any case…

[Speaker B] Interesting regarding the Tree of Knowledge—whether it too was forbidden for benefit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Apparently yes. If the Holy One, blessed be He, said not to eat, that includes benefit too, yes. And then, by the way, I think that is explicit in the verse, because afterward they say to you—right, there is some verse there saying that all the trees of the garden were given to you for enjoyment. Which implies that from the Tree of Knowledge it was forbidden also to derive benefit.

[Speaker D] “You may surely eat”—it doesn’t say “for benefit” there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the prohibition, yes, but afterward there is some reference in the Torah later on—after all, “I gave you all the trees in order to enjoy,” I don’t remember the exact verse, “in order to enjoy.” That implies that the Tree of Knowledge was exceptional also with respect to benefit and not only eating. I think. I need to look again; I don’t remember at the moment.

Okay, let’s look for a moment at the Commentary on the Mishnah. I marked the passage. Maimonides calls this “the marvelous point.” In the yeshivot this is what they call “Maimonides’ marvelous point” in the Commentary on the Mishnah in Keritot. I also put this in front of you on the page, and I’ll preface it here too. There is a principle in Jewish law that one prohibition cannot take effect on top of another prohibition. Meaning, if a certain thing is forbidden for eating—for example pork—and the prohibition of pork then falls into milk, now we have both meat-and-milk and the prohibition of pork. So in principle, when I eat that piece of pork, I have violated only the prohibition of pork, not the prohibition of meat-and-milk. Why? Because that piece was already forbidden even before it fell into the milk. It already had the prohibition of pork meat on it. After it fell into the milk, it also became forbidden by the prohibition of meat-and-milk. But it was already forbidden before, and a second prohibition does not take effect on top of the first. If a prohibition already exists on the piece, the second prohibition does not take effect. In the case of meat-and-milk maybe it would take effect, but I’m only giving this as an example.

Now there are two exceptions—what Idit asked earlier—actually three exceptions to the rule that one prohibition does not take effect on another. Just as general knowledge, it is worth knowing this. The three exceptions are: inclusive, additive, and simultaneous. Meaning, if the two prohibitions take effect at the same time—not one first and then the second came—then both can take effect. “One prohibition does not take effect on another” is always when there is a first one and afterward a second prohibition comes. But if both take effect together, then not. The Talmud gives examples of how that can happen. The second exception is an inclusive prohibition. An inclusive prohibition means that the second prohibition takes effect on other things besides the object of the first prohibition. For example, the prohibition of meat-and-milk applies not only to pork meat but also to other kinds of meat. And the prohibition of pork applies only to pork meat. So that would be inclusive. The third exception is additive, when the second prohibition does not apply to additional objects, but rather there are additional types of prohibited actions regarding the same piece. For example, the prohibition of meat-and-milk forbids both eating and benefit, whereas pork is forbidden only for eating, not for benefit. So from the standpoint of an additive prohibition, it ought to take effect.

Now I’m reading Maimonides. I marked the passage. “And in these words of ours there is a marvelous point that we shall illuminate, for it is a key to other matters besides the precision of analysis that it contains.” Maimonides says: look, this is not only analytically fascinating, but besides that it is also a legal basis for further legal implications. Therefore it is worth knowing, he says. “And it is this: it is known that meat-and-milk is forbidden for benefit.” Yes, both eating and benefit. “And forbidden fat, by way of example, is permitted for benefit.” It is confusing because there are no vowels here, but here it means forbidden fat, not milk. Forbidden fat is a certain kind of fat from kosher animals that may not be eaten. It resembles suet somewhat. It may not be eaten, but one may derive benefit from it. “And if one cooked forbidden fat in milk…” what should the result be according to what I said before? First of all, it was forbidden fat already; it was forbidden under the prohibition of forbidden fat. Now I cooked it in milk. Now I want to eat the forbidden fat with the milk. So there is the prohibition of forbidden fat and also the prohibition of meat-and-milk, because the forbidden fat is a kind of meat. So there should also be the prohibition of meat-and-milk. But one prohibition does not take effect on another, right? Since meat-and-milk is forbidden also for benefit and not only for eating, then there is an additive element here. Therefore it should take effect on the prohibition of forbidden fat, right? “And if one cooked forbidden fat in milk, why should the prohibition of meat-and-milk not take effect upon the prohibition of forbidden fat? And the same applies to a carcass”—yes, if one cooks a carcass in milk, it too should become forbidden because it is an additive prohibition, as we said here regarding consecrated forbidden fat, and so on. That is the question.

And the answer is: “Meat-and-milk is not forbidden for benefit except because Scripture forbade its eating, according to the rule we explained, that everything forbidden for eating is forbidden for benefit unless the verse specifies otherwise. And there is not one verse forbidding its eating and another verse forbidding deriving benefit from it; rather the two are one thing, the prohibition of meat-and-milk. And since we said one prohibition does not take effect on another, therefore the prohibition of meat-and-milk does not take effect on the prohibition of carcass. Therefore it will not be forbidden for benefit; rather it will be permitted for benefit. And one who eats it is lashed for carcass, and the prohibition of meat-and-milk falls away entirely, since it did not take effect.” That is the end of the quote.

I’ll explain. Maimonides says as follows. It is actually incorrect to say that meat-and-milk is forbidden both for eating and for benefit. It is forbidden for eating. It is just that anything forbidden for eating is of course also forbidden for benefit—but there is no additional verse forbidding benefit. It is the same verse. The verse forbids eating it, and anything forbidden for eating is automatically also forbidden for benefit. Now let’s see what happens when this forbidden fat or carcass falls into milk and I cook them together. There was a prohibition of carcass, and now also a prohibition of meat-and-milk takes effect on it. Seemingly there should be two prohibitions here, because the prohibition of meat-and-milk is broader: it includes both eating and benefit, so it should take effect on the prohibition of carcass. Maimonides says no. The prohibition of meat-and-milk is not broader, because the prohibition of meat-and-milk is only a prohibition of eating. Once there is a prohibition of eating, of course it will also be forbidden for benefit, but fundamentally it is defined as one prohibition, a prohibition of eating. There are not two prohibitions here, eating and benefit. And since that is so, the prohibition of meat-and-milk does not take effect upon the prohibition of carcass, because this is a prohibition of eating and that is also a prohibition of eating. Once the eating prohibition of meat-and-milk does not take effect, then the prohibition of benefit of meat-and-milk also does not take effect.

