On Weakness of the Will – The Problem (Column 172)
With God’s help
In a thread from a few days ago, the question of the mechanism of sin and its causes came up, and there I said that I intended to address it soon. We are standing on the threshold of the final sealing on Hoshana Rabbah, so it is not yet too late to clarify the mechanism of sin. In the next two columns I will deal a bit with this issue, which analytic philosophers have probed extensively and which they call "weakness of the will".[1] This column will present the problem, and in the next column I will propose a solution.
Weakness of the Will: Definition
The expression "weakness of the will" reflects a feeling that accompanies us after failures we have experienced in various areas. This ranges from a person who committed a transgression of Jewish law, broke the law, or violated moral norms, to someone who "sinned" against the rules of a diet they had taken upon themselves. In all these situations we feel that although we believed we ought to do X, we were weak (our will was weak), and therefore we did not manage to do it. Such situations are called "weakness of the will," to distinguish them from situations in which a person performs an action that in their own eyes is right (I will call this here a "considered action"). Of course, those very same actions can also be done in a considered way, that is, because one believes that this is the right way to act, or at least that this is how one wants to act. A person who does not want to diet eats fattening foods. That is not weakness of the will but a considered action, because here the person does not feel that they have failed; they did exactly what they wanted. The same is true of a person who commits transgressions—of Jewish law, moral, or otherwise—because that is what they want to do. In all these situations we would not say that the person acted out of weak will, because there is no failure here (in the person’s subjective sense). These are considered actions. Failure is an action that stems from weak will, that is, an action by a person against what they themselves think is right to do.
Weakness of the Will: The Problem Itself
The problem raised by various philosophers is that, apparently, a state of "weakness of the will" cannot exist. Here I will follow the formulation of the well-known American analytic philosopher Donald Davidson, in an article devoted to this subject in a collection of his essays.[2]
Davidson presents the problem by means of three claims, each of which sounds entirely reasonable, but they cannot all be accepted together (they are mutually inconsistent):
- If a person thinks that act X is right, they want to do it.
A clarification is required here. A person can think that theft is bad and nevertheless want to steal. But they cannot think that theft is not right and nevertheless want to steal. If they want to steal, then apparently they think that this is the right thing (for them in that situation) to do. Otherwise they would not want to steal. It is important to understand that here "right" is not identical with "worthy" or "moral." The term "right" here means what should be done after taking into account the whole set of considerations (the moral prohibition + the economic benefit in the person’s current situation + their needs, etc.). Therefore there can be a person who thinks that theft is not a bad act, and therefore wants to steal. Another person may agree that theft is bad, but from their standpoint the economic interest they have overrides the moral prohibition, and therefore they too want to steal. From the standpoint of both of these types, this is the "right" act for these particular circumstances. "Right" is what emerges from the totality of the considerations of the acting person in the given circumstances (desires, interests, values, etc.).
- If a person wants to do act X and there are no external constraints preventing them from doing so, they do it.
This seems like a simple claim. A person does what they want, unless there are some external impediments that interfere. If there are no such impediments, there is no reason to assume that what they do is not what they wanted to do.
- There are situations of "weakness of the will."
I defined these situations above. Let me only remind you here that we are speaking of an action that a person performs even though, in their view, it is not right in the sense defined in item 1. Put differently, "not all actions are considered actions."
As stated, each of these assumptions sounds entirely reasonable and compelling. And at the same time, the three of them cannot be reconciled with one another. If a person wants what is right in their eyes, and does what they want, then what is right in their eyes is what they do. But situations of weakness of the will are situations in which they do something that is not right in their eyes, and if such situations exist this contradicts what follows from the first two claims.
First Objection
The initial objection that usually arises in discussions like these is that sometimes a person does not act rationally. They do not act on the basis of right and wrong, but under the force of urges that push them to do things even though those things are not right in their eyes. The feeling of weak will, or failure, means that the desire to do the right thing was not strong enough to stand up to the urges, and therefore the failure occurred. For example, a person who undertook to go on a diet ate a fattening food. They failed, because they acted against their values and against what they think is right. Why did they do it? Because they had a strong urge to eat that food, and they did not withstand it. At first glance, this is an example of an action of weak will that satisfies the three claims brought above. 1. The person wants what is right in their eyes (= to diet). 2. In the absence of external constraints, what they want is also what they do. 3. But here there were external constraints (their urge), and so they nevertheless ate the prohibited food. If so, an action of weak will took place here, and it does not contradict any of the three claims presented above.
