Naso (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Midah Tovah — Sabbath Eve, Parashat Naso, 5766

Questions

1. What is ribbuy (inclusive derivation)?
2. Is there a ribbuy that belongs to peshat (the plain sense)?
3. What happens when the included element is written explicitly in the verse, while the base case is not written — a “reversed ribbuy”?
4. What is distinctive about ribbuyim derived from et?
5. Is the halakha (Jewish law) produced through a ribbuy inference included within the halakha that appears in the peshat?
6. Why is ribbuy not counted in Rabbi Ishmael’s baraita of the hermeneutical principles?
7. What is the relationship between the included halakha and the explicit halakha: are there ribbuyim that generate a genuinely new halakha?

The Principle

Ribbuy.

“And this is the law of the Nazirite: on the day when the days of his Nazirite vow are completed, he shall bring him to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.”

(Numbers 6:13)

“He shall bring him — could it be that others bring him? Surely he brings himself. This is one of the three occurrences of et that Rabbi Ishmael interpreted in the Torah in this way. Similarly, you may say: ‘and they shall cause them to bear guilt requiring a guilt offering’ — could it be that others cause them to bear it? Surely they bring it upon themselves. Similarly, you may say: ‘and he buried him in the valley’ — could it be that others buried him? Surely he buried himself. So too here: ‘he shall bring him’ means that he brings himself, and others do not bring him.”

(Sifre on Numbers, section 32; Rashi ad loc.)

A. Summary of Last Year’s Article

Last year we dealt with ribbuyim in general, and with inclusion derived from the word et in particular. Rabbi Akiva is well known for making use of ribbuyim, whereas Rabbi Ishmael generally does not derive inclusions from words or letters, but treats the biblical text as though it were written in ordinary human idiom: “The Torah speaks in human language.”

We noted that Maimonides, at the beginning of the second root, mentions ribbuy together with Rabbi Ishmael’s thirteen hermeneutical principles. We also suggested that this may reflect a joining of Rabbi Akiva’s hermeneutical rules to Rabbi Ishmael’s list, in order to create a fuller catalogue of interpretive principles.

The derivation concerning the Nazirite cited above is one of three places where Rabbi Ishmael also interprets et, and in all three he explains it as referring back to the person himself. At first glance, this seems to show that these cases are exceptions within Rabbi Ishmael’s method, cases in which even he derives an inclusion from et. However, at the end of the article we raised the possibility that even here Rabbi Ishmael is not deriving an inclusion from et at all. Rather, these three cases are merely a peshat interpretation of the word oto (“him”), not a drash (a non-literal hermeneutical exposition). This indeed seems to follow from Rashi’s comment on Leviticus 22:16.

In several talmudic sugyot there appears a dispute over whether one derives inclusion from the word et; see Babylonian Talmud, Menahot 11b, and parallels. In most cases, this is connected to the well-known baraita about Shimon, or Nehemiah, the Amsonite; see Babylonian Talmud, Bekhorot 6b, and parallels:

“And this tanna does not interpret et, as it was taught: Shimon the Amsonite, and some say Nehemiah the Amsonite, used to expound every et in the Torah. Once he reached the verse ‘You shall fear et the Lord your God,’ he withdrew. His students said to him: Rabbi, what will become of all the ets that you have expounded? He said to them: Just as I received reward for the exposition, so I received reward for the withdrawal. Until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: ‘You shall fear et the Lord your God’ — to include Torah scholars.”

From the baraita, and from the talmudic discussions surrounding it, it clearly emerges that this is a substantive dispute and not a local problem. One who does, or does not, interpret the word et is expected to do so consistently throughout. This is also stated explicitly by Rashi; see, for example, Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim 22b, s.v. “et lo darish.”¹ The wording of the baraita suggests that the entire dispute takes place within the school that already accepts ribbuy as a method, since the dispute concerns only derivations from et and not ribbuyim in general. This implies that the method of ribbuy itself is agreed upon. It follows that with respect to the word et there is a position according to which nothing at all should be derived from it, even for someone who otherwise accepts ribbuy.

We discussed the logic of deriving inclusion from the word et, and our point of departure was that et usually appears in its natural place as an ordinary part of biblical syntax. It is therefore difficult to see why it should serve as a basis for interpretation. We saw several possible explanations:

1. When there is some minor change in the verse, the word et is interpreted to include something.
2. When the word et is substantially redundant, then perhaps even Rabbi Ishmael will interpret it.
3. Even without any textual irregularity, the word et may be understood in the sense of “with,” and thus one derives an additional halakha from it.