And then a remarkable thing comes out. If I take the carcass and cook it in milk, I am allowed to derive benefit from it even from the outset. I did violate the prohibition of cooking; I did not violate the prohibition of eating meat-and-milk. If I were to eat it, I would violate the prohibition of eating carcass, but not the prohibition of eating meat-and-milk. And if I merely benefit from it, that is completely permitted. There is no issue at all. Because forbidden fat is permitted for benefit, and the prohibition of benefit of meat-and-milk does not take effect here at all. Meaning there is no prohibition of benefit at all. This is really astonishing.

[Speaker E] Rabbi, but meat-and-milk is also forbidden in cooking, and he counts that as a separate prohibition from the prohibition of eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, because that is unrelated to eating and benefit. It is a separate prohibition.

[Speaker E] But you’re saying that if I cooked a carcass in meat-and-milk, then I’m allowed to benefit from it. How can that be? I violated the prohibition of cooking.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The prohibition of cooking, fine—but not the prohibition of benefit. I violated the prohibition of cooking, but there is no prohibition on benefiting from what was cooked.

[Speaker E] I understand, I understand.

[Speaker B] Okay. A practical difference for what… with this food, to give it to cats and dogs.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the pet food is forbidden for eating, you meant

[Speaker B] for benefit—can I give it to my dog?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Understood. I took meat—is it non-kosher?

[Speaker B] No, no—if they cook some meat that isn’t kosher, imported from abroad from non-Jews, okay, and there is also meat and milk cooked together in it, let’s say, but I buy it at the grocery and give it to my dog—there’s no prohibition of benefit in that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. If the meat there is forbidden meat, then there’s no prohibition of benefit involved. And if the meat is permitted meat, then there is also a prohibition of benefit. Meaning, this is an interesting thing. In other words, if the meat is forbidden, then it’s less forbidden than if the meat is permitted. Yes? That’s what Maimonides—this is why Maimonides gets so excited about this wonderful point. In any case, so once again this is the same idea: the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit are ultimately just examples, two examples of the same prohibition itself. So there’s no reason to treat them as two separate prohibitions. And as Maimonides explained earlier, that’s basically because eating is only one example of prohibitions of benefit. Now let’s see—let’s go back to Maimonides at the beginning of the laws of leaven and matzah. I’m marking for you the Kesef Mishneh. I remind you that Maimonides in the laws of leaven and matzah says that leaven is prohibited for benefit because it says, “Leaven shall not be eaten,” meaning the reasoning of Chizkiyah, not of Rabbi Abbahu. Says the Kesef Mishneh—the Kesef Mishneh is, of course, the author of the Shulchan Arukh, Rabbi Yosef Karo, in the commentary he writes on Maimonides: “And our teacher,” Maimonides, “even though he holds like Rabbi Yehudah”—never mind, that’s not important for us right now—“wrote regarding Passover in the wording of Chizkiyah.” He wrote Chizkiyah’s reasoning. “For even though he holds like Rabbi Abbahu”—although he holds like Rabbi Abbahu, after all Maimonides rules like Rabbi Abbahu, as is explained explicitly in chapter 8 of the laws of forbidden foods, and also in chapter 2 of the laws of ritual slaughter it seems he holds that way, and so on. Never mind, he brings proof for that. Right? So he brings a lot of proofs that Maimonides rules like Rabbi Abbahu. I’m jumping to the end: “Nevertheless, concerning the prohibition of benefit on Passover, since there is an especially explicit verse there, which everyone agrees to, he adopted it. And something similar was written by the Ran on the Rif.” Meaning, what the Kesef Mishneh is basically explaining here is a known principle in Maimonides. Maimonides sometimes brings a source for a Jewish law from some exposition or some verse that is not the verse from which the Talmud ultimately derived the law. Why? Because if it seems clearer and more understandable, then Maimonides chooses that source, because one way or another the law is an agreed law anyway. The only question is which source you cite. So I prefer Chizkiyah’s source, because Chizkiyah’s source is more understandable, clearer. That’s what the Kesef Mishneh says, although it seems that even he himself is not fully comfortable with this explanation, because I don’t see why this is clearer. The idea that there is a prohibition of benefit derived from “shall not be eaten”—is that so clear? You have to explain Chizkiyah to me, why “shall not be eaten” comes to include a prohibition of benefit. Fine, that’s what he says. As I told you on the page, I want to argue that I have a substantive explanation. There’s no need to get to that explanation. My claim is basically this—and here I’ll now explain, I’ll tie up all the loose ends—my claim is the following: generally, prohibitions of eating in the Torah are based on the fact that the thing is supposed to be repulsive to us. If the thing is repulsive, the Torah wants us to distance ourselves from it, the Torah tells me don’t eat, and Rabbi Abbahu tells us: by extension, also don’t derive benefit. The Torah says don’t come near it—not benefit from it, not eat it, leave it alone. Therefore, as Maimonides explained above, the prohibition of eating itself is really not a prohibition on the act of eating, but a prohibition on benefit. One of the ways of deriving benefit is to eat, but in essence even the prohibition of eating is simply one species among the various forms of benefit, as he wrote there. There is no prohibition on the act of eating. You have to distance yourself from it, not benefit from this thing—it is repulsive, keep away from it. Those are the regular prohibitions of eating. My claim is that Maimonides’ view is that the prohibition of leaven is an exceptional eating prohibition. In the prohibition of leaven, the prohibition is on the act of eating, not on the benefit from the eating. That’s my claim. Why? What’s the idea? So I’ll explain the idea. After all, leaven—say, pork is forbidden all year, meat and milk are forbidden all year, right? Leaven is forbidden during those seven days of Passover. Before Passover you can eat it; we never heard of anyone saying that it is proper to avoid leaven the rest of the year as an extra stringency. Right? I never heard anyone say such a thing; obviously not. On Passover you have to avoid leaven, of course, but the rest of the year no. Meaning, there is nothing intrinsically defective about it. After Passover, before Passover—eat it, be healthy. So why is it forbidden on Passover itself? And what the Torah says explicitly—and these aren’t my innovations—the Torah says because the dough of our ancestors did not have time to become leavened, right? That’s why leaven was forbidden to us. What does that mean? That the prohibition on eating leaven is a prohibition with a historical basis. Since our ancestors did not eat leaven during these seven days, we too do not eat leaven during these seven days. That’s all. Not because there is something defective in leaven; there is nothing defective in it. If our ancestors had eaten leaven and not matzah during those seven days, then during these seven days we would have had to eat leaven and not matzah. Because what we are actually doing during these seven days is reenacting the Exodus from Egypt. The reenactment of the Exodus is not only in telling the story of the Exodus, what we do on the Seder night, but also in eating matzah and refraining from eating leaven. Not because leaven is repulsive and one must distance oneself from it, but simply because our ancestors at that time had the misfortune that their dough did not have time to rise, and so they ate matzah and not leaven. So we too, as part of the simulation we are doing of the Exodus from Egypt, are supposed not to eat leaven but only matzah. Therefore what is happening here is that when the Torah forbids me to eat leaven, it is not telling me don’t derive benefit from leaven; it is telling me don’t perform an act of eating on leaven, because our ancestors also did not perform an act of eating on leaven. I’ll just emphasize parenthetically: all the famous homilies about leaven, and how one has to clean the leaven out of our souls, and leaven represents the evil inclination—as this already appears in the homiletics of the sages, leaven represents the evil inclination, and so on—in my view these are homilies with no basis. A homily, as distinct from midrash. Leaven does not represent the evil inclination, and leaven is not defective, and there is nothing repulsive about it. Leaven just happened, by circumstance, not to be eaten by our ancestors during those seven days, and therefore we too, as part of identifying with what happened there, as part of reenacting what happened there, are also supposed not to eat leaven. That’s all. There is nothing repulsive about it. If leaven were a symbol of the evil inclination, I would expect works of ethics at least—even if not Jewish law—to tell us that it is fitting for spiritually elevated people to avoid leaven all year, not only during those seven days.

