5757 (1996–97)

With God's help

A.

In the portion of Acharei-Mot, the order of the Yom Kippur service appears. The portion opens by locating itself after the death of Aaron's two sons, when they drew near before the Lord and died. Against this background, it is clear that the portion comes to define how one ought to enter the holy place. And indeed, from the wording of the portion it appears that this is not an order of service for Yom Kippur, but rather an order of entry into the holy place. Only at the end of the portion does there appear a command to perform this order every year on the tenth of Tishrei.

This indicates that this portion deals with the order of entry into the holy place, and that the atonement and purification of Israel are preparations for entry into the holy place, not a law specific to Yom Kippur. There is a law on Yom Kippur to enter the holy place, and therefore this entire procedure becomes necessary. Atonement and purification are means, not ends.

And as is known from the Vilna Gaon, during the wanderings in the wilderness, if they had performed this order, it would have been possible to enter the holy place on other days of the year as well, and not only on Yom Kippur.

If so, it seems that there is a difference here between the character of Yom Kippur in Temple times and today. Usually, it is understood that something is lacking in the atonement brought by the very essence of the day, because of the absence of the two goats and of the sacrifices generally. But according to what we see here, the difference is of another kind: then, this was a day of entry into the holy place, and repentance and purification were means by which to do this correctly. Today, the entire character of Yom Kippur is that of a day of repentance and atonement, and we have no entry into the holy place at all. Seemingly, the main point is missing from the text.

Therefore, it seems that in truth the character of the day is a day of purification and atonement. Except that in Temple times the purification was purification through connectedness: whatever is connected to the pure is pure. Therefore, the very essence of the day atoned. The purification and repentance of Israel were a means by which to enter the holy place, and that entry was what atoned. Today, repentance itself is what atones. Today, atonement comes by means of a judicial decision. If we have gone through everything that must be gone through, the Holy One, blessed be He, forgives us our sins.

And in fact, Lechem Mishneh and Kesef Mishneh write in chapter 1 of Laws of Repentance, laws 1-3, that all the gradations of atonement were stated only for our own time. In purification through connectedness, this is a reality of purity, not a decision to atone and erase sins. It is the atonement that comes from being attached to the pure, and therefore, when one is attached, one is automatically atoned by that very reality itself. This is total atonement for all sins, and it does not depend on different stages and gradations of atonement.

Entry into the holy place is accompanied by bringing two goats, an inner one and an outer one. They are the primary agents of atonement for sins; that is, they constitute the essence of entry into the holy place. Prima facie, we would have expected the inner goat to be the one that atones, and the role of the outer one requires clarification.

Yet we find that the inner goat atones for impurity of the Sanctuary and its holy things, which is itself a transgression of improper entry into the holy place, like Nadav and Avihu. By contrast, the principal atonement in Temple times was specifically through the scapegoat. It atoned for all the sins of all Israel (see Maimonides at the beginning of Laws of Repentance). This is exceedingly puzzling.

The matter is even more puzzling when one considers the explanations of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) regarding the essence of this goat. Several medieval authorities write that it is not a sacrifice at all (see Tosafot Rosh, Shevuot 13, and Tosafot, Shevuot 9a, and Ibn Ezra below). Others explain that it is like a sacrifice to the 'Other Side,' or an appeasement of it so that it will not interfere, and the like. Prima facie, that is a marginal role: to appease 'hostile' factors. According to this, the main atonement is by means of the inner goat, and the sent goat is intended only to prevent disturbances. If so, these explanations do not advance us toward understanding why the principal atonement is specifically through the scapegoat.

Ibn Ezra (Leviticus 16:8): the secret of the goat. Contrary to Rabbi Samuel, it is not a sacrifice, and therefore it can be understood that it is not for God.

Nachmanides (ad loc.) reveals its secret.

It seems that the two goats constitute a theological experiment. We go all the way in both directions, and discover what lies at the depth of each direction. Through the inner goat, entry into the Holy of Holies becomes possible. Through the goat to Azazel, entry becomes possible into the depths of the region of impurity (see Nachmanides there). After that, one reaches the state of 'they shall no longer sacrifice their sacrifices to the goat-demons.' And at the end of Nachmanides' remarks he writes that this goat comes to refute the Greek and his wicked disciples, who arrogantly presumed to think that nothing exists except what they themselves had grasped in their own minds.

