Including Women for the Wedding Blessings (Column 598)
From the question about a small wedding to a principled question about changing circumstances
The starting point is a practical wartime question: at a small wedding, can women be counted toward the ten for birkat chatanim. From his reading of Rabbi Tzvika Reisman’s article, the column broadens the discussion into a more principled one: whether changing social circumstances, especially the changed status of women, can and should affect halakhic ruling. He notes that even when poskim argue in classical lomdus, background policy concerns often still operate: fear of Reform and reactions to the "spirit of the times."
The sources for requiring ten at birkat chatanim do not decisively show that it is devar shebikdusha
The column reviews the Mishnah in Megillah and the sugya in Ketubot: one source derives the rule from Boaz taking ten elders of the city, and another from the verse "bimkehalot barekhu Elokim." These sources more naturally suggest a need for publicity, an assembly, or a large gathering, not necessarily the technical category of devar shebikdusha. Even if the verses are only asmachta, they still teach something about the character of the enactment: a wedding blessing is meant to be said before many people because of the importance of the event and the praise it contains.
The real dispute: devar shebikdusha or a blessing of praise that must be said before many
The column argues that there are sources, such as the Shitah Mekubetzet and perhaps also Rambam in some places, from which one could infer that the requirement of ten for birkat chatanim comes from devar shebikdusha. But he stresses that this is difficult: birkat chatanim is not like Kaddish or Kedushah, and the Mishnah’s list also includes consoling mourners and land valuation, which are very hard to see as "devar shebikdusha." By contrast, the Ri"d, Arukh HaShulchan, Sha’ar HaTziyun, and others understand the need for ten here as parallel to birkat hagomel: not inherent sanctity, but saying praise and thanksgiving in a dignified way before an assembly. Even according to the views that use the language of "devar shebikdusha," he suggests that they may mean only that the source of the law is learned from there, not that this defines the blessing’s actual legal nature.
Rambam’s language and the commentators do not provide a clear source for excluding women
One of the central points is that Rambam’s wording on birkat chatanim excludes minors and slaves, but does not explicitly exclude women. The Maggid Mishneh also mentions only the exclusion of slaves and minors. The column concedes that this is not conclusive proof, because there are cases in which women may perform a certain halakhic act but are not counted toward the quorum required for it, as with Torah reading. Still, in his view, the absence of any explicit Talmudic or Rambam-based source excluding women from the ten for birkat chatanim strengthens the argument that this is not a classic minyan rule for devar shebikdusha.
The distinction between “community” and “many people” opens a halakhic path for counting women
The column adopts a distinction that Rabbi Reisman cites between cases that require a "tzibbur" and cases that require only "many people" or "publicity." Where a tzibbur is required, accepted halakhah usually does not count women; where only the presence of many people is required, there are sources indicating that women do count, as in some discussions of Megillah, kiddush Hashem, or asking forgiveness before ten. Therefore, if birkat chatanim belongs to the second category, women can be counted even without introducing a major innovation into the accepted halakhic structure.
The broader step: even identifying “community” with men alone depends on social reality
From here the column takes a further, more radical step: even the assumption that women are not part of a "tzibbur" is not self-evident. He argues that it has no sharp and clear source, and largely reflects an older social reality in which women were not seen as part of the public sphere. If so, once that status has changed, halakhah should also recognize that women are part of the community, and therefore can be counted not only for birkat chatanim but even for a prayer minyan and other devar shebikdusha. For him this is not merely an emergency leniency, but the halakhic truth that follows from changed reality.
Fear of a slippery slope is a policy consideration, not a halakhic argument that cancels a permission
The column emphasizes that in practice many poskim recoil from this conclusion not because of interpretive necessity, but because they fear broader consequences, a slippery slope, and association with Reform. He therefore reads the end of Rabbi Reisman’s article carefully: the final decision is handed over to the "judges" who will also weigh the need to protect "the walls of religion." Against this, the column argues that a posek is not entitled to turn a permission into a prohibition on policy grounds alone. A Sanhedrin could enact formal decrees; a contemporary posek can at most recommend not using a certain permission, but cannot present what is permitted as forbidden.
The practical conclusion: there are several cumulative grounds for leniency, but it is still wise to weigh the crowd’s reaction
In the practical conclusion, the column combines several arguments: if the ten for birkat chatanim are not required because of devar shebikdusha, then women certainly count; even if there is a link to devar shebikdusha, perhaps that is only in the source of the rule; and even if it really is devar shebikdusha, there is room to say that today women are part of the community. He adds that this is probably a rabbinic law, so there is also an element of safek derabbanan lekula, even though one must take possible berakhah concerns into account. He also mentions, in passing, his general puzzlement about the very idea that saying devar shebikdusha with fewer than ten could be forbidden, but he does not use that as an additional leniency here. In practice, he advised the rabbi who asked the question to assess the character of the crowd so as not to create turmoil at the chuppah, but if the practice is accepted, it could become the beginning of a broader and welcome change.
