Chametz Is Forbidden on Passover 5774

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a Tosefta. Hagahot Maimoni brings it in chapter 1 of the laws of leavened food. Even if this is something they say is fit for a dog to eat, it is certainly not fit for human consumption. That is according to all views. There is a dispute between Maimonides and the Ra’avad, and with regard to something not fit for human consumption, it is permitted by Torah law; at most it is only rabbinically prohibited, so here in any case that does not help. So let’s go back for a moment to what Maimonides says. I read these laws in Maimonides earlier, and I want to explain them in light of a Talmudic passage in tractate Pesachim. The Talmud in tractate Pesachim says as follows: Hezekiah said, from where do we know that leavened food on Passover is prohibited not only for eating but also for deriving benefit? As it says, “Leavened food shall not be eaten” — there shall be no permission for eating from it. So Hezekiah asks: where do we know that leavened food is also forbidden for benefit, not only for eating? So Hezekiah says: because it is written in the passive form, “Leavened food shall not be eaten.” “Shall not be eaten” means even in some indirect way — for example, if you give it to someone else, and Rashi explains it this way, and you receive money in return, and that leads to eating, that too is considered a case in which the leavened food is in some sense “eaten.” I’m not getting into the explanation of that right now; it’s a bit convoluted. In any case, you need some source from a verse in order to prohibit deriving benefit from leavened food. “The reason is that the Merciful One wrote, ‘Leavened food shall not be eaten’; had He not written ‘shall not be eaten,’ I would have said: it implies only a prohibition of eating, but not a prohibition of benefit.” In other words, according to Hezekiah, if there were no special source to prohibit benefit — if it had simply said “Do not eat leavened food,” not “shall not be eaten” in the passive, but “do not eat” — then it would have been prohibited only for eating and not for benefit. And this disagrees with Rabbi Abbahu, for Rabbi Abbahu said: everywhere it says “shall not be eaten,” “do not eat,” or “you shall not eat,” it implies both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit, unless Scripture specifies otherwise, as it specifies in the case of carcass meat, as it was taught: “You shall not eat any carcass; to the stranger within your gates you may give it, and he may eat it, or sell it to a foreigner.” So what do the verses say? Where is that? 22. What? 22. “To the stranger within your gates you may give it, and he may eat it” — it is talking about carcass meat. So the Torah itself goes out of its way to permit us to give the carcass to a non-Jew. Why does it need “or sell it to a foreigner”? Sorry — give it to the stranger, or sell it to a foreigner. So the Torah itself permits us to sell it to a foreigner. Why does it need to permit that? It was prohibited only for eating, not for benefit. Selling it to a foreigner and receiving money is benefit, not eating. So what’s the problem? Rabbi Abbahu says: we see from here that where permission for benefit is not explicitly written, it is supposed to be forbidden for benefit. In other words, from the very fact that something is forbidden for eating, it is automatically forbidden for benefit as well. That is what Rabbi Abbahu says. And Hezekiah does not accept this. Because the fact is, Hezekiah knows there is a prohibition of eating leavened food, and in order to derive the prohibition of benefit he has to make an inference from the passive language in which it is written: “Leavened food shall not be eaten.” That implies that the mere fact there is a prohibition of eating is not enough to derive from it a prohibition of benefit. This is the dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Hezekiah. In Jewish law, all the halakhic decisors rule like Rabbi Abbahu. That means that every prohibition of eating is also prohibited for benefit. Of course there are many exceptions. Pork is prohibited for eating but not prohibited for benefit. Forbidden fat is prohibited for eating but not prohibited for benefit. But every such exception needs a verse or an interpretive derivation or something that teaches why it is indeed permitted for benefit. Because the basic assumption is that every prohibition of eating is also prohibited for benefit. That is how Maimonides rules, for example, in Forbidden Foods, chapter 8: “Every place where the Torah says ‘do not eat,’ ‘you shall not eat,’ ‘they shall not eat,’ or ‘it shall not be eaten,’ it implies both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit, unless Scripture specifies for you, as it specified for you with regard to carcass meat, as it says: ‘To the stranger within your gates you may give it, and he may eat it,’ etc.”

[Speaker B] And this ruling — does it apply during Passover, or also after Passover?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker B] The prohibition of deriving benefit from leavened food?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leavened food over which Passover passed is a rabbinic prohibition. No — here the prohibition is during Passover. After Passover it is a rabbinic prohibition; that is unrelated. We are talking about Torah law. Okay?

[Speaker B] How can you derive benefit from something that is not allowed to be in my possession?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not in your possession — but you derive benefit from it. What do you mean? First of all, you can derive benefit even from leavened food not in your possession. But even if it is in your possession, then you have violated the prohibition against it being seen and found in your possession, and besides that you have also violated “it shall not be eaten.”

