Women’s Beit Midrash – Winter Semester II 5783 – Nedarim – Lecture 5

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, in the previous lesson we went through the Talmudic text, Rav Giddel’s statement: someone who swears to fulfill the commandment, swears to study Torah, to get up early and review. And in the first statement, the Talmud is really talking about being already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai—that an oath cannot take effect on a matter of commandment. We talked about that a bit. I noted the question whether this is because of the general rule that one prohibition does not take effect on top of another prohibition, or whether this is a special, specific rule about oaths. So today we’ll touch on that a little more from a somewhat different angle. The source for this law—that an oath does not take effect on a commandment—is found in the Mishnah on page 16a, at the end of the page. Of course, over there the discussion is about someone who swears to violate the commandment, to nullify the commandment. Here we’re dealing with someone who swears to fulfill the commandment. That’s an important point to keep in mind. In other words, there’s a difference between the topics, but still, the topic there definitely sheds light on our topic. So let me share for a moment. Yes, so the Mishnah says as follows: “And there is a stringency in vows over oaths. How so? If one says: Konam, a sukkah that I make, a lulav that I take, tefillin that I put on—in vows it is forbidden; in oaths it is permitted, because one does not swear to violate commandments.” In other words, there of course—again—we’re talking about “Konam, a sukkah that I make,” so the vow or the oath goes against the commandment. In other words, it comes to prevent me from doing the commandment. I’ll remind you again: here we’re dealing with someone who swears to fulfill the commandment. There it’s called an oath to violate the commandment. That’s what the Mishnah concludes: one does not swear to violate commandments. Now, the distinction the Mishnah makes is between a vow and an oath. First comment: “Konam, a sukkah that I make”—whether “that I do not make” or “that I make”—simply speaking, this is not a prohibition on making a sukkah, because konam is something that creates a prohibition on the object. So the meaning is apparently to prohibit to himself the sukkah that he makes. In other words, he prohibits to himself the object of the sukkah, and of course by doing that he prevents himself from fulfilling the commandment of sukkah. But if that’s really the case, then people have already pointed out: why is this called a vow to nullify a commandment? I mean, he prohibits to himself the sukkah that he made—yes, “that I make.” Let him sit in a sukkah that someone else made. In principle, the fact that he prohibits to himself the sukkah he made does not necessarily lead him to nullify the commandment.

[Speaker B] But he could have said “Konam, sukkah” in general?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but he didn’t say that. That’s not the case brought in the Mishnah. If he had said that, then fine.

[Speaker C] But maybe this sukkah itself has commandment status? It’s true that I can fulfill the commandment through another sukkah, but from the moment I built this sukkah there is a commandment-duty attached to it. So the question is whether I can vow regarding a sukkah that has that. After all, a sukkah…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A sukkah doesn’t carry an obligation on the person.

[Speaker C] This sukkah is an object used for holiness. It’s not just a bunch of boards.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, it’s an object used for a commandment, not an object used for holiness. Beyond that, as long as I haven’t sat in it, it probably isn’t even that. That’s called designation. Designation means something prepared for use in a commandment. And the question is what exactly the status of a designated object is—whether designation has Torah-level force, rabbinic force—but in the simple sense, it’s not yet an object of commandment as long as I haven’t sat in it. There are views that even the sanctity doesn’t take effect on a sukkah as long as I haven’t sat in it. By sanctity I mean, that is, the prohibition on using the sukkah for ordinary purposes.

[Speaker B] Wait, but regarding sukkah it says “that I make,” but regarding the lulav and the tefillin—is that every lulav and every tefillin? Right? Any lulav that I take and any tefillin that I put on?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. In fact, with lulav and tefillin the wording is problematic from a different angle. There really the… the wording implies a prohibition on an action and not a prohibition on the object. With “Konam, a sukkah that I make”—sorry, “Konam, a sukkah that I make”—there’s room to explain that this means konam on the sukkah that I make, not konam on the act of making the sukkah, but konam on the sukkah that I make.

[Speaker B] But with lulav and tefillin, no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It sounds like he means to say that this is konam on that lulav that I take.

[Speaker B] No, but the lulav in general, tefillin in general.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that means the wording in lulav and tefillin really is different from sukkah. But it’s different from sukkah because in “Konam, a sukkah that I make,” you can explain—or maybe you’re even pushed to explain—that this is a prohibition on the object of the sukkah. But “a lulav that I take” and “tefillin that I put on” seemingly mean an undertaking not to perform an action. That’s not on the object, but not to take a lulav or not to put on tefillin. With sukkah, say, the parallel should have been “a sukkah that I sit in,” “that I am sitting in.” That would be an undertaking not to sit in a sukkah, because making the sukkah is not itself the commandment. So all the formulations here are problematic. The wording of sukkah is problematic—true, there’s an object-based prohibition here, but it’s an object-based prohibition that doesn’t prevent him from fulfilling the commandment. And with lulav and tefillin, it doesn’t sound like an object-based prohibition but some sort of prohibition on an action. If you remember, we spoke a bit about whether there can be a vow that forbids actions to me, not objects. And I also brought commentators from our Talmudic discussion on page 8. So here too there’s some room to hesitate about what exactly is being discussed. If this is a vow that prohibits the action, as seems implied by lulav and tefillin—and maybe by sukkah too, I don’t know—then what is the difference between that and an oath? After all, the usual explanation is: why does a vow on a matter of commandment take effect, but an oath on a matter of commandment does not take effect? Because a vow is a legal effect on the object, and once the object is prohibited, then when I now come and want to fulfill a commandment with it, I can’t, because the object has been prohibited. So the result is that I can’t fulfill the commandment. But with an oath there is no legal effect on the object. The oath is to swear not to do the commandment—but that doesn’t exist, because I’m obligated to do it. Therefore an oath on a matter of commandment—that is, to nullify a commandment—cannot take effect, while a vow can. That’s the standard explanation. Now, if the vow being discussed here is also a vow that comes to prohibit an action and not an object, then we’re back in exactly the same situation as an oath. What’s the difference between a vow and an oath? In both cases I vow or swear to prohibit an action to myself. So that should not take effect, because I’m obligated to perform that action because of Torah law. So why is a distinction made here between a vow and an oath? That’s another indication that the vow is supposed to be some kind of rule about the object. Then maybe with sukkah you really can explain it that way—there’s the other problem, that this doesn’t prevent me from fulfilling the commandment, but at least it can be explained as a rule about the object. With lulav and tefillin it’s a bit harder. There it sounds like a prohibition on an action, and then it’s not clear why there’s any difference from an oath. Later in the Talmud this law is brought in a slightly different formulation: “the use of a sukkah is forbidden to me,” or “sitting in a sukkah is forbidden to me.” After they say that commandments were not given for benefit, then it’s “the use of a sukkah is forbidden to me,” or rather “sitting in a sukkah is forbidden to me,” sorry. And then indeed, first, it prohibits the sukkah in terms of benefit—that is, it’s a rule about the object—and second, it really does prevent me from fulfilling the commandment, because we’re not talking here about one specific sukkah but about all sukkot in the world being forbidden to me. That could be one possibility.

[Speaker B] Wait, if you say all sukkot in the world, then you have to say this too is really a vow that is basically an oath, because it’s about the action.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—I’m talking about the sukkot, all sukkot in the world are forbidden to me as objects.

[Speaker B] So why didn’t that work before with the tefillin and the lulav? Why there is it about the action?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tefillin and lulav are one problem; sukkah is a different problem. I’m not resolving everything. I’m saying that regarding sukkah there is a different wording in the Talmud that could have resolved it. What I left unresolved about tefillin and lulav remains unresolved, and really it could be that you can connect those two things in the following way. I said that the difference the commentators explain between a vow and an oath—the standard explanation, anyway; there are several explanations, and if we get to page 16 maybe we’ll discuss them—but the standard explanation is that in a vow there is legal effect on the object, and the object is not obligated to perform commandments. Right? In other words, the object—I define it, and then it becomes prohibited. Afterward, as a result, it turns out that I can’t fulfill the commandment. But that’s already a consequence; the object itself was prohibited. In an oath there is no legal effect on any object at all. Once there’s no legal effect on the object, all the oath says is that the person cannot fulfill the commandment—or rather, must violate the commandment, depending whether it’s a positive or negative one—and that really cannot be, because I am already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai. I’m obligated to do it. Now, if I explain all the vows in the Mishnah as prohibitions on actions—and we discussed that, that with vows concerning commandments there may perhaps be vows on actions, and it would still be a vow—but still it would not be the same as an oath. Why? Because in a vow there is legal effect, and in an oath there is none. Now true, here we’re talking about a vow that is a vow on an action, not on the object, but it could be that in a vow on an action I impose a legal effect on the person. There is upon me a legal effect of prohibition to perform that action, just as there is legal effect on the object if I want to benefit from it—there is legal effect on the object that blocks it from me. As opposed to an oath, where I merely swear not to do it; there are no legal effects there, it’s just the bare prohibition on the person to do it. If there really is such a difference between a vow and an oath—even between a vow on an action and an oath—then maybe we can understand it. Because then it could be that the difference between a vow and an oath is still preserved even regarding a vow or oath to nullify a commandment. Because if I vow regarding myself that I will not sit in the sukkah, then I did not simply forbid myself to sit in the sukkah; I created upon myself a legal effect whose meaning is a prohibition against sitting in the sukkah. Okay, now when I come to sit in the sukkah I have a problem, because I have a legal effect that prohibits it to me, and therefore I get stuck. But the legal effect took hold upon me because when it was imposed on me, it had not yet clashed with the commandment. There is a legal effect on me, period, and that is valid. Now when I come to fulfill the commandment, the problem arises. But by now it’s too late; the legal effect has already taken hold. In an oath there is no legal effect. In an oath it is only an obligation on me to do or not do something. When does that start to become relevant? When I come to act. And when I come to act, I’m engaged in a commandment—I am already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai—so an oath cannot prohibit me from something about which I was already commanded at Sinai. Already sworn, commanded—it doesn’t matter whether from Sinai exactly. And then it could be that I can explain the vows in the Mishnah as vows on the person and not on the object—that is, prohibitions on actions—and still understand why the Mishnah draws a distinction here between a vow and an oath, even though in both cases these are prohibitions on actions. Because in a vow this is a prohibition rooted in a legal effect on the person, and therefore it is a vow and not an oath; and in an oath there is no legal effect at all, it’s simply a prohibition on the person. And therefore a vow can take effect even to nullify a commandment, while an oath will not take effect.