As a bit of the escapism called for in these turbulent days, I thought to share a question that reached me this morning from a rabbi who officiates weddings. Here is its wording:
| …
In your opinion, can women be included in the quorum of ten required for the wedding blessings (Birkat Ḥatanim) under the ḥuppah—at least in wartime, when some weddings are very small? At first I thought it was obvious that a minyan is required—that is, ten men. But I found the attached piece by Rabbi Tzvika Reisman, and the truth is that after reading it, it seems to me there is room to be lenient. What is your view? … |
Rabbi Reisman’s article was attached to the email, but it can also be read online here. In my reply I addressed several points raised in his article, but I thought it worthwhile to spell them out further and look at this question from a more principled angle that bears on halakhic ruling in changing times more generally.
By way of preface, it is clear to me that in the background stand the broader issues of attitudes toward women in general and in the modern era in particular, and no less the attitude toward change in halakhah and fears of “Reform.” This raises the question of whether, how, and to what extent one may employ the consideration of changed circumstances as part of halakhic decision-making. Rabbi Reisman is a businessman and a Haredi talmid ḥakham, yet very open-minded, with original and fascinating thinking. In his responsum he does not seem to rely on that consideration (see especially his concluding remarks, quoted toward the end of the column), but I find it hard to shake the feeling that it nevertheless hovers somewhere behind his words. Like many others who are uneasy with the spirit of the times (Reform and the like), he may have relied on such a consideration but wrapped it in classic halakhic-analytical arguments (which, in themselves, are sound; I have no criticism of the arguments). But that is only my impression, of course.
The Requirement of Ten for the Wedding Blessings
The source for the requirement of a quorum of ten for Birkat Ḥatanim is the Mishnah, Megillah 4:3:
We do not recite the introductory blessing to Shema, we do not pass before the ark, we do not lift hands [for the priestly blessing], we do not read from the Torah, we do not read the haftarah from the Prophets, we do not perform “standing and sitting” [for mourners], we do not say the mourner’s blessing and words of comfort, nor the blessing of bridegrooms, and we do not make a zimun with God’s Name with fewer than ten; and with valuations of land—nine and a priest—and similar cases with people like these.
So it is ruled by all the poskim. The amoraim disagree in Ketubot 7b about the verse that serves as the source:
Rav Naḥman said: Huna bar Natan told me: “From where do we know that Birkat Ḥatanim requires ten? As it is said: ‘And he took ten men of the elders of the city and said: Sit here’” [Ruth 4:2]. And Rabbi Abbahu said: From here—“In assemblies bless God, the Lord, from the fountain of Israel” [Psalms 68:27].
According to Rav Naḥman, the source is in the Book of Ruth in Boaz’s action, and on the face of it this was done to publicize the matter (marriage should be performed publicly). Rabbi Abbahu, by contrast, learns it from a verse in Psalms, as Rashi explains there:
“In assemblies bless God, the Lord, from the fountain of Israel”—for the blessing of the ‘fountain’ [i.e., marriage] one needs an assembly (qahal), and that is ten, as in “assemble the congregation” (Num. 20), and ‘congregation’ is not fewer than ten, as we learn (Berakhot 21b) from the congregation of the spies—“How long shall I bear with this evil congregation?”—Joshua and Caleb are excluded.
It seems that, due to the importance of the matter, it should be performed “in the presence of the many” (a qahal or an edah).
Note that, plainly, this is a rabbinic law; however, in Massekhet Kallah other sources are brought from Rebecca, and Boaz’s verse is cited only to teach that the obligation applies also to a widow. There is lengthy discussion in the Shitah Mekubbetzet on the Ketubot sugya (see s.v. “u-beMassekhet Kallah”). It is not clear whether the sources in Ketubot are mere asmakhtot or actual sources. But even if they are asmakhtot, one can still try to infer the contours of the law from them.
The Meaning of “Ten” in Birkat Ḥatanim
Rabbi Reisman cites a distinction between two different sources for requiring ten: (1) as a davar she-biqedushah (“a matter of sanctity”), and (2) as an act of praise and thanksgiving that should be performed before a public.
The aforementioned Shitah Mekubbetzet on Ketubot writes:
“From where [do we know] that Birkat Ḥatanim requires ten? As it is said: ‘Boaz took ten men.’” Explanation: As a matter of course, he gathered them only for Birkat Ḥatanim—for witnesses or for a kinyan, two would suffice—so he gathered ten only for the blessing; and because blessing God is a davar she-biqedushah, he gathered ten. (Language of the Geonim.)
We see he understood that the requirement of ten for Birkat Ḥatanim is as a davar she-biqedushah. Interestingly, Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah to Megillah writes:
“[Scripture says:] ‘I shall be sanctified in the midst of the children of Israel,’ and it was received as a tradition that any davar she-biqedushah is not [recited] with fewer than ten. ‘Porsin al Shema’ is the preface recited before the Shema…”
He then discusses the list of practices mentioned in the Mishnah. It would seem that he, too, ties everything to the rule of davar she-biqedushah.