[Speaker E] But if it is really true that every prohibition of eating is also a prohibition of benefit, then the whole derivation we make from “meat cooked in milk” three times — one for cooking, one for eating, one for benefit…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On that Maimonides discusses it at length. He really devotes a full discussion there to the prohibition of meat cooked in milk. And Sefer HaChinukh also does something very detailed there. I’m not going to bring it here, although it does touch on our topic too. But take a look there. In any case, Maimonides rules like Rabbi Abbahu. Now if Maimonides rules like Rabbi Abbahu, then we go back to Maimonides’ wording that I read earlier in the laws: anyone who eats an olive-sized amount of leavened food on Passover is liable to karet. Law 2: leavened food on Passover is prohibited for benefit, as it says, “Leavened food shall not be eaten” — there shall be no permission for eating from it. That is Hezekiah’s language. But Maimonides ruled in the laws of Forbidden Foods like Rabbi Abbahu. Why do you need a special derivation to prohibit leavened food for benefit? From the very fact that it is prohibited for eating, it is also prohibited for benefit. Why do you need the inference from the passive language? Right? So there is some problem here in Maimonides. The Kesef Mishneh here struggles with what to do with it. He says, okay, sometimes it is Maimonides’ way to bring verses that fit the wording better — even though that is not the Talmud’s conclusion — and that is true; you see it in other places too. And that is a kind of general rule in Maimonides. But still, of course, where there is a good explanation, then you do not have to resort to explanations like that. So I want to suggest a different explanation. Maimonides explains Rabbi Abbahu’s view — that every prohibition of eating is also prohibited for benefit — in several places in his Commentary to the Mishnah on tractate Keritot. There is what is called there “the wonderful point.” That is what they call it in the yeshivot. “In these words of ours there is a wonderful point, and we will shed light on it.” That is what Maimonides says. And also in Sefer HaMitzvot, commandment 187, there concerning meat cooked in milk. In both of those places Maimonides explains that the prohibition of eating teaches us there is also a prohibition of benefit because eating is understood by Rabbi Abbahu as an example. When the Torah prohibits you from eating, what it really means is to prohibit you from deriving benefit, using the common example and saying, “Do not eat.” Just as it says, “If a man’s ox gores his fellow’s ox” in order to teach me that when my property causes damage I am liable to pay. And what about my dog that bit someone? Fine, that too is the same thing. “If a man’s ox gores” is an example, and of course any of my property that causes damage makes me liable to pay. The Torah very often teaches principles by way of examples. So Maimonides says: when the Torah prohibits eating, that is simply an example of a common form of benefit. But what it is really prohibiting is benefit. Except in places where it specifies otherwise, as with carcass meat. But where it does not specify — where we read a prohibition of eating — that is really an example. In principle, what is prohibited is benefit in general, and eating is only an example. Fine, without getting into all the implications of this, but that is what Maimonides says. Now let’s see what that actually means. It is clear that the prohibition of eating, according to Rabbi Abbahu’s interpretation, is not really a separate prohibition at all. There is a prohibition of benefit, and the prohibition of eating is only one example of benefit. But there are not two prohibitions here, one of eating and one of benefit. There is a prohibition of benefit. Eating is the example the Torah chooses in order to teach me that there is a prohibition of benefit. Therefore, for example, in the enumeration of the commandments, the prohibition of benefit will not be counted separately from the prohibition of eating. Okay? And everywhere Maimonides says there is a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit, he brings them together: “it is prohibited for eating and for benefit,” because it is the same thing. But here, if you noticed, Maimonides divides it into two laws: “Leavened food is prohibited for eating, and one who eats it is liable to karet, etc.” — law 1. Law 2: “Leavened food on Passover is prohibited for benefit, as it says, ‘Leavened food shall not be eaten.’” A separate law, a separate source, two different things. How does that fit with ruling like Rabbi Abbahu, that every prohibition of eating also implies a prohibition of benefit?

[Speaker F] And the punishment is different here. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The punishment is different here.

[Speaker F] That too — in the first law he says it is karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That too just strengthens the question. Why really is the punishment different? After all, every prohibition of eating is only a prohibition of benefit. So if it is a prohibition of benefit, then obviously deriving benefit should also carry karet, not only eating. On the contrary, that is a difficulty on Maimonides. So the Maggid Mishneh wants to say that deriving benefit is an unusual form of benefit, not the normal way. Because the normal way of benefiting from leavened food is to eat it. So if you derive benefit from it in a way that is not its normal manner, that is why there is no karet for it. But that is not a fundamental distinction — meaning, it is the same prohibition; it is just that when you do it in an unusual way, there is no karet. Okay? Maybe one could say there is a difference between, say—

[Speaker E] Something that is non-kosher as opposed to leavened food, in the sense that prohibitions of eating and benefit are permanent; they are always prohibited. And therefore, once you said it, you are saying this thing as a thing is prohibited.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A prohibition on the object itself, as it is called, okay.

[Speaker E] Leavened food is not leavened food that is prohibited; it is not something prohibited in and of itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What difference does that make? Maimonides’ consideration is the same consideration — what is the difference? Since if the Torah forbids me to eat, fine, a prohibition on the person, not on the object itself, but still the Torah forbids me to eat by way of example; what it really forbids is deriving benefit. In a personal prohibition, all right, in a personal prohibition. But I can make the same argument about a personal prohibition that I make about a prohibition on the object. What is the difference? If eating is an example of benefit, then even if you focus on the person you can make the same argument.

[Speaker B] Eating is not an example of benefit. For example, in a fast, eating is not an example of benefit. During a fast I am allowed to derive benefit from food if it is not for the sake of eating. There there is a clear distinction. Exactly as he says: for a permanent prohibition, in Maimonides’ view eating is an example of benefit; for a temporary prohibition, eating is prohibited because the Torah specifically means eating. Because that is exactly what is written.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About a fast, maybe I will comment on that later. It is an interesting comparison you are raising here; I’ll get to it in a moment, I hope I’ll get to it in a moment.

[Speaker B] In any case, you cannot say this in Rabbi Abbahu.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Abbahu says it about leavened food in any case, but—

[Speaker B] It is in every—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case it is contradicted in Maimonides, and I’ll get to that too in just a moment. Look, it seems to me that what is written here is as follows. The prohibition of leavened food — or prohibitions in general — why does the Torah forbid me to derive benefit from something? Usually it is apparently because there is something repulsive in it, something spiritually harmful — let’s not talk biology — but the Torah wants me to distance myself from it. It does not want me to come into contact with it, to derive benefit from it, to have some connection to it. Therefore Rabbi Abbahu says: to distance yourself means to distance yourself. In other words, it does not matter whether by eating or by other benefit — do not engage with that thing. Okay? That is in a place where the prohibition is grounded in the repulsiveness of the thing, where the Torah tells me: distance yourself from it, do not engage with it. Okay? But in a place where the prohibition is not because of the repulsiveness of the thing but for some other reason, there it may be that you cannot derive a prohibition of benefit from a prohibition of eating. For example, the prohibition of leavened food. Why is leavened food prohibited? Now yes, there are many Hasidic and other homiletic interpretations that leavened food is the yeast, the evil inclination, and so on. That has no root or branch anywhere. These are homilies, and as homilies they never really left the category of homily — I’m not even sure they entered it. But in the end leavened food was prohibited because the dough of our ancestors did not have time to rise, that’s all. The Torah tells us why it is prohibited; you do not need to make up homilies for that. The Torah says we are forbidden to eat leavened food as a remembrance of what happened then, that our ancestors’ dough did not have time to rise. And therefore we too are meant to remember this by eating matzah and not eating leavened food. In other words, in itself there is nothing repulsive about leavened food. It is not problematic in itself. Why am I forbidden to eat leavened food? I would say even more than that: it is part of the commandment to remember the Exodus from Egypt. This is the way we relive the Exodus from Egypt. Just as our ancestors did not eat leavened food, we reenact that and we too do not eat leavened food.

