'The Third Way,' or: On 'Religious Zionism' without a Hyphen

Tzohar – 5765

By Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham

Lecturer at the Institute for Advanced Torah Studies – Bar-Ilan University

A. Introduction

On the occasion of the deep crisis afflicting Religious Zionism in recent years, many are trying to examine its path and its fundamental ideas. And yet, it seems that the examination is not courageous enough, and does not truly touch the root of the real problems. In the final analysis, the basic dogmas always remain untouched.

In this article I wish to argue that one of the roots of the problem is the very fact of treating the religious-Zionist principle as a fundamental principle of faith.

When principles of faith (such as the coming of the Messiah, divine providence, and the like) are thrown into crisis by a harsh reality that strikes believers in those principles in the face, we are supposed to cling to them at any cost and to treat reality as a kind of trial that we must withstand. By contrast, when an ideology, or an assessment of reality, that is not one of the principles of faith stands in a similar conflict, we must undertake a courageous examination of both reality and ideology, and consider relinquishing certain components included within them.

B. Introduction: 'Religious Zionism' without a Hyphen

The Religious-Zionist outlook may be characterized chiefly by the following parameters:

• A positive attitude (usually moderate) toward various innovations, the outside world, its culture, and its ideas.
• A positive attitude toward the state and the renewal of Jewish nationhood in the Land of Israel.

The first characteristic is indeed correlated with Religious Zionism, but it is not the essential part of its character. There are Religious Zionists who do not relate positively to various innovations and to general education, and conversely: there are anti-Zionist Haredim who do relate positively to outside ideas and ideals (quite a number of the exponents of 'Torah im Derekh Eretz' were of this sort).

It is precisely the national element that is the essential foundation of the Religious-Zionist worldview, and it is this element that is undergoing crisis in the current period. Therefore, in what follows I will focus on examining the national element within Religious Zionism, and ignore its modern element.

The late Yosef Burg, one of the leaders of Religious Zionism, in his sharp idiom, aptly expressed the ideological core of Religious Zionism. He held that this lies in the hyphen joining the two words 'religious' and 'Zionist.' Rabbi Yaakov Ariel similarly writes in his article in Tzohar 21 that within the hyphenated expression, and the ideology it expresses, both the religious and the Zionist elements are transformed.

One may say that we do not have two terms standing side by side, as a mere juxtaposition (in the Rogatchover's terminology), but rather a blended composition that fuses these two expressions and creates from them a new element. There is no religious person here who also happens to be Zionist; rather, Zionism is part of religiosity itself.

For my own part, I would like to propose a different ideological suggestion, not necessarily a new one, which in my opinion has not received sufficient examination by the religious leadership of our time. The heart of the proposal is precisely the omission of the hyphen. Let me sharpen this a bit.

By way of introduction, I will bring here a well-known quip circulated in Bnei Brak in the name of the Ponevezh Rav, Rabbi Yosef Shlomo Kahaneman, of blessed memory: on Independence Day every year he did not recite Tahanun (the penitential supplication), but he also did not recite Hallel (the psalms of praise). When he was asked why he acted that way, he answered that he did not expect of himself a deeper Zionism than Ben-Gurion's. Ben-Gurion too, in his Independence Day prayers, recites neither Hallel nor Tahanun…

It seems to me that behind this quip, which is usually perceived as wit at the expense of the secular and the Religious Zionists, stands a unique conception of Zionism, one that even the Ponevezh Rav's students do not fully grasp. The Ponevezh Rav did not mean to joke at all, but rather to make a very serious claim (albeit in humorous form): one may espouse secular Zionism together with commandment observance[1]. He does not recite Hallel because he does not see the establishment of the state as an event of religious significance (in terms of redemption and the religious significance of state institutions), but neither does he recite Tahanun because it is a happy day on which a miracle occurred for the Jews in the Land of Israel, and for that one ought to thank God[2].

