First Fruits 1

Table of Contents

• [0:00] Introduction to the section of first-fruits and the Torah portion of Ki Tavo
• [1:35] The two commandments: bringing first-fruits and reciting over the first-fruits
• [3:56] The comparison between similar commandments of Torah reading and first-fruits
• [6:55] The Vilna Gaon’s example of entering the holy on Yom Kippur
• [16:08] The five commandments of first-fruits according to Maimonides
• [17:15] The confession—when it is obligatory and when it is not
• [21:03] Who cannot recite the first-fruits declaration
• [23:19] The Talmud: recitation does not invalidate except in certain situations
• [27:30] Rabbi Elazar and the rule that recitation does not invalidate
• [30:39] Maimonides’ paragraph—first-fruits after Sukkot
• [32:13] Doubt in the sale of trees—first-fruits and acquisition
• [35:40] The Talmud on one who brings but does not recite, and the solution
• [38:24] Tosafot—a messenger and bringing first-fruits without recitation
• [44:41] The Kesef Mishneh and the explanation of the doubt and the recitation

Summary

General Overview

The Torah portion of Ki Tavo opens with the commandment of first-fruits, which includes setting them aside, bringing them to the place that God will choose, placing them before the altar, and reciting the first-fruits declaration familiar from the Passover Haggadah. The text presents the first-fruits declaration as a commandment counted on its own alongside the commandment of bringing the first-fruits, and sets up a basic tension around the question of whether these are two separate commandments or one procedure counted as two. It then examines, from Nachmanides and Maimonides and from the passages in tractate Makkot and Bava Batra, how the recitation relates to the bringing, and arrives at fine distinctions in the rule that “recitation does not invalidate” as opposed to cases in which “one is not fit for recitation,” where recitation may indeed invalidate, while trying to resolve contradictions in Maimonides’ halakhic ruling by distinguishing between certainty and doubt, and between an obligation to recite in the present and an obligation that has been deferred.

The commandment of first-fruits and the first-fruits declaration in the Torah portion

The section commands setting aside first-fruits, bringing them to Jerusalem to the priest “who will be in those days,” placing the basket before the altar of God, and reciting the formula of the first-fruits declaration that opens with “My father was a wandering Aramean” and concludes with “And now, behold, I have brought the first of the fruit of the ground that You, God, have given me.” The text states that most of the halakhic details of first-fruits are written almost explicitly in the section: setting aside, bringing, placing down, reciting, and transferring them to the priest. The text adds that there are further details that are not stated here explicitly.

Counting the commandments and the tension between bringing and reciting

For most of those who count the commandments, the first-fruits declaration is counted as a commandment in its own right, and in the language of Nachmanides it is called the confession of first-fruits, and the later authorities (Acharonim) ask why this is called the confession of first-fruits. The text presents the question as a tension: on the one hand, bringing and reciting are two different commandments, and on the other hand, the recitation seems to be part of the procedure of bringing. The text formulates the question whether this is really two commandments, or one commandment that for technical reasons is counted as two, and what exactly the nature of the connection between them is.

Nachmanides: an analogy between pairs of commandments

Nachmanides, in his supplements to the positive commandments, commandment 15, writes: “That we were commanded to give thanks to His blessed name whenever we read from the Torah,” and from this the text concludes that Nachmanides holds that the blessing over Torah study is a Torah-level commandment. Nachmanides states, “And it is not proper to count it as one commandment together with the reading,” and brings an analogy to the fact that “the first-fruits declaration is not counted as one with their bringing,” and that “telling the story of the Exodus from Egypt” is not counted together with “eating the Passover offering.” The text emphasizes that the comparison itself sharpens the question, because in each of these pairs there is a sense that one is essentially bound up with the other, and nevertheless they are counted as two. So too, with the first-fruits declaration, the same tension exists: one unit from the standpoint of content, but two commandments from the standpoint of counting.

Maimonides in positive commandment 132 versus his wording in the Mishneh Torah

Maimonides, in positive commandment 132, formulates the first-fruits declaration as a commandment “to recount His good deeds that He did for us and saved us,” beginning with our forefather Jacob and ending with the slavery in Egypt, and to give thanks and request blessing “when one brings the first-fruits.” The text reads this formulation as a general commandment of thanksgiving and recounting God’s goodness, for which the first-fruits serve as the occasion, and not as a technical detail within the act of bringing first-fruits. Set against this is Maimonides’ introduction to the laws of first-fruits, where within the laws of first-fruits he counts the positive commandment “to set aside first-fruits and bring them up to the Temple,” and the positive commandment “to recite over them,” and from this it appears that the recitation is embedded as part of the procedure of bringing first-fruits and not as an independent commandment detached from the bringing.

Sefer HaChinukh and the move toward viewing recitation as part of the bringing

Sefer HaChinukh is formulated quite clearly: “That we were commanded, when bringing the first-fruits to the Temple, to recite over them,” and the text presents this as a direct portrayal of the recitation as an integral part of the act of bringing. The text states that the common approach among those who count the commandments and among the halakhic decisors is that there is a connection between the two commandments even though they are counted as two, and still the nature of that connection remains to be clarified. The text compares this to other pairs as well, such as the blue thread and the white threads in tzitzit, and the arm tefillin and the head tefillin, where there is one basic linkage but different possibilities of counting and of whether one element prevents fulfillment of the other.

Conceptual framing: a rule about the person or a rule about the object

The text suggests thinking about whether the first-fruits declaration is a rule about the person or a rule about the object. One possibility is defined as an obligation on the person bringing them as part of the procedure: when he brings them, he also recites. A second possibility is defined as part of the definition of the object itself: the recitation is required in order for the fruit to receive the status of “first-fruits,” and if the recitation was not said, perhaps the fruit is not considered first-fruits at all. This is emphasized by noting that the status of first-fruits has serious significance like terumah, which is forbidden to a non-priest on pain of death at the hands of Heaven.

Maimonides chapter 4: “requires” versus “not the same in every case”

At the beginning of chapter 4, Maimonides writes, “Whoever brings first-fruits requires an offering, song, waving, and lodging overnight,” and lists four components that always accompany the bringing. Maimonides adds, “But the confession is not the same in every case, because there are those who are obligated to bring first-fruits and do not recite over them,” and the text notes carefully that Maimonides does not use the language of “does not invalidate” here, but rather “is not the same in every case.” The text suggests that from this language one could understand that recitation may be a condition in some cases, but is not required in all cases, and therefore it is necessary to clarify when recitation invalidates and when it does not.

Those who bring but do not recite: limitations of the wording “which You have given me, God”

The baraita in Makkot 18b lists “the woman, the tumtum, and the androgynos,” as well as “the guardian, the slave, and the messenger,” as people who bring but do not recite, because they cannot say “which You have given me, God.” The text explains that the basic problem in many of these cases is the lack of land in the sense required for the wording of the declaration, even if from a monetary standpoint there may be situations in which they have some kind of acquisition. The text notes that in chapter 4 of Maimonides there is a much broader additional list of similar cases, as well as more complex cases such as ownership of produce rights without ownership of the land itself, and possession of trees without the land.

