On the Meaning of Blowing the Shofar

With God's help

Rabbi Kraus Volume – 5770

Michael Abraham

A. Sources

The primary commandment of Rosh Ha-Shanah is sounding the shofar. The Torah commands us to do so in Parashat Pinhas (Numbers 29:1):

And in the seventh month, on the first day of the month, there shall be a holy convocation for you; you shall do no laborious work; it shall be a day of sounding for you.

Immediately afterward come commands regarding the day's offerings. The wording of the verse implies that the essence of the day is the sounding, for that is the very name of the day: 'a day of sounding.' The Sages learn from the sounding of the Jubilee year that this sounding is a shofar blast.

Maimonides, in Positive Commandment 170, writes (and similarly in Chinukh, commandment 405):

The 170th positive commandment is that He commanded us to hear the sound of the shofar on the first day of Tishrei, and that is His statement, may He be exalted: "It shall be a day of sounding for you." The laws of this commandment have already been explained in tractate Rosh Ha-Shanah (16a, 26b–30a, 32b–34b). Women are not obligated in it (Kiddushin 33b; Rosh Ha-Shanah 30a).

And similarly, in Laws of Shofar 1:1, he writes:

It is a positive commandment of the Torah to hear the blast of the shofar on Rosh Ha-Shanah, as it is said, "It shall be a day of sounding for you." And the shofar with which one blows, whether on Rosh Ha-Shanah or in the Jubilee year, is the curved horn of a ram; all other shofars are invalid except the horn of a sheep. And although the Torah does not explicitly state that the sounding on Rosh Ha-Shanah is with a shofar, it says regarding the Jubilee, "Then you shall cause the shofar of sounding to pass… you shall cause the shofar to pass," and by tradition they learned: just as the sounding of the Jubilee is with a shofar, so too the sounding of Rosh Ha-Shanah is with a shofar.

The Torah also, in Parashat Emor (Leviticus 23:23-25), refers to sounding the shofar with the expression 'a remembrance of sounding':

And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel, saying: In the seventh month, on the first day of the month, there shall be for you a solemn rest, a remembrance of sounding, a holy convocation. You shall do no laborious work, and you shall bring a fire-offering to the Lord.

B. Rosh Ha-Shanah That Falls on the Sabbath: The Legal Basis

Precisely against this background, what the Mishnah says in Rosh Ha-Shanah 29b is very surprising:

Mishnah: On a festival of Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath, they would blow in the Temple, but not in the rest of the country. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted that they should blow in every place where there is a religious court. Rabbi Elazar said: Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted this only in Yavneh. They said to him: It is the same for Yavneh and for every place where there is a religious court. And Jerusalem had yet another superiority over Yavneh: any city that could see it, hear it, was near it, and could come to it—they would blow there; but in Yavneh they would blow only in the religious court itself.

On Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath, they would sound in the Temple but not outside the Temple. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted that they should sound before a religious court (there are many disputes about this among the medieval authorities, but this is not the place to elaborate). This is a surprising law, for as we saw, the Torah describes the sounding as the essence of the day, and yet when the day falls on the Sabbath we do not sound. What remains of Rosh Ha-Shanah without the shofar blast? What does Rosh Ha-Shanah look like without the central law that defines the very essence of the day?

In Sifra, Behar, parashah 2 (and likewise in Rashi on the Torah in the section dealing with the Jubilee), a midrashic exposition appears as the source for this law:

"By day" and not by night; on the Day of Atonement, even on the Sabbath. "You shall cause the shofar to pass throughout all your land" teaches that every individual is obligated. One might think that the sounding of Rosh Ha-Shanah likewise overrides the Sabbath; therefore Scripture says: "throughout all your land … and you shall cause the shofar of sounding to pass in the seventh month, on the tenth of the month, on the Day of Atonement." There was no need to say "on the tenth of the month, on the Day of Atonement," for once it says "on the Day of Atonement," do I not know that it is on the tenth of the month? Why then does it say "on the tenth of the month"? To teach that on the tenth of the month it overrides the Sabbath throughout all your land, but the sounding of Rosh Ha-Shanah does not override the Sabbath throughout all your land, only in a religious court.

This source presents a Torah-level exposition for the rule that one does not sound the shofar on Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath. Does Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath carry no obligation to sound, or is there an obligation that is displaced for some reason? The midrash explicitly says that the issue is overriding the Sabbath, not the irrelevance of the commandment of sounding. In other words, there is a prohibition against sounding because of the laws of the Sabbath, not merely an absence of obligation. A further indication is that in a religious court they did sound even on such a day.

