Lesson 24: Terumah

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Concepts

• A permitting condition and a preparatory act for a mitzvah (commandment).
• Preparatory acts for a mitzvah that are explicit in Scripture and those that are not.
• Is a permitting condition itself a mitzvah?
• Parts of a mitzvah and parts of an action.
• The joining together of the object of the mitzvah and the act of mitzvah-fulfillment.
• The collapse of the distinction between thought and cognition.

Summary

In this week’s article we address the relation between the mitzvah of building the Temple and the commands concerning the making of its vessels. The authors who enumerate the mitzvot do not count the making of the vessels as a separate mitzvah, and they base this primarily on the principle presented in Maimonides’ Root Twelve, according to which one does not count parts of an action separately. Maimonides and Ramban, however, give different reasons for not counting these mitzvot independently: either because they are part of the mitzvot of Temple service, or because they are part of the mitzvah of building the Temple itself. We connect this very division to two different conceptions of the Temple’s function in general: according to Maimonides it is a “house of service,” that is, an instrument for the mitzvah of offering sacrifices; according to Ramban it is a place for the indwelling of the Divine Presence.

We then discuss the relation between Root Twelve and Root Eleven, which deals with parts of a mitzvah. Our conclusion is that the distinction between them concerns the distinction between the objects of a mitzvah and the actions that make up the fulfillment of the mitzvah. Within that framework, we distinguish between a grouping of actions into a single whole called one act of mitzvah-fulfillment, and a grouping of objects into a single whole that constitutes the object of the mitzvah.

These two mechanisms raise substantial philosophical difficulties, which are described in the final chapter. There we examine the philosophical and epistemological foundation that underlies our ability to generalize and classify, both in scientific inquiry and in the interpretation of halakha (Jewish law), and even our ability to discern the existence of relations, collective entities, and groups of events.

The Rules and Principles Emerging from the Article

Concerning the Relation Between Parts and the Comprehensive Mitzvah

A Look at Generalization and Intuition in Halakha and Science

Introduction

In this week’s Torah portion, the Torah commands the building of the Tabernacle (Exodus 25:8):

“And let them make Me a sanctuary, that I may dwell among them. According to all that I show you, the pattern of the Tabernacle and the pattern of all its vessels, so shall you make it. And they shall make an ark of acacia wood…”

On the plain meaning of the text, this is a command directed to its own time: to make a sanctuary for God in the wilderness. Immediately afterward comes a detailed description that includes the form of the Tabernacle and all its vessels. But several authors who enumerate the mitzvot understood this command as a mitzvah for all generations to build a Temple. What, then, of the Temple vessels? Is making them also a mitzvah? This question branches out into Maimonides’ discussion in Root Twelve regarding the status of “parts of an action.” In this week’s article we will examine this issue and its philosophical implications.

A. The Mitzvah of Building the Temple and Its Vessels

The Mitzvah of Building the Temple and Its Sources

As noted, there is a mitzvah for all generations to build a Temple. The Sages say that this is one of the three mitzvot that Israel was commanded upon entering the Land (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 20b):

“And so Rabbi Judah would say: Israel were commanded with three mitzvot upon entering the Land: to appoint a king for themselves, to cut off the seed of Amalek, and to build for themselves the chosen House.”

There is a dispute among the enumerators of the mitzvot as to the biblical source of this mitzvah, but Maimonides and those who follow him saw its source in the verse before us. This is Maimonides’ formulation in Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 20):

“The twentieth commandment is that He commanded us to build a house of service, in which sacrifice will be offered and the fire continually kindled, and to which there will be going, pilgrimage, and yearly assembly, as will be explained. This is His exalted statement: ‘And let them make Me a sanctuary.’ And the language of Sifrei on Deuteronomy 12:10-11 is: ‘Israel were commanded with three mitzvot at the time of their entry into the Land: to appoint a king for themselves, to build for themselves the chosen House, and to cut off the seed of Amalek.’ It is thus clear that building the chosen House is a mitzvah in its own right. We have already explained, at the beginning of Root Twelve, that this rule includes parts, and that the menorah, the table, the altar, and the like are all parts of the sanctuary, and the whole is called ‘sanctuary,’ although the command was specified with regard to each and every part….”

The author of Sefer HaChinukh copied these words as well, in mitzvah 95.

Is the Making of the Temple Vessels a Separate Mitzvah?