Makkot 18b: placing down invalidates, recitation does not invalidate, versus the rule of “let them rot”

The Talmud brings in the name of Rabbi Elazar who said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that “for first-fruits, placing them down invalidates, but recitation does not invalidate,” and the text presents this as an explicit statement that recitation does not invalidate. The Talmud challenges this from another statement by the same source: “If one set aside first-fruits before the festival and the festival passed over them, let them rot,” and explains that the difficulty is that if recitation does not invalidate, one should have been able to bring them without reciting. The Talmud answers by means of the principle, “Whatever is fit for mixing, the mixing does not invalidate it; and whatever is not fit for mixing, the mixing invalidates it,” and the text formulates the conclusion of the answer as follows: recitation does not invalidate where one could recite and simply did not, but it does invalidate where one cannot recite at all.

The Mishnah in first-fruits: the season for recitation and the season for bringing

The Mishnah states that “from Shavuot until the festival one brings and recites,” and from the festival until Hanukkah “one brings but does not recite,” and the text presents the reason as derived from the verse “and you shall rejoice in all the good,” so that there is recitation only at a time of joy. The text sets the rule of “let them rot” against the Mishnah and raises the possibility of a dispute as to whether, in a state of inability to recite, the recitation disqualifies the bringing or not. The text emphasizes that Maimonides rules in halakhah 13 that from after Sukkot until Hanukkah one “brings but does not recite,” “even if he set them aside before the festival,” and thus recitation does not invalidate even when one cannot recite during this period.

Bava Batra 81: doubtful ownership of land, a messenger, and the appearance of falsehood

The Talmud in Bava Batra discusses one who buys two trees in another person’s field, where there is doubt whether he also acquired the land, and the halakhic ruling there is that he “brings but does not recite.” The text presents the internal difficulty in the doubt: on the one hand, perhaps these really are first-fruits and recitation is required, and on the other hand, perhaps there is no land and it is forbidden to say “which You have given me, God,” and so a problem is created of “one who is not fit for recitation.” The Talmud resolves this by saying, “He harvested them and sent them in the hand of a messenger,” because a messenger in any case does not recite, and it adds that the recitation is not merely exempted but may actually be forbidden because “it looks like falsehood.”

Maimonides in halakhah 4: “because of the doubt, the recitation invalidates in this case”

Maimonides rules regarding one who bought two trees that he brings but does not recite “because the matter is doubtful,” and instructs that this be done through a messenger “so that the recitation should not prevent them from being eaten.” Maimonides summarizes a rule: “For anything that is not fit for recitation because of doubt, the recitation invalidates in that case,” and the text presents this as a halakhic ruling applying the principle of “fit for mixing” with respect to recitation. The text highlights the internal contradiction: in halakhah 13 Maimonides allows bringing even when one cannot recite, namely after the festival, whereas here he determines that where something is not fit for recitation because of doubt, the recitation invalidates.

Tosafot: deferral from recitation depends on prior fitness and on the condition at the time of setting aside

Tosafot comments on situations in which “they were not fit for recitation and were deferred,” and argues that it should have said “they automatically must rot,” relying on the law that “if one set aside first-fruits before the festival and the festival passed over them, let them rot.” Tosafot formulates the principle of deferral in such a way that fruit which was at one point “fit for recitation” and later “was no longer fit” is considered “not fit for mixing, where the mixing invalidates it.” Tosafot brings in the name of Rabbenu Chaim a distinction based on prior intention: if at the time of harvesting he had in mind to send them through someone else, then it is “as though they were never fit for recitation at all,” and therefore they do not rot, and one brings without reciting; likewise, if “one set aside first-fruits before the festival with the intention of bringing them after the festival,” he brings and does not recite, and they do not rot.

The Kesef Mishneh: a dispute between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds and the distinction of “because of its doubt”

The Kesef Mishneh explains that in practice there are contradictory passages, and Maimonides holds that the Babylonian Talmud disagrees with the Jerusalem Talmud, and therefore even something that appeared fit for recitation and was later deferred does not rot, but rather “one brings and does not recite.” The text notes that the Kesef Mishneh still has to explain why, in the case of one who bought two trees, the recitation invalidates, and it quotes the Kesef Mishneh’s conclusion: “There it is different because of its doubt.” The text interprets the distinction as follows: in a situation where it is clear that at present there is no obligation of recitation, one may bring without reciting even if there was previously a time when recitation was possible; whereas in a case of doubt, there is a possibility that at present the fruits do in fact require recitation, and therefore one cannot allow a situation in which first-fruits that actually require recitation are brought without any ability to recite. Therefore a path involving a messenger is required in order to avoid recitation without creating a situation of an unfulfillable obligation to recite.