But this is a mistaken objection, because we must ask ourselves what the force of the urge acting upon them was. If that urge operated in such a way that the person could not resist it—an irresistible impulse—then they were coerced. An action in such a state is not a sin and not a failure (and it also does not require repentance), but at most an action that harms them (they gain weight). On the other hand, if they were indeed able to resist the urge, then why did they nevertheless act as they did? Apparently because that is what they wanted. Put differently, it was more important to them to gratify their appetite (and eat) than to lose weight. The conclusion is that even in such a state they are actually doing exactly what is "right" in their eyes (as a result of the whole set of considerations), and therefore there was no weakness of the will here but an ordinary action. I remind you that the economic interest that leads a person to steal, or the desire to gratify the urge to eat, are not viewed in this picture as urges, but as one of the person’s desires. The urge is the impulse that acts upon the person, but the action is the result of the person’s free decision to yield to that urge, and yielding to the urge is one of the person’s desires (apparently the stronger desire). Therefore a person who stole because of economic interest, or ate something fattening because of the urge to eat, although they certainly could have overcome it, did not act from weak will but from a full and ordinary will. This is a "considered action." We also saw above that although theft may be immoral in their eyes, in the final analysis it is what is right in their eyes in those circumstances, and therefore the theft in such a state is also a considered action.
The conclusion is that a person always does what they want, unless they are forced not to do so. If they are forced, then they are coerced, and this is not weakness of will. And if they do it without coercion, then they performed this act of their own will, and again there is no action of weak will here but a considered action. Therefore, at bottom, it seems that there are no situations of "weakness of the will." This argument implies that talk about weak will is, at most, an excuse we give ourselves in order to quiet our pangs of conscience over an immoral, illegal, fattening, or halakhically forbidden act. We tell ourselves a story that we failed and that our will was weak, and therefore we did not carry out what was right in our eyes (but really we are fine because we wanted the worthy thing). But the truth is that we did exactly what we decided to do and what was right in our eyes. We are not quite as "fine" as we tell ourselves (indeed, that is exactly what counted as "fine" from our standpoint).
Second Objection
Some wish to explain an action that stems from weak will as an analysis of the action from the vantage point of the future. A person stole on day A. They did indeed do so because, in their view, that was what was "right" (when morality and self-interest were weighed together). But on day B they think about what they did, and now they understand that it is not right to do such a thing, that is, that one ought to act in accordance with morality even when that runs against self-interest. Therefore now it seems to them like a wrong action, and they regret it and see it as a failure.
This explanation likewise does not solve the problem. This is not a failure but a change in value judgments. Given the data as they stood at the time the action was performed, there was no failure here whatsoever, since the person did exactly what they thought was right. True, their positions have now changed, and from the standpoint of their present position that earlier action was wrong (they repented, and now in their view one must always act morally, even against self-interest). So from now on they will act differently. But this does not explain the feeling of failure. The feeling of failure and weak will always relates to the situation as it was at the time the action was performed.
Is This a Paradox?
Some see "weakness of the will" as a paradox. But apparently what we have here is only a proof that there are no states of weak will, that is, that the feeling of failure is an illusion. Take the first two claims above. They constitute premises from which one can prove the conclusion that there are no states of weakness of will.
But Davidson presents this as a structure of three contradictory claims, and it seems that he is unwilling to give up any of them. These three claims seem correct to him, even though they do not fit together. It is clear to him that there are states of weak will (claim 3), and at the same time it is also clear to him that a person wants to do what is right in their eyes (claim 1) and does what they want (claim 2). Here we have a valid logical argument based on two true premises that leads to a conclusion that is clearly untrue. Therefore, from his perspective, this is indeed a paradox that requires a solution.
From where does he derive his confidence in the third claim? Why not see the first two claims as proof that it is false? It seems to me that this draws on the immediate feeling that each of us has after such a failure. In such situations it is clear to us that we acted in a way that we did not think was right, and at the same time it is clear to us that we were not coerced to do it (for otherwise there is no failure here).
Externalism and Internalism
In the Wikipedia entry on this topic, the issue is presented in a way that is ostensibly more academic. There it is not presented as a paradox but as a dispute between two philosophical approaches. I will quote the passage in full here:
The externalist view, separates recognition of the moral principle from the motivation to act in accordance with it, and identifies weakness of will as an ethical-normative anomaly, a clear-cut immoral case of the possibility of recognizing a moral value as such, even when it is not implemented in practice.
By contrast, the internalist view, argues that reasoning and agreement regarding the value of a moral principle necessarily include motivation and a reason to implement the principle in practice, and that any actual rejection of a moral principle indicates a lack of genuine agreement regarding its value in principle.