We shall try to understand this through a halakhic tour following the goat to Azazel. Through its halakhic characteristics, we shall try to understand the secrets of Ibn Ezra and Nachmanides.

B.

The stages in the process of sending the goat to Azazel are as follows:

Selection. Consecration. Lottery. Tying of a crimson thread. Laying on of hands. Confession. Handing over to the designated man (sending to the cliff of Azazel). Splitting the crimson thread into two: one part is tied on the cliff and a second part is tied to its horns. Pushing from the cliff. Going down to kill it (if necessary).

We shall now follow the goat's halakhic status at each of these stages.

1. Selection (Mishnah Yoma 62a). Two goats are selected that are equal in height, appearance, weight, price, and so forth. Rabbi Yitzhak Hutner ('Pachad Yitzhak' on Purim) explains that this is because we need to concentrate on the distinction between them, and not on external distinctions. The purpose of the matter is comparison between the sacrifice to the Lord and the goat to Azazel, and not anything else. Here we have a first hint that we are performing an act of comparison.

However, it should be noted that the similarity between the goats is not indispensable.

2. Consecration. Both goats require consecration like any other sacrifice. At this stage, it is clear that both are holy with the sanctity of a sacrifice. The Talmud in Yoma 62b determines that at this stage, if one slaughtered either of them outside, he is liable as one who offers consecrated sacrifices outside. That is, both are regarded as consecrated offerings (though see R. Chaim's mimeographed notes on the crimson thread of the scapegoat, where he raised a possibility of interpreting the Talmud differently, yet proved that at least according to Maimonides it is clear that this is because they are holy with the sanctity of a sacrifice). See also the dispute between Maimonides and Raavad in chapter 18 of Laws of Sacrificial Procedure, law 11, whether this lasts until the lottery or until the confession.
3. The lottery. Regarding the lottery, medieval and later authorities disputed its status. Is it an act of Temple service or not (and perhaps this depends on the above dispute between Maimonides and Raavad)? The 'Gevurat Ari,' Yoma 39a s.v. 've-ha-segan,' writes that the lottery is only a clarification and not a service, and therefore it suffices to bring up one of the lots, while the other is clarified on its own. Likewise, the declaration 'for the Lord, a sin-offering' is said only over the inner goat, and nothing at all is said over the other. Prima facie, there is here a first hint of the distinction between them: with respect to the sent goat, no service is performed and nothing is said.

However, Rashi on 39b s.v. 'aliyat' writes that both lots must be brought up, and one is not sufficient. It is thus proven that this is not merely a clarification, as Gevurat Ari wrote, but an actual act of Temple service. If so, both goats are still considered sacrifices, and service is performed with both of them.

And Maimonides, in Laws of the Yom Kippur Service 3:3, explicitly writes that the lottery is not Temple service. By contrast, Tosafot Rid on 39a s.v. 'Rabbi Yehudah' writes that the lottery is indispensable, is considered Temple service, and requires the High Priest. It is possible that this is in fact a dispute between two versions in the Talmud in Yoma 39b; see there. And Rashi on 39a noted a practical difference: whether the lottery is valid even when done by the deputy High Priest.

See also Meiri on 39b s.v. 'hagralah' and Tosafot Yeshanim s.v. 'hanahah,' who say that this is only an assignment of designation and not Temple service. If so, it seems that even one who holds that this is not Temple service does not thereby mean that the sanctity does not exist. Both still possess sanctity; rather, this stage is only designation, that is, a preparatory step for the service. For our purposes, the conclusion is that both are still holy.

4. Tying the crimson thread. According to some views, they tied threads on both goats: first on the sent goat, a thread weighing two selaim, and afterward on the inner goat, of some unspecified weight. Some wrote that they did not tie anything at all on the inner goat (see 'Seder Yoma,' p. 123, note 70. The liturgical poems also disagree: in 'Atah Konanta' it is written that they tied one also on the inner goat, while in 'Amitz Koach' it is not mentioned). And Gevurat Ari on 41b asks why the sent goat is dealt with before the inner one, for we maintain that the more sanctified takes precedence. We thus see that the sent goat is holier than its fellow (though see there for several ways of resolving this, and in the book 'Seder Yoma,' p. 121).