The passage of first-fruits and Jewish law. We’re opening the portion of Ki Tavo. At the beginning of the portion there is a commandment to set aside first-fruits and to recite, at the time of bringing them, the passage of first-fruits. “And it shall be, when you come to the land that the Lord your God gives you as an inheritance, and you possess it and dwell in it, and you shall take of the first of all the fruit of the ground that you bring from your land that the Lord your God gives you, and put it in a basket, and go to the place that the Lord your God will choose to make His name dwell there. And you shall come to the priest who will be in those days, and say to him: I declare today to the Lord your God that I have come to the land that the Lord swore to our fathers to give us. And the priest shall take the basket from your hand and place it before the altar of the Lord your God. And you shall answer and say before the Lord your God”—and then the recitation of first-fruits actually begins. We know it very well from the Passover Haggadah: “An Aramean sought to destroy my father,” where it recounts the whole history, the whole telegraphic version of history, “and he became there,” “in this place,” and so on. “And now, behold, I have brought the first of the fruit of the ground that You, Lord, have given me.” That is really the end of the passage, and then “you shall place it”—you have to place it in the Temple courtyard. In fact, most of the halakhic details of first-fruits appear almost explicitly in the passage: to set them aside, to bring them to Jerusalem, there must be placement, there must be recitation, and then it goes to the priest afterward. There are of course more details that do not appear here. Most enumerators of the commandments count the recitation of first-fruits—or in Nachmanides’ language this is called the confession of first-fruits—and the later authorities also discuss why it is called the confession of first-fruits. In general, they count it as a separate commandment. There is a commandment to bring first-fruits, and there is a commandment to recite the recitation of first-fruits—two different commandments. And the obvious question that arises is: what is the relation between these two commandments? On the one hand they are two; on the other hand there is some connection between them, since this is part of the procedure of bringing the first-fruits. There is a Nachmanides who, in passing, actually addresses this commandment of reciting first-fruits, the question of the relationship. In Nachmanides’ additions to the positive commandments, after Maimonides finishes—after Maimonides’ Book of Commandments—at the end there is a count of positive and negative commandments that Nachmanides adds to Maimonides’ count. Some he removes, some he adds, so that in total there is still supposed to remain 613. So in commandment 15 in the additions to the positive commandments he writes as follows: Commandment 15, that we were commanded to thank His blessed name whenever we read from the Torah—and the sources appear before you, yes—whenever we read from the Torah, for the great good He did for us in giving us His Torah, and informing us of the deeds that are pleasing before Him, through which we inherit eternal life. And just as we were commanded regarding a blessing after eating, so too we were commanded regarding this. So Nachmanides holds that the commandment of the blessing over Torah is a Torah-level commandment. From this it is explained that this blessing is from the Torah, and it is not proper to count it as one commandment together with the reading—the reading meaning the reading of Torah. Why count it? Because even if it is Torah-level, not every Torah-level commandment is also counted. There are rules as to which commandments are counted and which are not. One could have said that this is a Torah-level commandment but not to count it in the enumeration of the commandments. Why not? Because it is included in the commandment of Torah study, say. Fine, no matter. So he says: and it is not proper to count it as one commandment together with the reading, just as the recitation of first-fruits is not counted as one with their bringing. There are two different commandments: the bringing is 125 and the recitation is 132, and the telling of the Exodus is positive commandment 157 together with eating the Passover offering, which is positive commandment 156. So here Nachmanides is basically making an analogy regarding the relationship between commandments that deal with the same subject, among three pairs. One pair is the blessing over Torah as opposed to Torah study, the second pair is the recitation of first-fruits versus bringing first-fruits, and the third pair is the commandment of telling the story of the Exodus together with eating the Passover offering. So on the one hand it seems—he doesn’t elaborate—but the comparison itself perhaps sharpens the question even more: on the one hand there are two commandments here, on the other hand it is quite clear that one is part of the other. Blessing over Torah would ostensibly have been expected to be one detail within the commandment of Torah study, and nevertheless, that is why Nachmanides takes the trouble to apologize for counting it separately, because in principle we really should have related to both of them as one commandment. The telling of the Exodus together with eating the Passover offering is already a bit more far-reaching. At first intuition I’m not sure I would have thought this was one commandment. Both must be done on the fifteenth, but still, eating the Passover offering is one thing and telling the story of the Exodus is something else. But Nachmanides here too feels that there is some issue. And nevertheless they are counted as two separate commandments, and from here he also brings proof to recitation of first-fruits. That basically means that in recitation of first-fruits too there is this tension: on the one hand, recitation of first-fruits and bringing the first-fruits should have been one unit, and precisely because of that Nachmanides feels some need here to explain, since theoretically, in principle, we should have counted them as one commandment, and on the other hand they are still counted as two. So there is still something here that distinguishes between them. So what should we take from this? Meaning, are these really two commandments? Is this one commandment that for some technical considerations is counted as two commandments? How exactly are we supposed to relate to the relationship between the bringing and the recitation of first-fruits? When you look at the language of the halakhic authorities, the enumerators of the commandments and also the legal decisors, it comes closer and closer to being one commandment. In the count it is counted as two commandments, but in terms of the concept. Look at Maimonides in positive commandment 132—this is still actually the wording furthest from that conclusion. Maimonides says this: in commandment 132, that He commanded us to recount His benefits with which He benefited us and saved us, and it begins with the matter of our patriarch Jacob and ends with the Egyptians’ oppression and affliction of us, and to thank Him for all this and ask Him to improve the blessing for the one who brings the first-fruits. And that is what He, exalted be He, said: “And you shall answer and say before the Lord your God,” etc. And the laws of this commandment are set out in tractate Bikkurim. On the face of it, from reading Maimonides’ first sentence, this sounds like some general commandment to recount the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He, something incumbent upon every Jew to recount the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He. Then afterward he notes that this must be done at a certain time, when bringing first-fruits. It is not presented as a detail within the process of bringing first-fruits. There is a commandment to recount the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He. When should you do it? When bringing first-fruits. I’ll give you an example—maybe a very prominent example, and the Vilna Gaon also derived conclusions from it—the portion of Acharei Mot. There is the section about entering the innermost sanctum and the whole Yom Kippur service. In the Torah itself there is no hint that this belongs to Yom Kippur at all. The matter comes after the death of Aaron’s two sons, Nadav and Avihu, who died when they came near before the Lord. Meaning, they basically entered the innermost sanctum not in the proper way. Whatever their sin was, I’m not getting into that, but that is what the Torah says. Then the Torah tells us how to do it properly—meaning, not like Nadav and Avihu, but how to enter the innermost sanctum properly. Then it begins how to enter: to bring a bull and a goat, and all the immersions and sanctifications and warnings and all the details of the Yom Kippur service. But there is no mention of Yom Kippur. It is only the procedure, or the way, to enter the innermost sanctum properly. At the end of the section, at the very end, the Torah says that this should be done every year on the tenth of the seventh month, which is Yom Kippur. First it details how to enter the sanctuary properly—not like Nadav and Avihu, who died when they came near before the Lord, but with a bull and a goat and all the offerings. And at the end it says: and you shall do this every year on the tenth of the seventh month—that is, on Yom Kippur. So the Vilna Gaon really learns from here, and the passage itself cries this out. It is not presented as “this is what you shall do on