[Speaker B] But there is also that aspect that in the Temple too there was no leaven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but that issue of the meal-offerings—that’s a different discussion, except for the Omer offering—but the meal-offerings in principle also don’t come as leaven. Fine, not important. But there is no prohibition on eating leaven during the year. Why? What does that mean? It means that leaven in itself is not a repulsive thing; it’s not the evil inclination and not anything like that. During those seven days we are supposed to do what our ancestors did. That’s all; that is the prohibition of leaven. The difference is in the reason for the matter. But what does that mean halakhically? It has a great many halakhic implications, not all of which I’ll manage to get into today, but you’ll be able to see them in the summary—I wrote them in the summary. The basic principle underlying all the halakhic implications is that the definition of the prohibition is not a prohibition of benefit from eating leaven; it is a prohibition on the act of eating leaven. That is the prohibition, because that is what our ancestors did not do during those seven days. It is not a prohibition of benefit, because leaven is not repulsive; I am not supposed to distance myself from it. Therefore Maimonides says—now watch how I roll up the whole carpet. All the difficulties we had until now disappear by themselves. First of all, why does Maimonides require an additional reason for the prohibition of benefit from leaven, like Chizkiyah? What’s the problem? After all, every prohibition of eating includes within it a prohibition of benefit; he rules like Rabbi Abbahu, right? What do we see? Not true. That is true for every other eating prohibition, but not for leaven. Because with leaven the prohibition is on the act of eating and not on the benefit from eating. So with leaven, when the Torah forbids eating, you cannot derive from that that benefit is also forbidden just from the fact that eating is forbidden. Therefore you need a separate source telling you that one may not derive benefit from leaven either. Chizkiyah says that source is “Leaven shall not be eaten,” from the Torah’s use of passive language. And what is the idea behind that? Because just as our ancestors did not eat leaven, they also did not derive benefit from leaven. This does not branch off from the eating prohibition; it is a separate prohibition. It is a separate prohibition saying that just as there is a prohibition of eating in the case of leaven, there is also a prohibition of benefit in the case of leaven. And why? Both of them are because our ancestors did not eat and did not derive benefit from leaven. It’s not that one flows from the other; they are two different things. And therefore Maimonides… yes? Yes, yes.

[Speaker E] In the verses, the prohibition of leaven appears before the eating of matzah by our ancestors even takes place. Meaning, the prohibition against eating leaven already appears when they receive the commandment to offer the sacrifice, stay in their houses, put blood on them, and “for seven days you shall not eat leaven.” So why are you saying the argument is historical?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The argument is historical because there wasn’t enough time… the Torah itself writes it: because the dough of our ancestors did not have time to become leavened. The answer is a good answer; it’s a good question on the Torah itself, regardless of me. The Torah itself says that it is in remembrance of that. But the Torah also gives the command on the first of Nisan. That means the whole business was planned. It was not by chance that their dough did not have time to rise and therefore… that’s true. But still, in the end, from our standpoint, we do it because of what happened then. Why did the Holy One arrange things that way? He planned in advance that this is how it would happen.

[Speaker E] Right, so maybe there is some hint here that there is some kind of repulsiveness in leaven? Like there are, I don’t know, many things that the Torah permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there is some kind of repulsiveness in it, then why is it not proper to avoid it all year?

[Speaker E] Lots of things are not so ideal, but the Torah kind of permitted them. I don’t know, there are many—say—the prohibitions of Yom Kippur are forbidden even though all year they are permitted. But there is one day when we sanctify ourselves more.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That really is not repulsiveness. No, you gave an excellent example. The prohibitions of Yom Kippur really are not about repulsiveness. There is no point at all in fasting all year, even if someone could; there is no such idea. That is exactly the point; it is the same point. There too it means…

[Speaker E] But it causes you to become sanctified. But it does cause you to become sanctified if you fast and…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. Eating is not a defective thing. Specifically for the service of Yom Kippur I need…

[Speaker E] The Torah uses all the prohibitions…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Can you hear? Okay? Hello?