He further asked there how it is permitted to tie a crimson thread on the goat's head, since this is a ritual act performed on consecrated offerings (it should be remembered that the thread of the scapegoat weighs two selaim; on the other goat they tied a thread of some unspecified weight). See there, where he cites Tosafot on Pesahim 66 in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud, that any act of service needed for the sacrifice is permitted (though it is possible that the Babylonian Talmud disagrees on this, and later authorities disputed the issue, but this is not the place). If so, while they are standing in the Temple courtyard, where the tying serves their own need so that they not become mixed up with one another and with others, it is permitted. But when it is standing at the cliff, where the tying is for our sake, so that we may see our atonement, it is forbidden. This still requires investigation.

It is further difficult how tying was permitted on the Festival day, for that too is a Torah prohibition. And further, one thereby also violates the prohibition of making an animal perform labor on Yom Kippur.

Prima facie, in answer to Gevurat Ari's difficulty, one could have said that the goat is already no longer a sacrifice after the lottery (as we saw in Ibn Ezra and others, and see below), and perhaps that is the meaning of the Talmud in Yoma 62b, which wrote that one who offers it outside is liable only until the lottery (whereas Maimonides, in chapter 18 of Laws of Sacrificial Procedure, wrote until the confession). However, in Mishnah Shekalim 4:2 it is proven that the crimson thread is taken from the Chamber fund, meaning that the goat is a sacrifice. And there is a further difficulty from the forbidden labors, which are prohibited on Yom Kippur generally, and it does not help that this is not a sacrifice. Therefore Maimonides rules that one who offers it outside is liable until the confession, for even after the lottery it is still holy. And this follows the Talmud in Zevahim against Yoma 62b (see Kesef Mishneh there on Laws of Sacrificial Procedure).

And R. Chaim, in mimeographed notes, resolves this according to Maimonides by proving that tying the thread is a law given to Moses at Sinai, for otherwise it would have been forbidden for these reasons (and there he also proved this from the fact that the crimson thread has a fixed measure: two selaim). According to this, one can also resolve Gevurat Ari's difficulty about performing a ritual act on consecrated offerings.

It should be noted that in Tosafot Yeshanim 68a s.v. 'holek' he writes that this is making an animal perform labor in an unusual manner, and this proves not as R. Chaim held; thus all the difficulties return to their original place. Therefore one must find a particular answer for each permission to violate a prohibition regarding the goat.

[In Mishnah Shekalim 4:2 it is stated that a crimson thread comes from the Chamber fund, while the thread between its horns comes from the surplus of the Chamber fund. The commentators disputed the explanation of the Mishnah (see 'Seder Yoma,' p. 125):

Bartenura wrote that the first refers to the scarlet material that is thrown into the burning fire of the red heifer, and this is needed for the sacrifice; therefore it comes from the Chamber fund. But the thread between its horns is not needed for the sacrifice, and therefore it comes from the surplus of the Chamber fund.

Ribban and Pnei Moshe in the Jerusalem Talmud wrote that this refers to the same crimson thread in two periods. At first they would place it opposite the entrance of the Sanctuary. After the death of Shimon the Righteous, when at times it did not turn white, they enacted that it should be placed between its horns and on the rock.

And Tosafot Yeshanim on 68b brought that there were two crimson threads on the scapegoat: one crimson thread was tied on its head after the lottery, and therefore it came from the Chamber fund. The second was brought from the eve of Yom Kippur to the cliff, and it was not needed for the sacrifice.

And Maimonides, in Shekalim 4:1, wrote that the thread between its horns comes from the Chamber fund. Mishneh LaMelekh wrote that this is a scribal error, since the Mishnah states that the thread between its horns comes from the surplus of the Chamber fund.

And R. Chaim, in mimeographed notes (and likewise the Brisker Rav on Zevahim 107, p. 137 s.v. 'from R. Chaim'), explained that the crimson thread was an obligation regarding the scapegoat as part of the commandment of sending it. The whitening is only a result and not the purpose of the thread itself. If so, a thread that was tied near the entrance to the Sanctuary after the lottery would come from the Chamber fund. And the thread between its horns during the sending and at the cliff was an obligation regarding the goat, for it overrides Sabbath prohibitions; however, from the fact that prohibitions concerning sacrificial service were permitted, and that the act is valid when done by a non-priest, it is clear that at this stage the goat is already no longer a sacrifice. That is, this is an obligation of the day, but not a ritual act performed on a sacrifice.