the tenth of the seventh month” or “on Yom Kippur bring a bull and a goat,” and so on, the way festival offerings are presented. No—it is not presented that way here. And the Vilna Gaon really says that in principle this is a procedure for entering the sanctuary; it does not belong specifically to the Yom Kippur service. In principle one could enter the sanctuary on any other day as well, if one does this whole procedure. Part of this procedure is fasting, repenting; the people too are partners in these preparations of the High Priest who enters the innermost sanctum, and that too is part of the process of entering the sanctuary. That too is not a law specific to Yom Kippur. All of this is part of the process of entering the sanctuary, and if now someone wants to do it in Cheshvan or in Sivan, he can do it then too, as long as he does it with the correct procedure. Apart from that, there is an explicit commandment in the Torah to enter the sanctuary, the innermost sanctum, every year on Yom Kippur. That is another passage. First there is a procedure of how one enters the sanctuary, and that is how it is done whenever one decides to enter. In addition, the Torah also commands to perform this procedure every Yom Kippur, once a year. So there you really see it from the order of the writing, and the Vilna Gaon infers it, because that really is what such an order of writing says. If the Torah had wanted to say that this is the service of Yom Kippur, then the Torah should have said, “And thus you shall do on Yom Kippur,” or “on the tenth of the seventh month bring a bull and a goat,” and so on. Instead it says: “Thus you shall enter the sanctuary, not like Nadav and Avihu, but with a bull and a goat,” and so on. After that there is a commandment to do this on Yom Kippur. So it is not presented as the Yom Kippur service. Now, that is biblical language and this is the language of the Sages, so you can’t prove from there, but I think that this form—this relation—is definitely also relevant to the language of the Sages and to the language of Maimonides. And if Maimonides says that He commanded us to recount His goodness with which He benefited us and saved us, and so on, then there is basically some general commandment here to thank the Holy One, blessed be He, to recount that He did good for us, that the Holy One, blessed be He, did good for us. This story also has to be told with the first-fruits, together with bringing the first-fruits. It seems from Maimonides that there is some independent content to reciting the passage of first-fruits, and the first-fruits are only the timing—when it is to be done. Theoretically, if I continued like the Vilna Gaon on other passages, I would say, fine, perhaps there is room to do this on other dates as well; there is just an obligation to do it also with the first-fruits. Does the Vilna Gaon say that here about this issue? No, I don’t know of it. The Vilna Gaon also speaks about Torah passages; here it is the order of Maimonides’ writing, not of the Torah, so I’m not sure one can apply it. I am bringing it only as an example. So ostensibly in Maimonides it actually seems there is room to view this as some independent commandment, a separate commandment not merely from among the details of bringing the first-fruits. There is only an additional law that at the time of bringing the first-fruits one should also do this. But there is independent content here; it is not just some preparatory requirement for the first-fruits, not just the way in which first-fruits are brought, but some commandment to recount the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He. And that certainly should not be the explanation. What? That from that angle it certainly is an explanation, but not here. No, it can be an explanation, but the question is whether there is a commandment here. There is no doubt that this is a commandment. It is clear that one could have said that even without these inferences from Maimonides, but if one is obligated to do it, or if one fulfills a commandment by doing it, the claim is yes—perhaps. If this inference from Maimonides is really correct. I’ll show later that I’m not entirely sure about it, but it may be. What about the introduction to the laws of first-fruits, where he brings the list of the relevant commandments? He brings here only the first three, which concern first-fruits; after that it is challah and other commandments. So Maimonides writes there, as appears before you: in the laws of first-fruits and the other priestly gifts in the provinces are included nine commandments, etc. The first commandment is to separate first-fruits and bring them up to the Temple. The second, that the priest may not eat first-fruits outside Jerusalem. And to recite over them. And within his division in the Mishneh Torah, it really does seem that this is a detail from among the details of the commandment of bringing first-fruits. He says: within the laws of first-fruits there are three commandments—one negative commandment, that the priest not eat the first-fruits outside Jerusalem, and a positive commandment to bring the first-fruits, and a positive commandment to recite over them. So it seems that this is a commandment that is part of the procedure of bringing the first-fruits, and not, I don’t know, where would they put it? In love of God perhaps? Some commandment as part of the prayers? Meaning, one has to recount the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He, and besides that this is also said when bringing the first-fruits. So from here it actually seems that it is indeed part of the procedure of bringing the first-fruits. There is room to hesitate. In Sefer HaChinukh the matter is much more explicit. I brought you only one line just so you get the impression: “that we were commanded, when bringing the first-fruits to the Temple, to recite over them.” You see? That is the order of writing, and I would have expected, if indeed the recitation were part of bringing the first-fruits, that when bringing the first-fruits we were also commanded to recite over them. “To recite over them”—yes, that is different wording. And in the wording of Maimonides, say in positive commandment 132 above that we saw, then “all this when he brings the first-fruits” merely indicates the time. And here he says “to recite over them,” meaning that this is part of the procedure of how the first-fruits themselves are done. So again I say: in Maimonides I am not entirely sure; in Sefer HaChinukh it is fairly clear that there is some essential connection here to bringing the first-fruits. In Maimonides I am somewhat uncertain, and we will also see later that Maimonides is somewhere in the middle in terms of the implications. In any event, the accepted approach is that there nevertheless is a connection, even though this is counted as two separate commandments. There is a connection between them, and there is still room to discuss what the nature of this connection is. We know that there is a connection between the blue thread and the white threads in tzitzit, and yet these are two commandments and one does not invalidate the other. The matter of the phylacteries of the head and of the arm—we have many pairs of commandments regarding which there are disputes among the enumerators of the commandments whether to count them as one condition or count them as one thing. So the fact that something is a pair of commandments does not mean it is not one matter, and the fact that it is one matter does not mean it is not a pair of commandments. Meaning, these are things that have to be discussed separately. There is some affinity in these matters, but it is not necessary. Even if the connection is an essential one, we still have to understand what its nature is. One could understand it in two ways. On the page I left in the synagogue with the sources, I wrote that it is worth considering whether this is a law in the person or a law in the object—bringing the first-fruits. That is, suppose there is an essential connection between recitation of first-fruits and bringing the first-fruits, between these two commandments. The question is: what is that connection? Is recitation of first-fruits simply part of the procedure of bringing the first-fruits—a duty on the person who brings first-fruits, that when he brings first-fruits he must also recite the passage of first-fruits? Or no—this is part of preparing the first-fruits themselves; it is part of the status of first-fruits that should be on them. And if you did not do it correctly, they will not be first-fruits. That is what is called a law in the object—that the object of the first-fruits itself will not be first-fruits if you did not recite. Meaning, the recitation is required in order to define these fruits as first-fruits. And we know that first-fruits have a certain legal effect of first-fruits; this is called terumah in the Torah; a non-priest may not eat it; there is death at the hands of Heaven, just like terumah. So first-fruits are something that has a legal status on them, and it could be that there is a procedure here that is required in order for that status to take effect. Then if he did not recite the recitation, there is a law regarding the recitation of first-fruits, and the first-fruits will not be considered first-fruits. Exactly. It would be impossible to eat them, they would be invalid, it would be indispensable. Yes, we’ll discuss that in a moment. All of this is only an introduction to that discussion. Good. So Maimonides indeed at the beginning of chapter 4, the next source before you, writes as follows: “Everyone who brings first-fruits requires