Another Look at Tanakh and Morality (Column 272)
With God's help
In the previous column we saw an example of tendentious use of sources, when in fact what was involved was simple common sense (or not). In passing there, I noted the advantage of halakhic scholars and their mode of thinking. Against this background, I thought I would take the opportunity to touch on a Torah-based consideration regarding another political issue, this time in the security sphere.
About two months ago, two articles were published dealing with the Torah's approach to how one should relate to the residents of Gaza and the rocket fire coming from there. They once again stirred in me thoughts about the ability—or really the inability—to formulate a Torah position on such issues, whether such a position exists at all, and how one would go about doing so.
The Dispute
A little over two months ago, Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu published an article on the Srugim website under the headline 'Something is Confusing Us,' in which he called for firing missiles at the civilian population in Gaza in response to the missiles fired at our civilians. In his view, this is the language the Torah speaks, and the entire civilized world acts accordingly as well; only among us do bleeding hearts of various kinds confuse us with fake compassion. His claim is that this compassion brings disaster upon both us and the residents of Gaza, since prolonging the conflict brings more victims to them and to us alike and pushes off the end of the conflict; thus, out of excessive compassion, all sides suffer more.
A day later, Rabbi Ido Pachter published a response article, in which he argued that Rabbi Eliyahu's remarks run contrary to the Torah's way:
Indeed, Something is Confusing Us. In the Torah I know, Abraham prays for the people of Sodom, even though he knows they are very wicked and sinful before God, because perhaps among them there are a few dozen righteous people who have neither transgressed nor sinned. In the Torah I know there is a prohibition against despising an Edomite, 'for he is your brother,' even though he did not allow Israel to pass through his border. In the Torah I know there is also a prohibition against despising an Egyptian, 'for you were a stranger in his land,' even though the Egyptians enslaved Israel with crushing labor. And in the Torah I know, vengeance is the Lord's vengeance, for He alone knows how to take vengeance, whereas we are commanded to cleave to His Thirteen Attributes, which stop at 'clear' and do not continue into the attributes of punishment, which belong to Him alone.
He goes on to lament the fact that rabbis exalt the path of zealotry rather than the path of moderation and peace, which is, needless to say, 'the message of the Torah of Israel':
For this is the message of the Torah of Israel—to conduct oneself by the attribute of mercy and not by the attribute of strict justice. For it, war is a terrible thing, for from the moment permission is given to the destroyer, he does not distinguish between righteous and wicked, and woe if the blood of innocents is on our hands. So yes, If someone rises to kill you, rise early to kill him first., and let us not turn the other cheek to our enemies, and let us fight with utter self-sacrifice for our lives and our freedom, but let us never become addicted to the impulse of revenge and contempt for human life. We will prefer to invest in protection and Iron Dome, in targeted killings, but we will not sink to the level of our vile enemies who hide behind civilians. We, unlike them, spare human life, and we will not solve the problem through bloodshed that makes no distinction between righteous and wicked.
Both are emphatic, both speak about the Torah's way as though it yields a clear conclusion regarding the matter before us, and both accuse the other of deviating from it. So which of the two is right here?
Is There a Torah Position on This Issue?
Rabbi Pachter's words are positively honeyed (if somewhat Christian), in the spirit of Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace.. But for some reason it seems to me that he forgot a few other biblical passages, such as the apostate city, the execution of Sabbath desecrators and idolaters, the destruction of Amalek (men, women, and children, and even animals) or of the seven Canaanite nations, or the verse Daughter Babylon, despoiled one—happy is he who seizes your infants and dashes them against the rock. (Isaiah Leibowitz's favorite verse in response to talk about 'the morality of the prophets'), the rule that zealots may strike him, and so on. It seems to me that if I had to derive a general approach from the Torah, I most certainly would not derive from it a path of mercy and moderation. Certainly not. And to see war as 'a terrible thing'—you will not find a greater fabrication than that. Where exactly do you see this in the Torah? On the contrary, from the plain sense of the sources war appears to be an everyday and trivial matter. According to the Talmud in Berakhot, King David tells the hungry Israelites who come to him You have stretched out your hands against the troop., that is, go out to war (see Berakhot 3b and Sanhedrin 16a). The very concept of a discretionary war means that in Jewish law no justified cause is required in order to go to war. On the contrary, the king goes to war in order to expand his territory and his honor. None of this prevents Rabbi Pachter from declaring that this, and no other, is 'the message of the Torah of Israel.' A hidden message, found nowhere except in his fevered mind, is presented here as the Torah's message.
Here we have another example, one among many, of my old and battered claim that one cannot derive from the Bible, and perhaps not from the Sages either, moral conclusions on disputed questions. One can learn from there that murder and theft are forbidden, and other trivial conclusions of that kind (at least today they are trivial). But on any disputed question you will not succeed in extracting any conclusion whatsoever. Each person quarries from the sources the approach he happens to like. Tell me who you are, and I will tell you what the Torah's message is in your eyes. Everyone who speaks on these issues cherry-picks sources selectively, when it is perfectly clear that it is not the Torah speaking from his mouth but his own reasoning and his own approach. Moreover, as I noted regarding the question of the attitude toward war, the sources seem to say precisely the opposite of Rabbi Pachter's view, which does not stop him from presenting his position as the message of the Torah of Israel, no less, as though the sources could not possibly be read otherwise (as noted, here there is almost no room for another reading. The plain sense is exactly the opposite). Rabbi Pachter's heartfelt desires are what are being presented as the message of the Torah of Israel.
Moreover, typically there is no orderly analysis here of the sort one finds in legal disputes, where sources are set against one another and one tries to build a coherent doctrine and reconcile contradictory sources, and only then reaches conclusions on the matter under discussion. Here, by contrast, people typically pull sources out in a tendentious and selective way, interpret them at the level of a little homily at a wedding banquet, and in the end declare that this and this alone is the Torah's way. Let me clarify that I do not expect a short journalistic column to contain a systematic Torah analysis. But I do expect people not to wave selective sources about against the spirit that emerges from the body of sources as a whole and present that as the message of the Torah of Israel. Say honestly what you yourself want to say, and present it honestly as your own moral position, and that's it. Leave the verses alone, because they have nothing to do with the matter.
