Women’s Beit Midrash – Winter Semester II 5783 – Nedarim – Lecture 5

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says that in truth the verse tells us the same thing, right? In a vow and in an oath, there’s no room, from the standpoint of the verse, to distinguish between a vow and an oath. So what is the distinction? When he says, “The benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me,” and “I swear that I will not benefit from the sukkah,” he goes back to this. “The benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me” means there is a prohibition on the object of the sukkah, whereas “I swear that I will not benefit from the sukkah” is a prohibition on my action. And here comes the distinction I presented earlier in the name of the commentators, namely that this is the difference between a vow and an oath: with a vow, the effect applies to the object, and with an oath, the effect does not apply to the object. So we’ve moved away from this issue of “he shall not profane his word.” Meaning, this is not learned from the verse “he shall not profane his word,” because as far as the verse is concerned, a vow and an oath are really the same thing.

[Speaker C] But you could also say that “he shall not profane his word” originally began by being said about a vow, then continued by being said, okay, so also about an oath it works that way, and then we say: fine, with a vow the problem is the profaning of my speech; the problem is going against reality, as it were, against the legal effect that exists in reality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But “he shall not profane his word” is written about a vow too—what do you mean?

[Speaker C] Right, but if I understand a vow the way you said, then really “he shall not profane his word” doesn’t so much belong with a vow.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? It does belong with a vow. The moment you violate the effect you created, you’ve profaned your speech. The speech created a legal effect here. That’s the way to profane the speech. So I think that the accepted distinction made between a vow and an oath was introduced at this stage in the Talmud. At the previous stage, when the Talmud raised the difficulty, the Talmud understood that a vow and an oath really are two things that are more or less the same, and the difference between them was supposed, as it were, to come from the verse. But then the Talmud says: no, the verse rules the same way regarding both a vow and an oath. So you can’t learn it from the verse. We’re forced to conclude that there really is some fundamental difference between a vow and an oath: a vow forbids an object to me, and an oath forbids me with respect to the object, or forbids my action with respect to the object. Which, in fact, we already saw back on page 2, where the Talmud says that this one is on the object and that one is on the person. Rava makes a parenthetical comment that’s less important for our purposes. Rava said: “Were commandments given for benefit?” What does “the benefit of the sukkah” mean? The commandment of sukkah was not given for enjoyment. Rather, Rava said: this is where he said, “Sitting in the sukkah is forbidden to me”—not “the benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me,” but “sitting in the sukkah is forbidden to me.”

[Speaker B] Meaning according to Rava, if he had said, “The benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me,” then he would be allowed to sit there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, because commandments were not given for benefit.

[Speaker B] Yes, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And this is where he said: ‘I swear that I will not sit in the sukkah.’” But in any case, for our purposes that’s not important; it’s just a parenthetical correction. And this is the difference between a vow and an oath. As I said earlier, when we look at the Mishnah, at the wording in the Mishnah—here: “Konam, a sukkah that I make,” you see? And here: “The benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me.” “The benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me” is something different from “Konam, a sukkah that I make.” Meaning, “the benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me” is indeed, very clearly, a prohibition on the object. What would he say about “a lulav that I take” and “tefillin that I put on”? Presumably there too he would change it; he would say, “The benefit of tefillin is forbidden to me,” or “Putting on tefillin is forbidden to me,” or “Taking the lulav is forbidden to me.” Meaning, he apparently interprets all these things as prohibitions on the object, or perhaps, as I said earlier, prohibitions on action that begin with a legal effect. The plain sense of Abaye’s wording makes it sound like he’s coming to speak about some prohibition on the object. Now the Talmud continues: “And that one may not swear to violate commandments—from here does he derive it? He derives it from there.” Meaning: how do you get that one may not swear to violate commandments from “he shall not profane his word”? He doesn’t derive it from here; he derives it from there, as it was taught in a baraita: “One might think that if a person swore to nullify a commandment and did not nullify it, he should be liable.” Yes? If he swore to nullify a commandment and did not nullify the commandment—that is, he violated his oath—one might think he should be liable. The verse therefore says: “to do harm or to do good.” Just as “to do good” refers to something optional, so too “to do harm” refers to something optional. This excludes one who swore to nullify a commandment and did not nullify it, because it is not in his power. What does that mean? The accepted understanding is that “to do harm or to do good”—and this comes out more clearly in the Talmud in Shevuot, to which I referred you—that when you swear about a particular action, the action has to be something optional, something you can either do harm or do good with, something you can do or not do; the Torah doesn’t obligate you to do it and doesn’t forbid you to do it.

