Summary Booklet of Lessons on Critical Thinking – Rabbi Michael Abraham

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12 Bertrand Arthur William Russell – Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), British philosopher, logician, and writer

This paradox undermines the concept of a ‘surprise exam’ and argues that there is no such thing, by way of proof by contradiction. So why is this a paradox? Because we know there is such a thing as a surprise drill, and that in practice the soldiers will not know when the surprise drill will take place—and will indeed be surprised! Yet from the standpoint of the argument, every step is convincing and free of errors—and therefore it is a paradox.

12.4 .

Zeno’s paradoxes. Achilles runs twice as fast

as the tortoise. The tortoise runs 10

m per second, and Achilles runs 20

m per second. At the start of the race Achilles gives the tortoise a head start of 20

meters. Then the race begins. After one second Achilles has covered 20

m, whereas the tortoise has covered 10 m. It follows that the tortoise is 10

meters ahead of Achilles. While Achilles runs these 10

meters, the tortoise covers 5 m. It follows that it is 5 m ahead of Achilles. While Achilles runs those 5

m, the tortoise covers 2.5

and so on and so on. It follows that Achilles never catches the tortoise. This is a paradox because we all know that Achilles does catch the tortoise. We have not identified any flaw in the argument—

but we know that its conclusion is not correct. We need to look for the point in the argument that is not correct—

Clearly, something in the argument is not correct. People who encounter this paradox tend to say, ‘This is nonsense, obviously Achilles overtakes the tortoise!’ That is true, except that it does not solve the paradox. The paradox does not really say that Achilles does not overtake the tortoise; rather, it cries out, ‘Where is my mistake? I too know that Achilles overtakes the tortoise—

but where is the point in my argument that is not correct?’ As stated, in logic: in a valid argument, if the premises are true, the conclusion must necessarily be true. Therefore there are only 2 possibilities: either the argument is invalid, or at least one of the premises is false. In summary, paradoxes of this type do not arise from self-reference or from a loop, nor from the fact that one of the claims cannot be assigned a truth value. Rather, they contain a claim whose truth value we do know (there is a surprise drill / Achilles does overtake the tortoise), together with a logical process that on its face seems correct—and reality proves that something in the process is flawed. 13. Which premise should be given up? We saw that one possible way out of a paradox is giving up a premise. But sometimes people give up different premises—and that has consequences. In the Gemara, they often present an objection and try to show that the other side is not correct, and then it can be shown that there is another premise, not stated explicitly, such that if one gives it up—

the difficulty disappears, and I can remain with my original basic premise

12.5 . Note—religious thought and paradoxes. Religious people tend to solve paradoxes about faith with arguments like ‘the unity of opposites’ and ‘no thought can grasp Him at all.’ In my view this is intellectual laziness. The solution to the paradox is not about the Holy One, blessed be He, but about me. If there is a contradiction in my set of beliefs—I am the one in trouble, not God. It does not help to think that He is above logic—the question is what I believe about Him. For example, the question of foreknowledge and free choice—

So what if God is beyond logic?! If, as far as I am concerned, God knows what I will do, and as far as I am concerned I have free choice—then that is a sign that I do not believe one of my premises! The claim is against me, not against God. In logic there are clear rules. Rudolf Otto, who was a philosopher of religion, wrote in his book The Idea of the Holy as follows: ‘The unity of opposites is the refuge of the lazy.’ There is a way out for soft philosophers (not for mathematicians): if the arguments seem correct and the conclusion is false—I am permitted to assume there is a mistake in the premises, even though I am not wise enough to point to the mistake. That can happen. But this is a privilege only when one feels strongly that the conclusion is not correct. We will elaborate on this later (suspension of judgment).

13. All of Zeno’s paradoxes are built in this way

12.6 . Summary—paradoxes. Self-reference paradoxes usually create a sentence to which no truth value can be attached, and they are not related to critical thinking; they are an interesting logical amusement. As a rule, the solution lies in noticing that you used an undefined concept, or one that is forbidden for use. We will focus on paradox as a logical tool for attacking claims by proving that following the opponent’s premises will lead to a paradox (in cases of paradox where the arguments seem proper and the conclusion is false (Zeno)—

we will have to decide whether our conclusion is incorrect or whether something in the premises is false—and if so, we will need to locate where—

The burden of proof passes to me from the moment the opponent raises such a paradox against me. One may suspend judgment when I am not wise enough to find the flaw. Exercise—paradoxes and definitions. A. The ontological proof.

The Christian scholar Anselm of Canterbury proposed a proof for the existence of God, later called the ‘ontological proof’. 14 Schematically it is built as follows: Definition: God is the greatest/most perfect being that can be conceived. If He did not exist, one could conceive of a more perfect being—God who exists. In that case He would not be the most perfect being that can be conceived, which contradicts His definition. Therefore God exists. Try to formulate this argument as a paradox. Is it of the self-reference type? Can it be seen as a proof by contradiction? What does it prove? Solution: This is not self-reference, of course, but a proof by contradiction. The point is almost explicit in the formulation I gave. The full argument looks like this: Definition: God is the most perfect being that can be conceived. Premise A (for the sake of the discussion): God does not exist. Premise B: God can be conceived.

Premise C: a God who exists is a greater concept/being. Premise D: God who exists can be conceived. Conclusion: a being greater than God can be conceived.

But that contradicts the definition, and therefore premise A—that God does not exist—must be abandoned. Conclusion: God exists. One can formulate this slightly differently: we arrived at a self-contradictory conclusion: a being greater than the greatest being that can be conceived can be conceived. In this formulation, one may perhaps see here something like self-reference, but I think it is simply a contradiction. In any case, this is a proof by contradiction. One assumes the opposite and arrives at a contradiction. The conclusion contradicts our initial premise. As we saw, in paradoxes of this type the conclusion appears on its face not to be correct, and therefore one must look for which premise is false. Here the conclusion does not appear correct because of the definition, but note: once I brought all the premises to the surface, it can immediately be seen that there is no proof here that God exists. If we arrived at a contradiction, we must give up a premise, but the question is which premise. One can also give up premise B, C, or D. It seems quite reasonable to me to give up premise C.

14 For further reading, see Michael Abraham, The First Being, first conversation

I will not enter here into philosophical and logical nuances. My purpose was only to show what we learned above: 1. proof by contradiction. 2. When the conclusion is not correct, it is important to decide which premise to give up. It is not always the premise that first comes to mind. Some have claimed (Kant) that this very type of proof is paradoxical, since it proves a factual claim on the basis of a definition alone. Are there really no premises here? In light of what I wrote above, you can see that there are several additional premises here. But there is an interesting question whether they are factual premises. If not, then Kant’s description is still correct.

B. Berry’s paradox.

One can define numbers using words in Hebrew. For example, 2 can be defined as ‘the smallest positive even number’, or for instance with the word ‘two’. We are interested in the set of all the natural numbers that can be described by a word or phrase of fewer than 100

letters. We also require, for each number, that the phrase describe that number alone, and not an infinite set of numbers (for example, ‘all natural numbers’ is not a phrase we will regard as describing a particular number). Now, since we limited the number of letters to fewer than 100, and since there is a finite number of letters in Hebrew (22), there is only a finite number of possible word combinations, and from this it follows that there is only a finite number of natural numbers that can be described by fewer than 100 letters. Since there are infinitely many natural numbers, it follows that the set of natural numbers that cannot be described by fewer than 100 letters is not empty. Now, a well-ordering relation is defined on the natural numbers, and therefore every subset of natural numbers has a smallest number, and in particular the set of numbers that cannot be described by fewer than 100

letters. Let us describe this number by the phrase ‘the smallest number that cannot be described using fewer than one hundred letters’.

Now we have apparently reached a contradiction, because the phrase we used to describe the number had fewer than one hundred letters. (Is this a self-reference paradox? Would you give up any premise in order to solve it? Suggest a solution to the paradox. You may peek at the Wikipedia entry to which I linked.) On its face, this is a paradox of the self-reference type, since it speaks about verbal descriptions of numbers and itself constitutes such a description. In Wikipedia’s formulation:

In the sentence ‘the smallest number that cannot be described using fewer than one hundred letters’, the self-reference is hidden in the fact that it speaks about numbers describable in fewer than one hundred letters while it itself is one of them. To sharpen the point, one can phrase the sentence as follows: ‘the smallest number not defined by sentences of this kind’. This time the self-reference is completely clear, and the paradox is not.

However, unlike the liar paradox, which has no premises, this paradox can be solved. Therefore it can also be seen as a proof by contradiction. One possible formulation of the solution is through the claim that verbal descriptions are not unambiguous, and therefore one cannot arrange these descriptions according to a well-defined order. In fact, the term ‘a verbal description of a number by means of X letters’ is not well defined. Note that the first two problems show us that the distinction between self-reference paradoxes and proofs by contradiction is useful, but not unambiguous.

C. A dispute about the definition of Judaism. In his ‘speech of the rabbits,’ Rabbi Shach argued that the kibbutz members are not Jews, because they eat pork and desecrate the Sabbath. Here are some of the responses:

The Lubavitcher Rebbe said that no person has any right to speak against the Jewish people. The Jewish conception is that ‘a Jew, even though he has sinned, is still a Jew.’ The children of Israel are God’s ‘only son’, and whoever speaks against them is as though speaking against God Himself. Every Jew should be helped to observe all the commandments of the religion, but under no circumstances should he be attacked. The Rebbe defined the people of his generation as ‘brands plucked from the fire’, and as ‘captured infants’, who are not to blame for their knowledge and their attitude toward Judaism. •

Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu referred to the speech and said that even pork-eaters and rabbit-eaters are Jews, and even if all the rabbis were to decide like Rabbi Shach, they could not strip any person of the name ‘Jew’. •

MK Yitzhak Rabin argued that ‘everything done in the state was born thanks to the kibbutz movement in all its streams and forms. It is inconceivable to view the state, in its present borders and structure, without the constant partnership between the kibbutz settlement movement and the security forces.’ •

Likud minister Ariel Sharon responded: ‘The kibbutzim are an Israeli masterpiece, with enormous achievements in settlement, security, the economy, and in determining the borders of the state.’

Try to define the dispute. Is there really a dispute here? Apparently there is no dispute here. Each person defines Judaism differently, and a definition is not a claim. And yet, as I mentioned in class, when the definition tries to capture a concept that we all use and understand, then it is not arbitrary and disputes about it are possible. Therefore in this case one may perhaps argue that there is a dispute here: whether the definition of the concept ‘Jew’ is like that of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Eliyahu, Rabin, or Sharon. By the way, the rabbis did not really offer a definition at all. They seem implicitly to assume an ethnic definition (someone born to a Jewish mother). Rabin and Sharon argued that a Jew is someone who contributed/contributes to the state. A very problematic definition in my opinion (both because there are non-Jews who contribute, and because there are Jews who do not contribute). Beyond this, one can perhaps distinguish between an ethnic definition that defines an individual person as Jewish, and a cultural definition that defines a culture as Jewish. I think the rabbis relied on an ethnic definition of a Jew, but that is precisely what Rabbi Shach was not disputing. He certainly agrees that someone born to a Jewish mother is a Jew. His claim was on the cultural plane (that they do not behave and think as Jews). On that plane the rabbis’ claims are entirely irrelevant. דווקא the politicians’ claims are relevant (although silly in my opinion). Thus we learn that the critics of Rabbi Shach divide into two groups: A. the rabbis, who raise a claim that is irrelevant to the discussion. B. the politicians, who raise a relevant claim but whose definition is plainly wrong (in the sense I described above: it does not fit the meaning of the concept in the everyday use shared by all of us). This is a bit subtle, because many people do see contribution to the state as a kind of Judaism, so it is not quite correct to say that this is not our shared usage. But if I am right that these many people are simply mistaken (ignoring the two kinds of counterexamples I gave above), perhaps their definition should not be taken into account. This requires further thought.

13. Definitions 13.1. Introduction. For further expansion on the subject, there is a series of lectures on the topic15

There are 2 types of definitions in logic: 1. Extensional definition—by extension. 2. Intensional definition—by content. We will explain by example: one can define a ‘democratic state’ by giving a list of all the democratic states (extension), and one can define it through the essential characteristics of the concept of democracy, such as separation of powers, elections, etc. (content).

15 https://soundcloud.com/mikyabchannel/sets/jkwmv2myte5g

These definitions are commonly thought of as parallel, since the list of states is created by their meeting the content definition. For in order to determine the list of democratic states—

I will have to go through them one by one and examine whether each meets the content-based test of democracy. For our purposes, a definition will be content-based/intensional: we collect all the essential characteristics (in defining a horse we will not refer to its color). The importance of definition: without a definition, concepts are vague and intellectual tangles arise. Part of critical thinking is to define the concepts clearly before using them. The limits of definition: with that said, one must understand that not all the concepts we use can be defined, because we would need to define every concept using other concepts—

ad infinitum. There is no choice but to close the loop and define primitive concepts on the basis of derived concepts—

and that is legitimate. The philosopher Quine16 wrote that we grasp concepts in the form of a network that exists among concepts, and not in a linear form. Concepts are located at the nodes of the network, and there are connections among all the nodes; one cannot understand a concept in isolation. So yes—it is important to define concepts, but we will be aware of the limits of their definability. We will not fall into the trap of lazy people who claim that concepts have no definitions and avoid defining them.

13.2. An example of the power of definitions. I saw in a book a mathematical problem from the field of topology17:

Convex shapes—those with a belly outward, and concave shapes—those with a belly inward. In the following example, the shape on the left is convex, because on all its sides the belly faces outward, whereas the shape on the right is partly concave (the upper part) and partly convex (the lower part). Since there is a concave part, the shape is called concave. There is a theorem in mathematics that says: ‘Any intersection of 2 convex shapes also yields a convex shape.’

The question is how to prove this theorem. True, it has strong intuition behind it, but mathematicians demand proofs. I was unable to prove it, but the book I read did prove it, and it did so by first demanding a definition of what a convex shape is. It defined it as follows:

‘A shape such that the line passing between any 2 points inside the shape passes entirely within the shape.’

Once we have this definition in hand, the proof becomes simpler: take a circle and a triangle, as in the following example. Their intersection creates a pizza-slice triangle. How do we prove that the shape of the intersection is convex? That is, how do we prove that for any 2 points inside the pizza-slice triangle, the line passing between them passes entirely within the pizza-slice triangle? Since the pizza-slice triangle, by definition, is contained both in the circle and in the triangle—any line segment that passes between 2 points in it passes entirely within the shape! QED. A complicated problem was solved by a clear and sharp definition. Definitions have extraordinary power.

13.3 . Between a definition and a claim. A definition is essentially different from a claim: a definition does not assert anything; it defines a concept (‘a convex shape is a shape in which every straight line within it passes entirely within it’). Definitions are not measured as ‘true’ or ‘not true’; they define a concept—that is the concept, period. If you want to mean something else—give it another definition.

16 Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000), one of the most important American philosophers and logicians of the 20th century. 17 A branch of mathematics that developed out of geometry and deals with the study of the properties of space

All this is in contrast to a claim—which indeed can be true or false. The definition gives meaning to the concepts. The claim uses the concepts. The sentence: ‘The intersection of two convex shapes will always yield a convex shape’—

is a claim, and the concept ‘convex shape’ within the sentence—

requires a definition. Without a definition there is no meaning—we do not know what we are talking about. This is the accepted logical view of definitions. Note: in logic, a distinction is drawn between a term—a word in a language—and a concept—an idea. We use a term to define the concept. When two speakers use the same term to define two different things—that is not a dispute, but merely confusion.

13.4. Between a philosophical definition and a mathematical definition. What was said in the previous section is true for a mathematical definition, but philosophers relate differently to definitions. For a philosopher it is clear that a definition does not come from a vacuum; rather, it expresses some intuition about what the thing is. For example, the definition of a ‘concave shape’ did not fall from the sky; rather, we took an intuition about what it is and tried to sharpen it and fit it into a clear mold. We built a definition that tries to capture that insight-concept that exists in our initial consciousness. If that is what a definition is, then there is an aspect of a claim in a definition, as though one were saying: ‘What you mean when you speak about a concave shape is such-and-such.’ Thus, the mathematician brings the definition out of the blue, and from it goes off in directions and proofs, but does not relate to the intuition at the base of the definition. He does not examine whether the definition is correct or not—

because that is a philosophical distinction, not a mathematical one. In discourse and critical thinking we will indeed discuss the correctness of definitions, because we will try to make claims about concepts we have not yet defined, and then the interlocutor will force us to go back and define our concepts. And that definition will have to capture the insight that was already with us: if it captures it—it is good, and if not—then this is not the concept we meant. From this it follows that a definition in discourse is not arbitrary—and there is room to examine and argue about whether definitions are correct or not.

13.5. Regulative definition and constitutive definition 13.5.1. Types of definitions. There are quite a few disputes about definitions, and this is because definitions try to capture an existing concept, as opposed to a definition that constitutes the concept. Often we use concepts we understand intuitively, and we try to define them through characteristics—and a dispute can arise whether these are indeed the characteristics. For example: when people argue about ‘What is democracy?’ apparently what is the problem? Let each person define it with his own set of characteristics! What are they arguing about? But people understand that this term has an intuitive definition, and the definition tries to capture it rather than constitute it. So let us call these two types of definitions as follows: 1. A regulative definition (in analytic philosophy: a regulatory definition). 2. A constitutive definition (in analytic philosophy: a constitutive definition). There are systems of rules for each type of definition—for example, the rule system of chess, which defines what the game of chess is, and whoever plays according to other rules is not playing chess—this is a constitutive system of rules.