The first two possibilities are plainly forms of drash, but the third direction seems to be a peshat reading. How, then, can it serve as the basis for derivations from et? We explained that it is still drash because we continue to interpret the word et in its ordinary sense, and merely add to it the additional meaning of “with.” We may now add that even if one interprets the word as meaning “with,” the verse still cannot be read in that way on the plain level. For example, the verse “You shall fear et the Lord your God” is interpreted in the passage cited above to include Torah scholars. Suppose the word et is understood in the sense of “with.” How, then, are we to read the verse on the level of the derivation? A sentence like “With the Lord your God you shall fear” is not ordinary language. It is therefore clear that assigning the meaning “with” to the word et is itself a midrashic act. One must fear the Holy One, blessed be He, and together with Him one must also fear Torah scholars.

We also noted that it is not clear whether Maimonides has a uniform halakhic position regarding derivations from et.² Tosafot as well, on Babylonian Talmud, Menahot 11b, s.v. “veRabbi Shimon,” hesitates over the practical ruling and cites tannaitic opinions that derive from et only in some cases. We noted there that perhaps these opinions differ with regard to the three situations and mechanisms outlined above.

We then commented on the relation between the halakhot derived through inclusion and the halakhot learned from the plain sense of those verses. We saw that the medieval commentators dispute whether the halakhot learned from ribbuyim are included as an integral part of the original halakhot learned from the peshat, or whether they are independent halakhot that just happen to be learned from the same verse. We illustrated the different possibilities and opinions in relation to et-derivations that include the duty to honor an older brother, stepparents, and Torah scholars.

We further noted that the basis of the distinction may not lie in conceptual reasoning at all, but rather in a textual consideration. Where the word et is interpreted because it is redundant, the result is a separate halakha not included within the original halakha. But in places where the word et is understood in the sense of “with,” the included halakha is subsumed within the explicit commandment.

Finally, we returned to the derivation cited above regarding the Nazirite, and saw that it can be understood either as an exclusion or as an inclusion. If it is an exclusion, then this would be an exceptional derivation from et, which usually serves to include. This is further evidence that we are not dealing here with an et-derivation of inclusion, but with a plain-sense interpretation.

B. Ribbuy Derivations

Introduction: Types of Ribbuy

There are hundreds of ribbuy derivations in rabbinic literature. Even without a detailed statistical examination, it is quite clear that this is the most common of the hermeneutical principles. Within this vast range, one can distinguish several different kinds of derivation and classify them according to a number of different criteria.

Some ribbuyim arise from the plain sense of Scripture itself, and not from any particular word in the usual sense. This is a distinction between ribbuyim that belong to the realm of peshat and those that belong to the realm of drash.

One may also classify ribbuyim according to their textual source: an extra letter, an extra word, a non-extra word such as et, repetition of a word, which is a special form of redundancy, and so on.

One may also classify kinds of ribbuy according to the character of the halakhot being included: is this an expansion of the set of cases or objects to which the law applies, or is it the addition of a different halakha? In other words, is the additional rule part of the rule learned from the peshat, or is it a distinct rule learned from the same word?

With respect to all these types, one may ask the same questions that we raised regarding et-derivations: is there redundancy here? Is there a supporting literal meaning, such as the sense “with”? Is this peshat or drash? And so forth.

Plain-Sense Ribbuyim

Let us present one example, chosen at random according to the order of appearance in a computerized search, to illustrate the phenomenon of a ribbuy that arises from the plain sense of Scripture. Tosefta Shevuot 1:5 states:

“All those who are impure in the Torah, whether they contracted a lesser impurity or a graver impurity, are liable for defiling the Temple and its sacred things, as it is said: ‘in any matter of impurity’ — to include all those who are impure in the Torah.”

Here the inclusion is learned from the words “in any matter of impurity.” The Torah itself explicitly includes all forms of impurity here, and it is therefore quite clear that this is not a derivation but a plain-sense interpretation. One obvious consequence is that even according to Maimonides, in the second root, who classifies halakhot learned by ribbuy as rabbinic in status, this halakha clearly would not be rabbinic. This ribbuy is nothing more than a straightforward interpretation of what the Torah itself says.