The problem that arises here is: what prohibition could there be in sounding the shofar? After all, the decisors dispute even whether there is a rabbinic prohibition involved. It is true that playing music is forbidden because of a decree lest one come to repair a musical instrument, but with respect to the shofar some have written that this decree does not apply at all, for otherwise we would have to forbid sounding even on an ordinary Rosh Ha-Shanah. It is therefore clear that the Sages did not decree against shofar sounding, and certainly not on Rosh Ha-Shanah itself. So too writes Magen Avraham, section 588, subsec. 4. Indeed, according to the actual ruling, most decisors permit one to sound on an ordinary Rosh Ha-Shanah even just incidentally, even after one has already fulfilled the obligation of hearing the shofar (for practice, or even simply for no particular reason).

Now, in the Jerusalem Talmud passage, a different source is brought (Rosh Ha-Shanah 4:1):

"On a festival of Rosh Ha-Shanah," etc. Rabbi Abba bar Pappa said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan were sitting and asking: We learned, "On a festival of Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath, they would blow in the Temple but not in the rest of the country." If this is a Torah law, then it should override the Sabbath even in the provinces; and if it is not a Torah law, then even in the Temple it should not override! Rav Kahana passed by. They said: Here is a great man; let us ask him. They asked him, and he said to them: One verse says, "a day of sounding," and another verse says, "a remembrance of sounding." How so? When it falls on a weekday, it is a day of sounding; when it falls on the Sabbath, it is a remembrance of sounding—we mention it, but do not blow. Rabbi Ze'ura instructed the colleagues: Go and hear Rabbi Levi's voice expounding, for it is impossible that he should expound his portion without having learned it. He went in and said before them: One verse says, "a day of sounding," and another verse says, "a remembrance of sounding." How so? When it falls on a weekday, it is a day of sounding; when it falls on the Sabbath, it is a remembrance of sounding—we mention it, but do not blow. If so, then even in the Temple it should not override! It was taught: "on the first of the month." If so, then even in a place where they know that it is the first of the month, it should override! Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai taught: "And you shall bring"—in the place where the offerings are brought.

Thus, the Jerusalem Talmud explains that there is a contradiction between two verses: 'a day of sounding' and 'a remembrance of sounding.' It resolves the contradiction by stating that one refers to an ordinary Rosh Ha-Shanah and the other to Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath.

At the end of the Jerusalem Talmud passage there is a hint of a connection to uncertainties in fixing the calendar (and this also seems to be the view of the Ran, cited by the above-mentioned Magen Avraham; see there). According to this, the matter becomes clearer, for in truth they did not nullify a Torah-level positive commandment, but only in a place where we are in doubt, in which case there is no clear obligation.[1] Prima facie, on this basis, in a place where the date is known precisely one should sound even on the Sabbath, but that is not our practice.

It is also difficult to interpret the Jerusalem Talmud itself in this way, for it deals with an ordinary Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath and learns from the verse that sounding does not override the Sabbath. If so, the statement of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai is apparently an independent dictum and not an accepted view.

In any event, surprisingly, even in the exposition of the Jerusalem Talmud—which likewise serves as a Torah-level source—it appears that sounding is forbidden because it does not override the Sabbath, not that from the outset there is no obligation to sound. That is, the Jerusalem Talmud states that there is a prohibition against sounding on the Sabbath, and not merely that there is no obligation to do so. Here too the question arises: what prohibition is there in sounding the shofar? As noted, from the scriptural language that the Sages expounded, it appears that when Rosh Ha-Shanah falls on the Sabbath there is no obligation to sound at all, but only to remember the sounding. For some reason, the Sages understand this as a case of 'displaced' rather than 'permitted.'

It is strained to say that the view of the Sifra and the Jerusalem Talmud is that shevut (rabbinic Sabbath restrictions) are of Torah origin—as Nachmanides writes on Parashat Emor, and the Ritva cites as well on Rosh Ha-Shanah 33—and that for this reason the commandment is displaced (and in the Temple this would be well explained, since shevut does not apply in the Temple). Even according to Nachmanides, however, the term shevut does not refer to every ordinary rabbinic prohibition, but to public desecration. Perhaps sounding, which is done publicly, constitutes a Torah-level violation of shevut. In any case, this doctrine of Torah-level shevut is not accepted, and therefore this is not the usual explanation of the Jerusalem Talmud.