Before I explain, I should preface (see the fourth notebook in Part III) that an ethical claim such as "murder is forbidden" can be understood as a descriptive claim about some norm. But some see it as a prescriptive claim (an impetus to action), that is, the recognition that act X is moral includes within it the motivation to act, that is, also the view that I should do it. If someone tells me that they understand that murder is forbidden, but they still wonder why they should not do it, that means they do not really understand that murder is forbidden. The term "forbidden" includes within it the motive not to do it. It is not mere description but prescription. I will now return to the two approaches described above.
Externalism is an approach that does not identify the "right" with what I want to do. That is, it denies claim 1 above. This means that it sees moral claims as purely descriptive claims. The fact that something is forbidden does not necessarily mean that I want to act accordingly. Internalism, by contrast, does make that identification, and from its perspective what seems right to us is also what we will want to do. The internalist sees moral claims as prescriptive.
They then go on there to explain the moral implications of this dispute:
For internalists such as Socrates and Richard Hare weakness of the will is non-moral. Socrates denies its existence, and Hare holds that it is always an expression of a compulsive state of psychological incapacity, which exempts one from moral responsibility; the behavioral dissonance is not within the domain and bounds of morality, and is not an exception to the internalist rule.
Socrates argues that there is no such thing as weakness of will (precisely because he accepts the first two claims). Hare, by contrast, argues that there are such states, but the actions done in them are always compelled by an irresistible impulse. Therefore such actions should not be seen as immoral actions. Both agree that there is no action of weak will in a case where the impulse could have been overcome, that is, that there is no "weakness of will" that deserves moral condemnation and should be considered a failure, in the sense I defined above.
The externalists disagree with them on the basis of our immediate experience:
Hare’s critics, such as John Austin, point to the frequency of situations in which a person recognizes a moral principle and does not act in accordance with it, not out of impulse or coercion, but with self-control and a voluntary surrender to desire. In doing so, they undermine the claim that there is no moral principle that is not internalist, and that every weak-willed person is not responsible for their actions, and they cast doubt on the assumption that the prescriptivity of ethical words has unequivocal validity.
According to their view, there are actions of weak will, for we experience this all the time. A person yields to their urges, and more than that, they do so voluntarily, with deliberation and self-control (not as an irresistible impulse). Therefore, they are forced to give up claim 1 or 2, for it is impossible to adopt all three of those claims together.
Sharpening the Problem
When you look at the three assumptions brought above, you will see that, as Davidson argues, all three are very plausible. Therefore neither of the two approaches here sounds reasonable. Internalism gives up the clear feeling that there are states of weak will (claim 3), and externalism gives up at least one of the first two claims, without explaining how. But it seems to me that on a closer look it is easy to see from Davidson’s analysis that their entire discussion of this issue is lacking, because they are actually dealing with a different question.
The definition of the state of "weakness of the will" at the beginning of the Wikipedia entry is as follows:
Weakness of the will, or moral weakness, is a human behavioral scenario manifested in a gap between a moral principle that a person holds and endorses, and their actual actions, which are performed contrary to that principle.
Notice that according to their definition, "weakness of the will" is a situation in which a person performs an action that in their own eyes is immoral. But this definition is too weak, and certainly does not overlap with what we saw above. Such actions are really not difficult to understand and identify. Take the example I gave above: a person who steals because they prefer economic self-interest over obedience to moral norms. What is the problem with that? Does anyone imagine that such a situation cannot exist? It is clear to us that such situations exist, and I see no good philosophical reason to deny it. The same is true of a person who yields to an urge and eats a fattening food while dieting (here it is not even about morality, and it is doubtful to what extent their treatment of the issue applies to this case). This is a person who prefers momentary pleasure over a long-term diet, and therefore does what they do. What is the problem with such a situation? Why assume that it is impossible? How can one dispute the assumption that a person can want to lose weight and at the same time eat something fattening, and even do so voluntarily?
"Weakness of the will" as I defined it above (following Davidson) is a different situation: it is not an action that is immoral in the eyes of the acting person, but an action that is considered in their eyes to be "not right" (taking all considerations into account, and not only morality). When "weakness of the will" is defined this way, claims 1-2 seem self-evident, and it is very hard to dispute them. That is, with this definition it is clear that we must be internalists. The person who ate a fattening food because they preferred pleasure over dieting simply wants to enjoy themselves more than to lose weight, and therefore, in the final analysis, what is "right" in their eyes is to eat. They want what is right in their eyes, and they do what they want.
But notice that even with this definition it is still not reasonable to give up claim 3, that is, the assumption that there are states of weak will. A simple experience shared by all of us is that sometimes we failed, that is, we acted in a way that in our judgment was not right (and not merely not moral). A considered action should not arouse in us a feeling of failure. We simply did what we thought was right. After we ate the fattening food, we felt failure, and that means that it was not the "right" act in our eyes. That is, we do not really want pleasure more than we want to lose weight. And yet we still failed and ate, because the will was weak.