In the passage cited above, Maimonides determines that the making of the Temple vessels is not to be counted as a mitzvah in its own right, since it is included within the mitzvah of building the Temple itself. He explains this more fully in Root Twelve, where he argues that one should not count parts of an action among the actions we were commanded to perform, such as the stages of offering each sacrifice. At the opening of that discussion he also establishes the point that the making of the Temple vessels is not to be counted as separate mitzvot, and he proves it from the verses in our portion:

“The twelfth root is that it is not proper to count the parts of an action, among the actions concerning which we were commanded, each part separately. It is known that at times we are commanded concerning one act, and afterward Scripture begins to explain the manner of that act, clarifying the term that was mentioned and what it includes. Therefore, it is not proper to count every command that appears in that explanation as a separate mitzvah. For example, His saying, at the beginning of Parashat Terumah, ‘And let them make Me a sanctuary’ is one positive commandment among the mitzvot, namely, that there should be for us a prepared house to which they may come and celebrate, in which sacrifice will be offered, and in which assembly takes place on the festivals. Afterward Scripture comes to describe its parts and how they are to be made. It is not proper to count everything about which it says, ‘And you shall make,’ and ‘And you shall make,’ as a separate mitzvah. In this very same way the matter proceeds with the sacrifices mentioned in Leviticus. For the one mitzvah is the totality of the action described in each type of sacrifice.”

Maimonides interprets the subsequent verses in our portion as a specification of the general mitzvah to build a Temple.¹

Ramban, however, disagrees with him on this point. In positive commandment 33, Maimonides counts a mitzvah requiring the priests to wear priestly garments while performing the service. In his glosses there, Ramban cites the view of Halakhot Gedolot, which does not count this mitzvah. He explains that wearing the garments is a preparatory condition for the service and not a mitzvah in its own right. His words can be understood in two ways:

1. Wearing the garments is a permitting condition and not a mitzvah. In other words, without the garments it is forbidden to perform the service, but there is no mitzvah to wear the garments. In the enumeration of the mitzvot we include only mitzvot, not permitting conditions. A permitting condition is not a command but a condition. See something similar in Root Eight regarding negations.²
2. Wearing the garments is indeed a full mitzvah, but it is part of the mitzvah of the service itself. This mitzvah is not counted because it is already included in the mitzvah of service that has already been counted.

Later in that passage he elaborates, and it appears at first glance that he intends the second explanation. We will return to this point below.

Further on there he writes:

“It has already been explained in Root Twelve that we do not count parts of mitzvot. Therefore we do not count the making of the table, the menorah, and the altar as a mitzvah, because we were commanded to place bread before the Lord continually, and He commanded us regarding the preparation of this service, namely, that it be placed on a table fashioned in a certain way and arranged upon it in a certain manner. He also commanded us regarding the lighting of the lamp before Him, and arranged for us that this lighting be done in a golden menorah of a certain weight and form. These are sacred implements. But the reason given by the master, who said that they are parts of the sanctuary, did not seem persuasive to me, because the vessels are not part of the house. Rather, they are two mitzvot, and neither prevents the other; offerings may be brought in the house even if these vessels are not there.”

At first glance Ramban is merely repeating Maimonides’ position that the making of the vessels should not be counted as mitzvot in their own right. But closer inspection reveals that he means something entirely different. In his view, the making of the vessels is indeed not counted as separate mitzvot, but not because they are included in the mitzvah of building the Temple. Rather, they are included in the mitzvot of service themselves. The making of the table is part of the mitzvah of the showbread, which must be placed upon it. It is a preparatory act for a mitzvah, that is, the preparation of the means necessary to fulfill that mitzvah.

For this reason Ramban adds at the end of the passage that Maimonides’ view, which sees the vessels as part of the house itself, is not persuasive to him. In his opinion, the vessels are not part of the house, and he adds that the house and the vessels are two mitzvot that do not even prevent one another.³

The Basis of the Dispute: The Purpose of the Temple

At first glance, this dispute depends on one’s conception of the role of the Temple. Maimonides opens his discussion in positive commandment 20 with the following sentence:

“He commanded us to build a house of service. In it there will be sacrifice and the fire will continually be kindled….”