[Speaker B] And about that, he isn’t already sworn from Mount Sinai.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. About that, he isn’t already sworn from Mount Sinai, and that is an optional matter, and therefore an oath can take effect on it. But if the Torah has already forbidden you either the “harm” or the “good”—meaning, one of the options, either to do or not to do—then it’s no longer open to oaths; it’s already prescribed for you what you’re supposed to do. In such a case, an oath does not take effect. Okay? That’s that.

[Speaker B] Do you have to bring a sacrifice here, no? What? Do you have to bring a sacrifice or something?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a moment the Talmud talks about a sacrifice, but right now we’re not there yet. So what comes out is that oaths can take effect only regarding optional matters—matters where you can do it or not do it, and you swear to do it or you swear not to do it. But if it’s already prescribed for you in advance to do or not to do, then you can’t swear; the oath has no meaning at all. An oath is supposed to direct you when you have free choice—then it says to you, go right. But if there is only one road, what are you swearing about? Meaning, an oath always requires that two paths be open before you. That is learned from the verse “to do harm or to do good.” Okay? That’s the standard explanation. Now while we’re already here, I’ll point out: what about an oath to fulfill a commandment?

[Speaker B] The oath does not take effect.

[Speaker G] On an oath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m talking now within our topic, from the standpoint of “to do harm or to do good.”

[Speaker B] So wait, again, if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An oath to fulfill a commandment—an oath to sit in the sukkah. From the standpoint of “to do harm or to do good,” does the oath take effect or not?

[Speaker E] It does not take effect.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly it does not take effect, right. Even though the case is the reverse, still I am not standing at a crossroads where two paths are open before me and the oath directs me to one of them. Both when I swear to nullify a commandment and when I swear to fulfill a commandment, in both cases the crossroads where I stand has only one road leading from it, not two. And if the idea really is as I described earlier—that “to do harm or to do good” means you can swear only regarding optional matters, not because you’re going against a commandment, notice, that’s the important point. The problem is not that you are going against a commandment. If the problem were that you are going against a commandment, then in our case you’re not going against a commandment, so the oath should take effect. But if the problem is that you’re swearing about something that isn’t in your hands—you already swore from Mount Sinai, it was determined for you what you are supposed to do with respect to it—then if that is the understanding of why an oath cannot take effect, there is no difference between fulfilling a commandment and nullifying a commandment.

[Speaker G] In both cases, the choice is not in our hands.

[Speaker C] But not necessarily. Maybe you’re already explaining it in light of the sugya on page 8, but intuitively I would say that the issue of an oath does not necessarily sit specifically where I have only two paths open before me; rather, it exists where it is within my power to swear about this thing. Meaning, if it’s something I’m forbidden to do, then that path is closed to me and I can’t swear about it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “To do harm or to do good.” However you put it, you can’t swear about a commandment matter. “To do harm or to do good” means that the oath has to be about an action that is optional.

[Speaker D] The Talmud says—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Just as ‘to do good’ refers to something optional, so too ‘to do harm’ refers to something optional. This excludes one who swore to nullify a commandment and did not nullify it, because it is not in his power.” Meaning, he does not determine what to do; it is already prescribed for him. So in the simple sense it seems that this applies also to an oath to fulfill a commandment, and not only to an oath to nullify a commandment.

[Speaker D] We’ll see further—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a bit maybe one can qualify that, but it seems to me that the straightforward reading is the same. So one more important point.