Now, of course, the question returns with even greater force: how can this be? How does a situation arise in which we have a feeling of failure, that is, "weakness of the will" in the sense that we acted in a way that was not right in our eyes? If it really was not preferable for us to enjoy ourselves rather than lose weight, then why did we not overcome the urge? Why did we eat? I remind you once again that if the urge was of an irresistible force, it cannot be seen as a failure. And if this act really was right in our eyes—then again there was no failure here.
Searching for a Solution
I suggest that readers stop at this point and think a bit about the problem. It is very easy to dismiss it with a few declarations that a person is not pure intellect, and other slogans of that sort. If you think again and return to the precise formulation of the problem, you will see that all those solutions are irrelevant. This is an extremely difficult problem, and it threatens the very assumption that a person has free will and the ability to do or not do what is "right" in their eyes.
It is important to note that the deterministic alternative is, of course, free of this entire difficulty. Within that framework, a person does not choose and does not fail. They simply do what their cerebral computation drives them to do. There is no deliberation there and no freedom to decide. In the deterministic picture, the feeling of failure (whose existence, of course, cannot be denied) is nothing but an illusion. It too is the result of cerebral computation, and that is what creates such a feeling in us.[3]
For me, as someone who believes in human freedom of will, this is a paradox. It is clear to me that a person has the ability to choose and therefore also to fail (claim 3). Therefore I refuse to see the first two assumptions as proof that a person has no free will or no failures. On the other hand, the first two claims also seem self-evident to me.
In his article, Davidson offers some sort of solution, and as best I recall, when I read it I did not agree with him (or perhaps I did not understand him). More generally, in several of his articles I felt that I strongly identified with the analysis of the problem but did not agree with the solution he proposed (this is true not only of Davidson but of analytic analyses in general). In the next column I will propose a solution that I myself am not entirely convinced really solves the problem. I would be glad to hear your opinion about it, and in general. But for the moment I will stop here, in order to let you think about this paradox.
Do not worry: by Hoshana Rabbah the next column will also appear, God willing and without making a vow, so that you can repent and be sealed with a favorable note. Happy holiday.
[1] It has already come up on the site in the past, for example here and here. It is also mentioned briefly in my article on repentance.
[2] Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001a.
[3] Throughout my book The Science of Freedom, I have argued that determinism presents many of our most fundamental feelings and insights as mere illusions. This itself is a strong argument against it (or at least places the burden of proof on the determinist).
Discussion
This is the kind of answer people usually raise, but in my opinion it doesn’t really answer the difficulty. What you are basically saying is that he did not want it enough to cope with the temptation. But if so, that itself brings back the difficulty: after all, the thing that is “right” from his point of view after all the considerations is constructed like this: he has a desire of intensity 3 to do X and a desire of intensity 5 to enjoy himself right now. So overall he wants, with intensity 2, not to do X, and indeed he did not do it. If so, he did exactly what he wanted, and there is no failure here. At most, the next day he suddenly undergoes a change and wants more to do X (with intensity 7). That does not really solve the problem.
What is the rabbi’s definition of free choice?
I didn’t understand the question, or the context. Roughly something like this: a person’s decision that is not determined by any causal factors whatsoever (which is also true of a lottery), except for his own judgment itself (and that is what distinguishes choice from a lottery).
Hello Rabbi, following the solution proposed above,
why not separate between what a person *thinks* is right to do and what he has *internalized* as right to do.
As for what he thinks, in the end it does not directly affect the choice; rather, through that he can internalize that desire well, or internalize it only a little,
after that, clearly the ‘battle’ of the inclinations will be against the strength of the internalization.
So in fact weakness of will is defined as the failure to internalize what I understood intellectually; the falling is only an indication of that.
Now regarding the ability to internalize, one can explain that it always depends on another desire, fixed in the human soul – to follow the truth all the way / the degree of skepticism a person accepts against his position.
In fact the main correction will be to claim 2: that there is another stage between a person’s thought of desire and internalization, and this depends on how much a person believes in himself (or in his ability to reach the truth).
I think there is another solution to the problem presented. We are not as free as we think. We all know the situation in which we are driving and "suddenly" notice that we are home, or we are talking on the phone while pacing back and forth and do not notice where we have gotten to. This is a situation in which an unconscious part of us performed a sequence of actions that the conscious part could have "taken over," but the conscious part was busy with something else, and therefore those actions were done automatically. Libet’s experiments showed us that we do not really have free will, but when the subjects wanted to cancel, it seemed that they did have free will. What I want to say is that we do have free will, but it is limited to certain cases that we become aware of or choose to pay attention to. It often happens that a person will perform an action, but when his conscious part notices what his unconscious part has done, he will be disappointed that it happened. We can preserve claims 1+2 for cases in which the conscious part acts and makes decisions, and claim 3 for cases in which our unconscious part made a decision. I want to note that the use of the terms "conscious" and "unconscious" is not precise for what I am trying to suggest; rather, there are parts of human decision-making that are based on free choice, but these are fewer than we notice, mainly when we resist the course of events that was expected to occur and that has real significance, CHOOSING and not PICKING.
