A View on Emotions in Discourse and Beyond—The Walder Affair (Column 439)
A few days ago, a post by a man named Daniel Bokovza—apparently himself a victim of sexual assault—was shared on WhatsApp. He addresses the reactions to the Walder affair. The post, and even more so the responses to it, stirred me to revisit the emotionalism of our discourse and its harms, even though I’ve discussed this more than once. I’ll say upfront: you won’t find here a discussion of the affair itself or its various aspects.
The Post
Here’s what Bokovza wrote:
| I haven’t written an opinion in a long time. There are topics where I […] look at reality with tired eyes, take a cigarette, and close the door. A crooked, distorted, and sick world—where do you even start trying to heal anything? And I’m sorry, this is going to be smelly and unpleasant, what I’m writing here, but if your nose has survived the flood of Ynet push notifications in recent months—or recent years—I’m sure it will bravely hold up here too.
I love the tone of surprise, anger, and shock in those who can’t understand, or fail to grasp, or are simply appalled—how, how can it be that around Chaim Walder, or Yehuda Meshi-Zahav, or Ohovzki, or Eyal Golan, or Prof. Elkayim, or Tzipi Diner, or name it—each and every one of the perpetrators starring on your favorite news site every couple of days—how can there be around these people a wall of protection, friends who testify to their virtues, ignore their deeds, fight for them, swear by their names, ready to declare support for them. How, how. I love it mainly because I’ve learned that a sad smile is a great drug against innocence blended with feigned innocence, and sometimes with stupidity. I love it because some of these people, justice warriors armed with ideology, spoke with me this past month about the sexual assault I myself suffered, and knew how to qualify their words, to say “we’re not judging” or “it’s complicated” or “I don’t know,” you know, all those kinds of sentences that—how, how. How? Because everyone like Meshi-Zahav or Eyal Golan or Walder has friends. Friends, colleagues, family, people who owe them favors, fans, former students. All of these, in addition to the rest of humanity that tends to like repression in general, don’t want to know that the person they know is a total scumbag. Not in their world, not in their surroundings. Not the one they had coffee with, not the one they dined with last Shabbat. Heaven forbid. All of these will forget the firm and resolute rage when it hits their own backyard. They will forget, and parrot what the friends of Elkayim, Diner, Ohovzki say: it’s complicated, it’s complicated. We’re not judging. We weren’t there. We don’t know. They will forget how in the past they demanded we stand by the victims, how they swapped their profile picture to the tasteful slogan “I believe you.” They will forget how they were disgusted by the friend who played Eyal Golan in the car, because how, how. They will forget everything they prefer to forget. And suddenly everything will be complicated. You know what’s complicated? It’s complicated to know that you walked through hell and you can’t tell anyone about it. You can try, but take into account that it’s complicated, okay? It’s complicated. After all, they weren’t there. And they’re not judging. Maybe you didn’t understand? Look, every story has two sides. And he’s a charming person, charming charming charming. Don’t you know that bad people walk around with horns and a tag that says “I’m a jerk”? They’re not judging, the friends of. They don’t want to judge. Meaning, they say they’re not judging; in practice, they’ve long since rendered a verdict. In his favor, of course—and they don’t even grasp how active they are in this pleasant choice of theirs. Because in abuse there are two primary interests: the perpetrator wants the story to remain in his head and the victim’s, and the victim seeks trust. That trust—which until you feel your sanity depends on it you can’t imagine how precious it is—is a resource that lies, among other places, in the soil of your environment. It’s a precious resource that cannot be mined without cooperation. They’re not judging, but they keep in touch with him. What do you mean, it’s complicated. They’ll keep buying his books, or going to her classes, or having coffee with him, or inviting him to meals because poor guy, he’s going through a tough time himself and it’s complicated, it’s complicated. We’re not judging. With that infuriating innocence–feigned innocence–stupidity, they’ll lay stone after stone in the wall of silence surrounding the perpetrator and the victim, signaling outward: better keep quiet. And that’s what they say to someone who’s already speaking, yes? To the one who still keeps silent, they’re basically adding another nail in the coffin of her healing. Another ringing slap, another small ruin of trust in the world. Because it’s complicated, and he’s a golden person, and how can you now decide from one moment to the next that that’s it—and what, should we forget everything he did? You know how he lit up our wedding? * I look at the world through the eyes of someone who has seen how ruined relationships can be, and how people who are basically good people—just like you and me—with their beer and their Friday mornings at the market and their party and music in the car and good vibes and the correct opinions—how useful and convenient collaborators they can be, these “complicated” ones. And how cowardly. How they tremble at the upheaval their world will face if they follow their morals and conscience—and not, God forbid, what goes down easily with their Shabbat challah. When does it change? Not only when it’s light-years away from them, but when it’s close enough. Two weeks ago I spoke with one of those “complicated” types, someone who doesn’t judge, he wasn’t there, he doesn’t know. We talked, and I asked him—if I were a closer friend of yours, or your brother, would you still keep in touch with him? Would you still go talk to him? Would it still be complicated? He was silent. I understand, I told him. We’re just not close enough. Fighting sexual violence is important, but the existing order in your world is more important. If we were close enough, maybe you’d be willing to step out of that comfort zone where sexual violence is only a Ynet headline. Right now, no. And how can one say—grow a backbone, for heaven’s sake. Be brave. Be brave, all of you. How, how. And that, ladies and gentlemen, is the story. In its entirety. It’s complicated, there are two sides, you can’t judge—because it’s scary. Simply scary. It’s terrifying to grasp that this hell can exist next door, in your building-with-a-code. You know what’s even scarier? Bleeding alone from the soul, keeping quiet, sleeping every night with this nightmare, the complicated, the complicated. Being brave enough to speak and discovering it’s better you keep quiet. He was a charming man, a sweet soul. Don’t ruin what keeps things orderly in their eyes. |
Surely you won’t be surprised that once the post went up in the group, the responses were impassioned. People said it was jolting, chilling, thought-provoking. Someone wrote there:
I have no words… It’s thought-provoking and calls for repentance. I’m sorry…
These are typical reactions and I’m sure you can find many like them, but I must say that they—and the post itself—really annoy me, mainly in two closely related respects: the emotionalism and the attempt to force a position on me on the grounds that I must empathize with someone who suffered.
A First Look
I understand that these words are a kind of cry, an expression of great distress, and one can and should empathize with them and with the writer. But when addressing the content of his words, with all due respect to the distress and the desire to express it, I don’t accept that they dictate to me what I should think/say and what not.
The writer assumes that no one may relate in a complex way to a person who harmed others, and demands that we adopt a simple view with a clear, one-sided condemnation. I fully agree that the fact that someone harmed people deserves every condemnation, as well as treatment and punishment, but that doesn’t contradict the need and importance of understanding the complexity of the situation and the person, when such complexity exists (not every case is necessarily complex, but it can be). On the contrary, I’ve written more than once (see, for example, in columns 5, 29–30, 265–6, and many more) about the importance of understanding the complexity of positions, pictures, or people in order to form a balanced stance toward them and, especially, to draw substantive and relevant conclusions. I’ve explained there why simplistic thinking is very convenient for us but also very misleading and unhelpful.
Here the writer assumes that if someone says the situation is complex, this is merely to leave himself in his comfort zone—as if it were self-evident that no complexity can exist in such situations. How does he know that in Chaim Walder’s case the situation was simple and clear? How does he know there weren’t good sides to him, as his family and friends attest, and that their astonishment and disbelief regarding the acts aren’t authentic? How can he write such things without knowing the case (as I understand it, he isn’t writing from familiarity with the affair or the people involved)? In my estimation, it is precisely the writer’s unwillingness to recognize complexity that stems from his preference for his own comfort (as a victim who enjoys sympathy and compassion). He projects his own flaw.
I don’t intend to claim anything about the Walder affair—whether it’s complex or not—since I don’t know the details. That’s also not important in my view. I’m only arguing that if it isn’t complex, say so and justify it; and if it is complex, then you must acknowledge that. Of course you can express pain, distress, and harm, but don’t use these to force others into simplistic thinking and incorrect conceptions of reality. Even if distorting reality helps some victim feel supported by his environment, and even if a straight grasp of reality hurts him, I’m not prepared to forgo honesty in perceiving reality—that is, to yield to the pragmatist demand to subordinate the true to the useful. The exploitation of victimhood to impose positions and a certain mode of discourse is very common among us, and it annoys me every time; yet again and again it turns out to be effective.
In short: if the situation is complex, then it’s complex—and if not, then not. But that has nothing to do with the degree to which others were harmed. If they were harmed, they deserve proper attention—but that shouldn’t change how we relate to reality and its complexities. These remarks reflect the emotionalism of our public discourse. I’m entirely in favor of condemning offenders and forcefully opposing wickedness and injustice, but that has nothing to do with a complex view of the situation and its importance.
When I see impassioned posts of this sort, I tend to rebel. I feel I’m being emotionally squeezed, and I’m not willing to accept that. So in my initial response I wrote the following there:
With all the sorrow and empathy for Bokovza’s suffering and for victims in general, I disagree. It’s important to understand the complexity of people and situations even in these cases, alongside compassion and solidarity with the victims. The two are not at odds.
The inflammatory tone is understandable as a result of the harm he experienced, but we mustn’t let it take over the discourse. Emotionalism is understandable, but not justified. It’s a common phenomenon in our circles that victims take over the discourse and suppress any other, more balanced voice.