That is, the purpose of the Temple is to be a “house of service.” On such a conception, it is quite clear that the Temple vessels are part of the building itself, for the entire purpose of the building is the use of those vessels.⁴ Admittedly, at the beginning of Root Twelve, cited above, the wording is slightly different:

“As in His saying, at the beginning of Parashat Terumah, ‘And let them make Me a sanctuary,’ this is one positive commandment among the mitzvot, namely that there should be for us a prepared house to which they may come and celebrate, in which sacrifice will be offered, and in which assembly takes place on the festivals.”

But it is possible that this too means the same thing. In any event, it is clear that this house is an instrument for various mitzvot.

Ramban, by contrast, writes in his commentary to our portion (Exodus 25:2):

“…And He said, ‘And you shall be to Me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation’ (Exodus 19:6). Behold, they are holy and fitting that there be among them a sanctuary in which to cause His Presence to dwell in their midst. Therefore He first commanded concerning the Tabernacle, that there be for Him a house among them, sanctified to His name, and there He would speak with Moses and command the children of Israel. The main purpose of the Tabernacle is the place of the resting of the Presence, namely the ark, as He said, ‘And there I will meet with you, and I will speak with you from above the cover’ (below 25:22). Therefore He placed the ark and the cover first here, because it is first in importance….”

“The secret of the Tabernacle is that the glory that dwelt on Mount Sinai should dwell upon it in hidden form. As it is said there, ‘And the glory of the Lord dwelt upon Mount Sinai’ (Exodus 24:16), and it is written, ‘Behold, the Lord our God has shown us His glory and His greatness’ (Deuteronomy 5:21), so it is written regarding the Tabernacle, ‘And the glory of the Lord filled the Tabernacle’ (below 40:34). Regarding the Tabernacle it mentions twice, ‘And the glory of the Lord filled the Tabernacle,’ corresponding to ‘His glory and His greatness.’ Thus the glory that appeared to them on Mount Sinai was always with Israel in the Tabernacle…. And Scripture likewise says, ‘where I will meet with you there to speak to you there, and it shall be sanctified by My glory’ (below 29:42-43), for there will be a tent of meeting for speech, and it shall be sanctified by My glory.”

“One who looks carefully at the verses said about the giving of the Torah and understands what we have written there will understand the secret of the Tabernacle and the Temple and be able to reflect upon it…. And it is written, ‘And they prayed to the Lord toward the city that You chose and the house that I built for Your name, and You heard in heaven.’ It is explained explicitly: ‘But will God indeed dwell with man upon the earth? Behold, heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain You’ (II Chronicles 6:18). And it is written regarding the ark, ‘to bring up from there the ark of God, over which the Name, the name of the Lord of Hosts enthroned upon the cherubim, is called’ (II Samuel 6:2). And in Chronicles (I 13:6): ‘to bring up from there the ark of God, the Lord enthroned upon the cherubim, over which the Name is called,’ for the Name dwells above the cherubim.”

Ramban’s words clearly express the conception that the purpose of the Tabernacle and the Temple is the indwelling of the Divine Presence among Israel on earth, unlike Maimonides, for whom it is a “house of service,” that is, a house that serves merely as a means for the commandments of sacrifice, pilgrimage, and the like. According to Maimonides, the essence of the Temple is the altar; according to Ramban, its essence is the ark, which in itself is not used for any service or any other mitzvah.

If so, it is no surprise that Ramban maintains that the vessels are not part of the house. The house is intended for the indwelling of the Divine Presence, whereas the vessels are intended for the service. These are two mitzvot that do not prevent one another, since sacrifices may be offered even when there is no Temple building.

Ramban: Two Types of Permitting Conditions

Let us now return to Ramban’s remarks about the priestly garments. We saw that he offers there two different reasons:

1. Wearing the garments is a preparatory act for a mitzvah, or a permitting condition. That is, it is not counted because it is not a mitzvah at all.
2. Wearing the garments is part of the mitzvah of the priestly service. That is, it is a mitzvah, but it is not counted because it is included within the mitzvah of the service.

But from his later remarks in the same passage regarding the Temple vessels, it appears that he intends one fundamental idea: the permitting condition, or preparatory act for the mitzvah, is not counted because it is part of the mitzvah itself. One must notice the major novelty being proposed here: the reason a permitting condition or preparatory act for a mitzvah is not counted is not that it simply is not a mitzvah, but only an instrument. In principle it ought to have been counted, but it is already included in the mitzvah for which it prepares.

