Is the Torah a Guarantee of Proper Conduct (Column 356)
In Columns 84 and 219 I already addressed the recurring problem in the writings of Rabbi Ratzon Arusi, who time and again pins the ills of our society and government on a detachment from the path of the Torah and from commitment to it. His method is always to point to a flaw in the conduct of the State of Israel today (and there are, alas, quite a few), and then to cite sources (relevant or not) in halakha that indicate the proper way, thereby “proving” that adherence to the Torah’s way would have solved all the maladies of the government and society, and that these are a consequence of detachment from the Torah. Of course, such words fall on receptive ears. What God-fearing Jew would refuse a reinforcement of the sanctity of our Torah and its absolute righteousness, and of the failures that arise in those who deviate from it? But intellectual honesty requires that even if the words are pleasant to the listener, they must be weighed on the scales of reason and not accepted merely because they fit one’s preconceptions.
Failure of the Democratic System (no less!)
Today I was sent another such “gem” from his beit midrash, this time about “the failure of the democratic system” (that’s the title), and mainly about the voting procedures in the Knesset and its dissolution. Here too, as I have shown in the past, there is no small amount of demagoguery, but beyond that these words also create a desecration of God’s name and habituate people to cling to slogans instead of thinking a bit. Therefore I saw it as my duty to once again set his words in their place—for the listener’s benefit.
His column isn’t long, so I shall quote it in full.
| Last week members of Knesset voted on the budget, and the result was unbearable—the Knesset is dissolving. The people of Israel dwelling in Zion are supposed to prepare for elections for the fourth time in two years, on the 10th of Nisan, in the midst of a dreadful pandemic, in the midst of an economic crisis, and in the midst of a severe social rift.
But what we wish to address is the manner of the vote, within the framework of our habit of comparing the ways of our nation, which are determined according to the Torah, with the ways that are practiced by Western democratic society.
The voting procedure according to the Torah We do not speak with any intention to quarrel or, God forbid, to mock, but out of pain, out of a very strong desire that we conduct ourselves by the light of the Torah’s ways. According to our holy Torah, every single vote of a court or a council, and in every communal and judicial framework that represents the public, all are obligated to participate in the vote; according to the Torah there is no such thing as “abstain.” And matters go so far that if someone abstains he is replaced by someone else who follows him in line, according to the order. And even if a member of Knesset is ill, according to the Torah of Israel one must find him a substitute to vote in his place. All this so that every issue be discussed by the full panel and in the full forum, and so that each one will present his opinion in a reasoned and respectful manner, thereby enriching perspectives; and thus the vote will not be factional but substantive. This is the proper procedure according to the Torah of Israel: a substantive, dignified, responsible, and serious process. All the more so when we are dealing with decisions such as dissolving the Knesset for elections in the midst of such conditions.
Faulty conduct in the vote to dissolve the Knesset Let us see how the vote was conducted. Some of the voters hid in the restrooms, some hid in the parking lot, some of them popped up by surprise only at the second or third reading, because then the vote is decisive—and some of them voted against their faction! Seemingly this is a substantive vote, yet in terms of existing democracy they should have abstained from the vote and requested a replacement in their stead; they should have asked their faction to find them a substitute, since the vote was against their conscience and since today votes are faction-based. But to come and use the mandate received from the faction and vote against the faction and against the existing political and democratic rules—this is rebellion and treachery; it harms the entire political reality by which they operate. We encounter what is called a treacherous vote; we also find “voting with one’s feet,” i.e., not showing up—and this is shameful and disgraceful that such a reality exists! And as noted, we see clever ploys of not showing up for the first reading and for the second reading.
Applause for the decision to dissolve the Knesset—disgraceful behavior And after all this, suddenly, at the end of the vote, applause is heard. Even if the vote was to your liking, you ought to be in a state of dread—the people of Israel are now going to elections for the fourth time in two years, in the midst of a pandemic and an economic and social crisis beyond imagination. Now this is fuel to stoke all these crises more and more—so for this you applaud?! The Speaker of the Knesset even remarked to them, quite caustically: What are you applauding for, since as a result of dissolving the Knesset many of you will not return to the Knesset—so are you applauding that you are committing political suicide? That is to say, here we have patterns of behavior supposedly in the name of Western democracy, but they are disgraceful patterns of behavior. Can we rely and trust such processes? Is this the image of leadership? Let us recall, gentlemen, that our parliament—once I used to call the Knesset “Knesset,” today I call it “parliament,” for it is nothing but a parliament—reaches this level and, thank God, has not yet reached, but is liable to reach, the levels of parliaments in Europe, where our eyes have seen, not a stranger’s, how in the framework of votes they throw punches at one another—standing and punching one another. And this is called democracy—woe to such shame. And I repeat: these harsh words of ours do not come out of contentiousness nor out of a mental posture of “you see, we were right—the Torah way is the correct one,” but out of immense pain that our brothers and friends, who have not yet merited to be illuminated by the Torah’s light, conduct themselves as they do and do not know what a tremendous loss they suffer by not knowing the ways of the Torah. If they knew the ways of the Torah they would say: give us the ways of the Torah instead of these disgraceful ways. We pray to the Creator of the world that He pour out His spirit from on high so that our dear brothers will discover the light of the Torah and that its luminescence will return them to the good path. |
Hard as it is to believe, I can find in his words almost no statement that is logical. I will now try to show this by discussing the main points.