an offering, song, waving, and lodging.” Four things that anyone who brings first-fruits basically has to do together with them, as part of his obligation. He has to bring a peace-offering; there has to be song by the Levites; waving—one has to wave the first-fruits, the priest and the one bringing them together wave the first-fruits, which is also an interesting point; and lodging—he has to stay overnight in Jerusalem after bringing the first-fruits and not leave on the same day. But the confession, which does not appear among the four—the confession is already a fifth thing—is not the same in all cases, since there are those who are obligated to bring first-fruits and do not recite over them. Converts. Converts? Converts do not always recite according to Maimonides. Yes. The same thing in the Jerusalem Talmud; apparently Maimonides ruled that they do recite. So Maimonides says that there are basically five things that first-fruits require. Four of them are always necessary. Whenever first-fruits are brought, these four things must be present: offering, song, waving, and lodging. And the fifth thing, the recitation, the confession of first-fruits, is something that is not equal in all cases—this is Maimonides’ expression. “Not equal in all cases” means there are many cases where I bring first-fruits and do not need to recite. And I am not allowed to recite, as we will soon see. So you see that it is not an indispensable condition for bringing the first-fruits, because there are many cases in which one brings first-fruits and does not recite. But Maimonides’ wording is not that the confession does not invalidate. His wording is that the confession is not equal in all cases. And when someone says that and does not use the usual language of “it is not indispensable,” it says a second thing too. Because when someone says that rather than the usual phrase “it does not invalidate,” he probably means what you said earlier: that in fact it may well be indispensable, just not always required. Sometimes the recitation of first-fruits is required, and then if it was not recited, then indeed it would not be first-fruits; it would be a condition in their status as first-fruits. He is in the list of things required. Required, but not indispensable. Required but not indispensable? And what about the other things? Besides, Maimonides here does not address invalidation at all; he also does not write “this is not indispensable.” I say to myself: since many times one brings first-fruits and does not recite, ostensibly it follows that the recitation is not an indispensable condition for the first-fruits to be first-fruits. Because in fact there are many cases where one brings the first-fruits and does not recite. But there is a situation where recitation is required, and a situation where recitation is not required. Like “you may not ignore.” There is a situation where you do ignore. So there is a situation where there is an obligation and a situation where there is no obligation. It’s not that after the fact, if you didn’t recite, you did… Right. That is exactly the difference between the formulations. If Maimonides had written that since sometimes first-fruits are brought and one does not recite, then it follows that the recitation does not invalidate—meaning, if you did not recite they are still first-fruits—then the conclusion would be as you said: two separate things, one should do it, perhaps even in the more far-reaching formulation that this is merely some accidental combination. This is the timing at which one should recite first-fruits. When? When bringing the first-fruits. But it is not part of the procedure, since in fact even when one does not recite, one can still bring them. That is if Maimonides had written “it does not invalidate.” But Maimonides does not use that language. Maimonides says that it is not equal in all cases. And that says a second thing too. Because when someone says that rather than the usual expression “it does not invalidate,” he probably means what you said earlier: that in fact it may well be indispensable, just not always required. Sometimes recitation of first-fruits is required, and then if it was not recited, then indeed it would not be first-fruits; it would be a condition in their status as first-fruits. And in other cases where one does not need to recite, then one does not need to recite, and there is no problem. This is not because the recitation is some side issue; rather, the obligation to recite exists, only in certain cases and not in all cases. Why suddenly an offering and song? What do you mean? I said that together with the first-fruits one has to bring a peace-offering. A peace-offering that is brought together with the offering, right? Yes. And the song is by the Levites—the Levites would perform a special song when the first-fruits were brought. So every time they brought first-fruits, the Levites would stand on the platform when they brought the first-fruits and apparently they would play there the whole time while the first-fruits were being brought. What are those cases in which one brings first-fruits and does not recite? Almost all of chapter 4 in Maimonides, Laws of First-Fruits, is devoted to this matter, and there he brings a whole list of things. The basic list also appears in a baraita in the Talmud in Makkot 18b. Here: these bring but do not recite—the woman, the tumtum, and the androgynos, because they are of doubtful status, because they are of doubtful womanhood and cannot say “which You have given me, O Lord.” And likewise the guardian, the slave, and the agent, because they cannot say “which You have given me, O Lord.” There is here a whole list of people who, within the recitation of first-fruits, cannot say it. They cannot say “from the ground that You have given me, O Lord,” because a woman has no land. The land she has is not her inheritance, right? So that is a special case. Basically, a woman does not inherit in the Land. If there are no sons, she inherits. Yes, but still, basically she does not inherit. If there are no sons, then she receives her father’s inheritance, and even then it is called her father’s inheritance and not her own inheritance. She inherits it financially. It is not called a full inheritance or patrimony. It is called removed inheritance; in the monetary sense women do inherit it, daughters inherit it. So there is here a list of people who cannot recite. So when they bring first-fruits, obviously they do bring first-fruits. Meaning, there are situations where they do have land. Obviously in monetary terms they can own land, and that is exactly why the question arises. So they bring first-fruits, but they do not recite. They cannot say the verse, “which You have given me, O Lord.” Up to here, we basically have a list. After that, in chapter 4 of Maimonides, there is a whole list of cases in which one brings but does not recite, but these are individual cases, most of which are really situations in which a person has no land. When a person has no land, he cannot recite because he cannot again say that verse, “which You have given me, O Lord,” exactly as Maimonides writes here. That is the principle written here. And afterward there are various cases—we will look at one of them later—in which the person has no land but can bring first-fruits. Say he has only fruits. Can he bring first-fruits from them or not? In terms of trees, but without the land beneath them—can he bring first-fruits from them or not? If he has a usufruct right in the land but not ownership of the body of the land, there too there is discussion whether he can bring first-fruits or not. Various situations in which the person has no land, and so he cannot say “which You have given me, O Lord.” The example, as I said, appears in the Talmud in Makkot 18b. There is also a parallel in Bava Batra 81. The Talmud there says as follows. Rav Elazar said in the name of Rav Hoshaya—not an example of no land, we’ll get to that in a moment, this is another example. Rav Elazar said in the name of Rav Hoshaya: for first-fruits, placement is indispensable, but recitation is not indispensable. Meaning, one has to place them in the Temple courtyard, and one has to recite the recitation of first-fruits. The placement is indispensable. If there was no placement, the priest is still forbidden to eat the first-fruits. The recitation is not indispensable. And here it is already written explicitly, right? That the recitation does not invalidate. Earlier we only knew this from Maimonides, but here the Talmud says it does not invalidate. The Talmud asks: did Rav Elazar really say that? But did not Rav Elazar say in the name of Rav Hoshaya: if one set aside first-fruits before the festival and the festival passed over them, they must rot? What is the discussion there? Is it not because he can no longer recite over them? And if you would think that recitation does not invalidate them, why should they rot? What is the Talmud saying? There is a law that after the festival one can no longer recite the recitation of first-fruits. And the latter source brings this in the next section: first-fruits before the festival are fit for recitation; after the festival they are not fit for recitation. As it is written after the recitation: “and you shall rejoice in all the good.” From Shavuot until the festival, which is the time of rejoicing in the ingathering of fruits, one brings and recites. From the festival until Hanukkah one brings but does not recite. This is a Mishnah in Bikkurim. So the Mishnah says that after the festival you cannot say it. You cannot, because this is not a time in which you rejoice before