Now, in the question raised by the Jerusalem Talmud, the possibility is entertained that this is a rabbinic law, but it is rejected on the grounds that if so there would be no justification for setting aside a Torah law because of it (this is further evidence that the Jerusalem Talmud is not basing itself on uncertainty in calendar determination). Its conclusion is that this is a Torah law, derived from the exposition based on the contradiction between the verses.

By contrast, the Babylonian Talmud in Rosh Ha-Shanah concludes as follows in practice:

Gemara: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Levi bar Lahma said in the name of Rabbi Hama bar Hanina: One verse says, "a solemn rest, a remembrance of sounding," and another verse says, "it shall be a day of sounding for you." This is not difficult: here, it refers to a festival that falls on the Sabbath; there, to a festival that falls on a weekday. Rava said: If this is a Torah law, then how do we blow in the Temple? Furthermore, this is not a labor for which a verse would be needed to exclude it, as a teaching from the school of Shmuel taught: "You shall do no laborious work"—this excludes shofar blowing and removing bread from the oven, for it is a skill and not a labor. Rather, Rava said: By Torah law it is entirely permitted, but the Rabbis decreed against it, in accordance with Rabbah. For Rabbah said: Everyone is obligated in shofar blowing, but not everyone is expert in shofar blowing. Therefore they decreed lest one take it in his hand and go to an expert to learn, and carry it four cubits in the public domain. And this is the reason for lulav, and this is the reason for Megillah.

The first explanation raised in the Gemara is the contradiction between the verses, as in the Jerusalem Talmud. Immediately thereafter this explanation is rejected, because if it were truly a Torah-level rule, then how could they sound in the Temple? The Jerusalem Talmud asked this as well, and it is not entirely clear what it answered. Here there is an assumption that we are dealing with a Torah prohibition, and not merely an absence of obligation, for if it were only a cancellation of the obligation, what problem would there be with sounding in the Temple? Perhaps there the obligation remains. The language of the Gemara suggests that the exposition teaches a prohibition, not merely the suspension of the obligation. Moreover, this cannot be merely a shevut restriction, for even if it were, the question would not be difficult, since as a matter of law we rule that there is no shevut in the Temple.

What did the Jerusalem Talmud answer to this difficulty? It seems that this itself is its answer: there is no prohibition here, only a suspension of the obligation.[2] Hence there is no difficulty in explaining why they did sound in the Temple. It is true that the Jerusalem Talmud contains a second formulation of the exposition, and there it seems that there is a special derivation explaining why one sounds in the Temple. It is possible that there is a dispute here over whether the exposition is based on a prohibition or on the absence of an obligation.

Thus, even when the Babylonian Talmud brings the exposition found in the Jerusalem Talmud, it does not understand it as the Jerusalem Talmud does—at least in the first formulation. In the Jerusalem Talmud, in the final analysis, it is a suspension of the obligation; in the Babylonian Talmud it is an actual Torah prohibition. Of course, the question we raised above now returns with even greater force: what Torah prohibition—and perhaps even what rabbinic prohibition—is there in shofar sounding?

The Babylonian Talmud itself raises this question, and on its basis rejects the above exposition and offers a different explanation: the rule that one does not sound outside the Temple is a rabbinic law, enacted out of concern that one might go to an expert and carry the shofar four cubits in the public domain, as we find with regard to the lulav and the Megillah.

At this point we are certainly dealing with a prohibition, not merely an absence of obligation. There is a rabbinic prohibition based on the concern that one might carry it, and on its basis the obligation to sound the shofar on Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath was suspended. Later authorities noted that the ordinary rabbinic prohibitions—such as the concern that one might repair a musical instrument—cannot serve as the basis for this prohibition, because if that were the basis we would not sound even on an ordinary Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on a weekday.

Are the expositions cited above merely scriptural support (asmakhta) for a rabbinic rule? It does not seem so. The Gemara offers the rabbinic explanation as an alternative to the exposition; it does not say that the exposition is merely an asmakhta. Therefore, in the Jerusalem Talmud the exposition remains, in the final analysis, a Torah-level law.

C. Philosophical-Legal Significance

Ultimately, the Babylonian Talmud, which holds that this is rabbinic, must confront the same difficulty as the Jerusalem Talmud: how can the Sages, on the basis of a technical consideration, uproot the very essence of the day? We have seen that Rosh Ha-Shanah is called 'a day of sounding,' meaning that this is the essence of the day.