[Speaker C] Wait, but I have two small questions. Actually, no—really just one. I understand how a vow can take effect on a person, but then it’s a bit hard in the plain sense of the Mishnah, because in the plain sense the Mishnah is apparently only giving examples of vows, and at the end it says, “but in an oath this would be permitted.” Now, I had originally thought that if I say “a lulav that I take,” since we’re talking about taking a lulav, then okay, this is probably an oath, and then I understand why oaths are brought in here at the end. But if you’re saying that all of these really are vows, then why do they bring in here the statement that with an oath it would be permitted? What does “oath” even mean here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand—after all, it’s obvious that all these examples are vows. What?

[Speaker C] No, but you said—and it actually made sense to me—that “a lulav that I take,” since the prohibition here, the vow here, is on taking the lulav, then the mechanism is probably that of an oath and not a vow.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say that. I said it’s a vow on an action. And it’s a vow; it appears as a vow.

[Speaker C] So your principle… but before that you said that really we’re pushed to say that because the vow is on the taking, then it’s probably an oath and not a vow.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say it’s an oath. I said there would be no difference between it and an oath with respect to the question of whether it can be used to nullify a commandment. I didn’t say it’s an oath. There are people who explain it as an oath, but I didn’t say that. I read it as a vow, because that’s the plain sense of the Mishnah. It’s just a vow of a kind that… I think there should be a halakhic difference between it and an oath, because that difference is usually explained by saying that in a vow there is legal effect on the object, while in an oath there is none. But if this is a vow on an action, then there too there is no legal effect on the object, so even though one is a vow and one is an oath, there shouldn’t be any difference regarding a vow or oath to nullify a commandment. Now I’m claiming: no. Even if this is a vow on an action, it still is not like an oath in the sense that it begins with some sort of legal effect. And once it begins with some sort of legal effect, it could be that the legal effect takes hold even though indirectly it will lead me to inability to fulfill, or to violating a commandment, or to violating a prohibition—because at the moment it takes hold, nothing is yet colliding with it. Afterwards it has already taken hold—nothing can be done. By contrast, in an oath nothing takes hold at all; there is no legal effect there. All there is is an oath upon me to do something. When I come to do it, the Sinai oath stands against me and says: wait, but that’s forbidden.

[Speaker C] So then I can’t vow when there is already some commandment? What you just said—is it that I can’t impose on myself the legal effect of a vow on an action? With a vow I can.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—if I’m already commanded in something?

[Speaker C] With a vow I can. No, what I mean is: if I’m already commanded in something. You’re saying that right now I’m not commanded about

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] anything, so impose the legal effect on yourself, and afterward… But what do you mean I’m not commanded? I’m commanded from Mount Sinai. But the command is not yet relevant until I come to fulfill it.

[Speaker C] So I’m saying: you say that because in a place where the command is relevant, I won’t be able to impose that legal effect on myself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What case are you talking about?

[Speaker C] I can’t see a case. Say now I’m commanded about circumcising my son, and I’m already commanded—the eighth day has arrived—and now I want to impose on myself, to vow not to circumcise my son, just as an example. Various cases.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Good question, I don’t know. Because you could say that this too is like sukkah—also with sukkah, when the festival of Sukkot begins, I’m already commanded to sit in a sukkah. There may be room to distinguish; I don’t know. I can’t tell you.

[Speaker E] Why—I don’t understand the difference between the legal effect of a vow and… because an oath too either takes effect or doesn’t take effect. That’s our whole discussion all the time. When I come to swear to fulfill the commandment, or if I swear not to fulfill it—that is, to violate it—does the oath take effect or not? There is a taking effect with an oath too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll talk about that more, but at the moment what I’m saying is that when I say “an oath takes effect,” that doesn’t mean that something happened in reality, that some legal effect came into being. Rather, “an oath takes effect” means that I am bound by this oath. But being bound by this oath means: you are forbidden to sit in the sukkah. But I have a commandment to sit in the sukkah, so I can’t. If there were a legal effect in reality, then I’d say: leave that aside, reality itself is not obligated in commandments; there is a legal effect in reality. The legal effect was created. As a result of it there’s a clash with the commandment; therefore here it can take effect. But—

[Speaker E] Why with an oath does it not take effect immediately, but with a vow it does take effect? With an oath it doesn’t take effect at all—not immediately and not afterward.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no legal effect in an oath.

[Speaker E] Right, there’s no legal effect in… I just don’t understand the difference. Why is the legal effect accepted in a vow? In an oath there is no legal effect at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not because of the commandment—in an oath there is no legal effect at all. There is no concept of legal effect in oaths.

[Speaker E] Right, but there’s something that stops the oath from being accepted in the world, from existing in the world, because I’m already obligated and standing, or because one prohibition doesn’t take effect on another prohibition, or because I’m already sworn from Mount Sinai. But with a vow, why isn’t that there? What doesn’t stop the vow?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Because with a vow it’s not that I’m obligated not to sit in the sukkah. A legal effect takes hold on me. As a result of that legal effect, I am obligated not to sit in the sukkah. So when I discuss whether the legal effect takes hold, the person is only the bearer of the legal effect. In other words, it’s not yet a discussion about him. It’s not yet a discussion of what he is allowed or forbidden to do. Those are only consequences of the fact that there is a legal effect on him. True, the implications of the legal effect are that I can’t sit in the sukkah. But first of all there is a factual state here: a legal effect has been created. And that state is a state in the world, a neutral one. In other words, even if indirectly it will lead to a problem vis-à-vis the commandment, that will be a consequence. The legal effect as such can take hold. I don’t understand.

[Speaker E] But the whole essence of the legal effect is that I can’t sit in the sukkah, can’t take a lulav, say.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A consequence—what do you mean by “essence”? Some reality was created in the world. The result of that reality is that I can’t sit in the sukkah.

[Speaker E] That I understand with an object-based prohibition, when I prohibit the object to myself. But if the whole legal effect, its entire essence, is that I not sit in the sukkah…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—even with the person I create a legal effect. With the person too I create the same thing. Since there is a legal effect on… what’s the legal effect on the object? That I won’t eat it. That’s the legal effect on the object. So the legal effect on the person is that he won’t sit in the sukkah.

[Speaker E] That’s the legal effect on the person. I understand the two stages when it’s on the object. That’s clear. This is forbidden to me, and because of that now I… it’s a kind of two stages, because there’s a legal effect that descends, there is a prohibition that takes hold on the object, now I want to fulfill the commandment, I can’t.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same with the person. Why? Because the legal effect of the vow takes hold on me, and now when I want to fulfill the commandment, I can’t. We’ve talked in the past about the question of what legal effect means—you’ve surely already heard this from me—this whole idea that legal effect is some kind of entity, some kind of reality.

[Speaker E] When I speak about

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] ownership taking effect, people usually understand: what does ownership taking effect mean? It means you have usage rights, others may not use it without your permission, and so on. I claim that’s not correct. Ownership as a legal effect is first of all a reality, something resting on the object—my ownership-effect. That thing has consequences. The consequences are that I am allowed to use it and someone else is not allowed to use it. A practical implication could be, for example, that there can be an ownership-effect even if it has no practical consequence at all—it won’t create rights of use. In the case of a slave whose bill of manumission is delayed, I brought some examples; never mind, there are different examples of this. I also spoke about the fact that there can be contradiction in legal effects—that a woman can simultaneously have the legal effect of being a married woman and the legal effect of being divorced, even though a woman cannot be both married and divorced at the same time. Because I said that opposites or contradictions exist between properties, not between entities. A dish cannot be fully salty and fully sweet at the same time. But a dish can contain both salt and sugar—that’s not a contradiction. Now if I claim that the legal effect of married status doesn’t just mean that she is a married woman, but that there is a reality upon her, the result of which is that the laws of a married woman apply to her—the laws are a result, and first of all there is some sort of meta-legal or meta-physical reality that there is upon her the legal effect of married status—then I want to claim the same thing here. In a vow this really exists. Before I become forbidden to do these things, it begins first of all with the fact that some sort of reality rests on me, some kind of cloud hovering over me that forbids me or doesn’t allow me to do various things. And therefore it makes no difference whether that legal effect rests on a person or whether that legal effect rests on an object; it is some kind of reality, and reality always works. It doesn’t matter whether in the end it creates a problem for me vis-à-vis a commandment or whether it doesn’t. When I discuss the question of whether this reality was created—yes, it was created. Why shouldn’t it be created? You can create realities in the world. The fact that afterward it creates problems for me—it creates problems for me. In an oath there is no such primary dimension. In an oath all that exists is only a prohibition on sitting in the sukkah. But a prohibition on sitting in the sukkah cannot be, because there is a commandment to sit in the sukkah. Understood? So I’m saying this is one possibility, and then indeed I would say that this whole Mishnah is really talking about vows, but vows that come to prohibit actions to me, not vows that come to prohibit objects to me. Then one has to adjust a bit the standard explanation of the difference between a vow and an oath—not really change it, but expand it. In other words, people usually understand this as a legal effect on the object, and the object is prohibited, therefore I can’t sit. Now I want to claim that it could be a prohibition on actions, but even in a vow-prohibition on actions, as distinct from an oath-prohibition, there is a legal effect on the person that prevents him from performing the action. And therefore the basic division between a vow and an oath remains as it was in the case of the object.