In fact, there is here a substantive problem: if the thread is tied while it is still a sacrifice, then this is a ritual act performed on sacrifices. But if it is tied afterward, then it is not needed for the sacrifice, and therefore it should come from the surplus of the Chamber fund.

According to R. Chaim, in Maimonides' view, it seems that this is needed for the sacrifice, since it is tied after the lottery and before the confession. And apparently the prohibition of making an animal perform labor and the prohibition of performing a ritual act on consecrated offerings are permitted because of the law given to Moses at Sinai, as explained above. However, as we have seen, and will see further, after the confession the goat is already no longer a sacrifice, and therefore the thread comes from the surplus of the Chamber fund.

The root of the dispute is the question whether the thread is needed for the sacrifice, for without that it cannot come from the Chamber fund. According to some of the medieval authorities, already here the scapegoat is not a sacrifice, and therefore the crimson thread comes only from the surplus of the Chamber fund. In any case, the thread tied on its head at the cliff is already not needed for the sacrifice according to almost all views. That is, there its sacrificial status has already lapsed.]

5. Laying on of hands. The High Priest would lay his hands on the goat. Later authorities discussed whether this is the ordinary laying on of hands of sacrifices. In 'Mikdash David' it is proven that this is the regular laying on of hands of sacrifices, from the Talmud in Menahot 92, which states that this laying on of hands is that of an owner upon his sacrifice. And he writes there that the law requiring slaughter immediately after laying on of hands is fulfilled by the sending. If so, here it seems that the scapegoat is still a sacrifice.

In practice, if this were not laying on of hands of a sacrifice, it would be forbidden, since this is a ritual act performed on sacrifices, as in the discussion about women laying on of hands.

6. Confession. In the book 'Avodat HaMelekh' the question is raised why the High Priest's confession does not mention accepting future obligations, and it remains unresolved. And in Sefat Emet he asks why he does not detail his sins.

And in the book 'Avodat HaYom' (sec. 32) it is proven from the wording of the confession over the bull, which is the same wording as over the goat, that the confession over the bull is not a confession of repentance but a confession of a sacrifice. He proved this from the words of Rabbi Shimshon on the Sifra. However, regarding the confession over the goat, it is difficult why there the priest does not detail his sins or accept future obligations, for the goat is not a sacrifice. And indeed, Maimonides brought the laws of confession over the goat in chapter 1 of Laws of Repentance and not in Laws of the Yom Kippur Service. This is also evident from the Talmud in Yoma 36b, which brings proof for the formulation of repentance-confession from the confession of the goat.

Therefore, we must say that the High Priest confesses over the goat in the name of all Israel, and therefore he cannot detail sins, nor accept future obligations, and this is obvious. In any case, it seems possible that at the stage of confession the goat is already no longer a sacrifice.

7. The sending. This is valid even when performed by a non-priest. From this it appears that it is not Temple service (and above we saw from 'Mikdash David' that it is like slaughter, which also is valid when performed by a non-priest). The designated man enters the Temple even in impurity, and goes beyond the permitted boundary even on the Sabbath (see Yoma 66b). And in Shitah Mekubetzet, Keritot 14a, in the omissions and novellae, sec. 12 (and see Dvar Avraham, vol. 2, sec. 8, end of branch 7), he asks why they do not bring the goat out to him. And there he offers two answers: 1. because it is written 'by the hand of a designated man before the Lord.' 2. so that one should not say that the sending is Temple service and therefore may not be done in impurity. And he writes there that for this reason the sending is valid when done by a non-priest.

Prima facie, it is proven that at this stage the goat is already no longer a sacrifice. However, one could have rejected this by saying that slaughter in a sacrifice is not Temple service, though the sacrifice is still a sacrifice, and the same would apply to the sending.

However, we find in Tosafot Rid, who explained the Mishnah that says frivolous people would pluck at the goat's hair during the sending (Yoma 66a), that there is a prohibition of plucking on Yom Kippur. And we see that the fact that they did this to the sacrifice entails no prohibition. If so, it appears that by now it is already no longer a sacrifice.

