Platonism – Lesson 22

This transcript was produced automatically באמצעות artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Gifts are always permitted to give. Give whatever gifts you want. Only if the interest is fixed interest is it a Torah-level prohibition—when we established it at the moment of the loan as repayment in exchange for the loan. If you just give a gift afterward, that’s rabbinically prohibited interest, the Sages forbade it, but it is not a Torah-level prohibition of interest. Okay, in any case, for our purposes, that’s the claim. The claim, essentially, is that Choshen Mishpat illustrates this issue of Platonism, insofar as we see that there are certain abstract laws that are not implemented in our world, but they are always true. You can’t touch them. They don’t belong to our world. In that sense, they are Platonic laws. As for implementation in our world, there are all kinds of additional parameters, so it may be that the Platonic idea will not be expressed here, just as we know from Plato in every area, not specifically in connection with Jewish law. The horses in our world also are not perfect horses. The idea is always perfect. The idea there cannot be touched. Every horse in our world has something of the idea, but it also has flaws, deviations from the idea, because in our world things are always more complicated and complex. And it’s exactly the same in Jewish law. Therefore the claim is that this analysis of Choshen Mishpat points to the Platonism of Jewish law. What I want to say now is that the deviations from this Platonism are of several kinds. I mentioned earlier three kinds. One of them is stipulation. I can stipulate against what is written in the Torah—there’s no problem. It’s just that the stipulation itself has no Torah significance; that’s not Torah. It’s Jewish law—what you stipulated is what has to be done in practice, that is the binding Jewish law. But the fact that I now have to study your stipulation analytically in yeshiva in the morning—that is, your stipulation is not Torah. The same thing with the law of the kingdom is law: when I need to study law in order to know what to do today, I’m supposed to study law. It doesn’t matter—you don’t need to get certified—but you need to know what the law says because that is the obligation, unless you stipulated otherwise. Because according to secular law too, you can stipulate otherwise. But in principle you need to study law in order to know what to do; that doesn’t mean that legal studies are Torah study. They reflect technical problems in our world, and the same thing is true of custom. Custom is binding, but unlike what people try to hang on customs—various sublime secrets—in the end custom is just constraints that arise from society, from our world, which affect the law. It has force from the standpoint of Jewish law, but it does not reflect some eternal, absolute Platonic truth that cannot be touched, and therefore it is not Torah. It is Jewish law, yes, but it is not Torah. Two different things. The most striking thing in this context, and that’s what I want to talk about a bit now, is rabbinic laws. I talked about this in my Thursday series a few months ago—I don’t remember exactly when—but it comes in here too. I make the same claim about rabbinic laws. Rabbinic laws are not Torah, and that’s what I want to argue. Rabbinic laws are Jewish law, but they are not Torah. In that sense, it’s like studying law. My claim is that when I study rabbinic laws, even in yeshiva—they don’t study this in the law faculty, they study it in yeshiva—but essentially in yeshiva when I deal with rabbinic laws, I’m wearing the hat of a law student. Because in the end, the claim is that rabbinic laws are laws that bind me halakhically; they have force; what the Sages established must be obeyed. But what the Sages established does not reflect some Platonic truth, and therefore it is not Torah. Because Torah is only that. It is Jewish law, like the law of the kingdom is law, like state law, like stipulations, like anything else, and therefore you need to know it in order to know what to do, but it is not Torah in the Platonic sense. And since Torah by its essence, its definition, is Platonic, then this is not Torah. That is my claim. Now I’ll qualify that a bit later regarding the fact that there are different kinds of rabbinic laws, but first I want to present this thesis a bit more systematically. So look, in the end rabbinic laws are laws that the Sages establish. The Sages establish them, and the Torah—or the Torah or Jewish law—says that rabbinic laws have force. Where does that force come from? That force comes, say according to Maimonides, from “do not turn aside.” Because of the verse “do not turn aside,” the Sages have authority to interpret, legislate, enact decrees, and so on. Nachmanides disagrees with Maimonides; he argues that “do not turn aside” is the basis for the authority of the Sages to interpret. The authority of the Sages to legislate does not derive from “do not turn aside,” because if it did derive from “do not turn aside,” then it would be a Torah-level law. If someone violated a rabbinic law, he would really have violated the Torah-level prohibition of “do not turn aside.” So then what? Never mind, I won’t get into that right now. Nachmanides doesn’t write anywhere what it does come from, but I have some thesis on this matter; I even wrote about it on the website. In any case, the claim is that rabbinic laws have force. But there is still some difference between rabbinic laws and Torah-level laws. I think this is also connected to Nachmanides’ question against Maimonides: why, according to Maimonides, if everything comes out of “do not turn aside,” are we not stringent in a case of rabbinic doubt? Suppose you have something that is doubtfully poultry with milk. In principle you should have to be stringent and not eat it. Why? Because if you eat it, you’ll violate the Torah-level prohibition of “do not turn aside.” Torah-level doubt goes stringently. So how can it be that rabbinic doubt goes leniently? After all, every rabbinic law is really Torah law. That is Nachmanides’ question against Maimonides. There are approaches that tried to answer it; that’s not important right now. I want to propose my own suggestion on this matter. The point is that, let me formulate it through the… wait, I’ll formulate it through the Netivot. The Netivot says in section 234, he says the following. In the Shulchan Arukh it appears in Choshen Mishpat 234: “But one who sells his fellow something whose prohibition of eating…” meaning, someone who sold his fellow an item from which benefit is Torah-prohibited has to return the money; the sale is void. Even if the other person already ate what he received. “But one who sells his fellow something whose prohibition of eating is by rabbinic enactment—if the fruits still exist, he returns the fruits and takes his money, and if he ate them, he ate them, and the seller returns him nothing.” If the fruits are prohibited only rabbinically, then if the fruits still exist, return them and get the money; and if you already ate them, then you ate them. “Since the sale is void, he is like one who damaged or one who ate not through a sale, so why should he have to pay more than its value? And it is possible that even in Torah prohibitions, even if he ate them unintentionally, he requires atonement and repentance because of the prohibition. In any case, with a rabbinic prohibition no atonement at all is required, and it is considered as though he did not transgress.” The Netivot says as follows: if you ate a rabbinic prohibition unintentionally, you did not violate any prohibition. You do not need atonement, unlike a Torah prohibition, which even if you did it unintentionally—or under compulsion, I don’t know, unintentionally; compulsion is another question—if you did it unintentionally, you need to repent, you need atonement, sometimes there is even a sacrifice. With rabbinic prohibitions, if you violated them unintentionally, nothing happened. No atonement needed, no repentance, no anything. So if someone ate rabbinic prohibitions unintentionally—I sold him rabbinic prohibitions and he ate them unintentionally—then nothing happened. He received food, he ate it, he paid for it, and everything is fine. Was there any prohibition? No, there was no prohibition, because he violated this rabbinic prohibition unintentionally. To violate this rabbinic prohibition unintentionally is not a prohibition. And he brings proof for this: “You should know it, because we say in Eruvin 47, with rabbinic laws we act first and then raise the objection.” What does that mean? A person who sees his teacher about to violate a prohibition—if it’s a Torah prohibition, then he has to stop him respectfully, ask him: “Didn’t you teach us, our rabbi, that it is forbidden to do such-and-such?” Maybe his rabbi missed something, in order to prevent the prohibition, so you have to try to stop him and clarify it with him. But with rabbinic matters, we act first and then raise the objection. Meaning, if it’s a rabbinic prohibition, let him do it; afterward ask him, just so we know what’s going on. So