By contrast, traffic laws—which say how to drive correctly—and if you do not obey them you are still driving, just not correctly—constitute a regulative system of rules. 2 examples of a regulative definition: 1.

The definition of the concept democracy—

Some will say that it is civil rights, and some will say that the definition of democracy has nothing to do with that. The dispute will not be resolved by using a dictionary—

This is a value dispute. In a certain sense, a regulative definition is a claim (‘democracy is such-and-such’)—and one can argue about it. 2.

The definition of Judaism—as we saw regarding Rabbi Shach’s ‘speech of the rabbits,’ where he argued that the definition of ‘Jew’ is a cultural, behavioral definition, while others argued against him that the definition is different (army service / contribution to the state).

13.5.2 Disputes and changes as indications of a regulative definition. Take the example of a dispute between a religious person and a secular person about what Judaism is. Apparently, what exactly is the dispute? You define Judaism as X and I as Y, so why quarrel over the meaning of a word? Rather, it is clear that this is not semantic; it is a dispute about a concept and not about a term. ‘Term’ relates to the linguistic plane; ‘concept’ relates to the plane of ideas. We perceive the concept Jew as something that exists, and we argue about what captures this concept. Adopting two different terms for the same concept will not help us. That helps only when speaking of two different concepts. That is, the definitions we offer for ‘Jew’ are not constitutive definitions but regulative ones. That is, when there is a dispute about a concept—we are dealing with a regulative definition and not a constitutive one (there is no point in arguing about a constitutive definition—it is just words). Another angle: sometimes one feels that the concept changes: ‘The characteristics of the concept today are different from what they once were.’ According to the constitutive view, this ostensibly has no meaning, since if the characteristics changed then it is simply not the same concept but a different one. In regulative language, the set of characteristics is not the definition of the concept; rather, the set tries to capture it and describe it correctly. In summary: these disputes and changes are indications that we are dealing with regulative definitions (and not constitutive ones). We should remember that a regulative definition is a kind of claim.

13.5.3. Extensions. Extension 1. Leibniz assumed (at least implicitly) that an object is defined by its set of characteristics. I claim that he was philosophically mistaken, because an object possesses the characteristics. Let us see an example of the point: Leibniz argued that if there are 2 entities with the same set of characteristics, they are not 2 objects, they are 1. And I say that if there are two raindrops with the same shape and in the same place—they are two different drops! The fact that they cannot be in the same place is a physical limitation, not a logical one. In a lecture for women that I gave, someone asked whether to love is to relate to the object or to its characteristics. A fascinating question! And I think that it is a relation to the object itself: let us say all the characteristics because of which I loved him changed—there is no logical contradiction in my continuing to love him. Hence love is a relation to the object itself. Extension 2. Anselm’s ontological proof: when one says of an object that it ‘exists’—that is not one of its characteristics. Existence is a relation to the bearer of the characteristics. Therefore, saying that an object exists does not give it more perfection than saying that it does not exist. For perfection means that the thing has all its characteristics perfectly, but existence is not a characteristic. And this is the failure that collapses Anselm’s ontological proof.

13.5.4. The illusion between a regulative and a constitutive definition. A phenomenon of illusion: the modern concept called multiple intelligences—the existence of different kinds of intelligence (motor, literary, emotional, etc.). The origin of the concept is that science is in the service of political correctness: they take an intuitive concept, ‘intelligence,’ about which, 100 years ago, people knew that some people were more intelligent and some less. No one imagines that a soccer player like Messi is a genius in the same sense that Einstein is a genius. Yes, he is talented, but that is something else. The comparison between motor intelligence and intelligent intelligence comes from an attempt to distill the characteristics that define the concept ‘intelligence’—and lo and behold! they also characterize Messi—and hence: Messi is also intelligent, and thus all types of intelligence are species under the same genus. The absurdity: a person from 50

years ago would answer the question ‘Is Messi intelligent in the same sense that Einstein is a genius?’ with ‘Of course not!’ And today an attempt is made to conceptualize (a constitutive definition; we set out from an existing term—and discovered a result about which people from 50

years ago would not have agreed. What exactly happened here? If this is a definition that captures the old concept—this is proof that you did not manage to capture it (the fact is that in the past they defined it differently), so in fact a new concept has been defined and the attempt to capture has missed the mark. And this is an illusion because a regulative definition is turned into a constitutive definition. They started in a regulative way and in practice are making a constitutive definition—and this is in order to advance an agenda. Up to this point I have presented the matter as I once understood it. Today I qualify that understanding by saying that sometimes we try to sharpen an old definition—and expose things that, when we thought about them intuitively, we did not notice. It may be that in the past we did not think and analyze the characteristics—and went with our gut. If so, there is progress here: we refined a concept that had been intuitive. That is, even a regulative definition can sometimes change our insights. So what should be done in practice? One has to pay attention and examine each matter on its own merits. There are illusory moves of the sort described above in political correctness, but there are also definitions that reveal things we did not notice when they were in their intuitive form.

13.5.5. Context-dependent definitions. A certain concept or term can be used in different contexts with different meanings. Example 1 – migo. The Yad Malachi on the Gemara writes that the term ‘migo’ appears in several places with different meanings. Example 2 – the transmission of electric power. When I studied for my bachelor’s degree at Tel Aviv University, I had a professor of electrical engineering, Professor Frankental, who told that in the United States there was a federal law that if State A transfers something to State C through State B—the payment to State B for the mediation depends on the question: if the something passes through a wire—one must pay, and if it passes through the air—

there is no need to pay. State A transferred electricity to State C through State B, and State B sued them. The states brought to court a physicist who argued that Poynting’s theorem says that electric power passes around the wire and not inside the wire—and from this it follows that the electricity passes through the air. It is clear to me that the theorem merely points to the equivalence between two physical descriptions: one can describe the transfer of power as current and voltage inside the wire (current X voltage = power), or as electromagnetic fields around the wire. It is equivalent. An intelligent judge should have asked the physicist whether the theorem is a result or a definition. Is this a claim about the world, or a proposal for a way to describe a situation? For if it is the latter—then clearly payment is required, since the legislator’s intention was that if there is a wire—you pay (what difference does it make to me whether the power passes around it or otherwise? Without the wire the power would not have passed!). Here we see that the transmission of power depends on the context: in the physical definition, the two definitions can be equivalent, but in the legal definition it will be defined that the power passes through the wire. Thus we have two uses of one term. Example 3 –

glass. In the Hazon Ish kollel a man approached me, knowing I was a physicist, and asked me: ‘Is glass defined as a solid or a liquid?’ I asked him: ‘For what purpose?’ And he answered: ‘For the laws of Shabbat, heating, and the like.’ And I answered him

that for the laws of Shabbat, glass is a solid. In materials physics, glass is sometimes treated as a liquid because of its crystalline structure, which is not ordered (as opposed to solids). It follows that the definition of glass depends on the context. In physics it may be defined as a liquid, and in halakha it is defined as a solid. And from the general to the particular: in presenting and criticizing arguments—

one must understand in what context a term is being used; the definition may be context-dependent. A dispute over a definition is possible only if both of us are speaking about the same context. But if we are speaking about the definition in different contexts (for example, the definition of a Jew for a halakhic purpose and for the Israeli Nation-State Law)—then there is no real dispute; we are speaking about different contexts.

13.5.6. A demand for the definition of concepts as a straw-man deflection. In arguments people sometimes say: ‘Wait, define democracy!’ and that sounds sophisticated (since one needs definitions in order to argue), but sometimes this is a straw-man deflection. It is not truly possible to define all the terms we use, because then we will enter the circularity described above. If you want to claim that I am defining incorrectly or that you dispute my definition—that is fine and legitimate, but then fairness requires that you define it and show where you differ. Do not throw the ball to me to define it—for I proceed from the assumption that we are defining the same thing and understand what we are talking about—and therefore the burden is on you. This is relevant in particular with very basic concepts that are hard to define and that rely on shared understanding.

14. How to criticize an argument? 14.1. Overview of the process of raising criticism of an argument. When one hears an argument—before we raise criticism, we must define for ourselves what exactly was said, what the premises are, and what the conclusion is. If the conclusion does not follow from the premises—one should complete the premises for him (we ask what premise, if we add it to the argument, would make it complete), and only then, when the claim stands complete—

we move to the critical phase. The critique of the argument will be in the following order: 1. Examination of the terms and concepts—are they all clear to me? Do we disagree on definitions? 2. Examination of the premises underlying the claims—

which do I agree with and which do I not (this can be tested through counterexamples, as follows). 3. Check of validity—does the conclusion follow from the premises? 4. Paradoxes. At first glance, if I agree with the premises and the argument is valid—here I should raise my hands and submit to the logical conclusion of my interlocutor. But not necessarily! This is where paradoxes come in: sometimes a valid argument assumes a certain conclusion, but I know it is not correct18. Then what? I may not be able to put my finger on where the problem is on the way to the conclusion—but I will still think the opposite of the conclusion (Zeno proved that there is no movement in the world; I do not know where his mistake is, but I see that there is movement). In such cases we will have to remain in a state of requiring further examination—and that is fine and legitimate19. We will find ourselves in such a situation often when the opponent is skilled in his field and in the art of debate. We may bring examples that the conclusion smells bad—and that will strengthen my ‘requires further examination’, because now the opponent too must find what is wrong in his argument—and not only me. A logician who read the last paragraph would be horrified—after all, the premises are true and the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises—so it must be true! And I say: no, one should also check the conclusion. Perhaps you made a mistake in logic—and it is worth checking.

18 See examples in the chapter on paradoxes (chapter 12). 19

Many philosophers argued this way against Anselm of Canterbury’s ontological proof—it cannot be that his conclusion is correct! Kant, for example, argued that it is impossible, on the basis of a definition (without a premise), to assert a claim about the world. It is a kind of sense of smell that there is a bug in the argument.

The purpose in an argument is not to win, but to get the most out of the argument. To lose an argument is to get much more out of it than to win it—because in losing an argument you discovered that you were wrong and learned something new. If you won—you discovered nothing new. The goal is not to come out on top (as in debate and demagoguery), but to come out with your hand on what is right.

14.2 . The principle of charity. In everyday language people raise arguments not in logical formulation; they do not formulate all the premises, etc. For example: I debated on a website a claim that ‘man is in the image of God—and therefore it is forbidden to kill him’. Why? It is not clear. I argued that a premise is missing: ‘Anyone who is in the image of God may not be killed’—and then the argument is valid. This principle of completing the opponent’s argument by adding hidden premises is called completing enthymemes. We work for the opponent, because the goal is to check who is right, not to win the argument. Donald Davidson20 coined the term Charity Principle, according to which one must deal charitably with the opponent and present his argument in the best possible form—and only then respond to it. When all the premises are put on the table, it becomes much easier to point out where the dispute lies, the picture becomes clearer, and it is easier to sharpen our own arguments. An example of the benefit of the principle of charity: there are those who argue for changing the halakha that disqualifies women from testimony, because women today are educated and equal to men—and therefore their testimony should be accepted. The claim sounds reasonable to me, but it raises for many people

opposition in the style of: ‘Who are you to speak against the Sages?!’ etc. The way to deal with the argument is, first of all, generously. I will present it in its best light: the fact that women today are more educated than in the past is agreed upon by most people. Can one infer from this that the disqualification of women’s testimony is no longer suitable for today? No! Because the premise is missing that the disqualification is connected to the level of education. Once I have noticed that a premise is missing—it becomes possible to think about the argument: perhaps one can say that the Sages disqualified women’s

testimony for other reasons (modesty, etc.)—which are still valid today. The main beneficiary of arranging the premises of the interlocutor is me! Because now the argument is set out before me and I can examine it systematically (definitions-premises-validity), and if I am persuaded by the opponent’s argument—I have learned something new! The halakha was decided in accordance with Beit Hillel, although Beit Shammai were sharper—

because Beit Hillel put the words of Beit Shammai before their own. And why? Because one who acts that way, even if he is less brilliant than his opponent, will arrive at conclusions closer to the truth.

Exercise: definitions and completing arguments. A. Is homosexuality a disease? In contemporary debates regarding homosexuality, one hears opinions of experts who explain that homosexuality is not a disease. Think about the definition of the concept ‘disease’ (without entering into professional details, only the principle), and according to that try to examine the claim that homosexuality is a disease. Does the experts’ determination reflect a fact? Is this a constitutive definition or a regulative one? Is a dispute about it possible? Note: we spoke in the last lesson (and will speak more) about suspension of judgment. Try to disconnect the discussion from your personal opinion on the issue. The question deals only with the meaning and nature of the definition of the concept. Solution: Quite simply, the definition of the concept disease is nothing but: a medical (or mental) condition that we do not want. All other definitions are matters for professionals and for professional use, and they do not carry social or value meaning. The claim that this is an unnatural condition or one that is outside the norm does not withstand scrutiny. A very tall person is outside the norm, but if it does not disturb him there is no reason to define it as a disease. Kleptomania is a person’s natural condition if he suffers from it, and still everyone would likely define it as a disease. In the 1970s homosexuality became a phenomenon accepted as normative, and therefore they stopped defining it as a disease (it was removed from the DSM

by the American Psychiatric Association). But this has no meaning beyond definitions for professional

20 .American analytic philosopher

purposes. It ceased to be defined as a disease only because now it is no longer supposed to bother people. If there is a person whom it does bother (for example because of the religious issue)—for him it is a disease. There are indeed different definitions of the concept ‘disease’, mainly for professional needs (medical or psychological), but all of them are irrelevant to the value question. Sometimes they reflect facts, but the choice of which facts will stand at the basis of the definition is a choice made according to the context. In the value context, the definition accepted among professionals has no added value in the discussion of homosexuality. I mentioned in class that physicists define glass as a liquid, but that has no significance for the halakhic discussion. I also mentioned that physicists define electric power in a high-voltage line as though it passes around the wires, but that has no significance for the legal discussion. All of these are definitions based on facts, but the choice of the facts is made according to need and context. Therefore, although a dispute about these definitions is possible, it will take place on the plane of the facts one chooses as criteria in the definition.

B. How would you examine the proposed definitions of the concept Jew? On the previous assignment page, different views were brought in the dispute over what Judaism is (and not who is a Jew). Rabbi Shach (the religious-Haredi definition) versus Rabin and Sharon (the secular definition). Are these constitutive definitions or regulative ones? Is there any point to the dispute? Think how it can be decided at all (if it can). Think about a definition by extension and by content for the concept ‘Jew’, and about the relation between them (which we discussed briefly in lesson 4).

Solution: Rabbi Shach’s definition and that of Rabin and Sharon are probably perceived by them as regulative and not constitutive. Therefore there is a dispute. Otherwise, everyone can define the concept as he wishes, and what I called ‘semantic parting’ becomes possible. But of course a person can say that for him the definition is constitutive, and then there is no point in arguing. The way to decide the dispute could be through counterexamples (is a Druze person who serves in the army and pays taxes a Jew?). Of course this assumes that the examples are agreed upon. The dispute can clarify to the parties (if they do not agree on the examples) that perhaps these are constitutive definitions, and then there is no point in the dispute. The examples test the extension of the concept (what is included in it), and therefore they embody its content. If the examples are not agreed upon, that means there is a dispute about the extension and therefore also about the content. If so, it is likely that the parties think these are constitutive definitions.

C. A dispute about morality.

The Eskimos take their elderly out to die in the snow. In the West it is customary to keep them at home or in a nursing home. Is there a dispute here? What is the dispute about? Try to present arguments for each of the sides. Solution: Apparently the dispute is about the question of what is the moral way to treat the elderly. This is an ethical-moral dispute. One can present it as a dispute about the definition of the concept ‘morality’, and still, if the definition is regulative then the dispute is meaningful, and if it is constitutive then not. A moral relativist perceives his definition as constitutive, and therefore there is no point in arguing with him (except perhaps to try to convince him that the definition should be regulative, that is, that there is such a concept that all of us are trying to capture). The parties can raise in the dispute the value of human life: taking one out into the snow shortens his life. Against this, the Eskimo will say that the life of old age is not worthwhile, and therefore, in his view, there is no problem in shortening life. This discussion can be understood as though there is a dispute about the definition of morality (a constitutive definition), but it is more likely that the dispute is about the value of life. Is life of absolute value, or does it depend on its quality? And this dispute too can be understood as a dispute about a constitutive definition of ‘the value of life’, on which there is no point in arguing, or as a real dispute whether life as such has absolute value (regardless of its quality). Convincing will of course be quite difficult (perhaps one who believes in God can speak about the image of God in man, etc.). Another argument can rely on the fact that the elderly person agrees to be taken out into the snow. And here a discussion will arise whether consent justifies the prohibition of murder. This is a dispute over whether life is the right of its owner or an absolute value (in which case even he himself cannot agree to give it up). One can discuss this through examples of suicide, etc. Another argument can raise the possibility that morality is a function of what is accepted in society. In a society where it is accepted to take the elderly out into the snow, there is no moral flaw in it. Again we return to a similar question: is morality a matter of social convention (the social contract) or is it an absolute obligation (Kant’s categorical imperative)? The lesson is that before entering the storm of dispute, from which one cannot emerge, it is always worthwhile first to check whether we are dealing with constitutive definitions, in which case there is no point in arguing, or not. And when we conclude that a dispute should be conducted, it is important to understand which arguments can

attack the other person’s position (usually this means which relevant examples to bring—examples that will be agreed upon by him too, and therefore have persuasive force for him).