Therefore, there’s really no need to “repent” in light of his words. A complex view is always desirable and important.
The takeover of discourse and judgment by emotion is a malignant disease that appears everywhere in our discourse. Anyone disadvantaged or harmed is necessarily right. A woman who was raped (or even claims she was) is always right. Someone who is gay is necessarily disadvantaged, and one may not speak critically of him or positively of his opponents. You may not see any extenuating side in the perpetrator or in someone who simply disagrees with the victim’s stance. Victims of terror or families of captives are always right. And so too with Mizrahim, Palestinians, women, the disabled, and more—fill in the blanks. In this stupefying discourse, the weak become “made-weak,” and as such we bear total responsibility for their situation, and we are forbidden to express a more balanced view or try to understand the other side.
Implications
Because of the emotionalism surrounding such debates—on all sides, of course—all kinds of irrelevant arguments surface. Someone else wrote in that same WhatsApp discussion:
I think the argument is simple: don’t think that when you say “it’s complex” you’re not taking a stance. You are explicitly taking a stance. After that, of course, it’s up to you what to do with that determination.
That is essentially what Bokovza himself argued. If you think about it for a moment—this is sheer nonsense. And so I wrote there:
Saying “it’s complex” is definitely not taking a stance. On the contrary, it’s clear Walder’s conduct is problematic, but there are additional and complex sides. What stance is there here? This is just being swept along by emotions and identifying with victims.
Again, Bokovza assumes that whoever says it’s complex is really trying to stay in his comfort zone. Perhaps there are people for whom that’s true—but to draw from this a conclusion about everyone who utters the phrase “it’s complex” is vanity and nonsense. It turns out that even a statement that seems balanced and moderate on its face reflects emotional drift.
Blaming the Victim
One of the common claims under the emotionalist dictatorship is accusing those with a certain stance of “blaming the victim.” Try discussing the character or criminal past of Solomon Teka, or his problematic conduct during the incident and prior to it—or the character and past of George Floyd (see column 316)—and you’ve sentenced yourself, and certainly the discussion, to certain death. I addressed this in column 117, and won’t expand here.
I argued there that indeed there are situations in which the victim bears contributory fault, and it’s very important to discuss it. If someone blames women who were raped on the grounds that they conducted themselves provocatively (in those cases where that was the case), you can imagine what he’ll catch on the head. The crescendo of victimhood rises to the heavens. Likewise if someone points to problematic characteristics in Mizrahi society, or Palestinian society, or in LGBTQ groups, and so forth. This mode of discourse leads us to keep getting more and more harmful outcomes and more and more victims. Victimhood distorts discourse and also harms the effort to treat the phenomena in question. These are clear examples of the importance of a complex view and the need not to surrender to the terror of victimhood.
By the way, the law and the courts also take contributory-fault arguments into account in tort and criminal matters. None of this, of course, means that we won’t punish the perpetrator. Of course we will—but together with that, it’s important to clarify and analyze the situation that led to the harm. The fact that someone has contributory fault does not lessen the perpetrator’s responsibility. Even if I oppose provocative dress (or lack thereof), that doesn’t mean that someone who raped a woman dressed that way isn’t guilty or shouldn’t be punished. Both claims are true, and one must not come at the expense of the other.
Rape’s Halachic Status
Another example of emotionalist discourse in the Walder affair: in the public discussion we’re told that in the Torah, rape is a transgression as severe as murder, and therefore it’s astonishing that Haredim don’t rise up against such acts. People repeat again and again the verse “For as a man rises against his fellow… so is this matter,” said about rape. The claims against Haredi silencing and against problematic policies in handling these phenomena are justified. But even when a claim is justified, not every argument in its favor is correct. In the Torah, the rape passage is plainly about the rape of a betrothed maiden. The severe injury is to her marital bond with her betrothed (her monetary value in the ketubah?), not the mere violation of her innocence or sexual autonomy. From the perspective of Torah and halacha—like it or not—rape is not essentially different from consensual relations with a married or betrothed woman. It’s at most a prohibition of illicit relations, but not rape in the sense of violence (that only affects whether the maiden is also at fault—“but to the maiden you shall do nothing”). Some commentators and poskim expanded the scope (in ways I don’t find very convincing), but one certainly cannot blithely say that this is the Torah’s position.
I’m not claiming there’s no halachic prohibition here. There is “Love your fellow as yourself,” there’s the prohibition of injury, and perhaps shame damages—but the extra severity of the act, as we understand it today, doesn’t really exist in halacha. It’s no different from any other assault or injury to another. Dragging in contemporary discourse about rape and its meanings is ignorance or demagoguery.
Here too, as in many other places, moral motivation (usually very modern) influences how the Torah is read. That’s entirely legitimate to me—but precisely for that reason I see no value in recruiting the Torah to your side. As I’ve written more than once: if you want to say something on the moral plane, it’s simply unnecessary to harness the Torah—especially via the moral interpretation you attach to it—to support your view. You’ve decided the Torah sees this as a severe act because morally it seems severe to you, even though that’s not really written there. So just say it’s morally severe—period. Don’t enlist the Torah, if only because it isn’t true. It reminds me of those Hasidim who explain that all the great Torah scholars side with their Rebbe’s position—and when you bring a position of a Torah scholar who disagrees, the response is that he’s not one of the “greats.” Why? Because he doesn’t agree with the position of all the greats.
We must admit that the modern attitude toward rape is a product of contemporary morality. I’ll stress again that I fully identify with it and see rape as a very severe act—but deriving that from halacha or Torah seems absurd to me. This is part of the emotionalist brainwashing we all undergo.
By the way, that’s probably also why Haredim aren’t particularly alarmed by such acts. They know it’s not written in the Torah, and in their view what isn’t written in the Torah has quite limited standing (especially values they see as inventions of modern society). In their eyes, such acts are severe when they concern boy-children, because then it’s male-male intercourse (and unrelated to pedophilia, which the Torah doesn’t negatively address either; on the contrary, it seems indifferent). But harming girls is not such a severe halachic prohibition, and whether it’s rape or not doesn’t really matter. I assume no one here intends to teach Rabbi Gershon Edelstein or Haredi rabbis the Torah’s rape passage. What all those speakers who so learnedly quote the above verse know—surely they know as well.
Here you have yet another piece of complex thinking that is illegitimate when speaking about such topics. One can reject the act because of identification with modern values—without being secular on the one hand, and without recruiting the Torah on the other. Simply because it is a shocking moral injustice; and I, as a religious person, am appalled even by acts that do not contradict halacha—or at least are not very severe from a halachic standpoint.
Other Aspects of the Affair
Several discussions arise regarding this affair: Was it right to publish the allegations, and when? Is this not lashon hara (defamatory speech)? Can one render judgment without evidence tested in a court of law? Should the risk of prompting a suicide weigh in publication? And many more. Here too, one senses that the debate is very emotional, and each side expresses a very predictable stance. The opposing side of course rails against him, paints him as a vile villain, and presents the duty to publish as self-evident, with the victims naturally recruited to support it. But each such question must be addressed on its merits in a complex and balanced way, as befits hard questions. (On publication and causing death, see my very brief remarks here.) In this column I chose not to enter these questions, because their principled dimensions are fairly straightforward (contrary to what the discourse suggests—again, emotionalism skews it), and I don’t know the particulars of this specific case.
On Emotionalism
Emotionalism does not necessarily express moral sensitivity. In most cases it’s simply superficiality. Conversely, a cold discussion does not necessarily express indifference. It’s conducted coolly because it’s important to analyze complex issues in a cold and rational manner, which can sometimes seem alienated and detached. I’m entirely in favor of detached, non-emotional discussion. But that doesn’t mean extinguishing emotions or being uninvolved; rather, it’s a demand to try to detach emotions for the sake of the discussion. Afterwards, when we meet the victims, it’s indeed appropriate to express empathy and feeling—but not at the expense of a complex presentation (as Bokovza demands).
Despite—and perhaps precisely because—we’re dealing with sensitive and emotional phenomena, and people feel that emotional involvement is a condition for understanding the situation, in my view an emotional approach and discourse usually hamper understanding. The better path is to employ empathy that helps us grasp what happened and people’s feelings, and then detach from it to discuss the situation with coolness and reason (a discussion that takes into account, among other things, the insights we gained from our empathy).
I’ll bring a few further examples to sharpen the point.
Halachic Coolness
I’ve often said that one of the least understood aspects of halachic and religious practice in secular eyes is its coolness and rationalism. Contrary to the image that secularism is rational and religiosity emotional, on the ground the situation is quite the opposite. The secular world is very emotional, and the halachic world is generally cold and rational (even if it rests on assumptions not always understood by those operating within it).
A prime expression of this is the cold halachic treatment of infuriating situations. For example, according to halacha, a father may marry off his minor daughter to whomever he wishes, including a man with severe boils, or sell her as a maidservant. As is known, halacha assigns the status of mamzerut to children born of prohibited incestuous relations, even though these children did nothing—condemning them to a lifetime of misery. Halacha permits intercourse with a captive woman in war, and more. Usually, when one comes to study these topics, voices of great outrage are raised. By the way, this happens mainly when studying them with women (yes, yes, I know this is not politically correct, but as noted, I don’t tend to capitulate to dictates about discourse). In such cases I try to explain that the halachic discussion must be conducted coolly, and the general judgment postponed to afterwards.
