On Values and Their Rationalizations

Opening message from the rabbi

On Values and Their Rationalizations

Sent on 4/12/2005

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On Values and Their Rationalizations

In this week’s Torah portion (Toldot, Genesis 26:5) it says: “Because Abraham obeyed My voice and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My teachings.”

The Talmud in Yoma 28b explains that this refers to the seven Noahide commandments.

Rashi ad loc. takes a different approach (and perhaps, according to his method, this is the conclusion of the Talmud there), and apparently what led him to this is that within the Noahide commandments there is no category of ‘My statutes,’ since the Noahide commandments are rational commandments.

Therefore he follows the Talmud in Yoma 67b, according to which ‘My statutes’ are commandments for which the nations of the world taunt Israel (because they are not rational), whereas ‘My commandments’ are those commandments that, had they not been written, reason would have dictated that they be written (that is, the rational ones).

The source for the claim that the Noahide commandments are rational is the Talmud in Yoma 67b, where the commandments are listed such that, had they not been written, reason would have required that they be written; and the list is almost identical to the Noahide commandments (except for judicial laws, which are apparently included in the other commandments listed there, and the prohibition against eating a limb torn from a living animal). In contrast, there are ‘statutory’ commandments regarding which the nations of the world (according to the reading of Rashi on the Torah and Rabbenu Hananel ad loc.) taunt Israel; in the Talmud itself the reading is: ‘Satan’.

And this is the source of Rambam’s statement in Laws of Kings 9:1, where he writes that Adam was commanded with six commandments, and reason inclines toward them. Afterwards, however, the prohibition against eating a limb torn from a living animal was added for Noah, and it requires examination whether, in his view, reason also inclines toward that. And in 10:6 he also brings that crossbreeding animals and grafting trees were prohibited (although one is not put to death for them. There is a tannaitic dispute about this; see the commentaries there).

If so, then ostensibly Noahides too have commandments toward which reason does not incline: the prohibition against eating a limb torn from a living animal, and the above-mentioned prohibitions of mixed species were also added.

One can now ask regarding the Talmud in Yoma 67b: why do the nations of the world take issue with Israel over the ‘statutory’ commandments, when such commandments are imposed on them as well?

And perhaps one can say that they are indeed imposed on them, but they do not observe them because, in their eyes, they have no rationale.

Now Ramban on our portion (26:5) disagrees with Rashi, and holds that the division between rational and revealed commandments is found within the Noahide commandments themselves. He explains that the rational ones are the first five (see above), whereas the revealed ones are commandments such as grafting trees and crossbreeding animals.

If so, he explicitly maintains that Noahides are also subject to revealed commandments.

Yad Shaul raised an objection (cited by Rabbi Chavel ad loc.): Ramban contradicted himself, for in parashat Kedoshim (Leviticus 19:19) Rashi wrote regarding mixed species that they are a ‘statute,’ and Ramban disputes him and maintains that they do have a rationale (not to damage the created order of ‘according to their kinds’). See there, where the matter is left unresolved.

From all this it seems to me that there are three categories of commandments, not two as is commonly assumed:

1. Rational commandments, which can be rationalized.

2. Rational commandments that are based on intuitions which cannot be grounded in prior intuitions.

3. Revealed commandments.

The first two categories are what are called ‘statutes and commandments’ in our portion, and Noahides are commanded concerning them. But full-fledged ‘statutes’ do not bind them.

Indeed, I found in Ibn Ezra ad loc. (Genesis 26:5) that he explains ‘statutes’ as something engraved in the soul.

That is, the ‘statutes’ with which Noahides are commanded are not revealed commandments, but commandments regarding which there is an inner sense engraved in the soul that they are reprehensible. These are the commandments concerning eating a limb torn from a living animal, grafting trees (which, in my opinion, is harder to understand), and crossbreeding animals.

This also explains the interpretation that Ramban brings at the end of his comments, on the plain-sense level: ‘My statutes’ means being compassionate and gracious. And this too has been asked about him (see Rabbi Chavel): why is that a ‘statute’?