Is the comparison indeed between Torah law and Western democracy?
The most fundamental problem in almost everything Rabbi Arusi writes on these topics is fairness in the comparison he makes. He sets, one against the other, a governing system that functions in reality against some theory that has never been implemented. Democratic theory does not suffer from the flaws he listed, for those are the result of people and their practical shortcomings. And the practical functioning of the Torah on these matters has never been tested in the crucible of real-world practice.
If, for some reason, Rabbi Arusi wished to act fairly, he could have made the comparison on two different planes, in a way that does not suffer from the unfairness and methodological flaw of his comparison:
- On the one hand, Rabbi Arusi could have compared halakhic theory to the theory of modern law and governance (a field in which he is an expert; Rabbi Arusi holds a PhD in law). I am quite sure the results would be entirely different. I am far from certain, to say the least, that in such a comparison Western law would come out on the losing end. Already the Ran in his Derashot (Derash 11) writes that sometimes the laws of the nations are more moral and more orderly than ours (because we aim to attain the matter’s divine component and not merely social order and civic repair).
Moreover, the Ran there writes that precisely for this reason halakhic jurisprudence requires, for its practical completion and implementation, the system of the king’s law (mishpat ha-melech) to remedy these deficiencies. Therefore even an ideal government conducted according to the Torah is not meant to adhere strictly to halakha. On the contrary, the role of the king is to deviate from halakha, because it is impossible to run practical life solely by halakha. The king’s law is a derivative of common sense and does not draw from the Torah. In this it resembles the royal laws of all nations, as the Ran writes. Hence, a practical government is not supposed to differ from a secular government of gentiles.
- On the other hand, Rabbi Arusi could have compared Western-democratic rule (in Israel), which does in fact function, to a Torah-based rule that in fact functions. Admittedly such a state probably never existed, and if it did, it was in the distant past, with no detailed documentation of what exactly transpired. But if we take the events described in the Bible, we can honestly say this is not the pinnacle of morality and civic and social repair. The prophet perhaps, but the king usually not—even those kings who “did what was right in the eyes of the Lord.” Is the story of David and Bathsheba suitable as the alternative that Rabbi Arusi proposes to Western democracy? Or perhaps Ahab and Jezebel? One could say this happened precisely because the king did not obey the Torah, but that is precisely like waving the tautology that “a religious person cannot be a thief, because if he steals then he isn’t religious.” And if we are dealing in tautologies, we could just as well say that Western democracy is perfect, and the failures result from people being wicked and not behaving properly and not adhering to its directives.
Happily, however, we still have the possibility of making this practical comparison. Take the religious/ultra-Orthodox members of Knesset and tell me whether they conduct themselves properly—i.e., are not afflicted by the flaws Rabbi Arusi described? Does conduct “according to the Torah” save them from these defects, as opposed to their wicked secular colleagues (cf. “accursed evildoers”)? Of course not. But again, I am sure Rabbi Arusi will explain this is because they do not act according to the Torah. To which I reply that the secular MKs fail because they do not act according to the norms of Western democracy. Once more we are dealing with an unhelpful tautology. And what about the conduct of the Chief Rabbinate, of whose council Rabbi Arusi himself is a member? There all the members are rabbis who all cleave to Torah and halakha, and there we surely have a beacon of justice and integrity—a real light unto the nations. As is well known, the Rabbinate conducts itself with clean hands and without tricks. All votes are substantive; there are no intrigues, no failures or defects. Joking aside, everyone understands that its conduct is far worse than that of the Knesset: no transparency, no clean hands, monopolistic heavy-handedness, no proper procedures, and more and more—all in the name of the Torah by its standard-bearers. There you have a practice-to-practice comparison; I leave you to draw the conclusion.
And again one could say it is only because they deviate from the Torah’s path. To which I reply once more that the failures in democracy stem from the deviation of wicked people from the proper norms therein. Rabbi Arusi must decide: is he focusing on theory or on practice? On the Torah or on the people who implement it? One cannot, tendentiously, take theory on one side of the comparison and practice on the other, just so the comparison will yield the result one desires.
For some reason, however, Rabbi Arusi chose to make neither of these fair comparisons, but rather to make an unfair comparison between a Torah-halakhic theory and Western-democratic practice. In this way I can likewise show the superiority of secularism over religiosity, for Rabbis Moti Elon, Berland, the rabbi from Tzfat, and a few other rabbis sexually harassed youths and women, despite being revered rabbis; whereas secular theory views sexual harassment most negatively. It (the theory) is pure and clean as snow. There you have an unfair comparison between A’s practice and B’s theory. With this you won’t get far. It is hard for me to believe Rabbi Arusi did not notice the happy fact that theories are almost always perfect, and the less happy fact that in practice, when people are involved and not theories, there are usually quite a few problems and failures.
An example from The Kuzari
In The Kuzari, Essay I (sec. 113), the Ḥaver denounces the conduct of the nations as violent and forceful—“contempt, suffering, and killing”—and as characterized by the boasting and aggressiveness of kings, and more. By contrast, we Jews are poor, humble, and modest.
The Khazar king answers him:
114. The Khazar said: That would be so if your submission were voluntary, but it is coerced; and when you find the power, you will kill.
The Khazar explains to the Ḥaver that he is making a comparison between Jewish theory and the practice of the nations. Our theory advocates humility, peace, and proper treatment of every person, but this has never faced a real test, since we have not had our own government and power, and therefore we had no option to wield them against others. It is very easy to sit in an armchair and disseminate perfect opinions and principles. The question is what will happen when this faces a practical test.