[Speaker H] And also no leavened food on the altar?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that is a different passage. It is unrelated to the prohibitions here.

[Speaker H] Right, no, but there is something objective about leavened food.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is something objective, but the question is—

[Speaker H] Leavened food also is not brought up on the altar, like leaven and honey.

[Speaker B] Fine, so what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That does not matter.

[Speaker H] So on the altar they do not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They do not place leavened food on the altar, but there is no problem with leavened food.

[Speaker H] You can eat it whenever you want in the end.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I am not claiming there is absolutely nothing about leavened food. Of course there is something about leavened food. But the question is whether that something is its essence. The question is whether because of that something I am supposed to distance myself from leavened food.

[Speaker H] No. No, that certainly is not its essence. The question is, it is not only the Exodus from Egypt that has a problem with leavened food.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I am saying: leavened food on Passover is only about the Exodus from Egypt. In sacrifices it is a different topic. But leavened food on Passover is a different prohibition.

[Speaker H] Maybe, but maybe here too there is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Something thematic, maybe some common denominator. So then why not all year round? What is special about Passover? On Passover it is because our ancestors’ dough did not have time to rise. The Torah says so. In other words, the Torah says this is a prohibition whose basis is historical. A prohibition whose basis is historical — what does that mean? It means that once the prohibition is historical in basis, what exactly is prohibited to me? What is not prohibited to me is deriving benefit from leavened food. What is prohibited to me is doing the act of eating leavened food. Why? Because our ancestors did not do the act of eating leavened food. In other words, the way we remember the Exodus from Egypt is by not eating leavened food, or by eating matzah and not eating leavened food. So the prohibition of eating leavened food is basically part of the—this is already a little too analytical, never mind—but part of the remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt. Just as they did not eat leavened food then, so now too. What is the difference? What does that mean? It means that in the context of leavened food, the prohibition of eating is a prohibition on the act of eating, not on deriving benefit from the leavened food. Because in itself there is nothing problematic about leavened food. Rather, our ancestors did not eat leavened food, so we too do not eat leavened food, as a remembrance of what they did then. Is deriving benefit from leavened food prohibited here? I do not know. True, our ancestors also did not derive benefit from leavened food — but our ancestors also wore robes. So do we also have to wear robes? Not everything our ancestors did then is something we do here. The Torah determines what from what they did then obligates us today as well. Therefore, if only a prohibition of eating had been written, I would not know there is a prohibition of benefit. The reason all the regular prohibitions of eating expand into a prohibition of benefit is that regular prohibitions of eating are not prohibitions on the act of eating; they are prohibitions on deriving benefit through eating. So what difference does it make — eating, some other benefit? It is a prohibition on deriving benefit. But with leavened food there is no problem of deriving benefit from the leavened food; it is not a repulsive thing. I need not to do the act of eating, just as our ancestors did not eat leavened food. What about benefit?

[Speaker D] That raises a question about leavening agent — did our ancestors have time to remove the leavening agent?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’m getting to leavening agent in a second. I don’t know whether they had time to remove the leavening agent, but I’m getting to leavening agent; I’m aiming there.

[Speaker D] The story of the Exodus from Egypt does not mention leavening agent. Fine, okay. But historically, did they drive out the leavening agent? Did they have time to deal with the leavening agent?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At least it did not become leavened; as for dealing with it, I do not know exactly what it means to deal with the leavening agent. To wait for it to become leavened? No. Maybe it was inside, but they did not wait for it to become leavened. In any case I’ll get to leavening agent in a moment; I’m heading there.

[Speaker F] On the contrary, where we eat matzah we are forbidden to eat leavened food; it’s the reverse. The Festival of Matzot — so anything that clashes and conflicts with matzah is what is prohibited.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Those are two — I don’t know whether they are two sides of the same coin. Eating matzah and not eating leavened food are both reenactments of what our ancestors did there. I do not know what is more fundamental and what is less fundamental; you can argue about that.

[Speaker F] But you could say that deriving benefit from leavened food does not create any conflict with the Festival of Matzot. Eating matzah and eating leavened food — yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is what I’m claiming. The point is that with the prohibition—

[Speaker B] So that fits with “not a dog will bark,” what our ancestors—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait, I haven’t gotten there yet; I’ll get there in a moment. A regular prohibition of eating is really a prohibition of benefit; it is not a prohibition of eating, not a prohibition on the act of eating. I am forbidden to derive benefit from the thing. I can derive benefit from it by eating or in some other way; all of that is forbidden because there is a prohibition of benefit. But with leavened food it is exactly the opposite: leavened food is a prohibition of action, a prohibition on the act of eating what our ancestors did not do. So if that is the case, what is done here is the act of eating. Who says that the act of deriving benefit is also prohibited? Our ancestors also did not derive benefit from leavened food because they did not have leavened food, but I repeat: not everything our ancestors did then is something the Torah tells us to do today; for that you need a special derivation. Maimonides says, “Leavened food shall not be eaten” — there shall be no permission for deriving benefit from it. The Torah itself needs to prohibit leavened food also for benefit, because from the mere fact that it is prohibited for eating I would not have learned that it is prohibited for benefit, since this is a prohibition on an act. And if it is a prohibition on an act, then fine, perhaps only the act of eating was prohibited. Why suddenly bring in all the other forms of benefit too? Now, Rabbi Abbahu does indeed speak about leavened food — that is another problem, they mentioned it earlier — one second, I’m doing this step by step.