[Speaker C] Just a question—I don’t understand why you need to reach the assumption that there is a legal effect on the person too. I mean, if we assume… after all, even in a vow, even if I vow regarding an object, even if I impose a legal effect on an object for that matter, I can say that this cup is forbidden to me but only for drinking, say. In other words, I can impose on it a legal effect that doesn’t apply to all forms of benefit. So I’m saying: if we assume that, then you don’t have to say that the legal effect of the vow is on the person in this case. You can say: every sukkah in the world is forbidden to me with respect to sitting, or every lulav that I would take is forbidden to me with respect to taking it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, you can say that. The whole question is whether that’s the meaning of the wording used in the Mishnah.

[Speaker C] I’m saying, isn’t that more economical than saying there’s a legal effect on the person?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying it’s much more economical. That’s how I wanted to explain it at first. I just think that in terms of the language of the Mishnah, it doesn’t seem that way.

[Speaker D] Ah, because

[Speaker C] it says “Konam upon me, a lulav that I take.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “A lulav that I take” means a prohibition on taking the lulav; it’s not a prohibition on the lulav. That’s what it sounds like, I don’t know—unless we say that everything here really means all the objects in the world. That doesn’t seem to be the implication of the wording. But okay, those are the two possibilities. Clearly, the commentators usually understood this as object-based prohibitions. That’s clear. I’m raising here the possibility of sticking to the plain language of the Mishnah, where it doesn’t seem like an object-based prohibition but rather a prohibition on an action, and still being able to explain the difference between that and an oath. That’s basically what I’ve done until now. But I’m telling you, it’s less important for our purposes, because here we’re not dealing with vows; we’re dealing with oaths. The topic there mainly deals with vows, and when we get there we’ll discuss it. But what matters to me is oaths, not vows. So this is only to complete the picture. Let’s focus on matters of oath. The Talmud asks—what does it ask there on page 16? The Talmud asks: what is different about a vow, where it says, “If a man vows a vow to the Lord, he shall not profane his word,” whereas regarding an oath too it says, “or swear an oath to the Lord, he shall not profane his word”? It’s the same “he shall not profane his word” that goes forward and backward, on both vow and oath. And therefore the Talmud says: why should a vow not take effect on a commandment—sorry, why should a vow take effect on a commandment?

[Speaker F] Because, let’s call it, it’s object-based, and with sacred objects there isn’t the… wait. One second. Apparently the meaning here is: “If a man vows a vow to the Lord, he shall not profane his word”—that is, he is forbidden to profane his word in a place where he vows a vow to the Lord. But—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a place where he vows a vow against the Lord, where he is really vowing to violate a commandment, then there is no “he shall not profane his word.” That’s the source they bring for the fact that… wait, no, the reverse—that’s what confused me at first. The reverse, because with a vow it does take effect.

[Speaker C] Even if he vows a vow to the Lord, he shall not profane his word.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Apparently even if he vows a vow to the Lord, the vow—

[Speaker B] not his own and not Heaven’s—and not even the Name; it’s additional to his own word.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning the commandment, as if… and the wording here is a bit strange, somehow I only now noticed it. The wording is a bit strange: “if a man vows a vow to the Lord”—the vow is to the Lord, not that the vow is about a commandment that belongs to the Lord. Anyway, in any case, the Talmud understands from this that the vow takes effect, so the Talmud says: fine, then an oath should also take effect.

[Speaker C] But the verse doesn’t say “an oath to the Lord.” What? In the verse it doesn’t say “an oath to the Lord.”

[Speaker B] They say that “to the Lord” serves both of them—what comes before and what comes after.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the Name and on “he shall not profane his word.”

[Speaker B] As though it’s written once, but it applies backward and forward.

[Speaker C] It’s like a twisted formulation.

[Speaker B] Yes, from here it’s interpreted as applying before and after.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the claim basically is that there should not be a difference between a vow and an oath, because the same verse you have about a vow you also have about an oath. Now, if I really understand the distinction between a vow and an oath the way I explained earlier—that in a vow there is legal effect, and therefore the legal effect takes hold and the prohibition follows from it; while in an oath there is no legal effect, the whole thing is just the prohibition—then it could be that with an oath it does not take effect and with a vow it does. But then I think that doesn’t come out of the verse “If a man vows a vow to the Lord, he shall not profane his word,” but rather from the understanding of what a vow is. Okay? Therefore, when we learn it from this verse—if this verse is the source—then apparently this is still not the explanation I gave earlier, about legal effect on the object or not on the object, but rather they simply derive it from a verse. The Talmud says: if it’s from a verse, the same verse also applies to an oath. So I still don’t understand the difference between a vow and an oath. Now, here there is room to discuss what exactly the discussion is about. When we say that the vow or the oath takes effect, do we mean to discuss the very application of the vow and the oath, or the prohibition of “he shall not profane his word”? And when is the right place to say that both the vow and the oath take hold—there is a vow and there is an oath—but the prohibition of “he shall not profane his word” is canceled in the face of the commandment? The commandment overrides it. Then what comes out is that the vow or oath does take effect, only the prohibition against violating it does not exist. Therefore, if the whole discussion is about the prohibition against violating them, then what the Talmud says here sounds more plausible, this comparison it draws between a vow and an oath. In both cases, after all, it says “he shall not profane his word,” meaning that in such a case there should not be “he shall not profane his word.” The discussion is about the prohibition, not about the very taking effect of the vow and oath. And then indeed, once the discussion is about the prohibition, the Talmud says: so what is the difference between a vow and an oath? The prohibition is written the same way in both, and I don’t care right now that in a vow there is legal effect and in an oath there is no legal effect—that’s not the point. We are discussing whether there is a prohibition of “he shall not profane his word.” And if the Talmud says there is such a prohibition with a vow, there should also be one with an oath; and if there isn’t one with an oath, there shouldn’t be one with a vow either. Okay?

[Speaker E] But in our Talmudic discussion we said that the oath does not take effect. I didn’t understand. In the Talmud on page 8.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait—we’ll get to that Talmud there. Leave that for a moment, because I don’t want to mix things up. We’ll get to it in a moment, where we learn this issue. So Abaye answers like this. Abaye said: This is where he said, “The use of a sukkah is forbidden to me”; that is where he said, “An oath that I will not benefit from the sukkah.” What does that mean?

[Speaker B] Here you have one formulation that’s a vow and one formulation that’s an oath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but that’s obvious—the Mishnah says this is a vow and this is an oath. That’s not what Abaye is coming to teach.

[Speaker C] He’s kind of going back to… he’s basically not relating at all to the derivation from the verse. He’s gone back to the conceptual explanation of the difference between a vow and an oath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says that really the verse tells us the same thing, right? In a vow and in an oath, there’s no room to distinguish between a vow and an oath from the standpoint of the verse. So what is the distinction? When he says, “The benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me,” and “I swear that I will not benefit from the sukkah,” he goes back to that. “The benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me” means there is a prohibition on the object of the sukkah, while “I swear that I will not benefit from the sukkah” is a prohibition on my action. And here comes the distinction I presented earlier in the name of the commentators, that this is the difference between a vow and an oath: with a vow, the effect applies to the object, and with an oath, the effect does not apply to the object. And we’ve dropped this whole issue of “he shall not profane his word.” Meaning, this is not learned from the verse “he shall not profane his word,” because from the standpoint of the verse, a vow and an oath really are the same thing.

[Speaker C] But is it also possible to say that “he shall not profane his word” was first said about a vow, then extended to say, fine, so it’s also true about an oath, and then we say: okay, in a vow the problem is profaning my speech; the problem is going against reality, as if against the effect that has been created in reality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But “he shall not profane his word” is written about a vow too. What do you mean?

[Speaker C] Right, but if I understand a vow the way you explained it, then really “he shall not profane his word” doesn’t seem all that relevant to a vow.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? It is relevant to a vow. The moment you violate the effect you created, you have profaned your speech. The speech created a legal effect here. That’s the form that profaning speech takes. So I think that the difference commonly drawn between a vow and an oath is introduced at this stage of the Talmudic discussion. In the earlier stage, when the Talmud raised the difficulty, the Talmud understood that really a vow and an oath are two things that are more or less the same, and the difference between them was supposed to come, as it were, from the verse. But then the Talmud says: no, the same verse rules on both a vow and an oath. So you can’t learn it from the verse. We’re forced to conclude that there really is some fundamental difference between a vow and an oath: a vow forbids an object to me, while an oath forbids me in relation to the object, or forbids my action regarding the object. Which is what we already saw on page 2 as well, where the Talmud says that this one is on the object and that one is on the person. Rava makes a parenthetical comment that’s less important for our purposes. Rava said: Were commandments given for enjoyment? What does “the benefit of the sukkah” mean? The commandment of sukkah was not given for enjoyment. Rather, Rava said: this is where he says, “Sitting in the sukkah is forbidden to me” — not “the benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me,” but “sitting in the sukkah is forbidden to me.”

