A Look at Judaism and Jewish Identity: Part II (Column 337)
At the end of the previous column I was left with several puzzles. I described two talks by the Reform rabbi Buchdahl and said that, upon hearing them, a few reflections came to mind which together create an apparently insoluble limbo: 1) The content of her remarks does not look like Judaism, since these things could have been said verbatim in a (liberal) church or in a lecture to secular audiences (one must remember that Judaism is also a religion. We’ll discuss Jewish nationality later). These are universal values and insights that have no uniquely Jewish connection. 2) Surprisingly, the claim that this isn’t Judaism is not tied to her liberalism or even to her Reform identity, since synagogue talks by Orthodox rabbis—and even by staunchly conservative rabbis with messages entirely opposite to hers—could also be delivered in a (conservative) church. Those too, in my view, are not Judaism. This limbo leads us to wonder what Judaism even is (and not necessarily “who is a Jew,” which is a derivative question). The question is what distinguishes Judaism and can serve as a criterion or litmus test for belonging to it.
To deepen and sharpen the difficulty, let me recall what I wrote there: I fully agree with her that Judaism (as distinct from Jewishness, i.e., belonging to the Jewish people) cannot be defined on an ethnic–racial basis. The term “Judaism” is supposed to include some content or value basis and that is its essential part. But what is that content? From Buchdahl’s words one could ostensibly conclude that, in her view, it consists of commitment to moral values (opposition to racism, etc.). But I assume even she does not mean to say that anyone who opposes racism is a Jew, or that someone who supports racism is not a Jew (to say that every non-Jew, as such, supports racism is itself racist, and likely even Buchdahl would not accept that). I emphasize that I am not speaking of Judaism in the ethnic sense (which in her view does not exist at all). My remarks concern the content–essential plane of Judaism.
I cited there a passage from Buchdahl in which she explains that, for her, Judaism is entry into Jewish commitment and the Sinai covenant, but she does not spell out what that means. If so, we shift the puzzle from the question “What is Judaism?” to “What is included in that covenant that defines it?” In other words, it’s unclear what the convert’s declaration means: “I accept upon myself a Jewish commitment,” or “entry into the covenant.” And again, this question is directed equally at liberals, conservatives, Reform and Orthodox. No discrimination here.[1]
Because this point recurs again and again in discussions of Jewish identity, I wish to devote this column to sharpening it further. The issue touches on defining Jewish identity in general, but I’ll begin by examining secular Jewish identity, since discussing it sharpens the points I want to present even more. At the end I will return to the Reform identity that Buchdahl presents and try to examine the question of what differentiates it from the secular identity. Ultimately I’ll try to reach conclusions regarding a definition of Judaism—if only Orthodox—that actually holds water.
I want to open the discussion of secular Jewish identity through a 2004 debate between Kobi Arieli and Assaf Inbari. Some of you have surely heard me mention this debate more than once, since I have used it on several occasions to sharpen methodological points about reading and critical thinking. Here, though, I will distill their words and arguments on their own terms.
Kobi Arieli on the Shavuot Night Study at “Alma”
In 2004 the religious journalist Kobi Arieli wrote a column in Ma’ariv about Tel-Aviv Shavuot-night study events held at the pluralistic (secular) beit midrash “Alma” and at the Reform “Beit Daniel.” Instead of describing them I will bring his words verbatim:
There’s a common thread to these two Shavuot nights, north and center, that makes them, to my taste, infuriating: the lack of authenticity. The light fakery. The game of “as if.” The transparent trendiness. The adolescent, non-binding fashionability.
Both, Beit Daniel and Alma alike, speak of a Jewish experience. It may not be stated explicitly, yet a sweet whiff of “alternative” fills the air whenever a nicely designed Alma brochure is opened at a café corner. A Jewish alternative. I can do nothing but grasp my ancestors’ old craft—don a blunt, condescending zeal, as only a Haredi who studied in yeshiva knows how—and declare that this pseudo-religious Tel-Aviv scene, of readings and revolving tables, of “new readings,” “tikkunim” and narratives, not to mention the Reform and Conservative fringe scene, is pure gavava in the Talmudic sense. It may be Israeli culture, it’s certainly a kind of art, but Judaism? Not in this lifetime. Don’t let them fool you.
Nothing will help anyone. For the Jew in the Jewish state, where an overwhelming majority of stores don’t sell chametz on Passover, a Jewish experience is an elementary matter of connecting to one’s personal, familial, and national self. A Jewish experience for the Israeli Jew is like the texture of gefilte fish for an Ashkenazi or the smell of hilbeh for a Yemenite. True, not everyone experiences this regularly at a reasonable level, and it’s true there are those who perhaps never experienced it at all; be that as it may, even a one-time Jewish religious experience entails an inner connection to the collective genome, a tiny shard of which dwells in the heart of every Israeli Jew. What sense does it make, then, when one does try to experience it—to do so in such an alien “language” and framework, so estranged, so foreign?
There’s an embarrassing dissonance in the way this scene has managed to penetrate the fabric of cultural life and settle on the free niche of the yearning for Jewish-religious culture. Multiculturalism is fine for the individual and the society alike. On the other hand, when it comes in an illogical mix, it’s not multiculturalism but a tasteless pose game. You can have family life with a Moroccan rhythm and tempo while savoring European art with refined delicacy; you may break into a Middle-Eastern dance on a table at a sing-along while conducting your economic life with communist austerity. What you absolutely cannot do is live your entire cultural and spiritual life like a Levantine reserve soldier, sun-seared from barbecues, and at the same time experience your religious feelings in the very particular way a double-chinned prig in the Reform community of Boca Raton, Miami, Florida does. It’s not real, it doesn’t work, and it’s not us.
Let’s not bluff. As a platform for cultural dialectic, the Book of Ruth, with all its storytelling qualities, is no more than an okay text. What makes it a great, eternal, enchanting light is the formative meaning that deep-rooted Judaism pours into it.
Haredi intellectuals in the generation before mine risked their lives over the polemic surrounding the academization of the Bible and Talmud. I, of course, grew up in a cultural environment that rejected it utterly. But that’s not the point: go tell my father that 5,000 intelligent people in Tel-Aviv went on Shavuot night to hear Einat Fishbein and Ilana Hammerman talk about trafficking in women, and were convinced they had just done a Shavuot night study vigil. He won’t understand what you’re talking about.
There is only one authentic Judaism, which also fits the collective Israeli genetics, the language, the life-rhythm, and the truth. Yes, it’s in Bnei Brak and Jerusalem, in Efrat and Har Bracha, in Kiryat Sefer and Netivot—what can you do. It’s also a bit annoying and, unfortunately, not always welcoming, but anyone who wants it knows the way. I know it sounds awful, but whoever wants culture, fun, girls, and sympathy—let him go to Alma. Whoever wants Judaism—let him come spend Shabbat with us.
So why was Alma packed on Shavuot night? Because everyone goes to Alma—Alma, Alma—and everyone goes to yoga—yoga, yoga—and all the women moved to low-rise jeans and now returned to high-rise, and everyone’s into retro, and everyone’s into Kabbalah, and everyone’s interested, and everyone’s so spiritual. Bye. I’m going to throw up.
There are several themes in Arieli’s sharp critique, but I will focus here on one central point: What is Judaism? Arieli senses (as I do) that what goes on there is not Judaism, but in my opinion this is equally true of the synagogue talks by various rabbis, Reform and Orthodox, that I described in the previous column.
I think Arieli was imprecise in describing his feelings. Beyond the fact that his father likely wouldn’t understand Arieli’s own Jewish world either, in my assessment something entirely different disturbed him (and even if it didn’t disturb him, it does disturb me). I ask: What would we say about a Shavuot night study at the pre-military academy in Ali, where the Book of Ruth is studied and used to derive insights about conservatism and modesty, about self-sacrifice and devotion, about the institution of the family, about the duty to serve in elite IDF units, and the like? Would that count as Judaism? In my opinion, no. As I noted at the start of the column, all those messages could arise in a church study or a secular conservative group’s study of the Book of Ruth. And still, that wouldn’t be Judaism. Judaism is not defined as a set of liberal values, but neither is it defined as a set of conservative values. I’ll go further: liberal Jews are not less Jewish than conservative Jews. That’s not the determining parameter. In short, my intuition applies as well to the rabbi’s talk at the synagogue Arieli himself attends. And we return to the question: So what does determine Judaism?
Assaf Inbari’s Response
Assaf Inbari is a writer and man of letters and thought—broad-minded and fascinating. I have read quite a few of his books and articles and was definitely impressed. He deals extensively with Judaism, and in particular with secular Judaism. His (predictable, it must be said) response to Arieli’s words was published in Ma’ariv about a week later. His remarks touch on our topic only indirectly, but to complete and sharpen the picture I will bring them as well. There are tones of offense and comments about Arieli’s condescension and manner of discourse; I will ignore those here, for what matters to me are his arguments about what Judaism is:[2]
“There is only one authentic Judaism.” And that one, authentic Judaism is, of course, your Judaism. “Go tell my father,” you write, “that 5,000 intelligent people in Tel-Aviv went on Shavuot night to hear Einat Fishbein and Ilana Hammerman talk about trafficking in women and were convinced they had just done a Shavuot night study vigil. He won’t understand what you’re talking about.” Your father won’t understand? Give him some credit. If your father knows “the one, authentic Judaism of the Sages” better than you do, he will understand very well that a contemporary discussion of the Book of Ruth in Tel-Aviv in 2004 is no different from the midrashic study of the Book of Ruth in Tiberias and Pumbedita two thousand years ago, or in Ashkenaz, where the “Yalkut Shimoni” was compiled in the Middle Ages. “It is my intention to convert,” Ruth says to Naomi, according to a midrash in Yalkut Shimoni, “but it is better by your hand than by another’s. When Naomi heard this, she began to lay out the laws of converts for her. She said to her: My daughter, it is not the way of the daughters of Israel to go to the theaters and circuses of the gentiles. She said to her: ‘Where you go, I will go.’ She said to her: It is not the way of Israel to dwell in a house that has no mezuzah. She said to her: ‘Where you lodge, I will lodge; your people shall be my people and your God my God.’ Had you lived in the generation of the authors of that midrash, you would have complained that they are forcing upon the “one, original-biblical Judaism” meanings that have no basis in the Bible. Were there “laws of converts” in the period of the Judges? Were there Roman theaters and circuses then? Were there mezuzot in the tents of Judah? The Sages, using the biblical scroll, dealt with the problems that troubled their time; with current affairs. They were troubled, for example, by the danger of being seduced by the charms of the competing Roman culture (just as many of us today are troubled by the mass culture spread by the United States), and they used the Book of Ruth to discuss that danger. The midrashic, contemporizing use of the Bible was the Sages’ pattern of ideological discourse. Had you continued in their way, you would be treating a topic that disturbs today’s peace of mind in light of the sources. Say, trafficking in women.
“Whoever wants Judaism,” you write, “let him come spend Shabbat with us.” “With us?” Excuse me, with whom exactly? With the Breslover in Safed? With the Chabadnik in Brooklyn? With the students of Mercaz HaRav in Ofra and Beit El? With Neturei Karta? With Baba Baruch in Netivot? With the kollel men of Ponovezh? With a Haredi professor at the Hebrew University? Or does “with us” mean the Arieli family, holders of the “one, authentic” Judaism?
The Haredi and religious public in its varieties is not “one,” and never was. The biblical split between priests and prophets and between the culture of Judah and that of Israel; the Hellenistic split between Sadducees and Pharisees; the Mishnaic split between Hillel and Shammai; the Talmudic split between the Bavli and the Yerushalmi; the medieval split between the Jewish diasporas in Christian Europe and those in the Islamic world; the split between Hasidim and Mitnagdim and Maskilim (who, for your information, were almost all religious and outstanding scholars)—and the 20th-century split of Orthodoxy into various Hasidic and Lithuanian streams, some Zionist and some anti-Zionist—this is only part of the splitting of that “one” religion between the Haredi streams and all the other movements, from Religious Zionist (which, as you know, is also not monolithic) through Conservative and on to Reform.
Every stage in the history of the religion of Israel was revolutionary in relation to its predecessor. The prophetic stage was revolutionary relative to the earlier cultic stage; the institution of the synagogue effected a revolution (prayer as a substitute for sacrifices); and the tannaitic-amoraic beit midrash effected a revolution. You hate revolutions.