This is a disgraceful lack of intellectual honesty, though a very typical one, as is common in such discussions. The question that arises here is why most readers of these articles, certainly those who agree with their bottom line, do not even ask themselves the questions I have raised here. They read, and it seems natural and obvious to them that this is how one hews from Torah verses its central message for the world, even though nothing of the sort is even hinted at there. It seems that we have already grown accustomed to the fact that a position on these issues is a tendentious matter, and that 'the Torah's way' in this regard is nothing more than the writer's heartfelt desires. It is always like this, and so it no longer troubles us. This is true of great Haredi figures no less than of liberal rabbis. Everyone who deals with questions unrelated to Jewish law but to Tanakh, Jewish thought, or 'da'at Torah.' They all speak in the name of the Torah of Israel and its message, but in fact they are simply tossing out declarations that come from their own gut. The punctilious among them even see this as Torah study (study of Tanakh). Just imagine: would study of the Torah of Israel's message not count as Torah study? There is no greater Torah study than that. What is even stranger here is that, to my sense, although all this is obvious to everyone, the effect of these words nevertheless remains. A faithful Jew cannot ignore 'the Torah's way' and its messages.
A Dialogue of the Deaf
Beyond the general phenomenon of the attitude toward Tanakh and the formation of a position on such and similar issues, and beyond the question whether there is such a thing as 'Jewish morality' (there isn't), or whether there is 'the Torah's way' on these issues (there isn't), as to the specific questions being discussed here, it seems to me that this is simply a dialogue of the deaf.
Any sensible person understands that on this issue one must distinguish between two planes of discussion. There is the question of harming uninvolved persons for the sake of revenge and retribution, and there is another question: whether one can and should do so for the sake of deterrence and prevention of future attacks. Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu, in his article, speaks mainly about deterrence (though one can also hear tones there that justify revenge), whereas Rabbi Pachter, in his article, speaks mainly about revenge (though in his case one can also discern tones of opposition to such deterrent measures). That is the clear impression one gets from reading the two pieces, even without entering into nuances and close textual distinctions. Be that as it may, you surely all understand that the Torah's message is that in the realm of deterrence Rabbi Eliyahu is right, and in the realm of revenge Rabbi Pachter is right.
To see this, rather than resorting to general declarations about the Torah's way and message and quoting this verse or that, which say very little, I prefer to examine the matter from the perspective of Jewish law or of common sense. It turns out that on those planes one can formulate a very reasonable position (even if not quite an unavoidable one) on these issues. This is another demonstration, for anyone who still needs one, of my old claim that there is no point or benefit in dealing with Tanakh and Jewish thought, certainly not if one is trying to formulate a position on current questions. Tanakh and books of thought will not help you here. On the contrary, they will only obstruct and obscure. These sources are nothing but a rhetorical device for presenting the writer's position to you as though it had come down from Sinai.
By contrast, Jewish law, even if it is not a precise instrument and even if it does not always provide an answer, is a far more useful and reliable tool, and in general we will get from it a better and more convincing answer, and above all a more honest one. Especially since here one does not even need a full-fledged analysis in Jewish law, and considerations of common sense and basic morality are enough. I will therefore do so here very briefly, and I think that will be enough to show the point.
I will begin by saying that I know of no justification, whether in Jewish law or otherwise, for harming innocent people as revenge. This is murder in every respect. Apart from Amalek and the seven nations, I know of no permission in the Torah to kill a person, even if he is a gentile, if he does not threaten me. There are, of course, rules such as They are lowered down, but not brought up. and the like, but according to most halakhic decisors that does not exist today, for various reasons. And I have not even yet invoked international law, which forbids this, and according to virtually every opinion I know it is binding in Jewish law as well (with limitations, and of course without trying to be more righteous than the Pope in such matters). But at the same time and to the same extent, to the best of my judgment there is certainly permission, and perhaps even an obligation, to harm and even kill enemy civilians, even if they are innocent, if three conditions are met: 1. I have no other way to deal with the threat posed to us from their side. 2. In my estimation, this course of action will indeed produce the result (which I am not at all sure is true in this case, but my concern here is with principled moral clarification, not with resolving security and policy questions). 3. Reasonable proportionality (one does not kill a million uninvolved people in order to save one of our citizens. And let me anticipate the expected objections: I do not have a sharp criterion for that proportionality). I elaborated on these matters in an article, so I will not repeat them here.
The obvious conclusion regarding the dispute between Rabbis Eliyahu and Pachter is that this is a dialogue of the deaf. One should accept Rabbi Eliyahu's main thesis, that it is permitted and necessary to harm innocent people if this is necessary and effective (that is, if there is no other way to deal with the problem, and this way will indeed solve it, within the limits of proportionality), but one should reject the cry of vengeance that wafts between the lines of his words. At the same time, one should accept Rabbi Pachter's claim that killing uninvolved people as revenge is illegitimate, but reject the spirit that wafts between the lines of his words, which forbids collective punishment even if it is necessary and has a practical purpose. There is indeed a moral problem in harming someone uninvolved, but it is justified (both in Jewish law and in terms of the norms accepted in the civilized world) if there is no other way to deal with the situation.
Forgive me for not bringing verses and various biblical passages, or even Talmuds and halakhic decisors. That is because, to the best of my judgment, all of these are not the Torah's message but merely the products of common sense and simple logic, as well as elementary principles of Jewish law. It seems to me that this picture is not hard to ground in Jewish law, and it also accords well with common sense and accepted moral values. Therefore I see no need to resort to general and ungrounded declarations, and I see no value in the selective choice of sources, as Rabbi Pachter did (Rabbi Eliyahu did not deal with sources, and in fact did not substantiate his claim beyond hinted and ungrounded assertions that by this route we will attain the expected benefit).
Once again it has become clear that quoting biblical passages adds nothing at all to the discussion, and that the conclusions we draw from them are merely a reflection of our a priori assumptions. If I continue in Rabbi Pachter's fashion, I will protest here against the dishonest use of sources in order to advance agendas (even if those agendas were correct and justified, I am in favor of intellectual honesty and against the tendentious recruitment of sources), and against the fact that rabbis do not use the obvious arguments of common sense that would lead to the reasonable result both in Jewish law and morally, and instead issue dishonest declarations based on selective biblical sources from which no conclusion follows.