[Speaker E] Then that’s really just a case of an oath taking effect on an oath. What? It’s exactly the same case. I don’t understand. This is the case of an oath taking effect on an oath and not the case of being sworn and standing from Mount Sinai.

[Speaker B] What’s the difference? I don’t understand. It’s the same thing in different words.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—

[Speaker E] We said there’s a difference, that these are two different ways of explaining why it’s forbidden to swear concerning commandments. Is it because an oath cannot take effect on an oath—which is a general case not connected specifically to a commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or because one prohibition cannot take effect on another? No—“sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” is the expression in the Talmud. That expression itself can be interpreted either as “an oath cannot take effect on an oath” or as “one prohibition cannot take effect on another.”

[Speaker E] So here it seems simple, because the oath does not take effect. “To do harm or to do good” just means I already have an oath on this, so what sense is there in adding another oath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—quite the opposite.

[Speaker B] On an optional matter, you don’t already have an oath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. From here, on the contrary, it actually seems to be because one prohibition cannot take effect on another.

[Speaker E] No, but I mean in an ordinary case where I take an oath—if I take a double oath, it’s exactly the same case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In that sense, “an oath cannot take effect on an oath” is like “one prohibition cannot take effect on another”; that’s clear. The question is whether the converse is true: whether every case of one prohibition not taking effect on another is really just a law of an oath taking effect on an oath. Clearly not, because there is a general rule that one prohibition does not take effect on another. Now if I swear twice about the same thing, then obviously that too is a particular case of one prohibition not taking effect on another. The question is whether there is something additional here—that the oath never takes effect at all. Because for example, with one prohibition not taking effect on another, one might have said that it’s not that I did not violate two prohibitions, but that I would not receive two punishments. That is one possibility; maybe we’ll see it later. Okay? So there may be a difference between these two things. Here, concerning the statement that one may not swear to violate commandments, the Talmud says: how do we know that one may not swear to violate commandments? From where did the tanna derive it? As it was taught in a baraita: “One might think that if a person swore to nullify a commandment and did not nullify it, he should be liable.” Yes—he swore to nullify the commandment, but he did not nullify it; he fulfilled the commandment. So he violated his oath. One might think he should be liable. The verse therefore says: “to do harm or to do good.” What is this talking about? Is it talking here about liability to punishment, or about the prohibition, or about the very validity of the oath? There are three levels here:

[Speaker B] The question is whether—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whether the oath takes effect, whether he violated “he shall not profane his word,” and whether he will be punished for that prohibition if he violates it.

[Speaker C] Wait—what’s the difference between the oath taking effect and “he shall not profane his word”?

[Speaker D] The question—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The oath may take effect, but “he shall not profane his word” would not apply here because the commandment overrides it.

[Speaker C] Why? It overrides the prohibition? Yes.

[Speaker D] A positive commandment—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A positive commandment overrides a prohibition, for example.

[Speaker B] Could one understand “might he be liable” as referring to the very matter itself—to the fact that his oath to nullify a commandment shows his intention? Maybe that is what the question “might he be liable” is about, even though in the end he didn’t nullify it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] I’m saying that this phrase, “might he be liable,” maybe it refers to the issue that after all he swore to nullify a commandment. Well?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This—

[Speaker B] The fact that in the end he didn’t nullify it doesn’t detract from the fact that he swore to nullify it and wanted to nullify it. So maybe that’s what they’re asking about. No—the problem is that he violated… We don’t combine intention with action when there isn’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leave aside—

[Speaker G] His intentions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He violated the oath. He did not nullify the commandment, and the moment he did not nullify the commandment, he violated the oath. Correct. He swore to nullify it—that’s all. So the question is whether he is liable for that or not. Look, the Talmud says—the Talmud lays out—so yes, right now we are at the question: where do you know from that one may not swear to violate commandments? From the verse, or from “to do harm or to do good”?

[Speaker C] Wait, just one tiny question first: if an oath is not really an actual legal effect, just a commitment, then how can there be a difference between it and a prohibition? Meaning—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no effect on the object, but you spoke. The oath is valid—not in the sense that there is some effect in reality, but in the sense that there is an oath here.

