On Security Experts, Strategy, and the Current Situation (Column 678)
My God, give me alcohol to accept the things I cannot change,
caffeine to change the things I can,
and Ritalin to distinguish between the two.
(A fond paraphrase of the Serenity Prayer)
For years I have been writing that I don’t believe in “security expertise.” Senior officers understand how to move forces and, at best, are versed in local military tactics. They have no real understanding of strategy, and I doubt there even is a true disciplinary understanding in this field. I’ll begin with an anecdote from my own experience, and then move to discussing the current war.
Sandhurst, Haaretz, and Military Expertise
Back when we lived in Yeruham, we subscribed to the antisemitic periodical known as “Haaretz,” and even fought to have it delivered to Yeruham (on Shabbat). It seems they preferred to focus on Tel Aviv and New York. We thought it worthwhile to be familiar with positions and arguments different from our own in order to form a sober stance. I still think so, but everything has a reasonable price, and it turned out that reading “Haaretz” is far beyond a reasonable price—if only in terms of mental and intellectual health.[1]
One day I read in that paper a fascinating article about a very renowned military command college in Britain called Sandhurst. This college is well known worldwide, and even I—the least of the military experts in the universe—had heard of it more than once. Princes from Arab countries and officers from all over the world come to train there. It was a fascinating article, and among other things they described that throughout the training they do not deal at all with military topics. The students receive command tasks not necessarily military—for example, dispersing demonstrations without weapons and with strict limitations on the use of force—in order to see how they carry out complex missions under constraints and how they control the forces under their command within those constraints.
A few days after reading the article, we hosted for Shabbat lunch a local officer from Yeruham with the rank of colonel, together with his family. The conversation turned, among other things, to that article I had read. To my astonishment it turned out that this officer had never heard of Sandhurst. As noted, even I knew about it long before reading the article, but he—who specializes in the military field—had never heard of it, and certainly hadn’t read the piece. You should understand: that’s roughly like not having heard of West Point, the Battle of Waterloo, or the Normandy landings. I’m not sure that knowing about it would have made him a better officer, since as I said I’m a bit skeptical about the existence of a real military discipline (which will surely arouse the ire of Uri Milstein, who has even commented here in the past a few times). But one thing can be observed here: military expertise, even if such a thing exists, is rather dubious in the average Israeli officer (on this Milstein would undoubtedly agree). See also here under the “Criticism” section (Milstein is of course mentioned there).
And now we come to Major General (res.) Israel Ziv.
Israel Ziv and His Article
Israel Ziv is a well-known studio pundit who keeps feeding us, again and again, with his eye-opening (or: eye-“lighting”) analyses of our security and political situation. The fellow was commander of the Gaza Division, Chief Paratroopers and Infantry Officer, and finally Head of the Operations Directorate on the General Staff—seemingly a first-rate military expert. No wonder many radio and TV studios chase after him to hear his opinion and gain wisdom on the questions at hand. He repeatedly explains what should and should not be done, what the significance of a given step is, and so on.
I reached the conclusion long ago that all these studio sitters, including Ziv himself of course, are great experts on what was, but have no clue about what will be (as per Ben-Gurion’s well-known quip). From time to time you’ll hear feeble admissions of past mistakes, but that doesn’t stop them from voicing sweeping positions on everything that happens. According to them, it seems military expertise is born only after one leaves the army, since those running it now supposedly lack it. I suspect, however, that the difference lies elsewhere. Those currently managing affairs are equipped with the relevant information (to the extent it exists, and to the extent they use it—cf. October 7), whereas the various retirees are not. They are armchair experts, like you and me. Perhaps that is the difference, rather than some lofty expertise acquired precisely at the moment of discharge from the army.
