On Freedom of Expression, Holocaust Denial, and ‘Do Not Stray’ (Column 6)

Natan:
It is important to distinguish between freedom of expression and freedom of funding. Those seeking to outlaw Nakba Day events are not asking to forbid expressing the view that Israel’s Arabs experienced a national disaster in 1948, but rather to forbid institutions that receive state funding from allowing, on their premises, demonstrations that undermine the existence of the very state from which they receive that funding.
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The rabbi:
Hello Natan.
I am talking about banning the thing itself, and the issue that interests me is the principled matter of freedom of expression. If there is a view that wants to forbid this in a certain domain, that is a more technical question, and it can also be discussed. But as stated, that is a different issue.

Shu’a:
Even a loopy prohibition can have an effect. It raises the price of investigation, that is, the cost of the gamble. Now the person examining the matter has to take into account that if he is mistaken, then he has defied the commander’s word (and perhaps will bear punishment). And given the prohibition, a person who believes in the whole package at about 90%, and hears about a book containing new arguments, and for some reason initially assigns the book a 10% chance of changing his mind, is very likely to avoid reading it. Because there is a high probability that he will not reach any new conclusion and will only incur the transgression and the punishment.
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The rabbi:
I did not claim it has no effect. We can plainly see that it does (many refrain from exploring because of it). But the existence of an effect is a factual matter. My claim is on the normative plane: we should not allow it to have such an effect. I also claim that because of the circularity there cannot be any prohibition here, and that in turn neutralizes the factual effect as well (because if there is no prohibition, there is no need to fear it). Of course, anyone who is not persuaded will continue to be affected, as with any argument.
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Shu’a:
Is there really a normative loop in such a prohibition? An inherent contradiction? I don’t see one. What is the problem with a system forbidding inquiry into whether it is correct? The whole problem is simply that the hearer probably will not obey the meta-law, just as he does not obey the law itself. Even a law commanding one to obey the laws is not a loop; it just makes the side of violation heavier (something like violating five prohibitions in one act, especially for someone who does not attribute essences to transgressions). Now, if the prohibition is meaningful and has an effect, then on the contrary, it seems very plausible to me that one would be commanded in this way. It is only logical that a commander who is certain of the truth of his commandments would command the believers not to check other possibilities (and that this would affect them when they already assign fairly high credibility to his command).
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The rabbi:
Such a command is null, because it is a command that is not capable of being obeyed. Even if people obey it, that would only be because of a mistake in thinking (at most they would obey it because they have no real doubt, and then it is not because of the command). That is why I treat this as a logical loop. Pooh Bear’s command, “Offenders will be punished” (without defining who an offender is), is empty of content even though formally there is nothing wrong with it. Likewise a sign in some hall that says, “Nothing may be read in this room.” It is a paradox, even if formally perhaps not. The paradox is substantive, not formal.
But this hair-splitting is not important. It is clear that such a command has no validity whatsoever, whether you see it as a logical loop or not.

Alex:
I completely agree, but the prohibition on Holocaust denial has all kinds of reasons behind it that are not necessarily connected to the arguments you raise. That those reasons are ineffective is already another issue.
It is certainly possible that in a hundred years this prohibition in European countries will weaken or disappear. It is harmful and abusive to Holocaust survivors, and besides, there is no “Holocaust research” free of bias that does not somehow touch on antisemitism or the justification of the Nazis. Maybe there will be such a thing in the future.
But this is definitely a very valid point: the more one forbids discussion of something, the more attractive that thing becomes, in the sense of “stolen waters are sweet.”
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The rabbi:
Indeed. I would only add that even research that belongs to antisemitism or the justification of the Nazis should, in my opinion, be published, for the reasons I spelled out.

A Simple Person:
Hello Rabbi Michi,
A. A nice article, but it suffers from a distortion of the facts, as follows:

The Holocaust Denial Prohibition Law, 5746–1986, says this:
A person who publishes, in writing or orally, statements denying the acts committed during the period of Nazi rule that are crimes against the Jewish people or crimes against humanity, or diminishing their dimensions, with intent to defend the perpetrators of those crimes or to express sympathy or identification with them, shall be liable to five years’ imprisonment.

And in section 4:
The publication of a correct and fair report on a publication prohibited under this law shall not be regarded as an offense under this law, provided that it was not done with the intention of expressing sympathy or identification with the perpetrators of the crimes against the Jewish people or against humanity.

It is clear to all that the law prohibits publication for the purpose of identification with, sympathy for, and the like toward accursed criminals. There is absolutely no prohibition on intellectual discussion in any form; indeed, the meaning of the law explicitly indicates permission for such discussion, if its purpose is to clarify the truth and the historical facts.

In addition, a correct point that you raised briefly [without sufficient discussion, in my opinion] is that even if the prohibition were sweeping, more extreme than the law actually states, it would still have a worthy purpose. Just imagine what would happen in the antisemitic world if Holocaust-denial celebrations began. First, the extremist antisemitic minority would celebrate and spread “facts” that the Holocaust—as it is portrayed—never existed. In the end, even the “moderate antisemitic majority” [that is, most of the world, including the West, and the Holocaust proves it] would adopt these views, as propaganda accompanied by hatred tends in the end to influence the masses. Remember that were it not for that propaganda, which operated with even greater force under Goebbels’ direction, it is highly doubtful that the enlightened European peoples would not have risen up in the face of inhuman crimes they saw with their own eyes, despite not being, by definition, “lovers of Jews.”