[Speaker E] Yes, yes, I’m listening.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. No, what I’m saying is that on Yom Kippur too it’s the same thing. There is nothing repulsive about eating bread. Eating bread is permitted all year—eat and be healthy. On Yom Kippur, part of the service of the day requires some kind of abstention from eating or abstention from pleasures, but not because those things are defective, but because the service of the day requires it. That is exactly, exactly the proof. Many later authorities bring this as an example: when a thing’s prohibition depends on time, then apparently there is nothing wrong with the thing itself. This is what’s called—not a prohibition on the object, but a prohibition on the person. It is a prohibition on the person. The thing itself is not repulsive; it is not an intrinsically forbidden thing. And leaven is one of those. Okay, so now the claim is as follows. First, I claim that this is why Maimonides needs a separate source to explain why leaven is also prohibited for benefit and not only for eating. Because leaven—its prohibition of eating is exceptional; it is not like all the other prohibitions in the Torah. And therefore from the eating prohibition of leaven one could not derive the prohibition of benefit. Only because the Torah innovated a prohibition of benefit as well do we know that it is forbidden both in eating and in benefit. The second thing I asked about Maimonides: when you explain to me why sourdough doesn’t bother anyone even though it’s not fit for eating… not about Maimonides, about the Talmud. Why does it not bother anyone that sourdough is not fit for eating? A very simple answer. Because in fact the problem—what? If it isn’t fit for eating, then why isn’t it forbidden? Because there is no benefit from it, right? If a thing is not fit for eating and you eat it, you get no benefit from the eating. But when it comes to eating leaven on Passover, the problem is not benefit from eating but the act of eating. So why should sourdough not count as leaven too? So of course sourdough is forbidden. On the contrary, sourdough is even more leaven than ordinary leaven; it’s even more fermented, so all the more so there should be an a fortiori argument that it is forbidden to eat. Therefore this applies according to both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, once the verse teaches it—that’s the whole idea. Since the prohibition is a prohibition on the act of eating, one cannot infer that sourdough would be permitted because it is not fit for eating. So what if it is not fit for eating? It is leaven and I am eating it, so I ate leaven. By the way, this explains the third question I asked: why is Maimonides satisfied, when explaining to us why sourdough is also forbidden to eat? So Maimonides says because sourdough is certainly leaven; it is the father of all leavens, after all, with it other doughs are leavened. I asked, very nice—you explained to me why it is called leaven, but you did not explain why it doesn’t matter that it is not fit for eating. Maimonides doesn’t need to explain that. Once he showed that this thing is called leaven and I eat it, then I performed an act of eating leaven. What difference does it make that I got no benefit? It doesn’t matter that I got no benefit, because I performed an act of eating on something called leaven. It is enough to show me that it is called leaven in order to explain that it is forbidden. He does not also need to explain to me why a thing not fit for eating is forbidden here, because here the fact that it is not fit for eating is not a problem, since the only result of its not being fit for eating is that I do not benefit. So what? The prohibition is not to derive benefit from eating leaven, but to perform an act of eating on leaven. And all the difficulties I raised earlier are basically solved by themselves once you see the matter this way. Now I’ll show you another implication—two more implications, I hope I’ll get to them. One implication is the sciatic nerve. We know of one other prohibition in Jewish law that is also a historical prohibition, right? At least one that I can think of—that is the sciatic nerve. Look at the verse in Genesis; I marked it for you on the page. Look: “Therefore the children of Israel do not eat the sciatic nerve, which is upon the socket of the thigh, to this day, because he touched the socket of Jacob’s thigh at the sciatic nerve.” What is this “therefore”? I underlined it—do you see? “Therefore.” What is “therefore”? Because of the event that happened to Jacob, Jacob’s struggle with the angel, right? When the socket of his thigh was dislocated: “and Jacob’s thigh was dislocated.” “Therefore the children of Israel do not eat the sciatic nerve that is upon the socket of the thigh to this day.” So the Torah explicitly writes here that the prohibition of the sciatic nerve is a prohibition on an act, a historical prohibition, right? In memory of what happened to Jacob. Or in other words, also with the sciatic nerve, the prohibition on eating it is not because it is repulsive, but in order to remember the event of Jacob and the angel. In that sense it is very similar to the prohibition of leaven. Now look at something nice. Regarding the sciatic nerve there is a dispute in the Talmud—I won’t get into it now because we’re a bit short on time—that’s the Talmudic passage I brought here, but again, I won’t get into it, it’s a passage later in that same topic in tractate Pesachim. In that Talmudic passage there is a tannaitic dispute whether the sciatic nerve imparts flavor. Meaning, the sciatic nerve is a tendon—there is no taste in it, it’s not regular meat, it’s just—eating it is like eating a piece of rope; there is no taste in it at all. So how can the sciatic nerve be forbidden for eating? After all, it is not even fit for a dog to eat. The answer is: because the eating prohibition of the sciatic nerve is a historical prohibition, like leaven. The problem is not the benefit from the act of eating, but performing an act of eating on something called the sciatic nerve. I don’t care that there is no benefit from it, since the prohibition is a prohibition intended to remember what happened with Jacob’s tendon. That’s all—not because the sciatic nerve is repulsive and the Torah tells me to keep away from it, not to derive benefit from it. No: the prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve is only an eating prohibition; it is not benefit from eating. And now look—I’ll show you an implication, again without getting into all the sources; I’ll just bring the question. The glosses of the Ramakh—this is Rabbi Moshe of Lunel, Rabbi Moshe HaKohen of Lunel, one of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who commented on Maimonides. And the Rosh in tractate Chullin also asks Maimonides the same question. I marked it here. Maimonides says: “Such as creeping things and swarming things and blood and a limb from a living animal and the sciatic nerve, all these are permitted for benefit by oral tradition.” That is a quote from Maimonides. Okay? “It is astonishing,” says the Ramakh, “for I do not know why he wrote this, that the sciatic nerve is permitted for benefit by oral tradition, when after all he rules just below in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu, and according to Rabbi Abbahu the sciatic nerve is forbidden for benefit. And so it is stated in the chapter Kol Sha’ah.” It is explicitly written in the Talmud in Pesachim: you ruled like Rabbi Abbahu, that anything forbidden for eating is also forbidden for benefit, and the sciatic nerve is forbidden for eating, and Rabbi Abbahu says that if so, then it is also forbidden for benefit. So how does Maimonides say that the sciatic nerve is permitted for benefit? You see? I’ll mark the ruling in Maimonides for you—look: “The sciatic nerve is permitted for benefit. Therefore a person may send to a gentile a thigh