And to this the Ḥaver honestly replies:
115. The Ḥaver said: You have found the place of my disgrace, King of the Khazars. It is so: had most of us accepted poverty as submission to God and on account of His Torah, the divine matter would not have left us for such a long time…
Indeed, an unfair comparison. But I think a logical error is not the disgrace here. The disgrace is apparently the demagoguery, for the Ḥaver tried to present Judaism as superior to the nations by virtue of an unfair comparison that does not withstand the test of facts. Remind you of anything?…
Beyond this fundamental problem, there are also some local problems in Rabbi Arusi’s words, and here I will address the two main ones. As will be seen immediately, these points also connect to his fundamental flaw.
Is the decision to dissolve the Knesset disgraceful?
Contrary to his claim, the vote to dissolve the Knesset did not have disgraceful results. On the contrary, the decision to dissolve the Knesset is the necessary outcome in our situation, in which there is no governability and no way to run the state properly. The voters did not enable the elected officials to build a reasonable coalition, and the results of the previous elections dictated most of the failures in the current situation. The reason there are four rounds in two years is the distribution of voters’ ballots that did not yield a decision, not any substantive defect in democracy. For this reason I also see no flaw in the applause in the plenum when the decision to dissolve the Knesset passed. That is the appropriate reaction to a major repair effected by that decision. The continued tenure of a government and Knesset that do not function is the failure—not going to elections.
Moreover, our elected officials are indeed not great luminaries, neither intellectually nor morally, and they act in disgraceful ways in various aspects. But this has not the slightest connection to the democratic system. It is the result of the individuals operating on the ground. Incidentally, the kings who ruled over us in the past did not look any better—far from it. The intrigues of our present-day rabbis do not seem to me essentially different from the intrigues of our secular rulers. Nor are the actions of our rabbis generally more proper and wiser than those of our rulers. In short, human nature is all of one mold.
Rabbi Arusi is right that in a regime of “our holy Torah” there is no problem of four elections in a year, simply because they do not hold elections there. We’re talking about a king born into the right family (of the House of David). If one wishes to replace the king, it is done in a far more enlightened and elegant fashion than in our failing democracy: one simply rebels against him and/or assassinates him. Indeed, not a bad system—but for some reason I nevertheless find within myself a slight preference for a situation of four elections in two years. Rabbi Arusi prays that our erring brothers will discover the Torah’s luminescence and replace their loathsome democracy with the Torah system. I must say that at least on this plane I very much prefer the failing democratic system, despite all its limitations and flaws. And thus I find myself praying that our “correct” brothers will not happen to discover the Torah and its virtues and decide to become our erring brothers and forgo democracy. May the Merciful save us from such a thought.
Abstention in voting
Rabbi Arusi asserts that according to our holy Torah there is no such thing as abstaining in a vote, not in a court and not in any judicial or governmental body. First, I do not see why this is an advantage. He somehow assumes that abstention is a terrible defect, whereas in my view it is a reasonable mode of conduct for one who has no position on the matter. Coalition discipline appears to Rabbi Arusi as the footsteps of the Messiah—as if it were one of the Ten Commandments and a foundation of universal morality—whereas to me it looks like the government’s coercion over the parliament, freezing the status of the members of Knesset and neutralizing the Knesset from its main role. Thus the government forces the Knesset to say “amen” to all its decisions (in Column 300 I explained that in our country there are in fact two branches of government, not three; the legislative branch does not exist). And in the opposition it neutralizes the positions of rank-and-file MKs relative to the party leader (who is sometimes not elected in primaries at all). But for Rabbi Arusi, everything that happens here is a failure, through and through. He turns light into darkness and darkness into light—and he does so in the name of “our holy Torah.” I am astonished!
As a rationale for his peculiar position, he brings the argument that in elections we vote for party lists and not for specific individuals. But not for nothing are the people chosen to serve in the Knesset within the framework of the parties (in the party center or in primaries, each party according to its system). Otherwise there would be no need for members of Knesset at all. Each party (who is the party if not the members? the party center?) would decide its stance on the matter at hand and we would only need to count parties, not people. We could simply shut down the Knesset. This is a ridiculous system—morally and logically—but in Rabbi Arusi’s eyes it is the ideal model, and any deviation from it is a disgrace and a failure. Turning light into darkness and darkness into light—did I already say that?
But even on the merits: whence did he derive his conclusion that according to “the holy Torah” one cannot abstain in votes, and that if someone says he does not know he is replaced? Only from his own overactive imagination. In Choshen Mishpat §18:1 it is written that if a judge says “I do not know,” two more judges are added. That is, one does not appoint a judge in his place; rather, two more judges are added to the panel to reach a decision by three. The reason is explained by the commentaries there (see the Sema, sk. 3, and more): the decision must be reached by three judges. In other words, this is not a moral principle but a rule concerning the number of judges. How does he infer from here that abstention by an MK is a moral failure? And what does this have to do with the argument he raises that in elections we vote for a faction and not for a person? Even if that argument were logical (it decidedly is not), what is the connection between it and the rule about a judge who says “I do not know”?