A world without “coming to terms” with the human process that occurred in the Holocaust will eventually arrive at another Holocaust. The law is a proper mechanism to stop that process, which in my opinion, incidentally, existed throughout history, exists today, and will exist in the future, though in reduced measure.

I know you do not like psychology, but what can be done—this is how reality operated in the past, and presumably if we do not restrain the extremists it will operate that way in the future.

B. Regarding your claim about the prohibition on reading heretical books, I would like to raise a point that “fell out” of the discussion. I assume from experience that most human beings in the world are not “people of intellect”; there is no doubt that “people of wisdom” are a minority, and therefore if each person tries to formulate his own views, destruction will come upon the world. That is what the sages are for, each field and its own sages. That is how it is in security, economics, and law; that is how a sane society should conduct itself. What would happen if “Makhlouf from the market (the legislature)” began expressing views on matters of security? Surely every sensible person would protest. I believe every “person of sense” would be alarmed, and rightly so, if a talented physicist, however gifted he may be (even if he is a rabbi and philosopher), began teaching the State of Israel a lesson in the laws of security/economics/international relations.

The same applies, for the same reason, to such a fundamental matter as faith: not every first-year yeshiva student can express an opinion on these lofty matters. For that, one must be a philosopher [at the very least, reasonably so].

This idea is supported by Maimonides’ words (Laws of Idolatry 2:3), who presents the prohibition as follows:
“We are warned not to entertain in our hearts any thought that uproots one of the principles of the Torah, nor to turn our attention to it and think on it and be drawn after the thoughts of the heart. For a person’s mind is limited, and not all minds can grasp the truth as it really is; and if every person were to follow the thoughts of his heart, he would end up destroying the world because of the shortness of his understanding.”

In the following halakhah, Maimonides qualifies the prohibition:
“How so? Sometimes he will explore after idolatry; sometimes he will think about the unity of the Creator—perhaps He exists, perhaps He does not; what is above, what is below, what is before, what is behind; sometimes about prophecy—perhaps it is true, perhaps it is not; and sometimes about Torah—perhaps it is from Heaven, perhaps it is not. And he does not know the standards by which to judge until he knows the truth clearly, and he will thus come to heresy.”
I estimate that a critical reader will notice the phrase: “And he does not know the standards by which to judge until he knows the truth clearly.” Clearly, here Maimonides left an opening for a person who knows the “standards of judgment” [in my humble opinion, logic in the foreign tongue, or “the science of reasoning” in the holy tongue], to come and “open everything up” and conduct a deep inquiry in whatever field he wishes.

It should be added that it is true that Maimonides learned much external wisdom and books of philosophy, and even actual books of idolatry, as he testifies about himself in the Guide of the Perplexed: “I did not leave unread any book on idolatry that had been translated into Arabic.” But when he was young [if I recall correctly, seventeen], he studied Aristotle’s logic and wrote a treatise on it, and that was his first work [called “Explanation of the Terms of Logic”; see the introduction to R. Kapach’s edition].

The claim you raise—“It seems more reasonable to suggest that the prohibition of ‘do not stray after’ speaks only about people who are looking for a way out, that is, they are seeking arguments not in order to examine them honestly, but only in order to hang onto them and find in them justification for their evil inclination. According to this suggestion, the prohibition does not deal with someone who listens to arguments and reads various materials in order to form a serious position”—is certainly a serious claim, and clearly it is correct, but it is a prior condition to the condition that I presented: a person whose entire aim is ‘to escape religious commitment’ cannot arrive at the truth, because he is biased. Only after a person reaches the state of ‘seeking and pursuing the truth’ must he examine himself to see whether he has the ‘tools’ to inquire—whether his IQ level meets the criteria of an intelligent person. Only then may he approach the holy, and of course with a sense of holiness.

In addition, ‘a person who is looking for arguments to justify his evil inclination’ is unlikely to be deterred by a religious prohibition; he is not within the system and does not heed its instructions, so that is unlikely to be what the halakhah intends. The halakhah is not addressing such a person at all; they simply are not speaking the same language. [In this claim, I think there is also a logical fallacy, but I leave that to you…].

And in conclusion, I will finish with a sentence that at first glance may seem outrageous, but upon slight reflection a person will see that this is how our lives are run, and this is how every person [even the fool, who does not imagine he is wise] prefers them to be run.

