How Should One Criticize? On the Right to Moral Criticism

The Rabbi’s Opening Post

How Should One Criticize? On the Right to Moral Criticism

Posted on 12/10/2007

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How Should One Criticize? On the Right to Moral Criticism

In the thread on observing the week of mourning, a point arose that, in my humble opinion, deserves a more direct and detailed discussion.

IshTzip wrote there (p. 9):

In any case, I agree with you that journalists or others who have no commitment to Jewish law, or who challenge this very law as such (and not in the context of its application today), indeed have neither standing nor the right to criticize the family, the rabbinic authority, and the like in the present case.

He argues that one who is not bound by Jewish law has no right to criticize it.

After I replied that I do not think so—that there is a right to criticize, except that that (specific) criticism is, in my view, unjustified—he clarified (in response also to Yeruham):

Of course the matter is fit for public discussion (after all, you and I are participating in one, are we not?), but if someone sees this very law, and perhaps the world of Jewish law in general, as unworthy, then it seems to me that it would be hypocrisy, or at least a lack of integrity, on his part to criticize the brother’s actions, when in fact his problem is with the world of Jewish law.

He certainly does have a legal right (and here too this is a partial response to Rabbi Mikki’s remarks); a substantive moral right, in my opinion, he does not. (Or at least only in a limited way.)

The question I wanted to raise is whether there is any situation at all in which someone lacks a moral right to criticize another. In that case I do not think so, but the question is a principled one. Is such a situation possible at all?

For example, in the past there was a strong feeling that Diaspora Jews could not criticize the State of Israel, because they do not bear the consequences of its policies. For example, if they recommend that we reach a compromise with our neighbors, the risk of war falls only on us and not on them. Today the approach is somewhat different, but this is not the place to elaborate (this is only an example for the sake of the discussion).

Another example is criticism of some person’s behavior during the Holocaust. Here the feeling is always that one should not judge a person until one has been in his place (or at least can imagine that situation, and what we ourselves would have done in his place).

On the other hand, why should moral criticism require such conditions? Even if I myself would have been criminal in that respect, that still does not necessarily mean that the conduct in question is not worthy of moral criticism.

In fact, our discussion here concerns the rule “Correct yourself first” (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 107b). But even this is not understandable, precisely against this background, unless one sees it as a technical recommendation (that if you do not first correct yourself, people will not accept your criticism. But then the real question is why they will not accept it).

But it seems to me that this is a claim that belongs to the moral sphere, not the technical-tactical one. And even if one raises the tactical argument (they will not accept it from you), this is an indication of the substantive layer (for what they will not accept from you is precisely that because there is אצלם an implicit assumption of “Correct yourself first,” as in the previous parenthetical remark).

As an opening, I will present here an initial reflection that occurred to me on this matter.

Every moral judgment also contains a component of assessing reality. For example, someone who criticizes the State of Israel for its policy and demands that it reach a compromise with its neighbors (I am speaking about a demand based on morality, not pragmatism), is in effect saying that this is a proper demand, one that a reasonable person ought to meet. For it is clear that this also involves taking a certain risk, and the question is whether one may demand that a person assume risk in order to meet such a moral standard. If the level of risk is too high, that means one cannot make such a demand of him (a person is not obligated to commit suicide, or even to enter a situation of possible mortal danger, in order to save another’s life). What will determine whether and when the risk is too high? Presumably, it will be the reasonable-person test.

Now, when we consider moral criticism, we see that it contains two claims:

1. Morality dictates taking step X.

2. Although the step entails a cost, in the critic’s view the cost justifies the criticism. That is, a reasonable person would meet such a demand.

The first assertion has a clearly normative-evaluative character, but the second requirement is the factual component in the moral argument, or in moral criticism. One must determine what a reasonable person would do in such a case. [And here perhaps there is room to distinguish between a moral argument and moral criticism. Perhaps one can argue “academically” that this is the proper way to act, even without first correcting oneself. But according to those who hold the approach of “Correct yourself first,” it is clear that one cannot criticize someone who does not do so.]

And here is my reflection: the approach of “Correct yourself first” relates only to the second component. The person being criticized says to the critic: perhaps you are right in your moral claim (1), but I do not think that a reasonable person ought to assume upon himself, or in fact does assume upon himself, a risk at such a level in order to realize the moral imperative you set out in item 1 (clearly, the level of risk one must assume is proportional to the gravity of the moral failing). And the proof is that you yourself do not assume that risk (for example, someone who fled the country in order not to be endangered). Or at least there is no proof that you yourself would have met this test (in the case of someone who simply did not immigrate to Israel).

The same applies to criticism regarding the Holocaust.

What about the criticism of Rabbi Elyashiv’s ruling? There a claim was raised that one who is not loyal to Jewish law cannot criticize those who are loyal to it. That is also how IshTzip explained his claim after the clarification he gave. But it seems to me that this is a claim of an entirely different kind, and the two claims should not be conflated. At the basis of this claim stands the following statement: not that you have no right, but that moral criticism should be conducted according to the standards of the person being criticized, and not according to the standards of the critic (and it was this that Meitzitzenu protested there). It is enough for me to show that this is a different claim, and therefore I will not deal with it here. It is certainly worthy of a broad thread of its own, and together with this thread they will join the theory of argumentation and moral criticism that is destined, God willing, to develop here on this holy site.

M.L.’s remarks in that thread also deserve a separate thread, which will likewise join the tree of threads on moral criticism, but this is not the place to elaborate.

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Source (“Stop Here, Think” forum): http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=2293523&forum_id=1364