The halachic discussion doesn’t address what is fitting to do, but what is permitted, obligatory, or forbidden to do. On top of that, one can add layers of “fitting,” “moral,” or “immoral,” and the like. When dealing with questions of prohibition, obligation, and permission, everyone can understand that the debate must be cold. In my personal view, even questions of what’s fitting and moral should be conducted in that way.
Thus, for example, a discussion once arose about a Kohen’s wife who was raped, and the poskim obligated her and her husband to separate. They added tragedy upon tragedy, and the public discourse was so emotional that it was impossible to conduct it. Time and again people asked me: “Tell me, don’t you have a heart?!” And time and again I explained that those poskim certainly do have a heart—and in fact I suspect it was far harder for them than for the armchair moral knights, since they had to rule the halacha for this couple and bring about the tragedy with their very words. But it’s not that they’re indifferent to the moral and emotional dimensions of the situation. They have halachic considerations beyond feelings and morality (and in general, equating feeling with morality is itself an emotionalist bias). Again, there is room for criticism and disagreement—but the emotionalism of the discourse doesn’t allow it to proceed. The sense was that there are things one is not allowed to say.
For example, halacha can permit a father to marry off his daughter to a man with severe boils and at the same time say that it is not fitting to do so (and in practice a court will sometimes compel him not to). This is the difference between permitted and fitting. Why would halacha permit it? Several possibilities can be raised—for instance, the need to allow a father to secure his daughter’s economic and social situation after his death. In the ancient world, an unmarried woman—especially one without property from home—could find herself in a very difficult economic and social position. Think of a young girl being told to marry such a man, and of course she rebels against it—and quite rightly from her perspective. But the father sees and understands her interest better than she does and knows what will happen if she doesn’t marry. Of course, in modern eyes it’s very hard to explain this to people. The discourse becomes emotional, and the curtain falls.
In some cases emotionalism leads to errors on the moral plane; in others, to errors on the halachic plane (because people illegitimately mix it with morality). I assume you all understand I have no problem with critiques of halacha—but gut-level discourse is always harmful. The halachic debate is conducted rationally and coolly, without empathy and without emotional involvement in the situation—and in my view, it’s very good that way. Of course, when ruling on a specific case, it’s important to understand the emotional dimensions; but even there, the debate should be cold. By the way, the same goes for legal discussion—just like in halacha.
Rulings from Outside and from Within
In the third book of my trilogy I discussed two approaches to halachic ruling. Some argue that the decisor must be involved in the situation and aware of its emotional aspects. Other approaches favor his detachment from the situation. It seems to me both sides are partly right. The decisor must be aware of these aspects, but detach from them when rendering judgment. Such detachment doesn’t mean ignoring them; it means taking them into account in the decision-making process, but making the decision with the intellect rather than the heart.
I once mentioned a question a student involved in matchmaking asked me: should he follow his heart or his head? I told him that decisions are always made with the head; making decisions with the heart is, to me, like making decisions with the ears, the feet, or the fingernails. It’s simply not the right organ for deciding. The intellect should of course take the emotional dimensions into account when deciding—but the heart’s role is only to pass data to the intellect, not to decide in its place.
There are cases where a young rabbi serves a young, liberal community, and a halachic question arises regarding his community. He goes to consult his teacher, an elder who sits in a yeshiva. In such cases, in my opinion, the elder rabbi should advise him but leave the decision to him. He doesn’t know the situation and doesn’t necessarily understand it. He doesn’t know the consequences of each decision; therefore, he shouldn’t be the one to make it. In this sense, involvement matters. But at the same time, it’s certainly important to go consult the elder rabbi and hear what he has to say. Precisely because of the distance, he has considerable advantages in making such a decision. For a detailed discussion, see my article on Halachic Rulings in the Holocaust.
From this perspective, one can understand why the model of a “Council of Torah Sages” that makes strategic decisions for a political party has great advantages. Knesset members are, by nature, inside the cauldron and the situation—but precisely for that reason they’re tainted and don’t think coolly and logically, and especially not in a way detached from personal interests. Those who sit far away have a cooler and more balanced view; they’re not involved in the situation, and precisely because of that they can make considered decisions about it. The MKs should bring the question, present the arguments and different sides, and of course the implications of each decision—but the decision itself is better made by someone sitting at a remove.
In the article cited above, I noted the limits of this approach. In situations where it’s clear the decisor cannot understand the situation and its meaning even if it’s described to him (as in extreme situations during the Holocaust), it’s indeed not right to leave the decision to him. Thus, for example, it’s more appropriate that a rabbi in the ghetto make the decision, rather than someone outside who cannot truly understand what’s happening and the implications of his ruling. But the rabbi who’s there and making the decision must do so with his head, not his heart. His advantage lies in understanding the facts—but he must not let the heart decide. The consideration should be logical and cool.
Discussion
Moishe, I assume your remarks stem from a lack of information. Please be so kind as to read the research literature regarding the effects of sexual abuse, and then determine what role the media play in the matter. In World War I as well, they did not understand why soldiers were unable to function after the war; they blamed them, gave them electric shocks, and yelled at them. Later, the phenomenon came to be recognized as post-traumatic stress disorder.
I once heard from R. משה מרדכי שלוזינגר of blessed memory a piece of life advice from Rabbi Tzatzik, I think: 1. Don’t argue with someone who is right. 2. And don’t argue with someone who thinks he is right.
To Rabbi Michael,
Referring to the following quotation from your words:
"We must admit that the modern attitude toward rape is a product of contemporary morality. I’ll stress again that I fully identify with it and see rape as a very grave act, but to derive this from halakha or from the Torah seems absurd to me. This is part of that same emotional brainwashing that is done to all of us.
By the way, this is probably also the reason Haredim are not especially alarmed by such acts. They know that it is not written in the Torah, and for them whatever is not written in the Torah has a fairly limited standing (especially values that seem to them like inventions of modern society). For them such acts are severe when they are directed toward boys, because then it is male homosexual intercourse (and not related to pedophilia, toward which the Torah also has no negative attitude. On the contrary, it seems indifferent to it). But harming girls is not such a severe halakhic prohibition, and whether it is rape or not rape really does not matter. I assume nobody here intends to teach Rabbi Gershon Edelstein or the Haredi rabbis the Torah’s passage about rape. What all the speakers know, who so learnedly quote the above verse, he surely knows as well."
I think you are interpreting incorrectly (and also going easy on) the reaction of part of the Haredi public. What we have here is not some kind of consistent approach to non-consensual sexual acts or acts toward minors, in accordance with what is or is not written in the Torah. The Haredi media (newspapers, rabbis’ responses, pashkevils) cry out incessantly against the internet, movies, smartphones, immodest dress, and the laws of seclusion. What are the halakhic prohibitions there? “Do not stray after [your hearts and your eyes]”? wasting seed? rabbinic prohibitions? Fine. Those same prohibitions apply to the acts you described, along with a nice combination of several additional prohibitions. Where in the Torah is there a smartphone? Where in the Torah is there internet? For some reason, toward the phenomena of rape, any kind of non-consensual sexual contact, and sexual contact with minors under threats and exploitation—there is almost silence, and the responses do not come close to the scale seen on the above issues. Why?
My guess is that this is not about “a different complex conception,” but simply fear, denial, and anger at whoever dares bring these issues out into the open, because it threatens the autonomy of the Haredi public. (That is also the reason for the opposition to the internet and smartphones—it threatens their autonomy.)
See, for example, the letter issued in the name of R. Y. G. Edelstein. There is reference to the prohibition of suicide (hinted at in the final small clause), to the need to turn to professionals after “consulting a rabbi” (without any mention whatsoever of a prohibition or source from the Torah regarding sexual prohibitions), and to the prohibition of “public shaming.” Where are the rest of the Torah commandments? “Do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow”? (There have been testimonies for 10 years—is there no point in encouraging the victims or those who know of the matter to come forward?) Sexual prohibitions? (After all, those too are prohibitions…). But the main emphasis is around “public shaming” (which does not meet the standard of “things written in the Torah,” and in exchange for the words of Hazal about shaming, there are no fewer words of Hazal about sexual prohibitions).
There is a confusion here, in my understanding.
We all know the familiar distinction between emotion and intellect.
When we judge, we ostensibly need to operate with the intellect and suppress emotion, in order to reach more “correct” results.
But what about the fact that judging is a human-emotional situation?
In such a situation, if we do not activate our emotional system, we will not understand what we are dealing with.
If I discuss the case of Chaim Walder, or any other suspect in abuse, and discuss it in the same “state of mind” as someone analyzing a sugya in the Gemara, where we emotionally and consciously detach ourselves from the case under discussion, we arrive at absurdities.
You need to connect to the emotions in order to understand what is at stake.
You need to feel the victims’ pain, the insult of the denial, the fear of those close to them and their denial, etc.
Without identifying with these complex human situations, we simply won’t understand what this is about at all.
It’s like analyzing a problem in mechanics: first you need to draw a diagram of all the forces acting in the problem, and only after that do the analytical work.
The forces acting in a human situation will always be emotions. That is the driving force in every human story.
But after that, one must pause and activate the powers of analysis.
I know friends who are brilliant in mathematics and very weak at understanding human situations. Therefore, I would not suggest taking professors of physics very seriously on matters that require emotional analytical ability.