“The world belongs to the wise.”
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The rabbi:
A. I did not manage to understand which facts in my words were distorted. What does all this have to do with them? Even the expression of sympathy is permissible in my view, so long as there is no imminent danger. If you claim there is danger—I disagree with you (as I wrote).
B. I disagree, and not because I dispute the facts (that most of the world are not philosophers), but because there is no place for such a prohibition even with respect to fools. You suggest that everyone must follow the wise. Who is wise? Those in the environment where I was born? Why דווקא them? You did not address my arguments.
If such a person is not deterred, then there is no point at all in this prohibition. By your account it is relevant only to those who really do want to investigate. So what is its point? That is complete absurdity, of course.
To my intellectual regret and moral joy, “the world belongs to all its inhabitants” (not to the wise).
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A Simple Person:
A. The facts that were distorted are these: from the article it unquestionably appears that it is forbidden to express any opinion whatsoever, and not only an opinion of ‘sympathy and support’—which means that the intellectual integrity of the human race is not going to be harmed in the next thousand years, at least not because of this law. As for sympathy, it is likely to lead to support; this happened in the past and will probably happen in the future [I would be glad if you explained why you disagree].
B. You are touching on another problem: that a person has a tendency in the future to agree with what he agreed with in the past. In my opinion there is no solution to this, or at least none that I know of. A simple example: even you [a person I esteem] went through upheavals but in the end returned to the source. And again, in my opinion many of the motives are psychological.
A person should not follow the sages of his city; rather, once a person understands that he is mature and has become reasonably wise, he must clarify the truth for himself, and by his intellect alone. A person feels when he is ripe for philosophical inquiry. [Hint: at an age when bodily, hormonal desires no longer carry excessive weight in his decisions. At least in my opinion.]
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The rabbi:
A. I do not know how you understood that from the article. I looked through it again quickly and did not find the things you attributed to me. I spoke in principle about a prohibition on expressing an opinion, and I did not write that every opinion is forbidden to express. In general, I did not describe any fact except that in many places there is a prohibition on Holocaust denial. I described more extreme situations one could arrive at (such as denying part of the facts and the like) as a possible implication. So how did my words, which did not touch the facts at all, seriously distort them? Your secret remains your own.
B. Let me summarize what follows from your words. According to your approach, a person must do what his birthplace tells him (for example, worship idols and eat human beings) until he matures and comes into his own judgment (that is, until he is a cannibal versed in Kant and free of hormones), and only then can he examine himself and change the menu (focus on eating grass instead of people). At age 50 and up (when the hormones calm down), and only if he is one of the select few who has reached lofty philosophical attainments, may he change his way. Surely this is not meant as a humorous sketch?

See here an interesting discussion by Oren Nahari about rewriting history in the name of political correctness (even in its positive sense):
http://mag.walla.co.il/item/3092884?page=2

Hello, honorable rabbi,
1. I think one should distinguish between reading books of heresy and Holocaust denial. Here the matter causes people a certain emotional discomfort, which is one of the motives that led to legislating the law, and there, well, not so much.
2. You mentioned in passing that people who hold views concerning the Palestinian catastrophe are somewhere between unintelligence and mental illness. I’d be happy if you could expand a bit on that :).
Thank you very much.

Hello.
1. With all due respect to distinctions, hurting people cannot justify forbidding the expression of opinions and the raising of arguments. They should get over it.
2. What is there to expand on? Isn’t it self-evident? The Arabs did not accept the UN partition resolution and launched a war with the declared aim of eliminating all of us, and they lost. They cooked it and ate it. Poetic justice, and I do not have so much as a shred of guilt about it (Kishon wrote feuilletons about this that became books: Sorry We Won and Woe to the Victors). The mistake was that they did not throw all of them out of here, only some. That’s all.

Here, now a new uproar: only we are allowed to silence (mistaken) opinions in public discourse; when someone else tries to do the same thing, he is condemned from wall to wall: https://news.walla.co.il/item/3130611
All the idiots who are now passionately arguing about the law passed by the Polish parliament forbidding mention of the phrase “Polish death camps” and forbidding accusations that the Polish government assisted the Nazis. These are both clear historical truths: there were no Polish death camps, and there was no governmental assistance to the Nazis. A prohibition has now been enacted against whoever denies these truths. How is this different from the law forbidding Holocaust denial? In my opinion, not at all.

Maimonides in the Laws of Idolatry indeed describes how our father Abraham grew up among idol worshippers, until he began asking questions, and all the people in his place were idol worshippers. He does not explain at what stage Abraham stopped worshipping idols, but it was a process—he asked questions, but did not stop worshipping idols, until he reached the age of forty, and then began arguing with others.

“After this mighty one was weaned, he began to roam in his mind while yet a child, and to think day and night. And he wondered: How is it possible that this sphere should always move without having a mover? And who turns it? For it is impossible that it should turn itself. He had neither teacher nor informer, but was sunk in Ur of the Chaldeans among the foolish idol worshippers.

“His father and his mother and all the people worshipped idols, and he worshipped with them. But his heart roamed and understood, until he attained the way of truth and understood the line of righteousness through his sound understanding. And he knew that there is one God there, and He guides the sphere, and He created everything, and among all that exists there is no god besides Him.

“And he knew that all the people were mistaken, and that what caused them to err was this: their worship of the stars and the images, until the truth was lost from their minds. And at the age of forty Abraham recognized his Creator.

“Once he recognized and knew, he began to answer the people of Ur of the Chaldeans and to debate with them, saying that this is not the path of truth in which you are walking. And he smashed the idols and began to make known to the people that it is fitting to worship only the God of the world.”

I liked it very much. More power to you.