A person does not choose everything at every moment; rather, he chooses processes.
What I do at time Y may be the product of what I chose at time X that preceded it.
In other words: a person’s choice at moment X can lead to a result he is compelled into at moment Y (a person who decided to jump off the roof falls downward by his choice, even though once he left the roof he is already compelled. A person who decided to live in a refined way, over the years will not be able psychologically to behave with brutal violence, except after a gradual process of change).
In every choice, there is also a component (not necessarily conscious or explicit) of how much force to give to the chosen consideration.
If the force given to the decision at time X was strong enough, beyond a certain threshold, it would drive a process that brings it about that at time Y the chosen act is carried out automatically without needing to choose it again, or with only a low-intensity inner struggle required (and it is still rightly perceived as done by free choice, since it is a direct result of the choice at time X).
Therefore if:
* at time X a person decided to prefer the tendency to do the moral thing.
* at the actual time (Y) he preferred the impulse to do the pleasurable thing.
Then the meaning is that at time Y it became clear that the force granted to the choice in favor of the impulse to do the moral thing was not sufficient in order to neutralize or weaken the struggle enough at time Y => weakness of will (the feeling of weakness of will is not the weakness of the power of choice but the weakness you granted, in your choice, to the chosen decision).
It is also clear that behind (or alongside) these philosophical formulations stand chemical-physical mechanisms that are expressed in the brain’s activity. And there too, one cannot understand how free choice could arise, since in physics, if force A is greater than force B, there is no way that force B will prevail.
In your book The Science of Freedom, if I remember correctly, you argued that anyone who advocates free choice must believe that there is a deviation from physical lawfulness, and that a spiritual entity is able to activate (or not activate) an electric field in a certain direction.
Beyond the fact that this sounds strange and forced (at least to me), is there not a risk that this will be refuted in the coming years? Once they can map and understand the mechanics of the brain better, they will also be able to see what happens in situations of weakness of will as you described, and then it is likely that a full explanation will be found both for the decision and for the feelings of guilt.
Another question—the supporters of determinism explain that the intuition of free choice simply comes from the combination of the facts that we do what we feel like doing, and that we do not know what we will want in the future. That sounds completely reasonable to me.
Beyond that, feelings of guilt and failure can be explained by the accompanying education and the broad culture that developed in light of that illusion of free choice.
I would be glad for your response; happy holiday!
It seems to me that what you describe explains weakness of will only for a deterministic view and does not solve the problem of free choice.
If at time X an impulse arose with a given intensity and at time Y a stronger impulse arose, no room remains for free choice.
If you claim that the person is the one who chooses how much force to exert his will, the question arises again how the person chooses that.
In any case, free choice contradicts the principle of causality on the philosophical level and the mechanisms known from the exact sciences on the level of brain activity.
Amichai, that’s not really true.
The existence of an impulse that arises at different times does not negate free choice, because an impulse, in many cases, is a non-deterministic motivational factor (you can go against it and fight it).
Happy holiday!
The solution to this problem is that our choice is limited only to the present moment before us and not to future moments. That is, this whole matter of weakness of will concerns processes or ongoing phenomena or bad traits of ours. For example (as in the rabbi’s own case), eating an unhealthy diet. Or withdrawal from drugs. In fact, regarding such things we do not have free choice. Our choice is focused and limited to a specific eating of a specific food at a given time. Beyond that, the matter is not entrusted to man but to the Holy One, blessed be He. He has free choice not to eat chocolate only at a given moment and not afterward (or not to bite into the chocolate. Or not to reach out his hand for it at all. Or not to look at it. And in fact every action can be broken down into a sequence of mini-actions that compose it. And the choice is over the most minimal action that is closest to the moment at which the person chooses). At that moment, if the person is aware that he has a choice, there is no weakness of will at all. Everything is free and easy. If the person focuses on the present moment, and leaves the coming moments in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He, then the Holy One, blessed be He, helps him in this, so that it becomes easier and easier for him to focus on the moment before him (in the moments that will come after this one). After the accumulation of a critical mass of moments in which good choices were chosen, a miracle occurs. He will feel that he has been freed from his addiction. He will gain choice over the process / trait / ongoing phenomenon from which he wanted to wean himself. Thus a person merits a more developed capacity for free choice. He is weaned from the addiction. Regarding choice at a given moment, it should be noted that this assumes that we are not talking about an irresistible impulse, over which of course there is nothing to overcome. That is like an external limitation over which there truly is no choice. Just as we have no choice regarding the amount of mass in the universe.