But this is very difficult to accept, for, plainly, Birkat Ḥatanim is not a davar she-biqedushah. In fact, looking at the entire list in the Mishnah, it does not seem to consist of matters of sanctity. There is no Kaddish (of course, as it is Geonic), nor Kedushah, etc. By contrast, valuation of land and comforting mourners do appear there, and it seems obvious that they are not devarim she-biqedushah.
A closer look at Maimonides’ wording suggests the opposite reading: he opens by noting that devarim she-biqedushah require ten; then he proceeds to the other items in the Mishnah, which also require ten, although all—or at least some—are not devarim she-biqedushah.
In Mishneh Torah, Ishut 10:5, Maimonides writes:
We recite Birkat Ḥatanim only in the presence of ten adults who are free men, and the groom counts toward the ten.
He excludes slaves (who are not free men) and minors. But he does not exclude women.
The Maggid Mishneh on that halakhah writes:
What he wrote—that it is only with ten and that the groom counts toward the ten—is explicit in the Gemara. And what he wrote—“adults and free men”—is to say that a slave and a minor do not combine [for a quorum], [as ruled] in Berakhot 47b, at the conclusion of “Three who ate,” and so is his view in ch. 8 of the laws of prayer; and the same applies to any matter that requires ten—that they do not combine.
He, too, mentions only the exclusion of a slave and a minor—not of a woman—but he links this to the general rule regarding prayers that require ten, and, plainly, that is the rule of davar she-biqedushah (from which women would also be excluded). But, as noted, this is not compelled either by Maimonides’ phrasing or in general.
Rabbi Reisman notes that this also seems to be the view of the Tosafot Rid on Ketubot, namely, that this is not a davar she-biqedushah but requires ten because praise should be offered before the many. And this is explicit in the Arukh ha-Shulchan, Even ha-Ezer 62:11, who writes:
We recite Birkat Ḥatanim only with ten adults who are free men, not slaves, and the groom counts among the ten. Since they are blessings of joy and he is in a state of joy, why should he not be counted, whether recited at the time of the marriage or at the feast after Birkat ha-Mazon? And even though this is not a davar she-biqedushah like Kaddish and Kedushah, which may not be said with fewer than ten, nevertheless, since we say “He created all for His glory,” for the honor of those assembled and we mention the building of Jerusalem, it is not respectful to say them with fewer than ten.
Likewise, in Sha’ar ha-Tziyyun 219:7 he compares this to Birkat ha-Gomel, which is to be recited before ten; clearly that is a specific rule unrelated to davar she-biqedushah, implying that Birkat Ḥatanim is also not a davar she-biqedushah. In Ma’atikey Shemu’ah, p. 11, it is cited that the Griz disagreed, holding that it is because of davar she-biqedushah.
So far, we have seen a dispute about whether Birkat Ḥatanim is a davar she-biqedushah or not. But even for those who maintain that it is, since that position seems quite implausible, it may be that their intention was only that the requirement of ten for Birkat Ḥatanim is derived from the rule of davar she-biqedushah, not that the blessings themselves are such a matter. We find something similar in Sukkah 30b, where the sanctity of the sukkah wood is derived from the festival offering (“Just as the festival is ‘for the Lord,’ so, too, the sukkah is ‘for the Lord’”). Yet, according to most commentators, the wood does not possess sanctity; the derivation from the ḥagigah only teaches that use and benefit are prohibited, akin to a korban, though not for the same reason.[1] According to this, all may agree that the nature of Birkat Ḥatanim is not that of a davar she-biqedushah, and the dispute concerns only the source. Admittedly, the above-quoted Shitah Mekubbetzet seems to take it as literally a davar she-biqedushah, which is difficult.
One might have tried to uphold that position by arguing that kiddushin (betrothal) is, in fact, a davar she-biqedushah, based on Kiddushin 7a, which compares kiddushin to consecration (regarding “the leg of this animal is an olah” vs. consecrating “half a woman”—see the outstanding opening shiur of Rav Gustman in Kuntresei Shi’urim to Kiddushin). But this does not fit the Shitah Mekubbetzet, which claims that any blessing is a davar she-biqedushah (regardless of marriage). Moreover, the argument itself seems strained: if that were the rationale, the comparison to consecration concerns kiddushin rather than nissuin (marriage), and then we should require ten for kiddushin, not for nissuin. Indeed, in בש"C, Ketubot fol. 2, letter g, a dispute is cited:
Rav Aḥai wrote that the blessing of erusin [betrothal] requires ten, and R. Shmuel ha-Nagid disagreed, saying that ten are needed only for Birkat Ḥatanim, which alone is mentioned [in the sources]. Moreover, kiddushin is before two, and you require ten! And the Rosh wrote that Rav Aḥai’s words do not seem correct to me: according to what we derive from Boaz, Boaz also recited the blessing of erusin with ten; and according to what we derive from “In assemblies,” the blessing of erusin too, since it concerns the “fountain [of Israel],” requires ten… Yet two suffice for kiddushin, whereas for the blessings one needs ten.