[Speaker B] Meaning according to Rava, if he had said “the benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me,” then he would have been allowed to sit in it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, because commandments were not given for enjoyment.

[Speaker B] Yes, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And this is where he says, “I swear that I will not sit in the sukkah.” But in any case, for our purposes this isn’t important; it’s just a correction in parentheses. And that is the difference between a vow and an oath. As I said earlier, in the Mishnah, when we look at the Mishnah, the wording in the Mishnah — here: “Konam that I make a sukkah,” do you see? And here: “The benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me.” “The benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me” is something different from “Konam that I make a sukkah.” Meaning, “the benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me” really is, very clearly, a prohibition on the object. So what would he say about “a lulav that I take” and “tefillin that I put on”? Presumably there too he would change it; he would say “the benefit of tefillin is forbidden to me,” or “putting on tefillin is forbidden to me,” or “taking the lulav is forbidden to me.” Meaning, he probably interprets all these things as object-prohibitions, or perhaps, as I said earlier, prohibitions on actions that begin with a legal effect. The plain sense of Abaye’s wording seems to be that he comes to state some prohibition on the object. Now the Talmud continues: “And that one may not swear to violate the commandments — is that derived from here? It is derived from there.” What, you derive that one may not swear to violate the commandments from “he shall not profane his word”? No, it is not derived from here, it is derived from there, as it was taught: One might think that if someone swore to cancel a commandment and did not cancel it, perhaps he should be liable? Meaning, if he swore to nullify a commandment and did not nullify it — in other words, he violated his oath — might one think that he should be liable? Scripture says: “to do harm or to do good.” Just as doing good is optional, so too doing harm is optional. This excludes one who swore to cancel a commandment and did not cancel it, because the matter is not in his control. What does that mean? The standard understanding is that “to do harm or to do good” — and this emerges more clearly in the Talmudic discussion in Shevuot, to which I referred you — means that when you swear concerning a certain action, the action has to be optional. Something where you can either do harm or do good, you can do it or you can refrain from doing it; the Torah does not obligate you to do it and does not forbid you to do it.

[Speaker B] And about that, he is not already sworn from Mount Sinai.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. About that, he is not already sworn from Mount Sinai, and that is an optional matter, and therefore an oath can take effect on it. But if the Torah has already forbidden you from the “harm” or the “good” — meaning, one of the possibilities, either doing or not doing — then it is no longer open to oaths; it is already prescribed for you what you are supposed to do. In such a case, the oath does not take effect. Okay? That’s it.

[Speaker B] Do you have to bring a sacrifice here or not? What? Do you have to bring a sacrifice or something?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a moment the Talmud talks about a sacrifice, but right now we’re not there yet. So what comes out is that oaths can take effect only in optional matters. In a matter where you can do it or not do it, and you swear to do it or you swear not to do it. But if it is prescribed to you in advance to do it or not to do it, then you cannot swear — the oath has no meaning at all. The oath is supposed to direct you when you have free choice; then it tells you, go right. But if there is only one way, then what are you swearing for? Meaning, an oath always requires that there be two paths open before you. That is learned from the verse “to do harm or to do good.” Okay? That’s the standard explanation. Now I’ll already note here: what about an oath to fulfill a commandment?

[Speaker B] The oath doesn’t take effect.

[Speaker G] On an oath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s in our sugya; right now I’m speaking from the standpoint of “to do harm or to do good.”

[Speaker B] So wait, once again, if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An oath to fulfill a commandment — an oath to sit in the sukkah. From the standpoint of “to do harm or to do good,” does the oath take effect or not?

[Speaker E] It does not take effect.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Apparently it does not take effect, right. Even though the case is the opposite, I still am not standing at an intersection where I have two open paths before me and the oath directs me toward one of them. Both in the case where I swear to cancel a commandment and in the case where I swear to fulfill a commandment, in both of those cases the intersection where I stand has only one road leading from it, not two. And if the conception really is, as I described earlier, that “to do harm or to do good” means that one may swear only about an optional matter — not because you are going against a commandment, notice, that’s the important point — the problem is not that you are going against a commandment. If the problem were that you are going against a commandment, then in our case you are not going against a commandment, so the oath should take effect. But if the problem is that you are swearing about something that is not in your hands — you are already sworn from Mount Sinai, it has already been determined for you what you are supposed to do regarding it — then if that is the understanding of why an oath cannot take effect, then there is no difference between fulfilling a commandment and canceling a commandment.

[Speaker G] In both cases, the choice is not in our hands.

[Speaker C] But not necessarily. Maybe you’re already explaining it in light of the sugya on page 8, but intuitively I would say that the idea of an oath does not necessarily sit specifically in a place where I have only two possible paths before me. Rather, it exists in a place where it is in my power to swear about this thing. Meaning, something I am forbidden to do — that path is closed to me, and I cannot swear about it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “To do harm or to do good.” However they say it, regarding a commandment you cannot swear. “To do harm or to do good” means that the oath has to concern an action that is optional.

[Speaker D] The Talmud says—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Just as doing good is optional, so too doing harm is optional. This excludes one who swore to cancel a commandment and did not cancel it, because the matter is not in his control.” Meaning, he does not determine what to do; it is already prescribed to him. So on the face of it, it seems this would also apply to an oath to fulfill a commandment, not only to an oath to cancel a commandment.

[Speaker D] We’ll see further—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] shortly that maybe one can qualify this, but it seems to me that the simple plain meaning is the same. So one more important point.

[Speaker E] Then this is really just a case of an oath taking effect on an oath. What? It’s exactly the same case. I didn’t understand. This is the case of an oath taking effect on an oath, not the case of “already sworn from Mount Sinai.”

[Speaker B] What’s the difference? I didn’t understand. It’s the same thing in different words.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—

[Speaker E] We said there’s a difference: that these are two different ways of explaining why one may not swear concerning the commandments. Is it because an oath cannot take effect on an oath, which is a general case unrelated to a commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or is it because one prohibition cannot take effect on another prohibition? No — “already sworn from Mount Sinai” is the expression in the Talmud. That expression itself can be interpreted either as “an oath cannot take effect on an oath” or as “one prohibition cannot take effect on another prohibition.”

[Speaker E] So here it seems simple, because the oath does not take effect. “To do harm or to do good” just means I already have an oath on this, so what is the point of adding another oath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the opposite.

[Speaker B] On an optional matter, you don’t already have an oath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. From here, on the contrary, it דווקא seems that this is by the rule that one prohibition cannot take effect on another prohibition.

[Speaker E] No, but I’m saying: in an ordinary case where I swear — if I swear a double oath, it’s exactly the same case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That an oath does not take effect on an oath, in that sense, is like one prohibition not taking effect on another prohibition — that’s clear. The question is whether the converse is true. Is every case of one prohibition not taking effect on another prohibition simply a law of an oath taking effect on an oath? Clearly not, because there is a general rule that one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition. Now, if I swear twice about the same thing, then obviously that is also a particular case of one prohibition not taking effect on another prohibition. The question is whether there is something more here — that the oath does not take effect at all. Because, for example, with one prohibition not taking effect on another prohibition, one might say that it is not that I did not violate two prohibitions, but rather that I do not receive two punishments. That’s one possibility; maybe we’ll see that later. Okay? So there may be a difference between these two things. Here we have: one may not swear to violate the commandments. So the Talmud says: from where do we know that one may not swear to violate the commandments? What is the source? As it was taught: One might think that if someone swore to cancel a commandment and did not cancel it, one might think he should be liable? Meaning, he swore to cancel the commandment, but he did not cancel the commandment — he fulfilled the commandment. So he violated his oath. One might think he should be liable? Scripture says: “to do harm or to do good.” What is being discussed here? Is this speaking about liability to punishment, or about the prohibition, or about the very validity of the oath? There are three planes here:

[Speaker B] The question is whether—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] whether the oath takes effect, whether he violated “he shall not profane his word,” and whether he will be punished for that prohibition if he violates it.

[Speaker C] Wait, what’s the difference between the oath taking effect and “he shall not profane his word”?

[Speaker D] The question—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is whether the oath takes effect, but “he shall not profane his word” would not apply here because the commandment overrides it.

[Speaker C] Why? It overrides the prohibition? Yes.

[Speaker D] A positive commandment—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] overrides a prohibition, for example.

[Speaker B] Could one understand “might he be liable” as referring to the very matter itself — the very fact that he swore to cancel a commandment shows his intent. Maybe that is what the question is asking: might he be liable, even though he did not cancel it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] I’m saying that this phrase, “might he be liable,” maybe relates to the fact that after all, he swore to cancel a commandment. So what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That—

[Speaker B] The fact that in the end he didn’t cancel it doesn’t detract from the fact that he swore to cancel it and wanted to cancel it. So maybe that’s what they’re asking. No, the problem is that he violated the… We don’t combine intent with action when there is no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leave aside—

[Speaker G] his intentions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He violated the oath. He did not cancel the commandment, and the moment he did not cancel the commandment, he violated the oath. Right. He swore to cancel it, and that’s it. So the question is whether he is liable for that or not. Look, the Talmud says — the Talmud lays it out — yes, so right now we are at the question: from where do you know that one may not swear to violate the commandments? From the verse, or from “to do harm or to do good”?