On the religious map of the last hundred years there are two poles: Haredi Judaism, which opposes Zionism for religious reasons, and Religious Zionism, which supports it for religious motives. What is sorely lacking on the religious map, and especially on the map of religious leadership, is a middle way (= the third way): 'religious Zionism,' without a hyphen. This is a Zionism whose motives and roots are not religious (in the sense that will be clarified below), alongside which there appears, in an almost merely side-by-side fashion, a religiosity not all that distant from modern religiosity (the Religious-Zionist kind), but devoid of the national dimension. One may call someone who holds such an ideology a 'religious Jew and secular Zionist.'[3]

It seems to me that most Torah-observant Jews, both Haredi and Religious-Zionist, in fact espouse this middle approach. They want to be faithful and loyal citizens of the state, as every person is obligated toward any state in which he lives. Most of them also feel commitment to this state because it has a great many Jewish inhabitants, and we have a 'religious' obligation toward them as individuals and as members of our people. But it is difficult to find anyone (outside the rabbinic world) who still relates to the President of the State as though he were sitting on God's throne in the world, or to IDF uniforms as priestly vestments, or indeed to the State of Israel as though it were anything more than a political instrument for its citizens, Jews and non-Jews alike.

In my humble opinion, the polarization between Haredi Judaism and 'hyphenated Zionism,' and the absence of expressions of the third way, was created solely because the religious leadership is divided in a dichotomous manner between these two poles. It is difficult to find a rabbinic leader who will set up this heading as an alternative to the two contending poles. Hence the ordinary Jew finds himself in a situation that pushes him toward an identification that is not really his own: if you are not Haredi, then you must be Religious-Zionist, and if you are not Religious-Zionist, then you must be Haredi.

But, as stated, this equation is incorrect. There is a middle path, the 'third way' that I have presented: one may be a commandment-observant Jew and at the same time also a secular Zionist (= one whose Zionism has a 'secular' character). We need only recognize this and grant it legitimacy.

C. Illusions and the Current Situation

Religious Zionism has always seen itself as a kind of unifying bridge between poles within the Jewish people: between the secular-Zionist pole and the religious non-Zionist (Haredi) pole.

Today the situation is such that secular society sees Religious Zionism as an esoteric, messianic faction, almost a mystical sect, and relates to it very unsympathetically. In certain segments of the public one can find almost an attitude of revulsion toward it. By contrast, the Haredi world is beginning to look more positive, a camp occupied with spirit and not committed to belligerent nationalism (as Religious Zionism is portrayed). Its contribution to society, the economy, and security is indeed small, but in recent years these aspects seem forgivable.

It is very important to note here that this attitude is not characteristic only of a thin layer of universalist intellectuals (the media, artistic, judicial, and academic elites), as many of us tend to comfort ourselves by thinking. As anyone with even slight familiarity with the broader public knows, this is an outlook that is increasingly becoming the possession of a large and growing public. The broader public does not identify with ideas that in its eyes appear to be 'takeover' of territories (even if they are part of the Land of Israel), and with 'nationalism' and 'messianism' in the style of Gush Emunim. Even if there are temporary fluctuations in public opinion following one rocket barrage or terror attack or another, we should not err by assigning them too much significance. The general direction is sharp, clear, and very consistent.

Beyond that, we must not surrender to the comforting illusion as though what we have here were merely fatigue and an urge toward destruction and self-loss. These are universalist-moral ideas, unwilling to see territory and 'nationalism' as values for which one should kill and be killed, and unwilling to cooperate with the rule of one people over another against its will.

These illusions lead the Religious-Zionist public to pathetic campaigns of momentum intended to 'raise the nation's morale.' After every terror attack it is convinced that 'now everyone will understand that we were always right.' Public opinion is indeed influenced to some extent by terror attacks, or by rockets fired at us from Gaza, but when a real decision arises between continuing the occupation and the possibility of ending it (and certainly if there is also a peace agreement, regardless of how reliable it is), we will immediately see the true balance of forces in public opinion.

D. National Consensus through a Deep Spiritual-Religious Foundation

All of the above is not meant to say that one should give up the ideas that form the basis upon which the roots of Religious Zionism rest. Rather, we must channel these ideas, as will be explained below.

Rabbi Kook understood that the national awakening in his generation expressed a latent religious awakening. By virtue of this, Religious Zionism continues ceaselessly to fall into the illusion that one can create coalitions (political and social) around the common national denominator. Time after time Religious Zionism receives slaps in the face from its secular national 'partners' (who usually themselves carry out the withdrawals and the peace agreements, and 'surprise' us anew each time). This is a blindness into which Religious Zionism enters willingly.