the Lord. And since that is so, you cannot say the verse; it does not apply. The verse “and you shall rejoice,” etc., no longer applies, and therefore the law of bringing is not accompanied by recitation there. One cannot recite the recitation of first-fruits after the festival. Fine, so let us return to the earlier Talmud passage. One cannot… And that means you must… How does he recite? “And you shall speak and answer before the Lord,” perhaps. No, the Talmud says that after the fact you cannot recite. That’s what I also just read in Rashi. You cannot recite because it is not the time of rejoicing. But if you say it is not the time of rejoicing and think of it as not the time of rejoicing… Ah, you mean that this could invalidate the bringing itself? No, but the Talmud says that after the fact it doesn’t. The Talmud says, “Is it not because he cannot recite over them?” And if you say that recitation does not invalidate, then why should they rot if all the problem is only with recitation? Then the Talmud answers: why not? But clearly the problem all along is a problem of recitation. Let him bring the first-fruits and simply not recite. No—but here it says “they must rot.” Do not bring and do not recite. That is exactly what the Talmud says: if it is impossible to recite, then he should not bring them at all. Exactly. What is indispensable? Right. Meaning, we see here—why should they rot? He could bring and not recite. If recitation is impossible, then don’t recite, but do bring them. Yet the Talmud here says they must rot. So what do we see? If recitation were not indispensable, as we saw above, then here it should have said: bring them and do not recite; after all, the recitation does not invalidate. That is the Talmud’s question. The Talmud says: as Rav Zeira said. For Rav Zeira said: anything fit for mixing, the mixing does not invalidate it; but anything not fit for mixing, the mixing does invalidate it. This is a principle learned from Menachot. With a meal-offering one needs mixing. But the Talmud says that mixing invalidates the meal-offering only where it is impossible to mix for one reason or another. But if it is possible to mix and I simply did not mix it, that does not invalidate. Meaning, there are a whole series of things—I am not going into which yes and which no—in which there is a requirement for some halakhic detail. But if I did not do it, it is still not terrible—only if I cannot do it is it problematic. All right? As with mixing in meal-offerings: if this is a situation in which I cannot mix at all, the meal-offering is invalid. But if this is a situation in which I can mix and just did not mix—I don’t know, I forgot, I didn’t want to, whatever reason—the meal-offering is not invalid. Meaning, there are certain disqualifications that disqualify only when it is altogether impossible to do it, not when in practice I simply did not do it. The Talmud says: first-fruits are like this too. With first-fruits too, the recitation of first-fruits invalidates only in situations where one cannot recite. But in situations where I can recite and just did not recite, there it does not invalidate. What emerges from the Talmud? The answer says as follows: when Rav Elazar said that recitation is not indispensable, he meant someone who simply brings first-fruits and does not recite. If he brings first-fruits and does not recite, there is no problem—recitation is not indispensable, says the Talmud. But there are situations in which you cannot recite—not just that you did not recite. For example, after the festival. After the festival it is impossible to recite; this is not our time of rejoicing. Ah—and therefore the recitation is indispensable and invalidates the first-fruits. So instead of bringing… No, they must rot. Is that talking about someone who brings and does not recite? No, the opposite. I said that if recitation were not indispensable, then the law should have been that he brings and does not recite. But what does the Talmud say? Look at the Talmud—it says they must rot. But doesn’t that teach us about someone from Hanukkah on who brings and does not recite? No, no. I said “they must rot.” No—the case of bringing and not reciting was the earlier case written before. Wait, wait, we’ll get to that. We haven’t yet said that. We haven’t yet said that; we’ll see it in a moment. It isn’t clear. So how can you say that one brings… that even after Sukkot one brings and recites? It is obvious that one brings and does not recite. Why? Because there it is explicit. Well. The Mishnah says that from Sukkot until Hanukkah he brings and does not recite. One who says “they must rot” holds that about that too they must rot. Maybe—we’ll see—they disagree here. But didn’t we say that Rav Elazar son of… that it was brought in his name… Yes, but “they must rot.” What? But “they must rot.” But before that we said there was a case in which he brings… In what case? Not in this case. Something you said earlier: between Sukkot and Hanukkah he brings and does not recite. We didn’t discuss that. I said one cannot recite. Right—so now what is the conclusion? If recitation does not invalidate, then the conclusion is that in such a situation he brings and does not recite. If the conclusion is that the recitation does invalidate, then since he cannot recite, he also should not bring, and they must rot. That is an explicit Mishnah regarding Sukkot. It is an explicit Mishnah, and the question is whether Rav Elazar disagrees with it. After all, there is a dispute here as to whether recitation invalidates or not. And now they challenge Rav Elazar, who says that recitation does not invalidate, from here. How can Rav Elazar say that recitation does not invalidate? The intent is only if he brings before the festival. If he brings before the festival, what is the problem? Then recitation does not invalidate—that is what Rav Elazar says. Even though he did not recite… Yes, yes, exactly. He simply brings, brings and does not recite. They must rot, they must rot. Why? Because in a place where one cannot recite—there it invalidates. That is the whole principle of anything not fit for mixing, the mixing invalidates it. There are halakhic details such that if I cannot do them, then they invalidate. If I can do them and did not, that is not terrible. Then it does not invalidate. That is what the Talmud says. The Talmud says—I don’t understand. It says, as an interpretation, on one side it was before the festival and on the other side after the festival; that is how it comes out. All the more so. If even if he set them aside before the festival this invalidates, then if he set them aside after the festival, certainly this invalidates. He did nothing at the right time and not in the proper way. That is not necessarily so; in practice this is a dispute among the medieval authorities. I didn’t even check here all the possibilities. Maimonides rules in chapter 4, law 13: one who brings first-fruits from after the festival of Sukkot until Hanukkah, even if he set them aside before the festival—notice the “even if”; that is the a fortiori argument I mentioned earlier—even if he set them aside before the festival, he brings them and does not recite. As it is said: “and you shall rejoice in all the good,” and there is no recitation except at a time of rejoicing. From the festival of Shavuot until the end of the festival—and all other bringers besides these, they bring and recite. That is the end of the chapter; he concludes the list of those who bring and do not recite, and then he says: and everyone else brings and also recites. Fine, that is not important for our issue right now. But Maimonides here rules not like Rav Elazar, right? Maimonides says not “they must rot.” If I set them aside before the festival and brought them after the festival, Maimonides does not say “they must rot,” but rather “he brings and does not recite.” All right? You were right that this was the law, but we had not yet gotten there. In the Talmud it is explicitly written. So Maimonides says: he brings and does not recite. So it appears that Maimonides really rules that this does not invalidate at all. Even in a place that is not fit for mixing, right? That is what we see in Maimonides, right? Even in a place where one cannot recite at all, not where I simply did not recite. It is impossible to recite. After the festival it is impossible to recite. And Maimonides says that even in such a case he brings and does not recite. Meaning that the recitation does not invalidate even in such a case. So Maimonides does not write like Rav Elazar, right? That is what comes out. On the other hand, there is another Talmud passage in Bava Batra 81. What appears there? The Talmud discusses there someone who bought two trees from his fellow. What is the doubt there? One, or two, or three. In the end, if he bought five or two, there is a doubt. The doubt is whether someone who buys two trees from his fellow also bought with them the land, or whether this was a purchase only of the trees and not of the land. What is the practical consequence? Whether I am obligated to bring first-fruits. If I have no land, we said, then I do not have to bring first-fruits. If I have land, then I do have to bring first-fruits. So now the question is whether there is land here or not. We are in doubt, we do not know. This is a monetary doubt, a doubt in the laws of acquisition. When I buy two trees, does this include acquisition of the land or not? That is the doubt. So the Talmud says: he brings and does not recite. He brings and does not recite. And the Talmud discusses there—we explained why. After all, if this is not