Where Are We Headed: A Different Look at the Current Situation (Column 717)
In Column 710 I pointed out a loop that jams our discourse. Each side is unwilling to listen seriously to the other, which creates the feeling that the other side has no arguments; therefore, if it still holds its position it must necessarily be evil and/or foolish. But if that’s the case, there’s no point in listening to its arguments—and so on in a vicious circle. In the overwhelming majority of cases in our public discourse, this applies to both sides of the debate.
I argued there that listening to both sides can lead to more informed and balanced positions, and I demonstrated this through the heavenly voice (bat kol) that ruled like Beit Hillel because they prefaced Beit Shammai’s words to their own. In many cases your view will thus be refined and improved. But even if in the end you don’t change your position, it will certainly be more grounded and balanced after you take your opponent’s arguments into account. Here I wanted to bring a more concrete example and, through it, to suggest a slightly different perspective on our present situation.
Micah Goodman’s Article
The trigger for this discussion is an article by Micah Goodman that was published on the eve of the holiday on YNET and in the print newspaper. People were very enthusiastic about the piece, and I received it this morning from two different directions on WhatsApp. Goodman describes the tension between nationalism and liberalism that begins in the Declaration of Independence and sharpens in today’s political divide. His claim is that between the two extreme camps stands a third camp—not an average and not a compromise—but one that fully lives both ideas, nationalism and liberalism, including the contradiction between them, and is unwilling to compromise between them or give up either. This camp has no expression in the political discourse, and for various reasons (opinions on practical policy) it joins one of the two sides and thus loses its own expression. He argues that now there is an opportunity to form this middle camp, as one side has sobered up from the dreams of peace and the other side understands that it is no longer possible to exempt the Haredim from conscription (yes, yes! that is the thrust of his words as written).
This move is classic Goodman. Micah Goodman is enamored of the dialectic of thesis and antithesis, and his synthesis is always living in contradiction—unity of opposites. I think this structure describes all his writings. As usual, I felt I very much agree with the spirit of his argument. But Goodman, as is his wont, sketches a conceptual picture that is a bit too perfect. As I will explain shortly, I do not think there is a sobering up from the idea of peace and compromise. On the contrary. As for the other side, the supposed sobering up from the Haredi exemption, here we already see an artificial clinging to the dialectical structure just for symmetry. As if the exemption for the Haredim were the organizing idea of the right-wing nationalist side. I also strongly disagree with the “unity of opposites” and “living in contradiction.” To my mind, such terms express intellectual laziness. Instead of speaking about the unity of opposites, one should present a consistent and complex doctrine and show that there is no contradiction. It sounds very deep, but to me it’s lazy nonsense.
But Goodman is entirely right that the center does not exist in the discourse because it is split, cognitively and terminologically, between the two poles (which he does not define correctly). Moreover, in my view this missing side is indeed the center, and even if there is a combination here, it is not a contradictory fusion of nationalism and liberalism but a logical synthesis between them (at most with a bit of tension—phrases like “contradiction” and “unity of opposites” are unnecessary and, as noted, reflect laziness). Goodman is in love with the dialectical structure and therefore tends to cling to it in many cases artificially. Yet I must say that almost always, while it is indeed an overly rounded and aesthetic presentation of the idea, the idea itself is correct (a bit like Leibowitz who, as I have written more than once, almost always takes a correct idea and goes one step too far).
For the purpose of the discussion here, I’ll focus on the current disagreement regarding the war. For a change: without hostages and without judicial reform. Without corruption, and without Bibi and his trials.
A Look at the Dispute Regarding the War
I think the schematic description I’ll now offer does not stray too far from the truth. One side, which for simplicity I’ll call “the government,” speaks about complete victory, the collapse of Hamas, and some of it talks about conquering Gaza and settling it. The other side, which I’ll call “the protest,” is perceived by the first as harboring peace delusions, as defeatist, and in effect collaborating with the enemy. A political settlement is out of the question, certainly not after October 7. The other side, for its part, tends to think this is a futile war with no purpose—a war for its own sake in which there is no chance of victory (you can’t defeat an idea). Therefore, those who conduct it are evil and political opportunists, and/or messianic actors whose entire concern is the conquest and settlement of Gaza and taking over the universe. They also criticize the government for having no plan to end the war, i.e., a blueprint for the “day after” (since total victory is impossible, you must necessarily think about what to do once you stop—what you’re aiming for). In this context they do not stop citing Clausewitz, that war is the continuation of policy by other means, hence without policy there is no point to war. Note that I have not mentioned the hostages, since that issue skews the discourse here and I have addressed it more than once.
My sense in recent weeks is that this is a clear example of the phenomenon I described in Column 710. I will slightly alter Micah Goodman’s structure and argue what I argued there: that each side contains a correct aspect and sound arguments. A fuller and more balanced picture emerges if one tries to extract the correct aspects from both sides. What characterizes the extremes (the protest and the government) is that they do not do this. The third side, contrary to Goodman’s formulation, is not supposed to “live in contradiction.” There is no contradiction here. One can gather the correct elements from each side and create a different picture—entirely coherent. Note, as I claimed in Column 710, that this is almost always the case, and here I will try to demonstrate it.