the Netivot says: “And if he would be punished for the unintentional act, how could they let him transgress and receive punishment?” Meaning, if one is punished for a rabbinic prohibition—in other words, there is a prohibition, even unintentionally—how can it be that in rabbinic matters you let your rabbi violate the prohibition? Maybe he missed something. Stop him, ask him respectfully: wait, didn’t you teach us otherwise? Why make a distinction between rabbinic and Torah law? Rather, certainly, says the Netivot, one is not punished at all for an unintentional violation of a rabbinic prohibition. “And for the eater it is as though he ate kosher food, and he enjoyed it as from kosher food, and therefore he must pay the full value of his benefit, as in the rule of ‘this one benefited and that one lost a maneh,’ for the rule is that one must pay according to the extent that he benefited. Which is not the case with a Torah prohibition, where he receives punishment for the unintentional act and his loss is greater than his benefit.” By the way, this is some point I never noticed before; suddenly now I notice it. The claim is: I sold someone a rabbinically prohibited item for benefit and he ate it. He paid me for the sale and he ate it. Now I want to void the sale—he wants to void the sale—it turns out he ate, he bought and ate a prohibited item. So I tell him: what do you want? You benefited, and you paid for what you benefited from, and everything is excellent, everything is fine. Therefore the sale is not void. That’s how I usually understood what he writes, but here it seems not to be that way. He says you have to pay because you benefited, not because you bought. The money is payment for the benefit. Money in a sale is usually contractual payment—you received merchandise worth one hundred shekels, you pay one hundred shekels as part of the contract, otherwise you didn’t buy the merchandise. Here it is not purchase money but payment for benefit. Payment for benefit is a different category from purchase money. And he apparently wants to claim—I understand it this way, even though it really is somewhat strange wording—but this is what emerges from his wording, that he really wants to claim that the sale is in fact void. In principle he should have to return your money. The sale is void, but you benefited, and there was no prohibition in it, because a rabbinic prohibition done unintentionally is not a prohibition, and you are obligated to pay the value of the benefit. Therefore you have to pay him for the benefit. Yes, a practical difference would be if they set a purchase price that was a little more than the usual price, less than one-sixth so that there would be no overcharging, but a little more—whereas the value of the benefit you have to pay according to the value of the item, not according to what you set—so it could be that he would indeed have to return something. Fine, this is interesting; I never noticed that he isn’t speaking from the direction of the sale at all, but from the direction of payment for benefit. But for our purposes, that’s not what matters. What matters for us is what the Netivot is basically saying. He says that a rabbinic prohibition, if you violated it unintentionally, then you violated nothing. But why? So the later authorities explain—and this is the simple explanation—that the Netivot understands that a rabbinic prohibition has, in itself, nothing problematic. You ate poultry with milk; poultry with milk is rabbinically prohibited. If you ate meat with milk, which is a Torah prohibition, then, as we said, you violated the command of the Torah and also caused some spiritual damage that this transgression causes. Those are the two things present in every prohibition. A halakhic command. What happens in a rabbinic prohibition? In a rabbinic prohibition, according to Maimonides, you violated the Torah’s command of “do not turn aside,” but there is no spiritual damage, there is no spiritual result, because the Torah in fact did not forbid it. If there were something in reality itself, some kind of damage, the Torah would have forbidden it. If the Torah does not forbid it, that means there is no real essential problem here. Rather, there is an obligation to obey the Sages. And that’s fine, it has halakhic force. But if you do it unintentionally, then there was no disobedience to the Sages here, because you didn’t know that the Sages forbade it—you were acting unintentionally. So you didn’t know, and the essential problem does not exist at all in rabbinic prohibitions. So nothing remains. So a rabbinic prohibition done unintentionally means you violated no prohibition at all. In other words, what lies behind the Netivot’s view—not everyone agrees with the Netivot, by the way, but this is what he argues—is that rabbinic prohibitions are not only person-based prohibitions, but prohibitions of obedience. Meaning, all that exists in rabbinic prohibitions is this: the act in itself—there is no problem at all, do whatever you want. Nothing happened if you did this act. Even if done intentionally, nothing happened. What happened is that you violated the command, but not that any damage occurred as a result of the act. You violated the command, and it is forbidden to violate the command, and therefore it is a transgression—but a rabbinic transgression. And I want to argue that this is also why, according to Maimonides, doubt goes leniently. Doubt goes leniently because the rule of doubt going stringently always stems from the essence of the prohibitions and not from the command. That is the point. In any case, this Netivot is basically teaching us: so what defines rabbinic prohibitions? What defines rabbinic prohibitions is that they lack one of the two characteristics of Torah prohibitions. The obligation to obey exists, the command exists through “do not turn aside,” but the essence, the spiritual damage, the problem in reality itself—that does not exist in rabbinic prohibitions. Suppose you ate poultry with milk—nothing happened. You ate meat with milk—I don’t know, say it dulled your soul. Just for the sake of our discussion, it has some problematic spiritual consequence. That’s meat with milk. But poultry with milk is no problem—the fact is that the Torah doesn’t forbid it. True, the Sages forbade it lest you come to eat meat with milk, but the poultry, poultry with milk—if you didn’t come to eat meat with milk, you only ate poultry with milk but didn’t get to the Torah-level prohibition—then nothing happened in terms of reality, no damage was caused. You simply did not obey the command of the Sages. That is what defines rabbinic prohibitions. If so, then you understand that this is really just like legal studies. Because I need to study rabbinic laws in order to know what is permitted and forbidden to do, and what one is obligated to do. But there is no Platonic dimension behind it. I’m not studying truths that exist and stand forever in the Platonic world. Platonic truths also do not change. And the fact is that a rabbinic law does not exist before the rabbis establish it. After the rabbis establish it, it exists. So that means it is not truly reality, but only an obligation to obey them. A concern lest one come to some damage, which itself is damage in reality—the Torah-level damage. But in rabbinic matters as such, what happened because you ate poultry with milk? Nothing happened. That’s why the Torah doesn’t forbid it. Rather, you did not obey the Sages. That means rabbinic prohibitions are prohibitions that have a command but no essence, as opposed to Torah prohibitions, which, as I said, have both of those aspects. So you understand that this is like legal studies. Because if I study law, then essentially I’m studying what the Torah expects me to do, because the law of the kingdom is law has force from the standpoint of Jewish law. So I need to study it in order to know what to do. And if I don’t do it, I am a halakhic offender, because Jewish law told me that the law of the kingdom is determinative. But you can’t say that this is Torah, because it doesn’t express any Platonic truth. That was basically the claim. It does play on the halakhic field—you have to act as the law says—but it is not Torah in the sense that it does not express some Platonic, metaphysical truth. You could call it halakhic realism, the way people speak about moral realism—that moral norms are some existing reality in the Platonic world—so here it’s halakhic realism: halakhic norms exist. So all that is in Torah law. In rabbinic law there isn’t. The world itself feels nothing from a rabbinic prohibition. Only I was supposed to obey and did not obey, exactly like state law. I was supposed to obey the law and didn’t obey, so that is halakhically not okay. But what—because of that some problematic result happened on some metaphysical, spiritual level? No. There is an obligation of obedience. On the metaphysical level, only if I did not give the guardian his rights, the depositor his rights, as determined by the essential law, then something metaphysical was harmed. Unless we waived it and made a contract, in which case fine, then it doesn’t harm anything. So therefore, basically, I…