For some reason, the leaders of Religious Zionism do not draw the obvious conclusion: that it is impossible to create a national consensus without a deep spiritual-religious foundation. This identification is not created from the national plane; on the contrary, national identification is created out of religious identification. As long as the latter does not exist, there is no chance whatsoever of creating a broad national front.

The identification of Religious Zionism with nationalistic ideas, an identification that only deepens in light of the artificial persuasion campaigns with which we occupy ourselves, prevents us from exerting influence on religious planes. Today everything is perceived as part of the political-state 'schemes' of Religious Zionism. Many citizens think that the desire to get them to put on tefillin is also a means of getting them to oppose withdrawals.

This is the meaning of the deep fracture through which Religious Zionism has been passing in recent years (from Begin and Oslo, through Sharon's disengagement, to the events of Amona).

The fact that the State of Israel acts in ways unrelated to Judaism and Torah, and to a large extent acts vigorously against Torah, causes no crisis among us. The fact that the children of Israel are being sent into spiritual ruin in our state school system, and that general and Jewish education in the State of Israel simply do not exist, leads to no crisis. By contrast, the fact that the State of Israel does not act to conquer the whole Land of Israel and retain it is perceived by Religious Zionism as a theological catastrophe.

This is an astonishing, even alarming, phenomenon. Is possession and sovereignty over the whole Land of Israel equivalent to all the commandments together? Is belief in the religious significance of the state a principle of faith? Is it more important than issues of Sabbath, education, violence, social problems, and more?

The reason for this distortion lies in that same dangerous illusion as though national expressions possessed a hidden religious significance. As though the religious dimension would be created on the basis of the national dimension. The religiosity of the state became interwoven with its nationalism, and once the latter disappeared, the religious aspect disappeared with it as well. Thus we were left without the religious value of Zionism and of the state.

The deeper reason for this process is described in my book, Two Wagons and a Hot-Air Balloon, where I explain that nationalism is bound up with a 'chauvinistic' philosophical conception (synthetic, in the terminology used there), and therefore it cannot survive in a postmodern world. This is a deep process, whose roots lie far beneath the surface, and not in one political process or another. As I show there, secularity necessarily leads to a 'leftist' outlook, and this is not a historical accident or some sort of takeover. What we have here is a deep dispute about faith, truth, and values, and not the banal picture of the righteous and brave facing the weary, or of occupiers and occupied.

E. The Jewish Collective versus the Individuals

There are two additional characteristics of Religious Zionism, one rooted in the theological plane and the other on the tactical level.

• On the theological plane

There is a major innovation in the worldview of Religious Zionism, namely taking metaphysical analysis into account as part of the practical decision-making process. Let me preface by saying that the fact that, in someone's estimation, the State of Israel constitutes this or that stage in redemption does not necessarily lead to practical conclusions. One could believe this, and at the same time continue to conduct oneself in the most scrupulously Haredi manner, that is, to oppose this process and those who bear it.

Traditionally, the Torah approach to reality is based on responding to reality as it is observed with the eyes, and not to reality as it is analyzed with theological-metaphysical tools. Questions such as how conversion processes should be conducted (whether to be lenient in them or not), whether to cooperate with secular Jews, how to relate to the state, its symbols, and its institutions, whether to support the sale permit (heter mekhira) in the Sabbatical year, and the like, are not necessarily derived from the question of what the establishment of the state means within the process of redemption. All these matters are determined according to the parameters of Jewish law and a realistic assessment of reality as it is.

A sharp example, even to the point of bluntness, of this characteristic is found in the well-known story of the meeting between Rabbi Herzog and the late Rabbi Yitzhak Ze'ev Soloveitchik (the Griz), in which Rabbi Herzog tried to persuade the Griz not to abandon Jerusalem, then under attack in the War of Independence. Rabbi Herzog used the argument based on the tradition that the Third Temple would not be destroyed. The Griz answered him that he had another tradition from his father, Rabbi Hayyim Soloveitchik, namely that when people are shooting, one flees.