The Third Side
In recent weeks there have been encouraging signs on the Hamas side. It seems to be in a truly desperate state and losing control in the Strip. It is willing to compromise far beyond what it was ever willing to do in the past, but not at the price of suicide. For if it is already to commit suicide, it would rather do so literally and take with it as many Israelis (and Palestinians) as possible. On the other hand, we are losing the world’s sympathy because we are not expressing a willingness for a genuine compromise. The world stands with the protest, i.e., it sees this as a purposeless war for its own sake (a Trump-style transfer is not an option, and of course will not happen in practice). The war continues, and it seems it truly will not achieve its goal. The opposition from outside and within could itself cause the war to fail to achieve its objective. It’s a self-fulfilling idea. The government, meanwhile, continues to speak of complete victory and the defeat of Hamas. The jokes about Bibi’s statement that we are “a hair’s breadth from complete victory,” said already about a year ago, reflect the despair and lack of trust in him and in the war.
At the same time, proposals are emerging from moderate Arab states that sound almost like the messianic era: forging peace and friendship with Israel, disarming Hamas and removing it from power, creating a demilitarized Palestinian state not under its rule, with mutual recognition of Israel. Note: this is not a proposal from the Likud Central Committee but from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, from Trump, and from a significant part of the enlightened world.
So what do we do—continue fighting until complete victory, or head toward a political settlement? I propose both: fight until complete victory, and then move to a political settlement.
It is quite clear that a political settlement is impossible until Hamas is defeated. If it is not defeated, there is no actor that can govern the Strip the day after, and talk of this as a substitute for defeating Hamas is empty verbiage. Moreover, in my unlearned assessment there is indeed a possibility of defeating it. It is already on its knees, and within a few more months it may no longer exist as an organization. You may be surprised to hear, but as the Chief of Staff also said (he is neither a member of the Likud Central Committee nor of the Religious Zionism party, nor Ben-Gvir), we are indeed a hair’s breadth from complete victory. The nasty jokes about Bibi are tendentious and baseless. We are indeed there. With a bit more patience we can achieve it, provided the protesters and jesters don’t hinder us. One must remember that in a 150-year conflict whose end is not in sight, a year and a half is indeed “a hair’s breadth.”
Add to this the fact that there can be no political arrangement that circumvents Hamas if it is not defeated on the battlefield. Contrary to the protest’s delusions, it is highly unlikely that Hamas will reach an arrangement without remaining in power and armed—or, alternatively, only after it has been defeated. On the other hand, waging war to defeat Hamas does not bring us to the end of the road. The conflict with the Palestinians remains, and Hamas’s idea can rise again and gain organizational and military flesh. Here the protest errs. The world also does not accept a war with no political horizon.
My conclusion is that our policy right now should be as follows: we continue until complete victory over Hamas—until it does not exist in any form, neither militarily nor organizationally. Complete in the literal sense. After that, we turn to a political settlement, and our face is toward the proposal of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. A new Middle East. We will make a reasonable territorial compromise (which already exists de facto), mutual recognition between us and the Palestinians, moderate governance in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, total demilitarization, with our right to intervene by force when we see violations of the demilitarization agreement. Note that there is no contradiction at all between fighting to complete victory and a political horizon. On the contrary, one builds the other. So what, for heaven’s sake, is the argument about?!
All this must be declared as publicly and clearly as possible before the people (of Israel) and the world. If this is the policy, there is a chance that many—both in Israel and abroad—will accept it. We will clarify that we do not talk with Hamas, and as long as it exists there will be no peace here. This is a war for the sake of peace and against the terror that prevents it. We will say that we are not stopping until the total eradication of Hamas, but we have no intention to conquer or settle Gaza. Even so, the war will continue until Hamas is destroyed. Period. We will add that our goal is precisely the implementation of the proposal of the Arab states. We accept it fully, verbatim. The ball is now with the Palestinians and Hamas. The world—or the sane part of it—will also accept this policy, and the Palestinians too can pressure Hamas to stop the systematic destruction of their people.
In such a situation, Hamas can do one of two things: either save its men at the price of surrender and disarmament and the departure of its leadership (those who remain) from Gaza, or fight to the end and be destroyed. But with such a policy there is both a decisive victory and a political horizon. There is strategy and policy, and at long last there is a chance to realize all this. The left’s vision of peace might perhaps gain flesh, ironically through the very war it most opposes. Therefore I find it hard to see sweeping opposition within Israeli society to such a move. And even if there will be opposition, we shall nonetheless continue—until complete victory and negotiations for a political settlement.
We must understand that the land is already de facto divided, and all that is required of us is to agree to this formally, to recognize this reality, and to retreat from dreams of the whole Land of Israel, which in any case exist only within a small part of the right-wing public. Most are on the right mainly due to security issues. In my eyes this is a historic opportunity for a reasonable political settlement between us and the Palestinians, the like of which we have never had. Such a settlement will be achieved only when the Palestinians give up their dreams of defeating Israel and internalize the heavy price they pay for those dreams. This terrible war has a positive outcome, for it helps them rid themselves of those religious dreams by ensuring the price is indeed unbearable. To that end, Gaza must be laid waste and we must relentlessly destroy anything that moves there, until they express a desire for the sort of settlement I described above. All this not out of unbridled lust for war, and not in order to settle there, but because this is the only path that gives us any chance of advancing the resolution of the conflict.