with the sciatic nerve inside it.” Permitted for benefit—flatly against the Talmud. After all, you ruled like Rabbi Abbahu, and Rabbi Abbahu says that anything forbidden for eating is also forbidden for benefit. So how do you say that with the sciatic nerve it is forbidden for eating but permitted for benefit? The answer is, of course, what I said earlier: exactly the same question they ask him about leaven is also true of the sciatic nerve. In both these cases we are dealing with prohibitions whose basis is historical. These are not things that are repulsive. Therefore sourdough in the context of leaven, and the tendon, which is basically a piece of rope with no taste in it—both are not fit for eating, and nevertheless the Torah forbids them for eating. Why? Because the prohibition here is not deriving benefit from the act of eating, but performing an act of eating. In both cases. What is the implication? Just as I explained earlier that one cannot derive from the prohibition of eating the existence of a prohibition of benefit, since the eating here is not a prohibition on deriving benefit from eating—where Rabbi Abbahu would then tell us that if so all forms of benefit are forbidden—but rather it is a prohibition on performing an act of eating. But if that is the definition of the prohibition, one cannot derive from it that there is also a prohibition of benefit. And then what happens? With leaven there is nevertheless a prohibition of benefit. Why? You cannot derive it from the eating prohibition, but there is a separate source. It says “shall not be eaten” in passive language. So the Torah taught me that besides the eating prohibition there is also a prohibition of benefit. Fine. But with the sciatic nerve there is no such source. With the sciatic nerve there is no verse. The verse they bring for the eating prohibition—so Maimonides says, if so, then there is no prohibition of benefit, excuse me. There is a prohibition of eating, but the eating means the act of eating, not benefit from eating, because it is a historical prohibition. And since that is so, one cannot derive from it the existence of a prohibition of benefit. And therefore, as a matter of Jewish law, Maimonides says there is no prohibition of benefit in the sciatic nerve. And everyone is astonished here and leaves it unresolved and says there are difficulties against him, and I claim that this simply strings together his whole approach, also regarding leaven—all the questions we saw earlier, all along the way, in a very, very systematic fashion. Ruthie isn’t here, I see—Ruthie Patinkin. Ruthie and Nechama, we learned this once in Pesachim, this topic in Pesachim 21, and there I showed all along that this sugya proceeds in a way that is not ruled as Jewish law according to Maimonides. Maimonides does not rule according to that sugya. These two examples can be seen here too, both regarding the sciatic nerve and regarding leaven—the sugya there says that from the eating prohibition one can derive a prohibition of benefit, following Rabbi Abbahu. Maimonides in these two places says no. Because Maimonides, in my opinion, draws his source from the sugya in tractate Beitzah that we saw above. In the sugya in Beitzah we see that with the prohibition of leaven, it does not bother me that sourdough is not fit for eating. Maimonides says that from this it seems that the sugya in Beitzah understands that the prohibition of leaven is a prohibition on the act of eating leaven, not on benefit from eating leaven. If so, that directly contradicts the sugya in Pesachim, and Maimonides rules from the sugya in Beitzah; and therefore, even though the sugya in Pesachim says both regarding the sciatic nerve and regarding Passover—leaven—that the eating prohibition generates a prohibition of benefit, Maimonides in both these contexts says no. The eating prohibition does not generate a prohibition of benefit. Only on Passover, with leaven, do I have a separate source for the prohibition of benefit, so Maimonides brings the separate source and says there is a prohibition of benefit. With the sciatic nerve there is no separate source, so we remain with the fact that it is only an eating prohibition and not a prohibition of benefit. And that is against the Talmud in Pesachim—correct, because the Talmud in Beitzah contradicts the Talmud in Pesachim, and Maimonides rules like the sugya in Beitzah. That’s the claim. Now I want to show you one more implication, and with this we’ll finish. In the Talmud in Yoma 74, the amoraim Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagree about a partial measure; I mentioned this earlier. Prohibitions of eating in the Torah are prohibitions defined by an olive’s bulk. That is the regular measure for eating prohibitions in the Torah. What happens if someone ate half an olive’s bulk, three-quarters of an olive’s bulk, a quarter of an olive’s bulk? That is called a partial measure. “Half-measure” means less than the required measure, not necessarily exactly half—anything less than the measure. That too is forbidden; there is a dispute among the amoraim whether it is forbidden rabbinically or by Torah law. Rabbi Yohanan’s view is that it is forbidden by Torah law. Reish Lakish’s view is that it is forbidden rabbinically. Maimonides and all the halakhic decisors rule in practice like Rabbi Yohanan—he was Reish Lakish’s teacher—they rule like Rabbi Yohanan that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. So for what purpose were the measures stated? What is the olive’s bulk for? For punishment. Someone who eats an olive’s bulk of pork is liable to lashes. Someone who eats a quarter of an olive’s bulk of pork has violated a Torah prohibition, but he is not liable to lashes. Meaning, the measure of an olive’s bulk was stated only regarding punishment, not regarding the prohibition. The prohibition applies even to less than an olive’s bulk. So as we said, Maimonides rules like Rabbi Yohanan. Now let’s read Maimonides in chapter 1 of the laws of leaven and matzah, halakhah 7. “One who eats from the leaven itself on Passover, even any amount whatsoever, this is forbidden by Torah law.” Up to here, that is fine, right? Exactly Rabbi Yohanan. “As it is said: ‘Leaven shall not be eaten.’” What is that? Why “as it is said”? A partial measure is forbidden by Torah law—what’s the problem? That’s true for all prohibitions. “Even benefit!” What? “Benefit also has a measure. When I eat half an olive’s bulk, I also have benefit, and my benefit is not measured.” Maimonides learns it from the verse—it doesn’t matter right now what his source is or how he learns it from the verse—I’m asking why he needs a verse at all. There is a rule in Jewish law that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law in all eating prohibitions. So why do you need to bring me a special source regarding the prohibition of leaven? What’s the issue? So indeed the Kesef Mishneh there asks—he asks this. Remember him? The Kesef Mishneh who also asked about Maimonides in halakhot 1–2. Because the Kesef Mishneh apparently consistently did not understand Maimonides the way I’m suggesting here, and because of that he also gets stuck on Maimonides. “One who eats from the leaven itself on Passover,” etc., “as it is said, ‘shall not be eaten.’” That is the quote. “It is difficult for me,” says the Kesef Mishneh, “why do I need a verse concerning leaven on Passover? Why do we need a verse about leaven on Passover? For with regard to all prohibitions in the Torah we hold that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law.” For in all Torah prohibitions, a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. Why do you need to bring a special source concerning leaven on Passover? And in the end—never mind, I won’t get into the answer he offers right now—you see the last words in the passage: “and it requires further investigation.” Meaning, he does not accept the explanation he himself offered. Right? He