D. The following arguments are brought before you: complete them into a valid logical structure. In the answers I present here I will build the argument according to the principle of charity, and then also present criticisms of it. Clearly I cannot write an essay on every such question (and in at least some of them there is certainly room for such an essay). Here my purpose is only to show that completing the formulation of the argument actually sharpens the criticism and improves the dispute, and therefore one who does this does not lose. For that purpose, after completing the arguments I also add brief criticisms of the arguments to show this. D1. A biblical a fortiori argument (Exodus 6:9–12): And Moses spoke thus to the children of Israel, but they did not listen to Moses because of shortness of spirit and hard labor. And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Go, speak to Pharaoh king of Egypt, that he send the children of Israel out of his land. And Moses spoke before the Lord, saying: Behold, the children of Israel have not listened to me; and how shall Pharaoh listen to me, and I am of uncircumcised lips? Formulate Moses’ argument to the Holy One, blessed be He: what are his premises? Can one argue with him? Solution: Premise A: The children of Israel did not listen to Moses. Premise B: The chance that Pharaoh will heed him is lower than the chance that they would heed him (because Pharaoh is more removed from Moses and from God, or

because he is an interested party who wants to keep his slaves). Conclusion: Pharaoh too will not listen to him. But this is not an accurate formulation, and as it stands the argument is not valid. Beyond the fact that this is an assessment and not an absolute statement (it would be more correct to write: the chance that Pharaoh will listen to him is lower), one should note that premise A deals with the past, whereas the conclusion is based on the assumption that Israel do not listen to Moses always (also in the future), but that is a generalization based on past experience. There is induction in the background (if the children of Israel did not listen in the past, they never listen). Therefore one must add premise C: whoever did not listen to Moses in a certain matter in the past will not listen to him in other cases either (in particular

in the future). Now the argument is valid. Is it free of defects? Not necessarily. One cannot argue about the conclusion following from the premises, but now the point in the premises that may arouse dispute has been exposed. Is the chance that Pharaoh will not listen really lower than that of Israel? Perhaps he fears God’s plagues and will דווקא listen? And perhaps the reason Israel did not listen was fear of Pharaoh and his taskmasters, something that does not exist with Pharaoh himself? Beyond that, one can argue about premise C: does the fact that Israel did not listen to Moses in the past mean that essentially they do not listen to him? Both premises are far from simple.

D2 . Bibi and the cost of establishing a government. Bibi said at the swearing-in of the government yesterday: ‘Establishing a broad government costs much less than additional elections’. First of all, suspension of judgment (do not mix in your personal positions). What is he trying to counter? Formulate the argument in full. Premise A: The cost of additional elections is X.

Premise B: The cost of establishing the current wasteful government is Y.

Premise C: X>Y .

Conclusion: Establishing the wasteful government is preferable to going to additional elections. This is of course not a valid structure. One more premise is missing

Premise D: Cost considerations are the only considerations that determine the preference of one option over another. Alternatively (minimal, and therefore more precise): Premise D: In comparing the two options in our case, cost considerations outweigh all the other considerations. His claim reminds me of the saying of the Vizhnitz Rebbe: ‘Better to fail in baseless love than in baseless hatred.’ And I always think that the best is not to fail in either of them. The question whether these increased expenses should be compared to the expense of additional elections also depends on whether additional elections cannot be avoided without establishing such a wasteful government. Maybe not, but that is another premise that requires examination. Beyond that, who said that additional elections have only the disadvantage of economic cost? Perhaps they also have the advantage of political decision and the possibility of establishing a more effective government. And is the educational message to the public also worth the additional expenses? It is not correct to isolate the aspects and discuss one of them in isolation

from all the others when forming a general position on the issue (additional elections or a ridiculous government like the one that was established). The moment one formulates the argument in full, one sees how poor and incomplete it is (that is, demagogic). This is a very common phenomenon in presenting arguments: hiding the problematic premise (the one that is easiest and most obvious to attack), and presenting an incomplete argument that conceals it, so that it looks magnificently constructed (almost mathematically necessary. Who can argue with the fact that two billion shekels is more than a few hundred million?!).

D3 . Ehud Barak as a young Palestinian. Ehud Barak: ‘If I were a young Palestinian, I too would probably be a suicide terrorist’. Again, suspension of judgment. What is he claiming? Formulate the argument in full. Whoever wants may also practice on the positions in the article linked here 21

which contains more ricochets on Barak’s words (and of course zero suspension of judgment). Premise A: If I were a young Palestinian, I would grow up to be a suicide terrorist. Premise B: I am a normative person. Premise C: What a normative person (like me) would do is something that many others would likely do. This is a definition of normative behavior. Conclusion: suicide terrorists behave in a normative way (there is no room to criticize them). There is of course a missing premise here. Premise D: statistical prevalence (= the behavior of a reasonable person) is the measure of normative correctness. Here the following criticism immediately arises: the fact that many would act this way does not mean that the behavior is not wrong. Many people get angry when angered, or speak slander when they feel like it. That does not necessarily mean these are phenomena unworthy of criticism. There was a ruling by Aharon Barak regarding a woman who was driving a car and a cat passed in front of her. She swerved and killed a person on the sidewalk. In court she argued that this was the reaction of a reasonable person in such a situation. Barak argued that this was an unreasonable reaction of the reasonable person. It seems to me that his intention was what I wrote here (that frequency is not necessarily a measure of normative correctness).

One can, of course, argue about nuances in this formulation. For example: perhaps he does not mean to say that there is no room for criticism, but only to blunt the sting of the criticism. All in all, this is expected behavior that many of us would reach, even if it is indeed worthy of condemnation. This is a milder formulation that already seems more convincing. One can also criticize this formulation, by arguing that the Palestinian society that brings people to act in this way is immoral. Therefore, even if within that society I too would act this way, that only means the criticism should be directed at the whole society and not at the specific terrorist. But of course he is part of that society, and therefore there is room to criticize him too.

https://news.walla.co.il/item/2951203

In other words: if you (Ehud Barak) had grown up there, you would not have been you but someone else. Therefore this comparison cannot be made. Just as one cannot ask what Maimonides would say about a certain question if he were alive today. If he were alive today he would not be Maimonides (as the poet said: a person is the landscape of his birthplace). Barak could perhaps have argued that this would have been the result in another society too, not only a Palestinian one. But that is a rather far-reaching claim, and it is very doubtful to what extent it can be justified.

D4. Capitalism and socialism. In the debate between capitalism and socialism, claims are common that try to show that socialism is a system that leads to a better economic condition. One of the prominent examples brought in such a debate is the ‘Nordic’ (Scandinavian) countries that succeed because of (or despite) their socialism. Search Google for ‘Scandinavian countries as a model for a socialist economy’ and you will see a host of capitalist responses. You can skim them to get an impression of the types of arguments (really without any details, only what the basic claim is). Again, you are required to suspend judgment. Formulate the argument and the counterarguments (schematically, of course. There is no need to understand anything in economics). What are the premises of each side? (Hint: there are quite a few implicit premises here. Is there also a problem of definitions?) One can see here22 an article that deals with the logic of the dispute. And also here23 a sample critique. Here there is room to expand a great deal, and I will not do so. I will focus on the logic of the argument and on preliminary criticisms connected with it. The argument is as follows: Premise A: the economy in Sweden is socialist. Premise B: the economy in Sweden is successful (in economic parameters). Conclusion: socialism is a preferable economic system. This is of course not a valid argument. I would present here four kinds of criticism (each of which will require adding another premise in order

to make the argument valid): A.

First, the argument is of course inductive (and therefore not valid), since it generalizes from the example or examples to a sweeping law about all societies and states. A premise must be added: what happens in one country will probably happen in all other countries. B.

Beyond that, who said that the Swedish economy really is successful? One must add premises that justify premise B. C.

Who said that its economy is socialist? Again, one must add premises that justify this statement (premise A). D.

Who said that economic success is the measure of the system that ought to be adopted (preferability)? This too must be added as another premise: economic success is the measure (exclusive or at least principal) for adopting a socio-economic system.

All these points (and a few others) arose in the critical articles. Here I will only demonstrate a criticism of premise A: is the economy in Sweden really socialist? Sweden has some non-socialist characteristics (for example, there is no job tenure there and no labor unions). A criticism of the induction: perhaps the Nordic mentality is different from the Israeli one, and therefore it succeeds דווקא there? Perhaps there are other social characteristics that allow a socialist economy to succeed דווקא in Sweden (for example, the absence of trickery and the industriousness of the residents; a mentality in which it is shameful not to work, and the like). And what about the security constraints that exist here and not there? And what about the social and value cohesion that exists there more than here (perhaps)? It is worth noting that all these examples

22 https://www.davar1.co.il/148756

23 magazine.co.il/365 – http://maraah

are brought from Scandinavia. There may be special characteristics there that enable them to succeed, and this is not necessarily applicable elsewhere. A criticism of premise B, and actually of the definition of the concept ‘success’: what exactly is economic success? Who said that Sweden really succeeds? The fact is that in recent years that structure is collapsing there, and they are moving to other models, more capitalist ones. A criticism of economic success as a measure of preferability: the dispute between capitalism and socialism is at bottom more value-based than factual. Even if I accept for the sake of discussion that factually socialism succeeds more (let us say it increases GDP and also satisfaction and reduces the gaps between different strata in the population, etc.), there is still room for the value claim that a person has a right to keep the money he earned through his talents and efforts, even if this comes at the expense of overall success. Alternatively, even if socialism fails economically, the socialist will still argue that the value of equality is more important than increasing GDP. Therefore the naturalistic fallacy (which we will discuss later) determines that one should not infer normative conclusions from factual data. Who said that reducing gaps is a main or even an important criterion—perhaps overall success is a more important goal?!

15 . Basic premises 15.1. Basic premises and the new critique. Every argument is made up of basic premises, and they are its Achilles’ heel. The conclusion is derived from the basic premises by logical tools. The question is: how do we know the basic premises? One can say that they are the results—conclusions—of previous arguments, as in geometry, where there are some axioms from which everything is derived, so that the conclusions accumulate and build the knowledge. But in the end we arrive at a set of basic premises that we will not be able to derive from other premises (the edge). So from where do we know them? This question stands at the basis of the new, postmodern critique: at its base stands the point that I am not willing to accept anything for which I have no proof. And that for which there is no proof—is arbitrary. If that is the situation, we will very quickly arrive at the conclusion that nothing at all can be held, because all my premises are in the end derived from axioms for which I have no proof—it follows that all my premises are arbitrary and I have no proof for anything! I asked students in geometry: what is more correct, the axioms or the statements (theorems)? Apparently the theorems—

because they have proofs. But clearly that is nonsense—

for the proof of the theorems is based on the axioms (a proof in geometry is deriving from the basic premises)—it cannot be that the derived is stronger than that from which it is derived! The new critique exposes implicit basic premises, and once it does so, from its point of view it has proved its point—

because if you rely on a basic premise for which there is no proof—

you rely on arbitrariness—and from this it follows that it is not binding. In my opinion (more on this later), this critique lacks the next stage: to show why, in your view, the basic premise is unreasonable.

15.2 . Cognition and thought. It is customary to speak of two categories of intellectual relation: cognition and thought. Cognition – creating interaction with the world through the senses, drawing information, observation—learning through contemplation—perception. Thought – another toolbox, managed entirely inside my ‘head’. One can say that thought is not connected to the world, but rather analyzes and derives conclusions in a universe of its own. But this is not a full picture, for observation gives us only specific information: I see a ball falling toward the earth—all I know from this is that this specific ball is attracted to the earth. Only my mind makes a generalization and formulates a general law that every

body with mass is attracted to the earth. That is, observation gives specific information, and afterwards thought comes and creates a general law from it. Kant, Hume, and many other philosophers identified here a great problem: how can it be possible to learn something about the world from thought?! After all, thought is only the way I am built. How does what I think connect to facts about the world24? Information can be accumulated only through observation! Therefore, in modern science (unlike ancient science), the emphasis shifted to observation, because trust in thought as a tool for accumulating information about the world was lost. Aristotle, in his mechanical science, determined that bodies fall to earth in proportion to their mass—their weight. We do not need a particle accelerator to understand that this is nonsense; take a heavy stone and a light one and drop them from a tower—and they will reach the floor at the same speed! Aristotle too could have done such an experiment, but it did not occur to him that he needed to, because reason says it is obvious that a heavier weight falls faster—’Why do I need a verse? Reason itself says so!’ The ancient Aristotelian science is called rational; where reason had spoken, they did not require observations. Modern science rejects this and says that the fact that I think something says nothing about the world, only about how I am built. But wait: every generalization that we make does not come from direct observation! Every general law deals with large (infinite) groups of objects—that is, it cannot be that we have directly observed all the things. Moreover, if we saw everything, what need is there for a law—we simply know that this is how it is! A law is meaningful only when it gives me information about what

I have not seen. And the step of generalization is created by thought and not by observation! And who guarantees that this is how reality is? Returning to logic—the generalization, induction, arrives at a general conclusion on the basis of a number of isolated examples. For example: ‘All human beings are mortal, Socrates is a human being—therefore Socrates is mortal’. Where did the premise come from that all human beings are mortal? We have no proof of it—it is not derived from observation! Induction is not necessary; it may be false. And if the axioms from which I set out are arbitrary, then all the premises derived from them, and also the conclusions—are arbitrary—

everything is arbitrary! And whoever thinks otherwise, that reliable information about the world can be accumulated—

must give an account of where he gets the premises from—for they do not come from a logical argument, and they do not come from observation

15.3 . Intuition (Here I will give a practical justification for the claim that not everything is empty of content: in my view, besides the capacities of cognition (observation and thought), we have a third toolbox: intuition. And its tools are a combination of cognition and thought; it is cognizing thought. In my view, we arrive at basic premises and definitions by a kind of intellectual observation of the world. This is not pure thought and not observation with the eyes. There is a faculty of the intellect that observes the world by non-sensory means. This is intuition. In my opinion the label ‘feeling’ for intuition is not a successful one. I sit with an equation for months and cannot solve it; a genius comes and gives a solution without thinking. I check and find that he was right. I ask him: ‘How did you get there?’ And he answers: ‘I don’t know, I felt it…’ That is a conclusion not based on an argument. The concept of feeling is not precise, because for us it is associated with emotions (fear, love, etc.), to which the concepts of true and false do not belong, since they describe an inner state (I love a certain person and you do not; there is no dispute here). With the genius who instantly solved the equation, it is indeed true or not true. Intuition is reasoning that does not rely on thinking and arguments but reaches the conclusion directly: ‘It seems right to me’—this is a kind of observation, ‘the eyes of the intellect’, as Maimonides defined it at the beginning of Guide of the Perplexed. Also in looking around me at human beings, I see that they die, and I have a kind of sense that says that this is not accidental but follows from their very being human beings—and not only those whom I see. I have no argument for this and no way to ground it. But I assume it as a premise, and on it I build claims.

24 .And as Mark Twain said: ‘The world owes you nothing; it was here first’

And from this there are only two ways: whoever does not believe in the above process is a skeptic, and that is his right, but I am not addressing him and I have nothing to talk about with him. I am speaking only to one who accepts and gives trust (although not absolute trust) to intuition, and sees it as a tool for reaching correct things. This is an important point, because the weak point of an argument is usually not its logic, but the intuition at the basis of its premises. From this it follows that the decisive step in a logical argument is determining the premises and not deriving the conclusions from them. Therefore, when we want to present or criticize an argument—first of all we will present it as a logically valid argument. Why? Because then the premises will be arranged before us—

and we will begin going over all the premises and forming our opinion about each of them—and that is most of the work. If it turns out that all the premises are true, and the argument also seems valid—but the conclusion does not seem sensible to us—then we will have to check ourselves again. But usually the process will stop at the stage of examining the premises. Examining the premises of an argument is examining intuitions. If my intuitions agree with the premises of the argument—we can proceed. If not—

we open a discussion and try to persuade one another of the rightness of our intuition.

15.4 . :Rhetoric, or how does one test intuition?