The first examples you gave are sexual prohibitions. But the gravity of rape as spoken of today is not because of the sexual prohibition involved in it. It is not perceived as a very grave offense by someone looking through halakhic glasses.
Are you sure you read the column? If so, then read it again.
Yes. I read it, and I’m familiar with the genre of yeshiva guys immersed in Gemara who don’t realize they are terrible at understanding human beings.
According to the Lithuanian approach, you take a person who is a genius in Gemara and let him rule on matters that require emotional intelligence, and… boom! A social disaster.
I think you yourself have already admitted that you envy Aspergers, so you more or less fit the criterion, don’t you?
At least I have one advantage over all the various “sensitive” types. I at least read, understand, and respond to what is written. If one has to be Asperger’s for that, then may my lot be with them.
Rest assured, your lot is with them
It’s just a shame that you’re responding emotionally 🙂
Maybe the author of the post is aware of everything you wrote, and his whole claim against the people being referred to is precisely what you wrote. Think logically; if not, at least remain consistent in your emotional reactions (which, basically, resemble the first option).
Even through completely halakhic, “mathematical” eyes, how many prohibitions today are more severe than adultery with a married woman, relations with a menstruant, or male homosexual intercourse?
The Haredi approach is even sicker—forced male homosexual intercourse will be treated with far greater leniency than consensual male homosexual intercourse.
That is the point that requires the real analysis, which in my opinion stems from the essential definition of Haredism—the aversion to and the “walls” against the modern secular world.
If the boy is under age 9, there is not even male homosexual intercourse, and in fact there is no prohibition at all. Not even rabbinically. Just a recommendation to the court to close the breach. He is not even obligated to do so.
Formal halakha is a paradise for pedophiles.
In the entire discussion up to now, you have spoken about halakhic coldness and about emotions. The discussion has been narrowed to the space of the abuser, the victims, and their surroundings (closer or farther). But there is a larger space—the global one—the desecration of God’s name before the whole world.
Vermin like Walder or Moti Alon probably exist in every society / people / religion, and each human society has ways of dealing with both the abuser and the victims. But the moment some of that society’s leaders relate to the abuser “understandingly,” and even try to shield him and save him from punishment—that is crossing boundaries, not of halakha, but of humanity.
About three years ago I was sitting in front of the screen reading news on some newspaper website (“The New York Times”—have you heard of it?) and I saw a big headline about a Haredi sex offender in the newspaper’s city, who had been arrested and investigated, and the leaders of his community had pressured an assistant to the district attorney to close the case. Reports about sex offenders do not usually appear on the front page of that paper, but the story with the prosecutor’s assistant—that is very big news. And tens or hundreds of millions of people saw it, as I did.
I imagine that among the readers here there are some who do not watch films or television, but among those who do watch (most of the human race), the association is immediate: organized crime. Mafia. And this was a front-page headline.
I sat in front of the screen and thought to myself: is it possible to create a greater desecration of God’s name than this? Maybe slaughtering children for matzah blood? Or perhaps my imagination simply isn’t rich enough?
By the way: a few months later I saw a similar headline in another newspaper you may have heard of: The London Times. I could not find the strength to read the article itself.
And then came the Litzman affair and the monster he helped, and more and more until our own day.
I pray and hope that the appropriate recompense will be given to these “righteous men” by the One who is responsible for such things…
I agree, but that is not what I was dealing with here.
Still, one should remember that usually support is not actually given to these people. Haredim have distrust of the secular, Gentile legal system; they have a naïve trust in their own people that it is impossible they did such things (someone who is not exposed to the media lives innocently with such a consciousness). And there are laws of lashon hara, etc., which in their view forbid publicizing things even if they are true. Finally, there is an understandable desire (even if unjustified) to protect one’s own community.
But you are absolutely right regarding the desecration of God’s name that results in the bottom line.
Hello,
Regarding halakha’s attitude toward the rape of an unmarried young woman, I disagree with you. The story of Dinah and Shechem is clear enough to derive that coercive conduct in non-consensual sexual relations is severe. And even though we do not derive halakhot from the book of Genesis, we were educated with the conception that the deeds of the fathers are a sign for the children, and the book of Genesis is called Sefer HaYashar because it is the cornerstone of our morality. Therefore, to say that the passage of rape is only that of a betrothed maiden seems to me incorrect thinking.
Why do you need the book of Genesis? There are halakhic prohibitions involved, and I mentioned that in the column.
The Haredim chose to live in the world of the East European shtetl, at the end of the 18th century. They decided that this was the place and time in which the state of affairs was optimal. (In this they are very similar to the Christian Amish sect, except that they chose eastern Holland at the beginning of the 17th century.)
The problem is that the world has changed. And when a Jew does something bad, it becomes known not only in Yehupitz and the neighboring villages, but sometimes throughout the entire world.
The fact that they do not consume modern media and do not know what is happening in the world does not mean the rest of the world does not see them. Even the ostrich already knows that burying its head in the sand will not save it from predators.
About two years ago an Israeli chef opened a restaurant in New York that enjoyed great success and favorable media coverage. In many places on the internet (Facebook etc.), antisemites responded: “Don’t buy from the Jews. They rape their children.”
We cannot even defend ourselves and claim this is a false libel.
And those responsible for this are chief rabbis, yeshiva heads, and other great Torah leaders.
Woe to us.
The apparent understanding is that the rape of a betrothed maiden is compared to murder because of the violation of the woman’s sexual autonomy, she being under the husband’s domain, and consequently of the husband’s sexuality, if you will, of the marriage bond. In a culture where ownership and control over the body and its derivatives are in the hands of the woman, the determination of murder is relevant in relation to harm to the woman. Does the rabbi have another explanation for the analogy to murder?
The fact is that prohibitions not written in the Torah (internet, smartphone, modesty laws), or that do not have Torah-level status (public shaming), receive extra force, while sexual offenses that are no less severe halakhically (obtaining sexual gratification from touching a child, from seeing nudity, or adultery with a married woman, which carries karet and “be killed rather than transgress”) do not receive similar treatment. So I do not understand why you claim there is some sort of consistent conception or adherence to halakhic lenses.
That is certainly not a halakhic consideration. The analogy to murder is probably because the three cardinal sins are parallel, and here it is a forbidden sexual relation. Taking a life is like taking away a marriage (perhaps this is a kind of murder of the relationship).
Internet, smartphone, and modesty get extra force politically. I don’t think public shaming receives especially great emphasis. Adultery with a married woman doesn’t receive similar treatment? Are you serious?
The rabbi’s words are mostly correct.
But I am surprised by the claim that the severity of raping an unmarried woman stems from a modern perspective. It is true that the comparison to murder is specifically with a betrothed maiden, but the Torah treats the rape of an unmarried woman as making a person very, very vile—he is fined, and his freedom regarding married life is taken away from him (if we leave aside for a moment the question why on earth the raped woman would want to live with him—it is probably related to a different reality, as the rabbi described regarding a man afflicted with boils). This is not the Torah’s perspective on an ordinary assailant, who simply pays the five damages and goes home…
At most one could argue that in the Torah the severity stems from the damage to the woman’s future, because she becomes second-class, but that is already an unnecessary interpretation and, in my humble opinion, a bit too reductive.
Disgraceful. Is the Western world going to teach us how to conduct lives of sexual restraint and abstinence?
Shame and disgrace. Of course there are bad weeds everywhere, but is the Western world, as a society, going to preach morality to us in this regard? There is no fence this world has not breached, knowingly and as a society (now it is beginning to understand the damage…)
Of course, Heaven forbid, criticism of Haredi society can be made, I only mean to say that, as I recall, the outside world is not fit to voice criticism on this subject in general.
(And the Christian world all the more so.)
And again, none of this is to argue that if the Torah’s attitude were different, we too should belittle it. It is simply that in practice, this is how it seems to me.
Completely serious—as far as the Chaim Walder affair is concerned.
I was unable to understand the rabbi’s explanation for the Haredi silencing of rape cases.
Even if we accept that halakhically the rape of an unbetrothed girl is in the monetary realm and not considered a severe offense, still, as the rabbi writes, there is severe harm here.
Does every issue the Haredim cry out against necessarily fall under an explicit Torah prohibition?
Does the amount of outcry raised against taxing disposable utensils stem from a halakhic obligation, or is it that in Haredi priorities washing dishes is more severe than rape?
I too have always thought that even from the moral standpoint there is no difference between rape and a violent assault on a person (not just a slap—beating someone nearly to death). If someone is seized on the street and beaten savagely so that he ends up in the hospital, is there less violence and humiliation in that than in rape? And if one says that raping a woman uses her as an object, then is sadistic abuse of a person, from which the attacker derives pleasure, not equivalent to rape? And anyway, why does it matter that he derives pleasure from it? Even ordinary violent beatings of a man on the street, when a person is kicked while on the ground, are no less humiliating, regardless of how much pleasure the attackers derive from it. The whole story around rape and its glorification and comparison to murder is simply female emotionalism. Their difficulty in recovering from it does not change the facts. It is tied very much to the human ego. Human beings have difficulty recovering from humiliation. But someone who is ready to accept that such things can happen to him as well will recover from it quickly (and in fact this happens daily to men who are raped in prison), just as those who were beaten nearly to death recover from it. And even if they too do not recover quickly, in any case the level of severity of the two offenses is equal.