Not only was halakhic Judaism of the Sages revolutionary, it also was not “one.” There is no Jewish doctrine; Judaism is not Christianity. Halakhah is walking—creative activity—and as such, it is the opposite of stagnation. In the five hundred years of the Talmudic era, halakhic and aggadic creativity developed with unceasing momentum of creative renewal, amid unceasing, fascinating disputes between the sages. There were different and even contradictory schools. There were rationalists like Rabbi Ishmael and mystics like Rabbi Akiva. There were sages serious to the point of awe and sages filled with a spirit of play. There is no book in the world as alive and polyphonic as the Talmud; no book farther, like the polyphonic Talmud, from your monolithic conception of “Judaism.”
And Jewish creativity did not end with the Talmud. It continued in the Middle Ages with constant change and with unceasing splitting into clashing currents. Is the “one, authentic” Judaism the one presented by Maimonides, Aristotle’s devotee, in the Guide for the Perplexed, or is it the anti-philosophical thesis presented by Judah Halevi in his Kuzari? And how do Maimonides and R. Judah Halevi reconcile with the conceptual world of the Zohar? These are three completely different models of “Judaism,” each different not only from the other two, but from every previous stage in Jewish creativity.
Shall we go on to the Ari? To the Maharal? To Ramchal? To the Baal Shem Tov? To Moses Mendelssohn? To R. N. Krochmal? To Rabbi Kook? To Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik? The Jewish world of the observant was never unitary and rigid. It was always a living tree, with many branches. The rigid, “one” Judaism you presented is a tree cut down and sawed into a log.
I wonder how many of the directions that developed in Orthodox Judaism from the Sages to this day are legitimate at all by your tree-stump view. As for your alienation from the non-Haredi directions of Jewish culture, I do not wonder; I only regret it. If Bialik and Gordon, Agnon and Tchernichovsky are not included in your Jewish world; if Rabbi Kook and all Religious Zionism are not included in your story of Judaism’s development; if in secular Israeli culture you have found not a single literary, artistic, or intellectual work in which the sources of Judaism resound and are renewed—no wonder that a Shavuot night study a-la-Alma shakes your small, shuttered world.
“Everyone goes to Alma because everyone goes to yoga,” you wrote, and proved how shuttered you are; how you fail to distinguish between one secular person and another. Secular people who nurture their Jewish heritage and secular people who nurture their flexibility in a yoga course—this is the same public, of ignoramuses, from your point of view. From the angle of your blindness…
As noted, this response is predictable, and I assume many similar ones are voiced in circles of secular Judaism (the phenomenon of the “Bookshelf” and secular batei midrash). Precisely because it is so predictable and so charming to the ears of a contemporary person, it is worth examining this claim.
Critique
I’ll start with a methodological remark that will lead us to the point. Inbari employs here a common and irritating demagogic argument that can be phrased thus: “You have no monopoly on ___ (fill in the blank).” He points out that the concept “Judaism” has diverse and varied manifestations, and uses that to reject the claim that a given manifestation is not Judaism. Is a concept that has many and varied manifestations necessarily completely open-ended? Is it enough to point to disagreements among shades and different approaches throughout Jewish history in order to defend the assertion that approach X is also Judaism, whatever X may be? By that logic, those who go to do yoga are also engaged in Judaism. So why is Inbari offended by that comparison? It’s clear he too assumes there must be something common that threads all those fractured manifestations and shades onto the same strand called “Judaism,” and yoga isn’t on it. So what is that common thing, in his view? Without offering a criterion, or at least some characterization, his claim is empty demagoguery.
To be fair, one should note that Kobi Arieli also offers no criterion. He claims Judaism has a scent like gefilte fish that we all recognize, and that this universal sense of smell says that Alma’s or Beit Daniel’s vigil isn’t Judaism. That’s hard, and perhaps unnecessary, to argue with (though my nose says the same). Inbari has a different sense of smell; so what do you claim against him? Are you simply declaring how your olfactory sense is built? It’s hard to accept that such a declaration is worth an op-ed column. There must be a claim in the background. In other words, Arieli too needed to present some criterion when disqualifying something and excluding it from Judaism. He should show why the talk in his father’s synagogue or the Shabbat meal at their home is Judaism, whereas what is done at Alma and Beit Daniel is not.
There’s a sense that dealing with trafficking in women is a universal value. Belgians and Zimbabweans can deal with it and say exactly the same things. Perhaps that explains Arieli’s feeling. But what would we say about a talk whose content is the trait of humility? Surely such talks are also given in Mr. Arieli’s (father’s) synagogue. Is that Judaism? And what about a talk about coping with crises (like Buchdahl’s first talk in the previous column)? Or a talk on the importance of the “Jewish” family? Those are certainly talks often given in highly conservative synagogues. Yet I have already noted that such talks could be given in churches as well. So what exactly bothers Kobi Arieli? Perhaps it really was just his sense of smell. But I ask myself what bothers me—or what is the principled basis for the non-Jewish scent that accompanies Alma’s vigil?
I’ll go further. I think Inbari is quite right to claim that the Sages and the scholars throughout the generations did exactly the same thing. They too extracted values and insights relevant to themselves and to their contemporaries from the sources, even when they are not really there (and I’m putting it gently. See column 52 on derush and pilpul). True. Therefore, we must admit that what they did in that way wasn’t really Judaism either. As I said, my critique is not about the content of the messages—liberal or conservative—but about the very discourse and its methodology. Something in that wrapping does not look like a good criterion for Judaism. This does not mean that Jews don’t do this, or even that they shouldn’t. I only claim that such activity cannot serve as the touchstone that defines Judaism.
What remains, then, is only the claim that Jews extract these values from the Book of Ruth (yeah, right),[3] while others will extract them from the Upanishads, the New Testament, or To Kill a Mockingbird. Hence Buchdahl asserts that her opposition to racism is Judaism, hence Inbari argues that Alma’s vigil, which derives opposition to trafficking in women from Ruth, is also Judaism. Likewise with talk of the Jewish family or the condemnation of homosexuality in the study hall in Ali. I see no other criterion indicating why all these are Judaism. Now I ask you: Is it reasonable that what defines Judaism is merely the text or source from which you extract your value, regardless of the value itself? You may be surprised, but quite a few people will say yes (see more on this in the next column). I really think that one who defines the study of Hasidut or mussar works as Judaism is making the same mistake (at least regarding a significant portion of their content). These are principles not unique to Torah and Judaism, and the only thing “Jewish” is that the sources teaching them are printed in Rashi script. They are psychological, spiritual, and moral principles that, at least for the most part, any gentile can also engage with and see as his own. Therefore none of these can serve as the essential definition of Judaism.
For readers familiar with my view of Bible study, let me clarify that I do not intend here to enter the question of whether such activity can be considered “study,” or “Bible study” (in my opinion the answer is: absolutely not, and again not). That’s not our subject here (I elaborated on it in the second book of the trilogy). Here I am seeking a definition of Judaism. What does that amorphous, vague concept include if so many different and opposing shades nest under it? If both Hasidim and Mitnagdim, both Kabbalah and those who oppose it, both Maskilim and conservatives, liberals and revolutionaries—all are engaged in Judaism, then what is the essential content of that amorphous concept called “Judaism”? And more than that, I ask: what is the touchstone that will serve as a measure to determine what is Judaism and what is not?
Interim Summary
I do not intend to claim that statements like “the Torah or God expects us to oppose trafficking in women,” to support or oppose new family models, and so on, are untrue. All these statements may be true, but they cannot be the touchstone of Judaism. Moreover, in my opinion it is also unlikely that engaging in such topics be considered “Torah study,” but that is not our concern here.
I have repeatedly distinguished between Torah in the gavra and Torah in the cheftza. There are quite a few contents and values whose study has important value—even important Jewish value. I assume many of us will agree that a Jew ought to oppose trafficking in women and racism (at least in some of its senses). In any case, these are certainly legitimate claims. But in my view, the same applies to a gentile. Therefore one cannot see those values as the foundational basis for defining “Judaism.”
Here I seek the content-based touchstone for the term “Jew,” i.e., what a Jew is and what Judaism is on the content-essential plane (not Jewishness in the ethnic-racial sense): what must occur for me to say that a person or a group is or is not Jewish? From Inbari’s list one can learn that it is unlikely to see any set of values whatsoever as that touchstone. Not a liberal set nor a conservative set. Not Hasidic nor Mitnagdic. Not Maskilic nor “wagon-driver.” Not Zionist nor Haredi. Not right-wing nor left-wing. None of these is a plausible candidate to constitute the touchstone of Judaism. So, returning now to Buchdahl, I again wonder what can define Judaism—on her view and in general.
Secular Judaism Is Necessarily Defined on a Racial–Ethnic Basis[4]
In the previous column I cited Buchdahl’s claim that it is wrong to define Judaism on an ethnic–racial basis, and I wrote that I fully agree. Ironically, it is precisely Inbari—the liberal secularist—who presents an explicitly racist conception: Judaism is anything Jews do. I cannot see in his words any other criterion that threads together the whole list he brought (and it’s questionable regarding Jews who do yoga). From the fact that all the movements and shades he described were Jewish, he infers as self-evident that everything they did was Judaism. Hence Alma’s or Beit Daniel’s vigil is necessarily Judaism. I’ve already explained that his logic implies this is true of whatever Jews happen to do, for he never defined what distinguishes the pursuits he listed.
Surprisingly, his approach is the distilled essence of the approach Buchdahl opposes. Inbari offers a racial–ethnic definition of Judaism: anyone who engages the sources and ideas created by those whose mothers were Jewish is “Jewish” in content. One who writes literature and poetry in Hebrew (and Yiddish), one who speaks of Zionism, of political thought, of moral theories (whose noteworthy trait is that their exponents had Jewish mothers), and the like. It is precisely the sweeping breadth of his definition that leaves us only the racial–ethnic criterion. According to Inbari there seems to be no content limit on “Judaism” and on who is a Jew. What counts is only descent (or your mother).
Incidentally, this is almost a necessary corollary of a secular worldview. Judaism, in its secular sense, cannot be defined on any other basis. No wonder we constantly hear people defining their secular Judaism: “My Judaism is opposition to racism, equality, human and civil rights, peace, being the target of antisemitic persecution (my grandfather was murdered by the Nazis), or using Jewish sources (as inspiration only, of course).” Such empty definitions are unavoidable, since there is no other substratum for defining secular Judaism. If you ask for a content definition for “Jew” or “Judaism,” there is none. There are technical features (speaking Hebrew, reading this or that literature, using certain sources), but none is unequivocal. There are non-Jews who use those same sources, are committed to those same values, and speak those same languages. Conversely, there are Jews who do none of the above—and we would still agree to call them Jews.[5]
Back to Buchdahl
Let us return to Buchdahl. We rejected the possibility of tying Judaism to commitment to moral values. We also rejected the possibility of grounding Judaism in deriving universal moral values from Torah sources. She herself uses other sources as well (as do Orthodox rabbis, of course). Buchdahl also rejects Judaism based on a racial–ethnic basis, unlike Inbari and secular definitions (it is no accident that she is a rabbi, i.e., holds a religious office). It seems that, in her view, there must also be a religious dimension to the definition of Judaism—and in that I agree with her. But for her, that dimension is not the halakhic one. So what is it?
Belief in God is not uniquely Jewish. Moreover, I have often read statistics that many Jews—and many Reform rabbis—do not believe in God. For them, Judaism is a kind of culture and heritage and is not necessarily connected to belief.[6] I don’t know Buchdahl’s position regarding God, but I noticed that He wasn’t mentioned even once in the talks I heard.
Belief in the Sinai revelation (at least as a historical event) is also not a good candidate, for two reasons: many gentiles (Christians and Muslims) believe it happened historically. And she herself apparently does not believe it as a historical event (or at least many of her Reform rabbinic colleagues don’t; this is embedded in Reform theology. Those who don’t believe in God likely don’t believe in Sinai, unless they hold it was a subjective, suggestive vision). So what, on her view, defines Judaism? How is it different from Inbari’s secular definition, which is necessarily racial and ethnic? She contends there is a content-value definition. What is it?