[Speaker C] Wait, just one tiny question before that. If an oath is not a concrete legal effect, it’s only a commitment, then how can there be a difference between it and a prohibition? Meaning—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no legal effect, but you spoke. The oath is valid. Not in the sense that there is some effect in reality, but in the sense that there is an oath here.

[Speaker C] And if I did not violate a prohibition by transgressing it, then in what sense does it exist?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An oath was uttered in the world. What do you mean?

[Speaker C] What do you mean, an oath was uttered in the world? You didn’t say anything? Yes. No, but you’re saying that you did not violate the prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, then it’s not an oath. It’s not an oath. Again, independent of legal effect as a reality. Even if I do not define an oath as a metaphysical reality, there is still a question whether there is an oath-effect here or not. Whether there is an oath here or not. The term “effect” here is confusing. Okay. The question is whether there is an oath or not. That’s it.

[Speaker E] We still haven’t really explained whether there is an oath here and the Torah merely permitted violating it, or whether there is no oath here at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get there, we’ll get there. In any case, the Talmud says: “One verse is needed to exempt him from the sacrifice for an oath, and one verse is needed to exempt him from the prohibition of an oath.” What does that mean? The first verse, “he shall not profane his word,” from that we learn to exempt him from the prohibition of the oath — “he shall not profane his word,” okay? “To do harm or to do good” comes to exempt him from the sacrifice. And indeed, “to do harm or to do good” appears in the context of a sacrifice. The sacrifice for an oath is a guilt-offering, yes? So in that context the expression “to do harm or to do good” appears. So that means that when you swear about something that is not optional, there is no sacrifice if you violated the oath.

[Speaker B] Because the oath also doesn’t take effect on something that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. Notice — that is exactly the distinction the Talmud is making here. Meaning, “to do harm or to do good” only says that if I swore not to sit in the sukkah and I sat in the sukkah, then I am exempt from the sacrifice.

[Speaker B] Right, because it wasn’t an optional matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, because it wasn’t an optional matter. But that does not mean there is no oath here. It means I am exempt from the sacrifice. In principle, it could be that there is an oath here, and it could also be that I violated a prohibition. It’s true that in the conclusion I did not violate a prohibition, but that is not because of “to do harm or to do good”; rather, it is because of the verse brought above. The verse brought above says that if I swear regarding a matter of commandment, to cancel a commandment, then there is no prohibition. From “to do harm or to do good” it follows that there is no sacrifice. Now notice carefully: why isn’t one of them enough? After all, why is there no sacrifice? Simply because there is no oath and no prohibition. The sacrifice is brought for the prohibition, no? And conversely, if you tell me there is no sacrifice, then what reason is there to say there was a prohibition? Why do we need both of these sources? We see that the Talmud itself distinguishes between the question whether I violated a prohibition and the question whether I am liable for a sacrifice. Meaning, there can be a situation where I violated the prohibition but am exempt from the sacrifice. Now if I take that one step further—

[Speaker G] Wait, wait, sorry, just sorry, can you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] give—

[Speaker B] an example?

[Speaker G] Can you just repeat what you said for a second? That “he shall not profane his word” exempts him from the prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says, the Talmud says: “One verse is needed to exempt him from the sacrifice for an oath, and one verse is needed to exempt him from the prohibition of an oath.” What does that mean?

[Speaker G] The verse—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the first verse that I brought above — that verse teaches me that one who swears regarding a matter of commandment—

[Speaker F] to cancel a commandment — has no prohibition. And “to do harm or to do good,” which appears here, yes? “To do harm or to do good,” which appears here, comes to exempt him from the sacrifice. Okay? We have two sources. Now I ask: why do we need both of these sources? If there is no prohibition, how can there be a sacrifice?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if there is no sacrifice, then why is there no sacrifice? Presumably because there is no prohibition. Though fine, let’s say perhaps that is a law specific to the sacrifice — that I am exempt from the sacrifice, but there still is a prohibition. But once I already have a verse that exempts me from the prohibition, why do I need a verse that exempts me from the sacrifice?

[Speaker E] That’s really not clear.

[Speaker B] The sacrifice—

[Speaker E] is for “he shall not profane his word,” right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? The sacrifice is—

[Speaker E] And not for a vain oath, not for the fact that I swore.

[Speaker B] No, no, no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A false oath.

[Speaker B] Where is that verse? Which one?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “To do harm or to do good.”

[Speaker B] Somewhere in Leviticus, I don’t remember. Is it in Leviticus?

[Speaker C] But you’d have to say — maybe this is just something I didn’t understand — but it’s even harder than that. Because I could have said that my first source is “to do harm or to do good,” and then I learned that someone who swore to cancel a commandment and did not cancel it is not liable for a sacrifice, but maybe he still violated a prohibition. But once they tell me that even someone who swore to violate the commandments — meaning, swore not to do a commandment — does not violate a prohibition, then obviously someone who did not cancel the commandment did not violate a prohibition and is not liable for a sacrifice. That already sounds much simpler to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly, that’s what I’m asking.

[Speaker C] No, because I could have said — I could have said that precisely from the fact that they tell me that someone who swore to cancel a commandment and did not cancel it is exempt from a sacrifice, I’d say: fine, but maybe he still has a prohibition, and someone who swore to violate a commandment maybe even has a sacrifice. Maybe.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said that. But one side of the difficulty is even harder. Once there is no prohibition, how can there be a sacrifice? If there is only an exemption from sacrifice, one could perhaps say: exempt from sacrifice, but maybe there still is a prohibition. Then you would need another verse to teach that there is no prohibition either.

[Speaker C] Maybe someone who swore to violate the commandment is not even exempt from a sacrifice — maybe. Right, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What says that he is exempt? Because of “to do harm or to do good”?

[Speaker C] No, someone who swore to cancel the commandment is exempt from a sacrifice. But I’m saying: maybe he still has a prohibition, and someone who swore to violate the commandment maybe even has a sacrifice — that’s what I could have said. I didn’t understand: “to violate the commandment” and “to cancel the commandment” are the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because if I swore to violate a commandment—

[Speaker C] and I swore to cancel the commandment and then did not cancel it, then like, I don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same thing.

[Speaker C] To swear to violate a commandment and to swear to cancel a commandment are the same thing.

[Speaker B] No, but the point is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that I did not cancel it—

[Speaker E] meaning I violated the oath by fulfilling the commandment. Right, by violating the oath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “I did not cancel it” means I violated the oath, yes.