[Speaker E] Could one say that going against the law of the kingdom is law does indeed cause harm?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s why I also said in the parallel series, I said that when we study the laws of the law of the kingdom is law, that is certainly Torah study. What are the parameters of the law of the kingdom is law? What does it apply to, what does it not apply to, by what power does it apply? That is certainly Torah study in every respect. When I speak about legal studies, I mean studying the content—what the law of the kingdom is law actually established. The contents themselves do not have the sanctity of Torah, even though they are halakhically binding. But to study the topic of the law of the kingdom is law in Jewish law—certainly yes. Same thing: to study the topic of “do not turn aside” is certainly Torah study. But to study the parameters of the prohibition of poultry with milk is not Torah study. It is simply learning Jewish law in order to know what to do. Yes, it’s like studying the Mishnah Berurah: I want to study Jewish law in order to know what to do, but that is not Torah study. Torah study is understanding the ideas, the Platonic truth that stands behind these laws. Not merely knowing—otherwise Torah study is basically a preparation for a commandment, a means in order to know what to do. But the claim is that Torah study is a value in itself; it is not a means. Because Torah study is understanding the divine truth, yes, the Platonic truth that stands behind the laws. Usually, of course, one also has to implement it—if that is the truth, then that’s also what one should do. But sometimes a situation can arise—the law of the kingdom is law, a stipulation, things like that—that says no, this is not the truth even though it is what must be done. It’s not the truth in the Platonic sense, even though it’s what must be done. So in that sense I want to argue that rabbinic laws are in fact very similar to legal studies. It’s like, say, I compared it to a vow. The Torah says, “he shall not profane his word.” When I took a vow, then I have to fulfill “whatever comes out of his mouth he shall do,” “he shall not profane his word.” I have both a prohibition and a positive commandment to fulfill what I vowed. Now let’s try to examine what is included in what I vowed. Did what I vowed include only caraway bread or also, I don’t know, rye bread? Fine, so I vowed concerning bread; now I don’t know what “bread” means. It depends on what is accepted in society here, what people call bread as a plain term. I don’t know, you have to clarify. Is this clarification Torah study? Obviously not. This study is very important halakhically—I need to know what to do, which bread I am allowed to eat and which bread I am forbidden to eat. So halakhically I certainly have to do this clarification, but this clarification is only preparation for a commandment. It is a preparation in order to know how to behave. It has no value in itself. But studying the laws of vows—why a vow has force, how it has force, what the significance of the force of a vow is, a law pertaining to the object, a law pertaining to the person, all these things—that is certainly Torah study. Because that is learning what the Torah says, not learning what human beings think. That is why it is called Torah. My claim is that the same thing applies to rabbinic laws. Rabbinic laws are basically like vows. The Torah says “do not turn aside,” just as it says “he shall not profane his word.” Now with “he shall not profane his word,” now you have to check, wait, what did he say, in order to understand when you are profaning your word and when you are not. You have to clarify what he said, but that clarification is only preparation for a commandment. So too with rabbinic laws. I have to fulfill what they said; there is “do not turn aside.” Now I have to clarify what they said in order to know what to do. But that clarification is not Torah. It is preparation for a commandment in order to know how to behave correctly, that’s all. And this again brings us back to the fact that Torah study is not preparation for a commandment; it is a value in itself. So that is basically my claim regarding rabbinic prohibitions. Therefore, for example, I brought—there’s an article I wrote, actually two articles I wrote, on the meaning of rabbinic laws, and I brought there the Talmud in Sabbath 12. The Talmud says there, regarding reading by candlelight on the Sabbath, Rava said: “If he is an important person, it is permitted.” An objection was raised: “One may not read by candlelight lest he tilt it.” Yes, it is forbidden to read on the Sabbath by candlelight because there is concern that if the flame shifts a bit, I’ll adjust it so it won’t interfere with my reading, and then I’ll violate extinguishing, or lighting, kindling, and the like. Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha said: “I will read and I will not tilt it.” No problem, I will read by candlelight because I can be careful; I won’t come to tilt it. Once it happened and he wanted to tilt it—almost tilted—and then he suddenly caught himself and said, “How great are the words of the Sages, who would say: one may not read by candlelight.” Rabbi Nathan says: “He read and he tilted.” Not merely that he wanted to tilt it, but he actually tilted it, and he wrote in his notebook: “I, Yishmael ben Elisha, read and tilted a lamp on the Sabbath. When the Temple is rebuilt, I will bring a fat sin offering.” Yes, this obligation of a sin offering here is very interesting, because the claim is that once he violated a rabbinic prohibition—of not reading by candlelight—then even if in the end he violated the Torah law under compulsion, it is not compulsion but unintentional sin. This is a Talmud in Shevuot 18. The Talmud there speaks about someone who has relations with his wife close to her expected menstrual time. One who has relations with his wife close to her expected time—that is a rabbinic prohibition; the expected times are rabbinic. But what if during intercourse she saw blood? So now that is already menstrual impurity or flux impurity—menstrual impurity, whatever it may be—a Torah prohibition. But okay, the Torah prohibition is under compulsion. He didn’t know she would see blood during intercourse. On