Two Reservations
I am not naive, and it is clear to me that the likelihood of a sustainable arrangement arising here is quite small. Still, in my view—unlike in the past—now there is indeed such a chance, and we are strong enough to take the risk that it may fail. After all, there is hardly any concession here on anything that does not already exist today. The division of the land and Palestinian governance (internationally recognized) already exist. The threats of terror exist today as well. Moreover, even if the arrangement fails, at least we will have destroyed Hamas and solved that problem. The achievements of the war remain in any case, and if such a proposal/statement exists now, that itself creates a chance to realize them (without such a proposal/statement we may well fail even to destroy Hamas because there will be no legitimacy to continue the war). If we fail, at worst we will be left in the situation that existed until now—with the improvement that Hamas is no longer on the scene.
Beyond that, there is a fair chance that once we declare our readiness for this process, we will have agreements with Arab states across the region, and the diplomatic map and regional balance of power will change. Incidentally, this diplomatic situation may perhaps hold up in some fashion even if in the end the arrangement with the Palestinians fails or is imperfect. Perhaps. Even if not, I don’t see what there is to lose here, apart from dreams that are not realizable anyway. This is in addition to achieving social consensus within Israel and bridging the supposed rift that tears us apart. I wrote that it is “supposed” because I believe a vast majority of the public could agree to such a synthesis. If we manage to break the dichotomy between the extremes, the silent majority will discover that there is in fact broad agreement.
True, there is the Palestinian Charter and the Hamas Charter. There are Islamic principles of deceiving enemies and a sham peace that is actually a hudna until “our hand is strong” (sound familiar?). One can sink into this fatalistic despair, and I do not deny that there is something to it. This is a calculated risk that we must take. We must remember that life is dynamic. Not all Palestinians are Muslim zealots. Some are driven by national aspirations rather than religious motives. In Islam too there are different interpretations of its principles, and there is pragmatism in dealing with reality—just like with us. We also have various religious principles that can be cited, such as “lo teḥonem” (do not grant them a foothold in the land), the destruction of the seven nations, theft from a gentile and the expropriation of his loan, and more. And the fact is that among us there is pragmatism as well, not only among the secular. Religious principles chart a direction that is not meant to be fully realized in every reality, and even the aspirations to realize them can ebb in the face of reality. Perhaps we can help the Palestinians rid themselves of their religious dreams and be more pragmatic—or at least not allow those unwilling to do so to lead them—just like with us. If they see that their situation truly improves, I think there is some chance for this.
My Improved Dialectic
Such a proposal cannot be presented by the current government, since in today’s government there is no one who can declare intentions for peace. For them, the very declaration is a betrayal of the idea of complete victory. There is no mental readiness for this. Nor is there anyone there who will declare a renunciation of the dream of the whole Land of Israel, even though it is clear to all of us that it has long since ceased to exist (the land is already divided). On the protest side as well, there is no one willing to acknowledge that we are indeed close to complete victory—truly a hair’s breadth away, if we gird ourselves with a bit more patience. They are unwilling there to recognize that this war is indeed in its place and, despite the terrible failure and the horrific massacre that occurred, it may achieve its goals before long—and much more besides. It creates an opportunity to realize all their dreams which until now were fantasies. We are a hair’s breadth from complete victory—have I mentioned that already?!
Methodologically, note that this is a proposal that combines elements from both sides—the government and the protest—and I think it offers a more logical and healthy balance, just as I described in Column 710. Note the contrast with what Goodman proposes. I do not think we are sobering up from the idea of peace. On the contrary, I must say that I, who had despaired of it, now see some chance for it (even if not great). Precisely thanks to this war and thanks to the government’s persistence and resolve (even though that is not its policy). If we know how to leverage the successes of the war, then we could say that Smotrich and Ben-Gvir brought peace.
Moreover, this is not living in contradiction, as Goodman describes it, but living in harmony. It is not true that anyone who wants peace must oppose complete victory or belittle it. And it is not true that anyone who supports complete victory does not want peace. The opposite is the case: only complete victory will bring peace (not surrender and domination, not the whole Land of Israel, but peace). If you extend to your enemy both a sword and an olive branch, there is a chance you will not need to use the sword. Those who offer only an olive branch (the left) will fail. Those who offer only a sword (the right) will also fail, because a desperate enemy threatened with annihilation fights to the end. Not for nothing does the Torah command leaving a fourth side open in a besieged city.
This is an example of why it is worthwhile to listen to the arguments of both sides. They are not necessarily contradictory, and one can build a balanced and coherent synthesis between them. A further bonus of this attentiveness is that, as I wrote in Column 710, we will realize that the other side is not a collection of evil fools. There is a position there with arguments, some of them good, and it is worth taking them into account. If we do so, we will reach a more balanced and logical policy and position, and in this way there is a chance we will solve our problems at home and perhaps also abroad. At least, it is worth considering this angle of vision.
I have no doubt that in the talkbacks here there will be many who will explain, with great eloquence, why I am a naive leftist and of course wrong all along the way. I do not think so, but my claim is that this proposal is at least an option, and it seems to me that many are not prepared to consider it at all. It is simply not on the table, because it does not fit the agenda of the protest nor that of the government. After you weigh everything, you are of course welcome to reject it. Even if I am wrong in all my analysis, my aim here—and on the site in general—is not only the content but mainly the method. If we at least consider listening to the other side and neutralizing the vicious loop described in Column 710; if we consider fleeing the schematic slogans that obligate us to bias in discourse; if we are willing to examine the other side’s arguments and build a more complex position that takes into account the arguments of both sides—then even if in the end you decide I am wrong and you remain on one side or the other, I have done my part.
Before you start shouting and protesting, I only ask that you read attentively and respond to the substance.