[Speaker G] Just as “it shall not be seen and it shall not be found” requires a special derivation for leavened food. What? Like “it shall not be seen and it shall not be found.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that certainly requires a special derivation, because with other things — for example produce of the first three years, which is also prohibited for benefit — there is no “it shall not be seen and it shall not be found”; it is allowed to be in your house. So obviously the Torah has to write it if it wants it not to be in your house.

[Speaker G] Here the discussion of the prohibition of benefit is similar in that sense to “it shall not be seen and it shall not be found” — an addition to the original prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An addition, yes, but it is not learned from there; each one needs its own source. Right. So now basically that is the meaning. Therefore Maimonides needs a special source in order to derive the prohibition of benefit from leavened food, because the prohibition of leavened food is different from all the other prohibitions of eating and benefit in the Torah. Now it is also very clear regarding everything I asked earlier about leavening agent. Why? Because if in fact with leavened food this is not at all a prohibition on deriving benefit from the thing, but a prohibition on performing the act of eating leavened food, okay? Then if that is so, why should I care that the leavening agent is not fit for eating? So I won’t derive benefit from it. Okay, the prohibition is not a prohibition of benefit; it is a prohibition on performing the act of eating. Once that is the prohibition, then when something is unfit for eating and no one derives benefit from it, that does not exempt it, right? So then why does Maimonides need to give some reason in order to explain that leavening agent is also prohibited? He says that the leavening agent causes other doughs to rise. Simply because we usually understand that when something spoils, it no longer has the status-name of the original thing; after it spoils, it is no longer called pork. Therefore it is permitted. Okay? With everything unfit for eating there are two kinds of permissions. One permission is that no benefit is derived from it, and the second permission is that it is no longer the original thing — meaning it is no longer pork. And you can show this in various places as two different kinds of permissions; there are practical differences between them as well. With leavened food there is only the one permission. If no benefit is derived from the thing, that is irrelevant. It is irrelevant because the prohibition is a prohibition on the act of eating leavened food. Why should I care that there is no benefit? This is not a prohibition of benefit; it is a prohibition on the act of eating. So then you’ll say, fine, but it is unfit for eating, so it no longer bears the name of leavened food at all; it is not called eating leavened food — the second permission. To that Maimonides says: no. Something that causes other things to rise — leavening agent — certainly bears the name of leavened food. Earlier I asked: fine, I can accept your logic and understand that leavening agent bears the name of leavened food, but if it bears the name of leavened food, it is still unfit for eating. So he says: right, but with leavened food the only thing that matters is whether this thing is called leavened food. It does not matter whether you derive benefit from it or not, because what is prohibited to me is performing the act of eating something called leavened food.

[Speaker B] So that means that leavened food unfit for eating does not bear the name “leavened food,” but leavening agent does bear the name “leavened food”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Because it causes other doughs to rise, certainly. That is what Maimonides says, as distinct from leavened food unfit for eating.

[Speaker B] Leavened food unfit for eating does not bear the name—

[Speaker C] leavened food,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, like all the Torah’s prohibitions. Also pork that is unfit for eating no longer bears the name pork; that is no longer considered the original thing, it is already garbage. Okay?

[Speaker C] According to this, gross eating would also be prohibited; you would violate it in that case too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there is a very interesting discussion in Noda B’Yehuda about gross eating, and I probably won’t have time to get to that, and it is exactly connected to this point. But there are many implications to this; you can show it in a completely systematic way in all the contexts. It works beautifully.

[Speaker B] So that means that if you have leavened food that is not unfit for a dog to eat, it is still forbidden for you to eat it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—

[Speaker H] No, no, no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it is ordinary leavened food — spoiled bread; the Talmud says “spoiled bread” — if it is leavened food unfit even for a dog to eat, it is permitted. That is exactly what I asked at the beginning. So why is leavening agent prohibited? Because spoiled bread — I do not derive benefit from it, and it is also no longer bread, so it is no longer leavened food. But leavening agent, because it causes other doughs to rise — it is unfit, I do not derive benefit from it, but it is called leavened food. Exactly the same logic of Maimonides as the color example, as what I brought earlier, so it is called leavened food. Maimonides says: if it is called leavened food, that is enough for me. I do not care that you derive no benefit from it, because the prohibition is not a prohibition of benefit; it is a prohibition of action — of eating something called leavened food. As long as I have proven to you that this thing is called leavened food, it is prohibited.

[Speaker G] And now you are uprooting the a fortiori inference in Beitzah this way? What? You’re uprooting—why? On the contrary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there its leavening is—why? There is—

[Speaker G] No, on the contrary, leavening agent, whose leavening power is more severe than ordinary leavened food—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that is the a fortiori inference there. Exactly. So it says it is more prohibited. On the contrary, I am explaining that a fortiori inference. That is the whole idea. My claim is that Maimonides’ source is the passage in Beitzah. Maimonides’ source is the passage in Beitzah, because the passage in Beitzah tells us according to Beit Shammai that if only leavened food had been written, there would have been no need to write leavening agent. I would have learned it by an a fortiori inference. Why? Because its leavening power is more severe. Is “its leavening power is more severe” a reason to be more stringent or more lenient? It is not fit for eating, its leavening power is more severe, but the Talmud says “its leavening power is more severe” is a reason to be more stringent. Why? Because for the Talmud it does not matter whether there is benefit from it or no benefit from it; the question is how much such a thing is called leavened food. If its leavening power is more severe, then it is certainly called leavened food. If ordinary leavened food is called leavened food, then certainly it will be forbidden to eat it. You’ll say: but that is Beit Shammai, and Beit Hillel disagrees with them. True, they disagree until the verse arrives. That is why you need the verse. Because without the verse I would not know all this. The verse that pairs leavening agent with leavened food, and keeps saying both leavening agent and leavened food — that is what it comes to teach. Once there is a verse, Beit Hillel also agrees. Their dispute with Beit Shammai is whether I would have known this on my own or whether I need a verse to teach it. That’s all. But in the end they both agree that the basis of the prohibition of leavened food is a prohibition of action and not a prohibition of benefit, and therefore the prohibition of benefit needs a separate source.