Hello and blessings, sorry that I’m commenting on this old article, but I printed several of your early articles and read them on Shabbat.
Your article implies that you are basically not in favor of silencing opinions different from our own, but rather that everything should be raised and discussed and each person should decide for himself. In principle I think everyone would agree with you, but on the other hand, you too (I believe) would agree that a small child cannot decide what to choose among the various options presented to him; he is not sufficiently competent to decide correctly, and therefore you too (again, so I believe) would not want to expose him to problematic opinions that could tempt him toward views that might lead him to suicide, drugs, pornography, gambling, and the like.
Now I copy-and-paste this to our own situation: between those who know how to decide and those who do not want to decide, there are many others who do not know how to decide and understand the information made available to them. Such people do not know how to choose among different opinions and may follow the more popular view, the one that sounds better and more impressive, and so on. Therefore I would not make heretical arguments accessible to people who are not sufficiently competent; I would not raise every topic for discussion before people who are not sufficiently competent, and so on. The question is who counts as not sufficiently competent. Those who legally prohibit talk of Holocaust denial and the like do so because there is an audience that does not know how to cope with such information and may accept it easily, lacking sufficient critical mechanisms.
The question is whether you would agree with me that there are people who cannot decide and hear these opinions, and therefore it is proper to block access and not always make the information freely available to them, and that there needs to be a “Big Brother” to filter the information for them. As I understand it, this is the way conservative societies operate with regard to exposure to information and other offensive content for the general public. I see this as something very intuitive and plausible, not as something outrageous as you presented it.
I’d be happy to hear your opinion.

Hello.
My claim was a principled one. I oppose silencing opinions, and certainly reasoned opinions.
It is true that with regard to children, it is advisable to do this gradually: to expose them little by little to the various views while giving them tools of criticism so that they can form a position. But that is only a tactic. In the end, everyone should be exposed to everything.
If there are adults who do not know how to form a position, and there are many כאלה, that does not justify silencing. That is their problem. You cannot make decisions for them and decide for them what is right and what is not. If they formed a position incorrectly, they will answer for it and bear the consequences. The paternalism by virtue of which you want to form a position for others is very problematic, since many others will say that you too are not competent enough, and they too will not present you with the full range of views and arguments.
Offensive content is something entirely different. Opinions are not offensive content. Opinions should be addressed—accepted or rejected with reasons. Being offended by opinions is not a relevant response.

“Since many others will say” — is that merely a pragmatic consideration by which paternalism loses its standing in the face of fools?

Hello again, and thank you for the quick reply. I have a few comments on what you wrote:
A. Just as you agree that with children one should filter and expose them gradually, so too should one do with adults who are not capable of deciding. Of course one can always protest and say, who made you the one to decide? But the same claim can be made even with respect to children. The only difference is that with children we all understand that we have a somewhat broader understanding and perspective than they do, and therefore we allow ourselves to block them from excessive exposure to information that seems problematic to us. The same should apply to such adults who are in our society. I agree that anyone can raise the claim “who are you to decide,” but on the other hand, one cannot ignore the reality that there are people who are not mature enough to be exposed to all kinds of information and decide about it; they are not mature enough to cope with such information. Therefore your point about “who are you to decide” is valid, but in my opinion so is the reality that most people do not know how to decide properly regarding every kind of information streamed to them and to form a correct opinion about it. Therefore some kind of filtering system is needed—perhaps representatives of the public should decide what is appropriate and what is not, and so on—but certainly not in the sweeping and simplistic way you propose.
B. You claimed that if there are people who do not know how to decide, that is their problem. The problem is that this is the general public, and once information is broadcast openly to the general public—it can harm them if they do not know how to form an opinion on the subject.
C. You argued that one should distinguish between opinions and offensive content. I do not understand: if I want to expose your little son to drugs—why do you say that is offensive? I say it is a taste of the World to Come. Let him try it and decide for himself. And here we return to section A. So clearly there must be some degree of filtering.

No. It is an argument against paternalism.

I have nothing to say. Think for yourself about the difference between extreme examples and normal situations.

And what is it? Perhaps that I do not want unchecked paternalism as a general rule. Or that the fact that many would err in applying paternalism arouses suspicion that I too am erring. Or perhaps it is a thought experiment meant to make one feel the importance of autonomy in decision-making and the sovereignty to make mistakes. Or what? Could you explain?

All three. 🙂

I’ll phrase it differently so that the matter will be more specific and clear: as a parent who has formed a certain opinion and certain truths, and who regards himself as a wise and discerning person who knows how to form an opinion—would you want your children to be exposed to foolish opinions, if you know that they do not possess understanding like yours and that those opinions can cause them to stray and look toward other paths? You may say yes, but what if I tell you that these are paths that could lead them to ruin?

(This is also true regarding heretical statements: halakhic sages forbade what seemed to them a deviation from the path of truth so that their students would not come to err and miss the purpose of their lives—“to inherit Gehenna.”)

Definitely.

I understand. If you regard yourself as an intelligent person (more than many people, such as your children), why do you support exposing your children and others to opinions that in your eyes are nonsense and liable to lead them to mistaken places? What value is there in that?

Because there is value in a person’s autonomy and not only in truth. The value of truth is mainly if you chose it autonomously. See my article on authority and autonomy in halakhic decision-making.