Reversed Ribbuy

Another example of a plain-sense ribbuy appears in tractate Kallah Rabbati 4:12:

“‘And You spoke also concerning Your servant’s house’ — ‘also’ can only serve to include. Not only concerning him, whom You praised, but even concerning his offspring You spoke.”

Here too the inclusion is written explicitly in the verse: “also concerning Your servant’s house.” “Your servant’s house” appears in addition to some other element that remains implicit. In fact, the actual included element is precisely what is explicitly written in the verse — “Your servant’s house” — whereas the בסיס, the underlying base case, is specifically the element hidden in the verse. The logic of inclusion exposes the fact that there must have been a base case upon which the inclusion was built. If so, this is a reversed ribbuy. The identification of that hidden base is indeed not founded directly upon Scripture itself but upon reasoning. It therefore seems that in some cases one may treat such a ribbuy as drash. Unlike the previous example, its result is not written explicitly in Scripture but only hinted at there.

One may ask whether such a case is really a ribbuy at all. After all, the included element is stated explicitly, and from it we uncover the basic element, which is specifically the one not written in the verse. Can one really say that the base case is the product of the inclusion?

There is also room to wonder whether such a ribbuy is drash or peshat. On the one hand, the very wording of the verse tells us that there is some base element, and in that sense this is a plain-sense interpretation. On the other hand, it is not entirely clear what that basic element is, since it is not stated in the verse and must be supplied through reasoning. Is such an inferential process drash or peshat? We will return to this below.

A Vegam Inclusion That Is Not Plain-Sense

In contrast to the two cases above, let us now turn to an example of a ribbuy that at first seems to be plain-sense, and is likewise based on the word vegam (“and also”), but upon closer inspection appears to be of a different character. In Avot de-Rabbi Natan, chapter 43, in the section “Three Crowns,” it is stated:

“When it says, ‘And it shall be afterward that I will pour out My spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy.’ And similarly it says, ‘And also upon the male slaves and upon the female slaves’ — to include human beings, beasts, and birds. I would know only human beings; when it says ‘and also,’ it includes everything.”

(Joel 3:1-2)

At first glance, this too looks like a plain-sense inclusion. The literal meaning of vegam is indeed inclusive, much like the previous example. But this is a difficult case, and in its essence it differs from the previous one. The wording of the verse itself explicitly shows that the word vegam is meant to include male and female slaves, not beasts and birds. If so, this appears to be drash and not peshat: from the word vegam we learn something that goes beyond what is explicitly present in the verse. This now raises the opposite question: why did the Sages derive anything from this word at all? Is it redundant? Seemingly its purpose is to include male and female slaves, so what room is left for deriving an additional inclusion from it?

In fact, it would have been more plausible to derive this inclusion specifically from the beginning of the verse: “upon all flesh” — to include beasts and birds. But the midrash states explicitly that the inclusion is derived from the word vegam.

Let us now look at the full wording of the verse. Once the opening phrase says “all flesh,” we should have understood that it refers to all living beings, including beasts and birds. If so, why does the verse then continue with the words “and also upon the male slaves and upon the female slaves”? They too are included in the phrase “all flesh.” This shows us that the original phrase “all flesh” does not deal with all living beings, but only with human beings, and only free human beings. Now there comes an additional inclusion of male and female slaves. But even this picture does not give us a reason to include beasts and birds. On the contrary, the latter part of the verse would seem to exclude them.

It appears that the starting point is that the verse is awkwardly formulated. If its intention were indeed only human beings, why does it open with the words “all flesh”? From this we infer that its intention includes beasts and birds as well. If so, one may ask why the verse did not suffice with the words “all flesh.” The answer is that had only those words appeared, we would have understood them as referring only to human beings.

Note on Plain-Sense Ribbuy in Light of the Raavad

In earlier essays we saw that sometimes the Torah itself performs a derivation, and does not merely supply the textual basis upon which a derivation is performed; see the essay on Parashat Behaalotekha, 5765, regarding the principle of “two verses that contradict one another” and the principle of qal va-homer (a fortiori), and the essay on Parashat Vayigash, 5766, regarding hekesh (analogy by juxtaposition). In such cases, the Torah itself performs an inferential act of a midrashic character. For example, the verse “If her father had but spit in her face, would she not be ashamed for seven days?” does not provide a textual basis for the Sages to perform a qal va-homer; rather, the verse itself performs the qal va-homer inference.