For example, our acquaintance Israel Ziv, like many of his colleagues, pushed for a settlement in Lebanon (by the way, it seems Bibi wanted that too, except fortunately for us he didn’t succeed; it takes two to tango). In time, when the IDF entered and found what it found, it became clear to all of us that if a settlement had been reached there earlier, we would likely have suffered an October 7 on steroids from the north. Israel Ziv was forthright and admitted this mistake (a childish mistake, by the way; I’ll speak later about the chase after short-term quiet). A simple search on Channel 14 will show you more contradictions and statements he had to walk back (for example, similar statements regarding Rafah and the Philadelphi Route). But none of this stops him from continuing to supply us with forceful opinions on the issues of the day. One of them appears in an article I read yesterday, in which Ziv writes the following:
What’s Going Through Herzi Halevi’s Mind
The Chief of Staff is the only one left in a position where he understands the implications of the war’s prolongation, and he is the one the public expects to stand for the truth and prevent the drift, whose costs are already eroding achievements and exacting a very heavy price in soldiers and hostages • It is now his responsibility to stand firmly against the political echelon—and to draw the line • Commentary
On Friday I visited two families who lost their sons last week in Lebanon, in the difficult incident in which six fighters from Golani’s 51st Battalion fell. I learned from them about the brave sons who were killed in close combat with Hezbollah together with their comrades, about the values on which they were raised, and about the immense willingness to take risks with full awareness of the price. I also learned about the great wear-and-tear that the long war, despite all the motivation, produces. I found it hard to believe the figures about decreases in the number of soldiers in various units, to the point of questionable readiness. In general, the number of wounded the IDF loses every month in the fighting is worrisome in itself—and at the same time, the load on the reserves is already manifesting in lower turnout and explicit statements by commanders that reservists must be allowed to return to their lives and that call-ups must be reduced due to the strain. This is alongside troubling phenomena of fraying operational discipline. When you set the great attrition and the heavy toll of casualties against the creeping erosion in achievements, in a situation where the defense minister lacks the professional authority to understand the situation and lacks the backbone to stand up to the government, the question arises—does IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi understand that it is now his responsibility to stand firmly before the political echelon on the need to end the war, to stand without fear and insist on achieving the war’s goals—first and foremost bringing the hostages home? Is the Chief of Staff, who conducted himself during the war admirably and bravely, at this hour—when the army is under great strain and his soldiers, men and women, have been in captivity for 14 months, suffering severe abuse along with the civilians—doing everything, but everything, to bring the war to an end and return the captives now? If after 14 months of fighting the army continues only with tactical missions of bombings and killing terrorists, there is a serious problem of disconnect from reality. With all the impressive and important achievements, it seems the army is burying its head in the sand and not insisting on the real decisions required now. The Slogan of “Total Victory” Is Not a StrategyChasing the remnants of terrorists is the last thing we should be dealing with. In this war there are more complex and important problems to address, such as how to end the war with the upper hand, before its prolongation erases the achievements. We must prevent attrition and plan a wholly new strategy in light of the war’s achievements. The stubborn expansion of tactical activity looks more and more like an escape route, or at the very least an attempt to avoid grappling with the big, critical questions at this time—ending the war and the necessary recovery of our forces. The return of the empty slogan “total victory” and presenting it as strategy is manipulation that is anti-strategic at its core. The attempt to paste a façade of strategy retroactively is absurd demagoguery, since strategy must be set in advance and is supposed to be the framework for action, including operational and tactical moves. This is well-known doctrine, not a political slogan to retrofit reality—most of which was trial and error—although the accumulated successes are uncontested. A strategy has defined, achievable, and measurable goals. A strategy has stages and a timeline, and a matching tactical plan with which one can adjust during execution and assess whether the strategy itself has succeeded or failed. And most importantly, it must be written, not mumbled. The “strategy” they are trying to sell us is a rewrite meant to justify its absence and to justify granting the prime minister absolute and dangerous freedom of action to conduct the war as he pleases—a need that also explains Gallant’s ouster. In the absence of a defined strategy, the IDF uses its freedom of action to continue its tactical operations and strike more and more terrorists in Gaza and in Lebanon. Although killing terrorists is good, there is no chance this goal will ever be completed, as we have been in Gaza and Lebanon for years and did not eliminate the last terrorist—just like our actions over decades in Samaria. This time will be no different. Wisdom and leadership responsibility mean deciding when enough is enough, when the price outweighs the achievement and it is necessary to end the military effort and move to a political settlement. Since there is a completely monolithic government whose interests are the opposite of the national need for an effective war—being tainted by political interests—only the Chief of Staff remains in a position that correctly sees the implications of prolonging the war, and he is the one the public expects to stand for the truth and prevent the drift whose costs already damage the achievements and exact the highest price from the soldiers. Minister Smotrich’s visit to Nir Oz after 14 months was a vile act. Smotrich, with his messianic positions, did not tell the bereaved families to their faces that the slaughter of their families and their loved ones decaying in the tunnels is nothing but a sacrifice on the altar of the settlement he seeks to return to Gaza—and that he intends to prevent their return and abandon them to their deaths. Regrettably, even after 14 months of war, the prime minister does not feel the need to address the public and explain where on earth we are headed. The greater the dissonance with reality grows, the more the prime minister’s mouthpieces amplify the disinformation and sowing of confusion, which breeds despair for which the public pays such a heavy price. Israel must now end the war, stop the abuse of the public and the continued blood price. A deal must be signed in Lebanon without unnecessary insistence on clauses that, in any case, require no one’s approval in order to enforce a violation of the agreement. Even if it is written and there is opposition from Hezbollah to Israel’s entry, Israel will still enter. All that matters is that Hezbollah physically withdraw and the Lebanese army deploy in the south so we can return the residents. In Gaza there is only one critical mission: returning the hostages. Failing to bring them back is a moral crime. If Israel chooses not to replace the regime in Gaza, it can leave—and then re-enter anywhere again in exactly ten minutes. The entry of Donald Trump must be directed to the greatest possible thing—a good agreement for Israel to stop Iran’s nuclear program and create a regional coalition. The Chief of Staff is the man whose state, national, and historical role obligates him to stand firm and draw the line on the war’s prolongation and on bringing the captives home. Chief of Staff—be brave enough to do so. |
One may wonder why, in his view, it is specifically Herzi Halevi who must take a stand here, and against whom is he supposed to speak out? Ziv assumes that the government and Bibi are continuing the war unnecessarily for their own reasons. I remind you that this severe and baseless slander is very common in the protest circles, among the “families of the hostages” (those on the “right” side), and of course also on the “panic channels” J. Below I’ll offer a different perspective on the avoidance of a deal—one that seems to me far more plausible than that malicious and unfounded conjecture.