It should be remembered that Tosafot Rid himself wrote that the lottery is Temple service, meaning that at that stage, according to all views, it is indeed a sacrifice. We thus see that its sanctity lapses at this stage. And so too R. Chaim cited above wrote explicitly.

However, regarding the sending, there are those who disagree and hold that it is Temple service, and that the designated man is the agent of the High Priest. A proof of this is that the man returns and says to the High Priest: 'My master, High Priest, I have carried out your mission' (Yoma 71a).

See Rashi on 65a, who wrote that the sending is not indispensable at all. And Meiri (40a s.v. 'shalosh' and 66a s.v. 'amru') cites a dispute about this. See also Rabbi Shimshon on Sifra, Acharei, parashah 4, sec. 8.

It should further be noted that the designated man is also permitted to eat on Yom Kippur. This despite the fact that at least part of what he does is not indispensable.

8. The pushing. According to all views, this is not indispensable, and of course it is done by a non-priest.
9. After the pushing, the limbs are permitted for benefit (Yoma 67a), for we do not say that it is sent out in a way that creates a stumbling block.

And behold, the Brisker Rav on Yoma 61 s.v. 've-hineh' proved from Gevurat Ari that if it remained alive, it is permitted to slaughter it and eat it. See also Minhat Hinukh 185, sec. 10, that if the designated man went down after it and slaughtered it, perhaps it is permitted to eat. And so too Pri Hadash, Laws of the Yom Kippur Service 5:22, wrote in the book 'Mayim Hayyim.'

However, the Talmud (66b) states that if it did not die, one must go down after it and kill it in whatever manner possible.

Later authorities asked how the act of taking life was permitted, since its commandment had already been fulfilled. They explain that the pushing is a new commandment and not part of the atonement, yet it too is a commandment, and it overrides Yom Kippur (see R. Chaim above, and Hiddushei R. Aryeh Leib, vol. 2, sec. 33. He notes there a practical difference regarding laundering clothes afterward).

And in Rabbeinu Tam, Sefer HaYashar, responsum 52, sec. 5, it implies that pushing it is literally like slaughter (and apparently that is explicit in the Talmud regarding the law of 'it and its offspring'; see Minhat Hinukh cited above, 185, sec. 10). He notes there that some wanted to prove from here that after the pushing it is permitted for benefit and for eating even without slaughter, for the pushing itself is the slaughter. However, Rabbeinu Tam himself disagrees, and argued that this is like the slaughter of a burnt-offering, which does not permit eating.

In any case, even according to Rabbeinu Tam, if he did not push it but instead slaughtered it and ate it, it may be that eating is permitted (and so Minhat Hinukh inclined there). The dispute concerns only the question whether the pushing counts as slaughter, and not the very permission to eat itself.

And R. Chaim (there) proved from the fact that sending and pushing are valid when performed by a non-priest, that they are a new commandment and not part of the atonement and the service of the day. That is, at this stage, beginning with the confession, the scapegoat is not a sacrifice.

C.

We see here a very strange phenomenon. At the beginning of the process, we have two goats, both holy with the sanctity of a sacrifice. Afterward, that sanctity begins to be undermined. First signs appear already in the lottery service, which perhaps is not Temple service, at least not with respect to the sent goat. Afterward, in the tying of the thread, for otherwise perhaps this would be using consecrated property. Afterward, in the laying on of hands, it still seems to be a sacrifice, since otherwise there would be a problem of using consecrated property. Afterward, in the confession, there are signs that this is no longer the confession of a sacrifice. The sending and the pushing are already, according to almost all views, not Temple service performed on a sacrifice, and they are also not indispensable. And finally, the greatest wonder: the flesh is permitted for benefit, and perhaps one may even take the goat, slaughter it, and eat it.

As is known, intrinsic sanctity does not simply lapse on its own (see Nedarim 29). One cannot strip sanctity from a sacrifice except through an act. In the whole Torah there is no situation in which a sacrifice simply stops being a sacrifice. It would still be understandable if it became permitted after its commandment had been fulfilled; there are examples of that. But here, already at the confession it becomes permitted, even though the sending is indispensable according to almost all opinions (perhaps according to Rashi, who holds that even the sending is not indispensable, one could say that already at the confession its commandment has been fulfilled and therefore it becomes permitted).