So too, in the first type of ribbuy discussed above, the biblical wording itself performs the act of inclusion. This is not the ordinary case of ribbuy. As noted, most considerations of ribbuy are drashot and not plain-sense interpretations. In ordinary ribbuy derivations, it is not the Torah itself that includes, but the interpreting sage who includes in light of some biblical textual marker. There is an extra word or letter, and the interpreter infers from it a new halakha or an expansion of an existing halakha.

Ribbuy by Redundancy

One of the clearest and most common examples of ribbuy derivations resulting from redundancy is a derivation based on the repetition of a word in Scripture. One of the prominent talmudic discussions that deals with such ribbuyim is Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 31b, where a series of such repetitions is interpreted one after another: “you shall surely return,” “shall surely be put to death,” “you shall surely take a pledge,” “you shall surely open,” and more:

“‘The murderer shall surely be put to death’ — I know only the mode of death explicitly written concerning him. From where do I know that if you cannot put him to death by the specified mode, you may put him to death by any mode possible? Scripture says: ‘shall surely be put to death’ — in any case.

‘You shall surely strike’ — I know only the striking specified there. From where do I know that if you cannot strike them in the specified manner, you may strike them in any manner possible? Scripture says: ‘you shall surely strike’ — in any case.

‘You shall surely return’ — I know only where he took the pledge with authorization of the court. From where do I know this even where he took it without authorization of the court? Scripture says: ‘you shall surely return’ — in any case.

‘You shall surely take a pledge’ — I know only where he took the pledge lawfully. From where do I know this even where he took it unlawfully? Scripture says: ‘you shall surely take a pledge’ — in any case…”

In these cases a word is repeated in Scripture. The interpreter concludes that the repetition is meant to include something, and thus performs a ribbuy derivation. It should be noted that in all these instances the result is an expansion of the range of application of an already existing halakha.

There are of course also derivations based on the redundancy of words that are not repetitions. For example, in Babylonian Talmud, Moed Katan 8a, the Gemara interprets the verse “and on the day of appearing” with respect to the inspection of skin lesions, concluding that there are days on which lesions are not examined, such as for a bridegroom. The derivation is based on the fact that Scripture should have said “upon appearing” rather than “and on the day of appearing.” The words “and on the day” are redundant, and they serve as the basis for the derivation. And so in many other cases.

Characteristics of Ribbuy Derivations

In all the ribbuyim we have encountered so far, the conclusion is an inclusion of the situations, objects, or persons to which the law applies, or to which the biblical word under discussion refers. There is no inclusion of a new law here, only an expansion of the scope of an existing law.

In that sense, a ribbuy from et may appear to be exceptional. “You shall fear et the Lord your God” — to include Torah scholars — can perhaps be understood as an expansion of the commandment to fear God, extending it to Torah scholars. But it is more likely to be understood as a new commandment of reverence directed toward Torah scholars.

The same is true of honoring an older brother in relation to honoring parents. It is quite plausible to see this as a new commandment, and not merely as an expansion of the commandment to honor parents. With respect to stepparents, by contrast, it is more plausible to see it as an expansion of the duty of honor toward parents. These matters were discussed in last year’s essay, where we saw medieval disputes on these issues.

No one would dispute that putting a criminal to death by a mode not explicitly specified is an expansion of the obligation to execute him. The same is true of returning a pledge that was taken either lawfully or unlawfully. In all such cases it is clear that what we have is the expansion of one given halakha, not the creation of a new one. Derivations based on repetition expand the scope of an existing halakha. Derivations that include by means of the word et do not always do so.

This is the place to note that Rabbi Ishmael’s three derivations from the word oto also do not expand the scope of a given halakha; rather, they interpret the word oto. This fact strengthens our proposal from last year to view those derivations as interpretation, not as et-derivations of inclusion — a method to which Rabbi Ishmael apparently does not subscribe.

Ribbuy from an Extra Letter

By contrast, a ribbuy whose basis is an extra letter has a different character. Very often, a new halakha is generated there, one that does not seem to be merely an added clause within the halakha learned from the peshat. There are also other ribbuyim from an extra letter that expand given halakhot, like the previous forms of ribbuy.