Another Look at the Hostage Issue: Emotions as a Plan of Action
At this point allow me—pathetic sergeant (res.) that I am—to doubt Ziv’s analysis and assumptions, if only as a purely intellectual exercise. Ziv assumes there is no point in continuing a war that has been bogging down for a long time, since it will never end while we only keep wearing down. We’ll kill ten more terrorists and conquer and clear another area, then leave it, then return again, and again conquer and eliminate and clear, ad infinitum until the advent of the redeemer. Therefore, he argues, it’s pointless: we’ve achieved what we could, and now we must move to a hostage deal even if this will require withdrawing from Gaza and ending the war (and clearly it will). I get the impression that many in the public feel this way nowadays, even those who are not part of the Kaplan and hostage circles.
Let me preface by saying that it’s quite clear to me we will not get the hostages back even if we withdraw. At best they will kill all who are still alive and return corpses (after all, in the meantime we have not even managed to get information about who is alive and who is dead). But more likely Hamas will not return them all, since these are the only cards they currently hold against us. They can always say they don’t know what became of them (while hinting at the same time that they are in their hands, to play their cards—just as happened with Gilad Shalit). The learned statements popular in those circles—that Hamas can be eliminated later, after we do a hostage deal—are, of course, utter nonsense. Hamas was not born yesterday, and they will not agree to a deal until there are international guarantees that we will not do that in the future.
But let’s assume that we would indeed get the hostages if we withdraw from Gaza and accept the necessary international guarantees. Under these assumptions, is there no logic in continuing to fight rather than capitulate? Seemingly we are not succeeding in eliminating Hamas. As is known (or not?), you cannot eliminate a terror organization—or an idea. Well, in my learned opinion there is indeed logic in continuing. One may, of course, argue with this logic, but I came to present a side that I would expect Ziv to consider before stating such a categorical position. This is also an example of biases in these analyses and why it is dangerous to treat these opinions as professional expertise.
First, even if we could now make a deal, that would be due in no small measure to the fighting thus far—fighting that those critics urged us to stop long ago (without Rafah and without Philadelphi, and of course without eliminating Sinwar). Military pressure is a necessary (though of course not sufficient) condition for achieving a deal. But I want to argue something more far-reaching. With all the sentiment I have and with all the sorrow for the fate of the hostages—and with the guilt over the state’s failure, and ours collectively, to protect them—the primary goal of the war is not returning the hostages. A state should not have an overarching strategic goal of rescuing a hundred people (many of whom are corpses). That is clearly our interest, but it is not a strategic goal. Such talk is pure emotion.
To illustrate the emotional aspect, not long ago I was sent a video showing a visit by the families of hostages to Rabbi Dov Landau. The main thing he found fit to tell them was: What would Bibi do if his son were a hostage in Gaza?! Such a stupid claim from the mouth of a “Gadol HaDor” (to his credit, I don’t know how connected to reality he is at his advanced age) that even I, with zero expectations, was left stunned. If Bibi’s son were a hostage, then first of all he would have to remove his hands from anything to do with the hostage issue (of course he would do so roughly the way he carefully adheres to his conflict-of-interest arrangement). This is a cheap emotional and populist line meant to smear Bibi and the government (whose representatives are, of course, part of it), and to ingratiate himself with those present—to appear to them as someone different, who does care. In any case, it has nothing to do with common sense. You will surely wonder why I think he truly does not care? Because I would ask him what he would do if his son were a hostage in Gaza—and if he would do something different, then why aren’t his representatives in the government and coalition doing what he thinks should be done? On second thought, perhaps he simply lied and smeared in order to comfort and encourage them (there’s another dubious benefit of the doubt for him).
Enough about contrived and agenda-driven emotionalism.
The War’s Objective and the Strategy Deriving From It
Returning to our topic, bringing the hostages home answers feelings and emotions but cannot be a foundational strategic goal of the state. In my view, the war’s fundamental strategic objective is eliminating Hamas and restoring security to the Gaza Envelope and to Israel in general. That is what should be before the eyes of decision-makers and the heads of the security establishment. Once this is understood, one can grasp—and perhaps also justify—the current fighting policy, despite the questions about it.
Since Rabin, our assumption has been that Hamas will never be worn down and that we are weak. Hence the faintheartedness and softness that have characterized us for decades, and hence our ongoing chain of failures against forces far weaker than we are. I now thought that perhaps the government and the army finally decided to give up on that pessimistic assumption and to continue until we break them—even if it takes years. If that is the case, there is apparently no place for high-intensity fighting, since the world will not let us conduct such a war, and we ourselves will not withstand it over time. But if we continue with raids—killing and killing and killing again—until we break them, that is indeed possible. The goal is not to eliminate the last Hamas operative, as the demagogues who mock Bibi’s mantra of “total victory” would have it, but that Hamas as an organization will be broken and consent to leave the Strip as an organization. If they see that we will continue indefinitely—even twenty or thirty years—killing them by the hundreds again and again like cockroaches, they may eventually decide to break and leave. Let me remind us all that Arafat and his people left Lebanon en masse. The assumption that they are unbreakable and that we are weak is neither a necessity nor a decree of fate. It is permissible to fight that assumption itself, for it is likely part of the reason we keep losing to them.