Intuition is a cognitive tool (the intellect in cognizing thought and contemplation), and therefore we will deal with intuitions (and basic premises) on that plane—in the field called rhetoric25, and not in a logical manner. Rhetoric is the tool with which we cause the other side to look from my point of view when I arrived at my basic premises. In practice this works as in science—the treatment of scientific generalizations is through counterexamples. Since Karl Popper26 we have understood that a scientific theory cannot be proven, but can only be subjected to the test of refutation—that is, to bring an example in which the theory does not work. And this is what Thomas Kuhn27 calls ‘breaking the paradigm’, after which comes the proposal of a new theory or

a counter-theory. On the intellectual plane too, we refute basic premises by using counterexamples. A claim is raised; in order to test it one must think whether it makes sense, and if one feels that it does not—then it is not enough to say that—one must conduct a discussion! And this will be carried out through examples. In the chapter on definitions we spoke about 2 types of definitions: extensional definition—by extension and intensional definition—by content, and we said that in principle they ought to correspond. For example, one can define ‘democracy’ through its content, what there is in democracy (freedom of choice, freedom of expression, individual rights, etc.) and one can define it through the list of states defined as democracies—

and there ought to be correspondence between these definitions. Usually one uses a content definition, and only when one does not manage to formulate a content definition does one use a definition from extension. And here intuition is used regarding what is right and what is not. For example, it is clear to me that Syria is not a democracy and that Britain is. And although I do not know how to formulate the definition of democracy exactly—

the list of democratic states will give me the possibility of distilling from it what the content definition is. Hence counterexamples serve as a tool to test the definition through its extension. Let us give several examples of this •

The discussion of who is a Jew. As above, we saw definitions such as ‘pays taxes, serves in the army, and is a loyal citizen’—

If this is a constitutive definition—there is nothing to discuss, but we see that there is a discussion about the definition—and from this it follows that it is regulative. So how do we argue? Through examples! I know a Druze man who was a lieutenant colonel in the army, identifies with the state; his brother is a doctor of Hebrew literature who wrote a doctorate on Uri Zvi Greenberg and was Israeli ambassador to Denmark—according to the above definition, both are Jews. But it is clear that most people will agree that they are not. So we used a counterexample that attacks the above definition. I helped my interlocutor understand that his definition is not correct—this will help us sharpen the dispute.

25 Do not confuse this with demagoguery—which is deception and a lack of intellectual honesty. Rhetoric has importance in critical thinking even more than logic. 26 See note 9

Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922–1996), historian and philosopher of science, American Jew. He is considered one of the most important philosophers of science of the 20th century.

Should a defendant have to appear for the reading of the indictment in court? One can say that in all proper democracies this is a binding requirement. This is an example, not a logical proof—

but it provokes thought: in states that are not proper there is no such requirement—perhaps that is not accidental •

The theory of utilitarianism. This theory defines a moral act as an act that brings the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people. It can be attacked by counterexamples: there was a sports team that was stranded on the Andes Mountains and was freezing without food, and they debated whether or not to eat one of the players so that everyone else would live. From the standpoint of utilitarianism this is a moral act, because it brings the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people. We will not enter into the substance of the debate—only note that philosophical discussion is usually conducted through examples.

15.5 . Attacking the conclusion with counterexamples. Sometimes even after checking the definitions and the premises and checking the validity of the argument, it still seems to us that the conclusion ‘doesn’t make sense’—and then too we can attack it with counterexamples. For example: Anselm’s ontological proof for the existence of God defines God as the most perfect being that can be conceived, and if He did not exist—

then one could conceive of a more perfect being than Him (a being that exists)—and from this it follows that He is not the most perfect being that can be conceived, which contradicts His definition—and this is a proof by contradiction that He exists. Already in Anselm’s day there was a monk named Gaunilo who corresponded with him and criticized his arguments. One of his famous criticisms was the criticism of the perfect island: according to Anselm’s definition one can prove the existence of the perfect island, the perfect lion, etc.—countless objects. And you too will agree that one cannot prove in such a way the existence of countless objects—since there is not enough room in the world for countless objects. This is an example of attacking the conclusion even when the premises are agreed upon and the conclusion is compelled. Because there is something in the conclusion that does not seem sensible—

and it can be attacked with a counterexample. Such a counterexample does not overthrow the argument, but at most leaves us in a state of requiring further examination—and that is a legitimate state—from which one must go out and recheck the definitions and the basic premises.

16 . Fallacies 16.1. Definition of a fallacy. The definition of the concept fallacy in logic is that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. When I argue in physics and I say, ‘Even Einstein thinks like me’, then from a logical standpoint this is an ad hominem fallacy of the type ‘appeal to authority’—basing the conclusion on something that does not necessarily imply it (Einstein may be wrong). But from the standpoint of one seeking plausibility (and not certainty)—it is indeed a good argument: if Einstein thinks like my opponent—

there is a high chance that he is right and that I need to examine my arguments. What is more, if I were arguing in matters of morality—it might indeed be a fallacy—because there Einstein’s opinion may neither add nor detract. That is, one must distinguish between what is called in logic a fallacy (the argument is not necessary) and how the matter is perceived in discussion. It may be that for me this is not a fallacy—because I am looking for the reasonable argument. I think I am right, I am not sure of it. And that is fine; we almost always speak about the plausible and not the certain. 16.2 . Fallacy 1 – the naturalistic fallacy. An argument that begins with factual premises and ends with a normative, evaluative, aesthetic conclusion, etc.—is an invalid argument, because the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises—and this is the naturalistic fallacy. For example: ‘Murder is forbidden because murder causes heartbreak to the murdered person’s family’—this is a fallacious argument, because the fact that murder causes heartbreak to the murdered person’s family is a fact. But ‘murder is forbidden’ is a norm, and one does not derive a norm from a fact. What should be done? Add a premise that moves me from the fact to the norm—

for example: ‘One must not do what causes pain to people’—and now the argument is valid

B. Murder causes pain to the murdered person’s family (a factual premise).

If something causes pain—then it must not be done (a bridging premise, an ‘if-then’, and this conditional claim is a claim and not an argument—therefore it is one of the premises of the argument and not the argument itself). C.

Conclusion: therefore murder is forbidden. Thus the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy with limited warranty, because the person making the claim really means to say the full thing—so be charitable to him according to the principle of charity and complete his argument, and then respond to it. Therefore, for me, the naturalistic fallacy is only a device for checking whether the argument is built in an absolute way.

16.2.1 . An example of a naturalistic fallacy. First let us give an example that masquerades as a naturalistic fallacy, but is not really such:

‘(Recently there have been proposals to change the halakha and validate women’s testimony. The Sages disqualified women from testimony and ‘then both men, between whom the controversy is …’, and they argue that nowadays, when women are more educated and more involved—

their testimony should be validated. The premises of the argument are: A.

The Sages disqualified women from testimony. B.

Women at that time were not educated and were not involved in the economy. C.

Women today are not like that. Can one infer from this that it is proper today to validate women for testimony? No! Because even if we accept the premises (which are factual)—

there is no way here to infer a norm. A bridge principle is missing—and this is the naturalistic fallacy: the absence of a premise that transfers from the facts to the norm. In our case, this is the following premise: D.

The Sages disqualified women from testimony because of their lack of education and their lack of involvement in the economy. This premise connects the facts to the norms; it is not purely factual—it is a bridge premise. Many times the naturalistic fallacy is not a fallacy at all but merely the omission of the bridge premise. Sometimes by mistake, and sometimes intentionally (from an understanding that this premise is open to dispute)—and this is demagoguery. Every time we identify such an omission—

we must apply the principle of charity, put the premise on the table—and complete the argument. We seek truth, not victory. Now let us bring an example of a real naturalistic fallacy:

Kant presented morality as a yearning/commitment to the categorical imperative and was not willing to accept naturalistic explanations of morality. An example of a naturalistic explanation of morality: morality came from the fact that evolution developed in us a tendency to help members of the group—

because this benefits the survival of the species. Presenting this fact as a claim of obligation to moral behavior is a naturalistic fallacy par excellence—because even if this fact is true, so what if an altruistic feeling is planted in me because of that?! There is also planted in me a feeling to speak slander or to eat sweets—how can one derive a norm from a fact? That is, morality does not come to explain how people act (psychology does that), but to say how one ought to behave—and that cannot be derived from a fact of reality. In discussions with neo-Darwinians, the moral-evolutionary argument arises in various forms, in an attempt to ground morality on facts and not on norms. Exposing the naturalistic fallacy shows that even if they assume that ‘what benefits the survival of the species is morally binding’—one can ask about this: how do you know? For that statement is not a fact but a norm—and here you have entered the field of norms! Many people fail at this point, and that is astonishing.

Assignment sheet 6 – rhetoric (examples) and the beginning of fallacies. A. Rhetoric. Return to Inbari’s article that I sent at the beginning of the course [Judaism of a Log – Asaf Inbari]. Present the argument of Kobi Arieli and his. What are Inbari’s techniques of criticism? Did he attack the premises, the definitions, the validity, the conclusion? How did he do it? What is the point of disagreement? What can Arieli answer him? Try to examine the matter in light of what we saw in the last lesson (rhetoric: intuition and counterexamples with respect to definitions and with respect to claims—premises or conclusion). Within the logical framework of his argument, Inbari mainly uses counterexamples. He brings examples of several different and even contradictory approaches to Judaism, to show that Judaism is not one worldview (and in particular not Arieli’s). He attacks Arieli’s conclusion (no arguments in Arieli’s name are brought at all). Arieli can reject the claims in several ways: A.

to dispute that all of these are legitimate interpretations of Judaism. After all, even among all of these there were critiques like Arieli’s. For example, the Haskalah is not recognized as Judaism by many Orthodox Jews. Not to mention Christianity. So why is Arieli forbidden to express an opinion about other interpretations? Inbari demands that he look at the field like a referee or the UN secretary-general, and not take part in the discussion himself.

Inbari assumes that every doctrine of a person born to a Jewish mother is legitimate Judaism. By this logic, Marx’s communism, Einstein’s theory of relativity, and Freud’s psychoanalysis are Judaisms too.

One can argue that even if there is diversity, there is still room to examine the common foundation of all that variety. This does not mean that every interpretation can enter this variety, for even if there is diversity, there can still be boundaries. The common denominator of all these arguments lies in two points:

Inbari assumes that Kobi Arieli agrees that all these examples are legitimate interpretations of Judaism, and therefore he uses them to attack Arieli’s content-based definition by means of definitions by extension. But Arieli of course does not have to accept this (and apparently indeed does not).

Inbari does not bother to set boundaries for the diversity he argues for, and in doing so he pulls the ground out from under his very claim that there is such a thing as Judaism. If everything is Judaism, then the concept of Judaism is devoid of content. Beyond this, there is much more to say about Inbari’s specific arguments, but this is not the place for it.

B. Fallacies 1.

To become acquainted with the basic fallacies in logic books, I refer you to read the Wikipedia entry on logical fallacy: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%9B%D7%A9%D7%9C_%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92%D7 %99

2. It is worth going through the entire entry, at least by skimming it.

Try to think about a sample of several fallacies from it: which of them attacks only logical validity, and which of them is a genuine fallacy? Notice how many of the real fallacies are actually confusing (and not just mudslinging). And yet, you will be surprised how common they are in everyday discourse. I will bring only a few examples here. Among ad hominem fallacies, some are genuine fallacies (relying on a famous, rich, or righteous person on a question unrelated to any of those things), and some attack mainly logical validity (such as relying on an expert or on an intelligent person). Appeals to force, emotion, humiliation, and ridicule are of course outright fallacies. An appeal to patriotism can be relevant (if the issue really does concern patriotism). 3.

Return to Inbari’s article and try to point out fallacies that appear in it.

The two fundamental fallacies in Inbari’s words are these: 1. He did not even bother to present Arieli’s argument, but attacked his conclusion (that study at ‘Alma’ is not Judaism). Later I will explain that in fact he does not attack Arieli’s conclusion but a straw man that was presented in its place. 2. Inbari does not present a definition of Judaism of his own. It is hard to believe that Arieli thinks there is only one Judaism (the one in his own house). Of course this depends on what sort of difference between interpretations is supposed to count as ‘several Judaisms,’ but Arieli surely also agrees that Hasidism, Maimonideanism, and the Kuzari are Judaism. On the face of it, Arieli is only claiming that a secular Tel Aviv discussion of trafficking in women in light of the Scroll of Ruth is not Judaism. That claim is by no means equivalent to the claim that there is only one Judaism. If so, Inbari sets up a straw man here (‘Judaism is only what exists in Arieli’s home’), that is, he puts arguments and claims into Arieli’s mouth that Arieli never made, and then attacks the straw man instead of Arieli’s position. By the way, in my personal opinion Arieli is completely right, but even if not, Inbari did not show why he is not. Inbari’s article is full of appeals to authority. All the examples brought there as interpretations of Judaism are not anchored in any definition. So where does the assumption come from that all these are Judaism? Presumably because they were held by intelligent people (who were also born to Jewish mothers). Thus, for example, Inbari claims that the maskilim were mostly ‘outstanding Torah scholars.’ Even as a factual claim this is very dubious, but even if true it is not a relevant reason. There is no proposal in his words for what Judaism is according to his view, and therefore no substantive explanation of why all these are Judaisms in his opinion. Note that some of the examples are certainly also accepted by Arieli, and still they do not attack his claim. Other examples probably would not be accepted by him at all. These are consequences of the two fallacies above in Inbari’s critique: the absence of a definition of Judaism of his own, and the failure to present Arieli’s own position. In his words there is also reference to the person of the speaker himself (accusations of arrogance, of being a man eaten up by doubts, of cursing, of screaming out of control, and so on). Inbari does this politely and in an offended tone, but he exploits this passive-aggressive manner in order to attack Arieli. In critiques of this sort of a certain approach to a certain issue, when a person cannot defend his position he turns to insult in a passive-aggressive way, in order to present the attacker in an unflattering light. This is a classic ad hominem. It seems to me that every reader can see that Inbari gained the reader’s sympathy in this way, without raising even one argument in favor of his own position, and without presenting Arieli’s arguments at all. It is important to note that a fallacy in argumentation is not connected to the degree of aggressiveness and violence in the tone of speech or writing. Arieli joked cynically about the ‘Alma’ students, and Inbari wrote in a moderate and even offended tone. One can write substantive arguments in an aggressive way, and then it is not a fallacy (though perhaps it is impolite), and one can equally write unsubstantive arguments in a moderate tone, and that is of course a fallacy. It is important to note in this context that if throughout the article there had arisen substantive arguments against Arieli from which it followed that he is arrogant, shrill, and out of control, then one could refer to him as such in the conclusion, and it would not have been a fallacy. But no such arguments were presented in the article. The personal references serve as a substitute for arguments. In such a case, this is a fallacy. Inbari adopts a very common method of argument in the postmodern world: ‘You do not have a monopoly on _.’ This method exempts him from presenting a definition of the concept under discussion (in this case: Judaism), and thus in effect empties the discussion of content. There is no argument here at all, only a position and an offended protest against it. This is akin to the following discussion: Reuven claims that engaging in carpentry is not mathematical research. Then Shimon the carpenter replies in an offended tone that it is not true that there is only one mathematics. There are many mathematicses (geometry, topology, algebra, logic, differential calculus, and perhaps he will also add a few examples that are not included at all within the scope of mathematics, such as sociology, poetry, and establishing a shelter for battered women). Moreover, there is not even one argument in Inbari’s words that explains why what is done at ‘Alma’ is Judaism after all. Does the collection of examples he brought necessarily include what is done there? In my eyes, this article is an example of an intelligent, educated, and eloquent writer, who writes moderately, yet suffers from a completely faulty way of arguing. As stated, it is really more a protest than an argument.

16.3. Fallacy 2 – Negation fallacies. We explained that the liar paradox (a resident of Crete says that ‘all the residents of Crete are liars’) is not a paradox, because the negation of the claim that ‘all the residents of Crete are liars’ is not that all the residents of Crete speak the truth, but rather that there is at least one resident of Crete who tells the truth, and then the loop does not continue. People do tend to see the liar paradox as a paradox because they operate the negation incorrectly: they think that the negation of ‘all the residents of Crete are liars’ is ‘all the residents of Crete speak the truth’ –

and that is not correct. [Explanation: people tend to think this way: the resident says that ‘all the residents of Crete are liars,’ and that means that he too

is a liar, and if he is a liar, then ‘all the residents of Crete speak the truth’ (this is the mental fallacy here!), and if so he speaks the truth, then all the residents of Crete are indeed liars, so he is a liar, and so on.] We will now learn about 2 types of negation: 1. Contrary negation (1, -1) 2. Nullifying negation (1, 0). The Greek philosophers distinguished between contrary opposites and nullifying opposites: for example, cold and heat are contrary opposites: if I add hot water to cold water, I will get lukewarm water (a relation like 1 and -1), whereas light and darkness are nullifying opposites: if I add light to a dark place, I will get a lit place (this is like the relation between 1 and 0).

The conclusion for our purposes: many times arguments can be refuted by showing that negation was applied in them incorrectly (as in the refutation of the liar sentence, where we showed that it is not a paradox). So pay attention to what exactly the ‘opposite’ is that you want to show in order to refute a claim.

16.4. Fallacy 3 – The fallacy of relying on expertise. Relying on an expert is legitimate. On a subject in which I am not knowledgeable, I cite the opinion of an expert that sounds reasonable to me. This is not a decisive or valid argument (because it is not necessary), but it is legitimate and not a fallacy. However, one must pay attention to the field of the expert’s expertise: as a rule, an expert is an expert in facts, not in norms. In many cases experts express opinions in a field in which they are not experts, and sometimes the experts themselves are not aware of this. This fallacy is connected to the naturalistic fallacy, because the expert who uses his expertise card as a winning card regarding norms falls into this fallacy. It is important to note: an expert may express his opinion in the field of norms just like any other person, but using expertise as proof of a norm is a fallacy. An example is an argument I had with Professor Yoram Yובל28 about the question whether homosexuality is a disease or not. He used his expertise as a psychiatrist and argued that homosexuality does not meet the standards of a disease and therefore is not a disease. I argued that this is nonsense, both the content of the claim and the use of his hat as an expert, because the question is a value question. The determination whether a phenomenon is a disease is a normative question, and there the psychiatrist has no added value. He can be an expert on the roots of the phenomenon, its treatments, its prevalence in the population, etc. – all these are facts (all expertise is expertise in facts) – but from here to the inference of a normative conclusion there is a naturalistic fallacy.