In practice, it is accepted that kiddushin does not require ten, certainly not as a davar she-biqedushah.
Between “Community/Assembly” and “The Many/Public”
In sum, it is hard, on logical grounds, to accept that Birkat Ḥatanim is a davar she-biqedushah. The view of the Mishnah Berurah and the Arukh ha-Shulchan—that ten are needed so that many people are present—seems more persuasive. This is important for our topic, since it is accepted in halakhah that devarim she-biqedushah require ten men specifically. Thus, whether women are included in the ten for Birkat Ḥatanim hinges on the foregoing: if the requirement there is because of davar she-biqedushah, women are not included; but if for a different reason—i.e., it is not a davar she-biqedushah—then women may well be included. Indeed, we saw above that Maimonides excludes slaves and minors but not women, and, as I noted, it seems that this blessing is not a davar she-biqedushah. This further supports my claim that, even according to Maimonides, Birkat Ḥatanim is not a davar she-biqedushah. Incidentally, regarding who may recite Birkat Ḥatanim, Maimonides (Berakhot 2:9) excludes a slave and a minor but not a woman.
True, we find something similar with Torah reading, which also requires ten; it is accepted that women do not combine to the ten, and yet, in principle, women may be counted among the seven called to the Torah (were it not for considerations of communal dignity). Thus, we see a case where women may read but do not count for the quorum. Therefore, even if, for Maimonides, women may recite Birkat Ḥatanim, it does not necessarily follow that they combine to the ten. However, as we saw, Maimonides is precise in excluding a slave and a minor but not a woman—both regarding reading and regarding combining to ten; and the same regarding combining to a minyan of ten. Although it is accepted among the poskim that women are not counted, with respect to the Megillah—since women are obligated in its reading—the Rema (OḤ 690:18) is uncertain whether they combine to ten hearers (see also Responsa Rav Pe’alim, OḤ II 62).
In any case, for our purposes we see that there are halakhic contexts that require ten and can include women. Plainly this is because the requirement there is not on account of davar she-biqedushah but for some other reason. This leads to one of the interesting distinctions Rabbi Reisman brings (ch. 2 §3 of his article; it is not original to him) between tzibbur (community/assembly) and rabim (the many/public). His claim is that, in halakhah, some contexts require ten as a tzibbur—there, women are not part of the tzibbur and do not combine—and others require ten as rabim (publicity), where women can combine. I assume that davar she-biqedushah requires a tzibbur, not merely ten, and therefore women do not combine there.
For example, R. Yosef Engel (Gilyonei ha-Shas, Sanhedrin 74b s.v. “mah le-halan”) challenges the Rokeach, who wrote that sanctifying God’s Name must be done before ten male adults, and writes that, in his view, wherever ten are required for the sake of publicity, all persons count and women combine as well. Similarly in Responsa Rav Pe’alim (OḤ II 62) regarding asking forgiveness from one’s fellow before ten, as well as in the aforementioned Rema regarding Megillah (OḤ 690:18 and its commentaries), and more. The difference is that, in all these contexts, what is required is the many, not a tzibbur, and thus women are included.
This might also be tied to the interpretive question regarding the term “ezraḥ” (“citizen/native”) in the Torah (discussed, inter alia, in a Q&A here). Plainly, “ezraḥ” denotes membership in the tzibbur, and therefore does not include women. By contrast, “adam” or “ish” includes both women and men—anyone who is part of a multitude (and the derashah in Shevuot, “and the two men shall stand,” excluding women, is puzzling in any case; see, for example, columns 70 and 476). True, there are also contradictions in the Talmud regarding “ezraḥ” (see the Q&A there), but the conclusion of the sugya in Sukkah 28 seems plainly to concern men only.
The Relevance of This Distinction to Our Case
Thus far we assumed that women are certainly not part of a tzibbur but are included within the rabim. I would go further and question even that assumption: whence do we know that women are excluded from the tzibbur? (See also column 510.) There is definitely room to argue that this was the case in the past, but today it has changed. This is a factual change in women’s social status, and there is no reason not to take it into account halakhically. Understand that even if there were some derashah that excluded women (and there is none anywhere), there would still be room for such a halakhic shift, since derashot always rest on the reasoning of the expositor and the circumstances in which he acts (I have addressed this in several places; see, e.g., column 370 and more). But as for including women in a minyan and in devarim she-biqedushah, there is no clear source for exclusion anywhere—not in either Talmud and not in Maimonides. Moreover, according to most poskim, women are obligated in prayer like men; why, then, should they not combine for a minyan?! (See the aforementioned Rema regarding Megillah.) It therefore seems that, in our case, it is obvious that one can make this depend on the norms accepted in a given place and time. For a comprehensive survey, see here (a responsum by Rabbi David Golinkin from the Conservative movement; please consider the arguments and sources rather than the author’s affiliation), especially from p. 15 onward.