And altogether, what alternative does he propose? Does Rabbi Arusi expect that a member of Knesset who truly has no clear position should nevertheless vote? Or should we replace him, for this specific vote, with another person? How will we choose him? Will the party leader pick someone suitable for this specific vote? Is that a serious proposal? To say that these are “astonishing” words would be the understatement of the century. Or perhaps Rabbi Arusi expects, as we saw earlier, that decisions will not be made at all by the members’ votes but rather by the weight of the faction’s collective position—period—without votes? Beyond the fact that this is nonsense on both the moral and practical levels, does he think this alternative fits the laws of the Torah? Where did he find this mechanism in the Shulchan Aruch?
And beyond all this, how does he expand this rule, said with regard to a judge in a court, to votes in governmental institutions? Did he read this by skipping letters in the Torah, or between the lines of the Talmud? And even if halakha indeed stated this explicitly, in Choshen Mishpat §17:22 it is written that a community can accept invalid witnesses—head-on against Torah law. Can it not establish that abstention is also permitted in votes? Rabbenu Tam, for example, holds that decisions in a community must be accepted unanimously (we do not follow the majority). That is, the rules for court votes do not necessarily apply to votes in communal bodies. Is the impossibility of abstaining a mandatory rule that cannot be stipulated otherwise even in communal institutions? Many poskim wrote that in communal institutions decisions can be made without the minority’s presence. Yet when one voter abstains, Rabbi Arusi claims the decision cannot be made.
For the difference between majority rule in court and majority in communal enactments, see the explanation in Columns 66, 69, and 79. I showed there that these are two entirely different realms that do not intersect. Needless to say, on this plane a vote in the Knesset is not similar to a vote in a court (does Rabbi Arusi propose to disqualify women from serving in the Knesset because they are disqualified from judging?! And perhaps, by his logic, there should be no votes or deliberations at night?), but rather to a vote in communal institutions.
And beyond all that, even if we were to find that in communal enactments there is an absolute rule forbidding abstention, that rule itself emerged from the sages’ common sense and not from a halakhic source (as with all rules of communal governance). If so, Rabbi Arusi is in fact criticizing the democratic system on the basis of common sense and not on the basis of the Torah. One can of course argue about what common sense dictates, but in any case there is certainly no contrast here between democracy and the Torah’s system. In general, in Column 164 I showed that communal enactments are not part of halakha and that halakha has nothing to say about them. The presence of these topics in the Shulchan Aruch is the unfortunate result of a historical accident, nothing more—certainly nothing that pertains to Torah jurisprudence, and still less to “our holy Torah.”
And here we return to Rabbi Arusi’s fundamental flaw. We saw that his main failure is to compare democratic practice with Torah theory. We now see that the “theory” in question is not a Torah theory at all but simply common sense (in his view). And thus the circle closes. Note the logic of the move:
- Rabbi Arusi claims: Our holy Torah says one must not abstain in a vote.
- I ask him: How do you know?
- He answers: Because that is what common sense dictates.
- I reply: Then the democratic system dictates it as well.
- And he of course asks: How do you know?
- And I answer without blinking: Because that is what common sense dictates.
- So he asks: But in practice this does not happen?
- And I ask: And in the Torah world does it happen in practice? It does not happen there because there is no regime that actually operates on the Torah system.
- goto 1.
And at the margins of the discussion I wonder: In the municipalities of Bnei Brak, Beitar Illit, Kiryat Sefer, and the like—there is no possibility of abstaining in votes? Needless to say they conduct themselves in the most enlightened and proper fashion, in full adherence to “our holy Torah” in every aspect. So surely one cannot abstain there either, right? It would be worthwhile to inform them what “our holy Torah” says on this matter.
It is hard to believe these words came from the pen of a learned person, a rabbi in Israel, a PhD in law, and a member of the Council of the Chief Rabbinate (actually, it is not that hard to believe). And it is even harder to believe that someone bothers to print these words and read or listen to them seriously. And so I have written what seems correct in my humble opinion.
Discussion
So what, in practice, do you have in mind in the prayer “Restore our judges as at first” — a democratic state with a Sanhedrin that has authority to expound Torah law in a way that obviates critiques like that of Nadav Shnerb and the like? What do you think of the book A State According to Halakhah by Rabbi Ido Fechter?
Thank you for addressing this.
Rabbi Mikyab, I have a small problem. In your article about a halakhic state, you wrote a sharp critique of Rabbi Ratzon Arusi. Rabbi Arusi responded to you in an entire lecture, where he addressed the sources and explained himself with good sense and discernment, and completely refuted your remarks, and to this day I have not seen any substantive response from you on the matter. His response appears on your post about the halakhic state at the end of the comments as a video… see there.
I agree with most of it.
But the mention of David should be with Uriah, since that is what relates to the national aspect. His personal sin with Bathsheba is less relevant.
By the way, specifically regarding local rule and its successes in the Torah path, there are surely many places to examine this: the rule of the Nesi’im, the Exilarch, control in the communities of Spain, and more and more. I don’t know how much it really makes sense to examine it, but bringing an example from Haredi conduct is a bit demagogic.
He means the claim that it is impossible to run a society according to Hebrew law in an absolute way. Search here on the site; it was explained at length. The point is not that it is impossible to live as a Torah-and-mitzvot-observant Jew.
Ido Rekhnitz, not Fechter (not related to each other).
I’m not familiar with the book.
“Restore our judges as at first” means restoring the original system: the law of the king + halakhic law. Overall, I assume that halakhic law would not be very different from the law practiced today.