[Speaker E] But you could say that you can learn this directly from the verse, that it is a remembrance, that it is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but as is well known we do not derive law from the reason for the verse, even where the reason for the verse is written. In practical Jewish law, in the dispute in Sanhedrin 21a, there are three Tannaim there. According to Maimonides there are three Tannaim, and they disagree over whether we derive law from the reason for the verse even where the Torah itself writes the reason. “He shall not have many wives, lest his heart turn away.” Right? So therefore in any case you need the halakhic command, even if the reason is written. But once the halakhic command is written and the reason is also written, you understand that this is the definition of the halakhic command.

[Speaker B] What do you mean? In the conclusion of the Talmud in Beitzah they say that the dispute is about “it shall not be seen.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, but that does not change things; they do not reject this because of that. I didn’t read the continuation because I didn’t have time; you are right. The conclusion is about “it shall not be seen.” But the move from the prohibition of eating to “it shall not be seen” is not because they have a problem with the prohibition of eating, because the leavening is not relevant. It is for other reasons. For other reasons. So that does not matter to me. My whole consideration remains intact.

[Speaker I] But the conclusion is that the Jewish law is not like Beit Shammai, who distinguish regarding eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is. Because Maimonides—the Talmud made an a fortiori inference. I am now explaining that a fortiori inference. I explained it. Now the Talmud says: fine, but it does not work for other reasons, and they move on to “it shall not be seen.” But it has no problem with that a fortiori inference at the conceptual level; it did not reject it for that reason. So the proof still stands. Good. So what does this actually mean? That the prohibition of leavened food is an exceptional prohibition. It is a prohibition on eating leavened food, eating something called leavened food, and therefore for Maimonides it is enough to prove that leavening agent is called leavened food in order to say it is forbidden to eat. He is not interested in whether it is fit or unfit for eating, exactly as you see with Beit Shammai, and apparently as you also see with Beit Hillel, only after the verse. Because according to Beit Hillel you need the verse for this. But after the verse, that is what is written here. Therefore it seems to me that this also explains Maimonides’ division of the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit into two separate laws. It explains both the need for a separate source for the prohibition of benefit, and also the reason Maimonides gives that the leavening agent used to make dough rise must also be called leavened food — that is not a random reason — all these things. Another aspect of this matter concerns a partial measure. Maimonides… you know there is a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish regarding a partial measure. Reish Lakish says it is exempt. Okay. A partial measure of something — if—

[Speaker G] You—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you eat pork in less than an olive-sized amount, do you violate a prohibition? According to Reish Lakish, a rabbinic prohibition; according to Rabbi Yohanan, a Torah prohibition. Okay? And not only with pork — with all Torah prohibitions, at least prohibitions of eating. In practical Jewish law we rule like Rabbi Yohanan that it is a Torah prohibition. That is learned in one of two ways. The Talmud in tractate Yoma. One possibility is “any forbidden fat” — any amount of forbidden fat, meaning even the tiniest amount. And the other rationale is that it is fit to combine. Meaning, if you eat half an olive-size of pork — and there were no prohibition in that — and then you ate another half olive-size of pork, and in that too there is no prohibition, then how do the two together create a prohibition? That is how Rabbi Shimon explains that rationale — Rabbi Shimon Shkop. He says: the quality of the prohibition must also be present in each half, because otherwise it cannot suddenly come into existence out of nothing when you combine two halves. Clearly the quality is there; only the quantity is lacking. And what is the significance of the required measure? What? Only for lashes. It is a Torah prohibition, but for lashes, or punishment, that is only when the required measure is present. That is the law of a partial measure. Now Maimonides, regarding a partial measure of leavened food, writes as follows: one who eats from leavened food itself on Passover any amount whatsoever, this is prohibited by Torah law, as it says, “Leavened food shall not be eaten.” A partial measure, of course, does not necessarily mean exactly half; it means any amount whatsoever. “This is prohibited by Torah law, as it says, ‘Leavened food shall not be eaten.’” Maimonides invents a new derivation here: “Leavened food shall not be eaten” means any amount whatsoever, even if it is eaten in some form; even if I did not eat a full amount — if leavened food was eaten, then it is prohibited. Right? The measure of an olive-size is a measure in a person’s act of eating, but “Leavened food shall not be eaten” means it is enough that the leavened food was eaten; it does not require that I eat a full measure. Even less than an olive-size of leavened food, if it is eaten, then it is eaten. So Maimonides invents some derivation here to explain to me why a partial measure of leavened food is prohibited. “Even so, he is not liable to karet or an offering unless he ate the required measure, which is an olive-size.” Okay? So that is what he says here. So everyone asks here — the Kesef Mishneh says: I do not understand, it is difficult for me why a verse is needed for leavened food on Passover, since with all the Torah’s prohibitions we hold that a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. Why is a special derivation from a verse needed for this? He leaves it unresolved here. Let me remind you: this is the same Kesef Mishneh who raises a difficulty on Maimonides at the beginning of chapter 1, because he does not understand why a separate source is needed for the prohibition of benefit, and I think the explanation for this difficulty is the same explanation as there. The Mishneh LaMelekh brings something very interesting there, and here I come to Yom Kippur; I said I would get to it. “And I saw that Rabbi Mahara”l Nah, in a responsum,” says the Mishneh LaMelekh, “section 51, had difficulty with the question of our master” — that is, the Kesef Mishneh — “on this, and he answered that the prohibition of leavened food is not like forbidden fat, from which they learned that a partial measure is prohibited. Because forbidden fat is always prohibited and never had a time when it was permitted, unlike leavened food, which is permitted before Passover. Therefore a separate verse was needed for leavened food to prohibit a partial measure.” What is he saying? The prohibition of leavened food is a temporary prohibition, and therefore it cannot be learned from forbidden fat. The source for a partial measure is forbidden fat, which is a fixed prohibition, and there a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law; but leavened food is a temporary prohibition, and therefore it cannot be learned. Truly astonishing words — everyone falls off their chair here — because the Talmud in tractate Yoma brings this source from forbidden fat for the prohibition of Yom Kippur. For the prohibition of Yom Kippur. Now the prohibition of Yom Kippur is also a temporary prohibition. So what — where would anyone get the idea to say that from forbidden fat you do not derive temporary prohibitions? The Talmud itself, the whole context of the discussion is the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur, to say that a partial measure on Yom Kippur is also prohibited. So how can you say such a thing? It sounds completely absurd on its face. In a moment I will explain him, so that is why everyone is puzzled by this Mahara”l Nah.