Rabbi Herzog bases his practical decisions on metaphysical considerations, whereas the Griz, who expresses the accepted Jewish attitude (and the Haredi one, today), is unwilling to do so. He relates primarily to the practical, real aspects.[4]

B. On the tactical plane

A second characteristic of Religious Zionism is the tactic of influence on the large scale, in the macro sense. Religious Zionism has always believed in a form of global influence: through coalitions, religious legislation, settlement throughout the country, the public character of the Sabbath, and the like. It set itself goals concerning state institutions in general and public companies (such as Egged, El Al, and the like), and not goals on the micro level. It was less inclined to deal with the individual citizen and influence him (for example, bringing him back to religious observance), or with his views and attitudes (something that has changed in recent years).

These two characteristics, too, take part in the crisis. The macro tactic repeatedly runs into stubborn refusal. The Supreme Court decides to recognize non-Orthodox conversion, as is entirely expected and understandable, and Religious Zionism is surprised and shocked. The fact that these 'converts' (as well as outright gentiles) enter Israeli society all the time, with or without the High Court of Justice, concerns us far less. The public character and the declarative plane are what truly matter to us.

Religious coercion has achieved almost none of its goals, as was clear to anyone with eyes in his head. How long can one go on demanding that a broad public behave according to the dictates of a sector with which it does not identify at all, without protest? The state is becoming increasingly less Jewish, but this is not happening despite the coercion; perhaps it is happening precisely because of it. In recent years, when coercion has greatly diminished, the attitude toward Judaism has indeed changed somewhat.

How long can one compel an entire public to fight for territories and places whose importance it does not recognize at all, and whose retention it moreover regards as a moral and human wrong? The question of territories and occupation must also be discussed on the plane of our duty toward Israel's other citizens. Does it seem reasonable, and even moral, to force an entire public to continue fighting, and even dying, for goals in which it does not believe, even if peace will not result from this, and even if we gain nothing from the concessions? The fact that a large majority of the public is no longer willing to fight for these goals is not taken into account at all in our camp.

How long can one impose upon the public in Israel a 'Chief Rabbinate,' chosen through intrigues and religious politics, such that sometimes unworthy people are selected for extraneous reasons, while at the same time it claims powers and status with respect to the entire public?

The reason for this problematic phenomenon lies in the two characteristics described above:

The state as an organ and as a collective body occupies our entire field of vision. We do not discern the citizens who make up this organ. We speak in the name of the Jewish people as a whole, and forget somewhat the individuals. This is the influence of the second characteristic, the collectivist one. But the first characteristic is not absent here either.

Religious Zionism sees in the state an embodiment of an idea, an external expression of deep metaphysical currents, and therefore tends to ignore the concrete citizens who compose it. The seat of the President of the State is God's throne in the world, even though the person sitting on it (and I am not speaking specifically of the current president) does not see himself as connected to that, and at times does not acknowledge God at all. The Israel Defense Forces are holy, despite the fact that almost none of those who serve in them feels this. We know better than everyone else what they themselves think and do, and what their significance is. In practice, we do not see them at all. They are transparent, and through them we see the theological functions they fulfill for us. The duties and rights of the state and its institutions are derived from their metaphysical role, and not necessarily from their real functional performance and their actual character.

F. A State of All Its Citizens

For quite a number of years now, the State of Israel has been a state of all its citizens. A few remnants, generally unrealized, of Jewish uniqueness still remain, but they are steadily disappearing.

Within Religious Zionism, the war against the idea of a state of all its citizens is waged with full force, even though that war is no longer relevant. We are fighting windmills that defeated us long ago. In fact, in an essential sense the state was always a state of all its citizens, but our blindness prevented us from seeing this. For us, everything expressed deep ideas and collective metaphysical movements. The fact that the individuals did not quite fit the overall process did not really disturb us.

Rabbis and thinkers have labored greatly at intensive explanation of how everything fits the overall process. How Rabbi Kook's vision continues to be realized, even though all of reality was teaching us the exact opposite. For every deviation from the overall process one can find an appropriate paragraph in his writings (the process of redemption has ups and downs, and he already foresaw everything), and therefore everything works out.

In many respects, Religious-Zionist theory sees itself as an unfalsifiable theory, almost a tautology. This recalls other ideological conceptions, such as communism, mutatis mutandis, where too they showed that everything is already found in the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, and that all modern physics, or linguistics, is already present there; and whatever does not fit is simply an error in the observer's eyes or an 'evil inclination.' There too very sophisticated dialectics were created in order to reconcile a detached ideology with a recalcitrant and complex reality.