The Haredim are not silencing. They simply are not willing to wash their dirty laundry in public, and rightly so. They would like to close the whole matter within their own public and that’s it. The non-Haredi public does not understand that from a Haredi perspective, exposure and openness to the secular public (and even to the religious-Zionist one) means leaving religion, which is the worst thing in the world (apostasy, which is something one must die rather than transgress). And rape is less severe than apostasy. Therefore, they are not willing to use tools from outside their community in order to deal with the matter. And so when Chaim Walder is attacked from outside, they rush to defend him. This is a natural thing that would happen in any family when one of its sons sins against another son in the family. It is not that they really think he is innocent. They are not willing for someone from outside to dictate to them what to think and what to do, and quite rightly. To receive moral preaching from a secular person is generally intolerable (I really agree that a person who has no fear of Heaven cannot be moral. At most he can model morality, but when the moment of truth comes he will collapse like a house of cards. An average Haredi does not necessarily have fear of Heaven either—it depends on how connected he is to that society or how much reflection and thought he has invested in the matter. But it is something his society encourages him to do). But I very much doubt whether the average secular person, or any secular person at all, can have fear of God.
Gabriel, I am not justifying; I am explaining. The tax arouses protest because it hits the pocketbook. The severity in halakha is not the only reason for action, even among Haredim.
Understanding people is also a matter of intellect (emotional intelligence is intelligence). It is understanding. Emotionalism is not understanding. It is just emotionalism. Autism is indeed a matter of lack of understanding, and it is a matter of intellect. Understanding the victims still does not change the complexity of the matter. Different people respond differently to sexual abuse. In communist Russia, the rape of women who were under the authority of men (in the KGB and the like) was routine, and women did not make such a big deal of it. There were things there worse than rape, and they swallowed rape without salt. One must distinguish between sensitivity and excitability.
Hello Rabbi Michael.
I agree with what is written in the column, but in my opinion you missed the main claim that emerges from Bokovza’s words: complexity is an unavoidable part of our lives; everything we wish to clarify is complex, with aspects in different directions. What we try to do with our intellect is sort the claims out, place them against one another, and reach a conclusion, but the problem is that this is difficult and takes time. There are very few people (like you) who, despite the difficulty of the task, do it; and there are others (the overwhelming majority of us) who, because of the size and difficulty of the task, either do not clarify things at all or do so halfway, a third of the way, or a quarter of the way.
Bokovza is addressing those lazy ones, for whom everything is complex and remains complex, and he says: go with your first intuition.
And this is already an important philosophical question: is a person’s initial intuition correct most of the time? Of course, whoever can, it is better if he continues and investigates until he clarifies the true opinion; but given that the situation does not allow that, should one remain sitting with folded arms (“passivity is preferable”), or is it better to listen to the stirrings of the heart, mixed a bit with immature reason, and take a position?
The question is whether this pervert harmed Haredi children from that community or from outside it. Because the Haredim (and abroad, the Jews—at least in the past) perceive themselves as a separate people and are supposed to have autonomy of their own. They turn to outside authorities only when they have no choice. The mafia harms people outside it. Did it bother anyone that the mafia closed up sins between its own members within itself? And there is no point talking about desecration of God’s name, because human beings are not worth much. The State of Israel could be wiped out here and millions could die here in war, and the New York Times and the London Times would not care at all. The human race is, in its overwhelming majority, foolish and wicked, and there is no need at all to take into account the opinion of those who have no understanding.
I do not think the leaders of Haredi society relate with understanding to the offender. That is only outwardly. They are simply protecting one of their own from their enemies outside, who ostensibly are interested in their “good.” In Israel that is certainly the case.
I don’t think this is a matter of weighing doubtful sides. Complexity is when both sides are true. Walder sinned, and the victims deserve sympathy and participation, and together with that there may be complex circumstances surrounding his actions. There is no need to decide. One can live with both sides.
Most sentimentality is fake—social amplification of weak emotions—and is meant to make one appear to be a sensitive and considerate person so as to gain social acceptance.
In practice, genuine consideration for others from authentic motives is meager and rare, especially among those same public sentimentalists.
An example of a practical choice: should one speak about his praises or conceal them? It is true that in our minds we recognize and are aware of the complex circumstances, but in practice one must act in one way (sometimes).
I can testify that for some time now I have been reading and hearing everything on this affair—in the secular media, in the Haredi media, and in the religious-Zionist media—and although I am Haredi, in my opinion, of all the articles, essays, interviews, letters, videos, talkbacks, and sermons from rabbis that I have heard, the sermon that most clarifies and makes the most sense of this whole complex affair is Rabbi Yehoshua Shapira’s on Channel 7, and it is on YouTube (I linked to it above), including from the middle of the sermon a discussion of R. Gershon Edelstein’s words and an explanation of his conduct, including a halakhic discussion of “lashon hara,” “one who publicly shames his fellow,” and “you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.” I confess openly that after hearing his lecture, for the first time it dawned on me that this too is an area in which there are people who have specialized in it through dealing with these issues for many years, and so when they speak, one understands that they are authorities on this subject more than others who have not acquired experience in these matters, and more power to him for that.
And to our rabbi I ask: where can one see the treatment by halakhic decisors of the verse everyone brings as proof from the Torah that sexual harm is equivalent to murder, which the rabbi here contradicted briefly—what, in short, are his sources?
I do not know because I have not checked; I only know to tell that there is some yeshiva head who works with at-risk youth in Zoharim, I think, who courageously tells of prolonged abuse by his teacher when he was young, and when they told him this verse, his response was: too bad he did not physically murder me all at once and be done with it, because from his perspective and in his suffering, every day he feels murdered anew. So I would truly be glad to see the sources.
Such abuse is a morally serious matter. My claim is on the halakhic plane. Therefore the rabbi’s example is not relevant to the discussion.
You do not need any decisors or sources. See the verses in Deuteronomy chapter 22, which speak about a betrothed maiden and her punishment on account of forbidden sexual relations (“and to the girl you shall do nothing”—why do anything to her if she is unmarried?).
Something here has gone wrong!
I agreed with every word!
בס"ד 3 Shevat 5782
It is impossible to discuss such a subject without terrible dread. On one hand stands the demand of “Do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow,” against ignoring the pain of the victims and concern for future victims. On the other hand stands the grave fear of accusing an innocent person. After all, one cannot convict a person of a serious offense without the prosecution witnesses being carefully examined, and without giving the accused and his defenders the right to conduct a “cross-examination” of the prosecution witnesses and present their version.
And here lies the terrible problem. As a victim, the injured party needs to receive the feeling that people believe them and are not blaming them; but as a “prosecution witness,” they must undergo impartial “cross-examination,” and after all that hell, there still remains the fear that a “reasonable doubt” will be found that will not allow conviction, and the victims find themselves tortured a second time for nothing.
This built-in contradiction necessarily leads to a situation in which a considerable portion do not file a complaint, and even when a complaint is filed—90% of the cases end without an indictment, and even when an indictment is already filed—a conviction is still far off.
So there remains the route of judgment by the media and public opinion and social networks; and if the post’s author complains about them for “excess emotion,” it seems to me more correct to complain of “lack of sensitivity,” neither toward the complainants nor toward the accused—a jungle in which everyone devours everyone else.
Halakha has a middle way, namely the judgment of “one must take precautions.” On the one hand, the accused retains the “presumption of innocence,” and on the other hand the public is presented with the existing concerns about him and restrictions are imposed so that he will not endanger others. Thus, for example, the Sho’el U-Meshiv (first edition, sec. 185) rules regarding a teacher whose students testified that he had harmed them, that although they were minors at the time of the act, and although the testimony was accepted not in his presence—it may still be taken into account in order to prevent him from continuing to serve as a teacher lest he harm students, for here we are not coming to disqualify the man entirely, but only to prevent him from working in education, which requires special trustworthiness and fear of Heaven.
The usefulness of “one must take precautions” also makes it possible to impose restrictions on the suspect already in the early stages of the discussion, where on the one hand one announces that there is suspicion, but on the other clarifies that this is a doubt awaiting clarification. Thus, for example, Rabbis Silman and Rosenberg (from Rabbi Karelitz’s court, on the 2nd of Tevet) ruled that since there are suspicions regarding Walder—there is doubt as to the fitness of his books, a doubt that requires clarification in a beit din before which both sides will appear.
A sensitive combination of “honor him but suspect him” appeared in the “Notice to users concerning Chaim Walder” published on the Hidabroot website when the affair exploded. On the one hand they said that according to an investigation serious suspicions had been raised against him, and therefore the site was ceasing to publish his articles and books until the suspicions were clarified; but on the other hand they said that “would that it become clear that these things were not done.”
That is the nature of a “middle way” that is aware of and announces a “cloud of suspicion” over the suspect as an abuser, but on the other hand is careful not to impose definitive guilt upon him without a thorough legal clarification.
With blessings, Elieam Fishel Workheimer
Another way to balance the concerns is the path of mediation, used in most cases by Forum תקנה, where they first listen sensitively to the complainants, and afterwards confront the accused with the claims. Rabbi Sherlo says that usually it turns out that the gap is not large, and ways are found to minimize the risk—for example, transferring the accused to work that does not involve direct contact with students, and the like.