Discussion
Rabbi, I didn’t understand: if you made it difficult by saying that the government will not be able to bring about the peace that comes after total victory, then why do you still think it has a chance?
You’re not a naive leftist; you just write a bit superficially about dividing the land and repeat several times the phrase “it is already divided.” Honestly, it doesn’t suit you. You’re always teaching us about complexity, and then suddenly you brush aside the purely security issue as if it doesn’t exist. Judea and Samaria are not Gaza. In Gaza, Trump and the Arabs will build whatever they want. In Judea and Samaria there are currently 80,000 (eighty thousand) firearms according to the Shin Bet’s estimate. Why do you think the moderate forces in Ramallah or Hebron (together nearly 2 million citizens) will be stronger than our enemies and those who wish us harm? How are you so sure that it will be so easy to restore the situation if things go wrong? There is no agreement (hudna), and there will not be one without a massive evacuation in Judea and Samaria. There are more than half a million Jews there, so the land is not all that divided, and the security experiment you are proposing is not so simple. On the contrary, it is very dangerous. It will be possible to reach an arrangement with the Arabs on condition that we can continue living in most of Judea and Samaria (only that will finally prove that they have internalized that we too are here to stay). So here I am, a right-winger who at the moment is not interested in settling Gaza, who lets the Americans and Saudis do there whatever they want after the destruction of Hamas, but who thinks there is no chance at all for peace with the Arabs until we eliminate all their options for evil (terror infrastructure, weapons, smuggling, the desire to drive the Jews from every single place).
You managed to create a coherent strategy because you begged the question (took a side in the conflict): that it is realistic to destroy and replace Hamas in the short term and at a realistic price.
It’s not for nothing that Goodman does not offer a coherent solution but settles for an approach that lives with the contradictions in a balanced way, reducing the conflict rather than solving it.
What you are doing is too easy. Roughly half the public simply does not believe that replacing Hamas with a regime one can live with is realistic, certainly when the public in Gaza is mostly fanatical and overwhelmingly supports Hamas, and will not be willing to accept a pro-Israeli regime imposed on Israel’s bayonets. And all of this has to be done at a reasonable economic price for us that leaves us standing, and at a reasonable international cost. Good luck showing that!
Rabbi, can you sharpen your point? After all, there are settlements beyond the Green Line. Do you mean handing over everything, or only the territory of the Authority?
I understand that it is currently being reorganized.
It has a chance if someone acts properly.
A strange message. I didn’t say the security issue doesn’t exist. It certainly does exist. I don’t “think” anything about who is stronger than whom. All I said was that in my opinion this is an experiment worth trying, and that we could withstand even failure. I did not write that we would not fail. Nor am I “so sure” about anything. I presented a position for the readers’ consideration. I also did not write anywhere that Jews must be evacuated, or how many Jews must be evacuated. As far as I’m concerned, don’t evacuate anyone, or decide on borders and evacuate accordingly. That is a matter for negotiations and policy, and I did not go into the details.
I didn’t beg any question. I did indeed make assumptions. Every argument makes assumptions and derives conclusions from them. Are you suggesting that I present an argument without assumptions?
As for those in the public who don’t believe replacing Hamas is realistic, then apparently they disagree with me. That is perfectly fine. One thing is fairly clear to me: most of them did not even seriously consider this option before forming an opinion.
Goodman simply proposes living with contradictions and does not speak about solutions at all. He merely sketches an empty schema whose content is a general spirit, and with that I agree. Everything beyond that, in my opinion, is plainly wrong in his case.
As I wrote, I claim that even failure is something we could withstand, and therefore I am under no burden of proof that we will succeed.
No. I have no further clarification. I didn’t go into details and there is no need to do so. It will be in the negotiations, and whatever they arrive at there, they arrive at. As far as I’m concerned, any arrangement acceptable to the parties is excellent, and I assume that at least some settlements would have to be evacuated, and no disaster would result from that. The basis for the discussion is the situation that exists today, when in any case everything is already divided.
Your view pretty much reflects pragmatic Likud, and in fact many in the political center. I didn’t understand how your proposal constitutes a “third way” with a chance for broad agreement, or alternatively for reducing the rift in the national dispute.
1. It is easy to present coherence when you assume the realism of eliminating Hamas and replacing its rule in the short term. Goodman does not assume this, and therefore does not present a coherent picture but settles for verbiage about living with the contradictions (there is currently no coherent solution, at least none that we have found).
2. Your proposal is not “free” (at worst we lose nothing); continuing the war for several more years (how many?) carries costs of hundreds of billions that have to be offset from somewhere + an increasing international price + no normalization + an order of battle that is steadily being worn down.
In short, your picture is too simplistic. As for the method, of course I completely agree. There are 2 churches here (whether or not they are symmetrical), and there is room to draw half-truths from each church and examine things in depth.
I connect very much with the approach, mainly because it offers a solution to the internal conflict that is an obstacle to any possible solution.
But I have a question: does our being a step away from victory depend on implementing a compromise with a political horizon as you proposed?
Because if not, then the “government” side would do better to continue the war without offering compromises and reap all the benefits, no?
You’re not a “naive leftist”; you’re simply a leftist trying very hard to find merit in the government. If you were following the leftist-Kaplanist mainstream, you would discover that you are saying exactly what they are saying. What is the difference between your proposal and Moshe Radman (one of the leaders of the Kaplan protest), or between you and Yair Golan? There is no difference.