Let us emphasize: had this been a matter of principles of faith, then an assessment of reality should not have been expected to alter our relation to them. But the hyphen of Religious Zionism is not a principle of faith. It is an assessment of reality, metaphysical and practical, that has been shown false.

G. The Sane Alternative: Separating Religion from State Institutions

Everything begins at the foundation. The State of Israel is a state of all its citizens, and it should be seen as such. Torah Judaism is one sect within the state. Many of the state's citizens are Jews (at least biologically), but the state as an organ is not.[5]

Several conclusions follow from this. First, there is no prohibition upon a non-Jewish sovereign body handing over territory from the Land of Israel to another non-Jewish sovereign body. There is no room to expect this body to show preferential treatment toward halakhic Judaism, or to discriminate against other currents, Jewish and non-Jewish alike. Such an expectation is unrealistic, and in fact also immoral (from the standpoint of democratic principles). Admittedly, from the standpoint of enforcing commandment observance there might be room to try to stop this, but the uncompromising demand from state institutions (and especially from the High Court of Justice), and the lack of understanding of their motives, stem from the illusion that they too see reality as we do. Let us recall again the 'surprise' and 'astonishment' that seize us each time this occurs.

On the other hand, none of this need prevent a positive attitude toward the state and its institutions. This does not mean that one should 'convert' to Haredism. It is possible to maintain a secular and loyal attitude toward the state and its institutions, particularly against the background of the fact that many of its inhabitants are Jews, while at the same time not seeing in it and its institutions holiness and direct religious significance.

There is, of course, religious significance to the survival of Jews, just as there is religious significance to eating for the sake of Heaven, and to relieving oneself in accordance with the law. But that does not turn the food or the bodily function into something holy, nor does it turn the state, as a political instrument, into an entity that possesses holiness. There is religious and moral value in civic loyalty to any decent state, particularly if many of its inhabitants belong to the Jewish people, at least potentially. But this has nothing whatsoever to do with holiness.[6]

We must return and concentrate on influence at the micro level, on the state's Jewish citizens, and try to bring them closer to a Torah-Jewish outlook. Influence on the public will not be achieved through legislation, nor through fragile political coalitions built on shaky foundations. We must relate to the Jews living in the state as individuals, and not as expressions of a theological-metaphysical movement. Our goals should focus on the Jews, and not on the state and its institutions. We must stop seeing metaphysics beneath every movement on the surface. Note well: I do not mean to say that metaphysical analysis is necessarily incorrect. My claim is that even if there is metaphysics (and I definitely believe there is), it should not directly influence our practical decisions or our mode of conduct.

The President of the State is a superfluous institution, nothing more. The Prime Minister is a practical necessity (someone must manage affairs), nothing more. Neither of them is a king, nor even comes close to being one. At most they are local trustees, the 'seven good men of the city.' In general, politicians are no one's leaders, and that is a good thing. People of spirit ought to be regarded as the leaders of values. Politicians are bureaucrats, and should be treated as such. Concepts borrowed from the world of ancient kingship, when applied to institutions of democratic government, border on nationalism and sound rather anachronistic and ridiculous.

The Jewish people as a whole currently finds no practical expression. It is not represented by any concrete institution, and certainly the State of Israel is not its exclusive expression. The State of Israel, if we understand it as such, has no prohibition against handing over territory to someone else. The State of Israel need not arrange the sale of leavened food, nor the sale of land in the Sabbatical year. It is worth trying to persuade the Jewish citizens within it to do so. This can be done only through explanation and persuasion, and not by coercive means. Marriage and divorce, too, should be carried out in forms acceptable to the citizens, if only for practical reasons: there is no chance whatsoever of continuing to impose the Torah's view on the majority of the public in these matters either. Conversion is the concern of Jewish law, and not of statute and the state. Conversely, the definition of Israeli citizenship is the concern of the Knesset, and not of Jewish law. If the dangerous and patently mistaken identification between the terms 'Jew' and 'Israeli' were to cease, the problems of conversion, and many other problems that accompany us, would disappear on their own. Admittedly, the public character of the state would no longer be Jewish, but it already is not. What matters is the Jews, not the Jewish state. All these questions, of course, also have halakhic aspects, but this is not the place to elaborate on them.