If that is indeed the case, then women can be included for a minyan in prayer and for all devarim she-biqedushah, for they, too, are ezraḥiyyot (citizens). Even if, in the past, the practice was to exclude them, that was based on their social status. Now that this has changed, there is no impediment to changing that practice—and it would seem that one ought to do so (this is not a “leniency” to include them; it is the halakhic truth, and consequently whoever does not do so is a “conservative offender.” See columns 263, 570, and more). It follows that, regarding Birkat Ḥatanim as well, there is no reason not to include them—even according to the Shitah Mekubbetzet that the requirement of ten is on account of davar she-biqedushah. True, Ḥazal excluded women from “ezraḥ” in some matters, and indeed, until now, poskim have ruled not to include them for devarim she-biqedushah, but that is only because, in their day, women had a different social standing. Today, I see no reason not to change this.
Needless to say, even today poskim are very reluctant here. It is clear that the issue is not purely one of halakhic interpretation—for on that one can disagree with reasons and arguments, each according to his path. The firm stance here (see in Rabbi Reisman the citations from Rabbi Ariel and others) is apparently rooted mainly in fear of the winds of the time (“Reform”). This can also be seen from what Rabbi Reisman writes at the end of his article:
Let it be known that these words were written as a halakhic analysis; in practice, the ruling in this matter is in the hands of those who sit in judgment, who stand guard over the bounds of modesty and weigh the path they should take in additional respects, among them the concern not to introduce practices that were not practiced for generations, in order to protect and fortify the walls of religion and halakhah.
It is clear to him that the considerations here are not only halakhic but also of halakhic and public policy. Or, in free translation: it is true that I am halakhically correct, but the leading decisors must decide according to the correct meta-halakhic policy.
I cannot refrain from commenting on this point. Unlike him, in my view no halakhah is “entrusted” to any “sitter in judgment.” If we have reached the conclusion that the halakhah is that women combine for Birkat Ḥatanim, no one—whether “one who sits in judgment” or “a rider of white donkeys”—can change that, unless he brings arguments showing error in this ruling. The mere fact that it seems to him immodest or harmful for one reason or another (such as fear of Reform) is neither here nor there. Note well: not because the concern is necessarily unfounded, but because even if it is well-founded, a contemporary posek has nothing he can do about it. A Sanhedrin could enact a rabbinic decree that uproots the law for various reasons (like a slippery slope). But a posek in our day can, at most, say that although it is permitted, he nevertheless recommends not to do so in practice. To rule that this is the halakhah is simply false, for he thereby forbids the permitted.[2]
A Note on Davar she-biqedushah
In column 510 I wondered about the rule of davar she-biqedushah in general, which has puzzled me for a long time. For blessings, one might claim there is a prohibition to recite them in circumstances lacking ten—lest they be blessings in vain. But regarding Kaddish and Kedushah, how can there be a prohibition to say them with fewer than ten?! Is there a prohibition to utter statements that are true in themselves, privately to oneself?! Especially Kaddish, which has no Talmudic source and is a Geonic practice—what could prohibit saying it in any case? Perhaps it is considered a slight to the honor of Heaven; the matter requires further study.
Be that as it may, this is accepted de facto by all poskim, and therefore my wonder remains unresolved. Beyond that, in our case we are speaking of a blessing, not merely of saying a davar she-biqedushah. I shall therefore not enter this topic here, nor will I use it as an additional factor for leniency.
Summary—Practical Ruling
In conclusion, gathering my remarks, in my view there is definitely room to be lenient and include women (and perhaps this should be called stringency rather than leniency). For several reasons (even setting aside my doubts about davar she-biqedushah in general):
- If the requirement of ten for Birkat Ḥatanim is not a davar she-biqedushah—then women are certainly included in the ten.
- Even according to those who say it is a davar she-biqedushah, perhaps that concerns only the source of the law, not its nature.
- Even if it is truly a davar she-biqedushah, it seems that today women are indeed part of the tzibbur and can combine even for devarim she-biqedushah.
- Finally, Birkat Ḥatanim is, plainly, rabbinic; and in a rabbinic doubt we are lenient. True, in matters of blessings we are stringent (lest it be a blessing in vain), but here there is more than one doubt.
To conclude, I would add that perhaps a dispensation in such a time of exigency (see above that the question was premised on the current situation—“Swords of Iron”—where attendance at the ceremony would be small) could catalyze a welcome change in the status of women that would then expand to ordinary circumstances as well—certainly regarding Birkat Ḥatanim, where there is room to permit even without the consideration of changing circumstances, and thereafter even regarding devarim she-biqedushah and counting women for a minyan for prayer due to the change in circumstances. We saw that, halakhically, there is no impediment to this even for prayer and devarim she-biqedushah; it seems that what stands in the way are purely conservative obstacles (see also the previous column). Of course, that is precisely the slippery slope feared by the poskim, and in their view that is itself a major reason to forbid. But, as noted, even if their fear is justified, one cannot forbid what is permitted.