[Speaker B] Wait, so what will you explain about forbidden fat and Yom Kippur?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? There is a prohibition: “You shall not eat any forbidden fat.” The Talmud learns from here “any amount of forbidden fat,” even the tiniest amount, that a partial measure is prohibited. The Talmud in tractate Yoma discusses the prohibitions of eating on Yom Kippur, and it asks what happens if someone ate less than the amount of a large date on Yom Kippur, a partial measure or less than the measure. It says that this too is prohibited by Torah law according to Rabbi Yohanan, because a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, and the source is forbidden fat.

[Speaker B] So they derive from forbidden fat to a prohibition that depends on time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right — so then what do you mean telling me that leavened food is a prohibition that depends on time? The Talmud itself brings it regarding Yom Kippur. It seems to me that the explanation of the Kesef Mishneh’s question and the questions on Mahara”l Nah — and perhaps this is what he himself meant, because otherwise it really sounds strange — is that the point really is: why is a partial measure prohibited at all, as I said earlier? Because it contains the quality of the prohibition, as Rabbi Shimon explains, because even in the half there is the quality of the complete prohibition. The quantity is missing, so you do not get lashes. Fine? All this is with prohibitions on the object. But with a personal prohibition — meaning, not that the object is itself a prohibited or repulsive object, as I called it earlier, but rather I am forbidden to perform an action — well, if I am forbidden to perform an action, then what? If someone throws an object two cubits in the public domain on the Sabbath, is he liable because of a partial measure or not liable? Is it prohibited because of a partial measure? A Torah prohibition? The Talmud says no. So everyone asks why not — after all, it is a partial measure? The answer — the Sefat Emet at the beginning of tractate Shabbat and many others—

[Speaker B] say—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, he did not do anything—

[Speaker B] He did half. No, but what kind of half is that? It is just—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Why? Because throwing four cubits in the public domain is an action. There is no prohibited object here; it is a prohibition of action. I am forbidden to throw or carry four cubits in the public domain. With actions there is no law of a partial measure. With a prohibition on the object — and the Chacham Tzvi claims this is only with prohibitions of eating, but never mind — with a prohibition on the object there is a prohibition of a partial measure. Why? Because in the object itself the quality of the prohibition is clearly present in each of its parts. With a prohibition of action there is no partial measure. Therefore Maimonides says that a partial measure on Passover is prohibited. Why is it prohibited? The Kesef Mishneh asks: what do you mean, why is it prohibited? In the whole Torah a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. Not true. In the whole Torah, with prohibitions on the object, prohibitions of eating, things repulsive in themselves, there is a prohibition of a partial measure. But with leavened food, as we saw in Maimonides — and this is the same difficulty of the Kesef Mishneh that he did not understand at the beginning of chapter 1 — the prohibition is a prohibition on an action. True, the action is eating, but not the benefit from eating; the thing itself is not repulsive in and of itself. The prohibition of leavened food is not a prohibition on the object; it is a prohibition on an action. And with an action there is no law of a partial measure. Therefore Maimonides needs a separate source for the prohibition of a partial measure with leavened food. Now, it may be that this itself is what Mahara”l Nah means. What Mahara”l Nah wants to claim is that since leavened food is permitted before and permitted after, and is not prohibited all year round, that is an indication of what I told you earlier — it indicates that there is nothing repulsive about it in itself. Since it is not repulsive in itself, then what is the prohibition of eating leavened food? A prohibition on the act of eating, and not a prohibition in the object itself. That is an indirect proof that this is the character of the prohibition of leavened food. Therefore you cannot learn it from the prohibition of a partial measure of forbidden fat, and a separate source is needed. And what about Yom Kippur? Yom Kippur is a completely different topic. On Yom Kippur it is obvious that the prohibition is against deriving benefit from food, because the commandment is to afflict oneself. So true, it is a temporary prohibition, in the sense that before it is permitted and after it is permitted — and why? Because there is no prohibition of deriving benefit before and after. But on Yom Kippur itself it is certainly a prohibition on deriving benefit through eating. Right? Why is the measure a large date? It is a large date because that settles the person’s mind, right? A large date relieves the affliction. In other words, the idea is basically a prohibition of benefit. So I do not care that it is a prohibition dependent on time. That can be learned from forbidden fat, that a partial measure is prohibited here. Because with benefit, if there is some benefit from all of it, then certainly there is also benefit in a half; what is the difference? It is only a quantitative difference. What does Rabbi Shimon say? So what exists with forbidden fat can be used to derive Yom Kippur, but with leavened food, the fact that it is prohibited only during Passover and not before and not after means that apparently there is no problem of benefit in it; what there is is only a prohibition of action.