16.5. Fallacy 4 – The fallacy of begging the question. We saw above regarding a valid syllogism: if one accepts the premises, one must accept the conclusion, and that is because the conclusion adds nothing to what is stated in the premises. Whoever assumes that all human beings are mortal, and that Socrates is a human being, clearly also assumes that Socrates is mortal (which is the conclusion). That is: the secret of logical validity is that a logical argument does not innovate anything; the conclusion does not add anything beyond what is said in the premises. A yeshiva joke asks: ‘How do we know that a Jew should walk with a hat?’ And answers: because it is written, ‘And Abraham went’ – and a Jew like Abraham certainly did not walk without a hat; that is obvious! And if he walked with a hat, then we, his students and descendants, are certainly obligated to walk with a hat. QED. The proof above, though it sounds ridiculous, is valid! The problem is not in its logic, but in begging the question. At the basis of the assumption that ‘a Jew like Abraham certainly did not walk without a hat’ stands the assumption that a Jew should walk with a hat. The conclusion one wants to prove was placed in the premises implicitly. Whoever accepts the premises will have to accept the conclusion.

28 Yoram Yובל (born 1958), an Israeli psychoanalyst, psychiatrist, brain researcher, and member of the brain-medicine department at Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital.

When I present the proof above to people, they do not always know how to explain what the problem is, what is ridiculous. But as said, here there is begging the question in the premises, and here there will be disagreement about the premise. And therefore there is no point in presenting a valid argument to someone who does not accept the premises of the argument. But wait! It is customary in logic to say that begging the question is a fallacy. But that is not correct! For, as we saw, every argument begs the question! Begging the question is not a fallacy (as with Socrates being mortal). Every logically valid argument is valid because its conclusion is in some way found in its premises. Whoever sees a fallacy in begging the question can leave the course this very moment, and also retire from every argument in the world! So what is the point of using logical arguments? Let us return to what we already learned: really, logical arguments generally do not decide a dispute. They help sharpen and locate where the dispute lies, but the decision of the dispute is usually made by rhetorical tools and not by logical tools. It turns out that logic begins an argument, but does not finish it, except in a case where one side has fallen into a simple contradiction. Another value of logic is ways of extracting conclusions: in geometry there are so many facts, all derived from a number of basic premises (the axioms of Euclidean geometry). But few of us would arrive at these conclusions on our own. The way of extracting the conclusions is not trivial. That is: where the conclusion does not emerge trivially from the premises, there is great value in the mathematical/logical argument. Let us see an example in which attending to begging the question can help us. We learned that in examining an argument one should examine the definitions, the premises, and the validity of the argument. If the argument is not valid, one should complete it (principle of charity), and after adding the missing premise and examining it, one should examine the conclusion. Why? Because if after I have gone through the premises I read the conclusion and do not agree with it, that means perhaps I missed something in the premises and the validity. And here begging the question can help us: if I examine the argument and see that it is valid, but the conclusion still seems to me somehow incorrect –

there may be one of two possibilities here: a.

I will go over the premises again and become persuaded to agree with the conclusion. b.

It may be that I missed something in the premises, and did not identify in which premise the conclusion is embedded, and when I re-diagnose it I will understand that I do not agree with that premise, and thus identify the point of disagreement with my interlocutor. There you have a use of begging the question as a tool for a final critique – a critique of the conclusion. An example of the practical use of this insight: Leibniz advances a claim called the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, according to which when there are 2 objects with exactly the same set of properties, then it is one object and not two. I have no doubt that he is wrong. But it is not easy to identify the problematic assumption in his view. Leibniz says that if there are two entities with the same set of properties, yet they are 2 entities, then entity A has the property ‘is not entity B,’ and from here it follows that they do not have exactly the same set of properties. And from this he derives that when there are 2 entities that really do have the same set of properties, then they are one object. There cannot be 2 entities with exactly the same properties – that is his proof by negation. I tried to diagnose where I disagree with him, and I understood that Leibniz assumes that there is nothing in an object besides properties. For him, the collection of properties is the object. I disagree and hold that there is an object; the properties merely characterize it (in Aristotelian language: substance versus accidents), and that is the point of the dispute. And now to the use of begging the question in examining Leibniz’s claim: he said that the fact that entity A is not entity B (and entity B does not have this property, since it is entity B) is a sign that these entities do not have the same properties, and this is a proof by negation. But that is not correct! The fact that entity A is not entity B is not a property of entity A, but something that pertains to its essence. And here Leibniz begs the question: his argument is valid, but I disagree with him on that assumption. In fact, I have not proved that his conclusion is incorrect, but that his conclusion will not persuade me, because I assume a different premise.

There you have a use of begging the question to point to the place in an argument with which I disagree. In my view this is one of the most important tools in critical thinking.

16.6. Fallacy 5 – Correlation fallacies 16.6.1. Correlation fallacy 1: the direction of the correlation. Correlation is a relation between two data points. When one wants to infer causation from a correlation, one points to a direction: A is the cause of B. For example: a professor from the Technion wrote that the State of Israel should invest in higher education, since most countries that invest in higher education have a higher GDP than countries that do not invest. The possible fallacy here: it may be that in countries with high GDP there is enough money to invest in higher education (B is the cause of A). That is, pointing to a correlation does not indicate causation. A correlation between data may have 4 possible causes:

a. Chance – it is possible that there is a correlation by chance alone. Of course, the broader and stronger the correlation (statistical significance), the lower the probability that it is mere chance. b. Causation: phenomenon A is the cause of phenomenon B. c.

Reverse causation: phenomenon B is the cause of phenomenon A. d. External factor: phenomenon C is the cause of both A and B. For example: if we find a correlation between smoking and cancer, 4 explanations can be given for this:

a. It may just be chance that there are smokers with cancer. b.

It may be that smoking causes cancer. c.

It may be that cancer causes people to smoke. d.

It may be that there is something in people’s biological makeup that causes both cancer and a tendency to smoke. The practical implication of this: if someone says, ‘Don’t smoke or you’ll get cancer!’ that will be correct only according to explanation b. According to all the others, it is not correct at all. Newspapers fall into this all the time: they show a correlation and point to the wrong cause. In addition, there is a tendency to wave numbers around as if by magic and crush the opponent. It is important to know that usually, when there is an argument with an agenda, the numbers do not decide. So when a correlation is brought to us in arguments, we must make sure that the directions of the correlation were checked and that the other possible causes of the correlation were ruled out.

16.6.2. Correlation fallacies – expansion. Here is an article by Prof. Eyal Shahar [The coronavirus pandemic – Sweden: verdict and accounting –

https://www.zman.co.il/115716/popup /]. He opposes the lockdown and the pressure surrounding coronavirus and brings several quantitative data points. I will address a few points of critical thinking: a.

What is being measured? The article argues that in Sweden, where there was no severe lockdown, the graphs show a similarity to a regular epidemiological outbreak, and concludes that there is no need to fear giving up a strict lockdown.

I, who am not an expert in the field, will refer only to the fact that he presented the percentage of the dead out of the sick in Sweden as 1.6%, but that is under the assumption that these are only the patients who were discovered, and he assumes that only 10%

of the sick were discovered – that is, in truth the dead are 0.16%

of the sick! And this is a problem in presenting the datum, because the question is not how many died out of the infected, but how many dead there are altogether. Since coronavirus appears to be more contagious than ordinary flu, therefore even if the percentage of deaths among the sick in coronavirus is lower than in flu, it may be that the total number of deaths will be greater because coronavirus is more contagious. b.

To whom do we compare? To whom should we compare Sweden? Sweden itself cannot be tested as to what would have happened there under lockdown, because what happened already happened and there was no lockdown there. And in the world, there are countries that imposed a lockdown and had a high number of deaths, and countries without a lockdown and with a low number of deaths. Prof. Eyal argues that in the professional literature it is customary to compare Sweden to the neighboring Scandinavian countries: Norway and Denmark. And compared to them it turns out that Sweden has 5-10 times

more deaths than they do! Ostensibly this is a strong comparison, but then he compares the flu mortality data in those countries and sees that with flu too the mortality in the neighboring countries is fivefold. The starting point of the comparison is that these results are the result of policy. But the comparison regarding flu shows that, even if we assume the policy toward coronavirus is identical, additional differences exist of which we are not aware – it is not only policy. The conclusion from this: beware of numerical data; they have a certain magic, but one must clarify what is being measured, and one should also not rely blindly on experts – their words too must be checked.

16.6.3. Fallacies – causes and explanations. Before we continue with correlation fallacies, let us talk about causes and explanations. In the coronavirus article above, the argument brought an explanation for the cause of the high mortality from coronavirus in Sweden – namely, not imposing a lockdown. We saw that one needs to ask whether this datum really constitutes an explanation of the phenomenon. What is an explanation? An explanation means that the cause is a sufficient condition for the explained thing. For example: ‘Whoever goes on a diet loses weight’ – ostensibly the diet is the cause of the thinness. But it may be that the person who goes on a diet fell into depression and therefore lost weight, and from this it follows that the cause of the weight loss is the depression and not the diet. That is, a correlation between 2 phenomena is not enough; one must check for a causal connection – that is, that the explaining variable is a sufficient condition for the explained variable.

A sufficient condition means that if the explaining variable exists, then the explained variable will be as it is. This is an important principle, because very often explanations are presented to us that are not sufficient conditions – and then we are dealing only with a correlation, and it is not an explanation at all. Let us bring 2 examples. Example A – becoming religious. When a person becomes religious, his secular friends explain it by a psychological state that brought it about (depression and the like), and his new religious friends give a philosophical explanation – he found the truth, and so on. When a person leaves religion, his religious friends attribute it to a psychological state (‘Israel did not sin with the calf except in order to permit themselves sexual immorality,’ and the like), and his secular friends give a philosophical explanation – he understood that it is all nonsense, and so on. Beyond the lack of honesty on both sides – who is right? In my opinion, both are: every step a person takes can be explained both on the psychological plane and on the philosophical plane. The dishonesty lies in focusing only on one set of considerations and motives. Looking at the whole picture shows that the totality of the considerations (psychological + philosophical) is the explanation for the action – it is the sufficient condition for the explained phenomenon. That is, none of these considerations alone is an explanation (that is, it is not the case that with such a psychological state alone a person becomes religious regardless of philosophical considerations, or that given the philosophical considerations alone a person leaves religion regardless of other psychological considerations). None of these explanations is an explanation; only the combination of the two gives the explanation: if there were only the psychological circumstances, but he would not adopt the philosophical considerations, he would not become religious.

Sometimes a person gives an alternative explanation to the explanation you present –

one should examine whether this is not a case in which the explanations combine, as in the case above29.

Example B – Newton and the apple. Newton sits under the tree and suddenly an apple falls on his head. Newton asks himself why the apple fell on him and discovers the law of gravitation. Since Newton was a very religious man, why did he not answer himself that the blow from the apple was a punishment from God for some sin he had committed? In a series of articles I wrote on the topic of providence I called this dual causality, and I explained that it is impossible to give two explanations in parallel (theological and physical), because explanation means a sufficient condition: if this thing obtains, the result will occur, regardless of whether the second explanation obtains or not. That is: if the apple is attached to the branch in a state that cannot withstand the force of gravity, the apple will fall regardless of whether Newton sinned or not – and that is a sufficient condition (by definition, a physical explanation is a sufficient condition). And the theological explanation, if it is an explanation (= a sufficient condition), must be: if Newton sinned, the apple will fall even if gravity is not strong enough to make the apple fall. It seems that there are 2 possibilities: 1.

Choose which of the explanations is correct (the physical or the theological). 2.

Say that the combination of the two explanations together produces the falling of the apple – that is, the combination of the two is the sufficient condition. In summary, many times people bring something that is not a sufficient condition as an explanation – and from this a dispute is created. Let us continue with the correlation fallacies:

16.6.4. Correlation fallacies – spurious correlations. To explain this fallacy we will bring 3 examples:

Spurious correlation – Example A: Rabin and the Golan. Once I saw a sticker on a car: ‘Rabin has no mandate to give up the Golan.’ And I deliberated. My two considerations were: morally, Rabin declared before the elections that he would not give it up, but perhaps now ‘things seen from there are not seen from here,’ and perhaps he changed his mind. That is legitimate, but there should be a referendum. On the other hand, from the security/economic/political point of view – is it correct to make such an agreement with the Syrians? These are two questions that are independent of one another, and since that is so, I would expect there to be 4 groups in the nation: a. those who think the act is moral and justified. b. those who think the act is moral, but not justified. c. those who think the act is not moral, but justified. d.

those who think the act is not moral and not justified.

There is a criticism of philosophy that in the end there is a feeling that nothing can be decided with philosophical explanations. That basically we are treading in the same place where Aristotle and Plato trod, as Whitehead said: ‘All of Western philosophy is but footnotes to Plato.’ In my opinion, in many cases this is a misunderstanding. In a large part of philosophical issues

there is a very clear answer; the disputes are the result of different definitions, or the disputants are speaking about different aspects (as here: psychological or philosophical),

when in fact each one is correctly describing one aspect. This reminds me of the Talmud in Gittin (6a): ‘As it is written: “and his concubine played the harlot against him”‘ [the sages discuss what act made him angry until she fled from him]. Rabbi Evyatar said: he found a fly in the dish she had cooked for him. Rabbi Yonatan said: he found a hair in her food. Rabbi Evyatar later met Elijah and said to him: What is the Holy One, blessed be He, doing? He said to him: He is occupied with the matter of the concubine in Gibeah. And what is He saying? He said to him: My son Evyatar says thus, and My son Yonatan says thus. He said to him: Heaven forbid! Can there be uncertainty before Heaven?! He said to him: These and those are the words of the living God: he found a fly and was not particular about it; he found a hair and he was particular about it.’ In my opinion the explanation is that it was the accumulation of both things: the hair + the fly caused all the mess.

In practice there were only 2 groups in the nation: A and D. Whoever thought Oslo was politically justified also justified it morally, and whoever thought it was not politically justified

also rejected it morally. A correlation was created between the position on the moral question and the position on the political-security question. This correlation is unjustified and points to dishonesty. There is no reason in the world why there should not be a group that says: ‘I think this is very right in security and political terms, but since Rabin declared otherwise before the elections, he has no mandate for such an agreement,

and therefore it should be returned to the people and put to a new vote.’ And likewise there should be a group that says: ‘In my view Oslo is really not justified and not right,

but he is the prime minister and he decides.’ The fact that there were no such groups indicates dishonesty. I call such a correlation a spurious correlation. What is irritating about it is that everyone can say that he really just happened to stand in the place of group A or D. But the fact that the public split 50%-50% and not into 4 groups of 25% indicates dishonesty. It is proper to draw the opponent’s attention to a spurious correlation when it appears. Spurious correlation – Example B: Rabbi Druckman’s conversions. There was a dispute regarding conversions performed by Rabbi Druckman30. The rabbinical court in Ashdod invalidated all the conversions, and the Great Rabbinical Court approved the invalidation of the conversions. Rabbi Amar ultimately nullified this approval by the Great Rabbinical Court. The dispute that developed was divided between Haredi rabbis and Religious-Zionist rabbis. In an examination I conducted, I found that on the merits of the matter there were also Religious-Zionist rabbis who disagreed with Rabbi Druckman, but because he was under such an ugly Haredi attack, they did not express their opinion and mobilized to his side. Thus a spurious correlation was created between Religious Zionism and these conversions, versus Haredi positions and the invalidation of such conversions. I wrote a response in the newspaper on the matter and found 15

independent questions on which a person must form a position in order to formulate an answer to this question. If each such question can be answered yes/no, then the number of positions possible on this issue is 2 to the 15th power – that is, about 40,000

types of positions! In practice there were only 2 positions. Whoever was with Rabbi Druckman all the way answered ‘yes’ to all 15

questions, and his opponents answered ‘no’ to all of them. Such a spurious correlation is found a great deal in political questions. Spurious correlation – Example C: qualifying women for testimony. In this issue we know what each person will answer even before he opens his mouth. As in most arguments, by the way (and that is problematic in itself). But in truth, even if you are a conservative, it is fitting to hear all the arguments in the issue; perhaps there is a good argument here that will change your mind? It is not proper to determine a position on a matter

before you have examined the issue (and likewise for the innovator). In addition, in arguments of this sort people sin by mixing the consequential plane with the essential plane, and they do not divide the discussion into two discussions (principle and policy): ‘I fear a slippery slope;’

‘and what if afterward everyone starts eating pork because of this…’ Here one must demand: first tell me your opinion on this principled issue, without

relating to the consequences; afterward we will discuss the consequences and decide. Rabbi Medan31

said that he knows 22

reasons why the Scroll of Ruth is read on Shavuot, and only 1 reason why the Scroll of Esther is read on Purim. When there are 22

explanations, apparently none of them holds water. And so too, when you have many explanations and everything leads in the same direction, and you find no argument in the opposite direction, something here is not straight. In capital cases there is a rule that if all the judges ruled for death32, the defendant goes free. Because one smells that something here is biased – how did 23

Jewish judges agree on the same thing?! That raises suspicion.