The only difference is that you think: 1. destroying Hamas is a realistic goal. 2. that the price of destroying Hamas will not be high. 3. that the achievement of destroying Hamas stands on its own.
Regarding 1, I have nothing to add; you clarified your position. 2. Already now there are more than 420 soldiers dead since the beginning of the maneuver—not including civilians and not including soldiers killed in Lebanon. The price in soldiers’ lives is already very high. (And just today the names of three more fallen soldiers were cleared for publication.) 3. No one on the left thinks there is value in destroying Hamas in and of itself, and quite clearly no one on the right thinks there is value in destroying Hamas in and of itself either—and therefore they arrive at fantasies of expulsion and/or destruction. If you think expulsion/destruction are not realistic and in addition advocate destroying Hamas and think there is value in that—then sorry to tell you, you are not in the center or in some synthesis—you are an outlier who apparently learned nothing from 7/10.
And regarding this paragraph:
Add to that the fact that there cannot be a political arrangement that bypasses Hamas if it is not defeated on the battlefield. Contrary to the protest’s delusions, it is highly unlikely that Hamas will reach an arrangement unless it remains in power and armed, or alternatively after it has been defeated. On the other hand, a war to defeat Hamas does not bring us to the end of the road. The conflict with the Palestinians remains intact, and the idea of Hamas can rise again and take on organized and military flesh. In this the protest is mistaken (read: the government—the mistake is in the original). The world too does not accept war without a political horizon.
The goal of people on the left was never to reach agreements with Hamas (at most for the sake of releasing hostages). A political solution, in the eyes of any leftist, does not include Hamas remaining in power—either the PA or another government in whose elections Hamas people are allowed to participate. By contrast, in the government no one talks about a political arrangement like the thoroughly leftist solution you are proposing—and I’m not even talking about small parts of the government like Smotrich-Ben Gvir, I’m talking even about not-small parts of Likud (Karhi, Saada, Amit Halevi, and many others).
In short, in the government and among its supporters you will not find such broad agreement with your ideas. By contrast, the left was proposing what you are saying already in the first months of the fighting—when people began to understand that the government’s supreme interest was to drag the war out as long as possible. When I said in the first months that the war would be stretched out for a long time in order to avoid elections, no one understood what I was talking about; no one believed the war would continue for more than a year and a half. Now even government supporters are beginning to agree with me that the war is being prolonged in order to keep the government in power.
I agree with most of the things except for one conclusion – the government, more precisely the prime minister, is capable of passing such a plan. Ben Gvir will leave the government, Smotrich will be very angry but won’t bring down the government, the opposition will say it is giving a safety net but in the end will oppose it, and only the Haredim will exploit the situation and demand a draft-dodging law – in such a situation, would you be willing to sacrifice the issue of conscription for the sake of your plan?
Was that a question or an answer? Why, that is exactly my claim. That many on the pragmatic right and the sensible left would agree with this thesis, if they were not being swept along by the extremes for various reasons. I did not mean that I had reinvented the wheel, but rather the opposite: that what I am saying is, in my opinion, acceptable to most of the public. The problem is that in the discourse such a position does not appear because the noisy extremes take it over.
I think so. Without declaring that our goal is a political horizon, we will not get enough rope for military action and for eliminating Hamas. Moreover, eliminating Hamas without a political horizon will not bring the desired result, because then others will come in place of Hamas, and what have we achieved?! The whole idea is to help the Palestinians save themselves from themselves.
You remind me of responses I received after my book Two Carts came out. Quite a few people wrote me something along the lines of: well, you didn’t say anything new. It’s all already written in Rabbi Nachman, Rav Kook, R. Tzadok, the Maharal, and the like. And my answer was that indeed my aim is not to innovate but to clarify something that for some reason has become blurred. Namely, that in principle most of the public on the right and on the left actually agrees with this thesis, even though it does not appear in a discourse controlled by the noisy extremes. And no, this is not a leftist solution (“leftist solution” is an oxymoron). It is a solution of the pragmatic right, which understands that only the use of force will bring achievements and peace. See my reply above to Tsafrir.
Regarding my factual assumption that Hamas can be defeated, one can indeed argue about that, and I wrote this explicitly in my remarks. But I expect that at the very least this should be put on the table and debated. By the way, all the clever expert types from Kaplan of course know everything (like Yair Golan and Bogie). But the chief of staff and all his generals think otherwise. A few days ago he said Hamas can be defeated within a few months. Up to now the war has already been going on for about twenty months, of which only a few months involved actual fighting, and we are already past most of the way. For some reason, although all the experts from Kaplan know that Hamas cannot be defeated and that this is a political war and a war crime, all the generals, headed by the chief of staff, do not know this. They do not refuse and continue sending their soldiers to massacre civilians and to sacrifice soldiers’ lives for nothing. So one of two things must be true: either all the generals of the General Staff, including the chief of staff, are spineless cowards or idiots who do not understand simple things, or perhaps they know something the experts from Kaplan do not know. And perhaps the experts from Kaplan are mainly experts in public relations and the populism of the religion of the hostages, and less occupied with military considerations. I tend toward the latter possibility, but of course that’s just me.
A political solution that does not include Hamas requires defeating it before the negotiations. Anyone on the left who wants that should honestly say that the war must be finished first.
No one really says these simple things, neither right nor left (even though many on the right and left think this), and that is exactly why I wrote the column. This despite the fact that everyone knows it, of course, and despite my merely repeating what the left says.