Ziv claims that the reservists are breaking and not showing up, and that the economy cannot withstand a prolonged war. With all due respect to His Demobilized Generalship, I disagree. It may be that this is the reason the IDF has lowered the intensity and is conducting raids and targeted killings mainly with regular forces. That can be sustained without paralyzing the economy and without calling up reserves on an impossible scale. The war in Lebanon is, of course, a different opera. There we apparently don’t have that option, and therefore I assume it will end soon with some arrangement (I hope we arrive at a reasonable arrangement there, though I don’t see how that will happen in a way that the previous situation won’t return, as after Resolution 1701. But that is exactly what is being worked on these days, and perhaps a reasonable arrangement will nevertheless be found). On the assumption that the Lebanon issue ends soon, I see no principled problem in continuing the fighting in Gaza for many years using the standing army, with moderate reinforcement from the reserves, until we break them—or win. Not conquering Gaza or running a full war, but killing and killing and killing again, moving populations from place to place over and over. Giving them no rest until they break. We can indeed endure such fighting for many years.
As for the world’s attitude, I don’t know. But so far it seems the world (in part—not the folks at Harvard and Columbia, nor the most blatant antisemites) accepts the claim that we cannot stop fighting so long as there are hostages and a significant threat to Israel. We must declare that we are entirely ready for an immediate halt to the war on two conditions: the return of all the hostages and Hamas’s departure from Gaza. Not a moment before. In my opinion the world can accept this, and it will be clear who is the obstacle to peace. Of course I have no concrete information, but I assume the state and military leadership do, and at any rate that is how it currently appears.
The conclusion is that there is logic to continuing to wage the war at its current intensity until Hamas breaks, returns the hostages, and leaves Gaza. In my view, this is a very reasonable policy under the current circumstances, and if Israel Ziv opposes it—perhaps he is right. But he ought to put it on the table and explain why.
This is also an opportunity for me to admit a mistake. In the past I assessed that we would not be able to continue fighting for a long time (or at least that we would not be willing to), and I did not believe in the possibility of total victory—certainly in light of past experience (the endless list of operations that achieved nothing). Following the lessons of October 7, it seems some change has occurred. Precisely now, as everyone is beginning to despair, I am beginning to believe in that possibility.
A Strategic Look: The Mindset of “Buying Quiet”
I’ll say more. If we accept Ziv’s suggestion and end everything with a hostage deal—even assuming we get them all back alive—the question is: what have we done all year? Nothing. It will have been yet another operation in the endless series “Electric Pillar,” “Solid Cliff,” “Swan Wall,” “Protective Cloud,” “Yellow Hat,” “Fact Peaks,” and the rest of the nonsense the IDF supplies us. None of us remembers what each such operation was and what it achieved (hint: nothing. Soldiers fell for nothing in exchange for nothing—in effect, for allowing Hamas to grow stronger). If we stop the fighting now and make a deal, Hamas will remain in Gaza, rebuild its power and rule, and in two years we’ll be back exactly where we were on October 6. It will have been yet another pointless operation that cost us dearly in lives and economically, and all the sacrifices and noise will have been in vain. The rare and precious opportunity we have now to see this through to the end will fade and vanish.
That is essentially what Ziv and his friends are proposing. We must understand that so far we have no real achievement. Eliminating thousands or tens of thousands of Hamas operatives is of no significance. They will produce others in their place. And even if not, Hamas is not an existential threat to us. It is a terror organization, and it will always have a few hundred armed men—and that is the risk they pose (aside from failures that bring upon us events like October 7). The flaw in the thinking here lies in the faulty mindset that accompanied us until last October, according to which buying time is the maximal achievement we can hope for. That was the goal of the bizarre operations we conducted over the years—and also to placate and vent the public’s anger and desire for revenge. We achieved nothing—and could not expect more. This is exactly what is targeted by the cynical and shabby mockery of Bibi’s phrase “total victory.” The despair at the possibility of such victory is but a reflection of the same mindset. That despair is, among other things, what prevents victory, of course.
I hope we have learned this lesson, and that Bibi’s grand phrase truly expresses the fact that we have stopped trying merely to buy time. From now on we must try to solve problems, not just manage them. Of course this pertains to those problems that can be solved. Hamas in Gaza is, in my opinion, a solvable problem, as I explained. There are others that are not (like the Lebanon problem, and perhaps the Palestinian issue altogether). As our anonymous addicts (alcohol, drugs, and the like) said in their Serenity Prayer:
God, grant me the serenity—to accept the things I cannot change,
the courage—to change the things I can,
and the wisdom—to distinguish between them.
Or in the version I liked better, which I received a few days ago:
My God, give me alcohol to accept the things I cannot change,
caffeine to change the things I can,
and Ritalin to distinguish between the two.
