An A Fortiori Argument from Frogs

The rabbi’s opening post

An A Fortiori Argument from Frogs

Posted on 16/1/2010

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An a fortiori argument from frogs

An a fortiori argument from frogs. The Talmud in Pesachim 53b brings a puzzling a fortiori argument: “Come and hear, Todus of Rome expounded this as well: What led Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah to give [themselves] over for the sanctification of the Name to the fiery furnace? They derived an a fortiori argument on their own from the frogs. If frogs, which are not commanded concerning sanctification of the Name, about whom it is written, +Exodus 7+, ‘and they shall come [and go up] into your house [etc.], and into your ovens and into your kneading troughs’—when are kneading troughs found near an oven? You must say: when the oven is hot—then we, who are commanded concerning sanctification of the Name, all the more so.” What is the meaning of this a fortiori argument? Do frogs have free choice? And the early commentators there immediately begin discussing what Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah’s initial assumption was, such that they needed to reject it on the basis of the frogs. Rashi writes that they considered expounding “and live by them”—and not die by them. Tosafot reject this, since we are dealing with idolatry, and in public (see Tosafot ad loc.), so it is obvious that one must give up one’s life, and “and live by them” does not apply (except according to Rabbi Yishmael, whose view is not accepted as law). And Maharsha there refutes the a fortiori argument: frogs are not subject to “and live by them,” so the inference can be refuted. Now I saw in Tosafot Rid here (followed by a whole host of later authorities; see Tzelach, Sefat Emet, Hatam Sofer, none of whom cites him) that they understood the a fortiori argument as follows: if the frogs emerged alive from the ovens despite not being commanded—were they “saved,” or did they simply survive? How could they have known that?—then certainly the furnace would cool down for them (as indeed happened). This is of course difficult on the plain meaning of the passage in the Talmud. Incidentally, this consideration is brought in the Talmud as an indication that Todus was an eminent man (= a Torah scholar), and therefore they did not excommunicate him even though he issued an erroneous ruling (to eat a whole roasted kid on Passover eve). But immediately afterward an opinion is brought that he merited this because he supported Torah scholars and not because he himself was an eminent man. And it is hard to avoid the thought that this statement ignores the previous proof because it is dismissive of this strange a fortiori argument. So what did the Sages and the early commentators really want here? Are homiletical expositions not bound by some elementary logic? What is this really meant to teach us? How can one seriously entertain this consideration, interpret it in legal terms, raise refutations against it, and so on? I have a possible explanation, but first I will wait to hear what others think.

Source (forum “Stop Here, Think”): http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=2746181