Religion must be taken out from under the rule of political institutions; we must put an end to the Chief Rabbinate and other corrupt institutions chosen by politicians, on the basis of extraneous considerations, institutions that degrade the image of Torah in the eyes of the public, religious and secular alike. These institutions do far more harm than good. If Torah and Jewish law were non-institutional, they would possess moral power and authority immeasurably greater than they do today. Today Torah is a political camp in the State of Israel, a kind of party (as is well known, for this reason Rabbi Kook himself was unwilling to join any party). As such, its possibility of exerting influence and serving as a spiritual alternative is almost nonexistent. By our own hands we have contributed to the neutralization of the power and influence of Torah, From the illusion that it can be made into the constitution of the state and imposed upon its citizens. The late Yeshayahu Leibowitz recounts that he once met Ben-Gurion, and the latter said to him roughly in these words (quoted from memory): 'Leibowitz, I know that you want to separate religion from the state, but I will not let you do that, because I want to control the religious institutions and hold them by the throat.' That is the situation today, and in our foolishness we are still fighting to perpetuate it.[7]

H. Summary — the Third Way

What we have sketched here is a picture of a delusional way of looking at reality. This outlook tries to impose upon the recalcitrant reality around us standards to which it refuses to submit. The Religious-Zionist response to this recalcitrance is mainly creativity in explanations that reconcile the picture with our detached dogmas about it. For all these reasons, it seems to me very important to place on the map the third way, between Haredi Judaism and hyphenated Religious Zionism: 'religious Zionism' without a hyphen. Its meaning is loyal and engaged citizenship in the state, without aspirations to Judaize the state as an organ, but definitely with aspirations to Judaize the state's citizens as much as possible, by means of explanation and influence, but not by coercion.

Even one who is unwilling to accept such a path on the principled level must recognize reality. This will be forced upon us sooner or later, even if we refuse to acknowledge it. Therefore, at least on the tactical level, we must all contend with reality and squarely recognize the facts.

My appeal in this article is directed chiefly to the rabbinic leadership of Religious Zionism, for the root of the problem lies in the dichotomy found within the religious leadership. As I have already mentioned, it seems to me that most of the public on the ground has long since occupied the category described here. I mean both the Haredi public and the Religious-Zionist public. Most devout Jews, from all camps, have for some time already been in the 'third way.' The problem is that the ordinary citizen usually does not define himself in this manner, because the map placed before him by the religious leadership is dichotomous. It contains no heading that expresses another path. Any such attempt is presented as a kind of surrender, faintheartedness, fatigue, impatience, and the like. But all these are part of that same dangerous and destructive illusion that is leading us all into an unavoidable crisis.

[1] As is well known, at Ponevezh Yeshiva they hung a flag on the roof every year on Independence Day (at least until the end of Rabbi Shakh's life). The journalist Dov Ganchovsky told me that he himself, as a young yeshiva student, sat with the Ponevezh Rav on the roof of the yeshiva and guarded the flag from the rebellious students (according to him, he has a picture of them in that situation).

[2] I note that from such a conception one may also arrive at an obligation to recite Hallel, for it is no less significant than the Frankfurt Purim and the like (and indeed that is how I, in my modesty, conduct myself). However, it is quite clear that this was the Ponevezh Rav's principled intention. The halakhic question is not our concern here.

[3] In the past I described my outlook in newspaper interviews under this heading. Later I saw that this expression is cited in the name of the late Yeshayahu Leibowitz.

[4] See Rabbi Shevet's article on this in Tzohar 21. In note 38 there he brings this story and questions its reliability; and regarding the doubts about the reliability of the story of the Griz's statement, he says (paraphrasing the well-known story about the Hafetz Hayyim) that in any case it is clear that such a story is not told about Rabbi Herzog.

[5] The state has no 'mother,' and therefore the criterion for its Jewishness is only its culture, values, and mode of conduct.

[6] I do not wish to deal here with the holiness of a political framework in general, even one conducted entirely on the foundations of Torah. Here I will only note that this too is a topic requiring fundamental clarification.

[7] It is well known that the status of religion and its institutions in the United States is far stronger than in countries where there is no sharp separation of religion and state. The French model, however, is somewhat different, and so too is the situation there, but this is not the place to elaborate.