In any case, according to my proposal, the current war is truly for all the marbles, and we must take a deep breath with much patience in order to win it. We are in a situation of either total victory or we have done nothing. Therefore, in my view, we must not heed the Israel-Ziv-type calls to stop and move to a hostage deal. That should be the end of the process, after Hamas breaks and surrenders. If this can be achieved now—excellent. But I am not under the impression that this is the case, and in Israel Ziv’s words there is no hint that he thinks this is the case. In his words there is only despair, agenda-driven smearing of the government and the army, and mainly an outdated way of thinking that only wants to buy time.
To paraphrase the end of Israel Ziv’s piece: I hope Bibi and Herzi Halevi will be brave enough to ignore Israel Ziv’s demands (he who demands they be brave), to consider these possibilities—and others, of course—and if this indeed seems possible to them, to go for it. That is the courage I would expect from leaders.
I’ll conclude by noting that I too, of course, don’t actually know whether such a strategy is within our capability. In my unlearned assessment it seems, on the face of it, that it is. In any case, this is a matter that must be discussed and considered, and it stands in opposition to the so very prevalent calls to move to the deal phase. So let’s put it on the table and discuss it. It may be that the conclusion will be that it isn’t possible and then we’ll need a plan B—but this discussion must take place (and I hope it has already taken place in the venues responsible for it).
My deepest apologies to all my teachers for presenting here a pro-Bibi stance, but it turns out that the populism of the studio experts, the protesters, and the hostages has managed to draw surprising things out of me. As far as all of them are concerned there is only a mindset—proven ineffective—of attaining short-term quiet (which is what brought us to this point), and feelings of guilt and (justified) compassion for the hostages and their families, with a not-so-small pinch of (entirely justified) hatred for the government. But emotions and fixations are not a plan of action. It is important to reconsider the fundamentals and examine other options. Moreover, it is possible that this is exactly what is already being done in practice. If so, then all that is required of us—the general public—is to understand and acknowledge this, and not run straight to smears and agenda-driven conclusions.
[1] Whoever wants to see a good example would do well to read an enlightening interview with the artist Tami Ben-Tor—literally from today—which, to my surprise, was published in “Haaretz.” She speaks out against the culture of woke and deranged progressivism. The newspaper “Haaretz” makes sure every now and then to present opposing viewpoints (like a token religious person or right-winger) to project an appearance of balance. I greatly enjoyed reading the article, as she describes the terrible situation in academia, in art, among American elites and globally, and the destruction wrought by this subculture. While enjoying the piece and the refreshing breeze it brought, I noticed comment 24 (generally, reading the comments—as well as the articles in “Haaretz”—is not recommended for the faint of heart), which read as follows:
It’s a pity you didn’t translate it for the English edition as well. Is this article too hard to digest for English-speaking readers?
There you have the essence of the “Haaretz” operation in a nutshell. The Hebrew-speaking audience is granted, now and then, an appearance of balance—but to the outside world only anti-Zionist, anti-Israeli, and auto-antisemitic muck is exported, supporting Amos Schocken’s “freedom fighters”.
Discussion
There is another aspect that is important to remember when talking about the TV-studio babblers: the overwhelming majority of them are American sock puppets, whether through businesses they have in the U.S., or think tanks, or simply because that is their opinion. It seems that if the White House were to say tomorrow that the earth is flat, this whole chorus would quote that statement as if it were Torah from Sinai. Every child knows that in the Middle East the Americans are almost always wrong, but that does not stop this bunch from embracing every half-baked idea concocted at the State Department with the enthusiasm of cult members. The power gap between us and the U.S. is clear to me, and of course we have to take it into account, but the speed with which all the retired generals adopt every American piece of nonsense is truly embarrassing.
As for the essence of the newspaper "Haaretz"—as of today!
Headline of a review of a Holocaust film:
"In days of rising antisemitism and Jewish supremacy—it is hard to remain indifferent to this film."
As for military education—
On Wikipedia, in the entry for Aharon Haliva, there is a link to an interview with battalion commander Aharon Haliva
with Avihai Becker. The interview is titled "Tel Aviv’s Ambassador on Har Dov."
Subheading:
It is hard to know what excites Lt. Col. Aharon Haliva more: Tel Aviv’s trendiest entertainment complexes, or Hezbollah’s deployment in the Shebaa Farms.
And thus spoke Haliva:
"I am convinced that if I were interested in military literature about past battles and combat doctrines, it would sound much more serious, but what can I do—that’s just not me," says Haliva.
See there.
I have no information, but I am afraid you are getting seriously carried away. By the way, there are studio babblers on the right too, not only on the left. They are no less babblers.
Nu, so there is a video in which Haliva rebukes a soldier at Bahad 1. The man has the intonation, the clumsiness, and the IQ of a discipline sergeant major.
A related article (regarding the mindless chatter of the commentators in the studios):
https://www.inn.co.il/news/650440
One could also add to this all the dire predictions that a war with Hezbollah and Iran would paralyze the country and destroy the electricity grid, etc., and one could devote an entire column to the experts who warned that this time Trump would turn against us…
In any case, there is one thing I do not really understand: why do you see the issue of the hostages as an emotional debate? There is also a moral question here—how obligated is the state to its citizens and soldiers who were kidnapped? Not that this is the goal of the war, but to what extent should the goals of the war be given up for their sake?