found no explanation. Why does Maimonides need a source? And again, it is not the law itself that is difficult here, not the law. Because the law that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law is no problem. What is difficult here is the reasoning. Why does Maimonides need a source for it? There is a rule saying that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. So I’ll read you what the Mishneh LaMelekh brings; he cites the Maharalnach. The Mishneh LaMelekh writes as follows: “And I saw that Rabbi Maharalnach in responsum 51 was troubled by this question of our master”—our master being the Shulchan Arukh, that is, the Kesef Mishneh who asks on Maimonides. “And he answered that the prohibition of leaven is not similar to forbidden fat”—forbidden fat is where they derive the prohibition of a partial measure from. “So the prohibition of leaven is not similar to forbidden fat, from which they learned that a partial measure is forbidden. Why? Because forbidden fat is always prohibited and never had a time of permission, unlike leaven, which is permitted before Passover. Therefore a verse of its own was needed regarding leaven to forbid a partial measure.” What is he saying? He says that Passover is a prohibition that depends on time. Earlier it was permitted, and now it is forbidden. What is the source that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law? Forbidden fat. Every tiny amount of fat—that is what the Talmud in Yoma says. The prohibition of forbidden fat is a permanent prohibition; it does not depend on time, not only at a particular time. The Maharalnach says that Maimonides apparently thought that one cannot derive from the prohibition of forbidden fat to the prohibition of leaven. Maybe for something forbidden forever they forbade a partial measure, but for something forbidden only at a specific time they did not forbid a partial measure. The great wonder concerning the Maharalnach—and this is really something people leave unresolved—is that one cannot understand at all what he wants. In tractate Yoma, when the Talmud discusses a partial measure, do you know what the context of the discussion is? The context is the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur. The prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur—even if you ate a partial measure—is forbidden by Torah law. Well now, I don’t understand. The prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur is also time-bound. How is that derived from forbidden fat? If things that are time-bound prohibitions cannot be derived from forbidden fat, and one cannot know whether a partial measure is forbidden or permitted, then how does the Talmud itself derive on Yom Kippur that a partial measure is forbidden from forbidden fat? Yom Kippur too is a prohibition only on Yom Kippur. All the foods of Yom Kippur can be eaten the day before and the day after. So how can this be derived from any amount of forbidden fat? These are things the mind simply cannot tolerate; what he writes here is simply complete nonsense. Now it is so nonsensical that it is obvious he himself did not make this mistake. It appears in the very sugya itself; it’s not that he forgot some other sugya in a distant place. In that very sugya of partial measure, the whole discussion is about Yom Kippur. How can he say that things dependent on time do not involve the prohibition of a partial measure? It’s simply not—it is against the Talmud. I claim my claim. Several later authorities write that the prohibition of a partial measure was stated only where the prohibition is a prohibition on the object. Take pork: it is forbidden to eat an olive’s bulk of pork because it is repulsive. So keep away from it—even a quarter of pork, don’t eat. Because even a quarter of pork is still called pork; you just didn’t eat enough, but still it is not okay—keep away from that too. But if these are prohibitions of action, several later authorities say: the law of a partial measure was not said about that. For example, someone who carries four cubits in the public domain on the Sabbath has violated the prohibition of carrying in the public domain. What if someone carried one cubit or two? Is that a partial measure? No. Several later authorities say no; there is no Torah prohibition in such a case. Why? Because there there is no specific object, no piece of pork. It is a prohibition on an act. The act of carrying four cubits in the public domain is forbidden. Less than that is not even a significant act; it is not the act that was forbidden. With pork, the point is that even if you ate a quarter of an olive’s bulk, that quarter is still pork; it’s just not enough, the measure is lacking. But if it is part of an act, then part of the act is not an act at all. A partial measure was not forbidden. If that is so, then it seems to me very clear what is going on in Maimonides here with partial measure regarding leaven. After all, we saw that the prohibition of eating leaven is a prohibition on an act, not that the leaven itself is an object of prohibition. It is a prohibition on an act: I am forbidden to perform the act of eating leaven. If that is so, in prohibitions of action there is no prohibition of a partial measure. The indication of that is what I said earlier, that there is no commandment to abstain from leaven before and after Passover. Right? That is the proof that this is a prohibition on an act and not that the object itself is a repulsive object. I asked earlier about the Maharalnach—what about Yom Kippur? On Yom Kippur too, the prohibition of eating is permitted before Yom Kippur and after Yom Kippur, so why is a partial measure forbidden there? Very simple. Because on Yom Kippur, what is the prohibition on Yom Kippur? Chana, right? Chana Charazi? Is that Chana? No? Then I probably got mixed up with whoever sent me an email. In any case, what you said earlier—indeed on Yom Kippur, before Yom Kippur and after Yom Kippur it is permitted to eat. Only on Yom Kippur itself it is forbidden. But what is forbidden? It is forbidden to derive benefit from food, right? After all, other pleasures are also forbidden to me on Yom Kippur. Clearly on Yom Kippur this is a prohibition that in essence is a prohibition of benefit. Eating on Yom Kippur is forbidden because it is one of the kinds of benefit forbidden on Yom Kippur, not because the object is repulsive. But what is forbidden is a prohibition of benefit. Fine. If that is so, then the law of a partial measure applies there. It is not a prohibition on an act; it is a prohibition on benefit. Therefore on Yom Kippur the Talmud does understand that a partial measure is forbidden. Only with leaven Maimonides says that a partial measure would not have been forbidden were it not for a separate source. And what the Maharalnach writes, that this is because it has a time of permission—it was permitted before and afterward—he only means to bring from here a proof that this is not a prohibition on the object but a prohibition on the act. He does not mean to say that every time-dependent thing lacks a prohibition of a partial measure. The Talmud itself says otherwise in that very place. If so, then one can also understand the Maharalnach. Okay, I think I’ll stop here. More or less I said the main points. What I’m proposing now: I recorded this both in audio and in video. It will go up on the site as usual. I’ll also send it to you. One moment. Just one second here, just so I don’t get tangled up with all the sound and technical stuff. One moment. Okay. I’m staying now with whoever wants to ask questions, so I can answer here, and I’ll also send you both the summary and the recording by email. We’ll meet next time on—what day is it today, Tuesday? On Thursday, yes, the next class. I’ll send you before then an invitation and a source sheet as well. Okay, so thank you very much. You can open microphones, whoever wants. We’ll be here a few more minutes.