Yair Ettinger, in his article mentioned in the previous column, brings several hints in her name toward solving the riddle:
Jews are all those who decided to cast off their lives, flee oppression, and gather in a place where they can be free and serve a God who will redeem them. That is the meaning of being Jewish. And you can join this mission. Anyone can take part in the Jewish memory. If you want to join us, you too must stand at Sinai…
Aha, here a deity is already mentioned (though I’m not sure this isn’t a stock phrase, or perhaps a subjective notion of God). Fine—but she surely doesn’t mean that as a binding and exhaustive definition, since according to it any freedom-seeking Christian or Muslim would also be Jewish. They too want to cast off their lives, flee oppression, and serve a God who will redeem them. I also don’t suppose the place is the determinant (“to gather in a place”), since she lives in the U.S. alongside many secular people and atheists who aren’t waiting for any God to redeem them. Perhaps you’ll say that for Christians or Muslims it isn’t the Jewish God; but then I ask: who is “the Jewish God”? The One who created the world? Who revealed Himself at Sinai? In short, we have again returned through the back door to the question of what the term “Jewish” means. One cannot use it to define itself.[7]
Later in that piece Ettinger adds, in her name, the following:
In America there was a movement called “Ethical Culture.” It was founded by Reform Jews who ultimately wanted to take all the most important universal values of Judaism—like that we were all created in the image of God—and separate them from religion. But you know, it didn’t survive, because if you don’t have the particularity of rituals, of holidays, of the Jewish calendar and a shared language; if you don’t have some of that particularism, then nothing gives it a sticking power that remains.
Here some particular dimensions enter, beyond universal values (“we were created in the image” is of course used here metaphorically, as is customary among secular people, since many in that movement didn’t believe in God at all). Her rationale is that without this, the thing doesn’t survive; that’s hard for me to accept as a substantive argument. Is the definition of Judaism whatever manages to survive? There should be some content definition. What exactly is supposed to survive to be considered Judaism? The question is whether it’s true, not whether it’s conducive to survival. It appears the question of truth doesn’t interest her.
When she does move toward some content definition of Judaism, she adds some religious components: rituals, synagogue, holidays, the calendar, and the like. But even that is hard to accept and even to define. Is Judaism the use of certain rituals? Which rituals? The rituals she uses are not mine. And mine are not those used by Moses our teacher or Rabbi Akiva, or even Rabbi Nachman of Breslov or Rabbi Judah the Pious. In general, it’s hard to accept a definition of Judaism that is based on empty rituals—i.e., on the idea that anyone who performs action X at time Y is Jewish. One is supposed to believe in something or be obligated to something, and that ought to underlie the rituals. Otherwise Judaism is just the performance of some random katas. So I insist again: what is that something—beliefs, values, or obligations—that constitutes Judaism?
The Meaning of Halakhah in the Discussion: What Is “Judaism”?
There is no escaping the conclusion that several commenters to the previous column already noted (those who know my outlook likely anticipated this). The definition of Judaism is commitment to halakhah. That and nothing more. Everything around it (including Inbari’s entire list and more) are frills and flowers at best, but not part of the core. The Sinai covenant to which we are to belong and commit is the covenant to fulfill the commandments of God given to us there. That’s it. No value, belief, insight, or anything else can be part of the touchstone of Judaism (Isaiah III beat me to it here: “Who has preceded Me that I should repay?”). If you check now, you’ll see this commitment is indeed exclusive. No gentile is obligated to it, and even if he feels obligated he is mistaken. If he wishes to obligate himself, he must convert—then he joins Judaism and becomes obligated.
As noted, Judaism is not defined on an ethnic or racial basis, and therefore whoever wishes—welcome. But it entails accepting the yoke of the commandments, and only that. Studies of Jewish history or various worldviews, literature and poetry, Bible, rituals, and other such vegetables are frills and flowers, but not part of the necessary process of conversion. Conversion is the acceptance of the yoke of the commandments. A convert who declares that he accepts the yoke of opposing trafficking in women, inequality, or racism remains a thoroughgoing gentile (even if he undergoes circumcision and immersion). Likewise, a gentile who takes upon himself Breslov-style hitbodedut or Hasidic dancing and daily study of Hasidic teachings, including probing the biblical root of his soul—he too is a certified gentile. Likewise a gentile who takes upon himself the lofty value system of the rabbis of Ali and Rabbi Tau and becomes active and votes for the Noam party—he too is a gentile. In contrast, a gentile who takes upon himself the yoke of the commandments, even if he voices racist and chauvinistic views, and even if he spurns Hasidut and Mitnagdism and whatever else you wish from Inbari’s list—he is a kosher Jew (though in some cases a wicked one).
Of course one can define Judaism differently—say, as the congregation of those who oppose racism or chauvinism, or the congregation that denounces LGBT people and guards a woman’s inner modesty. Definitions of concepts are clay in the potter’s hand. But such a definition is arbitrary and does not fit accepted usage (and, as noted, is also racist and/or paternalistic, as it declares that explicit gentiles are Jews against their will, or alternatively refuses to recognize the Judaism of kosher, declared Jews against their will). Here perhaps enters Arieli’s gefilte-fish sense, for it is clear to any person of understanding (or with a sense of smell) that this definition doesn’t hold water.[8]
It is important to understand that Jewishness in the “ethnic” sense is also defined on this basis. It is easy to get confused when one sees that Judaism’s attitude to the secular is to treat them as Jews even though they do not conduct themselves as Jews (by this definition there is no essential difference between them and any gentile), while gentiles—even if they wish to convert and believe in the Torah—are not Jews so long as they have not converted. Seemingly this means our definition of “Judaism” is ethnic. But that is an error. First, they can convert despite their different ethnic origin. Beyond that, the definition of Judaism is commitment to halakhah, not halakhic conduct. Jewish conduct is conduct in accordance with halakhah. But note that the definition of Jewishness (that is, who is a Jewish person, not who behaves like a Jew) is determined by who is obligated to halakhah (even if he himself does not acknowledge it), not by who behaves according to halakhah. Jewish conduct—that is, Judaism—is obedience to halakhah. Jewishness, by contrast, is belonging (even if not conscious) to the group obligated to halakhah. Here runs the fault line between Jewishness and Judaism. A Jewish person can behave in a non-Jewish manner. If he does not in fact behave so, then he is a sinful Jew (a Jew who does not fulfill his obligation)—i.e., he is Jewish in the ethnic sense (in the sense of Jewishness) but his conduct is not Jewish (there is no Judaism there). That obligation, of course, comes either on an ethnic basis (born to a Jewish mother) or on the basis of conversion, but the definition of “Judaism” is not ethnic (the definition of “Jewishness” is partly ethnic). Therefore, as Buchdahl claims, and contrary to Inbari, ethnicity is not essential to Judaism (and not even to Jewishness). In other words, Jewishness does not define Judaism; rather, Judaism defines Jewishness.[9]
To my understanding, there is no other content definition of Judaism that holds water. My disagreement with Reform and secular people (and also with many Orthodox who do not see Jewish identity as constructed exclusively on halakhah) is not a debate between two positions. I don’t think there exists any other position that holds water. The definition of Judaism is necessarily religious and is founded solely on halakhah—there is no other. The phrase “secular Judaism” is, in my view, an oxymoron—not merely an erroneous conception—and this a priori, even before hearing all the proposals to fill it with content. Of course one may propose national definitions of Jewishness, as with any other people. Here I am dealing with Judaism as a religion, not as a nation—with values, not facts. I will discuss the connection between these two distinctions, and their meaning, in the next column. But first, one more important remark.
Judaism in the Gavra and in the Cheftza
Several times in the past I have distinguished between Torah in the gavra and Torah in the cheftza (I elaborate on this in the trilogy’s second book). Torah in the cheftza is “Torah” in a very narrow sense compared to common usage—namely halakhah and its interpretation, and nothing more. Torah in the gavra is “Torah” in a very broad sense: any study of human, intellectual, cultural, and moral value, and so forth. This includes literature, psychology, philosophy, various scientific fields, Hasidut, Bible, mussar, Jewish thought (yes, all of these. There is no difference between studying Kant and studying the Guide for the Perplexed, or between studying Hasidut and reading Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, and so on. See the second book). The upshot is that studying these subjects can count as “Torah” if done to enrich your halakhic/Torah world, but it is not Torah in an objective sense. If you engage in it and it does not contribute to you, in my view it is a valueless pursuit (bitul Torah), unlike halakhah and halakhic analysis.
Engaging in areas of Torah in the gavra is, of course, not unique to Judaism. All these areas are studied and taught by gentiles as well. Moreover, their contents are not “Jewish.” Morality, literature, science, and philosophy are by definition universal. I do not judge a scientific or moral claim by the criterion of whether it is “Jewish,” but by whether it is true and worthy. My gentile colleague will do the same. Therefore such study can have great value (perhaps no less than Torah study), but it is not Torah in the cheftza (not Torah in the objective sense). So far my claims in the second book of the trilogy.
Here I wish to add a point relevant to our matter. Defining “Torah” by domains of Torah in the gavra is logically ridiculous. A definition is supposed to contain the features unique to the concept defined. One cannot define “human” by the criterion “has a nose,” though that is true, because other creatures have noses as well. Likewise, it’s incorrect to define Judaism via engagement in Hasidut or Bible, or adherence to certain moral values (liberal or conservative). None of this is unique to Torah and Judaism, and therefore it’s wrong to base the definition of those concepts on it. For some reason, people think that if some pursuit is important, it must be “Torah” or “Judaism” in the constitutive sense. That is simply not true.
Returning to Buchdahl and Inbari (and likely also Kobi Arieli), this is the point on which I disagree with them. Inbari’s list does not offer a definition of Judaism because it rests on an ethnic criterion. Some of the groups on his list are, in my view, indeed “Judaism” in the content sense—but only because they were all obligated to halakhah (those that weren’t are groups of Jewishness only in the ethnic sense. They contain Jewishness but not Judaism). Secularism, kibbutz socialism, Hebrew literature—these are not phenomena that belong to Judaism (content-wise) but at most to Jewishness (because they were done by Jews). As for Buchdahl, my disagreement is that she and her peers are not committed to halakhah in any way. It’s not that they offer a different interpretation (like the Conservatives). There is simply no commitment to halakhah in any sense. There are rituals they themselves decide upon (influenced by our tradition) as cultural folklore, not as something binding. It is mainly a cultural recommendation, not a value content. In addition, there are values there, of course—like anti-racism and equality—but these are not Jewish values (though God does indeed obligate us to them, in my view).
One cannot build a definition of Judaism when its touchstones are non-essential and non-unique features—even if we think they are correct and indeed required of every Jew (and of every human). Buchdahl offers a definition of Judaism built only on subjective components (Torah in the gavra) without the unique, objective components (Torah in the cheftza—halakhah). We might call this “Judaism in the gavra.” It is akin, in my view, to defining the touchstone for personhood as having a nose or kidneys. I’m willing to accept that these are correct values, even important Jewish traits, and I also think that any Jew ought to adhere to them (at least some of them, in some interpretation), yet he ought to adhere to them as a human being, not as a Jew (every Jew is also a human being).[10] Moreover, one who does not adhere to them is, in my eyes, still a Jew—perhaps a wicked one—not a non-Jew.
Finally, I’m sure some readers will feel that all this is somewhat trivial. I disagree. Ask those who haven’t read these columns, and even if they are Orthodox they will usually tell you there are values that are essentially Jewish and that these constitute Judaism. It’s common to think (and I too agree) that the performance of commandments comes to express certain values. Therefore people don’t tend to see the very performance of commandments as Judaism.[11] The rabbis of Ali will explain that a conservative family, discrimination against women, restricting the steps of homosexuals, orderly study of the “white Shas” (the writings of Rabbi Kook), and being a brave commando in Sayeret Matkal—this is the essence of Judaism; while Buchdahl, in contrast, will say that fighting racism and for equality is Judaism. Each loads Judaism with his own values and then thinks this is Judaism’s essence. My main claim is that they are all making the same mistake. Hence I must stress again that my words are not about the content of the talks and the nature of the values proposed as touchstones of being a Jew, nor about whether I agree or disagree with those values. I reject the definitions offered by liberals and conservatives, Reform and Orthodox (at least most of them),[12] Maskilim, writers and poets, secular and Haredi alike. So who said I’m not egalitarian?…
[1] Don’t worry; I will get to halakhah later.
[2] Copying the text involved many distortions which I tried to correct. If needed, you can compare to the original.
[3] I do not enter here the painful question of whether this can really be derived from the Book of Ruth. Hint: absolutely not. We all understand that those studying at Alma brought with them opposition to trafficking in women from home and did not extract it from the scroll. But it’s not only Alma’s learners; this is true of all Bible study. This of course leads us into the endless debate about whether one can learn anything from the Bible (hint: no), and whether anyone ever drew from the Bible a message he didn’t already accept (unless he came to attack).
[4] On this issue and on Jewish identity in general, see my article here.