Precisely here I am not sure. The IDF and the government acted very wisely in Lebanon, including the beepers, the assassinations, and the gradual escalation, so that by the time Hezbollah was ready to strike us back fully, it was already pretty well neutralized. And of course our defensive measures have improved greatly over the years. Therefore, the assessment of what awaited us from Lebanon was not all that mistaken, and in my view this is not a problematic error.
As for the experts regarding Trump, that is indeed nonsense. Nobody really knows, including Trump himself.
As for the hostages, as a matter of fact the debate is emotional, judging by the arguments (or absence of arguments) made in it. And also because it is impossible to conduct an orderly discussion and raise arguments. Clearly one can also argue about it substantively; in practice that is not what is happening.
By the way, why did those operations seem so bizarre to you? At the time, after all, the assumption was that October 7 could not happen in reality (and indeed it should not have, if Israel had acted properly), and therefore operations designed to buy time were the least bad option on the table. After all, in this war alone several times more people have died than in all those operations together, and it has lasted longer than all of them combined, so in what way is it preferable to them? Because it is more concentrated?
1. To the best of my knowledge, Rabbi Landau is very well connected to reality. There is pressure in the Haredi leadership to end the war in order to relieve the pressure surrounding conscription. And as is well known, a lie told for the sake of Heaven is the truth, so there is no reason to suspect him of lying.
2. The claim that if we do not break them completely then we have accomplished nothing is exaggerated. The situation has changed fundamentally. It will be possible to prevent Hamas from building an army on the scale of 7/10. There is the matter of addiction to quiet and the lack of willingness to act decisively, but the capability definitely exists.
Why do you think he is getting carried away, and seriously so?
The reality of the past 50 years has shown that the Americans mainly destroy any possibility of stability in the region.
The overthrow of the Shah, the destruction of Iraq, Mubarak, refraining from responding to gas attacks in Syria, refraining from supporting the Iranian uprising, and even tying Israel’s hands so that it never wins a decisive victory over the Arabs/Palestinians.
That is all them.
Had they found another opportunity—and they did find one in the current war—they would have exploited that too.
Against the assumption that in all the operations that 'only bought quiet,' the proper thing would be to present Netanyahu’s overarching goal, which he declared several times and which does not comport with prolonged wars in Gaza, in Lebanon, or anywhere else.
That goal is of course the one that earned him the usual mockery: strengthening Israel in a way that would lead Arab states to sign peace agreements with us without the Palestinians giving their consent.
The first goal, strengthening, was carried out well enough for the revolutionary idea to begin taking shape in the form of the Abraham Accords.
It took shape to such an extent that those same Arab states, and even Saudi Arabia, did not distance themselves from us during the current war, and even the Palestinian Authority, which cursed as usual, understood that it was better for it to keep quiet and instead demand that those states insert clauses that would work to its benefit.
There is a claim that is hard to shake off: that Hamas opened the war as a desperate step to stop the process.
The goal was also achieved in that Israel is withstanding this war economically, and what is mainly hindering our achievements is the treachery of the American administration.
The goal was also achieved in that Israel is waging a very prolonged war and we have not heard even once the loathsome term 'the diplomatic hourglass.'
All those who make much of the phrase (ridiculous in the context in which it is said) 'you’re the head, you’re to blame,' should remember that in quite a few successes Netanyahu is also 'to blame.'
He is certainly not perfect, and sometimes he is really irritating, but overall (very much so, even) he gets the job done.
To Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham, may he live a good long life,
Your words are correct.
Regarding Rabbi Dov Landau, may he live a good long life, I am very perplexed by my assessment of him. On the one hand, he does seem truly to be among the disciples of the Hazon Ish, and an outstanding genius; on the other hand, recently there have been things about him that raise questions, and this requires further study. The argument you quoted from him is very puzzling. Suppose one asks: what is more severe and dangerous—someone whom people seek to kill, or someone who are threatening to kidnap his son? If so, instead of asking what Netanyahu would do if they kidnapped his son, one should ask what Netanyahu would do if at every moment and every hour he were in danger that enemies might kill him, as they have tried and are trying to do, and he has to live twenty-four hours a day under danger and the protection of security personnel?
If I am not mistaken, there was a committee called the Shamgar Committee that determined that people who are emotionally involved in a kidnapping issue must not deal with the matter. And did that great scholar consider what the Hazon Ish would say in such a case?
A disciple of the Hazon Ish mainly through his writings. Maybe that can explain something.
Several questions came to me as I was reading this post:
1. You describe the concept of “security expertise” as an illusion, and cast doubt on the existence of disciplinary understanding in the field of military strategy. Yet most of your arguments are based on a casual conversation with a lieutenant colonel from Yeruham and occasional viewing of interviews with Maj. Gen. (res.) Israel Ziv. Do you have any deeper familiarity with the field? It is hard to ignore the impression that you are making general determinations without a meaningful basis, using vague and flexible definitions that allow you to tailor the discussion to the desired conclusion.