[Speaker C] And if I didn’t violate a prohibition when I violated it, then in what sense does it exist?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An oath was uttered into the world. What do you mean?

[Speaker C] What does it mean, an oath was uttered into the world? You didn’t say anything? Yes—but you’re saying he didn’t violate the prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—then it isn’t an oath. It isn’t an oath. Again, independently of “effect” as a reality. Even if I don’t define an oath as a metaphysical reality, there is still a question whether there is an oath-effect here or there isn’t; whether there is an oath here or there isn’t. The term “effect” here is misleading. Okay? The question is whether there is an oath or not. That’s—

[Speaker E] We still haven’t really explained whether there is an oath here and the Torah merely allowed it, or whether there is no oath here at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get there, we’ll get there. In any case, the Talmud says: “One verse is to exempt him from the sacrifice for an oath, and one is to exempt him from the prohibition of an oath.” What does that mean? The first verse, “he shall not profane his word,” is used to teach that he is exempt from the prohibition of the oath—“he shall not profane his word,” okay? “To do harm or to do good” comes to exempt him from the sacrifice. And indeed, “to do harm or to do good” appears in the context of a sacrifice. The sacrifice for an oath is a guilt-offering, yes? So in that context the phrase “to do harm or to do good” appears. That means that when you swear about something that is not optional, there is no sacrifice if you violate the oath.

[Speaker B] Because the oath also doesn’t take effect on something that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. Notice—this is exactly the distinction the Talmud is making here. Meaning, “to do harm or to do good” only says that if I swore not to sit in the sukkah and then I sat in the sukkah, I am exempt from the sacrifice.

[Speaker B] Right, because it wasn’t an optional matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, because it wasn’t an optional matter. But that doesn’t mean there is no oath here. It means I am exempt from the sacrifice. In principle, it could be that there is an oath here, and it could even be that I violated a prohibition. It’s true that in the conclusion I did not violate a prohibition, but that is not because of “to do harm or to do good”; rather, it is because of the verse brought above. The verse brought above says that if I swear regarding a commandment matter, to nullify a commandment, then there is no prohibition. From “to do harm or to do good” what emerges is that there is no sacrifice. Now notice carefully: why isn’t one of them enough? After all, why is there no sacrifice? Simple—there is no sacrifice because there is no oath and no prohibition. The sacrifice is brought for the prohibition, no? And vice versa: if you tell me there is no sacrifice, then what side is there to say there was a prohibition? Why do we need these two sources? We see that the Talmud itself distinguishes between the question whether I violated a prohibition and the question whether I am liable for a sacrifice. Meaning, there could be a situation where I violated the prohibition but am exempt from a sacrifice. Now if I continue one more step—

[Speaker G] Wait, wait, sorry, just—sorry, can you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Bring—

[Speaker B] An example?

[Speaker G] Can you just go back for a second?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait—what? One at a time.

[Speaker G] Can you go back for a second to what you said—that “he shall not profane his word” exempts him from the prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says—the Talmud says: “One verse is to exempt him from the sacrifice for an oath, and one is to exempt him from the prohibition of an oath.” What does that mean?

[Speaker G] The verse—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The first verse that I brought above—this verse teaches me that one who swears regarding a commandment matter—

[Speaker F] To nullify a commandment—there is no prohibition for him. And “to do harm or to do good” that appears here, yes? “To do harm or to do good” that appears here comes to exempt him from a sacrifice. Okay? We have two sources. Now I ask: why do we need these two sources? If there is no prohibition, what sense is there that there should be a sacrifice?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if there is no sacrifice, why is there no sacrifice? Presumably because there is no prohibition. Though fine, let’s say perhaps that’s a special law about the sacrifice—that I’m exempt from the sacrifice but there is still a prohibition. But once I already have a verse exempting me from the prohibition, why do I need a verse exempting me from a sacrifice?

[Speaker E] That really doesn’t make sense.

[Speaker B] The sacrifice—

[Speaker E] Is for “he shall not profane his word,” right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? The sacrifice is—

[Speaker E] And it’s not for a false oath, not for the fact that I swore.