For example, in Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 68b, and see also 69a there, the discussion concerns the daughter of a priest who is married to an Israelite and then becomes divorced, so that she returns to her priestly father. The Gemara asks whether she returns only with respect to eating terumah (the priestly due), or also with respect to eating the breast and thigh, the portions of offerings given by the offerer to the priests.

“As it was taught: When she returns, she returns with respect to terumah, but she does not return with respect to the breast and thigh. Rav Hisda said in the name of Ravina bar Rav Sheila: What is the verse? For it is written: ‘And the daughter of a priest, if she becomes the wife of a stranger, she may not eat of the sacred contributions.’ She may not eat of that which is set apart from the sacred offerings! If so, let Scripture write: ‘she may not eat of the sacred offerings.’ Why say, ‘of the sacred contributions’? Infer from this two things. We have found this for a priest’s daughter; from where do we derive it for the daughter of a Levite or of an Israelite? As Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rav: ‘daughter’ and ‘daughter’; so too here, ‘daughter’ and ‘daughter.’ In accordance with whom is this? In accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who expounds vavs! You may even say that it accords with the Rabbis, because the entire word ‘and-daughter’ in the verse is extra.”

The Gemara says that Rabbi Akiva expounds extra vavs, whereas the Rabbis expound only words. It is not entirely clear whether Rabbi Akiva really regards the vav as redundant, since the possibility of writing only “daughter” rather than “and daughter” is somewhat unnatural in biblical style. In any event, we have here a ribbuy derivation from an extra letter, and indeed only Rabbi Akiva derives it. The Rabbis derive from words, not from letters.³

Derivations That Count as Peshat

We have already mentioned several times in our essays — see, for example, the essays on Parashat Vayeshev and Vayigash, 5765, and Mas’ei, 5766 — the remarks of the author of Keritut, who wonders why Rabbi Ishmael did not include in his list of thirteen principles all the other interpretive methods that we use. In the baraita of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean there appear thirty-two principles, and in the letter of Rabbi Sherira Gaon there appear about seventy. The author of Keritut himself, like other authors of rule-books, adds many more hermeneutical principles that are not included in Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s list.

The author of Keritut suggests three possible answers to this question:

1. Some principles belong only to aggadic exposition.
2. Some principles are disputed, for example Rabbi Akiva’s principles, which Rabbi Ishmael does not accept.
3. Some principles are regarded as though they were written explicitly in the verse.

We explained his intention in this third possibility: in fact, these rules are rules of plain-sense interpretation, not drash. The assumption underlying this is that exposing what is written in a verse is plain-sense interpretation, whereas drash is an expansion beyond what appears in the verse; see the essay on Parashat Yitro, 5765, and many others.⁴

Admittedly, the author of Keritut shows how to apply these three possibilities only with respect to the thirty-two principles of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean. There he goes through the principles one by one and explains, for each, which of the three reasons caused it not to be counted by Rabbi Ishmael. But we may view them as paradigm cases for discussing all the other principles as well. After all, Rabbi Ishmael counted only principles that are principles of halakhic drash, that are not disputed, and that do not merely expose what is explicitly written in the verses. If we can show that other principles also possess one of those three features, then it follows directly from the remarks of the author of Keritut that this is the reason Rabbi Ishmael did not count them either. His remarks therefore have a more general significance than merely comparing the principles of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean with those of Rabbi Ishmael.

Two Questions About the Status of Ribbuy

We now want to discuss two questions:

1. Why is ribbuy not counted among Rabbi Ishmael’s principles?
2. Why does Maimonides nevertheless bring it in the heading of his remarks in the second root, as an addition to Rabbi Ishmael’s thirteen principles?

It should be noted that these two questions stand in a certain tension with one another. On the one hand, the fact that Maimonides brings ribbuy as part of those principles from which the halakhot learned are of rabbinic status indicates that he views ribbuy as an extension beyond the written text. On the other hand, the fact that Rabbi Ishmael does not list this principle — and we are not dealing here with a principle of aggadic exposition — may indicate that he saw it as explicitly written in the text.