It is worth noting that several other rabbinic prohibitions are set aside in order to enable shofar sounding—for example, clearing a heap of rubble in order to extract a shofar to blow (though the medieval authorities disagreed about this, and one may distinguish between a violation at the time of sounding and preparing the shofar for the commandment). In the straightforward view, then, we do not allow a rabbinic prohibition to uproot the essence of the day.

Some wished to say that not sounding because of the Sabbath is itself the fulfillment of the commandment of shofar (Meshekh Chokhmah on Leviticus 23:24, and others). Others said (see Eleh Hem Mo'adai, sec. 15) that by virtue of keeping the Sabbath we receive the benefit inherent in the sounding even without an actual blast, through remembrance alone.

All of these, however, are explanations on the level of religious thought. But what about the law itself? How was the obligation to sound annulled, and what remains of the essence of the day without it? The meta-legal answer, as distinct from the philosophical one, must be rooted in the exposition. The conclusion is that, in some sense, the exposition remains in force even according to the final conclusion of the Babylonian Talmud.

D. 'A Remembrance of Sounding' in Practice

Prima facie, this proves that the Babylonian Talmud too holds that Rosh Ha-Shanah falling on the Sabbath is not the same kind of day. Something in the very nature of the day has changed. Perhaps for that very reason there was room to be stringent and not sound because of the prohibition. In any event, the option of 'remembrance of sounding' exists in the Babylonian Talmud as well. The source for this can only be the exposition, which was apparently rejected there. Something of it nevertheless remains in practical law.

According to the Jerusalem Talmud, this is a Torah law. In the Babylonian Talmud, although in practical terms it holds that this is a rabbinic rule, we nevertheless preserve a trace of the Jerusalem Talmud's exposition and treat Rosh Ha-Shanah falling on the Sabbath as a day of 'remembrance of sounding.'

A simple consideration shows that the verse 'remembrance of sounding' introduces not only a leniency but also a stringency (see the footnote above). It not only exempts one from sounding on Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath; it also obligates one to remember the sounding. This is a Torah-level law that binds us on Rosh Ha-Shanah falling on the Sabbath. Does this law remain in force in practice, even if the exposition was rejected or is only an asmakhta?

Rashi, on Rosh Ha-Shanah 29a, s.v. 'remembrance of sounding,' writes that from this verse we learn that on every Rosh Ha-Shanah there is an obligation to recite Kingship, Remembrances, and Shofar verses. On Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath, where the obligation to sound is suspended, only this obligation remains.

Nachmanides, however, on Leviticus 23:24, disagrees with Rashi and writes:

"A remembrance of sounding"—verses of Remembrances and verses of Shofarot, to remind you of the binding of Isaac, in whose place a ram was offered; this is Rashi's language. But the master should also have brought the verses of Kingship from the midrash, for it is impossible that Scripture would mention the verses of Remembrances and Shofarot and not mention Kingship. They already expounded these from the verse, "and they shall be for you as a remembrance before the Lord your God" (Numbers 10:10): there was no need to say, "I am the Lord your God." What then does it teach by saying, "I am the Lord your God"? Rather, this establishes a general principle: whenever you recite Remembrances, you attach Kingship to them, as appears in Torat Kohanim (parashah 11:2) and tractate Rosh Ha-Shanah (32a). But all this is merely asmakhta from rabbinic teaching. For they explicitly said (ibid. 34b): one goes to a place where they blow and does not go to a place where they recite the blessings. Obviously, the former is Torah law and the latter rabbinic law; no, it is needed even though the former is certain and the latter doubtful. But "a remembrance of sounding," like "it shall be a day of sounding for you" (Numbers 29:1), means that we should sound on this day and it will be for us a remembrance before the Lord, as it says later (ibid. 10:10), "and you shall blow the trumpets and they shall be for you as a remembrance before your God."

Nachmanides writes that this is only a rabbinic obligation, and the derivation is merely an asmakhta. His proof is from the discussion in Rosh Ha-Shanah 34b, where the Gemara says that the obligation to recite these verses is rabbinic (and therefore it is preferable to go to a place where they actually sound rather than to a place where the verses are recited).