Practically, I advised the rabbi who asked to assess the character of the audience present, so as not to trigger an uproar at the ḥuppah. The damage might outweigh the benefit. But if it would be accepted, this is an excellent opportunity to begin this welcome process.
[1] Admittedly, the Rashba there seems to understand this as literal sanctity, but that is a singular view.
[2] See Nadav Shnerb’s essay, “The Jewish Ark of Lies,” in part ten of my book Walking Among the Standers (especially ch. 33), and columns 275, 444, 453, 590, and more.
Discussion
I was not dealing with difficult times. The questioner was. I discussed the question whether this is permitted ab initio, and my claim is that it is. So I am not looking for other suggestions.
.Never let a good crisis go to waste Everyone has his own agenda. Maybe we should also make tzitzit for female soldiers.
Regarding the distinction between the source and the definition of the law: you brought from the wood of the sukkah and from Chagigah that there is an analogy with respect to the rule of prohibited benefit, but the definition is different, and the wood of the sukkah does not have sanctity. And you suggested that with the wedding blessings too there is an analogy regarding the rule of requiring a quorum of ten, but the definition is different and this is not a matter of sanctity. From there it seems that you continued and argued that if the definition is different, then perhaps the analogy regarding the laws that branch out from it is also only partial—meaning, only for the basic rule of requiring ten, and for the wedding blessings women may count toward the quorum. Could you explain the logic behind this additional step? [It seems that “it remains in its own place” is relevant only when there is an independent source in its own place, and the derivation from the source text comes in like the interpretive reasoning of the Tzelach, which alone is de’oraita; but when the entire law comes from the teaching source, then seemingly one takes from it everything it contains.]
And on behalf of what agenda is your honor speaking? And as for your suggestion, I’m in favor of abolishing the institution of tzitzit.
I don’t know why you assume that “it remains in its own place” applies only when there is an independent source. Beyond that, here this is plainly a rabbinic law, so the hermeneutical rules of derivation do not really apply at all. The claim is that ten are required as in a matter of sanctity, but for a different reason. By logic, the reason is publicity and praise and thanksgiving in public. Only when one wants to know how many count as “public” does one learn it from a matter of sanctity.
Why not? I was told that my father’s grandmother used to wear tzitzit.
Regarding the difficulty about the problem with saying Kaddish and Kedushah with fewer than ten, why not accept the suggestion (which you mentioned) that this is a degradation of the Holy One, blessed be He? A parable: a person addresses his friend one-on-one and says to him, “Greetings to you too, honorable audience”—it is obvious that this is nothing but mockery and frivolity.
In column 501 you asked how this differs from fulfilling “and I shall be sanctified” in the case of martyrdom, where one must be killed rather than transgress even as an individual, and I did not understand the question: there one has no choice, but here who forced him to say Kaddish and Kedushah in a formal and weighty manner without ten?
One more comment: you wrote at the beginning of the column that it is unclear whether the sources regarding the need for a minyan are mere scriptural supports. But it is explicit in Ran on Megillah there (regarding Kaddish and Kedushah): “Nevertheless, all these matters are rabbinic scriptural supports, for the very order of prayer is rabbinic.”
And in fact this explanation is explicit in the Gemara there regarding mentioning God’s name in zimmun: with fewer than ten, it is not proper etiquette.
And regarding the clarification whether the matters listed in Mishnah Megillah 23 are matters of sanctity or not, public obligations or individual obligations, the words of Ramban in Milchamot on Megillah are explicit: “Those taught in our Mishnah are all communal obligations.” If so (setting aside the meta-halakhic move regarding counting women as a “community”), according to Ramban there is no room to count a woman toward the quorum for the wedding blessings.
However, according to Machzor Vitry in the name of Rashi, that one may fulfill the repetition of the Amidah for one person who did not hear, it would apparently follow that he holds that “one who passes before the ark” is an individual obligation (and the ten are only a condition for fulfillment, and here you could investigate whether the definition of the law is community or publicness, with practical implications for counting a woman), and if so perhaps the same applies to the wedding blessings.
But as for the logic itself that the wedding blessing is not a matter of sanctity, this is difficult in my view: after all, this blessing is a rabbinic enactment, and it was enacted only in the presence of a community—meaning that the presence of the community is part of the law of the obligation of the blessing (and setting aside the “meta” innovations, a woman is not considered a community).
It sounds very strange that saying to myself that the Holy One, blessed be He, is holy should be a degradation of Him.
There, plainly, it is not connected to a matter of sanctity. In the blessing “Agilah” too His name is mentioned, and ten are not required.