[5] Someone sent me a link a few days ago to this discussion:
https://103fm.maariv.co.il/programs/media.aspx?ZrqvnVq=IDLKDL&c41t4nzVQ=FJF
Here there’s an argument in which the journalist Ben Caspit fails to answer the question “In what way are you Jewish?” He is, of course, one hundred percent certain he is Jewish, but he doesn’t really manage to offer a rationale and basis (apparently by virtue of Kobi Arieli’s sense of smell). In the end he manages to offer something: for him, the matter of chesed (loving-kindness) passes genetically. This is a strange criterion, both because it is racist and because it is detached from reality (certainly in our day). I would have liked to confront him with the question of whether he thinks there are no gentiles in whom that gene is embedded, and even whether he thinks Jews have it more. I very much doubt it. In any case, note that the only thing he manages to present is a genetic–racial definition (he could, of course, have claimed he is Jewish because his mother is Jewish. That criterion is far more persuasive, except that it concerns Jewishness rather than Judaism. He too understood there must be a content dimension in defining “Judaism”). And that is exactly my point.
[6] On this, see a (tendentious) review on the Ratio site here.
[7] Though this loopiness is very common in discussions of Jewish identity. Think how many times you’ve heard someone say: In my eyes, a Jew is anyone who perceives/defines himself as a Jew (and the punctilious add: none of you has a monopoly on Judaism).
[8] Some readers will surely ask whether there can be correct and incorrect definitions. Seemingly a definition is arbitrary. Well, no. See column 251 and also column 108, and many more.
[9] A paraphrase of Buchdahl’s remarks cited in the previous column, regarding the relation between race and racism.
[10] This reminds me of my article on Israeli law, where I explained why extracting universal laws from halakhah into Israel’s statute book is not “inserting Jewish law” into the statute book (to the extent this has any value at all; in my view it doesn’t). Those laws are not unique to Jewish law and are not extracted because they are part of halakhah but because they suit the Israeli legislator. See my remarks there.
[11] I too do not view observance done without commitment—à la Ahad Ha’am (who saw the commandments as a cultural instrument)—as Judaism. I speak of observance out of obligation to God’s command.
[12] Those who believe “there is gold under the tiles,” in the words of my friend Nadav Shnerb (who also mentioned this in a comment to the previous column and elaborated more in this thread on the Azach”H forum). The claim (at least mine) is that indeed there is gold there, but it is not what defines the act as a mitzvah and us as Jews.
Discussion
These are weighty questions, but they are not essential to this discussion. If someone offers an interpretation of halakha and is committed to it, he falls under this definition. One can argue whether his interpretation is correct or not, but that is not important. Like any halakhic dispute.
If someone goes to yoga as part of “guarding your lives” and sees it as a halakhic obligation, then indeed he is engaged in Judaism.
I would be glad for clarification as to why Judaism is not a nation.
(I also read the first column and thought that perhaps the current one would explain this matter more.)
As I understand it—and this is also the conception that appears in Rav Kook in many places (that in itself is not binding, but it seems these things of Rav Kook should be discussed)—Judaism is a nation. The meaning is that it is transmitted through the mother or through conversion. The essence of conversion is specifically accepting to become part of the nation, and this is done through the rabbinical court. Once a person is part of Israel, the obligation of the commandments automatically applies to him. (I would note that this is related to the question whether acceptance of the commandments is indispensable after the fact in conversion.)
This can be seen in the Tanakh (even though you can’t learn anything new from there 🙂 ): when God speaks with the Patriarchs, He does not speak with them about observing commandments; what stands out is that He speaks with them about establishing a nation—the multiplication of offspring and the Land of Israel. This appears in every promise God gives the Patriarchs. Likewise, in the Exodus from Egypt, the address to the people of Israel is national, and only before the giving of the Torah does God offer them the Torah and the people of Israel say, “We will do and we will hear.”
Thank you.
The discussion somewhat reminds me of the dispute on Rashi’s very first comment on the Torah. Rashi cites Rabbi Yitzhak as to why the Torah did not begin with “This month shall be for you.” The premise of the question, and also the answer according to the explanation of the Siftei Chakhamim, are based on the understanding that the essence of Judaism is halakha. But Ramban wondered at Rashi and wrote: “One may ask concerning it, for there is a great need to begin the Torah with ‘In the beginning God created,’ for this is the root of faith, and one who does not believe this and thinks the world is eternal is a denier of the core principle and has no Torah at all.” See there, where he expands on this.
This is completely arbitrary. Just because my mother is Jewish, that obligates me to keep commandments?
As a supplement to the rabbi’s remarks in the current column, I am attaching a link to other things the rabbi wrote on the topic that seem relevant to me:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%96%D7%94%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%99%D7%94%D7%95%D7%93%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%96%D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%A0%D7%95-%D7%95%D7%91%D7%9B%D7%9C%D7%9C
Where did I write that it is not a nation? Are you sure you read it? Wait for the next column.
Just as the law in a state obligates citizens who were not yet born when it was enacted. Just because they were born here?!
Thanks. I linked to that article. It really seems you didn’t read it.
More power to you! Because of the point you raise, I object to the concept of “Judaism.” Rather, I prefer the three concepts: the People of Israel, the Torah of Israel, and the Land of Israel. Generally speaking, the word “Jew” is a late invention, and the original is the People of Israel. Therefore I think the whole idea of Judaism is not critical; rather, we are talking about an ethnic identity (the People of Israel) that finds expression in the Torah (credit to Rav Saadia Gaon), and the place of manifestation of the People of Israel and the Torah is the Land of Israel.
You wrote: “No gentile is obligated in this, and even if he feels obligated in it he is mistaken. If he wants to obligate himself in it, he must undergo conversion, and then he joins Judaism and becomes obligated.”
Why does he need to undergo conversion—because his race is not Jewish—and after he successfully completes the conversion process, even if he observes none of the halakhot at all he will still be considered Jewish. So what exactly have you taught us?!
After all, if the Conservatives offer her a different interpretation of how conversion is conceived, what would you say then—that he is Jewish because in the end his Judaism came from an interpretation of the Torah?
His commitment to halakha will be subject to the Conservative interpretation—so what of it?!
The Reform Jew will claim that the very body of Reform is the halakha that the Torah requires—so why doesn’t Reform halakha make him Jewish?!
It seems that precisely Arieli’s gefilte—meaning the intuition of every Jew-hater—is the best way to know who is a Jew and what Judaism is, though of course it must be examined according to the traditional halakha passed down from Sinai to our own day.
(Maharal, the Ari, Rambam, the Gra, and almost all the other great paupers of spirit who were mentioned—aside from those whom Inbari intentionally shoved onto the list—did not dispute the halakhic basis, but rather the fifth Shulchan Arukh, namely devekut, which the dry halakha is supposed to bring a person to—that is, closeness to God.)
Tam, I am waiting for the moment when I will merit to see from you a question or argument that is formulated reasonably and relates to something I wrote (and preferably without declarations and sermons, and irrelevant references). So far, in my sins, I have not merited it. Perhaps it will still come…
After all, if the Conservatives offer her a different interpretation of how conversion is conceived, what would you say then—that he is Jewish because in the end his Judaism came from an interpretation of the Torah?
His commitment to halakha will be subject to the Conservative interpretation—so what of it?!
The Reform Jew will claim that the very body of Reform is the halakha that the Torah requires—so why doesn’t Reform halakha make him Jewish?!
Then he is Jewish according to the Conservative or Reform definition, and if he undergoes Karaite conversion then he is Jewish according to Karaite halakha, and so on and so forth. Likewise, he is also Jewish according to the secular definition if he listens to Static and Ben El, serves in the army, is an Israeli patriot in one way or another, and of course if he has a Jewish father or even even a Jewish grandfather and a Star of David chain—then he is Jewish squared.
That is the definition of other movements, with which I, you, and Mini also do not agree. Here in the column we are talking about the Orthodox definition of a Jew.
And Michi too*
Happy holiday!
This returns a bit to Dvir’s question: is there really such a thing as “the halakha”? Apparently not (and this is also what Inbari meant when he wrote about the differences between the School of Hillel and the School of Shammai). So if I understood correctly, there is no obligation, only devotion—that is, ostensibly, there is no concrete thing to commit to, but the inner movement exists, and that itself is Judaism. Perhaps we can return to the suggestion you rejected out of hand: the devotion exists in relation to the text (or perhaps I should say, to its interpretations..)
Rational,
Not true. I am not talking about the Orthodox definition of Judaism, but about the definition of Judaism in general. I argue that there is no Reform definition (because in their world there is no halakha), and the Conservative definition is like the Orthodox one (except that there are certain disputes as to what halakha is). As for a national definition, I wrote that this will be discussed in the next column.
N, a happy and amusing holiday to you too.
I can only follow your lead and go back again to explain that I am speaking about halakha regardless of the interpretations given to it. Reform Jews have no halakha, and secular people don’t either. From their perspective, Judaism also obligates no one. If Inbari claims that there is no such thing as halakha because there are disputes between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, and therefore Almah and Beit Daniel also have halakha, then he is an idiot. But he isn’t. He does not mean to say that there is no such thing as halakha, but rather that halakha is not the touchstone. I explained my view on this throughout the column.
I will explain what I meant.
I did not mean to suggest a new reading of Inbari, but rather to suggest a new reading of Judaism. In addition, I wanted to argue that halakha is itself the interpretation of the biblical text, and from that perhaps even manage to bring the Reform and Conservatives inside..
The main thing in Judaism is denial of idolatry. Everything else is marginal.
Denial of authority and of hierarchies is also part of denying idolatry.
As long as denying idolatry doesn’t become your idolatry..
So the attempt did not succeed.
So anyone who denies idolatry is Jewish. Wonderful. Our number in the world jumped from fifteen million to several billion. What a superpower.
Usually I do not respond to your unsupported declarations (and in many cases irrelevant ones). Right now I am making an attempt to respond.
The second Dvir [I see there’s another one, so as not to confuse things…]
What is the definition of “halakha” by which Judaism is to be defined?
Only what is written in the Written Torah, or also the interpretation of the Sages?
And if also the interpretation of the Sages, does that also include rabbinic enactments? [The question of rabbinic enactments becomes especially sharp according to Ramban, for whom “you shall not deviate” does not grant the Sages authority to institute enactments.]
I wrote that I am not entering into the question of what the determining halakha is. Anyone who is faithful to the halakha given at Sinai according to his understanding can claim that his path is Judaism.
Thank you, Michi,
In my opinion, your remarks imply that in Judaism halakha (the particular—since it is specific laws) precedes meta-halakha (which is universal inquiry or thought). But that very assertion—which is a meta-halakhic assertion—is itself universal…
In short, it seems to me that the problem with your interpretation of Judaism is not that it is a mistaken interpretation, but precisely that it is correct… It exposes that same essential paradox in Judaism that Leibowitz talked about all the time. Leibowitz did pretend to solve the paradox with a kind of deus ex machina (“It’s a religious paradox, not a logical one”), but as you and I know, that’s utter nonsense. On the other hand, he at least understood that there is a paradox here. That’s something too.
I see no paradox here at all. The commandments are meant to achieve goals, which I usually do not know. Judaism is defined through commitment to the commandments, regardless of the interpretation each person gives them.
Similarly, worthy Israeli citizenship is defined as commitment to the law, regardless of the interpretation each person gives to its purposes.
The analogy is not comparable to the proof. A citizen in a state is not commanded to observe the law; rather, if he violates it, sanctions will be imposed on him. A Jew, by contrast, is commanded to keep the Torah even without any sanction being enforced and even if he does not believe.
It is entirely comparable. A person is obligated to the law, and only for that reason is there justification to punish him. One who is not obligated to the law is not punished. The views according to which a person is not obligated to the law but is punished all the same are completely unreasonable formalism. That is why legal theory is full of discussions about the basis for the duty to obey the law, and does not suffice with the forceful-deterrent consideration.
Michi,
Your analogy to Israeli citizenship does not strengthen your argument but the opposite. The foundations of the regime itself are built such that the citizen’s “commitment” is first and foremost to “meta-legal” principles—for example, liberal and democratic values that are only expressed in the dry law.
Not so with Judaism, whose essence, according to you, lies in the law itself.
On the contrary, your justified attack on the conservative camp מצד one side and the liberals on the other does not place you, in my opinion, in a better position. Your opposition to loading “metaphysical” meanings onto Judaism (Chabad, Kookism, the crazies from the Eli pre-military academy, etc.) is indeed faithful to its original spirit, as is your criticism of the opposing camp (which itself rests on the “metaphysics” it inherited from European humanism and rationalism).
Still, your attempt to center your worldview in a “good middle place” leads you to the worst of all worlds (Leibniz in reverse).
From the narrow perspective of a miserable man like me, not only are you not content with trying to put the cart before the horse. It seems you are doing so in a world that has neither horses nor carts.
In this sense I really think you are a better Jew than those you attack. That is of course not a compliment.
You are conflating levels of discussion.