Rashi's view can be reconciled (Yom Teru'ah of Maharam ibn Habib; see also Mitokh Shiurim by Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, on Rosh Ha-Shanah 16a) by saying that only on Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath is there a Torah obligation, in place of the sounding, to remember the sounding. The Gemara cited by Nachmanides speaks about ordinary Rosh Ha-Shanah, where the obligation to recite is rabbinic. Clearly, where it is possible to sound, sounding is preferable, and then the obligation to recite the verses is only rabbinic.[3]

Indeed, the Gemara in Rosh Ha-Shanah 28b entertains the initial assumption that shofar sounding requires intention even according to the view that commandments do not require intention, based on the verse 'remembrance of sounding.' This is a different kind of intention, not intention merely to fulfill one's obligation. Presumably it is the intention to remember that which the sounding evokes. Although that suggestion is rejected, according to our approach the rejection means that when one actually sounds there is no need for accompanying intention beyond the intention to fulfill the obligation; but on the Sabbath, when there is no actual sounding, the obligation of that additional intention—to remember, as 'remembrance of sounding'—exists at the Torah level. And this is precisely Rashi's point.

Perhaps in support of this one may cite the words of the Zohar, vol. 3 (Leviticus), parashat Vayikra, 18b, which says:

Therefore we find in the book of Rav Hamnuna Sava, regarding those prayers of Rosh Ha-Shanah, that he would say: prayer and the sound of the shofar—that sound which brings forth that righteous one found in his spirit and soul within that shofar—that sound rises above, and on that day the prosecutors stand and are found above; and when that sound of the shofar rises, all of them are driven away before it and cannot stand. Happy is the portion of the righteous, who know how to direct their will before their Master and know how to repair the world on this day with the sound of the shofar. Therefore it is written (Psalms 89), "Happy is the people who know the sounding," who know, and not who blow. On this day the people must focus on a person complete in every way, who knows the paths of the holy King, who knows the honor of the King, so that he may present their prayer on this day and summon the sound of the shofar in all the worlds, with intention of heart, with wisdom, with will, in wholeness, so that judgment may be removed from the world through him.

The Zohar notes precisely that Scripture says 'those who know the shofar blast,' not 'those who blow.' Even the sounding is meant to bring one to knowledge, and that is what must be remembered.

And in practical law too, we find in the Shulchan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 582:7, which writes:

If it falls on a weekday, one says: "a day of sounding, a holy convocation"; and if it falls on the Sabbath, one says: "a remembrance of sounding."

That is, we see that this exposition leaves a residue even in practical law. Indeed, the day of Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath is, in practice as well, a 'remembrance of sounding.'

And the Mishnah Berurah there, subsec. 19, writes:

One says, "a day of sounding," etc.—even in the evening prayer or in kiddush, although one does not blow at night, nevertheless the day is a day of sounding, for tomorrow they will certainly blow. And the later authorities wrote that after the fact, if one said on a weekday "a remembrance of sounding" and concluded the blessing, he does not repeat it [for the Torah does write "a remembrance of sounding," even though by Torah law sounding is permitted on the Sabbath]; and likewise on the Sabbath, if one said "a day of sounding," he also does not repeat it.

Thus, on a weekday it is also appropriate to say 'remembrance of sounding,' and on the Sabbath it is appropriate to say 'sounding.' Prima facie, this would seem to mean that the exposition was set aside, since we interpret 'remembrance of sounding' as applying even to ordinary Rosh Ha-Shanah on a weekday. But according to our explanation, that is not so, for as we explained, on every Rosh Ha-Shanah there is indeed an element of 'remembrance of sounding,' only it is fulfilled through the act of sounding. On Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath, we fulfill only this aspect, because the decree prohibited us from sounding.

The source of the Mishnah Berurah is Pri Hadash, section 582, where he writes:

(7) One says, "a day of sounding," etc.—however, it is obvious to me that if one said "a remembrance of sounding," we do not require him to repeat it, for the Torah itself writes "a remembrance of sounding," even though by Torah law sounding is permitted on the Sabbath, as stated at the beginning of the last chapter of Rosh Ha-Shanah. Rather, what remains doubtful is whether, if on the Sabbath one said "a day of sounding," we require him to repeat it or not. It seems reasonable that since, according to all views, in any fixed and ordained religious court in the Land of Israel they would blow on the Sabbath, it is called a day of sounding and we do not require him to repeat it. Alternatively, one may say that since in other years it is a day of sounding, even though in this particular year it is not a day of sounding, there is no problem.