30 Rabbi Chaim Meir Druckman (16 Cheshvan 5693 / 15

November 1932 – 2 Tevet 5783 / 25

December 2022) was an Israeli rabbi, yeshiva head, educator, Knesset member, author of many books of thought, and a leader of the Religious-Zionist public. He was a member of the presidium of the Union of Rabbis of Torat HaAretz HaTovah. He served as head of Or Etzion Yeshiva and president of its institutions, rabbi of the settlement Merkaz Shapira, president of the Hesder Yeshiva Association, chairman of the Bnei Akiva Yeshivot and Ulpanot center, and a member of the national executive of the Bnei Akiva movement. He served as a Knesset member and deputy minister of religious affairs on behalf of the National Religious Party. In the years 2004 – 2012

he served as head of the Conversion Authority in the Prime Minister’s Office. He was awarded the Israel Prize for lifetime achievement for the year 5772 (2012).

Rabbi Yaakov Medan (born 21 Tammuz 5710 / 6 July 1950) is head of the Har Etzion hesder yeshiva in Alon Shvut and is also known for his method of studying the Bible. He is one of the authors of the Gavison-Medan Covenant. 32 Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 17a: ‘Rabbi Kahana said: A Sanhedrin that unanimously saw him as guilty acquits him.’

16.7.

Fallacies – the problem of pragmatism. People tend to argue for or against a certain claim because of its consequences. For example: ‘If there is no God –

then there is no morality in the world – therefore clearly there is God.’ This is a pragmatist argument, or as they called it in the forum ‘Stop Here, Think,’ a ‘holy lie’ – adopting a position because otherwise the result would be disastrous. Pragmatism is a fallacy. However, sometimes philosophical subtlety is needed to distinguish an exposing argument that is not a fallacy of pragmatism. For example: in the first book of my trilogy I raised the ‘proof from morality’: because without God there is no morality – therefore there is God. Ostensibly this is pragmatism, but if we formulate it a bit differently, it can be a legitimate argument: if I claim that I have a clear feeling that morality is valid and binding on everyone, and then I ask myself: but without God there is no morality – and infer from this that apparently there is God. Here my feeling that morality is valid reveals to me that I am a hidden believer. This is part of what I called theological arguments or exposing arguments. This is reverse logic – and it is a legitimate argument.

16.8.

Fallacies – dichotomies. Claim: ‘There is no point in having exams, because serious students study even without exams, and those who are not diligent will not study even with exams.’ The fallacy in this argument (and in many dilemma arguments) is its basic assumption. The argument assumes that the students are divided only into 2 extreme groups: pathologically diligent and pathologically lazy. This presents a dichotomous reality that does not reflect reality. In reality there are many middle students who without exams

will not study, and the exams encourage them to study. To reject such an argument it is not enough to say ‘the world is complex!’ One must justify and explain it. Let us give another example – the heap paradox:

Premise A: one pebble is not a heap. Premise B: adding one pebble to a pile of pebbles that is not a heap

does not change its status. Premise C: 10,000

pebbles are a heap. The three premises sound reasonable; adding one stone does not change the status of a pile into a heap. So how, when it reaches ten thousand, does it become a heap?! It seems we need to give up premise B – adding one pebble does change the status! But that is not correct either. Rather, adding one pebble changes the situation a little!

Here too the sin of the argument lies in its dichotomous assumption: either heap or not-heap. That is not right; there are different degrees of ‘heapness.’ And this is true of many everyday concepts (when exactly does it become afternoon, and when does a color change from red to purple), which are vague in essence and not dichotomous. Another way to neutralize dichotomies, beyond noting that between black and white there are many shades of gray, is as follows: common in political arguments is the pressure on a person to decide, ‘Are you for us or for our enemies?’

If you do not think like us, you necessarily think like the other side. And things are presented as though there are only two possible positions, and people are pushed to choose a position with which they are not fully at peace, because intuitively they identify neither with position A nor with position B. Here one should know that there are systematic tools for escaping dichotomies. Here is a central tool: the common side in opposites. When there are two approaches opposite to one another, that means there is something common between them: a bird is not the opposite of a number, because they have nothing in common. A bird and a fish – then one can already talk about an opposition between them, because they have a common camp: both are living creatures. And this is a great secret in breaking dichotomies: examine carefully what is shared by the opposing claims, and whether you agree with that shared thing. If you give up the shared thing, you will see that a third possibility is created. I will give a few examples of this: a.

Organ donation. Medically, there is harvesting of organs that can be used only if they are taken before the person dies, such as a heart and lungs. The problem from a halakhic point of view is that if we take these organs from one person, we will kill him, and it is forbidden to save one life at the expense of another. What is the solution? People distinguish between stages of death: there is brain death, which happens first; the brain stem stops functioning and there is still life, and then there is cardiac death – and the person is completely dead. And the principled question is: what is the moment of death? What is the status of the person between the brain death

and the cardiac death? The practical implication of this: the permission to harvest heart and lungs after brain death depends on the definition of death. Ostensibly, when I entered this issue I felt that I did not agree with either side33 (usually that is what I feel), and I tried to find the third possibility, but it looked like a dead end of an absolute dichotomy. In the end I argued that even without deciding the definition of the moment of death (brain/cardiac), one can permit harvesting the organs. The point common to the two disputants is that they hold it is forbidden to take organs from a living person –

and if I disagree with them on this point –

I have opened the door to a third way. I will not enter into the details of my argument in this specific case –

I want you to see the logical principle: finding a parameter common to both opposites, and creating a third possibility by challenging/refuting this parameter.

Religious Zionism and Haredism present a person with two options: what are you – this or that? In my opinion one can remove the hyphen between religious and Zionist. If people put aside the emotions that accompany discussions of this sort, I think many would find themselves in this party. What is common to Haredism and Religious Zionism is their relation to Zionism: either it is holy or it is an act of Satan. And here I challenge their shared point of reference and say: why should that be? Maybe Zionism is simply mundane. Then I join Zionism because I want to live with my people (just as a Belgian wants to live in Belgium), and this is an option open also to a religious person. Again, attacking the assumptions in the subtext can create a third approach. And this is a great tool for a person to locate himself in arguments of this sort. A great hobby of mine, by the way.

Evolution. On the one hand, religious fundamentalists claim that this is a theory of heresy and falsehood, and on the other hand the neo-Darwinians claim that clearly there is no God, since there is evolution. Common to the two camps is the assumption that God and evolution cannot dwell together. And if I do not accept this approach –

I create the third way. In all the examples above I am not speaking on the merits of the issue; they came to illustrate the use of the tool: in every dispute between sides, you do not always have to decide on which side you are. You can place yourself on a third way by challenging what is common to both sides. In political science this is called the third way (I agree neither with the Republicans nor with the Democrats).

33 By the way, I also think the doctors’ approach, according to which their determination is an absolute determination, is mistaken in my view, because, as said, they have no tools at all to determine this matter. It is a completely evaluative determination, not a medical-professional one.

Assignment Sheet 7: Fallacies. This page is mainly reading material. The more you manage to read (even if only skim), the more you will learn. In my opinion this is much more educational than one sample question or another. Just pay attention to faulty patterns, and connect them to what we discussed in class.

Regarding reliance on experts and the naturalistic fallacy: see my article, ‘Halakhah and Reality – What Is Halakhic Expertise’34, and also columns 25-26 on my website35. It is also worth seeing a short article that has just now been published in Globes36, which touches directly on our issue. 2.

To broaden your perspective on begging the question, it is worth reading about an ‘assumption requiring proof’ on Wikipedia. 3.

Regarding vague claims (which include concepts that are not well defined):

a. We already mentioned the ontological proof for the existence of God. Let us mention it again here:

Definition: God is the most perfect being that can be conceived. Premise A (for the sake of the argument): God does not exist. Premise B: it is possible to conceive of the concept of an existing God. Premise C: an existing God is more perfect than a non-existing God. Conclusion: God is not the most perfect being that can be conceived. That contradicts His definition. Hence premise A is not correct. We already saw that one need not reject specifically premise A. Now I ask: can you attack this argument by pointing to a concept that is not well defined, and how does that bring about the failure of the argument? Which concepts in this argument can be attacked in that way?

In the sources in section 1 above I discussed homosexuality, whether it is a disease or not. Where here is the definition of concepts important?

There are claims about the ‘special quality of Israel,’ that is, that the people of Israel have a special uniqueness compared to all other nations. Beyond agreement or disagreement with the claim (suspension of judgment), try to examine it in terms of defining the concepts. Is this claim scientifically testable? (Recall Popper’s principle of falsifiability.)

Directions of correlation and causality. There are arguments against astrology (remember: suspend judgment) that rely on the fact that it cannot be that the state of the stars determines the state of affairs on earth in real time (that is, simultaneously), because Einstein’s theory of relativity forbids influence faster than the speed of light. Does this argument collapse the astrological picture? (For the sake of the discussion, ignore the fact that the positions of the stars we see now reflect their state from many years ago, until the light reached us.)

Suppose the entrepreneur Moshe invested in a certain business and produced a handsome return of 20%

in a year. Does that mean he is a successful entrepreneur? (That is, is it worthwhile to join him going forward?) Suppose now that he did it again the next year and the year after. Would you join him now? Try to propose several explanations for and against.

Search Google: Halakhah and Reality – What Is Halakhic Expertise.

For column 25 – search Google: On Deviance, Expertise, and Values –

‘A response to Professor Yoram Yובל’s article, “They Are Not Deviants,”‘ Shabbat supplement, portion Eikev.

For column 26

– search Google: On Deviance, Expertise, and Values –

‘A response to Professor Yoram Yובל’s article, “They Are Not Deviants,”‘ Shabbat supplement, portion Eikev – continuation column.

Search Google: 7 expressions from economic discourse that annoy Professor Ariel Rubinstein.

Regarding the difference between correlation and causality, see several bizarre examples here37 (English). 6. See the following warning38

from the pediatricians’ association, who recommend weaning our children from screens. What do you think?

In the following source39, the researchers who conducted the study make sure to note that:

Research findings to date might suggest a correlation between television viewing and developmental problems, but they cannot show causality.

There you have the difference (which we discussed in class) between researchers and journalists who report on the studies. 7. The meaning of numbers. See here40 a summary about reporting on secularization in religious society. There is a rather short discussion there about data and their meaning (and there is also a longer version). One can also see here41 regarding various poverty reports (there are hundreds of critical articles about this. In terms of tendentious and faulty use of numbers, there is almost no subject more problematic than poverty).

Assignment Sheet 8 – finishing fallacies and dichotomies 1.

In recent days there have been demonstrations in the USA against racism (following the killing of George Floyd by a policeman). The administration is trying to prohibit the demonstrations for reasons of public health (coronavirus). See here42 an open letter (in English) signed by public figures, doctors, and epidemiologists in the USA in favor of granting blacks the right to demonstrate even in these days. In brief, their claim is that racism is more dangerous to public health than the demonstration itself (they bring evidence from data regarding morbidity and mortality, not necessarily from coronavirus, among blacks as compared to whites). It is not necessary to read the letter itself. Try to suspend judgments and personal positions on the issue itself, and ignore other arguments for and against this claim. Focus on the argument I described and the context. Try to critique the logic of the argument and look for fallacies in it, especially from the following angles: a. the factual data. b. the derivation of the conclusion from the data. c. the identity of the signatories and the relevance of their expertise to the discussion (especially doctors and epidemiology experts). Possible solution: there are several main problems here: 1.

The factual argument in this document is problematic, or at least unsupported. The data about the difference between whites and blacks (regarding infant mortality, life expectancy, and the like) can also be explained on the basis of differences in mentality, education, socioeconomic status, etc. Of course, in such a short document one cannot detail everything, but I doubt the validity of this determination. It is like the quotations about differences between Israel’s first and second publics in life expectancy (and especially the foolish claims about the Bedouin – life expectancy and infant mortality). 2.

Even if the facts are correct, still, if the demonstrations are dangerous in terms of coronavirus infection, the argument that racism is no less dangerous does not lead to the conclusion that they should be allowed to demonstrate. Let them demonstrate after the fear of infection and the second wave are gone. Alternatively, if they are already demanding consideration from the administration, let them demand improved treatment for them and not permission to demonstrate.

At the following address: correlations – https://www.tylervigen.com/spurious .

Search Google: YNET Pediatricians’ Association: Television forbidden up to age two.

Search Google: pediatrics Media Use by Children Younger Than 2 Years.

Search Google: Has Everyone Been Carried Away by the Wind? A Quantitative Mapping of the Phenomenon of Secularization and Leaving Religion in Religious-Zionist Society / Ariel Finkelstein.

Search Google: ‘The poverty festival of Yedioth Ahronoth.’ For the article on the Mida website 42

Search Google: Open letter advocating for an anti-racist public health response to demonstrations against systemic injustice occurring during the COVID-19 pandemic

According to them, the words of doctors and epidemiologists have no added value regarding the questions under discussion. They did not present epidemiological data, and the questions discussed here are evaluative and not professional-medical ones. This is presented as a scientific claim of comparing probabilities, and in light of the first two points this is truly misleading.

2. Years ago, the Women of the Wall demanded permission to wrap themselves in a prayer shawl in the Western Wall plaza (if I remember correctly, every new month). They argued that there is no prohibition in this and that it is their democratic right. I recall (I hope I am not missing something) that Rabbi Sherlo wrote in response that he wants to see how many of them go around with a small fringed garment in everyday life. Again, I ask you to suspend personal judgments. Try to formulate his words as a structured argument. After that, critique the argument. Possible solution: Rabbi Sherlo is essentially claiming that their demand is based on provocation and not on a genuine desire, and therefore one should not comply with it. His argument is as follows: Premise A: demanding a prayer shawl without wearing fringes in everyday life is provocative and does not come from a genuine place. Premise B: one should not comply with provocative demands. Conclusion: one should not comply with the demand to pray with a prayer shawl at the Wall. I do not accept either of his premises. Premise A is factual, and in my opinion factually it is not clear that this is a provocative demand. There are people who want a one-time ritual and do not want it enough to do something daily (especially if it also bothers them). Premise B is normative, and in my opinion it is not correct. Does anyone check whether men who come to pray always do so מתוך a desire for closeness to God? What business is it of anyone else to pry into a person’s intentions? Our sages told us that from acting not for its own sake one comes to act for its own sake, so why should we not apply that here? In my opinion, the important and only decisive question is whether it is permitted or forbidden, with no connection at all to motives and motivations. If it is permitted, he should have said that it is permitted even if their intention is to provoke; and if it is forbidden, he should have forbidden it even if they do not intend to provoke. Here, of course, it is permitted, so I see no grounds at all to object. And I have not yet mentioned that the halakhic question is not really supposed to be decisive here. Every citizen in a democratic state has the right to do as his heart desires in a public place, even if there are those – important as they may be – who think the thing is forbidden. Since when is the state run according to halakhah?! If so, I have in my bag several earlier things I would correct here, before the possibility of women praying with a prayer shawl. 3.

There is a moral dispute over the legitimacy of targeted killings. Factually, together with the terrorist, uninvolved people are also harmed. It turns out that the dispute is usually conducted on the two sides of the political divide: between right and left. Again, suspend personal judgments. In your opinion, is this a spurious correlation (between the moral axis and the political axis)?

Possible solution: ostensibly yes. The question being discussed is a moral question, and the dispute between right and left is a security-political one, exactly like the example of Rabin and the Golan that I gave in class. But on a second look, it may be that there is a real correlation here. The left tends to perceive the world as made up of individuals and the collective is a convenient fiction. The right tends to perceive the world as individuals organized in collectives (nationality). According to this, in the right-wing outlook one can see the innocent as part of the collective that is fighting us, and therefore they have the status of pursuers. In the left-wing outlook, every person is an individual standing on his own, and there is no permission to harm one while fighting another. From here a lesson: when there is a correlation, do not rush to classify it as a spurious correlation. Sometimes it is worth more thought (I expanded on these matters in columns 5 and 15

on my website). 4. There is a claim in favor of Haredi society and education as against religious-modern society and education, according to which the percentage of secularization among the Haredim is lower. In your opinion, is this a knock-down argument? Try to justify this in light of what we saw in the last lesson regarding the two kinds of pragmatism. Possible solution: this argument is based on an outcome criterion. But the result is not always the only criterion, and certainly not the main one. If I believe that the Haredi path of serving God is mistaken and the modern one is correct, it is not certain that the percentage of secularization is a consideration that decides in favor of conducting oneself in the wrong way. This of course depends on how mistaken I think the other path is, as against the differences in the rate of secularization. However, if one comes by way of essential pragmatism, that is, an approach that sees the outcome as an indication of truth, then there is room for such an argument. For example, if a person claims that the success of the Haredim indicates that the Holy One, blessed be He, wants their way, then the argument is legitimate. One should only remember that in the dispute about Zionism, the Haredim are precisely those who hold the approach that rejects that assumption:

the success of the Zionist state does not indicate that the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted it and that its path is the right path. This teaches you about the importance of agenda, and once again we have returned to consequentialism and pragmatism.