[Speaker C] Meaning, so maybe nonetheless—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there is a difference in the question of whether in the end I violated a commandment or I didn’t violate a commandment. Not the oath—the commandment. No, regarding the commandment you didn’t violate it, because you fulfilled it. Right, so that’s why I’m saying: how can I say—so maybe there I understand why I’m exempt even from a sacrifice? After all, in the end I fulfilled the commandment. I violated the oath by fulfilling the commandment. But in a case where I swear to violate the commandments—it’s the same thing, the same thing, the same thing. Sorry, my mistake. But aren’t we dealing here with two situations? What do you mean? One verse is to exempt him from a sacrifice. The oath here is talking about someone who swore concerning an optional matter. No, someone who swears about an optional matter has an oath-sacrifice and has a prohibition and has everything; that’s not what we’re discussing. “To do harm or to do good” comes to tell you that if you swear about something that is not optional, you’re exempt from the oath-sacrifice. Yes. So I’ll say again: what I’m saying is that the second one—“and one to exempt him from the prohibition of an oath”—that comes to exclude; he is exempt from the prohibition of the oath, but he is not exempt from some other prohibition that he committed. What there? You need two sources to exempt me from a sacrifice and to exempt me from the prohibition? If there is no prohibition, then for what would I bring a sacrifice? But maybe these are stages—not the prohibition and the oath. He is exempt from the oath, but not exempt from the prohibition of having uttered God’s name in vain. Fine, that’s something else; we’re not dealing with that right now. That’s a false oath. Yes, if he swore and didn’t—but that’s not what we’re dealing with. Here we’re dealing with a false oath in the sense of violating what one swore. But maybe we need to say—after all, you yourself said earlier that there’s a difference between saying “he did not violate the prohibition” and saying “there was no oath here.” It could be that the sacrifice I bring is for the oath and not for the prohibition, and then even if I have no prohibition I could still bring one. Exactly. That’s why I’m asking the question. Meaning, from the fact that the Talmud says that you need two sources—one to exempt from a sacrifice and one to exempt from the prohibition—it strongly implies that the oath exists. Or at least there was an initial assumption that it would exist. Yes, the oath exists, and therefore even if I’m exempt from the prohibition, that still doesn’t mean I’m exempt from the sacrifice. I didn’t violate the prohibition, fine—but the oath exists, I violated the oath, so I have no prohibition, or if you want, no punishment—but perhaps I would still bring a sacrifice. You need a verse to exempt me from the sacrifice. I think that’s a pretty strong hint. But isn’t a sacrifice brought for the prohibition? After all, I bring a sacrifice because I violated the prohibition. I’m saying: there was room to say—maybe in the conclusion, yes. But then why do we need a verse to say that? Because without the verse I would have thought that maybe you bring the sacrifice even if you don’t have a prohibition, because the oath still exists and you violated the oath. So there is no prohibition, but you would still bring the sacrifice. Especially if we’re talking about a guilt-offering, and a guilt-offering can be brought even without a prohibition. That’s a class I gave—maybe some of you heard it from me, I don’t remember. A guilt-offering has special characteristics. It can be brought even without a prohibition, so precisely with regard to a guilt-offering it’s easier. But in any case, for our purposes right now, it could be that now, in the conclusion, after the two sources have already been brought, I understand that there’s nothing here at all. But at least there could have been an initial assumption that there would be no prohibition and still an obligation to bring a sacrifice. The question is, after they exempt me from the sacrifice as well, what does that mean? Does it mean that there is an oath, but no prohibition and no sacrifice? Or no—that itself is the novelty: there is no oath at all, and therefore no prohibition and no sacrifice. Yes, the question is: what did the second verse ultimately teach me? Did it teach me: true, you’re right, the oath still exists, but there is no sacrifice either—not only is there no prohibition? Or not? Did it teach me precisely this—that no, there isn’t even an oath. And therefore there is no sacrifice and no prohibition. Yes, what practical difference does it make between those two possibilities? We’ll see in a moment. If a sacrifice is needed? We’ll talk, we’ll talk in another moment. No, if we’re exempt from a sacrifice—wait, I’ll explain. Another point I want to make: it is quite possible that when we say “to exempt him from the prohibition of the oath,” the intention is not to exempt him from the prohibition in the sense that there is no prohibition. “To exempt him from the prohibition of the oath” could mean: there is a prohibition here, but if he violates it, he is exempt from punishment. He is not liable. Why? Because he has a commandment. The commandment forces him to do this—are you going to punish him for doing a commandment? I already swore; you can’t punish me for the fact that I swore. You don’t punish me for the fact that I swore, because if I fulfill the oath and violate the commandment, I won’t be punished for that, right? So now, after I’ve sworn, I have two options. Either to violate the commandment and fulfill the oath, or to fulfill the commandment and violate the oath. It’s not reasonable that you should punish me if I chose the correct option—to fulfill the commandment. Therefore “to exempt him from the prohibition of the oath” can be interpreted as exempting him from the punishment for the prohibition, not that there is no prohibition. And now it’s also very clear why you need a verse to exempt from the sacrifice. Not only is there an oath, there is also a prohibition—it’s just that there is no punishment. So perhaps there would have been a sacrifice? The Talmud says no, there is another source that exempts you from the sacrifice as well. Then of course it goes down much more smoothly. Even the prohibition exists; only the punishment does not. Okay? Now basically the claim is—but that doesn’t seem to follow from the exposition of the verse, that the prohibition exists and we merely exempt him. Because from the exposition of the verse, this derivation involving obligations toward Heaven, it shows that there cannot be any prohibition at all, because “he shall not profane his word”—his word, but not the words of Heaven. Because it’s obvious—what am I violating? What am I violating? Here too, look at the language of the Talmud: “and one to exempt him from the prohibition of the oath.” What does that mean, “to exempt him from the prohibition of the oath”? You could perhaps understand it to mean to eliminate the prohibition, but “to exempt him” in the literal sense means to exempt him from punishment for the prohibition of the oath. And that still counts as “the prohibition of the oath.” Yes, there is a prohibition of oath, but you won’t get punishment, because it’s impossible to punish someone for fulfilling a commandment. But that’s a bit difficult, because you’re assuming here that the profanation of his word occurred when I performed the commandment. But ostensibly, when they say to me, “one does not swear concerning commandments,” I understand that from the outset I’m forbidden to swear concerning commandments—not that I didn’t swear. After all, it says one does not swear to violate commandments. Fine, so punish him for that—but that’s not what we’re talking about. We’re talking about the punishment for a false oath, when you profaned your word by not doing what you swore to do, not about the very act of taking the oath. Punishment for the very act of taking the oath is a false oath in the other sense—an oath in vain. We are talking about an oath of falsehood. Here the assumption is that I violate the prohibition but am exempt from punishment? Yes. It’s like—it’s not like, say, on the Sabbath, where they say—for example, a prohibition without an action. Like a prohibition without an action: it’s a prohibition that carries no punishment, but the prohibition can still exist. So one can say that the oath exists and there is no prohibition, and therefore also no punishment. One can say that even the prohibition exists, only there is no punishment. And one can of course also say that there is no oath at all. But as an initial assumption that of course cannot be, because then we wouldn’t have needed two sources to exempt from the prohibition and to exempt from a sacrifice. But after the two sources were brought, it could be that this itself is what they teach us—that there is not even any effective legal force of an oath here. It isn’t an oath at all. Therefore there is no sacrifice, no prohibition, no punishment, nothing. Now, basically what this means is that we have two ways to understand the question: is there an effective oath here, except that there is no prohibition against violating it because, for example, the commandment overrides it? Okay? Or is there no effective oath at all? The implication could be for our sugya, our topic here. What happens in our sugya? In our sugya, after all, we’re talking about an oath to fulfill a commandment, not to violate a commandment. Right? Now, “to do harm or to do good,” as I said earlier, seems relevant there too; it still isn’t swearing about something that lies in my discretionary domain, an optional matter. So there won’t be a sacrifice there either. The question is whether there is a prohibition there. So if in our case it’s only an exemption from punishment, because you can’t punish someone for fulfilling a commandment—that does not apply on page 8, right? In an oath to nullify a commandment—what am I saying? In an oath to nullify a commandment there is no contradiction at all between the oath and the commandment. Exactly, exactly. So therefore in an oath to fulfill the commandment, there was room to say that the oath exists, and if he violates it there will also be a prohibition and punishment and everything. The only thing that won’t be there is a sacrifice, because “to do harm or to do good” does not apply there. But the very application of the oath, and even the prohibition and even the punishment, could certainly exist. If you tell me that in a place where you swear concerning a commandment there is no application of an oath at all, then apparently “to do harm or to do good” really broadens. It’s not only an exemption from a sacrifice, but actually means there is no oath. Then I would say that even in an oath to fulfill a commandment there is no oath. But if all I’m saying is: look, there is an oath here, and maybe there is even a prohibition; it’s just that we don’t punish you for it. Why? Because you violated the oath in order to fulfill a commandment. That’s only when you actually swore to nullify a commandment, because then if you violated the oath it would be in order to fulfill a commandment. But on page 8 we’re talking about someone who swore to fulfill a commandment. If he violated the oath, then besides violating the oath he also committed a transgression. So why shouldn’t we punish him? You see? There could even be double punishment. What? I can’t hear. Yes, here certainly there would be punishment; the question is what happens with the oath. So basically what’s happening here is that if “it does not take effect” is pushed aside in the face of the commandment—that’s what the Talmud says here on page 16—then on page 8 that doesn’t apply, and “it does take effect” remains; there is an oath and there is a prohibition, everything. Now you can see that basically the “oath of encouragement” in our sugya can be interpreted in two ways. Why only in one way, according to what you just said? No, in two ways. If I say that in the end an oath concerning a commandment—the oath itself does not exist on page 16—then apparently on page 8 it also does not exist, since there too it is not “to do harm or to do good,” and in a place where it isn’t an optional matter, one is exempt from a sacrifice; there is no prohibition, no punishment, the oath doesn’t exist. But if I make a distinction and say no, the oath exists and the prohibition also exists; only the sacrifice does not exist, of course, because it isn’t “to do harm or to do good.” But the prohibition exists; it’s just that I don’t punish him for it, because you can’t punish someone for fulfilling a commandment. That does not apply on page 8. Right—so on page 8 you’re left only with the first possibility. No, on page 8 I now have two ways to read page 8. Where it says there, “what is an oath of encouragement? He swore to fulfill a commandment.” I can say that the oath