[Speaker B] No, no, no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A false oath.

[Speaker B] Where is that verse? Which one?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “To do harm or to do good.”

[Speaker B] Somewhere in Leviticus, I don’t remember. Is that in Leviticus?

[Speaker C] But you’d have to say—this may be something I didn’t understand—but it’s even harder than that. Because I could have said my first source was “to do harm or to do good,” and then I learned that someone who swore to nullify the commandment and did not nullify it is not liable for a sacrifice, but maybe he still did violate it. But once they told me that even someone who swears to violate commandments—that is, swears not to do a commandment—does not violate the prohibition, then obviously someone who did not nullify the commandment did not violate a prohibition and is not liable for a sacrifice. That already sounds much simpler to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—that’s exactly what I’m asking.

[Speaker C] No, because I could have said—I could have said that specifically from the fact that they tell me someone who swore to nullify the commandment and did not nullify it is exempt from a sacrifice, I would say: fine, but maybe he still has a prohibition; and someone who swore to violate the commandment maybe would even have a sacrifice. Maybe.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said—but after all one side of the difficulty is even harder. Once there is no prohibition, what sense is there that there should be a sacrifice? If there is only an exemption from a sacrifice, one might perhaps say: exempt from the sacrifice, but maybe there is still a prohibition; so you need another verse to teach that there is no prohibition either.

[Speaker C] Maybe someone who swore to violate the commandment isn’t even exempt from a sacrifice—maybe. Right, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What says that he is exempt? Because of “to do harm or to do good”?

[Speaker C] No—someone who swore to nullify the commandment is exempt from a sacrifice. But I’m saying: so maybe he still has a prohibition, and someone who swore to violate the commandment might even have a sacrifice, I could have said. To violate the commandment and to nullify the commandment is the same thing—I didn’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because if I swore to violate a commandment—

[Speaker C] And I swore to nullify the commandment and then did not nullify it—so, I don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same thing.

[Speaker C] Swearing to violate a commandment and swearing to nullify a commandment is the same thing.

[Speaker B] No, but the point is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I did not nullify it—

[Speaker E] Meaning I violated the oath by fulfilling the commandment. Well, by violating the oath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “I did not nullify it” means I violated the oath, yes.