a regular day, if she sees blood because of intercourse, that is compulsion; there is no obligation of a sin offering. But here, if she saw blood, there is an obligation of a sin offering. The Rashba explains why: because if the Sages said not to approach one’s wife close to her expected time, why did they say that? They warned him precisely because that time is a time when she may see blood. Therefore they told you not to do it. Now you decided to violate the words of the Sages, so not only did you violate a rabbinic prohibition, but you cannot claim that with respect to the Torah prohibition you are under compulsion. Because the Sages warned you, and you violated their warning. Yes, so basically the same thing that the Talmud says here as well. What it says is that the Sages essentially told you not to read by candlelight. If you read by candlelight, that is a rabbinic prohibition. Now, without noticing, you violated the rabbinic prohibition; without noticing, you tilted it. Without the rabbinic prohibition you would not be liable for a sin offering. It’s not an unintentional act; it’s mere involvement, it’s compulsion. There would not be liability for a sin offering. But since there is a rabbinic prohibition, it projects also onto the Torah level: there is liability for a sin offering. Since the rabbis told you not to read precisely because of the concern lest you come to tilt it. You ignored the rabbinic prohibition, so you cannot claim that you were under compulsion regarding the Torah prohibition. Because the rabbinic prohibition does exactly that—it warns you that you may fail regarding a Torah prohibition. Therefore that is what is written here in the Talmud. And for our purposes, we see that Rabbi Yishmael read by candlelight despite the fact that there is a rabbinic prohibition to do so. Why? Because he said, “I will read and I will not tilt it.” What does that mean, “I will read and I will not tilt it”? Very nice, but there is a prohibition against reading. Once the Sages established that it is forbidden to read, then even if in the end you don’t tilt it, you violated the rabbinic prohibition by reading by candlelight. It’s like someone who says, “I’ll ride a horse on the Sabbath; I’ll make sure not to come to pluck a twig.” Fine, but after the Sages said it is forbidden to ride a horse, then there is a rabbinic prohibition in the riding itself, regardless of whether in the end you came to pluck a twig or not. So how did Rabbi Yishmael allow himself to do such a thing? So there are three books—actually I think even more—but there are three books all devoted to resolving Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s “requires examination” comments, in order. One on the Mishnahs, one on the Talmuds, and one simply. Okay? So there is a volume like that, published by Netoren I think, where this came out. One of them is called Chazut Kashot, and it is on the Talmud. And there he goes through every “requires examination” of Rabbi Akiva Eiger and tries to resolve it. And at the end of tractate Beitzah, page 36, he says there—he asks on Rabbi Yishmael exactly this question. And he says as follows: “At first glance one could challenge the Talmud’s answer there, for Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha regarded himself concerning Torah matters as an ordinary person. If so, what did he originally think, that he read and thereby violated the rabbinic prohibition, and by this became disqualified from testimony and judgment like any other ordinary person,” and so on. Fine, there is a discussion there whether Rabbi Yishmael was an ordinary person or not; maybe it would have been permitted for him, but he regarded himself as an ordinary person—this is what the Talmud says there. So the Chazut Kashot says—I’m skipping the details because it enters the details of the topic there—it is proven that from the outset he also knew that the decree was lest he tilt. “And perforce one must say that even though Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha regarded himself concerning Torah matters as an ordinary person, nevertheless at first he thought that even with an ordinary person the rabbis decreed only in the ordinary case. But if he says explicitly that he will guard himself from tilting, as Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha said, in such a case the rabbis did not decree regarding the very act of reading by candlelight. Reading by candlelight is not forbidden in itself, only because of the concern lest he tilt. And Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha did not hold that, since he had in mind that he would read and would be careful not to tilt, in such a case the rabbis decreed.” Meaning, Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha thought that every rabbinic decree, if it has some reason or serves as a fence out of concern that you may reach a Torah prohibition, then in principle there is no problem violating this prohibition even in practice. Not only is there no essence—even the command isn’t there. Not only is there no essence, he says, that is obvious, because there is no problem reading by candlelight. The whole problem is tilting, and reading by candlelight is forbidden lest you come to tilt. So he says, yes, but if I’m careful not to tilt, then I may also read by candlelight, since there is in truth no real problem in this thing. He takes… he takes to an extreme the distinction I made earlier in the name of the Netivot. Yes, he basically says: in rabbinic laws not only is there no essence; once there is no essence, there is also no command. The whole command is only lest you come to a Torah prohibition, and if you know how to be careful, then maybe there isn’t one? That is what he thought. Only afterward, when he saw that nevertheless he came to error and wanted to tilt it—yes, suddenly Rabbi Yishmael saw that he had erred, that apparently he was not able to be careful—he said, “How great are the words of the Sages, who said plainly that one may not read by candlelight and made no distinction at all in this matter.” And therefore Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha was not disqualified from testimony and judgment here, because he thought that by this he was not violating the words of the Sages. So basically his claim…