takes effect. The oath takes effect; there is just no sacrifice for it. And I can say that the oath doesn’t take effect at all. Then what it says there—“he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai”—has to be interpreted in two ways. We’ll see in a moment. But on the conceptual level, from the sugya here, two possibilities emerge for understanding our sugya. In our sugya, in an oath of encouragement to fulfill a commandment, does the oath exist and does the prohibition also exist? He’ll probably be exempt from a sacrifice, but the oath and the prohibition exist. And the novelty of Rav Gidel in the name of Rav is that it is permitted—or that this isn’t a superfluous oath—that one may do this; one may spur oneself on. That’s the novelty, but the oath takes effect, there is an oath here. Second possibility: no, there is no oath there at all. But why shouldn’t there be an oath? We said here that it’s because he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai. Rather, there is simply no sacrifice and no prohibition attached to it. On page 8 that’s what we said—that there is no oath. How can it be understood otherwise? Now I’ll go back to page 8; that’s exactly where I am now. On page 8, I remind you again, at the beginning we had: from where do we know that one may swear to fulfill the commandments? “I have sworn and I will fulfill.” The Talmud asks: but he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai! How did we understand it there? That the oath does not take effect; one oath does not take effect upon another oath, right? Then Rav Gidel comes and says—that is, it is an oath for encouragement. An oath for encouragement, right? What does “an oath for encouragement” mean? The oath does not take effect, but it is permitted to swear in order to encourage myself, even though it does not take effect. A novelty for the ignorant masses, right? That’s what I explained there. The unlearned people, who don’t know that the oath doesn’t take effect—so it may be that the fact that they swore will prod them to fulfill the commandment, and therefore I permit them to swear even though the oath does not take effect. A second possibility that I’m now suggesting: no, perhaps the oath does take effect, as we saw from here. The oath takes effect. Maybe there will be no sacrifice for it, but there may even be punishment for it. So the question arises here: then what does the question “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” mean? Ostensibly the question is that the oath does not take effect. We’ll see in a moment. And what the Talmud answers afterward—that it is an oath of encouragement—means that in fact the oath does take effect, but still, why swear it? After all, there is already a commandment obligating me to sit in the sukkah, so why do I need to swear? So they say: no, in order to encourage yourself; so swear, it’s okay, it isn’t a superfluous oath. All right? I still haven’t explained what the difficulty of “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” is according to this reading. Are you with me? Yes. Fine. Two possibilities for reading our Talmudic passage. Is it a novelty for the ignorant masses, as I explained in the previous class—that is, people who don’t know that the oath does not take effect, and they swear in order to encourage themselves? And the novelty is that okay, he’s an ignoramus, but at least he did not utter God’s name in vain and he swore for a beneficial purpose, so an oath of encouragement is permitted. Two ways to read the Talmud there. Now let’s see it in the medieval authorities (Rishonim). The Ran, in the sugya on page 8a—our sugya, page 8a—look what he writes. “But is he not already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai? Rather, this is what it comes to teach us,” and so on. “It seems to me,” says the Ran, “that this is the explanation: initially it entered our mind that Rav Gidel came to teach us that an oath takes effect regarding a commandment just as it does regarding an optional matter. And he proves it from the verse ‘I have sworn and I will fulfill.’ Therefore the Talmud asks: but is he not already sworn and standing? For it is proven in the final chapter of Shevuot Shetayim that the verse ‘to do harm or to do good’ speaks of an optional matter, not of a commandment. And if you would say: that applies only to a sacrifice, for ‘to do harm or to do good’ is written in connection with a sacrifice, but ‘he shall not profane’ applies even regarding a commandment—if so, what does ‘I have sworn and I will fulfill’ add? It should rather have said that although a commandment is excluded from a sacrifice, it is not excluded from ‘he shall not profane,’ as we see there in the final chapter of Shevuot Shetayim, that something not included in ‘yes and no,’ or not included in the future tense category, if excluded from sacrifice by ‘to do harm or to do good,’ is nevertheless not excluded from lashes. And for that no verse is needed. So then what does it mean when it says, ‘as it is stated: I have sworn and I will fulfill’?” In other words, what is he explaining here? He says that when the Talmud asks, “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai,” what is the question? The question is: why do you need to tell me “I have sworn and I will fulfill”? We already know that without “I have sworn and I will fulfill”; from the laws of oaths themselves we know it. It is obvious that an oath takes effect to fulfill a commandment. Why does an oath take effect concerning a commandment? Why is that obvious from the laws of oaths themselves? Why shouldn’t it take effect? He takes the position that it does take effect. Obviously. What does not take effect on page 16 is an oath to nullify a commandment. Does it not take effect, or is there no prohibition? That doesn’t matter right now; maybe we’ll get to that. But that’s in nullifying a commandment. In fulfilling a commandment—what’s the problem? In fulfilling a commandment, why shouldn’t there be a prohibition attached? After all, I am fulfilling the commandment. There, apparently, the Ran understands that because I swore to nullify a commandment, they can’t impose a prohibition on me if I fulfill commandments, or they can’t punish me—they can’t impose a prohibition. But here, why can’t they impose a prohibition on me if I do not fulfill the commandment? Therefore he says: from the ordinary laws of oaths it is obvious that an oath takes effect concerning a commandment. And he rejects the possibility that it applies only to the sacrifice. “And if you would say that this applies only to the sacrifice, for ‘to do harm or to do good’ is written in connection with the sacrifice, but ‘he shall not profane’ applies even regarding a commandment”—yes? Will you say that “he shall not profane” applies also when someone swears concerning a commandment, and only from the sacrifice is it excluded, while from the prohibition what is excluded is an oath to nullify a commandment but not an oath to fulfill a commandment? If so, what need is there for “I have sworn and I will fulfill”? Why do you need the verse “I have sworn and I will fulfill”? “Already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai.” “Already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” means the oath takes effect. After all, he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai—why not? Wait, he writes that in the initial assumption, at first, one thinks that the oath takes effect concerning a commandment, and then he asks, “But isn’t he already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai?” No, he’s asking why you need “I have sworn and I will fulfill.” He proves it from the verse “I have sworn and I will fulfill,” and therefore the Talmud asks, “But is he not already sworn and standing?” And now he explains what the question is. So he says: for they prove in the final chapter of Shevuot Shetayim that the verse “to do harm or to do good” speaks of an optional matter and not of a commandment. Fine? So basically, regarding a commandment there is really no oath. And if you would say this applies only to the sacrifice, because “to do harm or to do good” is written in connection with a sacrifice, but “he shall not profane” applies even regarding a commandment—then what is “I have sworn and I will fulfill” doing there? What are you going to tell me? That it’s only about the sacrifice, but the prohibition exists? Fine, so why do you need “I have sworn and I will fulfill”? Just from the regular laws of oaths. For although a commandment is excluded from the sacrifice, it is not excluded from “he shall not profane,” as we see there in the final chapter of Shevuot Shetayim, that something not included in “yes and no,” or in “for the future,” is excluded from the sacrifice by “to do harm or to do good,” but not excluded from lashes. Exclusion from lashes requires an additional exclusion. So regarding an oath to nullify a commandment I have an additional exclusion in the Talmud on page 16. But regarding an oath to fulfill a commandment I have no additional exclusion. But from the fact that Rav Gidel brings “I have sworn and I will fulfill,” that shows that in fact an oath to fulfill a commandment is also excluded? Right—that’s what the Talmud asks. According to the Ran, that’s what the Talmud asks. Why did you bring the verse “I have sworn and I will fulfill”? And to that the Talmud answers: to teach me that a person may encourage himself. That is, “rather, this is what it comes to teach us,” and we answer—sorry—rather, this is what it comes to teach us: that it is permitted for him to spur himself on. Meaning: certainly the verse is not needed to say that it takes effect regarding “he shall not profane.” You don’t need the verse “I have sworn and I will fulfill” to say that the oath takes effect and that there is a prohibition of “he shall not profane.” I know that even without the verse. Rather, this is what it means: from where do we know that it is proper to swear in order to fulfill a commandment? And that even upright people, who generally refrain from oaths, do swear in such a case? As it is stated: “I have sworn and I will fulfill.” That is, King David did so. It’s proof from King David that people do this; and he certainly would avoid swearing whenever possible. If he did it, apparently there is no reason to refrain from such an oath. So the whole novelty is that one need not refrain from such an oath, but the fact that the oath takes effect is obvious. And the difficulty of “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” is only regarding exemption from a sacrifice? Meaning, that’s the— No, sacrifice doesn’t belong here, because “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai,” if I understand him correctly, means—it’s a bit ambiguous in his wording. “Already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” means: from the laws of oath given at Sinai it is obvious that the oath here takes effect. Why do you need to tell me “I have sworn and I will fulfill”? He’s bringing me a verse from King David? By the way, that also resolves what I pointed out in the previous class—that the verse is from the words of tradition, from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). Why do they bring a verse from the Hebrew Bible for a Torah law? So the Ran’s claim is that the verse from the Hebrew Bible is really just revealing a fact. Look—King David also swore this way. A sign that it is appropriate to swear this way. It’s not talking about the laws of oaths at all. The laws of oaths—whether they take effect or not—come from the verses we just saw. And an oath to fulfill a commandment is an oath that takes effect, and it has a prohibition attached to it, and whoever violates it gets lashes; aside from the commandment, he is also liable on the oath. There probably won’t be a sacrifice because of “to do harm or to do good,” but the prohibition will of course be there. There was only room to say: what’s the point of swearing? You’re already obligated by the commandment. So to that they say, “I have sworn and I will fulfill”—look, even King David swore about it. Like an exemplary precedent? Yes, exactly. It’s a kind of factual indication like that. In that respect it fits the Talmud well, also because they bring a verse from Psalms about something that is ostensibly a Torah law. Okay? So it turns out that according to his view, he really learned that an oath to fulfill a commandment does take effect. He goes with that side of page 16 that I was talking about there. The oath really does take effect concerning a commandment. And what there, on page 16, where the oath has no prohibition—that’s apparently because the commandment overrides the prohibition. But in our case, where it is an oath to fulfill a commandment, the prohibition exists, and there is no commandment overriding it, so the prohibition remains in force. Clearly, he learned page 16 to mean that the reason there is no prohibition is simply because the commandment overrides it—not because an oath does not take effect on