Pluralism and Autonomy in Jewish Law – The Incident of Rabbi Yohanan ben HaHoranit

The Rabbi’s Opening Post

Pluralism and Autonomy in Jewish Law – The Incident of Rabbi Yohanan ben HaHoranit

Posted on 22/6/2008

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Pluralism and Autonomy in Jewish Law – The Incident of Rabbi Yohanan ben HaHoranit

The Gemara in Berakhot 11a deals with the dispute between the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai regarding reclining during the recitation of the evening Shema. It then brings the Amoraic dispute between Rav Yehezkel and Rav Yosef:

Rav Yehezkel taught: If one acted in accordance with the House of Shammai, he has fulfilled his obligation; if in accordance with the House of Hillel, he has fulfilled his obligation. Rav Yosef said: If one acted in accordance with the House of Shammai, he has not fulfilled anything at all.

This dispute, which takes place generations after the members of the two Houses were no longer alive, can be understood in two ways:

– The dispute is whether the law was ruled in accordance with the House of Hillel or not. This, of course, runs contrary to the Gemara about the ruling of the heavenly voice.

– The dispute is whether, even after the law was ruled in accordance with the House of Hillel (through the heavenly voice), one may still act in accordance with the House of Shammai (perhaps one who agrees with them, or one who belongs to the House of Shammai – though that is no longer relevant in the Amoraic period).

It is quite clear that the dispute is not only about reclining during the Shema, but about the general character of the disputes between the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai, for immediately afterward a proof is brought by Rav Yosef for his position, and it concerns sitting in a sukkah (that is, a different dispute between the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel):

As we learned in a mishnah: If a person’s head and most of his body were in the sukkah, and his table was inside the house, the House of Shammai invalidate it, and the House of Hillel validate it. The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: There was an incident in which the elders of the House of Shammai and the elders of the House of Hillel went to visit Rabbi Yohanan ben HaHoranit. They found him with his head and most of his body in the sukkah, and his table inside the house, and they said nothing to him. They said to them: Is that a proof? They too said to him: If that is how you conducted yourself, you have never fulfilled the commandment of sukkah in your life.

This incident concerns the younger generation of the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai, who discussed an act done by an older generation of the two Houses. So there are three historical stages here: the Amoraic dispute; the original dispute of the elders of the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai; and the dispute of the younger members of the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai.

At first reading, it seems that the proof was based on the fact that the House of Shammai made no comment, from which it follows that they too understood that the law had been ruled in accordance with the House of Hillel, and accepted that one should act in accordance with the House of Hillel. This is a proof for Rav Yosef’s position. But afterward the proof is rejected by the assertion that there is an error in the incident: the House of Shammai did in fact object to conduct in accordance with the House of Hillel.

According to this reading, the Amoraic dispute is interpreted in the first way (= that is, the dispute is whether the law was ruled in accordance with the House of Hillel or not), and in the end the proof is rejected, so the Amoraic dispute remains as it was.

But on a more careful reading, one sees that the one who corrected the description of the incident was not Rav Yehezkel, but the House of Shammai themselves (the younger members). The wording is, “They said to them: Is that a proof?” That is, the speakers are the House of Shammai addressing the House of Hillel, not Rav Yehezkel addressing Rav Yosef. If so, the citation of the incident brought as a proof already includes the correction of what took place in the older generation. The proof is from the incident as corrected. Moreover, this proof is not rejected in the Gemara. That is, Rav Yosef comes out correct in light of the conclusion of the incident.

It is clear that the conclusion of this incident provides no proof at all regarding the question whether the law was ruled in accordance with the House of Hillel or not (and certainly not proof that it was indeed ruled in accordance with them, as Rav Yosef holds). If so, we must understand the Amoraic dispute in the second way (that is, regarding the question whether today one may act in accordance with the House of Shammai even though the law has been ruled in accordance with the House of Hillel).

Now the question is: what is the proof? At first glance, what emerges here is that initially the younger members of the House of Hillel claimed that the elders of the House of Shammai did not object, from which it follows that they agreed that the law was in accordance with the House of Hillel, or at least that one may act in accordance with them. But in the end the younger members of the House of Shammai reply that this is not correct, and that the elders of the House of Shammai did in fact object.

What can be learned from the fact that they objected? At most, that they held fast to their own view, and thought that one who acted not in accordance with them had fulfilled nothing. But what can be learned from this for the Amoraic dispute, which takes place many years later? There the question concerns the stage after the dispute between the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel had already been decided!

Rashi ad loc. explains that we learn that just as the House of Shammai were adamant that one who acted in accordance with the House of Hillel had fulfilled nothing, so too one may infer that the House of Hillel were adamant that one who acted in accordance with the House of Shammai had fulfilled nothing. From here there is proof for Rav Yosef.

If so, it is clear that Rashi understood the Amoraic dispute in the second way, as above. According to all opinions, the law was ruled in accordance with the House of Hillel. The Amoraic dispute is about how to act today after that ruling (and not whether there was a ruling, for from the incident there is no proof at all on that question). And for that purpose, a proof was brought from the objection of the House of Shammai.

And it is still not clear why this is relevant to the Amoraic dispute. There the question was whether we today, after the ruling, can act in accordance with the House of Shammai. The proof shows that the House of Shammai themselves held in accordance with their own view and rejected conduct in accordance with the House of Hillel. Why does that prove anything about us?

Moreover, the entire line of reasoning is unclear. How can there be room for a dispute over whether one may act in accordance with the House of Shammai when, according to all opinions, it is agreed that the law was ruled in accordance with the House of Hillel? What is the meaning of a legal ruling if even afterward one may still act in accordance with the House of Shammai?

Here I would suggest a possibility: perhaps the law was ruled only for someone who has no view of his own. But someone who himself holds like the House of Shammai can certainly, according to Rav Yehezkel, act in accordance with the House of Shammai. Rav Yosef disagrees. According to Rav Yosef, once the law has been ruled in accordance with the House of Hillel, there is no longer room to behave in accordance with our own view.

But if this is indeed the Amoraic dispute, then what is the proof from the words of the House of Shammai themselves? For what is proved from there is that the House of Shammai themselves rejected practice in accordance with the House of Hillel, and that is obvious. They themselves hold like the House of Shammai, and therefore, in their view, one who acts in accordance with the House of Hillel has fulfilled nothing. But what does that have to do with the question of what we are supposed to do today when we have a view of our own regarding a dispute that has already been decided? That is a completely different question.

As is well known, Tosafot ad loc. changes the entire line of interpretation, and on his view there are difficulties no less serious. But in order to stay focused, I am beginning with a discussion of Rashi’s view. After that we can branch out. I would appreciate it if, for now, we did not get into other approaches, unless they help clarify Rashi’s view.

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Source (forum ‘Stop Here, Think’): http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=2433224