[Speaker E] But apparently, Rabbi, apparently he initially thought that the Sages did decree in such a case? At first he thought the Sages did not decree, just as he himself says: if he would be careful not to tilt, in such a case the rabbis did not decree.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They warned; they did not decree—they warned. Notice: when you read by candlelight, you may tilt it. But afterward apparently he came to a different conclusion.

[Speaker E] Right, but—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, notice—not exactly. Because he didn’t come to a different conclusion; his interpretation is a correct interpretation. He only said: I was mistaken in my factual assessment of myself. I thought I would succeed in being careful; my conclusion is that even I did not succeed in being careful. But he did not retract from the principled conclusion that if there is someone who for some reason knows that he will be able to be careful, then for him it really is not forbidden. And what emerges from this—look at the conclusion of the Chazon Ish Kashyot—“And what emerges from this is that in a place where the Sages forbade doing something, and in that act there is no prohibition at all in itself, only because of concern that through this act one may come to do a Torah prohibition, it can be said that if one violated the words of the Sages and did it, he is not called one who violates the words of the Sages, because he thought that since he knows about himself that he will not come to violate the Torah prohibition that the Sages were concerned about, the Sages permitted him to do that act which they forbade.” And this is as Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha initially thought, and he retracted only because he stumbled in it. But if he had not stumbled—if he had succeeded in being careful—then his position would remain intact, meaning his interpretation of rabbinic laws would remain in place. “In any case, even afterward he does not have the status of a sinner, since in truth he did not come to do a Torah prohibition.” Yes, that’s what we saw afterward: suppose he failed, since from the outset he did not come to do a Torah prohibition, then afterward too he will not really have a Torah prohibition of intentional sin; apparently not even liability for a sin offering, because from the outset he essentially did not do something that was forbidden—he made a mistake. So—