Presumably Ramban is not claiming here that all preparatory acts for a mitzvah are themselves mitzvot. He means only those preparations that the Torah itself commands us to perform, as Maimonides says in positive commandment 20: “the command was specified with regard to each and every part.” The Torah commands, “And they shall make a table…,” and therefore this making is a mitzvah. Even so, it is clear that the content of this mitzvah is only a preparation for another mitzvah. In principle we ought to count it, since the Torah explicitly commands it. Nevertheless, we do not count it, because it is already included in the mitzvah for which it prepares. The reason for not counting it is that one does not count parts of a mitzvah, not that one does not count preparatory acts for a mitzvah.

True, Maimonides devotes Root Ten specifically to the principle that preparatory acts for a mitzvah are not counted. But it seems that there he means preparations that are not counted because they are indeed not mitzvot at all. The Torah does not command their performance; it merely instructs us how to carry out the mitzvah itself. Does Ramban disagree with this and maintain that all such preparatory acts are mitzvot, and that the reason they are not counted is that they are included in the mitzvot themselves? That seems, to some extent, to emerge from his glosses to Root Ten, but this is not the place to elaborate.

B. Parts of Mitzvot and Parts of Actions

The Relation to Root Eleven

We have seen that both Maimonides and Ramban, in their different reasons for not counting the making of the Temple vessels as mitzvot, refer us to Root Twelve. On the face of it, this requires clarification. Let us preface by noting that among Maimonides’ roots there are two that deal with parts of a mitzvah: in Root Eleven Maimonides lays down the principle that one does not count parts of a mitzvah among the mitzvot we were commanded, such as each of the four species that we are commanded to take on Sukkot. In Root Twelve he speaks about not counting parts of an action among the actions we were commanded to perform, such as each act involved in offering a sacrifice. It is not clear what the difference is between these two roots,⁵ and why the Temple vessels belong specifically under the category of Root Twelve.

At first glance, it seems that Root Eleven deals with material parts of the object of the mitzvah, such as the four species or the items required for the purification of a person afflicted with tzara’at, such as hyssop, crimson thread, and the like. Root Twelve, by contrast, deals with parts of actions, that is, stages in performing an action, such as the stages of offering sacrifices.

In light of this distinction, one can perhaps understand why Ramban refers us specifically to Root Twelve and not to Root Eleven. As we recalled above, in his view the making of the Tabernacle vessels is not counted because it is a preliminary stage of the services performed with those vessels. If so, this may be viewed as a stage in the action of the mitzvah, rather than as a part of the object of the mitzvah.⁶ But Maimonides’ reference is difficult to understand. Why is the making of the Temple vessels not part of the object of the mitzvah, namely the Temple, but rather part of an action? What is the difference between making a table within the building of the Temple and taking the lulav within the taking of the four species, or sending away the bird in the purification of the person afflicted with tzara’at?

A First Proposal: A Mitzvah That Functions as a Preparation

Above we mentioned the distinction between preparatory acts for a mitzvah that the Torah commands and preparatory acts that the Torah does not command. It is possible that this distinction is also connected to the question that arose here. According to Maimonides, building the Temple is itself a preparatory act for a mitzvah, namely for the mitzvah of offering sacrifices.⁷ Yet this act, although it is only preparatory, is defined by the Torah as a mitzvah in its own right, as he says in positive commandment 20: “the command was specified with regard to each and every part.”⁸

Now, if we accept that the building of the Temple and all its vessels are preparatory acts for the mitzvah of offering sacrifices, then the Temple and its vessels are not essentially objects of a mitzvah at all. Therefore the entire building is one continuous action; in essence it is the beginning of the act of sacrifice, just as Ramban above understands the status of priestly garments in relation to the service performed with them. It is not the creation of objects of mitzvah. Therefore this determination cannot be assigned to Root Eleven, but only to Root Twelve.

To be sure, this is somewhat forced, since in the end the Torah itself defines the building as a mitzvah, and therefore in the straightforward sense these are objects of mitzvah, even if the essence of this mitzvah is indeed to serve as preparation for another mitzvah. We will therefore now suggest a different explanation.