Thank you. I read your remarks about autonomous halakhic decision-making. You brought sources. But there is no logic in saying that there is value in autonomous decision-making if it leads to error. Why do you see value in that?

It is simple reasoning. If the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted the result as such (observance of the commandments), He should have created us without free choice and without inclinations. If those were created, that shows that what He wants from us is observance מתוך בחירה—from choice—and not mere observance itself.
Let me offer you a thought experiment. Would you agree to undergo hypnosis that would ensure that you will always observe all the commandments and avoid transgressions? Do you think it would be proper to do so?

What would your position be regarding a situation in which freedom of expression and the expression of opinions without any censorship is exploited in order to spread to children (age 7, age 15, or age 60) texts that will succeed in persuading them to close their eyes and stop up their ears forever against reading and hearing any material that contradicts their beliefs—that is, texts against everything you are fighting for in this article.
As you know, this is not a theoretical or imaginary situation at all, but one that exists in almost every religious group (including, of course, the religion of the newspaper Haaretz, the religion of Channel 14, the religion of LGBT, the religion of being for judicial reform, the religion of being against judicial reform, the religion of only Bibi, the religion of only not Bibi, the religion of bringing back the hostages at any cost, the religion of destroying Hamas at any cost, etc., etc., and much more could be said), but that is not the point, and let us assume this is only a hypothetical situation.
To sharpen the question, I add that empirical research proves to us with absolute certainty that this is a text written with such perfect and fantastic literary and rhetorical talent that after reading it, the reader fully adopts its contents and is indeed persuaded to remain forever enclosed in the bubble and shell into which he was born, without ever again peeking outside.
Even in such a case, would you still fight for “freedom of expression and the expression of opinions without any censorship” for those who distribute such texts?
If, as I am convinced, you would in fact fight with all force against the dissemination of such texts (and that is exactly what you are doing in this article), that is: if you would reveal yourself as a partner and loyal soldier of the method of silencing and censorship, at least in this case (again, as you reveal yourself in this article), then the necessary logical conclusion is that in your view there is only one serious danger in the whole world of beliefs and opinions, namely the restriction of their free framework and infrastructure, while no specific content of any belief or opinion, whatever it may be, is considered by you dangerous on that level.
Reality, of course, slaps that conclusion in the face, and every single article among the hundreds of articles you have written in this Q&A (not to mention most of the responses and talkbacks…) proves again and again and again how much you yourself think our world is overflowing with countless mistaken, foolish, dangerous, and harmful beliefs and opinions, which the average critical capacity of the ordinary person utterly fails to identify and replace with clarified and refined beliefs and opinions, and all of these are marching the world toward the abyss (and these are what you try with all your intellectual might to fight with full vigor—but how much do you in fact succeed in changing society, despite your very powerful arguments against the logical fallacies you expose?).
As someone who has spent decades clarifying beliefs and opinions, is it your impression that the ordinary person is equipped with tools that enable him successfully to cope with manipulative and demagogic rhetoric that endlessly sells him nonsense and absurdities dressed up as reasoned and “logical” statements (to the point that you think it so justified to fight for the right to expose the ordinary person to all this garbage and trust him to do the work of clarification properly)?
In other words: is there even one person on earth whom you would allow to write columns here in your place and in your name?

I hesitated whether to censor this demagogic text, but since I oppose censorship, I did not do so. I am also in favor of free and substantive discussion, and therefore I will even trouble myself to address this demagoguery, since amid the clouds of demagoguery there are also a few substantive arguments here (mistaken ones, of course).
1. My position regarding freedom of expression has been expressed here and elsewhere very clearly, so I wonder what you thought when you asked me about it. I am in favor of disseminating every opinion of every kind, including opinions opposed to freedom of expression (like your text, which was not censored). Your reference in the question to children is, of course, demagoguery, since there is definitely room not to expose children to every kind of content (pornography or violence, for example). But even with respect to children, that is mainly the parents’ role, not the state’s. From the standpoint of the state, there should be maximal freedom.
2. If there is a text written with such powerful literary talent, then it deserves to have an effect. And if someone disagrees, let him write a text with maximal literary talent in opposition. I do not oppose the dissemination of Haredi opinions. I am very much in favor of arguing against them and denouncing them. That is absolutely not the same thing.
3. Your confidence about what I think and what I would do is not an argument, and it does not really interest me. I suggest that next time you ask me questions about my positions and not decide them for me. Otherwise, I suggest you open your own blog and converse there with yourself.
4. The world is indeed full of mistaken and foolish beliefs (and also of texts like this) and of people who find it hard to cope with them, but that is not a reason to shut mouths. My success in persuading is not a relevant factor. Everyone should express his view, and the chooser will choose. Silencing is certainly not the solution to that, and certainly not in my opinion. The proof is that I let you write your words here.
5. The ordinary person does possess tools to cope, but unfortunately does not use them. It is appropriate to try to improve the situation, but that is not a reason to shut mouths and think in his place.
6. I would not let a single person in the world write columns here in my place and in my name. But what does that have to do with the discussion and with freedom of expression? If you want to express your views, do so on your own blog and in your own name. Do not worry, I will not shut it down.
In short, it is worth thinking a bit before writing in such a decisive manner, making absurd assumptions and then leaping straight to conclusions. After all, a text that deals with inability and demagoguery would do well to guard itself against both.