And again I refer you to Tsafrir’s question and my answer there.
In the framework with which Goodman defined Israeli society, one can create a picture of any society in the world; of any social circle, and even of any family circle. Goodman’s analysis reminded me of polarization in Israel, of the well-known image of someone who shoots an arrow and only afterward draws the target around it. Goodman sketched the views prevalent in the public, and afterward presented them opposite one another in a more or less symmetrical framework, rather forcedly, and in the middle presented the views of the majority of the public as they appear to him. Such a division of opinions you will find in every circle of opinions in the world.
I could not understand what the sages added with their article.
Of course he is capable. Who said otherwise?! The question is whether he wants to, because of the prices you described. There is no need at all to sacrifice the issue of conscription for this. And there certainly would not be public agreement to that, and that is one of the goals of the whole move I proposed.
“A conflict of one hundred and fifty years whose end is not seen as an option” — apparently you meant *horizon*.
Hello and blessings!
First of all, more power to you for these remarks.
What is your view regarding the hostages? Does acting in the way you propose slam the door on a full/partial deal to bring them back?
I meant that he is politically capable of carrying it out and also remaining prime minister at the end of the process, and to tell the truth I don’t think he could oppose the move if Trump demanded it of him.
Indeed. Thank you.
That’s what I meant too.
I’ll address one sentence:
“A moderate regime in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, total demilitarization, with our right to intervene by force whenever we see violations of the demilitarization agreement”
A. Even you understand that there will not really be demilitarization. There is no demilitarization in an Arab society or state (whether it takes 2 minutes or 5 years), so what is the point of a fantasy devoid of any basis?
B. Maybe I missed it, but under the agreement are we giving up parts of Judea and Samaria?
C. Will we really go to war when mortar dribbles or Kalashnikov fire begin on communities in Israel? Will there be legitimacy for that among the people? Will we be able to do that internationally?
D. And suppose you do go to war in the territory of Judea and Samaria after they are not demilitarized, what will you do after you defeat them?
What will you do with the millions of Arabs living there?
In my opinion, absolutely not. On the contrary, without continuing with full force there is not much chance of seeing hostages. Hamas will not simply give up its main bargaining chips. If we continue, there may perhaps be a chance to get them, or some of them, back, just so that the Hamas people can escape. Maybe yes and maybe no. In my estimation it only increases the chances, although in my opinion in any case the hostage consideration is not the main one.
A. No, I do not understand that. When I speak of demilitarization I do not mean that there will not be pistols there. The intention is that there will be no military force and no missiles. On that, in my opinion, we have control. We knew here too that they were developing such a force; we simply did nothing.
B. That is a matter for discussion of the details. In my opinion it is possible to evacuate several settlements within the framework of a reasonable territorial division.
C. Absolutely yes. Very much so.
D. We’ll see what the situation is then. From what it looks like to me now, I would do the same thing.
The disease of our public discourse on all issues—judicial reform, the war, and more—is that each side presents the worst case and conducts itself accordingly, and also presents it confidently as though this is certain to happen. That is a rather foolish way to conduct a discussion, especially when we can withstand even the worst case, as I wrote in the column.
Every Arabist and expert on Islam will tell you that expectations for a moderate regime in the PA are castles in the air. The entire territory of the State of Israel is considered “Dar al-Islam,” etc. etc., and there is not a single official Arab body that maps the State of Palestine along the ’67 borders.
Within a few months after that demilitarization, two things will happen: the smuggling route from Egypt will be renewed, and there will be an appeal to the UN asking permission for the PA to maintain a militia in order to prepare against “Zionist aggression.”
And then within years we will get Hamas under another name.
I have already invested so many times in reading the posts, and I did not always even comment, certainly I did not shout, but meanwhile while I am reading posts, those who actually decide have decided and will always decide since the establishment of the state (without posts and without setting up a third path, and if that does not work then also a fourth and fifth and the hand is still outstretched) are those who are immersed in the world of halakhah all their lives—these are the great Torah leaders, and now Maran R. Dov Lando, before him R. Gershon Edelstein, and before him R. Chaim Kanievsky, and before him R. Aharon Leib Shteinman, and before him Maran Rav Elyashiv, and before him Maran Rav Shach and the Steipler of blessed memory, and before that at the establishment of the state it was Maran the Chazon Ish. Meanwhile Michi and I and an entire generation that did not know Joseph were born here, and this blog and articles and books and posts were set up here, and practically speaking, what has come of it until today? A total waste of time reading posts and commenters’ replies, and shouting from here and from there up to the heavens, over and over again, while those who really move things are a decision from this morning by Maran R. Dov Lando to dissolve the government. So what is the point of my reading the posts and, without noticing, letting all the goats escape from the pen?
Maybe I didn’t make myself clear enough—the point I’m making is that you are a leftist, full stop. And that there are people in the political center (parts of Likud) who can agree with you—that is not a semantic matter, it is essential. You will not hear anything that rhymes with the words “a political arrangement with the Palestinians” from a large part of the “right-wing” side of the political map. By contrast, there is not a single leftist who opposes toppling Hamas in principle (at most on technical grounds). In other words—the extremists on the right control the government because their representation in the public (and as a result in the government) is very large; the extremists on the left are found mainly in the newspaper Haaretz. An absolute majority of leftists will sign onto what you are saying; no one in the right-wing public will be willing even to consider the words political arrangement—only certain parts of Likud (perhaps even a majority) could swallow something like that.