[Speaker H] And for a prohibition of action there is no prohibition of a partial measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what does that actually mean? So from the aspect of “you derived benefit”—what?

[Speaker H] In what? In leavened food? That’s not important…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no prohibition of deriving benefit — the prohibition is to eat, not to derive benefit. There is a prohibition of benefit, but that is a separate prohibition. In all the Torah’s prohibitions, the prohibition of eating is not separate from the prohibition of benefit.

[Speaker H] Right, not a separate prohibition to derive benefit — so in what sense is there benefit? You’re saying in what sense is there benefit?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You just eat. What is that called?

[Speaker H] But in eating you do not derive benefit the way you do on Yom Kippur.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—what do you mean, factually there’s no pleasure? Of course there’s pleasure. When you eat leavened food, you enjoy it. On Yom Kippur it’s the same thing factually—there is pleasure. No, on Yom Kippur that itself is the prohibition, since where does the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur come from? Because there is a commandment to afflict oneself by fasting. It is forbidden to derive pleasure—that’s the content of the commandment, not because of a time-based prohibition. And that lowers the condition of affliction if I enjoy even half. Right, and therefore they learn it from the tiniest amount of forbidden fat. So for Yom Kippur you can derive it from a half-measure of even the smallest amount of forbidden fat, but for Passover you can’t. That’s exactly the point, and therefore the Maharanch is not difficult. Now, what this really means is that the prohibition of leavened food on Passover is exceptional compared to the other Torah prohibitions of eating and benefit. It is a prohibition on the act of eating leavened food, perhaps as part of commemorating the Exodus from Egypt. So it follows from this that a prohibition whose basis is historical is different in character from prohibitions whose basis lies in the object itself, in the very essence of the object. What other example do we know of a prohibition whose basis is historical? The sciatic nerve? Right, the sciatic nerve. What happens with the sciatic nerve? With the sciatic nerve exactly the same thing happens. Whoever looks at Maimonides on the sciatic nerve—I’m not going back now into the Talmud in Pesachim—with the sciatic nerve, the Talmud in Pesachim says that according to Rabbi Shimon, according to Rabbi Shimon, the sciatic nerve does not impart flavor; the nerve has the taste of wood, it does not impart flavor, and it also does not absorb flavor from the meat, and it ought to be forbidden for benefit. That’s a connection the Talmud makes; I’m not getting into why right now because I want to finish. But when Maimonides rules on this in the Laws of Forbidden Foods, he writes as follows: “All other Torah prohibitions, such as the meat of creeping things and swarming things, and so on, are measured in a ratio of one in sixty, and likewise the fat of the sciatic nerve”—yes—“but the nerve itself is not included in the measure and does not render the mixture forbidden, because nerves do not impart flavor.” Never mind the context for the moment—Maimonides rules like Rabbi Shimon that nerves do not impart flavor. But in chapter 8 of the Laws of Forbidden Foods, in the very law just before the law where he rules like Rabbi Abbahu that the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit go together, he says: the sciatic nerve is permitted for benefit. Permitted for benefit. Now that also contradicts our Talmudic passage; it’s also an internal contradiction—how can that be? If he rules that nerves do not impart flavor, then in the Talmud it comes out that you need to say it is forbidden for benefit, yet Maimonides says it is permitted for benefit. Against the Talmud. What’s the idea? The idea is that the sciatic nerve too is a prohibition whose basis is historical. So what? So the fact that it is forbidden to eat does not teach us that there is automatically also a prohibition of benefit, because what is forbidden to me is deriving benefit in the manner of eating—it’s an act of eating. Why? To remember what happened there with Jacob and the angel, right? So again, it’s exactly the same as leavened food on Passover. And exactly as with leavened food on Passover: from the prohibition of eating I do not derive a prohibition of benefit. The difference is that with leavened food on Passover I have a separate source for the prohibition of benefit: “No leavened food shall be eaten,” meaning there shall be no permitted benefit from it. With the sciatic nerve there isn’t. So if there isn’t, then it remains permitted for benefit. And the Ra’avad in the Kesef Mishneh remains here with “this requires further study,” and the Ramach remains here with “this requires further study”; they all remain puzzled about Maimonides. Why? The same thing was missed. It’s the same point. Since Maimonides understands that historical prohibitions are a different kind of prohibition. By the way, there are later authorities who want to claim that a half-measure of the sciatic nerve would be permitted even ab initio—the Pri Megadim. They say that a half-measure of the sciatic nerve would be permitted. Exactly the same thing. Why? Since with the sciatic nerve it does not say “it shall not be eaten,” therefore there also was no prohibition of benefit regarding the sciatic nerve. That same exposition they make here from “it shall not be eaten” regarding half-measures in leavened food—that too cannot be made with the sciatic nerve. Therefore a half-measure of the sciatic nerve, even though throughout the Torah in all Torah prohibitions there is a law of half-measures…

[Speaker B] And that has a relatively enormous practical implication regarding removing the forbidden veins and nerve, because the sciatic nerve—the difficulty there is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, if a half-measure—if some of it remains—then…

[Speaker B] you don’t have to remove

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] every last bit for some tiny little sinews. Right, right.

[Speaker B] And that did not continue into practical Jewish law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Hm? And that did not continue into practical Jewish law. People do not eat it. They do not practice that.

[Speaker B] And that they could eat a half-measure of the sciatic nerve every day of their lives. Right. Certainly. The sciatic nerve is not a Passover prohibition; it applies all year.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying again: the Pri Megadim and the Minchat Chinukh raise such a possibility. As practical Jewish law, I do not know of anyone who rules that there is no half-measure prohibition regarding the sciatic nerve. But Maimonides writes explicitly that there is no… no, Maimonides writes explicitly that there is no prohibition of benefit; the half-measure point was added only by the later authorities.