Let’s simplify and focus the discussion with the help of a simple thought experiment:

1. Let us imagine three people: Reuven, Shimon, and Levi.
2. There is some piece of information that needs to be clarified (for example: did the Nazis burn bodies in crematoria at Auschwitz 80 years ago, or not?).
3. Assuming that:
A. None of them has direct, immediate awareness of the information.
B. All three are decent people, free of any interest or bias, who set out to investigate sincerely and in good faith, with the pure aim of getting to the truth.
C. All three are equipped with good thinking tools (one more, one less), at a level sufficient to reach the truth (if those tools are indeed used and exhausted).
4. In such a situation there is no dispute at all that full freedom of expression is the best framework for helping uncover the truth (the more each of the three is completely free to present to the other two any argument, reason, supposition, concern, criticism, idea, evidence, proof, refutation, question, difficulty, conclusive objection, etc., etc., with no limitation or censorship, the better it will be for everyone, and the greater the chances of reaching by joint effort the common goal: investigation of the truth).
5. Up to this point I agree with your position one hundred percent. Our disagreement therefore concerns the following situation:
6. Suppose that Reuven has direct, immediate awareness of the information (he himself was a prisoner in Auschwitz whose job was to transfer the bodies from the gas chambers to the crematoria), but on the ground there are no unequivocal forensic proofs by which he can prove to others what he himself knows with certainty. By contrast, the field is full of false “evidence” supposedly proving the opposite (for example, that the stories about gassing and burning bodies are malicious lies spread by the Allies in order to justify the war against enlightened Germany, in addition to being the fruit of Zionist propaganda to justify the criminal establishment of the State of Israel. This “evidence” includes documents—of course forged—presenting, in black and white, protocols of secret discussions in which Churchill, Stalin, and Chaim Weizmann plan in minute detail the spread of these “lies”).
Shimon was exposed to this “evidence” and was convinced by it (at least just as millions around the world continue to believe to this day, more than a hundred years later and despite the clear-as-noonday refutations, in the atrocious forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion; see the book by retired judge Hadassa Ben-Itto, The Lie That Wouldn’t Die), simply because Reuven’s testimony, despite its factual truth, sounds less persuasive than the “evidence” planted by the Nazis. Shimon, a writer of supreme talent, wrote a book in which he described his whole journey to the “truth” בעקבות that series of “evidences,” and afterward he passed away.
In your opinion, it is not proper, and indeed forbidden, for Reuven to throw the book into the furnace and not allow it to serve as a megaphone and platform for Nazi lies; rather, Reuven has an obligation to let Levi read the book, despite the very high concern that, like Shimon, Levi too will “buy the line” (well cooked and seasoned, far more than Reuven’s dumplings, bland and lacking sparkle as those of the last witness), will become convinced that the horrors of Auschwitz never happened, and will pass on this “information” to generations “that knew not Joseph” (after Reuven too ultimately passes on to the World that is entirely good).
In my opinion, Reuven may, and perhaps even must, turn this lying and despicable book into food for the flames, and the sooner the better, even though in this case the sacred and holy value of “freedom of expression” will be harmed. He must not adopt baseless optimism and take the risk that Levi too will fall into the cycle of falsehood and that the truth will be buried forever (together with the bodies burned at Auschwitz).
7. Now let us return to section 3 and add to the exercise also subsections B and C, that is:
Suppose Reuven is a decent person, but Shimon has a clear interest and agenda (in favor of the Nazis), or that Reuven’s thinking tools are vastly more developed and refined, while Shimon’s are weaker and more defective to one degree or another—while on the other hand Shimon’s powers of rhetoric and manipulation are greater than Reuven’s (there is no symmetry or overlap between these skills; there are people of truth devoid of rhetorical ability, and many liars whose powers of expression can hypnotize elephants and giants). Would you, Michael Abraham, continue to cling devotedly to the unassailable flag of “freedom of expression” and abandon Levi’s persuasion arena to the delusional optimism that confidently claims that even with such a combination of factors (truth + weakness in the force of testimony + lack of rhetorical skill, versus falsehood + self-interest and agenda + [or weakness in thinking and cognition] + rhetorical skill), specifically the absence of limitation and censorship will better advance the value of truth (or is freedom itself in your eyes a value equal to or even higher than truth?)? I, by contrast, am one hundred percent certain that the right thing in such a situation would be to sin a little (“a transgression for its own sake is great”) against the sanctity of “freedom of expression” and destroy every trace of the false “expressions” of the interested, agenda-driven, or foolish Shimon, and to allow Reuven’s truth to be accepted in Levi’s heart without disturbance.
8. Add to this a situation in which Levi, sincere and in good faith, truly seeks the truth, but his thinking tools are weaker than the thinking tools, and expressive powers, of Shimon the manipulator. (This is precisely what Maimonides’ words under discussion about the prohibition “do not stray after” are referring to: “For a person’s mind is limited, and not all minds can grasp the truth as it really is.”)
9. This is, without doubt, the simplest grounding for these words of Maimonides (your surprising attempt to find in his words the interpretation you present is, unfortunately, a model example of “threading an elephant through the eye of a needle”). Maimonides sees Moses our teacher (and all the more infinitely more so the Holy One, blessed be He Himself) as the “Reuven” in our exercise—that is, the one whose certainty regarding the correctness of the information he conveys to “Levi” is at the level of absolute certainty (see his words in Guide of the Perplexed III:24: “Everything the prophet sees in the prophetic vision is firmly true for the prophet; he has no doubt about any of it whatsoever”—and this is true of any prophet, all the more so of Moses; see his words in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 7:6 and in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 10:1, in the “seventh principle”). Therefore it is both his right and his duty to instruct “Levi” to censor and even destroy the “expressions” of “Shimon” (as above: after all, “Reuven” knows clearly that this is falsehood, and falsehood that can easily persuade, when “Levi” will not always be able to defend himself against it successfully).
10. In your view, how far is the world from the situation I described?
Is the world not full to the brim with “Shimons” who are self-interested, agenda-driven, and foolish, and with “Levis” of “limited understanding”?
Can truth always win in debates, in TV studios, or in living-room discussion groups? (As I wrote in the previous response: you are one of the best proofs that the truth, which you indeed often express in a brilliant and extraordinary way, is very far from succeeding in drawing to itself the intelligent layer among your readers and associates, and all the more so the masses, despite the excellent or reasonable thinking tools of many of them. No one knows this better than you.)
11. The comparison you draw between a proposition that directly and blatantly contradicts the principles of logic (thinking that 3+7=18) and a command given by one to whom the information is absolutely clear, namely “do not stray after” and gather and confront the whole array of “expressions” that undermine or deny that information—is exceedingly puzzling, especially when it comes from the keyboard of someone who undoubtedly knows (and repeatedly tells us) the difference between the absolute validity of logic and the attitude we should have toward anything else that is not pure and refined logic alone.
12. The entirely obvious fact that every liar, self-interested manipulator, demagogue, or fool can also stand up and declare—or even be wholeheartedly convinced (because of megalomania or plain psychopathy)—that he is the “Reuven” and all the rest are the “Shimons,” and therefore block “Levi” from exposure to all those “expressions” to which it is in fact extremely important—more important than anything else—to be exposed (certainly when the censorship of those false prophets and false messiahs and false priests places on the pyre the very “expressions” of the true “Reuven” himself, as has happened for thousands of years throughout history, from the time Nimrod wanted to “censor” Abraham our father, through the burning of the Talmud and the shutting of mouths by the Left to the [points of truth of the] Right and by the Right to the [points of truth of the] Left…)—that fact, difficult, painful, and challenging as it is, should not fling us over and abandon us to the opposite polar extreme that you propose, namely “freedom of expression” in every situation and at every price! One reason for this, besides the simple reason that one does not solve one delusional extreme with another delusional extreme (just as the solution to life at a boiling 100 degrees Celsius is not to move to a freezing minus 100), is that, as you often write, very nicely and very correctly in your way, about exaggerated fears over judicial reform or the lack of judicial reform, “no one is really going to legislate a law here to kill all redheads”…