And as has become clear, even the general legal system has no means to bring punishment in most cases, and as I mentioned—90% of the complaints end with the case being closed without an indictment. A proper justice system will prefer that a hundred criminals go free rather than one innocent person be punished unjustly.
However, for those who walk according to the Torah, there are effective protective walls, namely the prohibitions of seclusion and of physical contact, and the like, which prevent in advance the presence of an abuser and victim when no one sees them. If every boy and girl knows the laws of seclusion and physical contact, and more than that, that one must be suspicious and avoid relationships with unfamiliar people, and if he encounters problems, he should share them with parents and teachers without embarrassment—then the child himself will be the best “protector” for himself.
A Jewish child needs to know his own strength and power. Like Abraham, who at age three knew to rebel against the idolatry to which all the “adults” were seduced—one must know that in the world there are also evil people or, alternatively, mentally ill people, and that even a child can be the “responsible adult” who knows to “say no” and distance himself from abusers. Even a person who usually appears good and charming may be afflicted with severe mental illness that brings him to terrible acts, and therefore one should not be ashamed to say “no” and to share with parents and teachers what happened. This can even be an act of kindness with the abuser, as perhaps early exposure will bring him to psychiatric treatment before he deteriorates to a point of no return, Heaven forbid.
With blessings, AFO"R
AFO"R, your words are good, even if not sufficient; but in Israel the Holy One, blessed be He, demands the repair of reality from adults, at their head the leaders of the generation, its judges, and its rabbis—not from children. If children realize that the Torah-observant public does not care for them properly, some of them will naturally leave that public and seek their way elsewhere. Only a few generations ago in Eastern Europe, many teachers in the heders were cruel people who would beat their students brutally for no reason, and this is one of the reasons that most Ashkenazi Jews cast off the yoke of Torah and mitzvot. The Holy One, blessed be He, will always seek the pursued.
Clear and penetrating words from Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Jacobson:
And to Yehuda—
And more than that, I wrote in my first comment, “A Narrow Path Between Two Abysses,” paragraphs 5–7, that even before guilt has been proven—there is room for warning and distancing so that there will be no harm. Rather, the more the facts become clear and the more the doubt diminishes—the more forcefully the warning should be taken.
With blessings, AFO"R
To our sorrow, in practice for many years they neither warned nor distanced, even though there was testimony. Instead, they chose not to believe the victims and told them to be silent, or even ostracized them. All those rabbis and public figures who did not listen, and still do not listen, need to go to every victim, male or female, and ask for their forgiveness and pardon. “He who confesses and forsakes [his sin] shall obtain mercy.”
Support for the ruling of Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu’s court can be found in articles by Rabbi Yehuda Glick (formerly head of the rabbinical court in Safed and Petah Tikva) and by Rabbi David Fendel (head of the hesder yeshiva in Sderot)—both on the Arutz 7 website.
With blessings, AFO"R
AFO"R,
Everything you wrote is correct, and every dayan is supposed to know it. To our sorrow, there is an ongoing reality in which those who were truly harmed, and not those who made false accusations, say again and again that no one listens to them and that people shut their mouths; the vast majority are unwilling to testify because they fear their pursuers or because they have lost trust in the system or in human beings generally. Their general claim must be addressed with humility and with listening. To listen means to hear, to absorb, to ask forgiveness, and to begin to repair.
According to the beit din secretary, one of the witnesses broke into bitter tears after her testimony, and when the dayanim told her that she was not guilty, she said: "My crying is not because of the troubles of the past, but because of the hope that maybe a change is beginning here. My crying is because this is the first time rabbis have believed me after twenty years of coming to testify about what I went through. For the first time they are not telling me that it would be better for me to keep quiet, or worse things than that. Thank you, you gave me a great repair in relation to this whole society. My family boycotted me, and none of them is in contact with me anymore because I decided I no longer wanted to be silent."
AFO"R, you are mixing unlike things.
In a formal court, the prosecution has to submit its list of witnesses in advance and cannot add witnesses later on (only the defense can add surprise witnesses).
Therefore the prosecution acts cleverly and lists every person who might have information on the witness list (the precedent is the Olmert trial, where the prosecution listed hundreds of witnesses and in the end the case rose and fell on the sole testimony of Shula Zaken).
The witnesses in the trial under discussion did not come on their own initiative, and the overwhelming majority never even took the stand.
The witnesses in the Olmert trial did not claim Olmert had harmed them, and nevertheless the prosecution added and listed hundreds of witnesses because maybe they could add another tiny shred of evidence.
This is not comparable to the Walder case, where 15 different testimonies claiming that *they themselves were directly harmed* were collected before the Haaretz newspaper article appeared, and 7 additional complaints were added to the testimony before Rabbi Eliyahu (22 in total).
In the meantime, the number of complainants has already reached 25, and all are complaining of direct harm, not that they saw/heard…
Please listen carefully to Rabbi Yehoshua Shapira’s lecture:
With all due respect to Rabbi Yehoshua Shapira (and to the site owner for diverting the discussion from his words), his parable does not match the lesson. He compared it to a woman who was murdered and, before returning her soul to her Creator, says, “So-and-so murdered me.” And he asked: would we not believe her? But there the act is a fact that does not depend on her statement (she was murdered), and only the identity of the murderer depends on her statement. Here, by contrast, there is no objective evidence that something indeed happened and that some woman was raped—only the words of the rape victims. Unless, that is, we count their psychological condition as evidence… In any case, it is not similar.
Likewise, I do not understand why I should remove his books from my house (I don’t have any, by the way). If this is not like a Torah scroll written by a heretic, and I keep books by people who did bad things (Aristotle, Plato, Ben-Gurion, and many more), then because of the chance (which resembles the chance that the world created itself) that someone harmed by him might enter my house, I need to throw them out? If he claimed they were bad books in terms of content, fine. But if not, it seems excessive to me.
And returning to Ramda’s column—it seems to me to stem from emotions.
בס"ד 4 Shevat 5782
In a letter of explanation by Rabbi Tau, written following his meeting with Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu (in the article “The Chaim Walder Affair—After the Storm Stirred by His Words, Rabbi Tau in a Letter of Explanation,” on the Kipa website), Rabbi Tau clarifies our double obligation: on the one hand to act forcefully to prevent abuse, and on the other hand to avoid a culture of “shaming” and deciding a suspect’s guilt without trial. I will quote a few paragraphs here:
The course of action he recommends is:
“There is no dispute that when there is concern about harm to a man or woman—one must gird oneself with courage and fulfill within ourselves ‘Do not be intimidated by any man,’ in order to eradicate the act of wickedness, and as part of that there is an immediate obligation to turn to the police so that they investigate and clarify the matter thoroughly. Turning to the police is not only in order to punish the sinner, but also to prevent him from harming others. This is how I have instructed and acted always, and this is how one should act today as well.”
But clarification of suspicions is not meant to be done by “holding field tribunals” for every person who is suspected… “Just as we are obligated to ensure that when there are suspicions they are checked thoroughly, impartially, and without harming those who feel they were hurt—so too we have a parallel obligation not to allow a suspect’s guilt to be determined without exhausting the investigations and examinations according to law… Just as a person who committed grave acts must sit for many years behind bars, so too a person who did not commit grave acts must be treated by professionals and integrated into his community and family.
“All treatment of these matters should be entrusted to distinguished rabbinical courts, in which judges serving in judgment sit. It is known that in order to warn against a person—it may be that certainty is not required, and the beit din dealing with the matter can decide that ‘one must take precautions and publicize the matter,’ and it can rule his case according to the law of the Torah on the basis of evidence and with both sides present.”
All of the above applies during the suspect’s lifetime, but “after a person’s death—there is no need at all to warn against him, and if the beit din thinks it necessary to decide his case—it must prove it according to Torah law in a beit din, by authorized rabbis serving or who have served as judges.”
Rabbi Tau concludes:
“Let us purify our camp from the blemish of the covenant entirely, from the blemish of speech, and from all the harms of foreign winds that damage the purity of our camp and turn the upper ones below and the lower ones above.”
I have brought here only some of the remarks, and it is worthwhile to study them in full, as brought in Avichai Israel’s article (on the Kipa website).
With blessings, Yaron Fishel Ordner
בס"ד 4 Shevat 5782
To Benaiah—greetings,
Fortunately for me, I am not a rabbi issuing halakhic rulings, and I have never had Walder’s books in my home, nor was I ever interested in them. In fact, only after the affair exploded did I read one of his books that came into my hands, and I also read the introduction to another book of his that I encountered in a bookstore.
The content is excellent, and does not depend on the personality of the author. These are highly important educational contents. He speaks to the child as a mature person and guides him in proper coping with various problems he encounters in life. I even found in his work an excellent chapter on personal safety (Children Write About Themselves II, chapter 2, initials: B.B. 🙂). Moreover, every word in his books underwent reading and criticism by rabbis and educators, so the content is excellent.
The problem is the trauma. And the circle of trauma victims extends far beyond those directly harmed. There are tens of thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands whose souls are torn and shaken. The pleasant and wise educator on whose knees they grew up, and by whose light they were educated and educated others—has apparently been revealed as a monster, as a person who exploited, tormented, and humiliated the helpless. I imagine that every sight of his books opens the wounds and throws salt upon them for those who grew up on him. And many such trauma victims are walking among us, for whom every sight of the book will reopen their bleeding wound.