first-fruits, if in fact he has no land, then from these fruits one must separate tithes and priestly dues like from other fruits. If I bring first-fruits from them, first-fruits are exempt from all those obligations. So that is not all right, because if they are ordinary produce I need to separate tithes and priestly dues, while if they are first-fruits I do not. How exactly is this problem solved? And the Talmud discusses every side: if this is first-fruits, if this is not first-fruits, what happens. And there is a certain section of the Talmud that makes the calculation of what happens if in reality these really are first-fruits—if the true law is that indeed he did acquire land. But perhaps they are first-fruits and require recitation? So the first-fruits require recitation. The Talmud answers: recitation does not invalidate. Recitation does not invalidate—what is the problem? Let him bring them and not recite. The Talmud asks: but did we not learn, “he brings and does not recite”? Right, we said that is the law in the Mishnah. Two trees—he brings and does not recite. The Talmud asks: what do you mean, “he brings and does not recite”? But recitation is required. If the law is that these really are first-fruits, then recitation is required. How can he bring and not recite? The Talmud says: what is the problem? Recitation does not invalidate. Fine, true, first-fruits require recitation, and even on the side that these are real first-fruits, it is not a problem. Because if he recited—if he did not recite—then that does not invalidate. But doesn’t Rav Zeira say: anything fit for mixing, the mixing does not invalidate it, and anything not fit for mixing, the mixing invalidates it? We said—what is written here? Why does he bring and not recite in the case of doubt? Why does he bring? Because we have a doubt. So on the side that these are first-fruits, he brings them. No, but he cannot recite the passage, because perhaps he has no land, and then it would be false. On the side that he has no land, he cannot. Perhaps he has land somewhere else? That is already another question, within the discussion. And what is it that some do not recite? Within that, that some do not recite means irrespective of the land of their patrons. He certainly may own land somewhere else. No, but he needs this land, the land from which he is bringing. So that is a big question, because ten fields all over the world are all one thing mixed up together. Why does it matter specifically here? It does not matter right now whether he has land elsewhere or not. But let us say he has no land at all for the sake of the plain reading—let’s try to move on. So the Talmud says: then how can this be? Ordinarily here—what is happening here? Here, can he recite and he did not recite, or is it impossible to recite? What is the situation here? Because of the doubt. It is impossible to recite. Why? Because of the doubt, it is impossible to recite. Right, but in a place where one cannot recite, we said that recitation invalidates according to all opinions. Even according to the one who says recitation does not invalidate, in a place where one cannot recite, recitation invalidates according to all opinions. So how can it say here that he brings and does not recite? So the Talmud indeed says there is no choice; we find some other solution: that he acts in accordance with Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina, who said he harvested them and sent them by the hand of an agent. If he sends them by an agent—we said that an agent cannot recite—then from the outset he brings and does not recite. Then there is no problem; we solved the problem, because an agent also cannot recite even with ordinary first-fruits. So these first-fruits I have to send by an agent, so that I can be sure I have not missed a case where recitation is required and yet I am not reciting. All right? So they tell us to send it by an agent, and that is the solution. Now the Talmud says: but these are just verses, and that is the source from which we learned to recite. After all, these are merely verses—what is the issue if he recites them? What difference does it make whether he is obligated or not obligated? Is it forbidden to say these verses? The Talmud says no, because it appears like falsehood. It says it is forbidden—not merely that one is not obligated. On the contrary, there is a prohibition here. Good. What does Maimonides rule here? Maimonides rules here—see your next source—in law 4: one who buys two trees within his fellow’s field brings and does not recite, because the matter is in doubt whether he has land or does not have land. And how does he proceed? He first consecrates them to Temple repair. These are sections of the Talmud that we did not read—there are various tricks one has to do here; it is not worth getting into because it is complicated. In the end: and he does not bring them himself, for then he would come to the issue… And he does not bring them himself, but rather sends them by the hand of an agent, so that the recitation should not prevent him from eating them. For anything that is not fit for recitation because of doubt, the recitation invalidates it. What does Maimonides say? He clearly rules the Talmud exactly as it appears, right? That is what comes out of the Talmud. The Talmud basically says one must send them by an agent. Why? Because if you bring them yourself, you will be unable to recite, and in such a case you cannot recite—it is not merely that you did not recite. If you cannot recite, the recitation invalidates. And that is what Maimonides rules here, right? Maimonides rules exactly as follows from the Talmud, right? But Maimonides here is faithful to what is written in the Talmud, and he rules exactly what emerges from the Talmud. The earlier Maimonides, though, ostensibly ruled that even if I cannot recite, that is not a problem—it does not invalidate. One can bring and not recite. There is no such issue of anything fit for mixing, the mixing does not invalidate. So there is a contradiction between these two rulings of Maimonides. The next section in Tosafot there, in the sugya in Bava Batra—Tosafot there brings from the Jerusalem Talmud, and this is how almost all the medieval authorities understand it, that in practice one must understand this law of fit for mixing a bit differently. Tosafot there says as follows: he harvested them and sent them by the hand of an agent, and the agent died on the way; then he brings and does not recite. This is difficult. Are they not unfit for recitation and therefore should be pushed aside? Then it should follow that they must rot. For Abaye said in the last chapter of Makkot: if he set aside first-fruits before the festival and the festival passed over them, they must rot—because before the festival they were fit for recitation, and after the festival they are no longer fit for recitation. And for this reason we regard them like something not fit for mixing, where the mixing invalidates. And this is what we responded to what you said earlier. Tosafot basically interprets that statement of Abaye—first-fruits that he set aside before the festival and brings after the festival. What is the problem there? Until now we learned that the problem is that one cannot recite. Theoretically, even if I set them aside after the festival and bring them after the festival, still I cannot recite, right? Because there is a problem with recitation at this time. And since they are not fit for mixing—one cannot recite, not merely did not recite—one should not be able to bring them, so it should invalidate. It should make no difference whether he set them aside before the festival or after. Tosafot says no. Tosafot says—as is accepted by most of the medieval authorities—that this is only in a situation where he set them aside before the festival. And why? Because when he set them aside before the festival, what was the status at the time of separation itself? At the time of separation there was no problem at all—I could have brought them and recited properly; everything would have been fine, right? I delayed, the festival passed, now it is impossible to recite. But these fruits were actually obligated in recitation until the festival. After the festival I entered a situation in which I can no longer recite, but the fruits are obligated in recitation. Therefore, they must rot. That is what is written there in the Talmud, all right? So why do they rot, according to Tosafot? Not because at this moment it is impossible to recite—not only because of that. But because there was a stage when they were obligated in recitation, and because now it is impossible to recite, they must rot. What if from the outset they were never obligated in recitation? Then there is no problem; one may bring and not recite. All right? Of course not recite—but yes, one may bring them. They do not need to rot. Where is this example? Tosafot says it here. Yes, someone who set them aside after the festival, obviously—that is one example. But I read on: and Rabbenu Chaim answered that here, since from the outset when he harvested them his intention was to send them by another person, then he can send them by another person because it is as though they were never fit for recitation at all, as is proven in the Jerusalem Talmud. When I harvest them, from that point I already do it with the intention of sending them by an agent and not bringing them myself. And the agent, after all, does not recite—we said that earlier. So if from the outset it was already that way, then these fruits were from the beginning not fit for recitation, and therefore even if one does not recite and