You are exhausting me. I answered everything you asked here. In my opinion there is no justification for burning opposing arguments even in such a case. And I never wrote, nor do I think, that truth will necessarily prevail in the end. Preserving all opinions is not a means for truth to win, but an opportunity for those who can and want to formulate independent positions. That’s all.
You are sure you are right, but perhaps you are mistaken. You think that if you saw the crematoria then you know everything, but you do not know everything. And the Haredim too are certain beyond doubt that they know everything.
That’s it. I’m done.

In your reply—neither this one nor the previous one—there is any response to my explanation of why it is in fact “fair” on God’s part to command “do not stray after” (because He really is sure that the truth is with Him, so He is “allowed” to do so). Hence, either way: if God did not write the “and do not stray after” (according to Maimonides’ interpretation of this prohibition), but rather some human agent did—then it does not bind me, not because of any particular “problematicity” in such a command (as you argue at the end of the article), but simply because a human agent who pretends to be God and lies in His name does not bind me in anything, not even tefillin and the prohibition on pork; and if God is the one who wrote it (and it indeed, in your words, “descended from Sinai” with all that implies), then God, from His side—who surely “is sure He is right”—certainly can command such a command (as I explained in my previous message).
In short: “By God! If Joshua son of Nun told me this in God’s name, I would not obey him!”—fine, we’ve heard that; but where, may you be well, did you get the maxim: “Joshua son of Nun! If God told me this, I would not obey Him!”???
So no, I’m not done, because I am a devotee of “freedom of expression” and not of “shutting mouths” and ending discussions…

He did not command this. I have explained this several times on the site. At most this is an interpretation of the Talmud and the halakhic decisors. Even if that is what they understood—they were mistaken. And it is doubtful that this is really what they understood. Search here on the site.
And the difficulty about the other commandments—you added that only now. This is, of course, just a baseless expansion. When there is a difficulty or contradiction, I choose another interpretation or argue that they were mistaken. When there is no difficulty, then not. Just as the medieval commentators wrote about certain verses that they are a later addition, and that does not mean that the same is necessarily true of all the other verses. If I disagree with someone or do not accept his words on a certain issue, does that mean I have erased him entirely?
I too am a devotee of freedom of expression, but if you repeat the same thing again, I will not answer anymore. I am very much a devotee of ending pointless discussions that merely repeat themselves. Especially when they do so at irritating and unnecessary length.