2. You write: “Assuming the Lebanon matter ends soon, I see no principled problem with continuing the fighting in Gaza for many years using the standing army with moderate reinforcement from the reserves until we break them or forever.” To make such a claim, you need to take into account extremely complex considerations:
The army’s munitions economy and the effect of days of fighting on the broader economy.
The army’s ability to mobilize reserves over time without wearing down the fighters.
The army’s readiness for an all-out war on additional fronts.
The cost in human lives, which has already passed 800 dead in the current war.
Do you think you have the knowledge and tools to weigh all those variables? Beyond that, it is worth mentioning that human life is not a marginal item. It seems you lightly bypass the painful question: how many more soldiers would you be willing to sacrifice in order to realize your strategy? Is that, in your view, a reasonable price? You raised the possibility that the war would continue “forever”—does it not seem to you that a price of 800 young dead per year, every year, is unacceptable?
3. Throughout the post you return to expressions like “break them,” “do it all the way,” and “Hamas leaving Gaza,” but there is no attempt to explain what exactly happens after “we break them.” The criticism of the slogan “total victory” is not directed only at the physical outcome of eliminating Hamas, but at the basic problem: even if Hamas were theoretically to collapse completely, what would remain in the Strip? Have you thought about the day-to-day management of two million residents in Gaza? Who would govern the territory? As long as Israel opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state, even under international supervision, the term “total victory” is devoid of content. “Victory” without a clear vision of a political arrangement leaves us in exactly the same situation—with renewed conflict just around the corner.
They were bizarre because they sacrificed soldiers and resources for nothing. Quite apart from the question of October 7. I did not write that they were bizarre because of that. I wrote it even earlier.
There is no doubt that they were meant to create catharsis for public anger and nothing more. A government is supposed to act on substantive and security considerations, not on those considerations. The fact is that those operations were carried out only when something happened that required a response, and not when there was a threat that needed to be dealt with. There is not the slightest connection between the question of what happened and the question of whether one should act. Just as there is not the slightest connection between the question of whether a terrorist has blood on his hands and the question of whether to release him.
I am sorry, but I see here a serious problem in reading comprehension.
Wonderfully biased, as expected. Under the guise of a theoretical discussion of whether these issues are justiciable (obviously they are), substantive claims are slipped in (that the government is in the wrong), as expected.
First of all, if you cannot refrain, then do not refrain.
Second, note that I wrote here a general consideration. I am not the cabinet and not the National Security Council. I have not done staff work and I am not presenting a position by virtue of expertise.
My claim in the column was that the claims raised in such a discussion should take such considerations into account, and of course one may also reject them. It does not seem that Ziv did so, nor many others. I wrote and wrote again that I lack information and am certainly not an expert, so I do not understand your strange criticism.
If you are still missing more details in the detailed plan I presented here (such as, for example, the final model I envision for Gaza after Hamas is broken), see the appendices to my original document.
You claim that you are not presenting a position by virtue of expertise and that this is only a general consideration. Yet your column is full of emphatic determinations, such as: “I see no principled problem with continuing the fighting in Gaza for many years…” or “Hamas as an organization will be broken and will agree to leave the Strip” or “eliminating thousands or tens of thousands of Hamas members is a matter of no importance whatsoever.” Statements like these do not come across as a “general consideration” but as unequivocal declarations with far-reaching implications. If you do not claim to possess the information needed to substantiate them, why present things with such confidence? A text based on speculation or theoretical ideas ought to present itself as such in order to avoid creating a misleading impression.
Beyond that, it is worth noting that your columns dealing with political matters have presented differing and even contradictory positions from the beginning of the war until now. In each column you present a different approach to the issues under discussion, usually in a simplistic and one-sided way. When people confront you about the contradictions or the lack of clarity in your positions, your responses tend to include bluntness and mockery, at times at the expense of the questioner’s intelligence. Do you not think that a public discussion of such important issues requires a more serious approach, in which the limits of one’s knowledge are presented in advance, and criticism is expressed with full respect for the readers’ justified questions?
I really had an urge to move now to the stage of mockery. Good thing you stopped me. Still, just for your benefit I will say that you absolutely must improve your reading comprehension and your logic.
I will end here.
Thank you for the response. I think it worth emphasizing that I do not see your reply as a substantive engagement with the questions I raised. Instead of addressing the argument itself, you chose to address the person and to end the discussion unilaterally. That is of course your right, but a public discussion, on complex and sensitive issues such as those you wrote about, requires a level of precision and depth that I did not find in your answer.
This passive-aggressive tone has truly crossed the bounds of good taste.
So here is the matter. I did not at all address the person. I addressed the arguments themselves. It is simply that you had none, and that is what I remarked on.
You quote sentences of mine and see in them emphatic statements, when that exists only in your imagination. After all, I did not say that there is no problem with continuing to fight; I said that I do not see a problem. Does that sound emphatic to you? The same applies regarding breaking Hamas. You choose to ignore (or fail to understand) what I explicitly wrote several times in this column: that my remarks are certainly open to debate, and that I have no information and no expertise on these matters. I explained explicitly that my only intention here was to argue that these positions and arguments—my own personally (despite the above limitations)—sound very reasonable, are not being discussed in the discourse, and people are expressing emphatic positions without having addressed them.