cannot recite, that does not invalidate. Bring them and do not recite. Only fruits which at the stage of separation did require recitation, and afterward one can no longer recite over them—such fruits must rot. That is what Tosafot says. And in the Jerusalem Talmud there is another example, and in Kaftor VaFerach and other Talmudic passages, but in the final analysis this is what remains. Let us see and examine. Perhaps it can work with Maimonides. There he rules the law of a case where he did not have the possibility and did have the possibility. Where did he not have the possibility? Maimonides there speaks about the case in the Jerusalem Talmud there. Yes, but that does not directly help us in Maimonides. And according to this—I’ll just finish the Tosafot—if he set aside first-fruits before the festival intending to bring them after the festival, they do not rot; rather, after the festival he brings and does not recite. Tosafot says: what if I set aside the first-fruits before the festival, but already when I set them aside I intended to bring them to Jerusalem after the festival? Then from the beginning I planned to bring them in a way that would not obligate recitation. In such a case they do not rot; rather, he brings and does not recite. Why? Because from the outset there was never any stage at which these fruits were obligated in recitation. From the outset this was planned as bringing them without recitation. So that is fine. One may bring and not recite, and they do not need to rot. That perhaps can explain Maimonides, maybe. Because if I still want to explain in Maimonides that “he set them aside before the festival” means he set them aside with the intent to bring them after the festival, and not simply that he set them aside before the festival—Maimonides does not write that. Maybe that could indeed help us with Maimonides, but we will see that in a moment. The Kesef Mishneh in the next section asks this question, this contradiction in Maimonides. And he basically says this—I won’t read it inside, I’ll tell you what it says. He says that in fact there are contradictory sugyot on this issue. Maimonides claims that the Babylonian Talmud disagrees with the Jerusalem Talmud, and therefore Maimonides claims that even things which seemed fit to be brought with recitation and were later deferred—even then they do not rot, but rather he brings and does not recite. Even something that I set aside before the festival and brought after the festival—where at the time of separation it was possible to recite, right? There was no impediment to reciting. So basically this was already obligated in recitation. Now I bring it after the festival, at a stage when it is impossible to recite. According to Tosafot, what happens in such a case? They must rot—nothing can be done, right? Because they were already obligated in recitation and I can no longer fulfill it. But according to Maimonides, no—even in such a case he brings and does not recite; they do not rot, because of a contradiction between sugyot. He ruled against that earlier sugya, the first sugya you brought. Our problem, of course, is with the second Maimonides now. That does not solve the problem. All right—so Maimonides says there is no issue of anything fit for mixing. Meaning, even if one cannot recite at all, that does not invalidate. So why, in the case of buying two trees, does Maimonides tell us that since one cannot recite, either one does it through an agent or it must rot? Meaning, if he wants to bring it himself and not recite, there is no such thing—it must rot. Why? If he really does not accept the rule that when one cannot recite it invalidates, then what is the problem? Here the Kesef Mishneh says an obscure sentence, his last line: “And what our Rabbi wrote earlier in this chapter regarding one who buys two trees, that anything not fit for recitation because of doubt, the recitation invalidates it—that case is different, because of the doubt.” That case is different because it is because of doubt. What? In what case would I say…? If it is because of certainty, then there is no problem; one may bring and not recite. And if it is because of doubt, which is lighter, then one cannot bring and not recite? Why? What is written here in the Kesef Mishneh? I heard someone say it this way, and it starts becoming somewhat similar. What? As a doubt? The doubt is a doubt in reality, where he is bad—how can he recite? Why? A doubt whether he can recite. And reciting is certain. In terms of fruits, according to the one who says that if there is no ownership of the body of the land there is no problem—if you have no land, then you bring and do not recite. So the issue is that the doubt is mixed. It could be that the situation is that he really should recite. So what should he do? There is a doubt that perhaps he cannot. The doubt is mixed into the fruits; the question really concerns the status—whether he is obligated in recitation. Exactly. I think that indeed the distinction of the Kesef Mishneh is this: in a situation where I set them aside before the festival and bring the fruits after the festival, then the fruit right now—what is its law right now? It is not obligated in recitation, right? It was once obligated in recitation, but Maimonides does not accept that; that does not interest Maimonides. Right? That is Tosafot’s view, that since it was once obligated in recitation, one cannot cancel that obligation. Maimonides does not rule that way in practice. So what is the status of the fruit right now? It does not require recitation. This is fruit that was set aside by an agent—it does not require recitation; bring it and do not recite. With fruit of doubt the situation is different, because after all there is a possibility that I have land and am obligated in first-fruits and also obligated to bring them with recitation, and because of the doubt perhaps I do not have land, as we said with the two trees, perhaps I do not have land, so because of the doubt I cannot recite. So there is such a situation. So what are you suggesting? I should bring and not recite. But what would happen then? What would happen then is that it may be that I brought actual first-fruits, which I am obligated to bring, and did not recite over them. That does not work according to Maimonides. So in such a case according to Maimonides the recitation is indispensable. Meaning, if it is clear that these fruits—it is not clear—if there is a possibility that these fruits are indeed obligated in recitation, at least such a possibility exists, and it turns out that I brought fruits obligated in recitation and did not recite over them, that will not work; then it invalidates. In the case where he set them aside before the festival and brings them after the festival, it is clear that the fruits right now are not obligated in recitation. That is clear; there is no doubt about that. So what? Only that they were once obligated in recitation at the time of separation—that does not bother Maimonides. Then were they obligated? Now what is their status? They do not need recitation, so one may bring them and not recite. But that does not exactly fit the wording of Maimonides, who wrote at the end the language of mixing. Second, I have a solution. Why do it through an agent? Let him separate the first-fruits when he is there, and say everything, and then he exempts it all in one go. No, that does not work. Maimonides here, because there is a doubt, says perhaps here there is still an obligation, and I cannot forgo that, and therefore it must invalidate. The solution of an agent is only one example. Any solution you find that brings it to a state where recitation is not required is fine—that is obvious. And then in Maimonides this too falls under what it means, anything fit for mixing. He does indeed rule this Talmudic principle of anything fit for mixing. After all, what would happen, for example, if someone brought real first-fruits and simply did not recite, accidentally did not recite—what then? The mixing does not invalidate, right? Why? Because anything fit for mixing, the mixing does not invalidate. Exactly. Why? Because the fruits are obligated in recitation and he did bring them, but he did not recite. The fruits are fine—you transgressed, but the recitation does not invalidate; the mixing does not invalidate. Exactly—that is “anything fit for mixing,” and therefore this does fit Maimonides’ wording. When Maimonides says “anything fit for mixing,” he means to say: when there is something that is presently obligated in recitation, like one who buys two trees, then at present the fruits are obligated in recitation—at least there is such a possibility—and I am not reciting. So in principle that does not invalidate. But if I cannot recite and the thing is obligated in recitation, then it does invalidate. But all that is not said about Tosafot’s case, where the fruits were once fit for recitation and are now deferred—now one cannot recite over them. That is said only about a case where the fruits even now require recitation; at least there is a possibility that they require recitation. There is no situation in which there are first-fruits that require recitation and I brought them and they did not receive the recitation—I did not recite—and that is fine. No such thing. But all that is only if I cannot recite now. If I can recite now and simply choose not to recite, then it is “anything fit for mixing, the mixing does not invalidate.” Maimonides does indeed rule this lack of fitness for mixing in relation to recitation, but only according to the present situation, the current situation, not according to the past.