it. The oath does take effect and there is a prohibition; in principle there is indeed a prohibition, only the commandment overrides it, or at least exempts from punishment—the two possibilities I said there. Are you with me? Fine. Now, the Baal HaMaor writes something very similar, also like the Ran. And he says: in our Talmud and from our Mishnah, which teaches, “one who swore to nullify a commandment, not to make a sukkah,” and so on, that an oath never takes effect when one swears to nullify a commandment—whether positive commandments or prohibitions—except that he becomes liable to lashes because of an oath in vain. Here he brings in the oath in vain: for the very act of swearing he is liable to lashes, because he simply swore pointlessly. From the moment of his oath—whether he fulfilled his oath and violated the commandment, or whether he fulfilled the commandment and violated his oath. That’s the practical difference. For an oath in vain, he is lashed for the very act of swearing; it doesn’t matter whether in the end he fulfilled the oath or not. But at the time he violates the commandment or fulfills it, he incurs no punishment of the oath because of that act—nothing, neither sacrifice nor lashes. Now here the wording is interesting. He says that an oath never takes effect when one swears to nullify a commandment—apparently meaning that the oath does not take effect at all. But in the end he concludes that he incurs no punishment of the oath because of that act—nothing, neither sacrifice nor lashes. It sounds a bit as if the oath does take effect, only there is no punishment and no sacrifice. Fine, there is room to deliberate about that. Now he continues. You can’t say—maybe I misunderstood—but following the Ran too, perhaps they are making a deeper distinction, in the sense that from the fact that the Ran distinguishes between one who swears to nullify a commandment and one who swears to fulfill a commandment, perhaps one could also say that within that distinction there is another question: whether the oath exists at all. Even if, in an oath to nullify a commandment, the oath does not exist at all. Good—that’s two possibilities. The Baal HaMaor starts with that. In a moment we’ll see: the Baal HaMaor goes in the direction of the Ran. But the Baal HaMaor starts by saying that the oath does not exist at all—an oath never takes effect when one swears to nullify a commandment. So that’s the opposite of the Ran’s approach. Wait. He ends by saying, “he incurs no punishment of the oath because of that act—nothing, neither sacrifice nor lashes.” Here it sounds a bit as if there is an oath, only there is no sacrifice and no lashes. Now I’m saying: both possibilities fit, because we’ll see later—later, when he talks about one who swears to fulfill a commandment, in his next paragraph, there he goes like the Ran. But regarding one who swears to nullify a commandment, he could learn that there is no oath at all. After we learned that there is no prohibition and no sacrifice, perhaps there is no oath at all. But there is no oath at all not because of “to do harm or to do good,” but because it goes against a commandment. And in our case, where it’s not against a commandment but with a commandment, in our case there is an oath. Therefore it doesn’t have to be—he doesn’t have to adopt the position that I mentioned on page 16 and say that there too there is an oath when one swears to nullify. He can say that in swearing to nullify there is no oath at all, while in swearing to fulfill there is. Look, he continues now and says this: likewise, if one swears to uphold prohibitory commandments, he incurs no punishment of the oath at all—you see, to uphold prohibitory commandments, meaning not to transgress them—whether he upheld it or nullified it, for when he nullifies the commandments because of the oath he incurs neither sacrifice nor lashes. And this is what we say at the end of Makkot: “let us count as a case an oath not to plow on a festival”; there too, does the oath really take effect upon him? He is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai. That is, the prohibition of the oath does not take effect upon the prohibition of the commandment, because one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. What is he saying? Someone who swears to uphold a negative commandment—then the prohibition of the oath does not take effect upon the prohibition of the commandment, right? Because if he violates his oath, he will also violate the prohibition. He swore to uphold the negative commandment. So if he violates the negative commandment, he also violates the oath; so the oath adds another prohibition on top of the negative commandment. Because in the same act that I do, besides the prohibition itself, I also violate the prohibition of the oath. But that is a case of one prohibition not taking effect upon another prohibition. So it does not exist. Does not exist, or there is no punishment? Yes, that can be understood either way. Now look at the next paragraph. It sounds like it does not exist. It sounds to me that regarding nullifying the commandments he writes it explicitly—that the oath does not exist at all. I don’t understand how one can read it otherwise. Where? That it does not exist, that the oath does not exist at all. So why did he talk about punishment? “He incurs no punishment of the oath at all,” he says. Right, he says there is no punishment because of the oath. The punishment is because you nullified the prohibitory commandment; you violated the negative commandment, but there is no punishment— Who said there is no oath? Because he writes—I don’t know, look. He doesn’t even say there is no prohibition; he says there is no sacrifice and no lashes. The practical implication is that perhaps there is a prohibition. After all, at first what Noa says sounded completely reasonable to me; at the beginning it really sounds clear that he says the oath does not take effect at all. And now you’re saying that at the end it’s a bit— What beginning? Are you talking about one who swore to nullify the commandment? Here? Yes. Fine. We’re talking here—you need to distinguish. But it’s the same thing, the first two paragraphs are the same thing; we still haven’t reached our sugya. Right, right, right—no, no, pay attention. This is an important point; it’s a bit confusing. There is one who swears to nullify a commandment and one who swears to fulfill a commandment. That is an oath against the Torah, and an oath in favor of the Torah. But swearing in each of those two possibilities can concern either a positive commandment or a prohibition. Right, but it’s the same thing. If I uphold a prohibition, to uphold a prohibition means to refrain from violating it. And one can swear to violate the prohibition. One can swear to fulfill a positive commandment, and one can swear to nullify a positive commandment. But the first two paragraphs are about going against the will of the Torah. No—why not? Someone who swears to uphold prohibitory commandments is swearing in line with the Torah. He swore— Why? The second paragraph says to uphold prohibitory commandments. Right, to uphold prohibitory commandments means not to stumble in them. He swears not to eat pork. Yes. That’s like swearing to fulfill the commandment. Yes. Why? He writes, “and an oath not to plow on a festival.” No, there he’s bringing the Talmud in Makkot; he says one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. But that’s what he’s discussing, no? No, no, that’s not what he’s discussing. Someone who swears to uphold prohibitory commandments, okay? “Not to plow on a festival,” yes—an oath not to plow on a festival is exactly that. So what’s the problem? Well, “not to plow on a festival”—I’m going with the will of the Torah. Right, exactly. Someone who swears to uphold prohibitory commandments. So that’s it, now I understand. It goes with the will of the Torah. They both go with the will of the Torah. The first two paragraphs both go with the will of the Torah. No, no. Swearing to nullify a commandment goes against the will of the Torah, and the second goes with it. Right, right, right. Wait, now I got confused. That’s exactly the point—you have to pay close attention. The first paragraph is one who swears to nullify the commandment; that is the sugya on page 16. And there he makes no distinction between positive and negative commandments—notice that here. Do you see? “One who swears to nullify the commandment, whether a positive commandment or a prohibitory one”—there he makes no distinction. But when someone swears to fulfill the commandment, he does make a distinction and even divides it into two paragraphs. There is someone who swears to uphold prohibitory commandments, where there is no punishment or no prohibition because one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. You understand why this is one prohibition not taking effect upon another? Because when I violate the— Yes, because when I violate it, I plow on a festival, then besides the prohibition on plowing on a festival there is also the prohibition that I violated the oath. So it turns out that all the oath does is add a prohibition to something that was already forbidden anyway. One prohibition does not take effect upon another. So the second prohibition does not take effect, or there is no prohibition, or there is no punishment—but one prohibition does not take effect upon another. But the next paragraph: “And one who swears to fulfill positive commandments”—that’s again an oath in line with the Torah, but this time concerning positive commandments—“the oath and the vow do take effect upon him for lashes.” Not only does the oath take effect, not only is there a prohibition, there are lashes, there is punishment. But not a sacrifice, because it is not in the category of “yes and no”—that is, “to do harm or to do good”—and Scripture excluded it only from a sacrifice, as it says “to do harm or to do good.” And this is perfectly fine, just like the Ran. “And it is entirely proper from the outset to do this.” Know that it is proper, permitted from the outset, to do this, whether by oath or by vow, and to fulfill it. What does “and to fulfill it” mean? What he said, to fulfill what is said—because we say there: from where do we know that one may swear to fulfill a commandment? As it is stated, “I have sworn and I will fulfill,” and so on, just as it is there. Just like the Ran, right? Wait, but according to the Ran, in the first two cases too he would say the oath does not take effect? Who knows? I said there are two possibilities. I tend to think that if you say the oath takes effect on page 8, most likely the oath also takes effect on page 16. And the only thing that is absent there is the punishment. They don’t punish you for doing a commandment. And of course that does not apply on page 8, because on page 8 you are doing a commandment, and therefore if you don’t do the commandment then certainly you deserve punishment. But the Baal HaMaor, for example, does not go that way. The Ran could go that way, and he could go like the Baal HaMaor. What does the Baal HaMaor say? On page 8 the Baal HaMaor learns like the Ran: one who swears to fulfill a positive commandment has a prohibition and punishment—everything except a sacrifice, because it is not “to do harm or to do good.” But on page 16 he says there is no punishment, and perhaps there is no oath at all. But why claim that? What’s the logic? What is the logic of the Baal HaMaor in saying that when one swears to nullify a commandment there is no oath at all, if in principle he thinks like the Ran? Because the verse comes to teach me that there is no prohibition. So how do you understand the verse saying there is no prohibition? Presumably it means the oath does not take effect. So the Baal HaMaor is basically assuming not like you; he assumes that the prohibition tells me whether there is an oath at all. So that remains open. I’m saying it is open in both directions. As for the Ran, since he said nothing about page 16, I would read the Ran the way I said earlier: the oath takes effect, only the punishment is pushed aside because of the commandment. On page 8, where the commandment is not standing against the oath, there there will also be punishment. But that is not necessary. One can say that the oath takes effect on page 8, including punishment, including everything. On page 16, true, there was an initial assumption that the oath takes effect, but after they taught us that there is no prohibition and no sacrifice, perhaps that itself is what they taught us: no prohibition, no sacrifice, nothing—the oath does not take effect. Okay? Then he says: and vows take effect in nullifying positive commandments. That’s not of interest. I said I am dealing with oaths and not vows. Fine, we’ve wandered a bit. Next in line will be Nachmanides. Nachmanides disagrees with the Ran and with the Baal HaMaor, but we’ll see that next time. So I think we’ll stop here. Thank you very much, good night. Goodbye. Thank you very much, good evening.