That’s the point.
The example from Haredi and religious conduct in general is an excellent example. It proves that the issue is not the system but the people.
Let him do me the honor of writing a response on the site, and then I will read and respond.
https://youtu.be/GtKxK5-mNzo?t=1653
“My response is this lecture. Torah study! Torah study! We are not post people. Not website people. We are people who study Torah! With settled minds: let us bring a book and see”… “Links, tweets, everything… that’s the keyboard, gentlemen, today. Yes, yes, just not give-and-take.” The truth is that there is something straightforward and admirable in the way he reads the criticism without sugarcoating (even a well-known idiot like Amnon Yitzhak specializes in that kind of straightforwardness). But from the relatively little I sampled, I found absolutely nothing. Though from where I stand, treading on this kind of nonsense feels like spelling out at length proofs for the claim that Ahasuerus did not murder Arlosoroff.
Thank you very much for the important clarification!
I did indeed mean Rabbi Ido Rekhnitz.
There is not the slightest hint in the Torah of governmental voting.
What there is in the Torah is opposition to decisions that are not good: “You shall not follow the majority to do evil.”
In the Torah, it is not the foolish people who choose their leaders, but Moses our teacher. “And Moses chose able men from all Israel, and made them heads over the people—chiefs of thousands, chiefs of hundreds, chiefs of fifties, and chiefs of tens.”
Come on… that’s not his approach, to “correspond”—not his and not that of other rabbis… but he certainly did respond, and it is proper to listen for a moment and reply.
With God’s help, 16 Tevet 5781
To lfa"a – many greetings,
From the very source you cited – the choosing of the chiefs of thousands etc. by Moses – it is proven that Moses sought the people’s opinion regarding the appointment of their officers and judges, when he said to them: “Bring yourselves wise and understanding men, known to your tribes, and I will appoint them as your heads.”
As for the test of being “wise and understanding,” presumably the decisive factor was the ‘exam’ they underwent before Moses; but beyond wisdom, the leaders also had to be people in whom the public would place trust, and for that purpose even a prophet such as Moses needed to ‘consult the public.’
The elders, too, advise Rehoboam to take the people’s view into account, saying to him: “If today you will be a servant to this people, and serve them, and answer them, and speak good words to them, then they will be your servants forever” (I Kings 12).
There needs to be a leader who leads the people and is not dragged along after them, but among the king’s central qualities is “that his heart not be lifted above his brethren,” and not for nothing is he called melekh (“king”), because he knows how to consult the people and lead them wisely and intelligently along the proper path.
With blessings, Yaron Fish"l Ordner
According to Rabbi Arusi and the Rambamists, what is written in halakhah is morality; accordingly, the words of Ran are rejected, and all the other objections regarding the conduct of the community and the like, because if this is the moral way to run a court, then apparently it is also the most correct way for the Knesset.
But of course, the failure to distinguish between theory and practice is the root of the problem.
I don’t know Rabbi Arusi, but it דווקא seems that he made a fairly substantive claim – that Torah law does not allow abstention from voting – and you devoted a few words to responding substantively to that claim, and that was it. Aside from that, everything you wrote was pure fussiness and beside the point. Did he write anything about the Knesset being supposed, in all its details and laws, to be like a Torah court? All he wrote, basically, was that the democratic system in this style allows abstention, whereas Torah law does not allow it, or requires a substitute (in his view), and it seems to him intuitively that abstaining is not moral and that Torah law, as he understands it, is right.
Which theory is the rabbi referring to when he says “secular theory”? It seems that Rabbi Arusi mainly distinguishes between conduct based on the Torah, which comes from an eternal source, and conduct that grows out of human assumptions, and he shows that there is a practical implication: when it is not based on firm foundations, then the result etc. In addition, there is ostensibly a big difference between an “abstention” in the Knesset and a judge who does not know the ruling. True, in practice both do not affect the final ruling, but in terms of the approach, it is a complete inversion: when an MK abstains, in many cases it comes from ducking out for political reasons, whereas a judge who rules “I do not know” does so after in-depth study of the issue, so you cannot learn from here about the moral aspect of “abstaining” in the Knesset.
Did you read what I wrote? It seems not. Halakhah on these issues comes from human reasoning exactly like the democratic system.
And as for politicians acting politically, that really is disgraceful. I have nothing to say.
And by the way, in halakhah there is a discussion of a judge who says “I do not know” as a ploy.
I hope this attitude stems merely from tendentiousness and not from stupidity and poor reading comprehension.
Rabbi, you wrote – overall, I assume that halakhic law would not be very different from the law practiced today.
Really?
Perhaps you mean the legal methods, but in essence the foundational values are different, so clearly the laws are very different
aren’t they?
First, the values are not very different. Second, most areas of law are not connected to values but to common sense and reasonable management of life. When halakhah runs life here, nobody will insist on giving punishment only if there was prior warning and acceptance of the warning. It is impossible to run a society and a state that way. Likewise, women’s testimony will not be disqualified, nor self-incrimination, nor exempting one who causes damage indirectly, and so on and so forth. Earlier and later authorities already pointed this out. This is not my innovation.
Has the rabbi tried to study Rabbi Arusi’s books, or is he forming his impression of him through all kinds of links people send him?