A Second Proposal: Two Types of Composition

A simple look suggests that the various parts of the mitzvot discussed in Root Eleven do not form one unified whole. The four species are not one object, unlike the Temple and its vessels. What joins the four species is the fulfillment of the mitzvah through taking them. The acts of taking, as directed toward each of the species, join into one act of mitzvah-fulfillment; the species themselves do not together constitute one entity.⁹

By contrast, Maimonides holds that the Temple and its vessels join together to form one thing: the Temple. If so, the acts of building performed upon each of these parts are parts of the act of building the whole. Just as it would never occur to us to treat the building of the eastern wall of the Temple, or its ceiling, or the Sanctuary, or the Holy of Holies, separately as independent mitzvot, since these actions are parts of the act of building the house as a whole, so too with the building of the table and the other vessels. The building of each vessel is like the building of a wall of the structure, and therefore it is part of building the Temple itself.

From this it follows that the distinction between the acts of building the various vessels and the building of the house itself exists at the level of actions, not at the level of objects. These objects are not divided from one another at all; only the building of this one object is carried out in stages. In that sense, the distinction between building the Temple vessels and building the house resembles the distinction between the various acts involved in offering a sacrifice more than it resembles taking the four species. It is a staged action, not an action or set of actions performed upon a collection of objects. Therefore these various constructions are “parts of actions” and not “parts of mitzvot.” It seems that for this reason Maimonides places the discussion of the Temple specifically in Root Twelve and not in Root Eleven.

C. A Look at the Relation Between an Individual Entity and a Collective Entity

Introduction

In the previous chapter we noted a distinction between particulars that join to form one whole, such as the Temple and its vessels, and particulars that do not join in that way, such as the four species, where only the acts performed with each of them combine into one act of mitzvah-fulfillment.

How do we determine whether particulars join into one whole or not? Is there a clear criterion for this? We saw that Ramban probably does not accept this approach regarding the Temple and its vessels, although we linked that to his different understanding of the role of the Temple. Although the question as it arises here concerns halakhic interpretation, it is clearly only a reflection of a broader philosophical question.

Collective Entities

Halakha distinguishes between individual entities and collective entities. A community is a collective entity, and therefore it has different characteristics. For example, a community does not die; only the individuals that compose it are replaced. A monetary decision of a community does not require a formal act of acquisition, as discussed in our essay on Parashat Mishpatim, 5767, and more.

Do collective entities really exist, or are they only a legal fiction, what modern law calls a “corporation”?¹⁰ According to the common contemporary view, the collective is only a legal fiction, and what really exists is only the individuals who compose it. But if we continue in that direction of thought, we can arrive at genuine absurdities. For example, does the table before me really exist? In what sense? Is it not merely a combination of different pieces of wood and metal, each of which exists on its own, with some sort of connection between them? Is the table too merely a fiction? And what about the table’s leg? Does it exist? Or do only the molecules that compose it exist? And so one can continue all the way down to the elementary particles.

If so, almost every entity in the world around us, at least the macroscopic world, is a collective of “atomic” entities. If we give up the assumption that a collective can have independent existence, beyond its components, then we have also given up the existence of objects that are usually perceived as highly concrete, distinct, and individual. But then how can one say that a human being exists? Seemingly, he too is only a combination of all his limbs and parts, and each of those is itself a combination of elementary particles. We have not yet answered that question.

In fact, this is also a question of classification. For some reason, we decide that the collection of particles composing our bodies forms one entity, whereas the particles composing the tree next to us form another. How do we classify fundamental particles into groups that form collective entities? Is it by geographic proximity? Do the particles that compose my body become one collective entity merely because they are close to one another? That is not plausible. There are many kinds of proximity that we would not regard as creating entities. Perhaps what combines these particles is organicity, that is, behavior as an organism? But on that view, the table, like every inanimate object, really is not a genuine, distinct entity.

The conclusion, then, is that the question of the existence of collectives is also tied to the question of classifying and sorting basic elements into broader groups of belonging.

Classification and Categorization of Phenomena

So far we have dealt with the classification and categorization of physical objects into groups. A similar question exists with regard to phenomena. When we engage in scientific research, a difficult problem stands before us at the outset. On the one hand, we must gather all the phenomena that belong to one scientific context and then offer an explanation for the totality of those phenomena. On the other hand, as long as we do not know the explanation, we have no criterion by which to group different phenomena into the same set.