What is especially endearing about this simple analysis is that, to the best of my judgment, it holds water in terms of Jewish law (even if it is not the Torah's one and only message on earth), and at the same time it seems to me that this itself would also be the conclusion reached by ordinary non-Jews with common sense, without quoting the Ketzot or Rashba (though I assume they too would quote various verses about 'the morality of the prophets'; the ugly custom of making tendentious use of sources is not unique to rabbis). In this particular case, Jewish law is not essentially different from the reasonable judgment of any sensible person. Thus not only does this picture fit Jewish law, but in this case it also tracks common sense and universal morality (for as is well known, there is no such thing as Jewish morality or the morality of the Torah). In this particular case, the halakhic method is nothing but the intelligent use of ethical tools and common sense (see another example in the previous column, in the discussion of the question of not honoring political agreements and the canteen of water. There too I pointed to the use of an irrelevant discussion in Jewish law in order to justify a conclusion of common sense)[1], which only further sharpens the dishonesty involved in resorting to slogans about the Torah's message and to scriptural prooftexts in issues such as this.
One can of course discuss whether a state is bound by these principles. I am prepared to hear arguments that a state may act in ways that depart from these simple rules, that is, to punish or take revenge even on innocent people as part of its policy. But in my opinion, this is nothing more than an application of the question of deterrence when it is operated on the national plane (rather than the personal one). Moreover, when discussing this subject there is no point in bringing citations from Tanakh, because even if you do manage to find a source that says this (and here that is of course possible), the norms that were accepted there are not really practiced in our time, and perhaps that is a good thing. Even if you find sources relevant to this question, you will not succeed in showing me that this is the Torah's message and convincing me that this is how one ought actually to act. Like the classical commentators, the opponents will tell you that this was a temporary ruling, or that it was true for their time, or they will offer one limiting interpretation or another. But in the end the conclusion will always be what common sense and morality require. Tanakh will contribute nothing here. But, as noted, even that little was not done in the present discussion.
Emotion versus Intellect: Beating a Recalcitrant Husband
I find it hard to avoid the feeling that lurking behind this discussion is the question of reason and emotion. In their articles, both rabbis appeal mainly to emotion. One appeals to wounded national feeling and the other to moral feeling. I think that the use of cool reason, and refusal to surrender to the emotions aroused from every direction, leads us quite easily to the reasonable and obvious solution (the one I described above). Emotional biases lead readers to identify with what is written, even though it contains no arguments and no novelty; they flatten the discourse and neutralize the critical attitude that should be brought to bear on the arguments raised there.
This discussion reminds me of something Rabbi Shilat once wrote in the Shabbat supplement of Makor Rishon. Rabbi Shilat proposed beating a recalcitrant husband in order to force him to give his wife a bill of divorce, that is, simply to apply the Jewish law of He is beaten until he says, 'I am willing.' ("we beat him until he says, 'I want to'"). The intention is to use institutionalized beating by the authorities of the law, following a judicial ruling by a rabbinical court that the man is indeed obligated to divorce his wife. Those remarks elicited reactions ranging from reservation to outrage. Among others, Prof. Aviad Hacohen wrote that it is inconceivable that a modern democratic state would use violent means (torture is a 'doomsday weapon,' in his words) in order to enforce the law.
In my humble opinion, a proper democratic state should not allow a man to make his wife miserable and leave her an agunah, unable to remarry. It does not hand women over to their husbands as though they were property. If one has already chosen to adopt the Jewish law that gives the husband such power and to grant it legal and statutory sanction, it is inconceivable not to adopt together with it the solution that Jewish law itself attaches to that principled determination (He is beaten until he says, 'I am willing.'). As stated, this is a case in which a judicial body with legal authority (the rabbinical court, in this case) has determined that this situation is forbidden and that he must release his wife.
So how are we to understand these strange reactions? What is wrong with giving such a cruel criminal a sound beating? Why not respond to his violence with counter-violence by the institutions entrusted with doing so? Rabbi Shilat himself pointed out that in many cases a state uses reasonable force in order to compel obedience to the law. Putting a person in prison for many years is an immensely forceful act, not to mention the death penalty or even the imposition of a fine and the like. That man is behaving violently toward his wife, and in doing so he is also violating both Jewish law and the civil law, so there is no reason not to behave violently toward him in order to prevent this.
My feeling on reading these things was that, once again, this was an emotional reaction. People recoil from the idea of a person being beaten by the authorities of law. It sounds to them like Iran or Saudi Arabia (as opposed to handing a woman over to her husband as though she were property, which is apparently an enlightened and progressive step). Cold and straightforward reason, in my opinion, simply says in this case what Rabbi Shilat wrote. I therefore think that the opposing reactions come mainly from the gut. People feel that it is impossible for a proper democratic state to send its agents to beat a citizen. But reason says that there is no problem at all with such a step. As for me, I cannot even manage to see a dilemma here. To my mind it is simple and obvious that this is what should be done. This may be a good place to remind ourselves once again that morality belongs to the realm of reason, not emotion.
At the end of the previous column I pointed to one of the prominent advantages of Jewish law, namely that it proceeds in a cool and non-emotional manner, with a systematic method that reaches conclusions (despite the considerable number of disputes it of course contains). I argued there that this is also the advantage of halakhic scholars over others, and it is a shame that they themselves descend into unnecessary and unhelpful biblical discussions, thereby needlessly obscuring the discussion and dragging it down onto the emotional plane. We have a magnificent systematic platform for discussing these questions, and there is no reason to descend into the realms of literature and Scripture. Let those be left for Tanakh study days and for those who, for some reason, are interested in them.
[1] Even assuming that this is indeed the conclusion of common sense in that case. I will note here that I pointed there to various problems with that conclusion, but in any event the canteen example and the supposedly 'halakhic' discussion make no difference one way or the other.
Discussion
Shouldn’t cold reason be troubled by the fact that, in the laws of divorce, the woman is dependent on the husband?
What would your answer be in that case? Would you only explain the place of the Torah’s binding command? Or would you also turn to a discussion of the divorce laws as justifying the need for the woman’s continued dependence on the husband?