That is, man’s capacity for choice is something that grows and matures together with him. In fact, a person’s true maturation is precisely the maturation of the range of choice in his hands.
Happy festival.
I’ll try my hand at a solution to the problem:
First, in order to avoid complications connected with time, I’ll formulate the question in the present tense:
‘How is it possible that a person performs an action *and at the same time* thinks: a. that his act is “not right” (in the sense defined in the article) b. that he is guilty of doing it (he is not compelled).’
Solution:
I assume that according to any position that affirms the existence of free choice, there are situations in which, were it not for the capacity of choice, a person would be compelled by his inclination to perform an action that he knows is wrong, but because he has the capacity of choice he is able to overcome that.
Now let us consider such an event in which a person chooses not to overcome his inclination and to perform an action that is not right in his eyes.
It can be argued that the feeling that his act is wrong is justified. True, we assumed that he had the possibility of overcoming his inclinations by means of free choice, but since he chose not to do so, ordinary causality dictated that he act as he did, and in that sense he is compelled, and there is room for the sour feeling that accompanies events in which a person is forced by his inclination to act against his values, his conscience, or even against his other inclinations.
But since after all he did have the possibility of acting otherwise (through free choice), there is also justification for the feeling that he is guilty of the situation that arose.
What do you think?
I’m not sure I understood the proposal. Do you mean to challenge proposal 2 and say that it is not true that what a person wants is what he does? Then why does he do it? As far as I understand your words, the degree of internalization is nothing but the intensity with which you want the thing, and to that I replied above and explained why in my opinion it is not a solution.
Beyond several contradictions/ambiguities that I see in your words (do we have free choice/free will, or not? What exactly is the awareness you are talking about?), I do not agree with the formulation you proposed here. If I act unconsciously, then again I have no responsibility for my actions and there is no failure here. And if I decided on it, then the question returns once again. Perhaps you mean a different formulation similar to what I will suggest in the next column; we’ll see when I post it.
I’m moving this here as a continuation of the thread you started. Please continue here and don’t start a new thread each time. You respond to this thread by clicking "Reply" to your first message. The response you enter now will appear at the end of this thread.
David wrote:
I asked because it would be foolish to discuss the question of the existence of something when I don’t know what it is, or how it works. (It seems that the definition you gave is identical to Davidson’s second claim.)
If I understood correctly, the problem is the very existence of the phenomenon, that a person does what he knows is not right to do. According to what you say, the fact that he doesn’t get up in the morning is because he really does want to do that act at a higher level, which means that from his point of view the right thing to do at that moment really is not to get up in the morning. But if that is so, then in fact there is no such thing as weakness of will, because he did what he wants. This is exactly the application of the idea of free choice according to the definition you presented, that a person weighs at that moment what is more worthwhile for him and arrives at the decision himself. The reason for the guilty feelings he feels afterward is because he wants the result (of being thin, for example) “for free,” and there is a gap between reality and his desire.
I thought perhaps of another definition of free choice: the very fact that a person has more than one action he can do at a given time, and the very fact that he has considerations in both directions. Animals, for example, have only instincts; they do not think at all before they act, and so too everything else in this world.
My response:
You are repeating what I wrote, but that is the problem, not the solution. You are basically suggesting that indeed there are no states of weak will.
Roni, it seems to me that you are repeating the solution proposed above (by David in the first comment), which dealt with the intensity of desire. I explained there why in my opinion it does not solve the problem.
Amichai, regarding those contradictions I explained at length in my book. In any case, I did not understand the connection here. Do you mean to claim that we have no choice and thereby solve the problem? I mentioned that in my column. Within a deterministic framework the problem does not arise at all, and there is no need to solve anything.
Will a philosophical solution also provide a practical solution?
I don’t think there is any point in discussing here the question whether we have free will (and all the derivative questions you raised, which are merely a continuation of that same question). I discussed it at length in my book and in an article here on the site. This column is devoted to a different discussion: assuming that we do, how is there weakness of will? I suggest that if you want to challenge the very freedom of our will, you should open a separate question.
As far as I am concerned, talk of a "risk" is nonsense. If it is refuted, then it is probably not true, and that’s that. What risk is there here, and what kind of risk? The truth is never a risk.
I didn’t understand a thing.
I’m not sure I understood. But it seems to me that it is very similar to what I will write in the next column. I suggest we return to your words after the next column if you want to discuss it again.
I didn’t understand the question. But if it is being asked regarding what is expected in the next column, I suggest we wait for it and then talk.