This is a well-known problem in the philosophy of science.¹¹ A famous example, discussed in Carl Hempel’s Philosophy of Natural Science, concerns childbed fever. A Hungarian physician named Semmelweis sought the reason for the higher mortality among women giving birth in his ward, as compared with the lower mortality in the neighboring maternity ward. He tried to identify parameters that distinguished the two wards, but there are infinitely many such parameters: the name of the ward, the age of the oldest nurse, the height of the water jugs, and so on. As long as he did not know the explanation for the difference, that is, the cause of the mortality, he had no direction in which to look for parameters that distinguished the wards. The problem is circular: in order to find an explanation, we need a defined set of relevant phenomena; but in order to define the characteristics of such a set, we need the very explanation we are seeking.

Think of Newton, at the stage before he discovered the law of gravitation. He had no reason at all to assume that the phenomena of the paths of the heavenly bodies, the falling of objects to earth, and the ebb and flow of the tides belonged to the same group and were therefore explained by the same scientific law. Only after one understands the law of gravitation can all these phenomena be gathered into a single set.

Similarly, one may wonder about the relation between cause and effect. We can observe the succession of the event that is the cause and the event that is the effect; for example, a kick to a ball and then the ball’s flight. But how do we discern that there is a relation of causation between them? What gives validity to the claim that the relation between them is not one of mere temporal succession, but also a relation of causation? Can we see that relation?¹²

Here too a question arises regarding the ability and validity of processes of classification and categorization: how do we know how to classify and sort phenomena into wholes? What justifies such grouping? Why not gather the owl’s cry at night together with sea level in Kamchatka in the month of July, and the consumer price index in Upper Silesia, into a single group, in order to seek one scientific law that will explain them all? There are countless possible ways of classifying and dividing the totality of individual phenomena into subgroups. How do we succeed in doing this even before we have the general law in hand?

The Connection to the Meta-Halakhic Questions We Raised

In fact, one may identify the joining together of acts of mitzvah-fulfillment with the grouping of phenomena, whereas the joining together of objects of mitzvah is a grouping of objects or entities. The two questions we asked on the scientific and physical plane are precisely those that underlie the halakhic problems we encountered in the previous chapters:

• What justifies grouping a collection of actions, that is, acts of mitzvah-fulfillment, such as the stages of offering a sacrifice or taking the four species, into one whole?
• What justifies grouping a collection of entities, such as the Temple and its vessels, into one whole?
• Finally, what justifies seeing such a collection as an organic whole?

The Relation Between Thought and Cognition: Torah Insight and Intuition

The problems we have presented here in the philosophy of science are discussed at length in the first two books of M. Avraham’s quartet, Two Carts and a Balloon and That Which Is and That Which Is Not. We cannot elaborate here on that discussion, so we will present only the essence of the explanatory proposal advanced there. These problems compel us to give up the sharp distinction to which we have become accustomed, between thought and cognition.

We are accustomed to distinguish between cognition, which transmits data from the external, objective world to our intellect, and thought, which processes those data and performs their generalization and abstraction. But an intellectual capacity without an empirical component cannot be the source of a grasp of cause-and-effect relations, or of belonging to a shared group or organism. On the other hand, as we saw above, our cognition, at least our sensory cognition, does not directly discern these relations. It discerns proximities, temporal or spatial, but not the additional components: causation and organic unity.

The conclusion is that our cognition of collective entities, or of groups and wholes of phenomena, cannot be the result of thought, nor of sensory cognition. There is some capacity that combines thought with cognition, and perhaps even a kind of cognition that is not sensory in the usual sense, but uses some sort of sixth sense, or what we call intuition, and it is this that discerns those relations.

We simply “see,” by means of what Maimonides, at the beginning of the Guide of the Perplexed, calls “the eyes of the intellect,” the causal relation between events, or their belonging to the same group, even before our intellect has grasped and formulated the relevant law of nature for that group. On the contrary, this “seeing” is what underlies the conceptualization and formulation. In a similar way, we must conclude that we “see” that the whole called a human being is indeed a distinct entity, and not merely a collection of molecules, or elementary particles.¹³

A similar conclusion emerges with regard to the halakhic questions. We have the ability to discern groupings of objects and of actions or occurrences. We simply “see” that the Temple and its vessels are one whole, according to Maimonides and in light of his conception of the Temple. We see that the four species do not form one single objectual whole, but that the acts of taking them are gathered into one act of mitzvah-fulfillment. What we sought to show here is that this “mysticism” is not unique to the realm of Torah study. It also stands at the basis of all our rational activities, such as scientific research and generalizing thought as a whole.

Footnotes