I thought there would be a column about Kobe Bryant
Hello, honorable Rabbi,
Do you identify the same pattern of selective use of sources (preferring these verses and not others that might perhaps contradict them) and principles in order to ground or strengthen a position in other areas of religious life? For example, people’s tendency to harness God’s “miraculous” intervention in history when it suits their worldview (in ’67 yes, in ’73 no). Second, if one cannot derive morality from the Bible, beyond its being a religiously binding text, do you find any additional value in it that can be drawn from it?
Thank you very much
Yonatan
Indeed. He even understands the difficulty this raises regarding Bible study and drawing conclusions from the Torah, but in the end chooses to ignore it.
It is a halakhic command. I have nothing to say about it.
What a pity for what has been lost. Maybe there still will be.
Absolutely. I’ve written about this more than once already. How the Holocaust is a punishment for opposition to Zionism or for joining it, and the like.
I’ve also written here at length already about studying the Bible (in columns and in the responsa section). In my opinion there is nothing to learn from it. You can search.
This column reminded me of an original idea I once heard—to set up a system similar to Iron Dome, which would detect the place from which the missile was launched and strike it automatically (literally, an eye for an eye). They’re unlikely to approve setting up such a thing, but the idea has many advantages.
I assume you call it collective punishment even when the parties involved are not Arabs, but, for the sake of example, the relatives of the head of a crime organization.
Otherwise, it sounds problematic to me.
I don’t. And it isn’t problematic at all. The distinction is not between Arabs and Jews, but in the degree of responsibility for what is happening. See the article I linked to.
I assume you read about this interesting idea here on the site. I brought it a long time ago in Benny’s name.
??
It was a bit different, but the same idea.
To add: simple ideas like burying terrorists with pig carcasses are dismissed out of hand with childish emotional arguments as above. Of course, as always, there is a correlation between the moral rejection and the lack of effectiveness. Funny how that works.
You wrote: “I don’t. And it isn’t problematic at all. The distinction is not between Arabs and Jews, but in the degree of responsibility for what is happening. See the article I linked to.”
In your opinion, is there no difference at all between a civilian and an enemy, or is that also a consideration?
Rabbi Ido Fechter’s response (on Facebook):
It is so enjoyable to read Rabbi Michael Abraham addressing the latest polemic with Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu (and thanks to Shimon Itiel Yerushalmi for the link):
https://mikyab.net/posts/65160…
And there is so much to say and argue about this, but I’ll be brief:
Rabbi Michi’s approach is very tempting. Because indeed there are countless examples and stories in the Bible of acts that contradict morality today. But if so, what is the conclusion from his words? That one cannot learn values or morality from the Bible. Rabbi Michi qualifies this when he writes that one cannot learn values that are “subject to dispute.” But what is not subject to dispute today?
Here he writes: “You can learn from there that it is forbidden to murder and steal and other trivial conclusions.” But is that really so? Did David and his warriors not murder right and left? Did Moses not kill that Egyptian who struck the Hebrew? Did Joshua not cut off thumbs and big toes?
And this is the halakhic trap, which Rabbi Michi tends to rely on. He argues that “I know of no justification, halakhic or otherwise, for harming innocents as revenge. That is murder in every sense. Apart from Amalek and the seven nations, I know of no permission in the Torah to kill a person, even if he is a gentile, if he does not threaten me.” But it would be easy for those who claimed that from a halakhic standpoint the law of Amalek should be applied to anyone who rises to kill us—and lo and behold, you have a halakhic justification for indiscriminate revenge against our enemies. Is Rabbi Michi able to reject such a position outright? And why should such a position not be considered legitimate within the space of halakhic dispute?
Therefore my approach is that one must beware of fundamentalism on both sides. On the one hand, not to turn everything written in the Bible into a moral lighthouse for us. But on the other hand, it is impossible to disconnect from it completely. I believe that the Torah of Israel does indeed chart for us a world of values; the only question is how to learn them.
And this is the distinction. The Torah gives us eternal foundational values, but at the same time it speaks in the language of its era. Therefore it speaks about slaves, or sacrifices, or the beautiful captive woman; while it is clear (at least to me) that the purpose is not to exploit human beings (even Canaanites), including female captives, nor to slaughter animals for the sake of religious worship. The student, the God-fearing person, must therefore distinguish between content and aim and the plain wording.
Yes, in monarchical regimes, kings murder their opponents right and left, conquer territories for themselves, and slaughter enemies. That was how the world spoke then, and one could not have expected the king of Israel to behave differently, because then he would not have survived. But does that mean that this is the inner voice of the Torah? Is that what it strives for? Certainly not.
Precisely for this reason we were given the story of creation, where we are told that the world is good, and accordingly everything that brings the world to its fulfillment (that is, brings life) is good, and the opposite is evil. We are also told that man was created in the image of God, and that there is a Sabbath in the world that elevates us beyond the war of survival in nature, and so on. From this it follows that man’s glory is to realize the image of God within him—and not to kill innocents indiscriminately, not to take revenge wantonly, and so on.
Now let us take these values and see how to realize them in a given reality. If that brings someone to the conclusion that missiles should be fired indiscriminately at population centers, I fear that something went wrong along the way. And even if in the end you are required to kill an innocent person in order to save yourself (and that I accept), remember that in the end you killed something bearing the image of God. God forbid that this should be easy in your eyes.
It seems to me that I wrote this too here.
I didn’t understand.
With all due respect, these things are baseless. Murder is forbidden because it says “You shall not murder” and “Whoever sheds the blood of man.” That’s all. This is halakha, and therefore it really does teach. My remarks dealt only with the non-halakhic passages of Scripture. They teach nothing at all, as was well demonstrated here. The objections from King David are likewise irrelevant Bible study.
I am speaking about facts, and Rabbi Fechter is bringing wishful thinking. I too would like to learn values from the Bible, and think that is how it ought to be. But what can one do? One has to be honest: as a matter of fact, it simply does not happen. As a matter of fact, it is clear that nothing at all can be learned from the Bible. And in fact everyone reaches exactly the conclusions I would have predicted in advance that he would reach. So is that called learning them from the Bible?