I truly do not know how one could say more sharply what you wrote that you did not find in me. A problem in reading comprehension? In logic? Just bias and stubbornness? I do not know, but certainly at least one of those three.
I argued against Israel Ziv, who demands that the chief of staff be courageous and stand against the government. That means he has already reached conclusions: 1. It is clear to him that the government is simply murdering soldiers for no real reason. 2. It is clear to him that the chief of staff lacks backbone, and he is rebuking him. He is speaking conclusively, not merely expressing a position (all the more so since, coming from a general in the IDF, even that is not acceptable in my opinion). In contrast, against his remarks I raised the possibility that he should have considered things before accusing the chief of staff of lack of courage and integrity and the government of murder for political interests. Does that sound emphatic to you? Does that sound to you like something I needed to verify? What else exactly did I need to verify in order to make that claim?
It is worth reminding you that there is a difference between “one may raise a forced difficulty” and “one may provide a forced resolution.” The accuser must substantiate his accusation. The defender need only raise a reasonable alternative. That is what I did.
In short, you insist on finding defects in me that do not exist (perhaps there are others that do, but in your remarks there were none), and in the end you also take offense in a passive-aggressive way.
But against such arbitrary insistence, which ignores explicit things I wrote, and which raises absurd and baseless arguments, I have no way to respond. And that, too, is not a claim about the person but about the (absence of) argument.
Let us just note the obvious:
Yes, you did address the person. You wrote, “you absolutely must improve your reading comprehension and your logic.”
Contrary to your assertion, “I do not see any problem with continuing to fight in Gaza,” and by implication also fighting forever, since that is a possibility you raised in the column, it is obvious to all of us that there are indeed many problems with continuing to fight in Gaza. Let us start with the minor issue of hundreds of soldiers dying every year.
Again, a mistake. Your “obvious” is not only not obvious; it is incorrect. Addressing the person (ad hominem) means using an argument about the person as the basis for my claim. If I had written to you that you are wrong because you are an idiot or do not understand logic, that would have been addressing the person. But I did not do that. I wrote that you have such problems because of the problems and flaws in your remarks. That is a conclusion, not an assumption. Therefore this is not addressing the person but addressing the issue itself.
Your second remark is of course mere insistence (and that is not about the person). You apparently understood my words to mean that there will be no prices we pay for continuing the war. Well, that is a very interesting understanding, and if it is correct then you have really caught me out. Indeed there will be costs (how had I not thought of that myself?!). It is important to check again whether that is a reasonable interpretation of my words. I am sure you will work it out on your own,
In short, it would be good to stop insisting and start listening.
This is not about an 'ad hominem' argument, but about the fact that you referred directly to the person himself when you wrote, 'you absolutely must improve your reading comprehension and your logic.' Statements of this sort imply a challenge to the questioner’s ability to think and create the impression of an attempt to weaken the questioner instead of focusing on a substantive discussion. They also point to a defensiveness that does not necessarily strengthen your arguments.
Regarding the issue of costs, you are using sarcasm to sidestep the question. In your column you wrote: "Assuming the Lebanon matter ends soon, I see no principled problem with continuing the fighting in Gaza for many years," but when you were asked about the obvious costs of that, you wrote, "after all, I did not say there is no problem with continuing to fight, but that I do not see a problem." If you think there is a misunderstanding of your words here, all you need to do is simply explain what you meant.
I explained, and explained again, but there is a problem in reading comprehension. I did indeed refer to the person in light of the poor quality of his arguments. What is the problem with that? In short, we have exhausted this.
It is a shame that things descend into such low-grade arguments that are not to the point; it leaves a bad taste. There ought to be respectful engagement even if someone is mistaken.
Has Your Honor changed his attitude toward Bibi in any way?
I recall that a few years ago your posts had a very critical tone regarding him.
Today, in your analysis, Bibi seems to be presented in a different, more positive light… In several recent posts Bibi has come out looking good.
My Honor has not changed his attitude. The man is corrupt and harmful and is destroying the state.
Well, this did not age well, and with impressive speed, Rabbi. Does the agreement in the north fit with your position?
There is nothing I can do with mere declarations. What about the agreement in the north are you asking?
Regarding the meaningless names of the operations—usually these are generic names generated randomly by a computer with no thought behind them.
Sometimes there is human intervention when someone does not like the operation name the computer produced and changes it, but without inside information it is impossible to know what is correct in this case, and one can always blame the computer…
Has there been a turning point in your opinion of the prime minister?
I remember that you were not among his admirers.
Or are you speaking from what you consider an objective, substantive analysis of reality?
I am very far from being one of his admirers. In fact I detest him. What did you see here that indicates a turning point?
What is someone who isn’t willing to pay for Haaretz supposed to do? Miss out on the gem?
And regarding Rabbi Landau—Haredi thinking does not recognize the collective at all, nor does it recognize the state, so what is left? The personal argument. Bibi will have mercy on his son, and I will have mercy on mine.