The entire purpose of the goat is that it be sent to Azazel in the wilderness. Once that is realized, it is already no longer a sacrifice. More than that: this whole 'main point,' which is ostensibly the explicit purpose stated in the Torah, namely sending it to Azazel, is not indispensable. It need not be done at all. According to Rashi, from the point of sending onward, and according to the other medieval authorities, from the point of pushing onward. If so, the essence of the goat is the going and not the arriving (Azazel = az azal, 'the goat went').

More than that: there is nowhere to arrive. After everything, when the whole story is over, we find ourselves at the starting point. We have an ordinary, unconsecrated goat, which can be slaughtered and eaten. As though nothing at all has happened up to this point. An awakening from a dream, like Alice in Wonderland.

This is the interpretation that several commentators proposed for the name Azazel: az azal. The goat goes, and that is the atonement. Not the arrival but the movement toward the goal is what atones.

And it is further difficult why there are all these permissions for the designated man. They are unnecessary, and not indispensable at all. We allow him to make the animal carry a burden, to perform acts on consecrated offerings, to go beyond the permitted boundary, to eat on Yom Kippur, to tie on Yom Kippur, to enter the Temple in impurity, and all this for actions that he in fact need not do at all. They are not indispensable. Entering the Temple is entirely unnecessary, as in Shitah Mekubetzet. We also forbid slaughtering the goat outside until the confession so that… there will be no need to do anything with it necessarily (usually we require that it be fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, that is, for slaughter. Here it is fit for whatever the designated man wants to do with it. Nothing is indispensable). All the permissions indicate that there is some important goal, and then we discover that there is no important goal at all. Everything is non-indispensable. All the halakhic permissions are, as it were, merely to allow one to do whatever one wants!?

Ibn Ezra writes that if we know what comes after the word Azazel, we shall know its secret. If we know what comes after the going. But after the going there is nothing. We go, and in the end discover that there is nothing here at all. That we are at the starting point.

Nachmanides explained 'a cut-off land' as the place where impurity and the goat-demons dwell. To the ruler there we, as it were, offer the sacrifice.

Prima facie, this is a picture of two domains: holiness and impurity. And we offer sacrifice to both. When one tries to draw near into the depths of each of them, one suddenly discovers that there is only one. At the root of the domain of the goat-demons there is nothing at all. The sacrifice dissipates and becomes ordinary property. Everything is dream and imagination, and evil has no real existence whatsoever. Goat-demons are demons, whose kabbalistic definition is imaginary realities, without a root above, the essence of duality.

Nachmanides writes that Ibn Ezra's words, 'when you are thirty-three years old you will know it,' refer to the verse found 33 verses after the verse about Azazel: 'and they shall no longer sacrifice their sacrifices to the goat-demons.' If one understands that there are no goat-demons, that they are imagination, that is the recipe for no longer sacrificing to them. For then one understands that they are nothingness and vanity, with no substance in them.

When we go toward evil, we go without any halakhic constraints. The designated man is permitted to eat. He is permitted to make the animal carry a burden. He is permitted to tie. He is permitted to go beyond the permitted boundary, on the Sabbath and on Yom Kippur. He is permitted to pluck its hair. He enters the Temple in impurity. And all this without any real reason, since nothing here is necessary, as Shitah Mekubetzet on Keritot notes, or at least not indispensable.[1]

The law, or rather the laws, are annulled, and we go toward evil without any protections, in order to get all the way there. And when we arrive, we see that there is nothing there at all. We do not need these protections, and in the future, when the name of the Lord will be one and clear in the world, the commandments will be nullified. The commandments are a mode of conduct suited to a world of duality, a world that appears as though the goat-demons have some existence.

Therefore it was so important to the Sages to preserve the fact that the goat is not a sacrifice, according to the Shitah Mekubetzet in Keritot, to the point that they permitted entering the Temple in impurity. They wanted us to know the essence of the goat, and that is worth permitting a prohibition punishable by karet. This is also in order to teach that in such a state the commandments have no significance.

One who discovers this will no longer sin. In Nachmanides' words: he will no longer sacrifice to goat-demons, and will discover that there is none besides Him. Everything else is imagination.

Nachmanides concludes that his words came to reject the view of the wicked Greek and his disciples, Aristotle, who arrogantly thought that only what they grasp exists. Here we discover precisely the opposite: only what we do not grasp truly exists. All matter and existence outside holiness do not exist at all. What we do grasp is, many times, an illusory imagination.