To show that this happens, one must bring an example where a straightforward analysis of the Bible leads to a certain conclusion and the learner changes his a priori position by force of that conclusion. That does not happen here and does not happen at all.
What Rabbi Fechter is saying here is this: text x contains evidence in all directions: a or b. Your inclinations say a, and therefore you will infer a from it. But that way one can learn anything from any text. The prohibition (or obligation) of firing missiles at Gaza can be learned this way from the Quran, from the Upanishads, or from Bialik’s “To the Bird’s Nest.” In exactly the same way. Oh, you have a difficulty from the line “Hush, lest you awaken”—(the missiles will awaken the chicks)? Fine, the learning is not linear and has shades and facets. Don’t be simplistic. Come on, really! Is this serious?
I discussed this at length in earlier columns and also in the second book of the trilogy. There I defined these things and showed it. But here too, after setting aside wishful thinking, you will find only declarations and a priori assumptions, but not anything we learned from the Bible.
A few comments:
1. I did not understand your massive use of the argument of “common sense.” After all, it is clear that your common sense, Rabbi Fechter’s, and Rabbi Eliyahu’s do not hold the same opinion. Perforce you must say one of two things:
A. One of you is right and the other two are wrong. I suspect that this is what you tried to argue, but your rationale was common sense, so it is not really a rationale.
B. These are value judgments and not factual judgments, and therefore there really is no factual rationale (cf. the is-ought problem, at least as I understand it). You are discussing value claims, and so there is no factual rationale that can persuade. What can persuade? An appeal to emotion (as both of them do), or arguments for why this will in fact better serve some other value about which there is no dispute (for example, Israel’s victory or something like that).
In my opinion this is option B, and therefore I think integrity requires at least admitting that this is one value judgment and that is another value judgment, and it is not clear why one is better than the other.
2. I think the distinction you make between a halakhic dispute, where halakha has a clear conclusion, and a dispute such as the one you presented (where halakha offers no way and one must rely on common sense), is artificial. Truly, on questions where halakha already exists, one can decide using halakhic tools. But whoever originally formulated that halakha decided using tools of common sense or through looking at the Torah and its values, and only afterward issued a halakhic ruling. For the sake of example, let us assume Rabbi Eliyahu rules that the path he proposes is a binding halakhic ruling. In ten years, when this question is asked again, then the question will be examined with halakhic tools—and Rabbi Eliyahu’s opinion will be considered one side in an ordinary halakhic dispute.
What a coincidence 🙂
After all, in every halakhic dispute that touches on the soul’s desires or the human opinions of the decisor—such as handing over parts of the Land of Israel or the prohibition of euthanasia—
you see that there is a connection between the intellectual view and the halakhic conclusion.
From this it follows that there is really no ability to decide even in halakha, exactly as in Bible and faith,
and the attempt to create an objective truth is baseless.
With God’s help, 2 Shevat 5780
The deeds of the fathers of the world are Torah, and require study. After all, their words and deeds were written in the Torah so that we may learn from them ways of life, so that in principle there is room to compare one matter to another from the conduct of the Patriarchs to questions of our time. But such comparison requires attending not only to the similarities, but also to the differences.
Abraham does not always follow the path of patience. Against the four kings who took his nephew captive he goes out to war. Regarding the future enslavers and oppressors of his descendants, concerning whom God tells him, “And also that nation whom they shall serve will I judge,” Abraham does not ask for mercy. Perhaps the distinction is that the people of Sodom, however evil and sinful they are, do not attack the house of Abraham; but one who attacks will be answered with force.
Even the request for mercy for the people of Sodom is conditional on there being a community of righteous people among them; for fewer than ten Abraham does not ask. God asks his counsel and explains why He includes Abraham in the decision; the reason for Abraham’s inclusion is “For I have known him, to the end that he may command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord”—Abraham is the “expert in education,” and he is asked to decide whether Sodom has a chance of being repaired.
Abraham’s answer is that the matter depends on the existence of a “community” of righteous people within the city. When there is a cohesive group of righteous people in the place, there is hope for positive influence on the city as a whole. Isolated individuals have no real power of influence. Moreover, a city that allows a community of righteous people to exist within it shows that it has a certain openness to the good.
Today’s Gaza differs from Sodom in that it attacks us, and also in that it has “zero tolerance” for “righteous people” within the city. Still, this consideration can also provide a defense for Gaza’s general population. Perhaps they should be regarded as coerced, as “children taken captive” by their leadership, and for that reason it should be said that it is preferable to carry out “targeted killings” that seek to strike hard at the terrorists and their leaders, and less at the general public.
With blessings, S. Tz.
At this point the Midrash brings a dispute between Panger, Duke of Arabia, who was one of Vespasian’s military officers, and Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai. Panger argued that if a snake is wrapped around the mouth of a barrel, one breaks the barrel and destroys its wine in order to eliminate the snake. By contrast, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai argued that one brings a charmer who will catch the snake without harming the barrel or the wine.
With blessings, S. Tz.
To the comment “Between Sodom and Gaza,” paragraph 5, line 1
Today’s Gaza differs from Sodom in that it attacks us, and is similar to it in that it has “zero tolerance”…
Everything you wrote in part 1 of your response is very problematic!
I’ll address one thing that really, really bothered me, and I quote: “In my opinion this is option B, and therefore I think integrity requires at least admitting that this is one value judgment and that is another value judgment, and it is not clear why one is better than the other.”
First of all, it is obvious that it must be like option A—that one is right and the others are wrong. And regarding what you wrote, that value judgments cannot be decided, that is a terrible mistake whose implications I don’t think you have taken into account. If value judgments cannot be decided, what is the value of argument at all? How can you say about another person that he is wrong? Or that he is immoral? Or complain about this or that behavior of certain groups? (The Nazis, for example…)
A response to Dor:
That is exactly what I am arguing. See here, a short Wikipedia entry on the is-ought problem: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%99%D7%AA_%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%95%D7%99-%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%99
These are exactly the implications of that fallacy. There really is no point in arguing about a value discussion.