Maybe another year of fighting and people will understand that the war is pointless and move more to the left, and gradually the political echelon will understand that an arrangement must be reached. Who knows—maybe just as you moved to the left side, you will eventually conclude that this war is a sham war… time will tell.
Regarding the destruction of Hamas, I read the column again and again and thought I understood the essence of your definition of destroying Hamas: “In such a situation, Hamas can do one of two things: either save its people at the price of surrender, disarmament, and the departure of the leadership (whoever is still left) from Gaza, or fight to the end and be destroyed.” And you understand very well that the second possibility means “it is prepared to compromise far beyond what it was prepared to do in the past, but not at the price of suicide. Because if it is going to commit suicide anyway, then in its eyes it is better to really commit suicide and take as many Israelis (and Palestinians) with it as possible.”
So apparently your understanding of the definition of toppling Hamas is surrender and exile of its leaders (what remains of them), and in my view that is exactly what the prime minister means as well (because he also said it in his own words at some point).
But then I saw your response to the question whether a political horizon for the Palestinians is a necessary condition for eradicating Hamas rule—and you answered: “I think so. Without declaring that our goal is a political horizon, we will not get enough rope for military action and for eliminating Hamas. Moreover, eliminating Hamas without a political horizon will not bring the desired result, because then others will come in place of Hamas, and what have we achieved?! The whole idea is to help the Palestinians save themselves from themselves.” If you do not understand that this is the criticism (with a capital T) of the government from the left side of the map, and this is what all leftists have been arguing roughly since the beginning of the war, and this is the main reason they think this war is a sham war, then you need “to put it on the table and have a debate about it”… Or in fact there is no debate here at all—you are simply a leftist who wants to topple Hamas, wants to find an alternative to Hamas rule (and thinks that is a necessary condition for toppling it), does not dream of expulsion/mass destruction, and does not think one should settle Gaza—so please give me one “right-winger” from the government (or from its supporters) who is willing to sign onto all these things? Leftists I can find you in abundance… And that is without even saying the explicit name—political arrangement—which even Gantz and Lapid are not willing to say, and instead call it “regional alliance,” “alliance of the moderate states,” or all kinds of other made-up phrases. Maybe you should consider going back to the demonstrations in Kaplan…
P.S. If there is one thing I learned from 7/10, it is not to evaluate an ideology through my own eyes but through the eyes of those who hold that ideology. You keep falling back into the conception as if religious, fanatical, messianic extremists who decided to try to conquer a state dozens of times stronger than they are will simply lay down their weapons and go into exile after surrender. Even after the entire Hamas leadership in Gaza was eliminated from the rank of squad leader and up (except for Izz al-Din al-Haddad), soldiers are still continuing to fall in the Strip (today there was yet another clearance for publication from the north of the Strip). If you think we are a step away from Hamas’s surrender, I recommend thinking again about your basic assumptions.
We are repeating ourselves.
You’re right, it’s this disconnect. It reminds me of the prosecution’s cross-examination of Netanyahu yesterday about a doll his wife asked Milstein for. How many detached-from-reality people are there in our tiny country, constantly under attack and conducting a war on seven fronts—soldiers with amputated legs and arms, bereaved families and wounded, the middle class sliding into the prefix of a disgraceful poverty class, reserve families living in constant anxiety and loneliness—and these cynical people, the detached leftists, have the gall to waste billions upon billions, to provide this circus in the courts, and all, all for bottomless burning hatred. How long shall the wicked rejoice??
I pretty much agree with you about the possibility of reaching an arrangement that will eradicate the Palestinian problem in Gaza. But I do not understand why you assume there has to be an agreement with Hamas and not simply intervention by countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar in replacing the regime there?
And another question I have: you assume that your proposal, which you define as centrist, has many people who share it, but that the government cannot propose it for all sorts of reasons. In my opinion, that is the difference between politics and an opinion column. It is personally clear to me that Bibi also knows that the problem in Gaza cannot be solved without some external solution such as the residents leaving to other countries or external intervention in the administration there. The reason he does not say this clearly, but rather uses statements like total victory, is a political one. If the enemy and foreign countries know what the plan is, they will never agree to it. It is a simple rule in negotiations: you adopt an extreme position in order to arrive at an offer that is good enough for you. Therefore I do not think you are wrong in the opinion itself, but in your assumption, where you wrote that the government must say this clearly. That is not how world politics works.
It seems you didn’t read what I wrote.
Who said an agreement with Hamas? I explicitly wrote an agreement without Hamas.
Bibi certainly knows, but he is constrained by his coalition. There is no harm at all in declaring this policy. On the contrary, a declaration would only help.
But from what I understood, you oppose a deal.
He is talking about a deal with Hamas of the kind Israel wants (that Hamas leaves the Strip completely).
First of all, are you pitting one person against another? Second, you did not understand correctly, and I do not know where you got that from.
There are two paths to ending the war in Gaza.
The first path is the path of total victory. This is the Smotrich-Ben Gvir path, which holds that total victory means Hamas’s surrender. Contrary to what was said in the article, they know that Hamas’s surrender means Israeli military and civilian control in Gaza. In their dream, the Gazans disappear and Israel rebuilds Gaza, and peace comes to Gaza and a solution to the housing crisis. In reality, as B. Netanyahu wrote in his book, the total surrender of Hamas means Israeli military and civilian control in Gaza. The 700 million we paid this month for food for Gaza will become 700 billion.