[Speaker E] He holds that every decree too—even the horse and so on, where I say he’ll pluck a twig—even there, if I know that this won’t happen to me, then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s his claim. Now that’s a pretty extreme approach, but it does illustrate well the essence of rabbinic prohibitions. Basically he says that in rabbinic prohibitions there is in themselves no problem. It is not a forbidden act; there is nothing problematic about it. The whole problem is lest you come to do something Torah-level, which really is problematic. Therefore, if done unintentionally, says the Netivot, nothing happened, because you did not violate a command, because you didn’t know there was a command, and no problematic consequence occurred either, because in rabbinic prohibitions there are no problematic consequences. And he takes this to the extreme and says: fine, if that’s so, then in a place where I can be careful and ensure that there will be no problematic consequence, then it could be that the Sages also did not forbid it.

[Speaker B] Who are “rabbinic authorities”? Who are “the Sages”? Are there no rabbinic authorities today anymore?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Sanhedrin. So the list is closed?

[Speaker B] Right. So if the Sages said something because there was concern at that time, and today there are advanced methods to ensure that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a different subject. How are laws established by the Sanhedrin repealed? That is an entire body of teaching—Maimonides, at the beginning of Laws of Rebels, chapter 2.

[Speaker B] No, but is it logical—that it once existed and that’s it, and “Yiftach in his generation is like Samuel in his generation,” where does all that go?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s logical, but Jewish law also has formal rules, not just logic.

