On Freedom of Expression, Holocaust Denial, and 'Do Not Stray' (Column 6)
With God's help
The day before yesterday (14.5.2016), a demonstration was held by left-wing and Arab groups at Tel Aviv University as part of what the Arabs call "Nakba Day" (the mourning observed around Independence Day). The demonstrators called on the Israeli public to recognize the Palestinians' catastrophe and to stop lying to themselves and to others. Facing them, of course, stood the predictable right-wing counter-demonstration, and voices were heard calling to ban such events.
I do not wish to enter here into the particulars of the substantive issue—what exactly that "Nakba" is, and whether it is indeed justified to speak of a "Palestinian catastrophe." I will say briefly that, in my view, such conceptions lie somewhere between a severe lack of intelligence and a mild mental illness. But that is not my subject. The question I want to discuss here is that of freedom of speech and expression.
On freedom of expression
Whatever our opinion may be of the bizarre ideas expressed by this demonstration, I do not understand what reason could be offered for prohibiting it. There is no legal prohibition against lying, and that is a good thing. There is also no prohibition against being unintelligent, and that is no less a good thing. Moreover, there is no prohibition whatsoever against publicly expressing false and unintelligent ideas, and that too is excellent. Why is all this good? Here we arrive at what is called freedom of expression.
Freedom of expression is important from two main standpoints:
- First, it is a right reserved to each of us to express his opinion, whatever it may be. So long as he causes no harm, there is no justification for preventing him from doing so. This is the catharsis.
- But this is not only a matter of the speaker's right, but no less—and perhaps more so—of the listeners' right. Freedom of expression is not merely consideration for the distress of a citizen who wants to voice an opinion and release pressure, but enabling others to be persuaded by those opinions.
The fact that these views now seem to me stupid and/or wicked does not mean that I am necessarily right. To my shame, I have erred more than once in the past, and perhaps that is happening this time as well (although I am fairly sure that is not the case on this issue). In any event, it is doubtful that I could know this if people who think differently from me were not allowed to express their views. Let them express their views, and I will consider them on their merits and form my opinion.
Holocaust denial (warning: this section is not suitable for the faint of heart)
I want to go one step further. I have always wondered what the justification is for the prohibition of Holocaust denial that is accepted in many countries. In my view, this prohibition is an outrageous scandal. Someone arrogates to himself the right to act as guardian over what I may hear or say, and seeks to control my sources of information—that is, to filter facts or opinions in the name of truth (his truth). I am not trying to argue that I have any doubt that there was a Holocaust. I do not doubt it for a moment. And still, it is very important to me that Holocaust deniers be able to express their views freely and place them on the table for discussion.
It is important here to distinguish between the two aspects I raised earlier. As far as people's right to express a position that denies the Holocaust is concerned (the catharsis), I am not entirely sure I would fight for that. But it is certainly worth fighting for our own right to hear all these views and weigh them in order to form a balanced position ourselves, without the kindly assistance of Big Brother, who knows what is good and what is true for all of us.
Prohibiting Holocaust denial is a way of silencing people. What about someone who denies only part of it (who says that only two million Jews perished, or that it was not transgender people who were persecuted but only homosexuals)? Is it forbidden to discuss historical details concerning it for fear that we may be considered Holocaust deniers? Is not "Holocaust denial" a slogan that makes it possible to silence people in discussions that are, by all accounts, entirely legitimate?
I often imagine a situation in which we are all "living in a movie," inside some great Matrix, where we are told about a Holocaust, with testimonies and photographs and sources and teachers and lessons and lectures and museums, and all of it is nothing but one great fiction. Would you not want to hear views that try to point this out and wake us from that dream? If we are indeed living inside a fictional world, it is very important that the possibility of being rescued from it always remain. On the contrary: let everyone say whatever he wants and thinks, and then I will consider whether I am persuaded or not and form my own position.
Concealing information
Concealing information or opinions, however despicable, false, and bizarre they may be, is a grave ill in my eyes. Beyond that, it is also tactically mistaken, because it bespeaks weakness and in fact indirectly strengthens the silenced position. It makes it look as though we have no way to deal with Holocaust denial, and therefore we prohibit the expression of such views. If we do have a way to deal with it, then let all views be expressed and all arguments be brought forward, and then we can form an intelligent position.
Can anyone seriously imagine that there are historical issues that must not be freely clarified? Tomorrow morning it will be forbidden to examine what happened in the Six-Day War, or what happened in the court of the Duke of Buckingham. How will we know that we are not living in a movie? So what if we are sure? Perhaps that very certainty stems from the concealment itself. It is vital to hear all opinions and all facts (the correct ones and the incorrect ones), and to discuss them on their merits. The moment one begins to conceal opinions and facts and various statements, we have no way of knowing that someone is not taking control of our consciousness. Big Brother, or the minister for ideas, will determine what may and may not be said, and by doing so will deprive us of the free thought that is the foundation of our autonomy and our moral and ideological responsibility. Holocaust denial is probably historical folly, but political or other control over the marketplace of ideas can lead us to believe utter nonsense with the same degree of certainty with which we believe in the Holocaust. How will we know that this is not happening? How will we know that what we were taught about the War of Independence is indeed true?