With God’s help, 15 Tevet 5781
I am not well-versed in the sugya of ‘a judge abstaining from judging.’ It seems to me that one may distinguish between a judge who says “I do not know” and a Knesset member who abstains, because the role of a judge is to clarify and declare the law that already exists in the Torah; if he is unable to clarify the law in a certain case, then regarding that law he is like one who is not sufficiently learned and discerning and cannot judge it.
By contrast, a decision of the Knesset or the government does not come to clarify the law, but to create it. An MK or minister who abstains is essentially saying that he is not sure whether the clause they seek to pass as a law or decision ought to be enacted. And one who abstains because he is doubtful whether to say ‘yes’ is, for the time being, as one saying ‘no,’ and abstentions should be counted as votes ‘against,’ for he too does not agree to enact the decision.
With blessings, Shraga Feivish Halevi Konketator
That is exactly the difference I explained in my aforementioned columns nos. 62, 69, 79.
If a judge who says “I do not know” is replaced by others, we nonetheless find situations in which the entire court decides to recuse itself from the case. For example, the court may recommend a compromise, so long as it does not yet know which way the law inclines.
And we likewise find situations that the courts deliberately decided to refrain from dealing with. For example, in the days of Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach they ruled not to adjudicate monetary cases out of the sense that “we are not sufficiently wise,” and forty years before the destruction of the Second Temple, the Sanhedrin went into exile from the Chamber of Hewn Stone so as not to judge capital cases because “murderers had become numerous.”
Likewise, there are situations in which, because there is insufficient evidence, the court refrains from deciding and instructs “whoever is stronger prevails” or “discretion of the judges.”
Seemingly, if even expert judges can sometimes feel insufficient confidence to decide – then all the more so Knesset members or ministers ought to be careful not to make hasty decisions before they have exhausted clarification of the matter as deeply as possible. It would be worthwhile for there to be permanent experts and professionals who would serve as an ‘advisory committee’ alongside each of the Knesset committees.
With blessings, Shap"ak
Another distinction between courts, where abstention is problematic, and the Knesset and the government, is that in the decisions of these bodies no minimal number is required. One who abstains is not counted, and is as one who was not present in the hall.
I once saw a cartoon about a committee chairman who came to visit an MK who had fallen ill, and he informs the patient that the committee decided to wish him a complete recovery by a majority of three in favor, two against, and 20 abstaining 🙂
With blessings, ‘Peh Ehad,’ Shap"ak
That is the explanation I wrote in this column: that in a court, adding people is done in order to reach a quorum of three judges and not for value-laden reasons, and that is irrelevant to votes in the Knesset.
With God’s help, 15 Tevet 5781
Adherence to Torah law, which—according to the ruling of the court in Rehovot—gives legal validity to political agreements (as Rabbi Arusi noted in the past), would have spared us the political crisis from the outset.
If a Torah court had authority to supervise the actions of the branches of government so that they would be carried out according to the Torah, the court would not have had to wait until people turned to it; rather, it would have demanded ‘from the beginning of the year’ that they submit a biennial budget and establish a joint committee for appointing senior officials and a ‘conciliation committee,’ etc.
And a politician who refused the judges’ instruction would be stretched on the post to receive disciplinary lashes, as Torah law requires for those who refuse the court 🙂
With blessings, Ben-Zion Yohanan Korinaldi-Radetzky,
commissioner over ‘the judges’ implements—shofar, staff, and strap’
Indeed, disturbing sights.
What bothered me most was how this:
“All this so that each and every issue will be discussed in the full panel and the full forum and everyone will voice his opinion in a reasoned and respectful manner, so that there will be a fertilization of ideas, and thus the vote will not be factional but substantive.”
fits with his later claim that coalition discipline must not be violated.
If one has to maintain coalition discipline, the vote has no significance at all, certainly not for a “fertilization of ideas.”
“It is hard to believe that these things came from the pen of a learned man, a rabbi in Israel, a doctor of law, and a member of the Chief Rabbinate Council (actually it is not all that hard to believe). And it is even harder to believe that anyone bothers to print these things and read or listen to them seriously. And this is what seems correct to me.”
And harder than all of that is to believe that anyone bothers to write them a reasoned and detailed response that is even longer than the remarks themselves. And this is what seems correct to me.
With God’s help, eve of holy Shabbat, “Gather yourselves, sons of Jacob,” 5781
And perhaps דווקא from this crisis an opening to hope will emerge. What has happened until now is that right-wing and traditional people, who rightly or wrongly grew tired of Benjamin Netanyahu’s rule, joined a party whose leaders are distinctly left-wing (Lapid and Gantz and the like), or a party that is distinctly right-wing but anti-Haredi (Yisrael Beiteinu).
Now an alternative to Benjamin Netanyahu has arisen, at whose head stand leaders who are no less right-wing than he is and far more observant of tradition than he is, and who possess credentials and extensive experience in varied governmental activity.
Now the chances have greatly increased that right-wing and traditional people who moved from ‘hatred of Bibi’ to the left-wing and ‘anti’ parties will return ‘home’ to the national and traditional camp, and its strength will grow. If after the elections the right-wing parties—Likud, New Hope, and Yamina—are wise enough to join hands, then with God’s help we will merit a government that is more national and more traditional.
With blessings, Yaron Fish"l Korinaldi
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… that right-wing and traditional people, who moved…
There, line 4
… we will merit a government that is more…
With God’s help, 9 Tevet 5781
It is worth noting that it is not only Torah law that does not permit a judge to abstain. In the courts too, a judge’s abstention from deciding is regarded as an undesirable thing.