Do you mean the need for ten in the wedding blessings? I brought only one source as an example, from the Shitah Mekubetzet and tractate Kallah. Obviously there are others. Regarding a matter of sanctity, that too is not clear. One can say that it is a Torah law even if the order of prayer is rabbinic.
Who said it was enacted only in the presence of a community? Perhaps it was enacted in the presence of many, not a community, and then that includes women? That itself is my discussion.
Two specific comments:
A. You wrote that Kaddish is from the Geonim, but that is not precise. The recitation of “May His great name be blessed, etc.” appears several times in the Talmud (Berakhot 3a, 21b; Shabbat 119b; Sukkah 39a; and more). Apparently, only from “May their prayer be accepted” onward is an addition of the Geonim.
B. If today women are “citizens,” then they should also be obligated in the mitzvah of sukkah by law (see Sukkah 28b). Am I mistaken?
A. Kaddish in the form familiar to us. It is not clear to me exactly what the “Amen, may His great name be blessed” mentioned in the Talmud is. But for our purposes it really does not matter. By the way, the very fact that Kaddish is not mentioned as a matter of sanctity also hints that there was no such thing in the Talmud.
B. On the face of it this is a positive time-bound commandment, so it depends on the question whether the exemption of positive time-bound commandments has also disappeared nowadays. I have no indication whatsoever of that. True, there are two initial possibilities there as to why the verse is needed, and the first is certainly not relevant, because that initial possibility is that the woman would be obligated only by virtue of her husband. That certainly makes no difference for a woman nowadays. The second initial possibility is more relevant (the analogy to Passover), and even so it is not reasonable to obligate on that basis.
A side note: the sugya of “the sanctity spread” in Kiddushin appears on 7a and not on 6a.
Without entering the core of the discussion (it seems a bit too innovative for me), one can combine the opinions that the wedding blessings may be recited even with three after the fact (Nachalat Shiva, Responsa Rav Pe’alim). It follows that if there are three men (groom + two witnesses) it is easier still…
So there is only an indication from a matter of sanctity as to what counts as “many.” That is even less understandable than what I thought before. Because we did not know that “many” were required, and why should there be any connection between “many” for purposes of publicity and “many” for purposes of sanctity, such that the connection would be only about the number and not about the gender? [I am probing this point because it seems to be reason no. 2, and it seems to be the novel one in the column. Reason no. 1 is Rabbi Raizman’s words, reason no. 3 is sweeping and of a general nature, and reason no. 4 depends on the others.]
There is no difference regarding what counts as “many”; rather, for certain contexts the many also need to be a community. Here perhaps gender comes in.
Indeed. Corrected. Thanks.
I am reading the article while sitting and waiting for a tenth person for the minyan that I am joining, and saying Kaddish for my mother… If only someone would grasp the needed change
A. I do not really understand what you wrote, because apparently “Amen, may His great name be blessed” in the Talmud is a matter of sanctity (there is an initial assumption that one interrupts in the middle of the Amidah to answer it, and it is more important than Kedushah), even though this is not written explicitly.
B. Here too I did not understand you. The first initial assumption is that since a married couple usually lives in the same house (a fact that is true today as well), if the man is obligated to live in the sukkah then the woman is also obligated. So how is it “not reasonable” to obligate if the Gemara says that we would have obligated were it not for the derivation from “the citizen”?
A. You are repeating yourself. I addressed it.
B. When there is an initial assumption, that does not mean we would obligate the woman, only that there was such a possibility. What would have happened without the verse? It is not clear. Perhaps by logic too we would exempt. But even if we would obligate, the obligation would be by virtue of the husband (this is the husband’s dwelling, that it be with his wife), not an obligation of the woman herself.
At the margins of my remarks, there is room to discuss whether after we rejected the initial assumption and exempted women from sukkah, they now reverted to being exempt by the rule of positive time-bound commandments, or whether this is a different specific exemption. According to the first possibility, it is even more likely that we would exempt even without this derivation.
There is another source about betrothal and consecration in Ketubot chapter 5 (57b, I think), where from “betrothal on condition” they prove that according to Rabbi Meir a person can consecrate something not yet in existence..
Rabbi, I do not understand the assertion that these halakhot and mitzvot are only for men on the basis of statuses, (from the language of “the citizen,” as it were?) and therefore today it is different. (Why not say that women are exempt from positive time-bound commandments—which is on the same basis—because of the source of the derivation?) Perhaps we should say that we do not know why God commanded this way. (Because this is Oral Torah? The derivations there are de’oraita too, no?)
This reminds me of a ruling (of Shevet HaLevi, I think) regarding the prohibition of touching—whether it applies to a stepsister, for example. He ruled there that it does not, because the basic permission to touch a biological sister is because they were raised together, etc., and that reasoning therefore applies also to a stepsister (who from childhood, presumably, was likewise raised together), for why should she be any worse? But perhaps the permission is a kind of “scriptural decree”? And not based on social considerations?
I would appreciate your thoughts on whether there is a “razor” for understanding such things. Thank you!