In Oscar Wilde’s book The Happy Prince, a sparrow (I grew up on a version with a swallow) is described as remaining in cold Europe and carrying out errands on behalf of the prince (a statue made of gold and jewels) to distribute from his treasures to the miserable people of the city. As the cold intensifies, the bird loses his strength, until finally, just before his death, there is a heart-rending passage in which he parts from the prince. Wilde describes it thus […] But lately he knew that he was going to die. He still had strength enough to fly once more to the prince’s shoulder. ‘Goodbye, dear prince!’ murmured the little bird, ‘will you let me kiss your hand?’ ‘I am glad that at last you are flying to Egypt, little bird,’ said the prince, ‘you have stayed too long in this place; but you must kiss me on the lips, because I have loved you.’ ‘Not to Egypt am I flying,’ said the bird, ‘I am flying to the lands of death. Is not death the brother of sleep?’ And he kissed the Happy Prince on the lips, and fell dead at his feet. At that moment there arose a strange sound of cracking inside the statue. Something had broken in it. The truth is that the leaden heart had split in it into two matching parts. Indeed, it was a severe and terrible frost. What is the explanation for the cracking of the prince’s heart? Discuss it, of course, in literary terms. Possible solution: the lead heart cracked because of the cold. The lead did not withstand the temperature changes. Literarily, the lead heart cracked because of the sorrow, of course. The second is a psychological explanation, and the first is physical-mechanical. People will say that the sorrow was realized through physical means. But if one sees these two as explanations, then each of them must be a sufficient condition for the effect. That is, if there were sorrow, the heart would crack even without the cold, and if there were cold, it would crack even without sorrow. Therefore it is impossible to adopt each of these two explanations as the correct explanation. One can choose one of them and reject the second, or claim that the combination of the two is

the full explanation (the sufficient condition for the breaking of the heart). 6.

Reuven and Shimon argue whether to kosher metal utensils in which pork was cooked. True, in the general halakhic tradition this is forbidden, but Reuven claims that scientific experiments show that the absorption is negligible and therefore it should not be taken into account. Shimon argues against him that if we kosher these utensils, many laws from the laws of mixtures in the Shulchan Arukh will be nullified.

Is there really a dispute between them? What is it? Possible solution: Reuven is making a halakhic claim: the prohibition stems from a certain assessment of the degree of absorption. It was shown factually and scientifically that the percentage of absorption is different, and therefore the halakhah should be changed. Shimon counters with a slippery-slope argument, that is, he has no dispute with Reuven’s premises. In fact he says that Reuven is right that the prohibition stemmed from an assessment of the percentage of absorption and that the absorption rate is indeed different from the Sages’ estimate, and nevertheless in his opinion the halakhah should not be changed. One can say that in his opinion Reuven’s conclusion does not follow from the premises. Even if the absorption rate changed, and even if the prohibition stemmed from the absorption rate, there is still not necessarily cause here to change the halakhah (there are further considerations). Note that Reuven’s argument looks valid at first glance. If you follow the formulation I gave above, you can get the impression that his conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. And yet, on a second look, one sees that this is not so. This is a very important lesson for critical thinking. In practice, of course, there is a dispute between them. Both can agree, each for his own reasons, with the other’s consideration, but the weighting of the two considerations differs between them. Reuven prefers the essential consideration over slippery-slope considerations, and Shimon prefers slippery-slope considerations over the essential halakhic consideration. Thus, although both sides agree to both considerations, in the bottom line there appears to be a dispute between them about the relative weight of those considerations.

The Greek Parmenides was the first to use proofs by negation and arguments with a dilemma structure (what in Talmudic jargon is called ‘whichever way you look at it’). For example, he argued that if what exists came into being at some stage, then there are two possibilities: either it came into being out of nothing, and that is impossible, or it came into being from something else, and that too according to him is impossible (because he does not accept a multiplicity of beings. Alternatively, one could argue

that the same question would arise regarding that something else as well). From here he concludes that what exists did not come into being at all. This is essentially a proof of the eternity of everything that exists. You can see details here (in the text and in note 43).

Does the solution we proposed for the heap paradox (vagueness instead of dichotomy) solve this dilemma argument? How can this argument be refuted? Think: is there begging the question here? Possible solution:

It seems that vagueness will not be a solution here. There is no intermediate state between coming into being from something and coming into being out of nothing.

Moreover, there is begging the question here, and therefore the argument appears valid (we saw that every valid argument begs the question).

But as we saw in class, precisely because of this, if we do not agree with the conclusion (that everything that exists never came into being), we must examine the premises with a critical eye. The conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, and if it is not true this must be found somewhere in the premises. In this case it seems that the necessary result is to give up the premise that there is no multiplicity of beings. The moment one gives up that premise, the argument of course collapses.

8. Peter van Inwagen44 raised a dilemma argument against the libertarian view (which advocates free choice): either a person’s act has a cause or it does not. If it has a cause, then the result is deterministic (I remind you of what we learned, that a cause is a sufficient condition for what it brings about), and if there is no cause, then the result is arbitrary (indeterministic). Conclusion: we have no free choice. Try to attack this argument with the tools we learned regarding neutralizing dichotomies. Possible solution: after completing his argument according to the principle of charity, one discovers that the argument is indeed valid, and precisely because of that it is clear that it begs the question. Ostensibly, his argument is as follows: Premise A: everything either has a cause or has no cause. Premise B: if it has a cause, the mechanism is deterministic. Premise C: if it has no cause, the mechanism is indeterministic. Conclusion: there is no free choice. But this argument is not valid. To complete it according to the principle of charity, we must add two further premises. Premise A: everything either has a cause or has no cause. Premise B: if it has a cause, the mechanism is deterministic. Premise C: if it has no cause, the mechanism is indeterministic. Premise D: determinism and indeterminism are the only two possible mechanisms. Premise E: free choice does not fall under either of these two mechanisms. Conclusion: there is no free choice. Now the argument is indeed valid, except that precisely because of this it begs the question. Note that the problem lies in premise D or premise E, exactly the two premises that we added בעקבות the principle of charity. He assumes that free choice does not fall under either of these two and that these two are exclusive. But libertarianism holds that this is not true. Free choice falls under indeterminism (if one defines it as everything that is not deterministic), and then premise E falls. Alternatively, if one defines indeterminism as an

action that is arbitrary and aimless, then indeed free choice does not fall under it (premise E is correct), but according to this definition premise D

falls: free choice is a third mechanism. Note that part of the problem is that van Inwagen did not define the concept of indeterminism, and this created vagueness. Therefore we had to discuss his argument according to each of the two possibilities and refute each one. In summary: in order to formulate his argument, the principle of charity obligated me to define the concept of indeterminism in his place, and to add two premises without which the argument is not valid. Did I lose anything by this? Not at all. On the contrary, in the original formulation the argument seemed strong and necessary, and precisely its completion showed and exposed its flaws. The additions I made in his place helped me attack his argument much better and sharpen the points of dispute. In my books on the science of freedom I discussed at length the fallacy in this common argument, and there I also defined the mechanism of free choice better, thus standing on the difference between it and indeterminism (briefly: indeterminism is action without a cause and without a purpose. Free choice is action without a cause and with a purpose. Determinism is of course action arising from a cause). I spoke about this just this morning (Friday) in the lesson here45

toward the end. 17. Critical reading. Up to now we have learned the theoretical basis, and this is our foundation for practical work. What remains is to present the general algorithm of how to approach an article/argument and perform a critical analysis on it.

17.1. Preliminary checks. Before we approach analyzing an article, let us ask ourselves: a. What is the aim of the article? Here there is room to be suspicious of ourselves and neutralize our personal opinion, and try to understand objectively what the writer of the article is trying to achieve. b. Who is the target audience of the article? This matters for the way things are presented in the article. c. In what framework am I performing the critical thinking? Am I in a debate or forming a personal opinion? As a rule I do not like the genre of debate, where the aim is to win and not to find the truth. Debates are gladiators in the arena of ideas. And in general, in an argument we want to win and it is hard for us to admit error. It is told of Rabbi Shach46

that he delivered a general lecture in Ponevezh, and there it was customary that the rabbi spoke for 2 minutes and then for 20

minutes everyone argued, and then he would continue and speak another 2 minutes, and so on. Once someone raised an objection against him, the rabbi thought for a minute and said: ‘You know what, you are right’ – and stepped down from the podium. As someone who knows how much a person invests in preparing such a general lecture, this is worthy of appreciation. It is told of the author of Ketzot HaHoshen47 that one of the sages of his generation came to him and said that he had written a book no less good than his, but for some reason it had not caught on in the yeshivot. Ketzot asked him: ‘At what hours did you write your book?’ And he answered: ‘In the mornings, when I was fresh.’ And Ketzot replied: ‘That is probably the reason it did not work; I wrote mine at night… and in the morning I would erase.’ As someone who writes books himself, I know how much harder it is to erase than to write. The best format for critical thinking is between me and myself – there too there are biases, but it is easier to overcome them.

Search Google: Free Will and Choice – lesson 6. Rabbi Michael Abraham. 46

Rabbi Elazar Menachem Man Shach (1899 – 2001) was head of Ponevezh Yeshiva and president of the Council of Torah Sages of Agudat Israel and afterward of Degel HaTorah. From the 1970s onward

he led most of the Lithuanian Haredi public in the State of Israel. 47

Rabbi Aryeh Leib son of Rabbi Yosef HaKohen Heller (also known by the common nicknames taken from his books, Ketzot HaHoshen, or simply Ketzot, Avnei Miluim, and Shev Shema’teta) (1745-1812) was a rabbi, decisor, and yeshiva head. He became known mainly for his famous book Ketzot HaHoshen, which became a foundational work both in the world of halakhic study and decision and in the yeshiva world, as a work of analytical scholarship.

17.2. Beginning the process of critical thinking

A. Preparations for the critique 1.

Determining the point of departure (intellectual honesty). 2.

The purpose of the critique (the target audience; debate or forming a position). 3. Suspension of judgment. Especially on charged issues we tend to form an opinion immediately and judge the writer. We are required to suspend this initial judgment and grant the writer charity: to try to understand his words and why he thinks this is correct.

First step – constructing the argument under critique

Locating the conclusion of the article. It is not always clear, and certainly does not always appear at its end or its beginning. 5.

Collecting the basic premises from all parts of the article. 6.

Distilling the logical structure (out of the literary one). Building the argument (including sub-arguments) from the premises to the conclusion(s). 7. Completing enthymemes. Principle of charity. A full and empathetic formulation of the argument under critique. The aim is to reconstruct the writer’s arguments in the best and most charitable way. We know we have finished when his argument is valid. If the way of completing the argument is not faithful to the writer’s intention, one should not do so (it is not right to build another argument in place of his, except after the critique for the purpose of forming my own position). 8.

Completion to a valid argument. Principle of charity: I complete the gaps in my interlocutor’s argument – and only then do I confront his valid argument. If I am standing מול an argument that is not valid, then either I was not charitable enough, or there really is a fallacy in his argument and one cannot get from his premises to the conclusion. Up to this stage the logic is valid. But from the moment we stand מול a valid argument – we are no longer on the logical playing field! c.

Second step – the critique. Now, since I stand before a valid argument, this is the order of the critique: 9.

Clarifying my relation to the basic premises. Do I agree/disagree with each of them? 10. Checking the definitions of concepts (by extension and by content). Stipulative definitions: incorrect or not agreed upon (= not necessary). Constitutive definitions: inconsistent or vague. Counterexamples. 11.

Checking validity, checking again whether the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. Usually this stage is unnecessary, since it was already done in the preparation stage (checking for fallacies such as correlation as causation, etc.). 12.

Finding arguments concerning the claims. Can I ground agreement/disagreement with claim A, etc.? (For example: can I bring a counterexample? It is not always necessary to bring a counterargument. Sometimes a counterexample that in my opinion would be accepted by the writer is enough: if he is persuaded – excellent, and if not – at least this will ground why I do not agree with his words.) Note: in postmodern discourse people are used to criticizing by pointing out that the claimant has basic premises, and from this concluding that what he says is unproven. This is nonsense! For, as we saw, every argument is based on basic premises (and every attempt to ground an argument without basic premises, such as Descartes’ cogito and Anselm’s ontological proof – all of them failed). We point to the premises – and only from here does the critique begin: either it is not necessary or it is not correct. 13. Relation to the conclusion. Ostensibly this is a superfluous stage, for if the premises are correct and the argument is valid, then the conclusion is required and you should raise your hands in surrender. But that is not נכון! If the conclusion seems problematic on its face, one must return and examine the premises. I remind you that every valid argument begs the question – that is, the conclusion is found in the premises – and clearly you do not agree with something in the premises. And here there are 2 possibilities: either to raise your hands and agree with your opponent (and that is good – because you learned something new), or to return and check the premises and their validity until you find the point with which you disagree.

17.3. Critique that evades a real argument. There are 2 kinds of critique one should beware of, because they evade argument. a.

Psychologism. ‘You think this because you went through such-and-such, and therefore you are biased.’ For example, Rabbi Sherlo argued against the Women of the Wall that they are merely making a provocation, and the proof is: ‘How many of them really go around with a small fringed garment in daily life?’ But the truth is that this does not matter, because even if it is provocation, the question under dispute is whether women can pray at the Wall with a prayer shawl – that is the body of the discussion. You can argue that their act is not proper –

but you cannot reject the heart of the discussion by that. In my opinion psychologistic critiques are beside the point and are usually brought when the speaker has no substantive arguments. b.

Characterizations. ‘You are Reform,’ ‘This is Montesquieu.’ This is similar to psychologism, except that it places things in a certain context – but what do I care if it is ‘Reform/heretical/Montesquieu’? Relate to the argument itself! The label under which you place your opponent’s argument changes nothing. In the forum ‘Stop Here, Think,’ established by a group from Bnei Brak in which I participated, there was a rule: do not mention sources! Do not say ‘this is Maimonidean,’ ‘this is Jung’ – tell me what you think! This resembles Godwin’s law – whoever mentions Nazis in a discussion has lost the argument. Quotations of this sort are intended to show that you are clever, not to deal with the matter itself. They do not show what the person thinks on the merits of the issue.

17.4. Practicing the scheme of critical reading. Article 1. We will read an article by David Frankel entitled: ‘Ehud Barak declares: complete gibberish’48. The writer is sharp and witty, but what is actually his claim? Option 1: to mock Barak, because there is no connection between what Barak says and what he does – and therefore there is no point in relating to his words; they are meaningless. Option 2: to mock newspaper editors – there is no connection between what is written in the newspapers and what will happen. There is a riddle that at the entrance to heaven and hell there are two angels, one who always tells the truth and one who always lies, and you do not know which angel is which, and you have one question to ask one of them. What will you ask?49 The point is that one can learn from one who always tells the truth, and there is also much information in one who always lies. But nothing at all can be learned from one who tells truth and lies arbitrarily. And that is true of most political statements (Ehud Barak and newspaper editors alike). Article 2. An article by Professor Tamar Saguy and Professor Eran Halperin – ‘The impact of Breaking the Silence in the world: not harm but benefit’50. The researchers argue that the activity of Breaking the Silence benefits the State of Israel, because when people hear criticism that comes from a group about that same group, they develop more empathy toward the group. They compare this to studies in which people heard criticism about the police. And here one needs to practice suspension of judgment, because I may be against Breaking the Silence – but weigh this argument on its own – and perhaps I will accept this argument. We tend to criticize immediately when we read something about a body with which we are in dispute. The point is that even in our fiercest opponents

article link: https://news.walla.co.il/item/1290491

[the whole article should be read]. 49

The answer is: ‘If I ask your friend what is the road to hell, what will he tell me?’ and then do the opposite of the answer. Because in this way the lie is mixed into every possible result – and one must do the opposite. 50

article link: https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4743077,00.html .

there are points worth listening to, learning from, and perhaps being persuaded by in some of the matters. We suspend judgment, examine the matters on their merits – and afterwards decide. Note that also on the rhetorical plane it sounds more serious when you relate to your opponent’s claims and say: ‘On these points I agree, and on these points I disagree.’

17.5. Continued practice in critical reading. An article on organ transplantation. Professor Yaakov Lavee’s article directed against Rabbi Lau51. What is the writer’s aim? To conclude that once brain death has been determined, it should be permitted to harvest organs according to halakhah as well. What are the premises through which he reaches the conclusion? Premise A: organ transplantation saves lives. Premise B: there is religious/halakhic value in saving lives. Premise C: there is no halakhic impediment to organ donation for the sake of saving lives. Premise D: donation of organs on which life depends is possible only from a dead person. Premise D is agreed upon by both Lavee and Rabbi Lau; the issue concerns organs that need to be harvested while they are still functioning. So a kidney, for example, most decisors allow, because one can live even without 2 kidneys. But the disputed cases are organs like the heart and lungs – which must be harvested while still functioning, and it is clear that once they are harvested, the donor will not return to life. And here there is a ‘whichever way you look at it’: if he is dead, there is no benefit in harvesting from him, and if he is alive, the harvesting is murder. Ostensibly this is a problem with no way out. But there is a claim that in the period between the stage of brain-stem death and the stage of cardiac death, the organs are still functioning – and perhaps they can be harvested at this stage. Those who hold that the decisive moment of death is brain death indeed say that harvesting at this intermediate stage is not murder and is permitted. But those who hold that cardiac death is decisive say that such harvesting would be murder. The anonymous voice of the Gemara speaks about breathing: as long as the person breathes, he is considered alive. And between brain death and cardiac death there is still breathing. From here to the premise that in Rabbi Lau’s words the moment of death is only when the heart, brain, and lungs die – this is the most stringent view. Premise E: a person who cannot return to life is a dead person. Premise F: brain death is an irreversible state. Suspension of judgment: in all this analysis I am still suspending judgment. Checking the validity of the argument – if it is not valid, we will have to complete enthymemes52. Let us begin the analysis: from premises A + B it follows that there is religious value to organ donation. Premise C was brought in Rabbi Lau’s own words, and it is legitimate to use it against him. Premise D – all sides agree to it (the dispute is only over what the definition of death is).