Our discussion does not deal with the question of whether there is gold under the floor tiles (in Nadav Shnerv’s formulation), that is, whether there are values at the basis of the halakhot/laws, but with the question of what is the binding foundation that obligates us in them. In both law and halakha, the binding foundation is not the values underlying the laws but the fact that they are laws. You are obligated to the law not because of the goals it seeks to achieve but because it was legislated in the Knesset. And so too in halakha: you are obligated by virtue of the command, not by virtue of the values underlying halakha.
The question of whether there are purposes at the infrastructure of the commandments is another question. By the way, contrary to your description of my position, I also think there are, except that in my opinion no one can know what those purposes are.
Yes. Halakha was given to Jews as a remedy or as a punishment. Depends how you look at it. Jews are the greatest deniers. A stiff-necked people whom nothing helped to bring back to the right path. The gentiles do not need this. One Jesus. One Muhammad. And they immediately deny idolatry.
The law obligates because the law obligates. Amazing! Now everything is clear to me! Apparently I missed the whole point of my civics classes. And also, it now turns out, I learned nothing in my Oral Torah classes: halakha obligates because it obligates. Amazing.
Birds of a feather flock together.
Still, I thought I’d refresh your memory regarding the real subject of our discussion. The name of your column in Israel is “A View of Judaism and Jewish Identity,” and within it you explicitly argue that the core of Judaism is commitment to halakha.
As I wrote in my first response: your basic claim is a meta-halakhic claim about the centrality and priority of halakha in Judaism. A meta-halakha that constitutes the halakha, which in turn constitutes the meta-halakha, and so on and so forth.
Vertigo.
What is so complicated?
I will nevertheless try to spell it out more fully.
Until the last few columns, it was obvious to every toddler that a Jew means an ethnic race and a Jewish mother, and Judaism is anything done for the sake of the worship of God. The worship of God, of course, was handed down to us through the Written Torah and the Oral Torah.
Bizarre/new definitions proposed by outsiders were not worth responding to. Who are they to decide who is a Jew? In Yiddish they call this “utter gezugt.”
It seems every ordinary antisemite understands who is a Jew without argument and philosophizing, and this is perhaps Arieli’s gefilte fish: human intuition does not fake it in this matter.
Even in antisemitic cartoons, the Jew is drawn as Haredi Orthodox and not as the secular Jew found in our districts. That is, even here it is simple and clear that at most a Jew is an ethnic origin plus observance of Torah and commandments.
***
What have you taught us?!
That Judaism is not homiletics from the Bible?! And not some sort of moral behavior? And that one must relate to every person who claims he is Jewish, even if he is some bizarre Asian who decided to combine part of Jewish culture as folklore into his boring life?!
And what did you claim? That Judaism is commitment to halakha. And here the son asks: after all, even according to your own view, the initial foundation is entry into Judaism, namely the conversion process required as a necessary condition. You are aiming at an arbitrary Judaism that does not depend on your Orthodox or Conservative conceptions, a kind of absolute Jew, and for some reason you force the Conservative and Reform Jew to enter through the necessary condition that you determined according to the laws of halakha in which you believe a priori. Why does it seem to you that you have ownership over the basic necessary condition for defining the absolute Jew!? What is wrong with Conservative / Reform conversion? After all, every person will do the initial stage called conversion according to his own understanding, and just as with the Orthodox, if after the necessary condition—namely conversion—he does not observe halakha, he will be considered a wicked Jew, of course, but still a Jew. In short, the conversion you believe in is everything; likewise, commitment to halakha is everything in making something Judaism, except that there are those who think that that halakha changes according to the era, from Conservatives to Reform. But no: because they are not within the domain of the halakha that you determined, they are not performing acts of Judaism but nice rituals for the sake of folklore.
So according to you, Judaism is a monistic conception in which my slot, and only my slot, is the ultimate Judaism. It turns out that you are right, Kobi Arieli is right, and even that Quranic Bukhdel is right, if only she weren’t a gentile… It reminds me of the judge who ruled that both sides were right, and when the bystander asked how that could be, the judge replied like a Jew: you’re right too..
What belongs here is Henshke’s response to Amos Oz’s attempt to define Judaism together with his daughter in the book Jews and Words.
But if everyone interprets halakha according to his own understanding, how will it be possible to maintain a society?
But what practical difference does all this make? Isn’t this just dealing in words? Why is it so important what counts as Jewish and what does not? From what I know of your approach, you have written a lot about how things should be discussed on their factual plane. If so, what difference does it make what counts as Jewish and what does not? Hear the truth from whoever says it.
Maybe I am mistaken in understanding your words, but they imply that the basis of Judaism is acceptance of the commandments as such, and it does not matter at all what values the person accepting the commandments holds. In my opinion, there are commandments whose observance and the content behind them are more fundamental to Judaism, and mere general commitment to halakha is not enough. I will illustrate this in three ways.
1. I do not think it is correct to say of anyone who is not careful about some particular halakha that his behavior is un-Jewish. One who worships idols, one who has illicit sexual relations, are defined in the Gemara as someone who does not “perform the deeds of your people”; but if you say of someone who eats meat and milk together that he behaves like a gentile, he could sue you for compensation (according to the custom that one could bring a Torah-law suit over such insults).
2. There are commandments such that someone who violates them out of appetite can still be accepted as a Jew, and there are such commandments where he cannot. Those commandments such as idolatry, etc., that if a convert violates them out of appetite we will not accept him, express specific contents that certainly involve matters more fundamental to Judaism.
For example, a person who murders for a living—we will not accept him as a convert even if he says he accepts the yoke of the commandments (unless it is clear to us that he will stop and has repented); but a moneylender with interest—if he accepts the commandments, then even if we fear he will later go back to making his living that way, we can accept him.
3. One who does not believe that God created the world is, according to Rambam, a heretic. As I understand it, there is no halakha obligating belief in this. One who does not believe in certain theological principles—we also will not accept him, even if he is willing to commit to performing all the halakhot. Maybe you do not agree that one belief or another is fundamental, but I assume that even according to your view there are fundamentals that are not commandments, and one cannot say a person has Jewish values if he does not believe in them.
To sum up—not only commitment to halakha is needed, but also identification with the values that stand behind some of the commandments of halakha.
The laws of the state are laws necessary for social life. Citizens are obligated to the laws of the state not “because they were born here,” but because that is how social life must look.
By contrast, the laws of the Torah are not necessary for human life, and therefore there is no logic in obligating a person just because of his mother.
I did not say that everyone will interpret according to his own understanding, and I did not say that one can maintain a society that way. What I said is that the definition of Judaism does not depend on the interpretation of the concept of halakha. Under any interpretation whatsoever of the concept of halakha, one can offer a definition of Judaism.
Beyond that, when I discuss the question of what Judaism is or what halakha is, I am discussing the correct definition of those concepts. The question of whether it is possible to maintain a society has no bearing on the question of truth.
And since you raised it, of course everyone interprets according to his own understanding. That is also what happens today. Sometimes he chooses to adopt the interpretations of others, but that too is his decision.
A practical difference for a woman’s betrothal. Whoever that isn’t important to—then no.
There are several claims here.
1. Obviously not everyone who is not careful about some halakha is not Jewish. I was speaking about commitment to halakha in general, not to some specific halakha. By the way, if someone wants to sue me, good health to him. What does that prove?
2. A distinction that is really not principled. Someone who murders for a living is no different from someone who eats pork. Maybe you like him less, but in the laws of conversion there is no difference at all.
3. Here there is room for discussion. Rambam’s principles were not accepted by R. Yosef Albo and the like. I am not sure there are intellectual principles without which you are not a Jew. You can of course invoke Torah from Heaven, but that is a meta-halakhic principle, not an intellectual principle. In that sense, belief in God is also such a principle.
The fact that the laws of the state are necessary for social life (and even that is debatable) does not mean that I am obligated to follow them. And the fact is that they address the citizens of the state and not others. That is, your origin stands at the basis of your obligation to them. And your assumption regarding the laws of halakha is also unclear to me. They are entirely necessary for human life. Without them, his life is not worth much.
It seems to me that there is a basic bug in the whole discussion (both Arieli’s/Inbari’s and even that of my teacher Rav Michi), namely the assumption that there is a “thing” called Judaism. Or in other words—many times the answer to the difficulty is that it is not a difficulty at all.
It seems to me that even in the world of natural science (though here if Rav Michi refutes me I will immediately retract my opinion), it is not entirely clear whether there are distinct categories of substances / plants / animals, etc. Are there really mammals as opposed to reptiles “objectively,” or perhaps these are merely tools that help us in the “understanding” of nature?
As for human definitions—even the division into races (which, thank God, everyone agrees does not define Judaism) is not necessarily clear. Is Obama, who has a white mother and an African father, “black”? (And, to distinguish, the Nazi definition of a Jew.)
And what about “nationhood”—is there any place at all to discuss “the Judaism” as a religion or as a nation, when these categories did not exist at all for most of its years, and it is quite possible that they too will pass from the world when, in the future development of ideas, it becomes clear that they are irrelevant, etc.
And what about human traits: who is an introvert? Who is anxious? Who is intelligent and who is stupid? Who is in love and who is enslaved? And so on and so on.
Even the question of what religiosity is is disputed among the religious themselves (not to mention what traditionalism is). (For example, will a religious person who does not accept the authority of the “greats of the generation” be defined as “religious” in the eyes of the average Haredi? And what about someone who fasts on Yom Kippur even though all the doctors and rabbis instructed him to drink because of danger to life?)
At best, Judaism is a vague sociological term. And if that is so [not certain], then like any sociological group there is a certain eclecticism by which one can map out (in a very non-binary, “on a spectrum” way) “materials of identity,” such that one who has a certain cluster of them can perhaps be identified by it [not by chance I do not use the term “defined” by it, but “identity”].
These materials can of course include observance of commitment to halakha. But to claim that the Bible is not a Jewish book (since the overwhelming majority of it is not concerned with halakha—including of course all the exalted ushpizin who come to visit us in our sukkah, who were never committed to halakha, since that concept arose only among the Sages)—yet it seems to me that a Jew whose cluster is composed of great interest in Jewish history, and who celebrates Yom Kippur, Hanukkah, and the Passover Seder, and also has some ethnic connection (say, even a grandson of a Jewish grandfather), and serves in the IDF—
one can define him as Jewish, even if he is not committed to halakha.
And conversely: what of someone who takes on commitment to halakha because he believes God is a kind of cruel super-human, who, if we do not take upon ourselves the “halakha” He established, will cause us to become sick and die of COVID in this world and will judge us in boiling excrement in the world to come?
And it is important to emphasize—I completely agree that the specific values/contents I mentioned above are not what define “Judaism.” I deny the need to define what Judaism is and what it is not. I simply deny this distinct “object.”
And in your language, Rav Michi: who said there is Judaism/Torah as a cheftza at all—why can we not suffice with Judaism as a gavra (and as far as I am concerned, one can even give that up)?
Do the French ask themselves what Frenchness is? Can Americans agree on how to define Americanness?
The interesting psycho-sociological question is why there are people at all who require a definition of this kind.
(Empirically, it seems to me these are mainly people who identify as religious + a small group, people involved in Jewish renewal.)
It seems to me that perhaps Judaism can be defined (at least that of the religious in our time)
—as something that tries in vain to define itself
…
I have a question that was sharpened by the last column:
Let us assume that the percentage of Jews who observe the commandments—those committed to halakha—is 20% (for the sake of discussion, let us define them as Sabbath observers),
and all the rest of the Jews, from “traditional” and upward, are 80%. (I assume in the world it is even more than that.)
Where do they get the power to decide who will be part of the Judaism of the other 80%? The State of Israel? The Chief Rabbi?
Shouldn’t the change in “religiosity” and its becoming a marginal minority in the last two hundred years change the definition of what Judaism is?
(Of course one can sharpen this to absurdity: if commandment-observers become one percent, or one Jew, then has Judaism died?)
In my opinion this is where the definition you do not like enters in: “Judaism is what Jews do,” with an asterisk.
And that is: whatever is considered a consensus among the majority of the Jewish people is Judaism.
A Jew is someone who sees himself as part of the Jewish collective (or at least has not removed himself from it by his own hands, perhaps like the traitor Vanunu).
Therefore the State of Israel/Zionism is such, and likewise belief in God, enlistment in the IDF, and so on.
(It doesn’t bother me that under this definition there will also dwell millions of Koreans…)
On second thought, a Korean/Druze person who enlists in the IDF as part of the Jewish people (or who becomes a “rabbi” in the U.S.) should count as Jewish, whereas if he enlists in order to impress his girlfriend, then he should not count as Jewish. (An example of this: the Righteous Among the Nations.)