Perhaps it is right to do as in the story of the rabbi who was asked what to do with meat that had fallen into a sewage pit, and answered: “It is kosher but it stinks.” So too here: “the book may be kosher, but it is traumatic.” Perhaps one should suggest treating it like a book that fell into a sewage pit: if it is a sacred book, one places it in genizah, but if it is a nice secular book—we should painfully put it into the recycling bin, from where it will go to purification and be recreated white and clean.
In any case, Chaim Walder merited a son who continues his path, the gifted writer R. Moshe Walder, who will continue to benefit the public, and perhaps be in the category of “a son who brings merit to his father,” bringing repair and atonement.
With blessings, Otiphron Nafshetim HaLevi
Paragraph 4, line 4
…into the recycling bin, from where…
On the other hand, there are book-lovers for whom the very business of destroying books creates trauma. Maybe it would be simpler and easier to paste a black strip over the author’s name, expressing our revulsion at his crimes alongside our appreciation of his work, and relate to him the way Rabbi Meir related to his teacher Elisha ben Avuyah: “He ate the inside and threw away the peel.”
The man was torn inside between his divine soul, under whose inspiration he wrote his wonderful work, and his animal soul, which lowered him into the pit of destruction. In truth, we are all a little torn. One moment we rise to the heavens and the next descend to the dust: “Today an angel, tomorrow a priest,” and nevertheless we do not throw ourselves into the trash bin, but cling to the “little good” so that it may overpower the abysses of evil.
The wounded book with a black strip over its author’s name will be a warning sign for us, teaching how careful one must be not to fall into the abyss. Perhaps that is preferable?
With blessings, A.N.H.
This letter of explanation is nonsense. There is a recording in which Rabbi Tau is heard in his own voice saying clear things: that the whole thing is a plot because Walder harmed Aharon Barak, and the truth is there is nothing and there was nothing, just like with Katsav. He repeats and says that Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu is a McCarthyist. So please don’t muddle our minds with apologies and clarifications. The man is not sane and apparently suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. It seems rapid hospitalization is required here, and so too for his foolish followers who trail after him blindly. A first-rate cult. See also column 19.
And another question:
If we remove Chaim Walder’s books from the house—will the alternative be better? Instead of reading books that present values and educational content in engaging writing, is it preferable that they spend hours wandering through screens full of garbage, violence, and pornography?
With blessings, A.N.H.
To R. M. D. A.—greetings,
Between the statements you quoted and the letter to which I referred, there was a meeting in which “the tensions were ironed out,” and the two apparently reached a mutual understanding, following which the “letter of explanation” was drafted. So “take the final formulation,” and there is no point in “conjuring up” things said “in a time of anger” that were not originally intended for publication.
In the letter, Rabbi Tau refrains from addressing a specific case, and instead lays down the guiding principle for handling abuse and suspicions of abuse.
On the one hand, Rabbi Tau says that abuse must be treated severely and that one must turn to the police in order to punish and deter; and that there are situations in which even without certainty of guilt one may publicize the suspicions because “one must take precautions,” but that requires a decision by an authorized beit din.
On the other hand, Rabbi Tau says, a social atmosphere must not be created of a lynch-trial by “public opinion,” along with a prohibition on expressing an opinion supporting the suspect’s innocence. An atmosphere in which anyone who argues in a suspect’s defense is automatically denounced as “ignoring the suffering of the victims.”
Essentially, Rabbi Tau is saying what you say in this post. Blessed is He who directed you to the view of a great man 🙂
With blessings, YFAO"R
A photo of Rabbi Tau’s letter (written in response to Rabbi Boaz Kahana’s question) can be viewed on the Rotter website and on the Srugim website.
If I have matched his small mind, I am beginning to worry. Perhaps my own opinion is starting to go wrong too, Heaven forbid.
This “clarification” letter can convince only the fools of his cult, since it was written as a clarification in response to so-and-so’s question. As if he is explaining what he said, but not retracting it. There is no clarification at all in this letter, because the letter does not clarify what was said in the conversations in question (Aharon Barak plots, there is nothing in these accusations, I repeat this again and again also for publication, it’s all like with Katsav, and more and more “pearls”); rather, it says other things.
The fact that he presents it as a “letter of clarification” means he is like a dog returning to its vomit and repeating his folly. He is like those politicians who are caught in wrongdoing and instead of apologizing and retracting their words, explain that their remarks were “taken out of context.” But anyone listening to the recording can clearly hear that nothing there was taken out of context. This fellow’s answer will come when he says: I made a mistake and I hereby apologize to the public and to Rabbi Eliyahu, I am going to a psychiatrist for treatment, and before anything else I am disbanding the cult of fools that follows me. A sinner’s repentance is accepted only when he breaks his idols.
In general, I say that I am not speaking of him at all in terms of repentance or apology, and all the appeals to him to apologize and the protests amuse me. I do not protest his words, because he is a sick man who needs treatment. And apparently so do his followers (and were I not afraid I would say that anyone who sees him as a great man should examine his own sanity as well). If a person stands in the marketplace and shouts, “I am Napoleon Bonaparte of Corsica, charge after me at Blücher and Wellington,” I would not ask him to apologize, nor would I protest his words. I would hospitalize him. And regarding our present fellow, because of the damage he does and his band of fools, perhaps one should consider involuntary hospitalization. The man is losing contact with reality and with reason—which does not bother even the last of his fools, as it is said: “My father chastised you with whips…”
On Rotter they gave Rabbi Tau’s letter the headline summing up his position in a few words: “In favor of victims; against field justice.”
With blessings, YFAO"R
Indeed, a headline that sums up his “clarification” letter well. But what does that have to do with his earlier statements? He says here simple things that everyone knows and writes, but does not address the nonsense he spouted in his earlier remarks. Exactly as I wrote.
If he had said he was in favor of victims and against field justice, nobody would have chirped. But that is not what he said. That is what he wrote now.
Emotions can be a sign that this is an important subject that deserves careful examination. That does not necessarily mean the initial position is correct. Like the difference between the context of discovery and the context of justification.
Clearly one should not dismiss arguments because of emotionality. That itself is emotional conduct.
There is a big difference between Rabbi Tau and Rabbi Michi. Rabbi Tau opposes going to the media (which he calls a field court), whereas Rabbi Michi requires going to the media. There is support for Rabbi Michi’s approach from the beginning of tractate Ketubot, where a virgin is married on Wednesday so that if there is a problem they can go to court on Thursday, so that word will get out and additional witnesses will come.
I also agree that one must be careful with publication and public shaming, certainly as long as things have not been proven. One must also make sure that the publication is necessary and useful. But under those limitations, I certainly think one should publicize and not spare him. He is a pursuer, and it is permitted and necessary to harm him in order to save his potential victims. Certainly after the matter has undergone clarification in beit din (Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu).
And it is possible that Rabbi Tau did not retract his reservations, but decided not to continue the polemic, perhaps also because most of the rabbis of religious Zionism, headed by Rabbis Yaakov Ariel and Dov Lior, support Rabbi Eliyahu’s ruling; and even the head of Yeshivat Har HaMor, Rabbi Amiel Sternberg, supports Rabbi Eliyahu’s position.
Apparently because of this Rabbi Tau decided to cease publicly expressing his opinion regarding the specific Walder case, and instead to define in principle the guiding principles for handling the issue:
To refer suspicions to the police or to a beit din of experts who are great in Torah and experienced in judging, and to avoid “judgment by public opinion.”
With blessings, YFAO"R
בס"ד 5 Shevat 5782
I will not enter into a discussion of halakhic concepts, but on the face of it, proper legal procedure requires a right to be heard, which is reserved even for a suspect in the gravest acts. Not only conviction in a criminal proceeding, but also a hearing on detention or a restraining order, requires giving the suspect the right to representation by counsel who will plead in his defense. Likewise, administrative disqualification due to unreliability of the suspect requires a right to be heard and representation by counsel, and certainly it is improper to “shame” someone who defends a suspect in a grave crime.
The exceptions to the sweeping right to be heard are situations in which there is concern about obstruction of the investigation—and then there are cases in which the suspect is prevented from meeting a lawyer and is not told the information on which the investigation is based. Even in cases involving fear of terrorist activity, there are situations in which the suspect is prevented from meeting a lawyer or is subjected to administrative detention or distancing.
The common denominator in these situations is that the limitation on the “right to be heard” is for a fixed period of time and requires a decision by a judge who is not part of the team of investigators and prosecutors, who will approve the temporary restriction of the suspect’s rights. In this case, the judge is also supposed to act as a kind of defense counsel, not allowing the prosecution to do whatever it wants.
Following this analogy, there is room to propose two similar measures for a situation of declaring a suspect dangerous when there is concern that he will learn who the complainants against him are. The “declaration of dangerousness” should be limited to a period of one or two years, toward the end of which a new hearing will take place to examine whether he is still dangerous or has mended his ways.
Likewise, in my humble opinion there should be a separation between the “prosecution team,” which by the nature of its role needs to look for the “side of guilt,” and the “judging team,” which is also supposed to look for the “side of merit” and challenge the complainants even with piercing questions. Best of all, in my humble opinion, there should also be a third team, a “defense team,” who would not be the suspect’s representatives, so that the complainants would not be afraid, but who would fulfill with the same zeal as the prosecution the public’s duty of “and the congregation shall save.”