You interpreted my words as a sweeping “all or nothing” broadening of the front—if this is not true then nothing is true, and vice versa—but that is not at all what I said.
What I am saying is that you are ignoring the clear distinction between the attitude toward the requirement of “do not stray after” (as Maimonides understands it) מצד the giver of the command, God in this case (assuming He exists and indeed gave the Torah to Israel), and the attitude toward this same requirement מצד the recipient of the command.
When you argue, near the end of the article, that in your opinion this command “is not coherent and therefore is void, no matter who said it,” you are merging these two attitudes into one. That is, since in your opinion the recipient of the command should not limit his space of inquiry and it is better that he “turn over every stone” on the road to truth, therefore in your opinion it is also not fair for the giver of the command to limit him.
To this I argue that although it is possible that the recipient of the command will still treat this command itself with skepticism (and may even suspect that it reflects weakness), nevertheless, assuming that on the part of the giver of the command there really is: (A) absolute certainty regarding the correctness of the content about which he is limiting the scope of inquiry, and (B) also a high-probability concern that the recipient of the command may be influenced by sophisticated manipulations that will prevent him from agreeing to that correct content (which is certainly correct from the standpoint of the giver of the command, as above)—then there is nothing illegitimate at all in issuing a command whose purpose is not to be exposed to manipulations that he may very well be unable to withstand (and for that I brought the analogy of Reuven, focusing only on the question whether there were crematoria or not, and not, as you unjustly expanded my intention, to other matters that Reuven indeed may not know; regarding those I fully agree that it is indeed called for to continue allowing unrestricted inquiry if the other conditions I listed in section 3 are met, namely fairness and competence. By the way, that is also a point of difference between the analogy and the analogue, since God, assuming He exists and gave the Torah and the command, is regarded as omniscient).

In any event, it is clear that Maimonides was fully convinced that the Sinai revelation happened historically and that no trickery or illusion could have been at work there (see Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 8:1, and at much greater length in the Epistle to Yemen), and therefore it is entirely consistent and coherent, at least in his eyes, that in such a situation there is no problem applying the “principle of finality” and determining that from this point onward there is no more point in continuing skepticism and inquiry (at least for one who, in his words in Laws of Idolatry, “does not know the standards by which to judge until he knows the truth clearly, and thus comes to heresy”).

Besides these words of Maimonides, there are quite a few other verses and sections in the Torah in this spirit—for example, the deadly attitude (in every sense) and utterly uncompromising approach toward the “enticer” and the “one who leads astray” (why not listen patiently to him and discuss his arguments calmly?), and so on.

My intention, of course, is to some of the recipients of the command who would treat this command itself skeptically (like you, for example, and many others), but obviously a very large part throughout the generations did and still does accept the command without skepticism (so one cannot raise the claim that the command is in any case ineffective).

Perhaps what you mean is that God commands on the assumption that anyone sufficiently wise will not obey Him. That is possible in principle, and I seem to recall that this suggestion appears somewhere else on my site. But that is of course very forced, because in my opinion there is no place for such a command at all (God is trying to deceive and hopes to get away with it). Be that as it may, it does not bind me.

God commands on the assumption that whoever is wise enough and understands that it is logical and right to rely on Him—will obey Him.
This command of “do not stray after” (according to the interpretation of Maimonides and others) does not appear in a vacuum. The Torah describes a long and complex process that led, stage by stage, a “stiff-necked people” to believe more and more in His existence, His involvement in the world, and His being a commanding God (the ten plagues, the splitting of the sea, the Sinai revelation, etc.), and in such a situation wisdom actually supports relying on the command rather than casting off its yoke.

If not, then in what principled way is “do not stray after” different from “you shall have no other gods before Me” and all the other prohibitions of idolatry? How do I know that the god who commanded me this is the true God? Perhaps דווקא those whom He forbids me to accept as gods are the truth (and perhaps they would have forbidden me to observe the Torah of Moses, and I should have obeyed them). Why do you accept that but not “do not stray after”?

Whoever believes in Him can obey Him. This is relevant to someone who has doubts.

The prohibition of idolatry concerns worship. There are no prohibitions on beliefs (except perhaps if they arise from inclination).

Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:6: “One who worships idolatry—whether one serves, sacrifices, burns incense, pours a libation, prostrates himself, or accepts it upon himself as a god…”
Maimonides, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:6: “Anyone who entertains the thought that there is another deity besides this One transgresses a negative commandment, as it is said: ‘You shall have no other gods before Me,’ and he denies the fundamental principle, for this is the great principle on which everything depends.”

And in any case, what difference does it make? If belief in the god commanding me not to worship other gods is not clear to me with certainty, then why should I obey him? Why shouldn’t I experiment with the experience of worship?

I do not know why everything has to be repeated several times. Such a prohibition has no meaning whatsoever. What do these quotations help? I know them too. Either they mean something else (for example, someone who thinks this only because of inclination), or they have no validity whatsoever.