The picture calls to mind Ishmael and Isaac. There are many parallels here, rising early in the morning, a surprising discovery at the end, the sacrifice of sons, and much else, and in fact these are two bindings: Isaac is brought up into the Holy of Holies, on Mount Moriah, and Ishmael is sent away, to Azazel, into the wilderness. Hagar is the designated man (valid when performed by a non-priest = a non-Jew).

Abraham discovers that he need not sacrifice Isaac but the ram, yet this counts for him as though he had sacrificed Isaac, his ashes being heaped upon the altar. Hagar discovers that the place in which she finds herself is not a wilderness at all. There is a well of water there that she simply does not see. The world is a wilderness, yet within it there is a real existence of water, which one does not always see. The designated man discovers that there is nothing wild or desolate in the wilderness to which he goes. Nor does the designated man sacrifice his offering, for it is not an offering. It can be brought back again. Ishmael returns as he is, whereas Isaac is, as it were, sacrificed, his ashes heaped upon the altar.

Isaac discovered the secret of sacrifices, and Ishmael discovered that there is nothing beyond them.

Therefore on Rosh Hashanah we read these two passages of the binding, and on Yom Kippur the passage of the two goats.

Entry into the holy place requires this contrast. One must discover both the way to draw near to God, that is, to enter the holy place, and conversely the fact that there is nothing on the other side that has any real root. Living with such an experience prevents sin, and constitutes total repentance, without limitations, what we called above purification through connectedness.

Kesef Mishneh asks concerning Maimonides how lesser sins are atoned for by the goat, since the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination without repentance. According to our explanation, this is very well understood, since this is purification through connectedness. The goat is not a sacrifice, and therefore the atonement it effects is not sacrificial atonement. It does not require repentance.

And so too we find regarding the atonement of the scapegoat. In Tosafot s.v. 'de-avar,' Shevuot 13a, one answer states that the goat atones even for transgressions committed after it was sent away. And in Gevurat Ari on 85b s.v. 've-al,' he cites that the Ran disagrees about this. And Tosafot Rosh, who cited those Tosafot, added that the goat is not a sacrifice, as Ibn Ezra wrote above. And so too in Tosafot s.v. 'ho'il' in Shevuot 9a.

It is thus proven that the atonement of the goat is not like the atonement of sacrifices, for those atone only for transgressions committed before they are brought. And so too Tosafot Rosh cited above wrote. If so, the sending is not an act performed on a sacrifice but a different kind of atonement, as we saw above.

Ideally, we must kill the goat, and complete the act of offering, for one cannot live in such a realm. We are not capable of living in a state in which everything around us is imagination and only the Holy One, blessed be He, exists. Therefore a contraction is made. It is impossible to live in a place where there is no evil at all. Absurdly enough, that is the place of the goat-demons. There one sees that they do not exist, and therefore there in fact exists a reality in which there is no evil at all. Outside that place we think there is evil there, and also good, and therefore we live in duality. When one is there, one discovers that one is in the very source of holiness itself. There is no other source for any reality.

In everyday life, we live within an imagined reality and fight it through the commandments. One must not live this way in the course of ordinary life. We need to preserve this in consciousness, in the background, but not to live this way. One can touch this experience only on Purim and on Yom Kippur. There we are exempt from the commandments, but over the course of life it is impossible to live this way.

The commandments will be nullified in the future, and so too the books of the Prophets and Writings, except for Purim and the Scroll of Esther. In the future, we shall live this way all the time. These will be lives lived in the consciousness that there is none besides Him, and therefore we shall not need commandments. The whole year will be Purim.

The Messiah will bring back the goat, but these will be complete lives of the goat, and not a goat once, or twice, a year. All of life will be lived in the experience that there is none besides Him, and therefore all of us will be designated men, and we shall live without commandments, and without the books of the Prophets and Writings.

D.

Let us deepen this point still further.

In the Passover Haggadah, the wicked son, and not the simple son, is the opposite of the wise son. Opposite the gates of understanding stand the gates of impurity, and not the gates of foolishness.