A quote from Leibowitz speaking about this issue:
“In the years of the Second World War Eleanor Roosevelt defined as the highest goal securing the existence of a world in which every child would be provided with a cup of milk every day, whereas General Tojo defined as the supreme value death for the emperor and for honor (and so too Trumpeldor said before his death: ‘It is good to die for our country’); some thousands of years before us the divine poet Asaph (Ps. 73) defined ‘nearness to God’ as ‘good.’ What can the scientific method, or what can the conclusions of biological, psychological, and sociological research, or what can the possibilities made available to man against the background of the achievements of science—what can all these contribute toward deciding between the values of Eleanor Roosevelt, of General Tojo, and of Asaph?”
I seem to remember he also says something similar about Hitler, but I don’t recall the quote. In any case, according to his view (and I have not yet found a refutation of it), there is no point in arguing about values. The only option is to fight over them.
Note: It’s a shame one can’t reply to a comment; that would surely make the discussions here much more understandable.
With God’s help, 2 Shevat 5780
To Alon—greetings,
You can reply to a comment. Click “Reply” at the head of the thread.
With blessings, S. Tz.
1. I think that what I called in the column the conclusions of common sense would largely be accepted by both of the above rabbis. The disagreement is really at the margins, and it is presented in sweeping fashion because of careless and imprecise thinking.
But my main purpose in the column was not to express the position as such, but to warn against improper use of sources when the question is one of common sense. Even if there is a dispute (and in my opinion it is at the margins).
Your claim that value questions cannot be decided and perhaps there is no truth about them has already been answered by my predecessor.
2. I did not draw a distinction between halakha and common sense. On the contrary, here the two coincide.
I don’t know what to do with declarations. If you have some comment on what I wrote, I’d be happy to hear it.
Alon, you can reply to a comment in response to a comment. You need to return to the first message in the thread and click “Reply” there. Your response will appear at the end of the thread.
As for your point itself, the is-ought question is not related to the question whether there is value-truth or not. Even if one cannot determine the truth on the basis of observational facts, one can determine it on the basis of arguments. The fact is that people are sometimes persuaded even on value questions (and that is indeed an empirical fact).
With God’s help, 2 Shevat 5780
The angels who announce Isaac’s birth are the angels who are going to overturn Sodom. Isaac’s appearance heralds a strict and exacting divine governance. Abraham influences the world through pleasantness and drawing people near, through explanation and personal example.
Abraham’s way is the way of an individual who influences by the power of his spiritual strength. But a nation of worshippers of God, a nation that also contains simple and average people, cannot endure by the power of love alone. To create a proper society there must be a system of justice that enforces the good and prevents the evil. A nation that not only influences by gentle ways, but also fights for its values against its enemies.
From now on begins a more forceful divine governance. Sodom must be overturned, and Ishmael is driven from Abraham’s house so that he will not compete with Isaac and interfere with his education. Later Abraham and Isaac undergo the test of the binding, at the end of which Abraham is blessed for the first time: “And your seed shall possess the gate of his enemies.” His descendants will have to conquer their land by war.
It is not for nothing that Isaac thinks that the son fit to establish the kingdom is Esau, the expert in the tactics of war, and not Jacob, who is “a mild man, dwelling in tents.” Yet in the blessing he intended for Esau, Isaac did not settle for a “career” as a hunter. He blesses Esau that he should also be a tiller of the soil like his father, and should merit through his labor “much grain and wine,” continuing Isaac’s own path, who began to work the land of the country and found in it “a hundredfold.” In the end it becomes clear that דווקא the mild one, who does not desire a “military career,” is the one who will have to take on the role of fighter and conqueror as well. It is better that power be entrusted to one who is not eager for it.
The children of Israel are destined to inherit their land through war, but before the war they are commanded to call out for peace, because war is a necessity of reality and not an object of desire.
With blessings, S. Tz.
Paragraph 5, line 2
…because war is a necessity of reality and not an object of desire.
You wrote that the criterion is the degree of responsibility. It sounds as though that is the only criterion. In your opinion, does the distinction between a citizen of your state (or a member of your people) and an enemy carry any weight?
That is too general a question. Ask a specific question and I can address it.
In short:
The possibility of learning from Abraham’s prayer for the people of Sodom runs into a number of questions: (a) Does this patience also exist toward one who fights against the people of Israel? (b) Abraham too demanded a “threshold condition” of ten righteous people within the city, and the question is whether in today’s Gaza there are “ten righteous people within the city” who might lead their city to spiritual repair? (c) Does the appearance of the people of Israel not signal a more forceful struggle against opponents and enemies?
In any case, we find that even in an obligatory war against the seven Canaanite nations the Torah required calling for peace first before embarking on total war, and therefore it seems that insofar as possible one should prefer “targeted killing” against the terrorists and leaders over collective punishment, in accordance with Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai’s instruction to take the snake with tongs and not break the whole barrel (Lamentations Rabbah 1:31).
With blessings, S. Tz.
Indeed,
selective use of sources exists on both sides.
In general, in the whole treatment of the issue of gentiles-Jews or of morality-religion, one can find two completely opposite positions in the Gemara and in the halakhic decisors, and certainly in the literature of “Jewish thought.”
Precisely dry halakha really will not support mercy, repair, and kindness toward the average gentile, certainly not toward the average enemy gentile. Has it escaped Rabbi Fechter’s notice, may he live long, that there is a prohibition on giving life-saving treatment to members of other religions, and are the Ishmaelites, our enemies, not outside that category? Will the rabbi adhere here too to “Torah in its plain sense”?) It is true that there are exceptions such as the Meiri, and in general the school of Rabbi Kook apparently wanted to create a synthesis or narrow the gaps between Torah and morality—but other approaches exist.
Certainly on the political questions of going to war and harming innocents one cannot really know what the Rambam or Rashi would think today, and on the other hand, in many explicit halakhot there was really no sense of shame in writing about slaughtering whole cities, women and children (just as family law, relations of ownership over children and women, censorship and blocking freedom of speech, putting heretics to death, and forbidding basic compassion toward members of other religions are found in much of the halakhic corpus)—therefore, if a person chooses to live with two parallel systems of values, he should admit that his consideration is moral-value based and extra-Torah.