Going back in time 2,000 years and more—what was conversion like in the biblical period? Joining the Jewish collective. (The Bible did not even bother to write how one becomes a convert; it only commanded 36 times to love the convert. In my opinion this is because it is very simple—the convert who dwells among you.)
And in the time of the Sages it was mezuzah and Sabbath boundaries. (By the way, I read somewhere that according to Rabbi Kanievsky, a convert has to accept having a generator on Shabbat, otherwise he has not properly accepted the yoke of the commandments…)
(I would note that I have never found any treatment of the high percentage of secularization, amounting to an overwhelming majority over roughly the last two hundred years, in relation to determining the concept “Judaism.”)
Thanks in advance for the enlightening columns!
Bialik’s answer to Inbari
“A generation is growing up in an atmosphere made entirely of sayings and jingles, and of various things that are all mere breath and lip-service. A kind of optional Judaism is coming into being. They call it nationalism, revival, literature, creativity, Hebrew education, Hebrew thought, Hebrew labor—and all these things hang by the hair of some affection: love of the land, love of the language, love of literature—what value has airy affection?
Affection? But where is duty? And whence will it come? And from where will it draw sustenance? From aggadah? But by its nature it is only optional, with yes and no and weakness in its hand.
A Judaism that is all aggadah resembles iron that has been put into fire and not put into cold water. Aspiration of the heart, good will, awakening of the spirit, inner affection—all these things are beautiful and useful when they end in action, action hard as iron, cruel duty.
You say to build—‘They made a firm covenant in writing, and upon the sealed document were our princes, our Levites, and our priests… and they imposed commandments upon themselves’—is that not how your ancestors also began to build? Come and impose commandments upon us! Let us be given molds into which to cast our flowing and slack will into solid and enduring coinage.
We thirst for concrete acts. Give us a habit of much doing and little saying in life, and a habit of much halakha and little aggadah in literature.
We bend our necks: where is the iron yoke? Why does the strong hand and the outstretched arm not come?”
(H.N. Bialik, Divrei Sifrut, Tel Aviv 1956, pp. 106–107; first printed in Knesset, 1917, pp. 12–26, cited in Henshke’s article linked above)
In the spirit of the biological definition of species:
For someone who cares whether he is Jewish or not, one can judge from the side that from his point of view a Jew is someone he would be willing to marry his son or daughter to.
From the standpoint of certain movements in Judaism, 99% of the Jews in the State of Israel are not Jews at all, since they are not willing to marry them. Or remote primitive tribes who see themselves as Jews. From their perspective they are Jews. From ours, not so much.
And in general, the first Christian gentiles saw themselves as Jews.
That is, this is a subjective definition with certain amorphous characteristics, some of which contradict one another in different groups.
The claim is a bit puzzling. If something could be said in a church, does that mean it is not Judaism?! You know there are Evangelicals who think one must keep halakha the way their master kept it? So ostensibly even halakhic commitment is an idea that can be said in church in certain places in the U.S.
I don’t know, it mainly reminded me of the claims Rambam writes against—that there are people who think the Torah must be unintelligible in order to be true. I know you are not saying exactly that claim (indeed, quite the opposite), but the idea that if a Christian can say it then it is not Judaism—seems parallel to me. In the end there can be Jewish contents that also passed into Christianity; that is not unreasonable, considering the history of Christianity…
Moreover: according to Jewish halakha itself, gentiles are obligated in commandments whose laws are determined by internal factors of Jewish halakha (for otherwise, the Christians too do not define themselves as worshippers of “idolatry,” as is well known, and they denounce “pagans”—whatever it is). So then, would a gentile who accepted upon himself the seven Noahide commandments—with commitment to the rulings of some Jewish court regarding their parameters—be defined as Jewish?
It is clear, then, that halakhic commitment is a necessary condition (and therefore the Reform woman rabbi you spoke of is perhaps a wonderful, wise, talented, and interesting person—but not Jewish) but not sufficient to define “Judaism.” Not that I know what would be sufficient for that.
By the way—I recommend Benjamin Sommer’s book Revelation and Authority, which reaches the same conclusion as yours, though through an analysis of a possible Jewish confrontation with the findings of biblical criticism. My criticism of his book is identical to my criticism of your words. Halakhic commitment—even to halakha (or to the general demand for halakhic commitment) whose source is Sinai—is not enough, even within the boundaries of Jewish halakha itself, to define something or someone as “Jewish” (male or female).
You wrote that Judaism is not a racial or ethnic matter. What is the difference between that and a nation?
Interesting. A few points:
A. I think there is a bit of begging the question here. That is, the assumption that Judaism is commitment to halakha is indeed a criterion one can latch onto (and I think sociologically it is indeed useful, that is, to distinguish between those committed to the Shulchan Arukh and those who are not—even though, as one can see in the “religious” world, one cannot derive from this any worldview agreed upon by all who are committed to the Shulchan Arukh), but it is accepted only by a minority of those who identify themselves as Jews, and it imposes its conception on those who do not hold it (that is—if I am not committed to halakha, then in order to avoid excluding me from Judaism as the Edah Haredit did at its inception, you are forced to determine that I am Jewish because according to your conception I am committed to halakha since I was born to a Jewish mother, but my friend who lives and thinks exactly like me is not Jewish because he was born to a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother, and therefore he is not committed to halakha—and that seems pretty absurd to me).
B. This conception of Judaism as the group of those committed to halakha, and not as a national group or an ideological group, is not necessarily self-evident. That is—in the biblical period there was no Judaism, there were Israelites (and thus a sinful prophet and king can argue over which of them is “the troubler of Israel”). In fact, the transition to Judaism was accompanied by the breaking of the conception that connects religion with nationhood and turns it into a supra-national system constituted by a shared idea; see Megillah 13a:
“Rabbi Yohanan said: he was really from Benjamin, so why is he called ‘a Jew’? Because he denied idolatry, for anyone who denies idolatry is called ‘a Jew,’ as it is written: ‘There are certain Jewish men whom you have appointed over the affairs of the province of Babylon, Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego; these men have paid no heed to you, O king; they do not serve your god, nor worship the golden image which you have set up.’”
C. Regarding Inbari, I think that in determining that he defines Judaism on a racial-ethnic basis, you are reading things that are not there (at least not in the quotation you brought, and from acquaintance with the man and with what he wrote, probably not elsewhere either), and apparently determining that what defines Judaism for him is “racial-ethnic.” I think this is a definition that might be derived from a pluralistic conception such as Inbari presented, but it is not a necessary conclusion. Nationality has an ethnic foundation, but that is not what defines it. What actually defines it is the sense of belonging to a national collective (sometimes it comes from the person himself, and sometimes from the environment that associates him with that national collective, sometimes against his will). And this belonging is expressed to a large extent in relation to what we call the “bookcase,” or what I call the “symbolic space” by means of which a person expresses his culture. That is—what makes us Jews and distinguishes us from the French is that even if we all oppose trafficking in women, and even if we all celebrate a spring holiday, the Jews wrap this in symbols from the Jewish space and celebrate Passover, while the French wrap it in symbols from the French space and celebrate Easter.
D. And of course, the question of the boundaries of the definition of secular-national Judaism arose very early with the appearance of this conception, and Brenner already answered it in 1915:
“‘Everything Jews did etc., that is Judaism,’ says the author. ‘Everything’—the reader will wonder, of course—can you imagine?! Have all restraints been removed? Rather, say: all the deeds of Jews within their environment and for the sake of their continued existence—that is Judaism. The main thing is to seek the Jews in everything first—and Judaism will come in the end. If there are Jews, if they do their work and live their own lives, there will already be some kind of Judaism. Then whatever there will be—it will be called Judaism…’
The deeds of the young Israelites in Russia who belong to the Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries certainly are not from Judaism—however dear these young people may be to us. Those deeds are not from Judaism not because they are Marxist or Bakuninist, and Marx and Bakunin are not from the Torah, but because they are outside the Jewish environment and not for the benefit of the continued existence of the Jewish environment.
I agree that what makes the Jew unique is halakha.
But why can’t one say that morality is an essential part of Judaism?
It is true that I would not define a person as a creature with ears, because other creatures also have ears, but ears are certainly part of a human being.
So too morality is part of Judaism; a father or rabbi who educates someone to behave morally is educating מתוך the Jewish conception. [One could say that he teaches from a book of Jewish education and there is also a chapter there on morality.]
Let me sharpen it further and add that perhaps there is a Jewish morality. If so, why is a rabbi’s sermon in the synagogue not Jewish? The fact that other nations also have beliefs similar to Judaism does not negate the Jewish character of his sermon, for the morality of the Jewish rabbi is a morality written in the Torah. And if it is written in the Torah that one may sell one’s daughter as a maidservant, the rabbi sees—or does not see—in that anything contrary to morality.
And as Leibowitz said in his lecture in Ma’alot [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7x0BaQJnHFc] “There is no universal morality, sir; there is no such thing at all.”
Happy holidays. What I did not understand, and would be happy to have clarified, is why a “Jew” is one who believes in/does “Judaism.”
For this purpose, there is the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. But one need not be a Copenhagener in order to believe in it, and one who believes in it is not necessarily a Copenhagener. So too, “Judaism” usually describes a whole set of values (universal ones) and worldviews, and “Jew” is an ethnic-national-racial-group-identity matter (someone born to a Jewish mother, or someone who undergoes the acceptance ritual of this group). Accordingly, there can be a gentile who believes in “Judaism,” and there can be a Jew who believes in idolatry, etc., and there is no contradiction.
According to my view:
A. Who is a Jew? A person who belongs to the group of Jews by ethnic origin or by a process of acceptance into the group. (Today one can ask whether there is one monolithic group or many groups, because there are many types of conversions and there are paternal Jews, etc.; I won’t get into that.)
B. In the process of conversion, what does the convert mean when he makes his declarations? That he links himself and his identity to belonging within the circle of the group of Jews. In practice this may be expressed in a radical change in all his ways of life, and it may never be expressed except in his mind and in the minds of others in the group.
C. What is “Judaism”? A set of values and worldviews constituted by Jewish rabbis hundreds of years ago and developed over time. It would be better to call it, for example, “Hazalicity” (or Pharisee-ism).
D. What is included in “Judaism” and what is not (apart from halakha, which is obvious)? In other words, what is canon and what is inside-the-seventy-one-faces-of-the-Torah? I do not have a line, but it is clear to me that Marxism is not Judaism (even though Marx was Jewish), and belief that there is a Creator of the world is (even though Christians also believe this). If I had to point to something, I would point to Pirkei Avot as a good example. Even though Pirkei Avot contains contradictions, there are non-trivial agreed-upon principles there in my view (“not in order to receive a reward” is really the opposite of Randism), and there are principles found in other worldviews that do not enter there (missionary activity, for example).
A somewhat different point—a critique of the nose analogy, that it cannot define a person because dogs also have noses:
I do not want to argue with things already written in the rabbi’s books, and I do not want to get into essentialism and characteristic properties and necessary properties, etc., but it is clear to me that in language we can use a word to describe an amorphous concept lacking a clear definition but containing a variety of properties and characteristics and conditions, sometimes not necessary and sometimes not sufficient (see Wittgenstein and the word “game”). Therefore, even though in church too there is a set of values similar to much of Judaism, I do not see a problem in using the word “Judaism” to describe an aggregate of values and worldviews and theology, which by nature are to some degree universal or are not agreed upon by all thinkers, but as a whole there is something there. And this is true of many other words we use (for example the famous one about the judge who could not define “pornography” and nevertheless believed that it was a concept pointing to something).
1 – Judaism (“Hazalicity”) contains values and worldviews (sometimes theological) that are not trivial at all. For example, the principle “there is judgment and there is a Judge” is completely opposed to atheist principles or to various Eastern religions that believe there is no judgment and there are multiple judges at war with each other. Another example: ancient Australian natives believe that every person contains a spirit responsible for preserving a certain parcel of land physically and spiritually (by the way, your personal parcel of land is where your mother was standing at the moment she first felt movement in her belly while pregnant with you). Likewise, Judaism is opposed to the Hellenistic conception of sanctifying the body, and so on. As I said, Pirkei Avot is not trivial.
2 – It is not only in Judaism that it is like this. Also in Native American tribes, a white person can be “accepted” into the tribe if he undergoes certain rituals and shows some kind of loyalty to the tribe, etc. The group has the right to determine who is in the group.