[Speaker F] Thank you very much, thank you very much, have a good day.

[Speaker G] One—

[Speaker H] One.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank you very much.

[Speaker H] Thank you very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Goodbye.

[Speaker G] Rabbi, regarding the conclusion from the class.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yehudit, yes?

[Speaker G] Yes. I know people talk about medicines on Passover—that if they have a bitter taste or are wrapped in all kinds of things, capsules and so on, then there isn’t a problem with them. But according to what we saw now, it doesn’t matter; it would still remain prohibited.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that I didn’t get into in the class; you’ll see it in the summary. In the summary I said that hardened leaven, for example—leaven not fit for eating—is also permitted. Only sourdough is forbidden. Why? Because leaven that isn’t fit for eating is simply not food; it’s just dirt. And that’s what Maimonides says. But sourdough, even though it isn’t fit for eating, is still leaven, because with it you leaven other doughs. That is exactly the difference.

[Speaker G] Yes. I know that among Ethiopians it is permitted to eat injera, which is basically sourdough on Passover. Their leaven is much more sour than ours. Meaning, they don’t have the five grains and all that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I don’t know, maybe.

[Speaker G] Okay. So—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I know that among Ethiopians it is permitted to eat—

[Speaker G] Injera, which is basically barley on Passover.

[Speaker F] Their leaven is much more sour than ours.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, they don’t have the five grains and all that. So that’s a bit like Beit Shammai. Okay, I don’t know, maybe. Fine. Rabbi?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. You said that… who are we speaking with?

[Speaker F] Ravit. Wait, then I’ll stop the sharing for a moment and then I’ll just see all of you. Yes, Ruthie.

[Speaker F] You said that when it’s about an action, then there is no measure, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, who is speaking? I don’t recognize—Ruthie, Ruthie. Ah, Ruthie, yes, Ruthie is here. Ah, okay, I thought you weren’t here. Yes. When the prohibition—

[Speaker F] Is on an action, then there’s no issue of measure, you said?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, there’s no partial measure.

[Speaker F] Yes, but then why did you still say that leaven is forbidden in any amount whatsoever?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? “Leaven is forbidden in any amount whatsoever” means there is no nullification in the majority.

[Speaker G] Leaven is the object; it’s not the person doing an action.

[Speaker F] And one more thing: you said that usually prohibitions of eating are because the thing is repulsive. Yes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Because the repulsiveness—

[Speaker F] Because the thing is repulsive there is a prohibition of eating on it; that anything that has a prohibition of eating is repulsive. So going back to the first prohibition of eating, the prohibition of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge—so it wasn’t repulsive?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It wasn’t repulsive, it wasn’t repulsive, but one had to keep away from it. That is a prohibition on the object. When I say “repulsive” I don’t mean in the sense of disgusting or degrading. Sometimes, for example, a holy thing too is something one must keep away from; there is a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit. But that is specifically because it is holy, not because it is lowly. But still, there is a prohibition on the object; we are supposed to keep away from it. Okay, anything else?

[Speaker E] Yes, regarding Yom Kippur, I didn’t quite understand why it’s not a prohibition on the object. Sorry—why on Yom Kippur is it a prohibition on the object and not on action? On the face of it, it sounds like what is forbidden on Yom Kippur is the action and not the object.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that is not the act of eating; that is benefit. On Yom Kippur, after all, what is forbidden on Yom Kippur is to derive benefit. The commandment is a commandment of affliction, right? So if the commandment is—

[Speaker E] So then it’s not on the act of eating—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The act of eating is only a way of deriving benefit, and therefore there there will be a prohibition of a partial measure. Ah, it’s not because it’s a prohibition on the object; it’s for another reason. Right, exactly. Meaning, I agree—you can define it not as a prohibition on the object, but clearly this is not a prohibition on the act of eating; it is a prohibition on the benefit that comes from eating. Fine, thank you. Okay.

[Speaker H] I wanted to ask—can you hear me? Yes. You said prohibition on pork and everything you said in the class, so how does that connect, for example, to… okay, I understand how it connects, but there is also a prohibition, say, on eating worms, and I know the punishment for that is lashes. So surely it’s also written somewhere else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there is such a prohibition. So what then?

[Speaker H] So you’re saying there is kind of an issue of why it is written somewhere else—that’s what I understood—that you spoke about pork and then said, like, why wouldn’t all the prohibitions be written together.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand the question.