Hello Rabbi.
Sorry that I’m not responding to my predecessors, but I also wanted to comment on the article itself:
I would like to challenge assumption number 1. How do we know that what a person sees as right is what he wants? I see it as right to serve in the IDF, for example, but I want to have fun and travel the world. And that is the source of regret: that I do not want what I believe and think is right. In other words: perhaps there is in a person a desire to do evil, to go against reason? And it is true that he chose what he wanted, but not what he saw as right?
Nadav, pay close attention to the explanation I gave for claim 1. This is what is called "right" from the standpoint of the totality of your considerations. That is what I was talking about.
I think I understand, but I still ask: perhaps the regret is not over my bad choice, because it really did arise from the full set of considerations I had at the time, but rather over who I am that led me to choose it. And in fact over what preceded the sin.
For example, when a person gets suddenly angry and has no control over it, although he is compelled at that moment, he should have worked on this trait beforehand.
As I write this I think others have already preceded me with this claim, so if I am repeating things, I apologize.
So where is weakness of will here? Why didn’t I work on myself beforehand: did I decide not to work, or was I compelled by my inclination? Seemingly the same question arises regarding the earlier stage.
I think you too are approaching the solution I will present in the next post, but it needs to be formulated more precisely.
Really? A pity for those who are gone and cannot be found again (Rabbi Michi A., with whom I could speak briefly and in code)
So let’s simplify: in cases where we have choice, there is no weakness of will, and in cases where there is weakness of will, we have no choice. Choice concerns actions (deeds). There are various kinds of actions. There are primitive (simple) actions. And there are those that are a sequence of the simple ones (composed of them) or of ones that are less composite (a recursive definition). Among the latter, where we feel weakness of will, we have no choice over the whole sequence but only over each action of which it is composed, at each moment when its time has come to be carried out. Unless those actions in turn are also composite, in which case it is possible that even with respect to some of them there will be a feeling of weakness of will. But with respect to simple actions there is never weakness of will and we do have choice (I do not know how to point to such an action. It always seems that every action can be broken down into a sequence of yet smaller actions). In any case, one always goes down in the reductive process until there is a sequence of actions all of which are experienced by us as ones in which there is no feeling of weakness of will, and then we choose each such action at the moment when its time has come to be carried out. After we perform the sequence several times, a feeling will arise that it was not difficult. We have achieved choice over the entire sequence as one action. We have achieved an expanded capacity of choice. Our free choice has expanded.
Just as if someone has a feeling that it is hard for him to do something, they tell him: one step at a time. Let’s begin with something simpler that constitutes the start of the path to carrying out the difficult thing (the first action in the sequence that constitutes the difficult action). Example: there’s a wedding and the groom got cold feet? Fine, so let’s just take a shower. That was easy. After that, let’s just put on a suit (I wouldn’t wear one). That too is easy. And so on.
Ilon, the loss is apparently more severe than you think. I still didn’t understand.
Your whole description seems irrelevant to me. What you are saying is that in every discrete action there is choice and no weakness of will, meaning you are not prepared to accept the two together. So why is the decomposition important?
Beyond that, I also do not understand the decomposition itself: if there is choice over every action, then there is also choice over the whole. The whole is nothing but the sum of all the discrete actions.
I suggest that you point out exactly what in the argument I presented you disagree with, and then explain.
As a continuation to Phil:
Not every action comes from will; a person also has non-volitional behavior. The will can intervene and change the action, but that requires effort.
It seems to me that you wrote this in the book.
Sorry for the delay. The response was written yesterday but sent only now. I received the suggestion, but before I write exactly what in the argument you presented I disagree with (in a separate response),
I’ll explain the rest:
1. I am indeed saying that there is no weakness of will with respect to a discrete action (which occurs in an instant, literally in zero time). But there are non-discrete actions with respect to which we have no choice (there is weakness of will), yet we can gain or acquire choice with respect to them by breaking them down into factors and using the point-choice for the discrete actions of which they are composed, because choice is always only in the present, and a complex action takes time. At that level, I indeed never chose the whole but only the collection of which it is made. However, after several repeated performances of such a series of choices, it will become a whole that one will be able to choose as a choice of a discrete action (this is an ontic experience in which the whole is experienced as discrete in itself). That is, I argue that the series of choices is a whole greater than the mere sum of its parts. Or that a whole is an ontic entity in its own right. (The rabbi is invited to turn to Rabbi Michi A. for an explanation of this.)
2. Conclusion: the decomposition is important in order to diagnose that there is choice over the particulars but not over the whole. Sometimes there is also choice over the whole. And in addition, to claim that choice over the whole is achieved by a repeated process of choices over the particulars of which it is composed. Sometimes there is choice over particulars but not over the whole. It is not the sum of all the discrete actions.