57b. I do not see there in the sugya any comparison between betrothal and consecration.
And as for your question: because the exemption of women from commandments that are not time-bound does not seem connected to their status or to anything else. So there is no basis at all for the claim that today their situation is different.
You are speaking about not interpreting the reason for a verse, but that is not always true. In fact, usually it is not true. You assume something is a scriptural decree only if you have no other way out, and even then it is quite clear that there is some reason for it, only that you do not know it. There is no reason to reject a reasonable explanation out of fear that perhaps there is some hidden explanation we have not thought of. See my article on the fifth root about this.
mikyab commented:
21/11/2021 at 06:56
I will add here another brief eulogy from Rabbi Shibi Fruman that was sent to me this morning:
Once I officiated at the wedding of a sweet couple, and the bride insisted that a woman recite one of the seven blessings under the huppah. I have no allergies to revolutions in this area, but I also did not feel that I had a role in leading them, so I tried to dissuade her and sent her to discuss it with her grandfather.
“Her grandfather” was one of the most important halakhic decisors in the Haredi world, Rabbi Shlomo Fischer, a tremendous Torah scholar and a well-known figure in the Lithuanian Haredi Torah world, who would certainly be at the wedding.
Two days later the lady comes back and surprises me: “Grandpa says there is no problem.”
I did not believe it. That very day I went to his yeshivah in Jerusalem, entered the underground study room, which was packed with books in every direction on old yellowing shelves, and there he stood, bent over, leaning on the stand and radiant with Torah study with his “young” study partner (about 80 years old), exactly like in the stories I had heard about him in my childhood.
After I dared interrupt with the strange question about the granddaughter, he began to wash over me with quotations and references like a cyber program breaking code. I did not really manage to follow, only to understand the bottom line—that there is no problem, because it is all due to the honor of the community, and this is a community that honors itself this way.
And so it was: the first and second blessings were recited by the great Torah leader of Haredi society, and the seventh blessing was recited by a woman. Just like that. Despite the infinite distance from the social world from which he came, and which he even led, he had a loyalty to straightforward halakhah, without its politics. And certainly also a loyalty to his family, with all its complexity…
“The great Torah leader of Haredi society” as a description of R. Shlomo Fischer is something that could come only from a religious-Zionist. They mistakenly think that among Haredim, greatness is determined by greatness in Torah. So they are convinced that figures like R. Zev Nechemiah and R. Shlomo Fischer and the like are the Haredi gedolei hador. So I have a novelty for you: even R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach was not considered a gadol hador among the Haredim (certainly in Bnei Brak). In my time in Bnei Brak, the average kollel fellow had never even heard of R. Shlomo Fischer or R. Zev Nechemiah. Of R. Shlomo Zalman they had heard more, but he was really marginal. In Jerusalem the situation was a bit different, but I am giving here the Bnei Brak angle, and one can learn from that.
By the way, the fact that this description is presented as praise is shocking to me. It is so simple and basic that one should adhere to halakhah and not be impressed by the other nonsense. That is of course also the reason he was not considered a gadol hador in the Haredi world. He was not politically correct because truth was his guiding light. And as is known, truth is a dirty word in the Haredi world.
Rabbi Raizman is a businessman and a Haredi Torah scholar, but also very open-minded and possesses original and fascinating thought.
I wondered: “but”—what is that coming to tell us?
That a Haredi Torah scholar can have an open mind and original thought? He already made that point in his eulogy
for Rabbi Shlomo Fischer, of blessed memory.
That businessmen can have an open mind? We have already found such people.
Unless it is because it is uncommon.
In my humble opinion all the lengthy discussion above is unnecessary. In this week’s Torah portion it is proven that when it comes to a covenant—even seven lambs that were designated for that purpose join and complete a quorum for Abraham, Avimelech, and Phicol the commander of his army—”that it may serve as a witness for me.”
Hello Rabbi,
You wrote that in these difficult times, in the current situation, there is room to be lenient because it is hard to gather ten men for the wedding blessings. However, you did not explain why one should not conduct the huppah and postpone the blessing to another time.
The Rema ruled in Even HaEzer sec. 61 that if it is not possible to recite the blessing at the time of the huppah, they should recite it on another occasion after several days, since the blessings are not indispensable (there is no prohibition of “a bride without a blessing is forbidden to her husband like a menstruant,” in accordance with the view of Rambam and those who follow him, that the prohibition is on a bride without huppah, not on a bride without a blessing, unlike Rashi and those who follow him).
Accordingly, in a pressing situation one could say that they should conduct the huppah without the blessing, and postpone the blessings to another opportunity, when there will be ten men.
There are drawbacks to the suggestion I proposed. It could sour the family’s feeling, as though the huppah was not performed in full. It could be that the couple will not be careful to gather ten men, and the blessing will end up being omitted entirely.
In any case, the suggestion of conducting the huppah and postponing the blessings is advice that appears in the Rema, and therefore it calls for consideration.