[Speaker B] But in every generation isn’t there a sage who can, yes… no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A matter established by a count requires another count to permit it. Something established by the Sanhedrin requires a Sanhedrin to cancel it, and according to Maimonides—according to almost everyone, really, according to almost everyone—even if the reason has lapsed. Even if the reason has lapsed and it no longer applies today, you still need a Sanhedrin. There is a dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad whether the second Sanhedrin needs to be greater in wisdom and number when the reason has lapsed. Maimonides says yes—even if the reason has lapsed, the second Sanhedrin must be greater in wisdom and number—and the Raavad says no: if the reason has lapsed, then not. But you need a Sanhedrin; you can’t simply cancel laws. Fine. I dealt with this at length in the third book of the trilogy, and there I showed that there are indeed mechanisms that allow repealing or changing laws, but that is basically the law in its foundations. What I want to say for our purposes is that rabbinic laws also reflect the same distinction I made earlier. If in Torah law there is the Platonic dimension… the Platonic dimension, which is basically what turns it into Torah, as distinct from laws that do not contain a dimension of Torah—they are only Jewish law but not Torah, yes? State law, the law of the kingdom is law, and so on, stipulations. Rabbinic laws too are basically the same thing. Because they lack the Platonic dimension, they are not Torah. But this sharpens the point very much: Torah is defined by the fact that it reflects Platonic truths. That is the definition of Torah. Whatever does not have that is not Torah, even though it can be halakhically binding. It has status on the halakhic plane. Therefore, for example, many later authorities wrote that there is no such thing as a fence in Torah law. Yes, in the book Lekach Tov by Rabbi Yosef Engel, rule 8, he discusses this question: do we find in Jewish law a fence within Torah-level laws? He says Torah law is all one great fence. The accepted tendency among later authorities is that there are no such laws. Fences are always rabbinic. He says maybe seclusion, maybe “it shall not be seen and it shall not be found”; he brings there several statements of medieval authorities (Rishonim) in very, very specific cases. But in general there are no Torah-level laws that are fences. Why not? What stands behind this? What stands behind this is that the Torah, in essence, expresses a Platonic truth. It describes to me what happens in the Platonic world. In our world this can change, as I said before, for various considerations, but that is the eternal Platonic truth. What happens with fences? Fences by their essence are exactly not like that. Fences basically mean: this act in itself is no problem, but because there is concern that you may come to do a problematic act, therefore we forbid this act as well. Meaning, by definition this is an act that has no problematic background in the Platonic sense. And precisely because of this, the later authorities say, fences cannot be found in Torah-level laws, because Torah-level laws are only those laws that have a Platonic dimension behind them. And that is the point of fences. I just want to add one qualification in order to finish this section. I want to qualify: there are rabbinic laws that are laws of a different type. Until now I have spoken about fences and decrees and the like, but there are rabbinic laws that are laws of a different type. For example, the later authorities bring—and actually you can even see this distinction in Maimonides—that there are two kinds of shvut on the Sabbath, rabbinic prohibitions on the Sabbath. I’m finishing in just a few minutes. One kind of shvut is concern lest you come to do a Torah prohibition, like riding a horse—concern lest one cut off a twig. There are other shvut laws that are an extension of the Torah prohibition, a rabbinic extension of the Torah prohibition. For example, one could look—not sure there are such cases, but there are later authorities who claim there are such shvut laws. For example, if I separate food from waste, the Torah-level selecting is waste from food, but suppose I select food from waste. Then one could say that the Sages forbade it, but not out of concern lest you come to separate waste from food—that would make it a fence or a decree. Here it could be that the Sages forbade it because there is also here a dimension of selecting. Admittedly not as strong a dimension as waste from food, so it is not a Torah prohibition, but it is rabbinically forbidden. Meaning, this is basically a rabbinic extension of the Torah prohibition. That is this kind of shvut. You should understand that with riding a horse one cannot interpret it that way. You cannot say that one who rides a horse is harvesting rabbinically. There is no connection between the act of riding a horse and harvesting; it is not another kind of harvesting; it is not harvesting at all. There it is clear that it is only concern lest you come to harvest; it is not rabbinic harvesting. But with selecting, for example, it could be that selecting food from waste is simply rabbinic selecting, not done because of concern lest you come to select waste from food, but rather this itself was forbidden rabbinically because it is not complete selecting as done at the Torah level, but there is a scent of selecting here, there is a certain dimension of selecting here, and the Sages decided to raise the fences and forbid this too. Now, one could go on at length about this; later authorities discuss these things, and there is a difference between these two kinds of shvut. But for our purposes, what I want to say is that what I said earlier—that rabbinic prohibitions have no essence, only an obligation to obey the command—that may not apply to shvut laws of this type, because shvut laws of this type basically say: when you select food from waste, there is something problematic here in itself. Not problematic enough for the Torah to forbid it, but there is something problematic here. So therefore, true, it became a prohibition only on the rabbinic level—the Sages forbade selecting food from waste too—but here, in this rabbinic prohibition, there is also an essential dimension, unlike riding a horse. Here there is an essential dimension because you are in fact selecting on the Sabbath. A weaker, less significant selecting, but still, you are selecting on the Sabbath. It is not only concern lest you come to something else that will be the problematic thing. Here there is itself a problem, at least a partial one, and therefore in this kind of rabbinic law there may also be essence, though of course not Torah-level essence, but a weaker, thinner essence. But still, here there could be essence. And the same is true also of rabbinic commandments. Rabbinic commandments are probably all like this. Commandments like Hanukkah and Purim. These are rabbinic commandments, but they are not commandments intended to prevent me from stumbling into a Torah prohibition or to bring me to fulfill a Torah commandment. These are things that have value in themselves. The Torah just didn’t establish them; the Sages established them. But of these things you cannot say they have no essence. They do have essence. Just rabbinic essence and not Torah-level essence. So it is not true of all rabbinic laws that they have no essence and only a command. For laws of this sort, which are an extension of Torah law, the Behag, for example, counts Hanukkah and Purim in his enumeration of the commandments, among the 613. Meaning he takes these commandments as truly Torah-level. But even Maimonides, who says no, obviously this is not a fence; rather, these are commandments that are only rabbinic and not Torah-level. It is an extension of the Torah level. But it is not a fence or a decree. Therefore these commandments have an essential dimension. There is some kind of Torah study—at least rabbinic Torah study—even when one deals with these laws. Okay, we…

[Speaker E] Regarding the answer the rabbi gave from Nachmanides against Maimonides, would that also apply to commandments that have essence?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which answer?

[Speaker E] Regarding rabbinic doubt going leniently.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be yes, because a doubt regarding such an essence is a weaker doubt, so you don’t need to be concerned. It is an essence that is not Torah-level essence. There is essence, there is value in engaging with it. But it is an essence that is not Torah-level. It may be that with such a weak essence, if you are in doubt whether you will fall into it or not fall into it, since the pit you might fall into is a small pit, you don’t need to worry. Okay. Comments or questions?