The second path is a hostage deal under which Israel leaves Gaza. An alternative government is established with the support of Arab countries and Western countries. Israel still retains control over Gaza’s perimeter, including the ability to prevent smuggling. In such a situation, the Arab states mobilize to help reconstruct Gaza, and Israel conditions that on active action by the alternative government against any Hamas rearmament, just as is happening in Lebanon, where reconstruction of the Shiite villages is conditioned on Hezbollah’s disarmament. At the same time, Israel acts as it does in Lebanon against any attempt by Hamas to rebuild itself in Gaza.
The path you proposed in the article simply does not exist. Hamas’s surrender would cause Israel to be the one responsible for Gaza, and that is before we even talked about the price we are paying in the world for every additional day of fighting.
Chronology of Rabbi Michael Abraham’s views:
Late 2023: “If we were offered a deal of all the Hamas prisoners in our hands in exchange for all the hostages, I would support it without hesitation.”
September 2024: “I have written my opinion more than once. I am against a deal. Period. It doesn’t matter even if we find them all dead.” And also: “Any deal Hamas agrees to will be very bad for us.”
May 2025: “In my opinion, the relative weight of the considerations leads to opposition to the deal,” and also: “There are additional considerations against the deal, and therefore, taken together, the totality of the considerations in my opinion indicates opposition to it.”
June 2025, in response to someone who understood that Rabbi Michael Abraham opposes a deal: “You did not understand correctly, and I do not know where you got that from.”
I find it a bit hard to deal with serious problems in reading comprehension. It reminds me of the “facts” and “numbers” and quotations that are brought to us in the media and public discourse.
I stand behind all the quotations you brought here. Up to the last one.
1. If we were offered a deal of all the hostages in exchange for all the prisoners, I would be willing. This refers to that being the deal, irrespective of eliminating Hamas, of course. That was what was being discussed before the war broke out.
2. Following the war and its achievements, I am indeed against any deal Hamas would agree to, unless it is a surrender in which Hamas departs and is eliminated. I oppose any deal that leaves it in power.
3. Indeed there are considerations for and against a deal, but the totality of the considerations indicates opposition.
4. The last quotation spoke about opposition to a deal in which Hamas departs. I truly do not know where he got that from.
I hope I have filled in what your kindergarten teacher and first-grade teacher failed to.
Again, this seems like problems in reading comprehension. The second model is roughly what is described in the column.
The sentence “If we were offered a deal of all the Hamas prisoners in our hands in exchange for all the hostages, I would support it without hesitation” was published on 23 November 2023, which was a month and a half into the war.
Doesn’t that contradict your position “I am against a deal. Period. It doesn’t matter even if we find them all dead”?
Not at all, and I also explained why. Even today I would agree to that immediately. It’s hard when one doesn’t read or doesn’t understand what I write
Well, it is simply a statistical miracle that so many readers with reading-comprehension problems happened to come read your site, of all places in the world.
Sorry, again a mistake. Their percentage here is no different from the general percentage. On the contrary, in my impression it is smaller. Certainly on current-affairs issues saturated with emotions like this one.
I seem to recall that not long ago you argued (around the discussion of Amalekite genocide) that, in comparison to Nazism, Palestinian hatred is deeper. If that is indeed the case, then I do not understand where your optimism comes from. Presumably, a victory that uproots the desire to destroy us and allows a safe experiment in a Palestinian state would look at the very least like the victory over Nazism, which included long years of occupation and re-education. That is not a victory within reach, and the political price it requires would also be higher. As I understand it, the decision/defeat they speak about in the army describes at most reaching a situation of security control like in Judea and Samaria, which requires constant “mowing the grass.” From there to a Palestinian state is too long a road.
“The second path is a hostage deal under which Israel leaves Gaza. An alternative government is established with the support of Arab countries and Western countries” – and what is Hamas’s fate in your scenario? Destruction? Exile? And who is that alternative government? The Authority? Without details about the path between those two sentences, your path too simply does not exist..
Not Palestinian hatred, but Hamas hatred. I did not express optimism here. I spoke of a possibility of success that is worth trying, because the price of failure is not something we cannot withstand.
The kal va-chomer from Nazism is odd to begin with. In fact, that is an excellent example of a victory that changed the picture within a day. No long years of occupation and no re-education. There was none of that there.
Your proposal shows a lack of understanding of who the enemy is. The enemy is not only Hamas but its many supporters in Gaza and Judea and Samaria. The moment you let the Arab population rule, the result will be a government with Hamas’s ideology. Already today Hamas has 80 percent support in the Authority (if not more), and the Authority’s rule rests solely on the bayonets of the IDF (and of course the Authority is not moderate at all, but gives salaries to terrorists and names squares after them). The hope for some vague demilitarization to be carried out from afar by Saudi Arabia and the like—come on. There is no substitute for our control on the ground, and there is no long-term control without establishing settlements in the territory
Do you personally believe in and want the dream of the Whole Land of Israel?
You say the dream is dead, but if the Turks expelled Greeks after thousands of years, then for us too the technology exists.
What about the Temple—this is an opportunity now to build it.
I didn’t say the dream is dead. If it comes in the future, it will come. I do not see any opportunity right now.
Thank you for the rational, clear-eyed, eloquent, and original voice you bring to the table! I enjoyed reading it.
A question on another topic – what about your podcast on Spotify? I saw that many episodes were deleted…