We see that it is obvious to him that if one said 'remembrance of sounding' on a weekday, that is certainly acceptable. If the reverse occurred, however, he is uncertain.

Thus, we see that the exposition remains in practical law, at least at the level of liturgical wording. In addition, we see that even on a weekday the idea of 'remembrance of sounding' is relevant, as we explained in Rashi. Let us now return to the significance of this fact for our topic.

E. Synthesis

Several commentators try to integrate the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, thereby allowing the exposition to remain in force even in the final conclusion, and not only at the level of wording.

The simplest approach is to view the exposition as an asmakhta for the rabbinic rule rooted in the concern 'lest he carry it' (see Penei Moshe and Korban Ha-Edah there on the passage). There are, however, commentators who go in the opposite direction (Penei Yehoshua and Shibolei HaLeket).

The author of Shibolei HaLeket, in section 294, writes as follows:

The law of whether shofar overrides the Sabbath, or whether one may clear rubble from upon it on a festival, or carry it beyond the boundary, or bring it down from a tree, or cut and prepare it.

On a festival of Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath, they would blow in the Temple but not in the rest of the country. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted that they should blow in every place where there is a religious court. Nowadays, however, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai's enactment no longer applies, and in all Jewish communities the simple custom is not to blow on Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath. And we say in the Gemara: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Levi bar Hama said in the name of Rabbi Hanina: One verse says, "a solemn rest, a remembrance of sounding," and another verse says, "it shall be a day of sounding for you." This is not difficult: here, it refers to Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath; there, when it falls on a weekday. And in the conclusion we say: Rava said, by Torah law it is entirely permitted, but the Rabbis decreed against it because of Rabbah, for Rabbah said: Everyone is obligated in shofar blowing, but not everyone is expert in shofar blowing; therefore they decreed lest one take it in his hand and go to an expert, and carry it four cubits in the public domain.

Some are puzzled: why do we need Rabbah's decree, when there are two verses written—"a remembrance of sounding" and "a day of sounding"—and we establish one for the Sabbath and one for a weekday? They explain that one may say that Rabbah himself interprets these verses: why did the Torah say "a remembrance of sounding"? Because of the decree lest one go to an expert to learn, etc.

The author of Shibolei HaLeket explains that Rabbah's rabbinic rationale is the basis of the Jerusalem Talmud's Torah-level exposition. But note carefully: he does not say that the exposition is an asmakhta. On the contrary, the explanation—which is ostensibly rabbinic—is itself the reason for the Torah law.

It has already been noted that this seems to contradict the Gemara. After all, in the Gemara the exposition was rejected because of the difficulty: why then do they sound in the Temple? Perhaps his intention is to say that this difficulty does not actually refute the exposition, since its plain meaning is that there is no obligation, not that there is a prohibition. If so, perhaps there is an implicit answer: in the Temple they sounded because of the obligation to remember, whereas outside the Temple they did not sound because of Rabbah's concern.

In other words, his claim is that the exposition underlies the rabbinic decree, for otherwise the Sages would not have nullified a Torah commandment. At the Torah level, the very character of the day indeed changes. The obligation to sound the shofar still remains, but its core is remembrance (except that when it is possible to sound, that act also fulfills the obligation of remembrance). The Sages, however, removed the obligation to sound and left only the obligation to remember, and that obligation is fulfilled by reciting the verses. But all of this rests on a Torah law that on a Sabbath Rosh Ha-Shanah the primary obligation is remembrance, and the rule of sounding lapses, unlike an ordinary Rosh Ha-Shanah.

Thus, the change in the nature of the day, as compared with ordinary Rosh Ha-Shanah, is of Torah origin. Only the cancellation of actual sounding is rabbinic. The absence of obligation is Torah-level, though it would still have been possible to sound and thereby fulfill the duty of remembrance. The prohibition is rabbinic, and that is because the Torah-level obligation can also be fulfilled in silence.

This neatly resolves our earlier difficulty: how can the Sages nullify the essence of the day because of so incidental and marginal a reason? According to what we have said here, they did not nullify the essence of the day at all; on the contrary, they constituted it.