According to my view, the reason is that being compassionate and gracious is not valuable because by means of it we come to do good to others. Those traits are ends in themselves, for the refinement of the soul. Therefore this belongs to the category of statute, because the understanding that one truly ought to act this way is engraved in the soul, yet it cannot be rationalized.

From here to the practical implication. Today it is common to identify the distinction between duties to one’s fellow and duties to God with the distinction between revealed and rational; or moral and cultic/religious.

Such a conception turns the laws of morality into instrumental ones, since they serve as a means of bringing good to others and preventing harm to them. This is a rationalization of values, which, as Leibowitz argues in many places (see, for example, the last essay in his book Emunah, Historiah Ve-Arakhim, on the case of Karen, the terminally ill patient), leads to the relativity of values and to limiting their scope: if the prohibition against murder is ‘because of something,’ then it is possible to arrange matters so that in certain cases that ‘something’ will not be present, and then murder will be permitted.

Hence there is a drift in our world toward permitting prohibitions: what was accepted as a moral prohibition in the past is now rationalized and permitted (homosexuality, abortion, marital infidelity, and the like). When something is done with the consent of all the parties involved, no one is harmed, and no rationalization for that value can be given, it becomes permitted.

The Torah’s conception is more ‘old-fashioned,’ and it believes that there are acts that are reprehensible even if it cannot be shown that they harm someone or something. That is, values cannot be rationalized.

This is what Leibowitz argued, and, in my opinion, rightly so: a ‘value’ is always an end and never a means, and therefore it cannot be rationalized. Consequently it obligates categorically (=without qualifications or exceptions, except for conflicts within the hierarchy of values).

A ‘value’ is always the final stage in the process of rationalization; that is, when one finishes justifying the justification, and so on—and every process of justification stops somewhere—the final justification is what is called a ‘value’.

There was once an article in Haaretz about incest within the family. Gadi Taub wrote about the grave harms this causes to the children involved in the act. I wrote a response arguing that Taub’s claims were an attempt to rationalize a prohibition that is a taboo. On his approach, if I sedate the child or ensure that no harm results from the matter, it would be permitted.

But in my opinion, moral prohibitions arise from a moral feeling (=conscience), while the rationalizations come only after that feeling already exists, and therefore they do not exhaust it.

Accordingly, one may not assess values solely by the question whether they harm someone, or whether they are done without consent. On the contrary: only after we ask those questions about a given act will the answers to those questions include values. They will constitute a reason that explains why something is forbidden. But values themselves cannot be rationalized.

I want to clarify an important point. My claim is not that rationalization is dangerous, in the sense that it will yield permissions in certain cases. My claim is that rationalization is incorrect, since the obligation of these values does not arise from the reasons it offers. This is a claim about the proper and the reprehensible, not instrumental preaching about avoiding risks.

Returning to Ramban: in my opinion, Ramban does not contradict himself. There are two types of rational commandments: the first six, ‘toward which reason inclines,’ in Rambam’s formulation, are commandments that can be rationalized (and therefore they are not values, but derivative values). The prohibitions against eating a limb torn from a living animal, grafting trees, and crossbreeding animals arise from an intuitive sense of reprehensibility.

And revealed commandments are a royal decree (and apparently they too involve some kind of blemish, and were not stated for no reason; but it still requires some further thought why Noahides are not commanded to prevent such a blemish. Perhaps the blemish is not corrected if one does not feel it. This is a ‘blemish’ in the person rather than in the object, and this too requires further examination).

One more clarification: I would be glad if we did not argue with Ramban’s intuitions (it is difficult for me as well to understand why grafting trees is problematic. Gur Aryeh already asks there that we were commanded to improve creation, but this is not the place to elaborate). My question is a principled one in moral theory, in values, and with respect to Noahides: is this distinction indeed correct? Why are Noahides enjoined specifically regarding these matters, if other commandments also have a rationale, though we do not sense it?

Source (forum “Stop Here, Think”): http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=1700006&forum_id=1364