Link: 3036852,00.html – https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L

[Search on Google: “Open Letter to Rabbi Lau – YNET.”]

An enthymeme (from the Greek: enthymeme, ἐνθύμημα) is the rhetorical equivalent of the syllogism in logic. An enthymeme is an incomplete inference, that is, an inference in which one of the premises has been omitted, and it is built from one premise and a conclusion. The reason one of the premises of the argument is omitted is that that premise is already known to the target audience, or is agreed upon and self-evident. According to the Greek philosopher Aristotle, the enthymeme is the strongest means of persuasion.

Now let us check whether the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises: brain death is irreversible, and this is a medical fact. A person who cannot return to life is a dead person. A person whose brain is dead—

—is a dead person. And now, according to premise D, organs may be donated from a dead person, and therefore organs may be donated from a person who has undergone brain death, and there is no halakhic impediment to this. Hence one should issue a halakhic permit to donate organs from a patient who has died brain death. Focusing the point of dispute: ostensibly their question is about “what is the moment of death?” but one can say that the debate is about what death is at all. And we may ask: is the definition they seek for death constitutive or directive? If it is constitutive—there is no point in arguing, since the entire context of the discussion is that it is forbidden to take organs on which the soul depends from a living person—because that is murder. The discussion of whether a person is alive or dead cannot be merely semantic—because it determines value! And value is measured in terms of truth and falsehood—am I obligated by this or not. Therefore it is clear that this is a directive definition—this is a moral dispute that does not depend on the definition of the concept. But what are they trying to capture in this directive definition? It is unclear; one can go by extension instead of by content. We saw the heap paradox. Here too there is something similar: according to everyone, after cardiac death a person is defined as dead. But from complete health to cardiac death there are stages of deterioration of conditions approaching absolute death. So here before us is an absolute everyday concept—death—that is actually placed on a continuum! It follows that the dispute between Rabbi Lau and Prof. Lavi is not about what death is—but rather “how dead do you need to be in order for us to permit killing you and taking vital organs from you?” And here there cannot be a simple answer, since it is not clear where the line is. This is similar to the question “What is a dangerous speed on the Haifa–Tel Aviv highway?” There is a sense of a certain zone, but it is hard to put one’s finger on it precisely. Prof. Lavi tried to move the line to after brain death by combining claims E and F: he argues that brain death is an irreversible condition—no person who has undergone brain death has returned to life—and therefore concludes that, evaluatively, it may be permitted to harvest organs from him, since we will no longer save his life. Critique of Prof. Lavi’s argument: the claim that a person who cannot return to life is defined as dead begs the question and does not withstand any test of counterexamples. For example: a terminal illness from which no person has recovered, and the patient has 5 years left to live—would Lavi say that it is permissible to harvest his organs? No. But definition E does not exclude such a case. Moreover: birth is an incurable disease; I do not know a person who was born and did not eventually die. It follows that according to Prof. Lavi’s definition, it is permissible to harvest a heart and lungs from anyone. Principle of charity: clearly Prof. Lavi did not mean that; what he meant to say to Rabbi Lau is:

You too agree that brain death is on the axis of death, and our question is where to draw the line—I propose drawing it where it becomes irreversible. Critique after the principle of charity: there is still question-begging here. If he assumes that brain death is death—why does he add the point that “no one has returned from such a state to life”? Because he understands that it is not completely death—and if so, why does the definition “no one has returned from it” add anything (no one has returned from birth either, as above)?! Rather, this is a matter of intuition—that this is an advanced stage of death, and there is a chance to give life to a person who has a chance to live. In sum: the article falls into every possible error, but by applying the principle of charity we succeeded somewhat in formulating its claims. Critique of a few more points in the article:

The naturalistic fallacy. It assumes that the determination of “what death is” is known to every doctor—

and this is nonsense; this is a value judgment, and a doctor has no tools to measure death on the normative-evaluative scale. This is not a medical determination. B.

Premise D. I do not agree with premise D. I argue that organs may be taken even from a living person, if he is defined as alive at a very low level—in order to save someone whose level of life is higher. Therefore, instead of discussing where the line between death and life passes, let us discuss whether it is permissible to take organs from a living person with 20%

life in order to save a person who has 50% life. Why is there any need at all to go through the definitions of alive/dead? C.

Demagoguery. The article criticizes Rabbi Lau for inconsistency—that regarding his relative he praised organ donation, while in halakha he argues differently—yet that does not matter! He needs to deal with the argument against organ harvesting.

Demagoguery 2. The article uses sources against Rabbi Lau, and it is clear that the writer is a complete ignoramus (“Choose for yourself a rabbi”—“one who has compassion in his heart”)—this is demagoguery במקום an argument. There is no need to remind Rabbi Lau that “whoever saves one life…” E.

Demagoguery 3. The article tries to present Rabbi Lau as someone who does not care about human life. And this recalls the story of a rabbi who permitted a woman to desecrate Shabbat in order to save her son from conscription into the Russian army. And they said to him: are you so lenient in the laws of Shabbat?! And he answered: no, I am stringent in the laws of saving life. Here too Rabbi Lau can be presented as someone to whom the life of the person from whom the organs are taken matters.

Pragmatist fallacy. The article argued that the moment of death must be defined this way—because it will save many lives. But this is a fallacy, because the question is what the moment of death is—and not what the consequences of this definition are.

17.6. Continued practice in critical reading: the article “Judaism of a Log” – Assaf Inbari [For reading—search the article title on Google; it appears as a PDF document.]

The core of the argument. Inbari’s only argument against Arieli is the host of examples he brings to show that there is not one Judaism (Merkaz Harav, Neturei Karta, the ultra-Orthodox, and others). So how could Arieli claim that Alma is not Judaism? Let us construct Inbari’s argument: A. Historically there have been many Judaisms. B. Therefore it is impossible to define one Judaism. C. Therefore it is impossible to disqualify Alma. Critique of the argument: A.

Dishonesty in relating to the argument. Arieli himself brought several streams—

and assumes that there are several criteria common to all of them. The fixation on the expression “there is only one Judaism” is demagoguery and a passive-aggressive posture. B. The argument is invalid. The fact that there are many Judaisms does not necessarily mean that Alma is one of them. In addition, he brings all kinds of figures that he defines as Jewish—but Arieli may not define them as Judaism. C. Appeal to authority. The example of Mendelssohn. So what? What did you prove here? D.

Lack of an argument. The truth is that Kobi Arieli did not present an argument, and therefore Inbari’s response is also unclear. Since there is an amorphous concept here—and it is not clear from where it should be defined (by extension or by content). The analysis we did of this article was not according to the algorithm we learned, but was more associative.

Assignment Sheet 10 – Critical Reading. Following what was discussed in the last two lessons, I am now attaching an article for a concluding analysis: https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinion/206803 / [Search on Google: “What Is the Difference Between Conservatism and Liberalism? Corona, Makor Rishon.”]

You may use the algorithm described in Assignment Sheet 9. I suggest paying attention to the general context of the things said (not only to the direct content). What is the overall direction in which it is aiming? The article by Racheli Malk-Boda: “What Is the Difference Between Conservatism and Liberalism? Corona” (It is important to know that article headlines and the summary in the newspaper’s subheading are usually given by the editorial staff and not by the author. Therefore it is not advisable to rely on them in your analysis.)

Let us perform an analysis according to the algorithm in Assignment Sheet 9. A. Identifying the article’s conclusion. “I will not presume to deal with the question whether the fear of the other, which reveals itself in all its glory with the eruption of coronavirus into our lives, is rational or emotional, based on statistics or merely stereotypical. But one can still be aware that this is another story that makes present the essential gap between conservatism and liberalism.” Omit what I placed in parentheses (this will be discussed later), and it seems that what remains is the conclusion: coronavirus stories (=the reservations about foreigners) make present (=illustrate) the invalidity of liberalism. Note: she writes that this makes present the gap. This is probably an inaccuracy of wording (her intention is to refute liberalism and not to demonstrate the gap between the two positions, which is ostensibly clear). Perhaps she means the gap between the identity they try to construct in us (liberalism) and what remains in existence in practice (natural national identity, but not the value of conservatism). Note that she is also careful in her wording and writes that this makes present and not proves (that is, this is an illustration and not necessarily a proof). One should also note that the subheading uses the term “proves” and not “makes present,” and this is inaccurate.

Another possible formulation of the conclusion is Gadi Taub’s sentence: “People really think they live in the Republic of Seinfeld or something,” Gadi Taub once told me. “What do they imagine—that if there were an earthquake here, Lady Gaga fans would run to help each other because that is their identity? Even if we do not know how to explain why, nationality is the strongest emotional bond there is among people in large groups.” And now, stripped down: if there were an earthquake here, Lady Gaga fans would not run to help each other because that is their identity. Even if we do not know how to explain why, nationality is the strongest emotional bond there is among people in large groups.

B. Defining concepts. Conservatism – is (among other things) adherence to national identity (which is natural). Liberalism – is (among other things) the thought that it is possible to create other identities (which are artificial) through social and cultural constructions.

C. Arranging the premises. Premises scattered throughout the article (including completion of enthymemes—implicit premises): Premise A (fact): there are phenomena of reservation toward foreigners during the coronavirus period (several examples were brought). Premise B (fact): this occurs even when there is no factual basis for it (as in the case of the American professor of Chinese origin, who certainly was not infected in China). Intermediate conclusion (implicit): the reservations also stem from their very being foreigners (and not only from the facts and statistics). Premise C: reservation toward a person on the basis of affiliation expresses preference for national identity over constructed (universal) identity, that is, conservatism. Premise D (induction): these phenomena reflect a general approach (they are not unique only to coronavirus). Intermediate conclusion (factual): people do not succeed in escaping the identities ingrained in them (the deep connection to what is familiar and naturally close). From this follows the conclusion (appearing above): coronavirus stories (=the reservations about foreigners) make present (=illustrate) the invalidity of liberalism. The argument as presented here is valid, and it seems that this is the logical reconstruction of what she claims.

D. Critique. I will not go into a critique of the definitions of conservatism versus liberalism. These concepts are of course much broader, but she has the right to focus on this aspect of the dispute (=the ability to construct a ‘Seinfeld’ identity) and to define the concepts in this way for the purpose of the discussion here. Still, there is room here for criticism of definitions that are too binary (black-and-white). Everyone agrees that it is difficult to get rid of natural and ancient identities, and the questions in dispute are whether this is possible (and how difficult it is to do so—the heap paradox) and whether it is desirable. Facts and values: the most basic problem in the article is that there is ambiguity in it regarding the relation between norms-values and facts (the naturalistic fallacy). It is not clear exactly what her claim is, and therefore also not how she proves it. The dispute between liberalism and conservatism is presented here only on the factual basis: the question whether it is possible to construct an identity other than the natural one (national, or familial). But there is between them a no less important dispute on the evaluative plane: is it desirable to construct such an identity (is national identity desirable, or is universalism preferable)? The naturalistic fallacy says that it is impossible to derive norms from facts. We must now decide whether she wanted to focus only on the factual dispute (which is the only one she addresses) or whether she is actually hinting also at the normative dispute. If her intention is to point only to the facts, then her claim is very weak. The problems are divided into two types: the conclusion regarding the examples she brought (A-C), the generalization regarding humanity as a whole (F), and some that address both planes (D-E): A.

Is it true that in times of crisis people tend to cling to the familiar? Yes. But does that indicate that change is impossible? By all accounts, times of crisis pose a special challenge. She herself points this out: “People want to believe that they are global, developed, and unbiased creatures, who do not distinguish between dark and light, between man and woman, between Chinese and European, and between rich and poor, but at critical moments humanity’s wild nature is revealed. Suddenly, in a single day, whole populations become ostracized, every tourist who passed through Italy is declared suspect, every slant-eyed person is contagious, and everyone who coughs is a leper. Put people with their backs against the wall, make them feel that their very existence is in danger, and see how they stop being inclusive and universal, and become small and miserable creatures who keep their heads down and rely only on those who look like them. Only on their state and only on their nation.” B.

Even with regard to the cases brought in those very examples, there is nothing in her words that proves anything about relating to people according to national identity (correlation fallacies). After all, during coronavirus the Chinese and the Italians really were suspect statistically. So why should an ordinary person not take that into account when deciding whether to approach or not? Those are the data available to him (a person who looks Chinese is usually Chinese). Does she recommend that liberals ignore statistics? She herself writes in the concluding sentence that she does not wish to address the statistical basis of these attitudes (statistics or stereotype). But that is her entire argument. So how can this be ignored!? Moreover, here the fallacy is more severe. Usually the fallacy stems from the fact that there are two possible explanations for the correlation (a causal explanation or some other one). But here it is more likely that the attitude toward the Chinese person and the Italian did not stem from their foreignness (that is, the causal explanation is weaker—so why choose דווקא it?!). Take other foreign populations. Did they receive the same fearful attitude from the majority population? Is it an accident that the examples were דווקא Italians and Chinese and not residents of Zimbabwe or Serbia? C.

There is a black-and-white conception here (the heap paradox). Perhaps the world is progressing toward liberalism, and these examples are situations that have not yet been dealt with (and will improve in the future)? It is true that the term “makes present” tries to skip over this. It is an illustration and not a proof. But to bring a few counterexamples regarding a universal claim is very weak, even just as making-present. It seems that she herself sensed this in her concluding sentences:

“While liberals believe that through educational means one can extract a person from his natural context, from his origin and his roots, and teach him to be universal, conservatives come and remind us that it is not so simple. One cannot replace childhood. There is no way to neutralize belonging. With logic or without it, in the end, when a cruise ship with coronavirus patients stranded off the coast of Japan is reported on, the first thing we want to know is how many Israelis are there. Has the process ended? Liberalism is a project that may perhaps succeed more with time.” D.

Do liberals really claim that identity is completely elastic? It is unlikely that they deny the facts. At most this is a question of degree, and therefore the examples here lose almost all significance (where exactly is the line of dispute? Do liberals think that naturally we will turn to Seinfeld fans and not to our own people?) E.

Do certain cases testify to the rule? Has research been done on liberals’ attitude toward ethnic minorities? Perhaps the cases she brought were only cases of conservatives. If we take as an example groups that regularly meet people different from them (such as artists, academics, and other liberals), in my impression liberalism there would be much stronger. This only says that liberalism has not yet penetrated all strata, but the project is certainly possible. F.

One could have criticized the cat example (incidentally, this is told about Maimonides), but it is only an example and not an argument. In the subtext she assumes that a human being is like a cat, unable to overcome his nature. That is an incorrect assumption, but I do not think she assumes it. She illustrates it through the cat, but the proof is from the human cases she brought. Therefore the example is perfectly fine. It should, however, be noted that what follows from this is that conservatism sees a human being as a cat, lacking choice. Liberalism, by contrast, sees him as a creature endowed with choice, superior to animals. This is a very particular shade of liberalism. Perhaps the ignoring of the statistical basis is meant to say that her intention is to speak about the evaluative dispute through the factual data. That is, although there is a statistical basis for these attitudes (that is, the Chinese and the Italians really were sicker), we as liberals should have ignored the national affiliation in the name of liberal values. But this is already a very problematic claim: 1.

Does liberalism need to be blind to facts? Sometimes it behaves that way, but it is not reasonable to demand that of it. 2.

Her reasons were only factual (and even that is questionable, as above). At most she proved that people are not liberal (and even that was not proved, as above). Does that mean it is not desirable to be such? 3.

One could add another premise (an enthymeme): that goals that are difficult to achieve are not worthy of being our value-goals. But this is not plausible. Counterexamples: completing the Talmud, not speaking slander, and the like. 4.

Even with regard to impossible goals, it is not necessary to claim that they cannot serve as our value-goals. One can move toward them even without truly reaching them. To improve our degree of liberalism (the heap paradox). In sum, these examples have a certain persuasive power to show that our identity is not completely elastic and is not easy to change. Does that mean that it is impossible or not desirable to change it? Absolutely not. We found an illustration here; a convincing argument—not really. In terms of fallacies, there are here: 1.

(Perhaps) a naturalistic fallacy, at least if she intends to argue in favor of the conservative value. 2. The heap paradox (a black-and-white treatment of everyday concepts). 3. Correlation fallacies (drawing causal conclusions from correlation). Here this is more severe, because as we saw, in these examples the more plausible explanation is precisely the non-causal one.

Source: https://drive.google.com/file/d/12tJS9FK-eK5s8SL2uZwiqrEyJaIl0lGF/view?usp=sharing