Put differently: above we saw that every Rosh Ha-Shanah includes both an obligation of remembering the sound (perhaps rabbinic and perhaps Torah-level) and an obligation of sounding itself. On Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath, the obligation to remember remains. The essence of the day has not changed; it has been narrowed. Perhaps this can be explained further as follows: there are two ways of reaching Rosh Ha-Shanah's goal—through actual sounding and through remembering the sound. On ordinary Rosh Ha-Shanah we do so by means of actual sounding, but on Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath, because of Rabbah's concern, we choose a different mode, that of 'remembrance of sounding.' Since both modes appear in the Torah, both are effective in achieving the day's purpose. Once again, this decree does not injure the essence of the day.[4]

F. A Sound Rising from Silence

We thus learn that for both the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, the conjunction of the Sabbath with Rosh Ha-Shanah creates a third kind of day. It is a day on which another mode of crowning the Holy One, blessed be He, finds expression: enthronement through silence.

This recalls the chapter in which Elijah, in his flight, encounters the Holy One, blessed be He (I Kings 19:11-12):

And He said: Go out and stand on the mountain before the Lord. And behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and mighty wind was rending mountains and shattering rocks before the Lord; the Lord was not in the wind. And after the wind, an earthquake; the Lord was not in the earthquake. And after the earthquake, a fire; the Lord was not in the fire. And after the fire, a still, small voice.

God's deeper manifestation comes through silence. Enthroning Him means discerning Him through silence. Only when all the noise surrounding us is stilled can one perceive God.

How is this achieved on Rosh Ha-Shanah when it does not fall on the Sabbath? One should note that even then the noise has a very special character. A song is something composed of words and melody. Strip away the words, and only melody remains. That is already a subtler phenomenon. Strip the melody of the nuances that shape it, and what remains is sound without melody: a primordial sound, and nothing more. That is the shofar blast. Thus shofar sounding is indeed a sound, but it is a simple and abstract sound, lacking all the noisy characteristics that accompany the everyday sounds we encounter. On the Sabbath we undergo one further abstraction: there we erase even this simple sound. Far from effacing the essence of the day, this yields a purer and more complete manifestation of it.

We have no fuller expression of this than Rashi on these verses in Kings, who writes:

"A still, small voice"—a voice with which they praise quietly; but regarding the prophets of the nations of the world it says, "there was silence, and I heard a voice" (Job 4:16): the silence was for praise. And I have heard: a voice coming from within the silence, tintissement in Old French, and one does not actually hear the voice itself.

On Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath too, the voice of the shofar is present. It emerges from the silence, and there is no greater sound than that. And of this it was said (regarding the shofar at Mount Sinai): a great voice that did not cease (see Deuteronomy 5:18), which Onkelos translates as and it did not stop (ad loc.).

In closing, I would like to wish my friend Rabbi Kraus, may he live and be well, the community's new rabbi, great success in his role. May God prosper his way, may his voice be heard from one end of the world to the other, and may his memory endure through his descendants.

[1] There is still a case for stringency in situations of doubt. But with respect to positive commandments, Rabbi Akiva Eiger already wrote that one does not necessarily say that doubts are treated stringently—because even if we perform the act, it is not certain that we have fulfilled the obligation.

[2] One must understand that this exposition, if interpreted literally, is not only a leniency but also a stringency: not only is there no obligation to sound—which is a leniency—but there is an obligation to remember the sounding—which is a stringency. The Jerusalem Talmud we saw understands there to be only a leniency here, since the obligation is displaced by the prohibitions of the Sabbath, and not that there is an alternative obligation. Perhaps, however, precisely because of the displacement there is also an alternative obligation. See below.

[3] Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik, however, in Harerei Kedem, sec. 29, suggests that the recitation together with the sounding is of Torah origin. The Gemara was speaking about a case in which the sounding took place in one location and the recitation in another. Recitation by itself is rabbinic. Indeed, Rosh Ha-Shanah 32a appears to imply that there is a Torah obligation ('the Torah said: remember').

[4] Perhaps this is related to the dispute among the decisors over the status of one who transgressed and sounded on Rosh Ha-Shanah that falls on the Sabbath: did he fulfill the Torah commandment and merely violate a rabbinic prohibition, or did he fail to fulfill even the Torah obligation? On this see Derush ve-Hiddush of Rabbi Akiva Eiger (in the section on Hagigah, where he disputes Magen Avraham on this point). On the face of it, according to our approach, one who sounded did fulfill the Torah obligation, for this too is a way of reaching the day's purpose. One might nevertheless reject this in light of Tosafot, s.v. 'de-amar,' Sukkah 3a, but this is not the place to elaborate.