By the way, where did the absurdities of the various Nakba demonstrators come from? From that same concealment, and in fact from those same two phenomena I pointed to: 1. They do not hear, or are unwilling to hear, other opinions and facts. Try saying in Umm al-Fahm (or in the newspaper "Haaretz") that there was no Nakba. You will immediately be crucified in the town square as a Holocaust denier (there are places where the expression "be crucified" should be taken literally). 2. Our denial and the taboo on these conceptions (which until recent years was fairly sweeping) grant them extra force. People may think that if so much effort is invested in hiding them and forbidding them to be voiced, then perhaps there is something to them?…
What we are trying to do on our side is a mirror image of what happens there. The Palestinians are fed tendentious and distorted information, and thus an absurd and disconnected position takes shape. Is that what we want to happen among us? How can we know that their position is absurd and ours is correct if we do not hear the arguments? Even if we are convinced that we are right, the discourse must still be free. If only so that there will not be issues in which we are convinced we are right but are mistaken. I am not willing to take even the slightest chance that because I could not hear certain opinions or facts I formed a detached and erroneous position.
Imminent danger
Of course, I do not deny the need for limits on freedom of expression in places where there is a clear and present danger. But so long as this is not the case, one must fight to the bitter end against attempts at silencing of any kind. Justice Brandeis, of blessed memory, already said that sunlight is the best remedy for every illness and every corruption. It is also the best remedy for every attempt to lie. If we silence it, we will only increase its power. On the contrary, everything should be said freely, and the free criticism that each person applies will handle the situation in the best possible way.
I assume there will be readers who will say that positions of Holocaust denial or conceptions of the "Nakba" are indeed dangerous and therefore should be prohibited. I do not think so, certainly not within the Israeli public. Perhaps within a neo-Nazi community this is dangerous because it might lead them to action (but even there this prohibition is meaningless, because those views will be expressed one way or another, and without sunlight they will not be able to deal with them), and likewise with regard to a Palestinian community. It seems to me that the distance from a tangible and imminent danger is still great enough that we should not infringe freedom of expression in these contexts.
A look at religious prohibitions on freedom of expression and thought
But all of this is really only an introduction to the real issue. In the halakhic tradition, a conception developed according to which it is forbidden to express certain positions (heresy), whether opinions or facts. This can even be grounded in enumerated commandments such as and you shall not stray after your heart and after your eyes ("do not stray after your hearts and after your eyes"), which are taken to forbid us to read books that express heretical views or to believe such views (see, for example, Maimonides, Laws of Idolatry 2:3, and Sefer HaMitzvot, prohibition 47, among many others). In our time this has expanded into a collection of principles, whose source is not always clear, that have become articles of faith, and anyone who denies them is to be excommunicated, silenced, and perhaps even worse. The prohibition of you shall not stray and the like have become tools of silencing. Any opinion that does not find favor in someone's eyes—he need only declare it heresy, and immediately it becomes illegitimate. These are not apocalyptic fantasies, but things that are constantly being done in practice (see, for example, my article on "those coerced by reason").
Here too, the problem is not only that a person is not permitted to read certain materials or express his opinion, but that because of these prohibitions, each of us forms a position based on partial information and on not hearing arguments from certain directions. What is a position formed in this way worth? Can a person who formed his position in this manner even be regarded as a believer?
One might perhaps think that such positions (=heresy) exert a certain charm on those who read them (heresy is different, because it exerts a pull—heresy has a seductive pull), and therefore they must be prohibited so that people will not be drawn after them without exercising judgment. But what is the alternative? Can one seriously demand of a person that he remain within the conception into which he was born simply because that is how he was born? Should someone who was born into a tribe of idol worshippers and cannibals in Africa also remain as he was educated and where he was born? How would we explain that he, specifically, should read outside and foreign literature (which the sages of his tribe prohibit to him) in order to form a position? What claim do we have upon him if we do not recognize that a person must examine different positions and arguments in order to form a position? Simply because we happened to be lucky enough to be born in the "right" place? Who told us that it is the right place if we cannot ascertain that? Does the fact that we were born here mean that there is something true here? Almost every one of us is biased toward thinking that the place in which he was born is the right one. Such a conception seems to me neither moral nor logical, and in fact not consistent at all.
It is interesting to note that this prohibition seems completely incomprehensible to people who stand outside religious commitment. They mock this closedness and deride the believer's begging of the question. But at the same time, for some reason, everyone keeps utterly silent about the prohibition of Holocaust denial, and some even propose banning Nakba Day demonstrations and the like. Why is it ridiculous in the religious context, but understandable and called for in the civic and historical context? It seems to me more correct to conclude that it is unjustified—neither here nor there.
An interpretive proposal
It makes more sense to suggest that the prohibition of you shall not stray speaks only about people who are looking for a way to escape—that is, who seek arguments not in order truly to examine them, but only in order to hang their hat on them and find in them a justification for their evil inclination. According to this proposal, the prohibition does not deal with someone who listens to arguments and reads different materials in order to form a serious position.
I do not know whether the interpretation I have suggested captures Maimonides' intention or that of other halakhic decisors. Perhaps it does (for Maimonides himself read quite a few books of the kind that he himself forcefully forbids reading), but perhaps not. One can perhaps infer from his words this way or that. The point I wish to emphasize is that none of this is really important. Even if this is not Maimonides' intention, it does not matter. A prohibition against examining positions and arguments is inconsistent, and therefore void, no matter who said it—Maimonides, Moses our Teacher, or even God Himself. Even He cannot command me to think that 3+7=18. Of this the Talmud says (see Hullin 124a): By God! If Joshua son of Nun had told me this in his own name, I would not have listened to him! ("By God! Even if Joshua son of Nun told me this in his name, I would not obey him!").
In other words, even if such a prohibition had come down from Sinai, I would not obey it, for this is a prohibition that forbids me to examine the very framework that imposes that prohibition upon me. This is a self-referential argument, and as such it is invalid on its face. It is worth noting that for this reason, of course, such a prohibition cannot possibly have come down from Sinai. Had it come from there, that would not have been Sinai. Such a God is not the God whom I am willing, and feel obligated, to serve.