[Speaker H] Why wouldn’t all the prohibitions be written together?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why should they be written together? Every prohibition—

[Speaker H] Yes, pork together with worms, together with everything. Why does it need to be written… maybe it’s not connected?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Every prohibition is a separate prohibition. What do you mean, why should they be written together?

[Speaker H] But what’s the difference between worms and pork?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They are completely different prohibitions. What do you mean, what’s the difference? What connection is there between them? Both are forbidden for eating, but they are different prohibitions. Both are forbidden for eating, but these are different prohibitions. Just as I am forbidden to do labor on the Sabbath, and I am also forbidden to do labor on the first festival day of Passover. It isn’t written in the same verse, even though in both cases I am forbidden to do labor. Two different prohibitions.

[Speaker H] Right, but in both cases you have the same result, you have the same punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? Also on the Sabbath and Yom Kippur—so what? Or on the first festival day of Passover and the festival of Sukkot. When the prohibitions are different prohibitions, they are written in different places in the Torah; they are not written together. Okay. Okay, anyone else? Fine, so I’m here, I see Iris’s chats. Iris, do you want to speak in the chat? I understand you don’t have a microphone. So you can stay, I’ll speak with you. Fine. Or if you want, the chat here is general, right? You see the chat too, right?

[Speaker I] Yes, that’s possible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so you can look there. I’ll just talk here with Iris because she doesn’t have a microphone. Rabbi?

[Speaker I] Yes. I understand that on Thursday there is no class, right? Why? We’re going into semester break, Passover break. I understood that on Wednesday they go into Passover break, according to the seminary calendar. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think that’s next Wednesday.

[Speaker I] It says—let me check for a second—maybe I made a mistake—from Wednesday. Right, right. Sorry.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By my calculation, we’re supposed to have four lectures. Okay, fine, one hundred percent, sorry. Thank you very much. Okay, now let me go up for a moment with all the—there are a lot of questions here, hold on, I’m going through the chats now. Okay, but on the first day—I’m answering you, Iris, I’m answering orally. “But on the first day,” why the emphasis on the first day? Another question, not connected to us, I don’t know why this is connected to us. According to this, is it permitted to eat spoiled pork? The answer is yes. Spoiled pork, if it is not fit even for a dog, is completely permitted. If it is fit for a dog but not for a person, then it is forbidden rabbinically. A clarification: according to Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel there are two parameters, the degree of leavening and whether it is fit to be eaten. According to Beit Shammai, only the degree of leavening; according to Beit Hillel, both parameters. Next question: “It shall not be eaten”—from this they learn that there is an additional prohibition here; if so, then is that always the case? In principle, yes, it is always the case. I haven’t checked throughout the Torah, but it is presented as some kind of general principle. You’d have to check each place whether it isn’t so; if not, there should be an explanation why. But Hezekiah says something general here. There is an explanation in Rashi there in tractate Pesachim about the idea behind this, as I said: that it shall not be eaten even if a gentile eats it and I only profit from it financially, which is basically a prohibition of benefit. So that is supposed to apply everywhere. How did the Sages know that the three mentions of the three prohibitions of meat and milk teach specifically those three? I don’t know. It could be a law given to Moses at Sinai and then the exposition is just leaning on it, but it could also be a creative exposition. Meaning, there are extra verses, and the Sages understood that they come to teach some prohibition. Now, “do not cook” is written explicitly, and if I ask myself what else it comes to include, it could be that by reasoning they said eating and benefit, because those are the usual prohibitions in the Torah. Question six: according to Maimonides, if every prohibition of eating is also a prohibition of benefit, how will he explain the mentions in the Torah? Are two mentions enough? Excellent question. That is the continuation of Maimonides there, which I didn’t read. Take a look in section 183, in the summary itself I explain it a bit. There is a long discussion there. Question seven: a carcass that was cooked in milk, and the permission to derive benefit from it—is that because there is no benefit of eating here? Meaning, is there a distinction between benefit in general and not? Not because there is no benefit of eating, but because there is no prohibition on benefit. Because the prohibition on benefit branches off from the prohibition on eating, but the prohibition on eating does not take effect, because one prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists. Since the carcass is already forbidden by a prohibition of eating, carcass in milk is also only a prohibition of eating, because the prohibition of benefit only branches off from that. So it does not take effect. Once it does not take effect, the prohibition of benefit does not branch off from it either. If there is no prohibition of benefit, then even if I actually benefited, there is still no prohibition in that. There is no prohibition of benefit. Hezekiah’s argument is more pedagogical and more memorable—that’s what the Kesef Mishneh said. I explained there—Sivan Harazi, sorry, yes, not Hannah, my mistake, but I meant you. For some reason Hannah was stuck in my head, I don’t know why. Okay, question eight regarding the prohibition of eating half an olive-bulk. Are we talking about the pleasure of eating? After all, even tasting can be pleasurable, so why should the quantity matter? Exactly right. The quantity doesn’t matter; therefore there is a prohibition. The quantity matters only with regard to punishment. Therefore a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. This is how Rabbi Shimon Shkop explains the law of a partial measure; the Talmud states a reasoning for it. Aside from the verse written regarding forbidden fat, “all fat”—any amount of fat is fat—Rabbi Shimon also explains that it is fit to be combined. Meaning, if you take half an olive-bulk of pork and another half olive-bulk of pork, then it becomes a full prohibition when I eat it. So clearly the quality of the prohibition exists even in the half-measure. All that is missing is only the quantity. Therefore, essentially, it is forbidden. Only the required measure is lacking. Thanks, thanks. Did I already read out the questions? No, I already answered them, okay. Okay, so that’s everything.

[Speaker G] Wait, one more question. Yes, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Iris, but is that okay from your perspective? She only answers in the chat, so I just want to make sure. Look, in the summary the points basically appear there. I see that she—okay, I hope Iris got an answer. Okay, let’s move on.

[Speaker G] A short question. Regarding—I know that it is forbidden to do experiments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More questions? Okay, so I’ll send you the summary and the recording. We’ll see each other, God willing, on Thursday. I’ll send it to you again, of course, as Thursday gets closer. Goodbye.

[Speaker G] Thank you very, very much. Bye. Bye.