And one more difficulty—It seems to me that most would agree that the religion of Judaism has a certain theological whole (subject to dispute, but surely there is something there, and I am prepared to bring examples against other religions). I also think most would agree that belief in some theological whole is not “nothing,” even if it does not always translate into acts or halakha. So why not say that the religion of Judaism is that theological whole and not only halakha (which in the eyes of many is only the implementation of the beliefs included in theology)? And to one who says that a gentile can believe in Jewish theology and not be Jewish—why is that true for theology and not for halakha? That is, where does the decision come from that acts are what determine and not beliefs? Just as there can be a gentile who believes in Jewish theology, there can be a gentile committed to halakha. (I have no problem with that because I separated Jew and Judaism.)
And to complete the picture, Brenner wrote in 1911 in “On the Phenomenon of Apostasy” about Jews who assimilated and stopped being Jews even before they converted their religion (which according to your view changes nothing at all about their being Jews, since they are still committed to halakha according to your view, and they are still Jews, even if “apostates”):
“I am not at all horrified when I see in the Viennese Zionist German newspaper, from time to time, lists of the names of converts denounced before the public; indeed, I do not understand whom those miserable Adolfs and Bernards harm, who from their childhood were strangers to Jewish society and religion and who, in order to enter Christian society, also accepted its ‘faith’? What had we from them before, when they did or did not go to the Jewish temple, and what have we lost from the fact that they rose and sprinkled themselves for their pleasure with holy water? […] What have we to do with all those dozens and hundreds who were assimilated from childhood, and for what purpose they become Christians, and why should precisely this slight external change horrify us more than their lives before the change? After all, the essential forms of their lives were in any case un-Jewish, and what had we from them had they not taken this final step and remained only inscribed among Israel, without taking part in our hard life and our struggle for our national future?”
And in the 1970s, when in the kibbutz movement, for example, they dealt with the phenomenon of non-Jews who sought to join the kibbutz and the people of Israel (mainly in the form of volunteers who married kibbutz members), they began to discuss the need to create a Jewish-national conversion process, to teach you that this Judaism too is not merely a matter of “atmosphere” and folklore.
What is all the complication about? It is very simple. That is what is written in the Torah. Even the commandment to believe in God is halakhic. See the Ten Commandments, see the portion of Bechukotai, see the entire book of Deuteronomy…
Judaism has no source other than the Torah. And that is what is written there.
As trivial and banal as it is simple.
Any other claim creates another religion. Not Judaism.
Hello Michi.
It is clear to me that in your view (actually also in my view, and in my opinion this view is correct), there is no Reform definition of Judaism, since they have no concrete statement or conditions unique to a person’s being Jewish in order to enter Judaism, but only universal messages and moral principles not unique to Jews.
Even so, let us take the Conservatives as a second example. If a Conservative rabbi from the left-wing stream converts a person on condition that he keep halakha according to his interpretation (he is allowed to live with a homosexual partner and have intimate sexual contact with him because the prohibition was only said regarding full relations and idolatrous worship; he is allowed to bless “who made me an Israelite” and “who made me a man” in place of the negative formulations and perhaps it is even preferable that he do so; and so on and so forth, halakhic changes—and let us assume for the sake of the example that he does indeed keep Conservative halakha in its lenient and modern form, and the conversion itself was done properly with circumcision, immersion, declaration, and sacrifice—and we see that he believes in the Sinaitic revelation, Moses’ prophecy, and obligation to halakha, only according to the interpretation of a Conservative rabbi), then what is he? A Jew in error? An apostate Jew? A doubtful convert?
No. He is simply not Jewish at all according to my definition and yours, and according to the definition of all those who have an Orthodox religious conception. And he is Jewish according to liberal-Conservative conceptions. That is all.
Hello Udi.
1. Inbari and Arieli do not really define Judaism. At most they try to characterize what it is and what it is not. Therefore I too am not dealing with a definition in the mathematical sense but with characterization.
2. Categories in the natural world definitely exist, even though they sometimes have blurred boundaries. But that does not mean there are no distinctions in reality. That is a mistake. The same applies to the definition of races (there was a discussion of this in a talkback to the previous column). The existence of intermediate cases does not mean there is no such thing as races.
3. Regarding Judaism as a nation, I already wrote that I will get to that in the coming columns. Nationhood too is not an unambiguous concept, but one who denies the existence of nations is mistaken. By the way, even if its current definition is new, I do not think it is really an invention ex nihilo. There are ancient foreshadowings of it. But that is not important for our matter.
4. If something is disputed, does that mean there is no truth about it? By the same token, if there is a dispute about the definition of a concept, that proves nothing. Perhaps one side is wrong and the other is right? Or perhaps there are intermediate cases, and only about them is there a dispute?
5. Once you moved to sociology, I lost you. I deal with values and not sociology (which concerns facts). I will get to that later.
6. You deny the need to define, or the existence of this object. As for the need, that is a matter of taste. Some people are interested in it and some are not. As for the existence of this object, you are again conflating blur or lack of sharpness in the definition with non-existence of the concept. We talk about Judaism and live within it, so it is hard for me to see someone denying the existence of Judaism. You can say its definition is blurred, and still you will have to give me riverbanks for it (even if not definitions). I will deal with that too later.
7. By the way, Frenchmen and Americans certainly do ask themselves these questions. Though for them the value discussion is less substantive because it has no real basis (it is not about a religious tradition but about facts, and there everyone inserts into the definition the values he likes, just as our secularists do).
In closing, I would only note that in my opinion such statements are usually an expression of intellectual laziness or an attempt to evade painful conclusions. See my introductions at the start of my series of columns about poetry (there too they explain these explanations to us: the concept does not exist, it is vague, undefined, everyone has his own poetry, etc.).
This is not a question of power or of majority. The question is what the correct definition is. Not who decides and by what authority. When I ask what poetry is, if I arrive at some conclusion, it really will not matter to me that many others think differently from me.
Changing the definition is a problematic statement. Are you referring to a new concept? Then call it by a different name. Otherwise you have turned everything into semantic confusion. Unless in your opinion this is the proper continuation of the previous concept. Then you have to define the previous one and explain why this is the proper continuation for our day. If commandment-observant Jews disappear—then indeed Judaism dies. What is absurd about that? Just as if mathematicians disappear then there is no community of mathematicians.
A biological species is a fact; Judaism is a conception. I will address this in the coming columns. I am not asking a descriptive question—what people think. I am asking an essential question: what is the definition of the concept.
Halakha is what we were commanded at Sinai, and what branches out from it. If they think so, then they are indeed a Jewish sect. Note that I am looking for a touchstone and not characteristics. Obviously Jews also do universal things. See my remarks at the end about Judaism in the gavra and in the cheftza.
It seems to me I already wrote to you at least twice that the discussion of nationhood will come, and that there is a Jewish nation. What is the point of repeating the same claim/statement again and again?
A. I already wrote above that I am not dealing with the descriptive question: what people think Judaism is. I am dealing with the essential question: what Judaism is.
B. This takes us into the question of Judaism as a nation. I will get to that later.
C. I will also get to that claim later (it is the core of Ehud Luz’s argument).
D. He asked a good question and did not answer it (what I call stretching the question mark into an exclamation mark). One cannot define a concept by means of itself. That is a loop that empties the concept of content. What makes X-ish acts is X. I am asking what X-ish acts are.
Having a nose too is part of your being human. On the logical level, a definition is supposed to contain the characteristics unique to the concept.
The fact that Leibowitz said something does not constitute an argument. He is wrong, and badly so. There definitely is universal morality, though disputes about it may exist. Another of his positivist fallacies.
You are comparing different things. Why is a mathematician someone who does mathematics? Why is a cobbler someone engaged in shoemaking? Copenhagen is a place name attached to a conception born in that place. A Jew is someone connected to Judaism.
All your content-based definitions miss the point I made in these columns. Even if you find a value found only among us, as long as that is accidental it is not Judaism. A definition of Judaism is supposed to provide an essential touchstone. Therefore even if there is a conception found only in Judaism (there is none, in my opinion), as long as it could be found elsewhere, it is not a good touchstone.
As for the theological whole, in my opinion it is only what serves as the infrastructure for halakha (belief in God, Torah from Sinai—or from Heaven).
A gentile cannot be committed to halakha. There can be a gentile who thinks he is committed to halakha. By the same token, there can be a cobbler who thinks he is a mathematician.
As for Judaism as a nation, I will speak about that later. There too I will discuss the definition of open and vague concepts.
They stopped behaving as Jews, not stopped being Jews. A Jew is one who is obligated to halakha. Judaism is behavior according to halakha. All along I distinguished between Jewishness and Judaism.
I disagree. He would indeed be Jewish according to his definition, and I would agree that it holds water. Because the Conservatives have halakha, in my opinion they have a valid definition of Judaism. Valid does not mean that I agree with it. By contrast, the Reform have no definition at all.
Thank you very much. It seems to me that only now has the penny dropped for me regarding the whole column. I agree that there is not one conception found only in Judaism, but would you be satisfied if the set of Judaism’s conceptions taken as a whole were found only in Judaism and constituted the touchstone, even though each member of the set can be found elsewhere?
For some reason a physical analogy jumps to mind: Judaism is a certain vector that of course shares projections with other conceptions, but differs from each of them in another dimension:
Judaism: {one God, anti-missionary, concern for others,…}
Christianity: {one God, missionary, concern for others,…}
Hinduism: {multiple idols, anti-missionary, concern for others,…}
Randism: {no idols, missionary, no concern for others,…}
….
I mentioned that I will discuss open definitions later.
In short, commitment to observing halakha,
that is what the rabbi wrote.
Either commitment undertaken or obligation.
If you were born Jewish—obligation. (“He held the mountain over them like a tub.”)
If you want to convert—undertaken commitment.
Above I wrote that Judaism cannot be conceived in a way that does not take into account about 80% of the Jews.
Following a conversation with a friend, I understood the point of my disagreement:
There are three concepts: the Jewish religion, the Jewish nation (which has not yet been discussed), and “Judaism.”
Indeed, the rabbi’s definition is that the “Jewish religion” is commitment to halakha.
My claim is that “Judaism” is not the Jewish religion, but is more in the direction of the Jewish nation, or the Jewish bookshelf, or Jewish culture,
and this so long as commitment to the Jewish religion today is a brilliant minority among the Jews.
Indeed, it may be that over the generations “Judaism” was identical with the Jewish religion, but the situation today, for the past 200 years, is different.
And therefore today, the religious “conversion” is halakhic, but it is a living fossil from the period in which Judaism was expressed in religion, and today to take a gentile and bring him into the Jewish religion but not into the Jewish nation is ridiculous.
I will end with a simple distinction (which may perhaps have been written earlier):
The Jews preceded Judaism, and therefore the Jews determine what Judaism is.
The Jews preceded Judaism, and therefore the Jews determine what Judaism is.
Suppose you found a definition for the concept “Jew.”
What criterion would you use to test whether the definition is correct?
If the majority agree? If the Haredim agree?
This seems altogether like an attempt to find a definition that is convenient for you.
“Jew” and “Judaism” are social concepts. As such, they do not admit of a coherent definition.
“But the things that are revealed belong to us and to our children forever, to do all the words of this Torah” (Deuteronomy 29:28).
Anything else is not what is written in the Torah, which Judaism believes was given from Heaven. Forever.
The semantics of contemporary concepts do not really matter..
Again, even with the laws of the state, nobody asked him, and yet you still assume an obligation. Socrates in the Crito at least assumes later acceptance (from the very fact that he continued living in Athens, it is proven that he accepted the law of Athens voluntarily). You, by contrast, argue that the Jew is obligated as such whether it pleases him or not, with no possibility of exit and no ability to change the law within whose framework he lives; Judaism is imposed upon us willingly and unwillingly.
The only explanation for this in your view is that Judaism assumes it was given to the nation, and the acceptance by the nation is what obligates the individuals. Here too voluntary acceptance by the nation was required—that is what happened in the days of Ahasuerus—but without the existence of a nation there is no obligation on individuals. There is a dialectic here: the Torah was given to the nation, but without the existence of a nation that includes even those who do not believe in God and the Torah, such as Assaf Inbari, there is no place for Torah. Therefore the Babylonian Talmud obligates only because of the nation’s acceptance, as the Kesef Mishneh argues.
One question that remains open for me is why only the Babylonian Talmud was accepted by the nation, and whether there is a procedure that would allow further acceptances by the nation.
And what about the laws of morality? Did anyone ask me there either? Can I opt out of that?
Socrates says that I accepted it upon myself. And I say that I did not accept it. What is the meaning of that argument?
The verse you brought has no connection to what you want to derive from it.
There are nicer verses for decorating homiletic remarks.
As for the matter itself, even the Torah given from Heaven needed the agreement of the Jews in order for it to be accepted,
and today there is no such agreement among the majority of the people.