Happy New Year..:) Sorry about the timing (though indeed it suits the timing..)
I read the above articles and the article on repentance.
I didn’t quite understand the problem – if I understood correctly – the discussion here is not about free choice, but rather how a feeling of weakness of will is possible. If so, what’s the story..?
A person wanted A (the pleasant thing) more than B (the useful, the moral, etc.) at a given moment – so must he necessarily rejoice in his decision? Is there no possibility in which he indeed understands that he is choosing something that in the long run will harm him or others, and nevertheless does it?
Does everything we choose through deliberation necessarily make us happy and jubilant about it?
In short – the feeling is ingrained in me that the useful and the moral is the ideal (what I should want), but I prefer to choose the bad because it is good for me now. Fair enough, on the basis of my considerations of pleasure I choose right now to do what is pleasant at this moment, and I know and feel that this is not good in the long term (and all the more so after a moment and a half when the pressing urge subsides – and immediately the considerations of choice change and I feel more strongly the side that tells me to choose the moral and the useful).
You can’t make this into an equation of choosing X at level 5 and not choosing X at level 2, 5-2=3, and hey presto, be happy with your choice.
If I am mistaken and did not read enough (in the article or in the comments), I’d be glad for a reference (it was long and I did my best.. and in any case perhaps I had weakness of will..)
And again, happy new year and more power to you.
You wrote that “externalism does not identify what is right to do with the motivation to act accordingly—that is, it does not accept claim 2.”
But actually it should be corrected that it does not accept claim 1, right?
Correct. I corrected it. Thanks.
Fascinating topic. As a fitness coach (who loves philosophy), I would correct the diet example—a fat person. Although it is indeed good as a test case of weakness of will versus different conceptions. But since I saw that this example is woven through other articles by the rabbi as well—it is worth correcting.
The reasons for the correction: 1. There is no such thing as a fattening food. It does not exist and never will. For a simple reason – gaining weight is created because of a prolonged caloric surplus (which is usually created by excess energy and insufficient energy expenditure), therefore it cannot be that one food, however calorie-dense it may be, will cause a person to gain weight. In fact, a person can gain weight mainly from “non-fattening foods such as vegetables, fruits, poultry, and so on” because those are the excess calories of each day for him.
(He needs to eat 2000 calories per day in order to maintain a balanced weight – so if all 2000 were from sweets and ice cream, and calories 2001 through 3000 were from chicken breast and lettuce, he would gain weight “from a food that is not fattening.”)
Therefore there is no such definition / assumption.
One could say that “there are foods that are calorie-dense and highly conducive to overeating, and eating them increases the likelihood of caloric overeating during the day” (very long, but that is the reality)
2. Unlike theft, eating a fattening food, however fattening it may be, is not by definition an act that is “not right or bad.”
As I expanded in point 1, eating a calorie-dense food is not equivalent to gaining weight.
And so too, even if there is weakness of will that causes the eating of a fattening food – that weakness of will occurs at 2 points, and even 3 and 4 points:
A. At the point where I go above my daily caloric total.
B. At the point where I choose (as the rabbi supports the idea that not choosing is an element of choice) not to do extra movement (exercise) to balance the positive caloric balance into which the body has fallen.
C. At every point in time where I choose not to correct this situation.
As I detailed – weight gain is a long-term product of a prolonged caloric surplus; that is, at every second and every second the energy equation can be balanced back again – so at every second and every second of a person in a state of gaining weight, he has a turning point / choice or weakness of will. (Weakness of thinness?)
A fascinating discussion.
I am not an expert, and therefore I see no point in addressing the factual remarks. Perhaps you are right. But they are not relevant in any way to the discussion. If a person decides that a cream cake is fattening and therefore does not want to eat it, even if he is mistaken about this, then if he nevertheless eats it, that is an example of weakness of will. The factual question does not touch the discussion in any way.
Accepted. Indeed.
The truth is, I had thought about this before. I’d be glad to hear your opinion. A person who wants to get results, to improve, will usually have to put in effort, and inevitably also pain. He knows what needs to be done, but free choice is about how serious he is about it. For example, he may not "succeed" in getting up for prayer, but if he had a meeting in the same situation he would make that effort. It would still hurt him just as much to get up, but he would do it. That shows that although he knows it is right to get up for prayer, it is not as critical to him as the meeting. That’s the whole idea of a test: how much you are willing to sacrifice, focus, and suffer for the thing you wanted to achieve shows how much you want it. So the bad feelings that come after the sin are because he wants the results and did not get them, but the fact that he failed may indicate that he did not sufficiently understand what he wants, that he is not connected to it enough.