Possible Explanation: A Dispute

The first direction in which these phenomena may be explained is the fact that there is a dispute about this principle. As we noted, Rabbi Ishmael appears to disagree with Rabbi Akiva regarding ribbuy. He does not derive ribbuyim, because he adopts the approach according to which “The Torah speaks in human language.” If so, it is clear why this principle has no place in his list. By contrast, Maimonides, who adds this principle, wishes to attach Rabbi Akiva’s principles to the list as well in order to create a fuller list of hermeneutical methods, and according to Rabbi Akiva this is certainly one of the principles of drash.

However, in last year’s essay we presented the possibility that Rabbi Ishmael too sometimes derives ribbuyim. That is to say, there may be no principled dispute over ribbuy as such, but only a dispute over where and how the method is to be applied. For example, perhaps according to Rabbi Ishmael a redundancy in the Torah is required in order to derive inclusion, whereas according to Rabbi Akiva it is not, at least with respect to derivations from et.

Yet in light of what we have said so far, a third possibility also emerges. As we saw, there are ribbuyim that are plain-sense, because Scripture itself performs them. There are also ribbuyim that can definitely be seen as present in Scripture, such as the reversed ribbuy discussed above. These two types of ribbuy, and others like them, clearly do not belong in a list of principles of drash, since they may be regarded as tools of plain-sense interpretation. By contrast, ribbuyim from an extra letter or an extra word are forms of drash. With respect to them, the question of why Rabbi Ishmael did not include them in his list still remains.

It therefore seems that plain-sense ribbuyim, in all their varieties, were not included in the list because they are not principles of drash. Midrashic ribbuyim, by contrast, were not included because there is a dispute about them. Maimonides, in his remarks, combines the lists.

Another Explanatory Direction: Ribbuy as Explicitly Written in Scripture

However, it is quite possible that even the midrashic ribbuyim were not included in Rabbi Ishmael’s list because they are considered as though they were written explicitly in the text.⁵ Take, for example, the midrash we cited above on the verse in Joel. This is a vegam inclusion that is not plain-sense. But it rests upon a difficulty that we identified in the wording of the verse. Is the midrash a solution to that difficulty? If so, there is room to see the result of the midrash as the interpretation of the verse. True, in order to propose that interpretation we had to use reasoning, but interpretation — even plain-sense interpretation — also makes use of reasoning. It may therefore be that such ribbuyim are forms of drash and not plain-sense interpretations, and yet they still uncover the meaning of the verse.

We saw an example of this in the essay on Parashat Vayigash, 5765, where we discussed the explanation of the author of Keritut for why the principle of hekesh is not included in Rabbi Ishmael’s enumeration. We saw there that it is regarded as though written explicitly in the Torah because the textual hint that Scripture gives us for making the hekesh is direct. This is so even though the result of the hekesh is produced by the interpreter’s own reasoning. So too in the case of ribbuy, of course only when it is based on redundancy: there is a textual hint that an inclusion is to be derived. After the derivation, the halakhic result is precisely the interpretation of the redundant word, and is therefore regarded as explicitly written in Scripture. See our discussion of the character of ribbuy in last year’s essay.

Additional Questions

We have seen that ribbuyim usually expand the scope of a given halakha. Even when they generate a new halakha, it generally has a close connection to the halakha explicitly written in that same verse — as in the case of honoring an older brother and stepparents, or reverence for Torah scholars in relation to reverence for God. Already here there is doubt whether it is justified to regard the result as a ribbuy, since what we have is not the inclusion of something already present but the creation of a new halakha.

It would be worthwhile to examine whether there are not also ribbuyim that generate entirely new halakhot. If such cases exist, then ribbuy is only the midrashic means by which the halakha is derived, but it does not indicate any real substantive connection between it and the explicit halakha. Such a derivation is difficult to regard as ribbuy in an essential sense, and yet the fact that it is learned from an extra word or letter would still allow us to classify the principle as a kind of ribbuy.⁶

Another question is what distinguishes derivations of inclusion from et. We have seen that they are disputed between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva, but that probably characterizes all ribbuy derivations. We have also seen, however, that all these derivations are treated as a single unit: either one interprets the words et, or one does not interpret them. This is not a local matter. It obviously depends on whether they are based on redundancy or not; see the possibilities we raised in last year’s essay. In light of what we have said here, one may perhaps suggest several features that distinguish these derivations and may provide a possible explanation of the phenomena noted above:

1. According to some opinions, they generate new halakhot and do not merely expand the scope of existing ones.
2. According to some possibilities, they are not based on redundancy.⁷

Footnotes