[Speaker F] And everywhere that Maimonides himself writes that the prohibition of the sciatic nerve is because it is a commandment from Sinai and not from… that doesn’t matter, that doesn’t matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is brought there regarding an impure animal—it’s a different passage, whether there is a sciatic nerve prohibition in a non-kosher animal, Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages. It’s not connected to our issue. On the contrary, maybe I even think it can be connected, but I’m not going into that here. In any event, what comes out for our purposes is that historical prohibitions in Maimonides are conceived as a different type of prohibition. Unlike regular Torah prohibitions of eating and benefit, historical prohibitions are prohibitions of action. And that has a number of implications—regarding nullification in mixtures, there are many more implications in this matter; I won’t bring all of them, we’ll suffice with this. The two implications we saw: one is regarding the prohibition of benefit—that a prohibition of eating does not teach a prohibition of benefit, even according to one who rules like Rabbi Abbahu, when it comes to historical prohibitions. It does not teach a prohibition of benefit; you need a separate source, and if there is no separate source then it really will be permitted, as with the sciatic nerve. The second implication is regarding a half-measure: with a half-measure you cannot derive it, since this is a prohibition of action; there is no half-measure in prohibitions of action. And therefore with a half-measure too, the same thing: if you have a source, as on Passover, then it is forbidden; if you do not have a source, then you cannot derive it from forbidden fat, and therefore with the sciatic nerve it really could be that a half-measure would be permitted.

[Speaker J] So both leavened food and sourdough starter are a historical prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, certainly. It’s the same prohibition. Leavened food and sourdough starter are not two separate prohibitions. They are both forbidden by the same prohibition.

[Speaker J] Historical—even sourdough starter?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Since sourdough starter leavens doughs, it too is considered leaven, so it is automatically included in the prohibition of leavened food. Just one last note: people asked here earlier—after all, Rabbi Abbahu himself speaks about the prohibition of leavened food. So how can Maimonides rule like Rabbi Abbahu but say, yes, but not for leavened food? Here I don’t know, but it seems to me that when you read the passage in Pesachim on page 21, where the dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Chizkiyah is brought, that passage runs over about two pages—there is not a single section in that passage that is not contradicted by Maimonides. Every single section, I guarantee it. Whoever finds me a section in that passage that does not stand in contradiction to Maimonides’ words—I’ll reward him like a sage led to the bathhouse with a gift. Meaning, it’s not that there isn’t… this passage simply—every line contradicts Maimonides. Therefore it seems to me pretty clear that Maimonides simply did not rule like that passage. He understands that there are passages that disagree with it, and he does not rule in accordance with it. One of the passages we saw was the passage in Beitzah. That’s the example I brought, because there you really see that the prohibition of leavened food is not a prohibition on benefit, because if they make an a fortiori argument from leavened food to sourdough starter, right? Then in its essence you see that leavened food is not a prohibition of deriving eating-benefit from it, the way he understands the Pesachim passage according to Rabbi Abbahu. So therefore probably—I don’t know whether because of the Beitzah passage or because of other passages—Maimonides does not rule in practice like the Pesachim passage.

[Speaker B] But Rabbi Abbahu appears there, and he rules like Rabbi Abbahu.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He rules like him in a general way. The principle that says prohibitions of eating are also prohibitions of benefit—certainly. Even regarding leavened food.

[Speaker B] But does he also appear somewhere else differently? No, he doesn’t appear somewhere else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He appears elsewhere, but not because of this; rather, he speaks about all prohibitions, including leavened food. Maimonides rules like him regarding all prohibitions, but not regarding leavened food, and also not regarding the sciatic nerve. That’s what comes out. I’m saying again: I don’t have a better answer than that. It’s a correct point. But look—the passage on page 21, there isn’t a line there that is not contradicted by Maimonides. I went through it tooth and nail, line by line, over two pages; there isn’t a line there that isn’t contradicted by Maimonides. Maimonides—I don’t know—apparently did not have that reading, I don’t know if he lacked that text, but he certainly did not rule like that passage at all, in anything. It’s in dozens of matters, not one or two—dozens of matters.

[Speaker F] There’s a question here, sorry—did Maimonides say that the prohibitions of leavened food are more severe? No, it’s not a matter of severity, it’s a matter of character. Character. Why? It doesn’t make sense—of course it does, I explained the logic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is a historical prohibition? A historical prohibition means: why don’t I eat leavened food? Because our ancestors did not eat leavened food. In other words, I am not really supposed to distance myself from the enjoyment of leavened food; there is nothing spiritually defective in it in itself. Rather, I have to imitate, to reenact, what our ancestors did. If they ate matzah and not leavened food, then I too eat matzah and not leavened food. In other words, this is some kind of process of commemorating the Exodus from Egypt. Therefore the character of the prohibition—it’s not a matter of stringency or leniency—is a different character. The character of the prohibition is a personal prohibition, a prohibition on action. The object is not intrinsically a forbidden object.

[Speaker G] Really the opposite question is: if there is a rationale, why on Passover is there a special prohibition of benefit? Why not leave it as with the sciatic nerve?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I explained that too. I said: after all, our ancestors also did not derive benefit from leavened food; they did not eat leavened food because they did not have any. Right? They didn’t have any. So now the only question is which parts of what our ancestors did the Torah imposes on us as well. So once there is a source saying that benefit too is forbidden, there’s no problem. The Torah says, “Do not derive benefit from leavened food,” and not only, “Do not eat leavened food.” That’s not difficult. After all, that was part of the historical reality there—on the contrary. Some people could have said, even without Rabbi Abbahu, that if there is a prohibition of eating then there is also a prohibition of benefit, because our ancestors also did not derive benefit from leavened food—they had no leavened food. What was asked here earlier, yes—if one violates “it shall not be seen” with leavened food, how can one ever get to deriving benefit from it? Fine, one can derive benefit from a gentile’s leavened food; that’s not… But there was room for such a rationale. So certainly once there is a verse that forbids deriving benefit from leavened food, I can explain that this prohibition too is a commemoration of what our ancestors did, since they too did not derive benefit from leavened food. Happy holiday.