A wicked person is intelligent, like the Greek in Nachmanides: one who believes only in the reality he sees, and not in what lies beyond it. In effect, he believes in a reality without a root. Impurity is a complex entity without a root (a corpse, the ultimate source of impurity, is a body without life). The gates of impurity are gates of understanding without faith in the root within them.

The Vilna Gaon, on Proverbs, on the verse 'The Lord made everything for His sake, and even the wicked for the day of evil' (Proverbs 16), explains: the word 'everything' has the numerical value of 50, corresponding to the fifty gates of understanding, which God made for His sake. And the words 'and even' have the numerical value of 49, corresponding to the forty-nine gates of impurity, within which stands the wicked person. There is no fiftieth gate of impurity.

Nachmanides too, in the introduction to his commentary on Genesis, writes that the fiftieth gate is different. It is not exactly understanding.

The fiftieth gate is wisdom, the root of understanding, the axioms. Understanding is logic, analytical intelligence.

The term 'gate' describes passage from room to room. That is understanding. A chain of forty-nine gates of understanding can end in one of two ways: either in a room with no gate at the end, which is wisdom; or by returning to the starting point and closing a circle.

Understanding without wisdom teaches nothing. If the axioms are arbitrary, the entire mathematical structure built upon them says nothing. Therefore understanding can constitute great intelligence that is of no use whatsoever. Wisdom gives it all its meaning.

One who believes in understanding without wisdom, that itself is the gates of impurity. Understanding without a root is something disconnected, with no meaning whatsoever. It is mere imagination. There is a feeling that there is great wisdom in mathematics, but that is all imagination. All meaning is given to it by the axioms, by the root-point that gives it life. Without the axioms, we do not know that the sum of the angles in a triangle is 180; we know only that if the axioms are true, then this too is true.

A chain of gates with no room at its end leads nowhere. It returns to itself, and is without meaning. This is the journey to Azazel: to discover that the complex and intelligent structures we encounter have no meaning whatsoever without the root-point that animates them. Understanding without wisdom is worth nothing. It is an illusory fantasy. The land of the goat-demons, or Azazel.[2]

We have seen that when we are in the place of the goat-demons, we are in fact at the root-point of evil, and discover that this is the root of good and holiness. There is no other root. The fiftieth gate that animates the gates of understanding also animates the gates of impurity.

Nachmanides mentions Esau, who is on Mount Seir, and is also a hairy man. The sacrifice too is called a goat, and it is also offered to the goat-demons.

Amalek, the son of Esau, has the numerical value of 'doubt.' He attributes everything to chance. A reality without a root. Therefore his end is utter destruction. We destroy him on Purim and on Yom Kippur.

Amalek is the root of the outlook of the Greek and the goat-demons, against which the service of the day acts. In the future, we shall discover that Amalek is nothing but imagination. A reality of evil is a reality without a root, and therefore it has no true existence. This is what we discover in the journey to Azazel.

The Sages call Esau an apostate Jew. In fact, he is the only one who truly succeeded in being an apostate Jew, that is, in turning into a gentile. Today this cannot be done ('a Jew, even though he has sinned, remains a Jew'). Reality cannot truly detach itself from its root. A Jew who sins, or an apostate, lives in the illusion that he is detached from his root. Esau embodies the idea of detachment from the root.

Much of the modern world is reality without a root. A collection of things that look impressive and powerful, yet in fact have nothing in them. Emotion in place of intellect, because of despair of intellect, that is, understanding without wisdom.

The philosophical root of all this is postmodernism. This is Amalekite. It is a view according to which there is no truth, a view that believes only in what is clear and proven and grasped.

[1] Something similar we find on Purim: rabbinically forbidden mixtures. Men's clothing on women and the reverse. Causing damage out of joy. Yom Kippur = ke-Purim. In both, we enter all the way into a state of impurity. The commandments will be nullified in the future except for Purim, and so too the books of the Hebrew Bible, apart from the Scroll of Esther.

[2] The author of 'Leshem' asks against the Vilna Gaon in Proverbs from the rabbinic midrash about Israel in Egypt, that if they had waited only a little longer they would have sunk into the fiftieth gate of impurity. From there it seems that there is a fiftieth gate. The answer is that this gate is nothingness. And from it one indeed cannot be rescued. One cannot teach anything to an analytical person who believes in understanding without wisdom. If he does not accept the very concept of truth, the dispute is not over one truth or another.