The option given by Hebrew law—to replace judges who are unwilling to decide with other judges who will decide—is considered undesirable, because then the decision will be made by judges who did not themselves hear the arguments and evidence and are less familiar with the matter.
The entry of a new judge into a case, who naturally needs time to study the subject, even if it does not impair the correctness of his decision, will still prolong the proceedings, something liable to bring about ‘the affliction of justice’ [delay of justice].
With blessings, Yaron Fish"l Ordner
On the issue of abstaining from abstention, the norms required of judges have not been applied to public representatives, who are allowed to abstain.
Recently, the tendency has reached the legal system to demand of elected officials the norms required of judges, and thus they now want to apply to public representatives as well the prohibition of ‘verbal bribery’—disqualification from adjudicating the matter of one who gave the decision-maker ‘sympathetic coverage.’
This norm of ‘the prohibition of verbal bribery,’ which state law is less sweeping in applying even to judges, they are now trying to turn into a binding rule for elected officials…
Usually you relate in a more substantive and serious way to things others write (for example, in the columns where you addressed the words of that Reform rabbi).
If you had addressed his words respectfully, you probably also would have understood them better, and not put words in his mouth.
Let me just preface by saying that his words are based on the mishnah in Sanhedrin, which says that unlike a case where two support and one opposes, where there is a ruling, in a case of one who does not know—there is no ruling and judges are added. And ostensibly this is puzzling—for even if he had opposed, the ruling would have remained? Rather, from here one may derive a principle that was self-evident to Hazal by reason: that one who abstains is as one who is not there.
He did not argue that practically it should be established that it is forbidden to abstain in the Knesset, or in a court, nor did he say that it is a moral failure; that is something you put in his mouth. He argued that according to halakhah, a decision is reached on the basis of discussion and decision by all those present. It is true that the need to replace abstainers stems from the fact that the decision must be reached by 3 or some other number, but the definition that there must be a certain number of opinion-holders is connected to the fact that according to the Torah there must be substantive deliberation—that 3 people really express an opinion on the issue under discussion, because according to the Torah one who abstains is as one who is not there, not an opinion that should be counted. And therefore even if 2 support and 1 says “I do not know,” judges are added.
In other words, one could state this argument as follows: if we pay salaries to 120 Knesset members because it is important to us that decisions be made on the basis of a large number of people, each of whom thinks and decides independently, it is reasonable to expect them to treat every issue seriously and make an effort to decide on it. Perhaps in practice it is not practical to replace them, but when abstention or absence becomes routine, there is something defective here.
The thought that judges must be added because of something technical is incorrect, because if the number of judges is a scriptural decree, then why should we not say that a judge who says he does not know is also counted? Rather, the sages understood that when 3 judges are required, the meaning is 3 opinion-holders and not abstainers.
By the way, practically too, it is not such a bad idea to define a certain number of MKs as a minimum for passing a law, so that a situation does not arise where Basic Laws pass with 32 MKs.
2. He also did not argue that faction discipline is the messianic ideal; again, that is something you put in his mouth. On the contrary, he wrote that today it is customary to elect factions and not individuals, and therefore there is an obligation to the faction, and to vote against the faction’s position is to vote against what brought you into the Knesset. Therefore, one who comes and votes against the faction’s position is not performing an act of conscience and acting according to the ideal of the Torah described earlier, but doing something improper, because he is more obligated to the faction than to his conscience, since the citizens sent the faction to the Knesset and not him as a private individual.
All in all, these are reasonable things that one may of course dispute, but it is worth addressing their content substantively rather than ridiculing them.
Most of what you wrote is exactly what I understood from his words. Another part is incorrect. But all of this is nonsense, and I explained well in the column why. Even if I wanted to ridicule him, I couldn’t. He does that perfectly well by himself. If you had troubled yourself to think instead of immediately pleading his case, you would have understood that on your own.
Hello, honorable rabbi,
Although the Torah is not a guarantee of proper behavior in the sense of being an exclusive cause, I actually liked your approach that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects us to behave morally and properly; if we understand this and fulfill His expectations, a whole moral people ought to be seen here—which is not so among other peoples, where there is division between those who believe in morality and those who do not.
If so, then the people of Israel, faithful to the Holy One, blessed be He, and to His expectations, really ought to be more moral than other peoples, right?
I didn’t understand the claim. The Holy One, blessed be He, expects the whole world to be moral, and if the world fulfills His expectations it will be moral. How does this tautology help you? The theory is perfect, and if we live by the theory we will be perfect.
Right, let me sharpen the claim: not necessarily Jews, but believers in God will necessarily be more moral than those who do not believe in Him.
With God’s help, 20 Tevet 5781
By its nature, the Torah’s influence on proper conduct is more evident on the individual and the community. A person who ‘has God,’ who lives with constant awareness that he is accountable before God for all his deeds—such a person is more careful in his actions lest a mishap come through him.
In addition to faith, the conduct of Torah contributes as well. When a person is accustomed to examining every step in life according to the halakhic and moral instructions of prophets, righteous people, and sages, his threshold of moral sensitivity rises.
The next stage in which moral repair will be seen is the community, whose individuals aspire to proper and moral lives and establish standards; accordingly, they will insist that their community be led by wise and understanding people, men of truth, God-fearing, and haters of gain.