[Speaker B] Okay, this is a topic not exactly for here, but as I understand it, all the religions in the world and in history came out more or less from the same direction—that killing criminals was done instantly, cutting off limbs was quick and easy, everything was like that. Judaism at some stage—I don’t know when, but at some stage—understood that cutting off an attacker’s hand isn’t really the thing, it’s money, various developments as cultures changed over the years. But that’s it; since then we stopped the Sages—there aren’t any more. If in later generations people reach the conclusion that there are things that shouldn’t be, stop, you’re not, you’re not enough—or the opposite, there are rabbis who say, you’re right, but who am I that I should…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it didn’t stop. It didn’t stop—you’re mistaken. It absolutely did not stop.

[Speaker B] But that’s what we just said, that in these generations we don’t have enough.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it is definitely done, in many matters.

[Speaker B] So that’s what I asked—whether today there is anyone authorized.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying, you need to know that not everything that makes sense to change is also possible to change. There are halakhic rules for how laws are changed. But there is a possibility to change even today, even without a Sanhedrin. I devoted a large part of my book Between the Fixed Ones to that. Okay.

[Speaker F] Rabbi, can I make a comment? Yes, yes. I wanted to comment regarding Yishmael ben Elisha—we know he was a High Priest, and in the Temple there is no shvut. Yes,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But here the case is not like that. What do you mean? You can also see that it wasn’t like that, because evidently it was not in the Temple, because the fact is they did relate to it as a prohibition.

[Speaker F] Because if there is no shvut in the Temple, then what would have been the exemption here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There would be no decree there at all.

[Speaker F] Yes, I’m saying, so I didn’t come to justify something, but I said that maybe when the Talmud goes back and forth about why he thought that, then maybe there’s more of some basis here, that maybe that’s presumably how it was.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe psychologically, since he was used to reading by candlelight in the Temple, and there there is no rabbinic restriction, then maybe he carried that over outside the Temple as well. Although even in the Temple itself, for things not connected to the service, I’m not sure there is no rabbinic restriction. That’s a more complicated question. In the context of the service, there is no rabbinic restriction in the Temple.

[Speaker F] He also says, when it will be rebuilt, then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also things connected to the service, but regarding that—I’m not remembering right now, I once saw something about it—it’s apparently not so simple. Because with regard to the service, even Torah-level prohibitions were not stated. Whatever the service requires, what has to be done for the service, has to be done, even if it involves Torah-level prohibitions. They slaughter animals in the Temple; the additional Sabbath offerings are brought on the Sabbath, and slaughtering is taking a life, which is a Torah-level prohibition. Obviously, service that is defined as needing to be done on the Sabbath is done even when it involves Torah-level prohibitions. When they say there is no rabbinic restriction in the Temple, they presumably do not mean things that the service itself requires. Fine, but that would take us into the whole topic of rabbinic restrictions in the Temple; that’s something else.

[Speaker F] And I wanted to ask the Rabbi regarding laws from Kabbalah—can they be defined as laws that have essence but do not have halakhic validity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Kabbalah is not the hidden Torah, not from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). Yes, it’s—

[Speaker F] That’s what I mean, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is called “words of tradition” means the Prophets and Writings.

[Speaker F] No, I mean the teachings of the Ari and things like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, if you believe what he says, then yes; if not, then no. The Ari, by the way—when he states laws on the basis of the… or not specifically the Ari, but the kabbalists in general—when they establish laws on the basis of Kabbalah, they establish Torah-level laws, not rabbinic ones. The meaning they give to Torah-level laws is interpreted and clarified through Kabbalah. That is their interpretation of Torah-level laws; it’s not that they add more laws because of Kabbalah, but rather they interpret Torah-level laws within the kabbalistic framework. And sometimes that also leads to a practical difference in the law. In most cases not, but sometimes it does lead to a practical difference. So according to their approach, if you accept their view, then of course there is essence in it, because that is their interpretation of Torah-level Jewish law.

[Speaker F] I meant things that in my view also seem to lack a basis, like the order of cutting fingernails and things like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s fireworks, I don’t know. Someone who believes in that presumably believes in it; I don’t know. He doesn’t say to cut your nails lest you come to violate a Torah-level prohibition. He says that cutting the nails in a certain order apparently has some value in itself. Either you accept that or you don’t accept it, but that’s the claim.

[Speaker F] Something with essence, but its validity seemingly is not—it’s more rabbinic, kind of, less an actual law of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s something with essence. Now the question is whether you accept it. If you do, then it’s neither rabbinic nor Torah-level. So it’s something with essence. Now if you’re concerned about it, then don’t do it; if you’re not concerned about it… on the contrary, here you have essence without commandment, not commandment without essence. They’re not saying there’s an enactment here, or a rabbinic enactment, to do this. Rather, they’re simply saying you should be careful to do it this way because it’s dangerous. That’s essence without commandment.

[Speaker F] Yes, that’s what I was pointing to, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Shabbat shalom. Thank you very much.