And regarding harm to innocents in war—I also do not really understand what all the fuss is about when there is no choice (or when there is reason to think that the quicker path, or the only path, to prevent conflict) is to harm innocents—then one does so (and that was done in the past as well in the bombing of Dresden, in the most enlightened places in the world).
And responsibility for this lies with the side that started the war.
The question whether one should feel sorrow that an innocent person was killed or not is, in my opinion, rather foolish.
Every day in the world millions of innocent people die. The more correct question is whether it is proper to rejoice that an innocent enemy civilian died or passed away.
In my opinion, once you are already protected and safe, going out in cries of joy over some ordinary person having died is simply stupidity.
But if that is really the whole controversy between them, it is utterly silly.
Israel Aumann also proposed this idea (in 2014). Search for the word “automatic” in the article here: https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001071137
With God’s help, 4 Shevat 5780
Besides the moral advantage of “targeted killing,” which strikes the perpetrators and their leaders rather than the rest of the population, “targeted killing” also has a deterrent advantage. After all, the leaders of terror do not care at all about the fate of their people. On the contrary, they exploit the suffering of the civilian population in order to stir up world “public opinion” against us.
By contrast, targeted strikes against the terror leaders, who will feel that they and their families are not safe from harm, are what create significant deterrence. Just as Pharaoh, so long as the blow fell on the general population, was not especially moved. But when the threat was carried out—“Behold, I will kill your son, your firstborn”—then he was forced to surrender without conditions or evasions.
With blessings, S. Tz.
Not slaughtering animals for the sake of religious worship—that is the Torah’s aim? Astonishing.
Why should the state intervene in a religious matter?
The recalcitrant husband is not holding his wife by force; rather, her faith forbids her to remarry.
If she says that she believes that until he eats a chicken’s head she is forbidden to remarry, should we beat him until he does it?
If the state would remove its hands from the whole matter of marriage to begin with, perhaps there would be something to discuss. At present the situation is that the state will not allow her to remarry.
Hello Rabbi Michael,
In principle I agree with what you wrote—it is hard not to agree, since reality shows that people use the exact same text to justify whatever they want (and this is not only Rabbi Fechter and Rabbi Eliyahu, but billions more people who disagree with one another about everything except the fact that everything they think is written in the Bible). Still, I think the leap you make from that determination to the determination that there is no value at all in studying the Bible is unjustified. That would be true if the purpose of studying the Bible were to know what to do in practice in various situations—and it is not surprising that halakha is in fact not decided from the Bible, nor even from the Mishnah or the Gemara. But perhaps it is possible that the Bible was written not in order to be, in the phrase of our dear friends, “the manufacturer’s instructions” (a metaphor I don’t understand the enthusiasm for: a product that needs so many instructions to operate, and they are so unclear, and every deviation from them leads you to hell for no reasonable cause, does not testify to a particularly intelligent manufacturer) but in order to be what it is: to tell a story. I don’t remember who once said that one of the things that distinguishes the Jewish myths—that is, the Bible—from other myths (I have not checked the claim, but it seems there is something to it) is that in a “regular” myth, man tells stories about God, whereas in the Bible God tells stories about man. And very often, stories in which God is not present at all. And even more often—in fact almost always—the human being being told about is complex and mistaken and confused and noble and brave and cowardly and strong and weak and faithful and defiant, all at once. The fact that one can draw support from the Bible for any position one wishes—and genuine support, not by means of the thirteen hermeneutical rules, but by actually bringing explicit, unequivocal references—strengthens in my eyes the understanding that the Bible does not come to give instructions but to tell the story of man, especially of man standing before his God. Listening carefully to the Bible and to what it really says—like what you yourself are suggesting here (and like what quite a few serious Bible teachers with intellectual honesty do)—will not leave us with clear knowledge of what to do. But hopefully it will cause us to recognize our humanity and understand it better. I assume you will say that this is like any good literary work, and I will agree. In fact, that is also the aim of good psychological therapy (another field whose importance you for some reason tend to ignore, in my opinion without justification), and for that one does not need the Bible. Maybe. But I still think there is something special in the fact that (at least according to what I believe) the Holy One, blessed be He, decided that our sacred writings would not be (only) a halakhic code and not (only) a historical description (perhaps), but first and foremost—a good literary work. That is no small thing.
David, you have already answered in my place. All this is not Torah, and in fact, as I showed in the second book of the trilogy, it also does not teach you at all (and not only in terms of practical instruction). You learn from it only what you already agree with in advance. I discussed this at length there in the chapter on Torah study.
With God’s help, 11 Shevat 5780
Regarding the definition of “the good” in Asaph’s words in Psalm 73, “But as for me, nearness to God is my good,” it seems from the end of the verse that “nearness to God” is not only the good personal feeling of delighting in attachment to God, for the continuation of the verse is, “I have made the Lord God my refuge, that I may tell of all Your works,” meaning that “nearness to God” is bound up with telling of the mission of the Holy One, blessed be He, with imparting this mission to others as well. In other words, “nearness to God” comes through engaging in education.
From Asaph’s words in Psalm 82, “God stands in the congregation of God; in the midst of judges He judges,” it appears that one attains nearness to God when one engages in doing justice and judgment between people, especially when one does justice with the poor, as it says: “Judge the poor and fatherless; vindicate the afflicted and needy. Deliver the poor and needy; rescue them from the hand of the wicked.”
If in Psalm 73 one attains nearness to God through educational action with another, in Psalm 82 it is speaking of doing justice in the material sense. And similarly, if Eleanor Roosevelt saw “the good” in concern that every child should have a cup of milk, Asaph adds that also “one who shows a cheerful face to his fellow,” one who benefits him with a pleasant countenance, attains “nearness to God,” for in this he cleaves to the attributes of the Omnipresent: “Just as He is compassionate and gracious, so you too be gracious and compassionate.”
With blessings, S. Tz.
Paragraph 1, line 4
…with imparting this mission…
Paragraph 3, line 2
…in the material sense. If Eleanor…
There, line 4
…for in this he cleaves to the attributes of the Omnipresent: “Just as He is compassionate…”
And like Asaph, the prophet Micah’s definition of the good is also complex: “He has told you, O man, what is good and what the Lord requires of you: only to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God”—careful adherence to justice and the attribute of strict judgment, combined with acts of kindness “beyond the letter of the law” out of love, while with all the virtues and good deeds a person remains modest and humble.