With these two qualifications—time limits and separation between prosecution, defense, and judging—a process of “declaring dangerousness” would be more just both in terms of truth and in terms of appearance.
With blessings, Elieam Fishel Workheimer
Correct and precise. Only at the end it seems you contradicted yourself a bit. Should the old, detached rabbi make the decision? (as on the Council) Or דווקא the one who is himself on the ground (like the community rabbi)?
It depends on whether the elder can understand the situation after the explanations he receives. If it is foreign to him, then he should leave the decision to the younger person. If he merely lacks information, then he will receive it and decide himself. In such a case, detachment is actually an advantage.
Of course, the basic premise of the post is a frozen metahistorical conception of halakha, for which I find no justification.
A riddle.
First—I made a mistake; I should have written ahistorical and not metahistorical.
As for the matter itself—forgive me. But you speak about halakha as some kind of defined and frozen system, and what can be done? It simply is not there.
Maybe you hinted at this briefly when you wrote in parentheses, “and the halakhic world is generally cold and rational (even though it is based on assumptions not always understood even by those operating within it),” maybe not. Either way, afterwards you did not really address it.
One cannot deny that our halakha was formed not a little on the basis of morality. And the assumption that ‘okay, halakhically it’s one way but morally it’s another’ simply seems quite mistaken to me. At most one can accept the internal halakhic distinction between rational commandments and revelational commandments (though I wonder how original it is in Judaism), but in the Gemara, when Rav thought, for example, that it was not so logical for a father to betroth his minor daughter, he flogged people for doing so, and the decisors established that as halakha (except when it clashed too directly with life). When Rava thought that a living Torah scroll is more important than a written Torah scroll, he hastened to define those who diminish the honor of a living Torah scroll as fools, and the decisors also established that as halakha. This is not some incidental matter; it is very essential to halakha, its development with reason. And since rape is not exactly the most moral thing in the world, the simple conclusion is that it is not legitimate from the standpoint of Talmudic halakha. Unless you think the amoraim thought that morally it was not such a terrible thing either—but I think it can be proven from the Gemara and the Rishonim that this is not so.
On YouTube one can watch the enlightening lecture of Rabbi Binyamin Tabedi, head of the beit midrash for training rabbis in Ra’anana, “The Halakhic Foundations for Conduct in Response to Claims of Sexual Harassment.”
With blessings, AFO"R
בס"ד 8 Shevat 5782
The two possibilities Rabbi Tau raised in his letter as addresses for a complaint—turning to the police or to beit din—can lead to a just clarification of the complaint while hearing both sides, but the very criminal (or quasi-criminal) investigation may undermine relationships within society and family in a way that will further intensify the harm to the victims, and therefore Forum תקנה prefers to arrive at mediation between the complainant and the accused, aspiring to prefer the path of rehabilitation.
For this reason, the Ministry of Education prefers that teachers who encounter a concern of abuse (and by law are required to report to the police or to a welfare officer) turn to a social worker, because they have more professional tools to handle the case delicately and discreetly, with an aspiration to rehabilitate rather than destroy. Welfare officers have the possibility of turning to an exemption committee that releases, in about 50% of cases, from the obligation to report to the police, in order to solve the problem delicately and in a way that benefits everyone.
With blessings, AFO"R
Paragraph 1, line 4
…and therefore Forum…
You are right, and he is right too.
What you say—that it is “complex”—is of course correct, but it is not in place. Not everything that is true, rationally, needs to be said in every situation, and that is essentially Bokovza’s claim (as I understand it).
You can tell your wife that you love her, which is presumably true, but you would not say that to the taxi driver you are riding with, because your love for your wife is none of his business. Not everything true is appropriately said.
I’ll illustrate this a bit more extremely—suppose Mr. Bokovza approached you and told you he had been harmed by a certain person, and perhaps you were even in a position to stop it. Would you tell him that it is “complex”? Even though that is true, and his perspective is not necessarily the only one—but the person is in distress and needs your help, and it would not be fitting to answer him that way.
Every victim, even after the abuse has stopped, needs recognition from society. In fact, the social injury, when there is no recognition, may be even more severe than the sexual injury itself. And this is what he is crying out about—don’t say it is complex. Social recognition is needed here.
Indeed, the situation is complex, and on the pages of your blog you are entitled to analyze and present all the sides, but every piece of writing and every statement has significance. Victims encounter them in the public sphere and on social media, and they may intensify the harm.
Therefore, although your statement is justified, I am not sure it is in place.
On the need for an “adversarial investigation” in the presence of the accused, Rabbi Aviner writes in the article “10 Short Notes on the Chaim Walder Affair,” dated 24 Tevet 5782 (on the Srugim website):
“A. Everything written below about Chaim Walder is according to the current state of our knowledge. If there is new information, we will have to reexamine.
B. Every person has a presumption of fitness so long as the opposite has not been proven, what is called in the laws of the Gentiles ‘the presumption of innocence.’ It is not that he has a presumption of wickedness and must prove that he did not sin. Until now nothing has been proven.
C. Proof must be established not by the media or social networks, but in a beit din that conducts inquiry and investigation, namely an ‘adversarial investigation’ in the presence of the other side, ‘Hear between your brothers.’
D. Until now, complaints of women have not been investigated in beit din in the above adversarial manner.
E. The only woman who came to beit din said that she committed adultery with him, and since the husband believed it—that is enough according to halakha to obligate her to be divorced. But it was not proven in beit din that this is indeed what happened.
F. Regarding all the rumors spread about him—according to halakha rumors do have a status, but this is not said of every rumor, and there are laws as to what constitutes a credible rumor. Moreover, with someone who has enemies—the rumors are not valid. And indeed he had opponents for various reasons.
G. The beit din in Bnei Brak that dealt with the matter now indeed wrote that if the things published about him are true—one should not read his books. But it added that still ‘the author has not stood for clarification, and the claims have not stood for proper clarification according to Torah law.’
H. Even if a person sinned and transgressed, that is no reason to carry out a public lynching of him and vilify him in wide circulation, which of course also harms his family. All the more so when nothing has been proven according to law and judgment.
I. As for his suicide, the decisors determine that one should not judge a suicide by the full severity of his legal status, because we assume that from great distress he lost his sanity.
J. Therefore one may read his books.
May God have mercy.”
Section F, line 2
…but this is not said of every rumor, and there are laws…
In Techumin 42, which came out recently, there are articles on the topic by Rabbi Shlomo Dichovsky and Rabbi Yair Frank.
With blessings, AFO"R
In the comment “Between Disposable and Serial,” paragraph 3, line 8
…in Bnei Brak who were asked “to sit on the matter”…
On the Kipa website, a letter by the rabbis of “Torat HaAretz HaTova” dated 3 Shevat 5782 was published, in which it says among other things:
“We wish to express our support and appreciation for Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu, may he live long, who did not recoil and is acting in cooperation with great rabbis from all sectors to save the oppressed from abusers of all sectors. This is being done with caution and exactness according to Torah law and after proper clarification. When discreet treatment is not effective—the matters and their evil deeds are publicized so that the abuse will not continue. We strengthen his hand for having found the ability to go out with courage of spirit to purify the camp of Israel, and thereby save many lives…
And signed:
Rabbi Chaim Druckman, Rabbi Dov Lior, Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, Rabbi Aryeh Shtru, Rabbi Yaakov Shapira, and others.
With blessings, AFO"R
בס"ד 10 Tevet 5785
In my comment “A Narrow Path Between Two Abysses,” I presented the approach of “one must take precautions.” It is important to note that from the articles in Techumin by Rabbi Dichovsky and Rabbi Yair Frank, it appears on the face of it that in certain situations one can also arrive at certain clarification even “not in his presence.” It is important to study these articles carefully in order to obtain the full picture.
With blessings, AFO"R
The ruling of Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu also won the support of Rabbis Dov Lior and Yaakov Ariel. See the article: “The Rabbis of ‘Torat HaAretz HaTova’ Support Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu,” on the Arutz 7 website.
With blessings, AFO"R
A note, without knowing the details of the case or the halakhic side:
Rabbi Shlomo Aviner’s criticisms are more relevant to a beit din that has authority to punish, from which objective and demonstrable neutrality is required.
But there is also an “investigative court,” which, after thorough clarification, hearing the many complaints, the accused’s version, and the opinions of additional professionals, is convinced that the complaints are justified and issues a “prosecutor’s declaration,” expressing the prosecutors’ complete conviction.
And here, after all, the clarification was done thoroughly while consulting great Torah scholars, in an effort to examine with due sensitivity even the side of merit.
With blessings, AFO"R
Actually, perhaps my suggestion above was fulfilled here—to have a “prosecution team” and a “defense team.”
And another note:
Accepting testimony not in the accused’s presence does not necessarily contradict the “right to be heard.” That is how it is practiced today in the courts, where a victim testifies not in the presence of the abuser, so that he will not terrify the witness with his facial expressions.
With blessings, AFO"R
The double advantage in a “prosecutor’s declaration” from an “investigative beit din” is: (a) strengthening the warning in order to prevent potential victims. (b) strengthening the self-confidence of complainants, male and female, in a way that will enable them to approach a judicial forum!
With blessings, AFO"R
In line 1… from an “investigative beit din”: (a) strengthening the warning in order to prevent victims
It should be added that the media are partly to blame in that they amplify the harm involved in sexual abuse, and that itself causes people to feel that it is more terrible than it really is.