In other words:
Even a Torah given by whatever god it may be does not become “Judaism” without the consent and acceptance of the Jews; otherwise it is simply the Torah of some particular god.
And is a person living as a slave in a dictatorial state also obligated by its laws?
The obligation to laws comes from the people’s consent to the laws. This can be tacit consent, as Socrates says, or acceptance of the coin as legal tender by me, as Rambam writes in the laws of robbery and lost property—but consent is required. Without that, the law is not law. The laws of morality are not relevant here because they are imposed upon us by reason (even in a society of robbers there are criteria of justice). The Torah is not a rational constitution, nor is it a civic constitution. So what is it? The constitution of slaves coerced by an invisible tyrant (“As I live, says the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm and with fury poured out I will reign over you”—Ezekiel 20:33)?
From too much sophistication, people sometimes forget to relate to the verses as substance and not as decoration.
Everything is written. But people do not want to read.
And by the way, let us not forget: before they remembered to accept it a second time, they almost disappeared from the world.
At least according to the Sages, yes. I tend to think not. Is consent necessary? In my opinion not necessarily, certainly if the commander is the Creator of the world and our creator.
Happy holidays.. What is the rabbi’s issue with his systematic attacks on the rabbis of Eli???
Where did you see an attack? I only quote from what they themselves said as published. I indeed disagree, and I also think that such quotation makes them look ridiculous, but they are doing that to themselves.
My teacher, my father, used to say about such excuses: “He didn’t die; the Arabs killed him.”
I agree with some of the commenters who argued that perhaps the assumption about the nature of the criterion is what dooms the search for it to failure. I would propose a criterion similar to the mathematical definition of “closed” (it exists in many fields, including computer science, though I think the idea is similar): “Judaism at stage n+1” would be everything generated from “Judaism at stage n” in such a way that there exists at least one representative from stage n who confirms being the source of what we are currently examining.
This is of course simply an attempt to push the word “tradition” into a formal mold, but I have found that there is benefit in this way of approaching it.
For our purposes, I think this mold addresses, on the one hand, the fact that too strict a criterion will push out the Eli pre-military academy, Satmar, and the religious kibbutz (indeed, any application of the strict criterion will generate another application of it, so that we are left with nothing). On the other hand, it does leave outside most of the sects and oddities that try to sound very similar to Judaism but toward which many feel the suspicion that Arieli expressed.
I hope you are not serious. Is there really anything on earth שאין one representative from stage N who approves it?
In the n+1 definition, you have also included the Reform and Zionism as Judaism.
To solve the problem of terminology, let us create a new concept—judaism stile.
Similar to kosher stile, which is already common in restaurants in the U.S., for example..
Kosher style refers to foods commonly associated with Jewish people but which may or may not actually be kosher. It is a stylistic designation rather than one based on the laws of kashrut.
(Wikipedia)
And thus we can distinguish between the definition that entails obligation in commandments and everything else.
Bzzz… not true. Of course the Reform have n+1, but that is only because there have already been several generations of Reform. One can point to a stage at which a rupture occurred.
The intention was to give an intuition, not to claim that tradition is a model (in the logical sense of a model) that precisely instantiates the concept of “closed.”
As for your question, of course there is.
As an example, I will mention the “Mishkan Ohalim” movement from the mid-1990s (only in the context of tradition, without addressing the truth of their claims or the pain they expressed). We had a neighbor then who identified with the movement, and my father asked him a simple question—Which Yemenite rabbis stand behind them? Who gave ordination to the leader of the movement? And the neighbor answered that the ordination was directly from Moses our teacher… So this is indeed an anecdote, but to my mind it is a good example that when a movement lacks the ability to point to the connection between itself and stage n—the matter is evident.
You can also take as an example other creatures that emerged from various study halls (some of them have also been mentioned by you from time to time) and even initially enjoyed the patronage of known Torah scholars—when they chose to cross red lines, their supporters shook them off, and it was hard to be confused and claim that a connection to stage n remained between them.
So yes, the gates of sophistry have not been locked, and one can claim that there is some rabbi who still has some very loose connection with, say, Ohad Ezrachi (again, a somewhat extreme example for the sake of discussion). But here integrity is required in the discussion—when one reviews the latter’s process of development, and “reviews” here means simply opening his Wikipedia entry—it is evident that there were two stages after which the said person severed his ties with Jewish tradition.
Why can things that are Judaism not be studied by Christians or secular people? As you said, “Torah as a cheftza,” and it does not matter who studies them—they remain Judaism because it is in the cheftza. (For example: the Bible and its commentators, and the Talmud with the Rishonim and Acharonim and halakha.) All these are defined as Judaism. I do not understand why Judaism has to be unique to Jews.
They certainly can. That is exactly what happens. Therefore I argue that this is Judaism in the gavra (like Torah in the gavra), and it cannot serve as a touchstone for Judaism. Wearing pants and having a nose are also Judaism in a similar sense. I explained this.
But I do not really understand the rabbi’s approach.
Why is the rabbi introducing ‘whataboutism’ here? Why should I care that in church they preach the same sermons as all sorts of ‘rabbis’ in the synagogue? Does that change the essence of those rabbis’ sermons?
In the previous column, dear Sh.Tz.L also responded with this claim (maybe here too; I simply did not read the comments), if I remember correctly, that even the root of those priests itself has its essence in the (Jewish) Bible, and that the fact they turned the Jewish value of faith into a universal value should not interest any Jew as such.. (because the root is Jewish).
What—if fools argue among themselves and adopt philosophical concepts in their discussions, then philosophers should claim that because donkeys speak in those terms, those terms are spoiled and no longer philosophical?!
An argument is an argument by virtue of being an argument.. (and that is a great principle in the rabbi’s teaching).
And if tomorrow churches study tractates from Nezikin as they are studied in yeshivot, with commentators (and perhaps even with lomdus), and speak about practical halakha (and tomorrow they also practice it).
Then traditional Torah study suddenly is not Jewish?!
—
The deep sermons (of wise rabbis, certainly not all of them.. to put it mildly) delivered in synagogues are a direct continuation of the discussions of the Sages throughout the Talmud. (Beyond the halakhic discussions.)
The fact that the rabbi is less drawn to the content side (and not the halakhic side) is perfectly fine. But to project that onto the whole content side, as though it is not Judaism, seems to me fundamentally mistaken. (Homilies may be dreadful nonsense, but they are still Jewish [even if this was converted into Christianity, that is a woe to Christianity. This content-style is Jewish {and its source is probably as far back as our father Abraham} in itself]).
The analogy between synagogue lessons and church lessons is not of the same kind as the claim at all.
Even if we say that this is not the substance of the Jew but his form (Judaism of the gavra), still to say that ‘it has no Jewish value’ is, in my humble opinion, mistaken (to the point that the habit of reading books of ethics would be as gentile as Jewish). Of course it is a Jewish value; it is just a directed value, not a constitutive one.
By the way, rabbi, first of all… in the laws of the state I am obligated because I am a good citizen in the state. However, the reason the civil law was constituted this way is future utility… (‘and not for the sake of having laws’), and theoretically if there were no utilitarian logic in the laws, it would be proper that there be no law. But as it is? There is logic. Therefore it is needed.
True, one can argue that in halakha the obligation is not the logic behind the command but the command as such. But in my view this is a very deep discussion, about the foundation of divine command. (A sign after the fact? Or a reason? A sufficient condition? Or a necessary condition? [whether there is a rationale to the commandments or not—this is an ancient debate).
Since in metaphysics there is no doubt that things work differently.
Everything was explained well. One simply has to read.
If I understood correctly, you define Judaism as carrying out God’s command that was given at Sinai.
This can also include principles of faith, character work, and habituating oneself to certain character traits.
(Anything that, in my eyes, was said at Sinai.)
If so, I understand the criticism of secular Judaism. But what is the criticism of the Reform? In their view, what was said at Sinai—or what remained relevant out of all that was said at Sinai (on the assumption that at Sinai we also received mechanisms for adapting what was said to a later period)—is to care for the rights of the weak and minorities and blah blah blah.
I also do not understand the criticism of the Haredim and the Hasidim. In their view, what was said at Sinai is that one must study Hasidic books and prostrate oneself on the graves of the righteous. They admittedly do not claim that this was said explicitly at Sinai, but at Sinai it was said that one must cleave to the Creator, and today this is possible only through cleaving to the righteous one, and that is through prostrating oneself at his grave.
In the end everyone draws from Sinai; they just process it, and process it again. But the halakha in the Shulchan Arukh is also a processing.
I have no criticism here of the Haredim, and not even of the Hasidim. In general, I have no criticism here of anyone. What I offered here is a definition. That is all.
In the eyes of the Reform, nothing was said at Sinai because there was no revelation at Mount Sinai. Principles of faith, and facts in general, are not Judaism. A true fact is true for every person, and if it is not true then it is not true even if Jews think it. And so too regarding proper moral traits. I explained everything.
Hello Rabbi Michael Abraham,
An important and fascinating opinion piece (I could not help noticing the similarity in the line of thought between you and Prof. Leibowitz z”l, who denied any characterization of Judaism not based on religious and halakhic commitment).
But this answer places before us a no less difficult question:
How are we to define commitment to halakha and the commandments of the Torah?
As far as I can grasp, the only consensus surrounding binding commands is those given at the Sinaitic revelation.
From then until today much has changed, and it is difficult to find broader agreement regarding which binding halakhot are such that the title “Jew” is denied to one who violates them.
I would be happy to hear your view on the subject, or to be referred to an article in which you have already addressed this issue.
Ravit
Many thanks. I do not remember that I spelled it out in any one place, but I have referred to it in several places (mainly when I wrote about conversion). My claim is that anyone committed to halakha, whatever his interpretation of halakha may be, is included among Jews. I may of course disagree with his interpretation from one end to the other, but as long as one is dealing with halakha, this is Judaism. So too regarding conversion: there are many discussions about how many commandments are required for the conversion to count as including acceptance of commandments. This is conceptual nonsense. Acceptance of commandments means acceptance of the halakhic yoke. How the person interprets it, and what of it he observes (or even intends to observe), is irrelevant to the discussion. In my opinion, even a convert who does not intend to observe a single jot of halakha—so long as he understands that it obligates him, and his violation of halakha stems from impulse and weakness—is a valid convert, even if that was his plan from the outset.
Hello and blessings!
I would be happy to hear what the rabbi thinks of Rav Kook’s words in Orot (at the beginning of the essay “For the War of Beliefs and Opinions”) regarding the definition of Judaism. Thank you very much, and more power to you!
“The ideas stand astonished because of the flood of foreign opinions that go on sweeping and surging, especially foreign opinions of idolatries. They burst in a torrent into the camp, capturing many hearts and distorting the paths, and turning many of our youth from ways of life to ways of death. Those who defend the opinions of Judaism raise a cry, invalidate the evil opinions, and expose their falsification and falsehood by clarifying the boundaries of Judaism. But it is very doubtful whether in this style they will succeed in turning back what has begun to burst forth like a mountain of breaches. In particular, those who seek to define Judaism by known definitions, from the side of its soul and its spiritual content, are mistaken, although it is possible to define it from the side of its revealed and tangible historical content. In its soul it includes everything, and all spiritual tendencies, the revealed and the hidden, are stored within it in a supreme inclusiveness, just as everything is included in absolute divinity. Every such definition with regard to it is a cutting down of its saplings and an example of setting up a graven image and molten idol in the name of the divine character. In this, the value of Israel, which bears Judaism among the nations, is similar to the value of man among all creatures. Many creatures have advantages that man does not have, but the general combination of qualities and the elevation of spirituality by means of them, to use with intellect the powers included in him potentially and actually—this is what makes man a supreme entity in the world. So too there are many nations that possess a particular talent greater than that talent is found in Israel, but Israel, as the essence of all humanity, gathers within itself the qualities of all the nations, and they are united within it in a holy ideal form, in exalted unity.”
What do I have to say about this? I only ask myself where he knows from that Israel contains the essence of all the opinions and talents in the world. And how he defines “foreign opinions” as against the thought of Judaism. In my opinion there is no such creature. This has already been spelled out in countless places.
Happy holidays!
Even if we define the touchstone as “commitment to halakha,” we still have to ask and clarify: A. What is that halakha? Who has the authority to determine it? What are that person’s basic assumptions? Who is authorized to ascertain this commitment, and how?
B. Why not view the expansion of halakha—for example, yoga too could be seen as an extension of “and you shall greatly guard your lives,” and so on. Likewise, dealing with trafficking in women or with values and character traits would be part of the commandment “and you shall walk in His ways,” and engaging in philosophy would be part of the commandment of knowing God, and so on.
More power to you!
Ariel