And from here a paradigm for all the “contradictions” in Scripture. Scripture offers a complex conception that brings harmony between opposites, which complement one another. One cannot partially quote statements to one side without completing the picture through statements that present the other side, and without the balance brought by the third verse. The “Torah of the Lord,” when it is whole—then it “restores the soul.”
With blessings, S. Tz.
S.Tz.:
What I meant was not to say what the Torah thinks is “good,” but to show that everyone says that “good” is something else.
With God’s help, 14 Shevat 5780
And I suggest that every definition given of the good is one piece of a large “puzzle.” Like the parable of the dwarfs and the elephant: one defines it as a giant leg, one as a long pipe, one as a broad back, and one as a long horn. Each dwarf describes the small piece that he feels, and the true picture emerges from combining them all.
And so regarding the good. It includes concern that every child should have milk, self-sacrifice for the sake of the homeland, and also “nearness to God.” All these are parts and branches of the concept of the good. And the Torah, which in the Maharal’s words is “the order of the world,” calls to all the parts of the good and gives each one its proper domain and measure.
With blessings, S. Tz.
With God’s help, 15 Shevat 5780
One of the examples of the advantage of imposing personal responsibility over collective punishment is the difference in the Allies’ treatment of Germany between the First and Second World Wars.
After the First World War, none of Germany’s leaders were put on trial. By contrast, heavy economic punishments were imposed on Germany as a state, destroying the country’s economy and bringing about great bitterness that led to the rise of Nazism.
By contrast, after the Second World War, personal responsibility was imposed on the Nazi leaders, who were put on trial and punished severely. At the same time, the Allies acted this time to rebuild the country’s economy, and they acted similarly toward the Japanese. Thus the two peoples discovered that it was more worthwhile for them to harness their talents and become powers not by force of arms but by economic activity, through industrial production that won a worldwide reputation for its special quality.
Heavy personal responsibility toward the leaders, together with the economic rehabilitation of the nation, brought better results.
With blessings, S. Tz.
One must distinguish between divine morality, whose revelation is the Written Torah, called “the instruction of your father,” and the morality of the sages, whose purpose is to teach a person how to resemble his Creator, and whose revelation is Tractate Avot, and universal human morality, which is the basis for the refinement of character traits, for proper conduct preceded Torah.
Since from the time the Temple was destroyed prophecy was taken from the prophets and given to fools and children, and since regarding the sages of the later generations the Ramchal already wrote that no great investigation is needed to see our inferiority and that all our wisdom is considered as nothing, for the greatest sage among us is only among the students of the students of those of the early generations—therefore caution and restraint are required in expressing opinions on general moral issues, all the more so in an age in which opinionatedness is abundant and listening is scarce.
The Sages called the Land of Israel rich in opinions—opinions, not in one opinion or another. Torah scholars should strive to listen to one another and to make one another’s words pleasant.
I heard the symposium on the trilogy and hope I found the correct column you referred to..
You wrote that your decision is “the decision of common sense and basic morality.”
A. I do not understand what common sense is and what basic morality is, and why it obligates anyone. If my basic morality says like Rabbi Eliyahu or Fechter—it is not relevant at the moment which—could you persuade me that I am not right? And even after you persuade me, are we not treading here on the problem of relativism versus moral absolutism? Have you written about this somewhere and could you link me to it? (In any case—I really hate the misuse of Mark Twain, so I would be happy with a very brief response insofar as coronavirus days leave you any leisure.)
B. Just a remark. Why attack Rabbi Eliyahu, when in the writings of the Rambam and al-Muqammis and Rabbenu Beḥaye and anyone whatsoever from that period, scientific and philosophical proofs are supported by verses right and left. It is not fair, in my opinion, to strike the student’s words and not the teacher’s words, despite the relevance..
A. If you do not understand, it is difficult to explain. If you feel differently—then we have a disagreement. I was addressing those (who I estimate are many) who feel as I do. This is not the place to discuss relative or absolute morality. I’m not sure, but I think there is a bit about it in the fourth booklet (the fourth conversation in The First Foundational Entity).
B. I did not attack Rabbi Eliyahu in any way that I noticed, but rather the approach that hangs on verses and extracts moral principles from them, or actually presents things as though they came out of the verses. I did not understand why what the early authorities did right and left, even if true, changes anything. I claim that this is a false presentation. That’s all.
But I didn’t understand why it is binding, and why it itself can be a justification for killing someone.
Sorry for the pestering, and thank you for the answers. And happy holiday.
And regarding response B, I didn’t mean to make a point. I was just tossing balloons into the air about the fact that I too have a bit of a ??? feeling about how some of the early authorities cling to verses in order to explain that the heavens speak (cf. the Rambam, that the stars have a soul and Scripture proves it, as it says “The heavens declare the glory of God”; and by the way, it is a bit funny that the Rambam always sees verses as not at all simplistic, while here he supposedly finds a proof for his words—and examples are many), and therefore I do not understand why speak only about them… if so, then all the more so…
It’s a pity you are not continuing the original thread. It is impossible to understand what this is about.
Morality permits killing or forbids killing. That is its nature. And moral common sense is the most fundamental source of morality (that is conscience). If that is not the criterion for killing or refraining, I do not know what the criterion could be.
I expect the sages of our time to be wiser about this matter. Science is already more developed, and the world is also morally more refined.
And again, it is not advisable to open a new thread when this is a continuation of a discussion that already took place. One should click “Reply” at the end of the first message in the thread, and then your message will appear at the end of the thread.
Rabbi Ilai Ofran wrote similar things here:
https://www.google.com/amp/s/musaf-shabbat.com/2015/08/08/%25D7%2594%25D7%25AA%25D7%2595%25D7%25A8%25D7%2594-%25D7%259B%25D7%259E%25D7%2591%25D7%2597%25D7%259F-%25D7%2595%25D7%2595%25D7%25A8%25D7%25A9%25D7%259A-%25D7%2590%25D7%2599%25D7%259C%25D7%25A2%25D7%2590%25D7%2599-%25D7%25A2%25D7%2595%25D7%25A4%25D7%259F/amp/