The greater problem lies in the political sphere, where those who excel in scheming and aggressiveness often succeed, and the more decent a person is, the harder it will be for him to survive in the political ‘jungle.’
But here too, to the extent that the world is repaired from below, and to the extent that there are more people for whom Torah and morality are a lamp to their feet, so too will the public demand for decent and upright leadership grow.
The path to repairing the world according to the Torah and its morality is neither easy nor quick, but insofar as we persist in seeking what is upright and good in our private ways, we will bring nearer the blessed influence in the public sphere as well.
With blessings,, Yaron Tzemach Fish"l-Plankton
That too is incorrect. Believers in God who fulfill His expectations will be perfectly moral, exactly like atheists who live under the illusion that there is atheist morality and act accordingly. You are making the same mistake as Rabbi Arusi: comparing theory to practice.
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… whose individuals aspire to proper and moral lives, and accordingly seek that their community be led by…
Not exactly. Atheists divide into two groups: those who believe in atheist morality and those who do not. The truth is that there is no atheist morality, so in the end only those who are not moral will remain, because in the end the truth is bound to come to light. Believers divide into two groups: those who believe that God expects us to be moral and those who do not. The truth is that God expects us to be moral and in the end the truth is bound to come to light, therefore all believers are destined to become moral.
My claim deals with theory, so please attack it on that level. In practice it is hard to attack it, because it speaks about a future practice that still cannot be refuted!
Your claim does not touch theory even from a kilometer away. Only practice. In fact it is a theory about what practice will be like (which is of course even worse): in the end the truth is bound to come to light. Good luck with the predictions.
With God’s help, 20 Tevet 5781
To Nadav – many greetings,
Faith is one of the factors that makes a person behave more morally. A person who believes that he is accountable before God for his deeds—there is a likelihood that he will be more careful.
I saw in the memoirs of a Jew from Radin that the Hafetz Hayyim traveled with a non-Jewish wagon driver. When the Hafetz Hayyim saw that the driver did not cross himself when passing before a statue of the crucified one, the Hafetz Hayyim took out his wallet, paid the driver his fee, and left the wagon, for a person who does not fear his God—who knows what he is capable of. And indeed, the Nazis and the Communists, who cast off faith, kicked morality away as well.
But one who has Torah attains an additional level. At every step he is accompanied by moral and halakhic guidance in matters between man and his fellow. He lives under the influence of prophets, righteous people, and pious ones, tannaim and amoraim and the sages of the generations, whose whole being was carefulness regarding the honor and property of others.
On the public plane, the advantage of faith and Torah is perhaps less conspicuous, because in a world of power-brokering, aggressiveness, and scheming, a person can ‘forget himself’ and think that the goal sanctifies the means. But here too there is an opening of hope: to the extent that the demand ‘from below’ for leaders to conduct themselves properly increases, so too their motivation to do so will increase.
With blessings, Yaron Tzemach Fish"l-Plankton
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… in the memoirs of a Jew from Radin, that the Hafetz Hayyim…
“In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice—there is.”
“In the end the truth is bound to come to light” is a logical claim, as follows:
It takes time to clarify things rationally, and during the process of clarification we make mistakes. Therefore I am optimistic that the truth is destined to come to light, and not because I am a prophet.
Judging by the way other disputants are treated – option B is the correct one, if not worse.
For example – we have an enormous amount of material, recorded and transcribed, from the thought of Rabbi Shagar, of blessed memory. From what I have heard until today from Rabbi Michi (and it is not a little), I could mistakenly have thought that Rabbi Shagar spent his whole life writing only one obscure sentence about “dancing in the circle of differences.” If one forms one’s impression from Rabbi Michi’s words, it is hard even to understand whether this is a sentence whose subject is sociology or statistics. I can only wish Rabbi Michi that his disputants treat him with greater fairness.
It is not customary for a rabbi of his stature to correspond on websites; one can see the response in the uploaded video.
With God’s help, 9 Shevat 5781
It seems to me that if affairs in the Knesset were conducted according to the Torah, most Knesset members would have had to abstain from discussing matters in which they are not experts, and transfer the discussion of each issue to a council of experts and professionals, who would submit an opinion (or a range of opinions that disagree with one another). And only after reading the opinions and hearing the various experts would they sit and decide.
With blessings, Yaron Fish"l Ordner
It’s a shame you didn’t bother to listen.
He, for example, testifies about himself that in his view he agrees that sometimes there is no choice and one must use a state’s witness.
But Rabbi Michael Abraham attacked him for his opposition to the institution of the “state’s witness” – that is, he attacked him for a position
that he does not hold.
If that is correct – and you can check it – would you call that nonsense?
Even Mordechai instructs Esther that it is forbidden to abstain. She must not keep silent; rather, she is obligated to take a stand and demand from the king that the decree be annulled!
Even Mordechai did not make do with refraining from bowing in the passive manner of ‘he neither rose nor moved,’ but said outright that he does not bow because he is a Jew!
Also Harbonah, remembered for good, did not abstain but expressed his opinion clearly against Haman, and therefore we too will not abstain from mentioning him for praise.
And we too do not abstain, but answer and proclaim, and sweeten with song, over the wonders and the miracles.
With blessings, Pedahzur Fish"l Pri-Gan
On what basis do you say that part of the king’s role is supposed to be to deviate from halakhah? After all, if you say this “because it is impossible to conduct practical life according to halakhah” – I could say that about any private individual as well.