[Speaker C] Meaning, so maybe nevertheless—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there is a difference in the question of whether in the end I violated a commandment or I did not violate a commandment. Not the oath—the commandment. No, with respect to the commandment you didn’t violate it, because you fulfilled it. Right, so that’s why I’m saying: how can I say—so maybe there I understand why I’m exempt even from a sacrifice. After all, in the end I fulfilled the commandment; I violated the oath by fulfilling the commandment. But in a case where I swear to violate the commandments, it’s the same thing, the same thing, the same thing. Sorry, my mistake. But isn’t the discussion here about two situations? What do you mean? One verse is to exempt him from a sacrifice. The oath here is talking about someone who swore regarding an optional matter. No—someone who swears regarding an optional matter has an oath-offering and has a prohibition and has everything; that’s not what we’re dealing with. “To do harm or to do good” comes to tell you that if you swear about something that is not optional, you are exempt from the oath-offering. Yes. So I’ll say again: what I’m saying is that the second phrase—“and one to exempt him from the prohibition of the oath”—that comes to exclude: he is exempt from the prohibition of the oath, but he is not exempt from another prohibition that he did violate. There? You need two sources to exempt me from a sacrifice and to exempt me from a prohibition? If there’s no prohibition, then for what would I bring a sacrifice? But maybe these are stages—not the prohibition and the oath. He’s exempt from the oath, but not exempt from the prohibition of uttering God’s name in vain. Fine, that’s something else; we’re not dealing with that now. That’s a false oath. Yes, if he swore and didn’t—but that’s not our topic. We’re dealing here with a false oath in the sense of breaking an oath. But maybe one has to say—if you yourself said earlier that there’s a difference between saying “he did not violate the prohibition” and saying “there was no oath here.” It could be that the sacrifice I bring is for the oath and not for the prohibition, and then even if I have no prohibition I could still bring one. Exactly. That’s why I’m asking the question. Meaning, from the fact that the Talmud says you need two sources, one to exempt from the sacrifice and one to exempt from the prohibition, it very strongly implies that the oath exists. Or at least that there was a initial assumption that it would exist. Yes, the oath exists, and therefore even if I am exempt from the prohibition, that still doesn’t mean I’m exempt from the sacrifice. I didn’t violate the prohibition, fine—but the oath exists, I violated the oath, so I don’t have a prohibition, or I don’t have a punishment if you want, but perhaps I would still bring a sacrifice. A verse is needed to exempt me from the sacrifice. I think that’s a pretty thick hint. But isn’t a sacrifice brought for the prohibition? After all, I bring a sacrifice because I violated the prohibition. I’m saying, there was room to say—maybe in the conclusion yes. But why do you need a verse to say that? Because without the verse I would think that maybe the sacrifice is brought even if there is no prohibition, because the oath still exists and you violated the oath. So there’s no prohibition, but you would still bring the sacrifice. Especially if we’re talking about a guilt-offering; a guilt-offering is sometimes brought even without a prohibition. That’s a lecture I gave—maybe some of you heard it from me, I don’t remember. A guilt-offering has special characteristics. It can be brought even without a prohibition, so specifically regarding a guilt-offering this is easier. But that’s not our issue right now. It could be that now, in the conclusion, after the two sources have already been brought, I understand that there’s nothing here at all. But at least there could have been a initial assumption that there would be no prohibition and still an obligation to bring a sacrifice. The question is: once they exempted me from the sacrifice too, what does that mean? Does it mean there is an oath, but no prohibition and no sacrifice? Or no—that itself is the novelty. No, there is no oath at all; automatically there is no prohibition and no sacrifice. Yes, the question is: what did the second verse ultimately teach me? Did it teach me: correct, you’re right, the oath still exists, but there is also no sacrifice—not only no prohibition? Or not? Did it teach me this itself—that no, there isn’t even an oath. So automatically there is no sacrifice and no prohibition. Yes, the question is what practical difference there is between these two possibilities. We’ll soon see. If a sacrifice is needed? We’ll talk, we’ll talk in a moment. No, if we’re exempt from a sacrifice—soon, I’ll explain. One more point I want to make: it’s entirely possible that when we say “to exempt him from the prohibition of the oath,” it doesn’t mean to exempt him from the prohibition in the sense that there is no prohibition. “To exempt him from the prohibition of the oath” could mean: there is a prohibition here, only he is exempt from punishment if he violates it. He is not liable. Why? Because he has a commandment. The commandment compels him to do this—are you going to punish him for doing a commandment? I already swore; you can’t punish me for having sworn. You don’t punish me for the fact that I swore, because if I fulfill the oath and violate the commandment, I won’t be punished for that either, right? So now, after I swore, I have two options: either violate the commandment and fulfill the oath, or fulfill the commandment and violate the oath. It is unreasonable that you would punish me if I chose the correct option—to fulfill the commandment. Therefore, “to exempt him from the prohibition of the oath” can be interpreted as exempting him from the punishment for the prohibition—not that there is no prohibition. And that also makes it very clear why a verse is needed to exempt from the sacrifice. Not only is there an oath, there is even a prohibition; it’s just that there is no punishment. Perhaps there would still be a sacrifice? The Talmud says no—there is another source that exempts you from the sacrifice as well. And then of course everything is much smoother. Even the prohibition exists; only the punishment does not. Okay? Now, the claim really is: but that does not seem to emerge from the derashah on the verse, that the prohibition exists and they merely exempt him, because in the verse’s prohibition—the derashah there with matters of Heaven—it shows that there cannot be a prohibition at all, because “he shall not profane his word”—his word, and not the words of Heaven. Because it’s clear: what am I violating? What am I violating? Here too, look at the language of the Talmud: “and one to exempt him from the prohibition of the oath.” What does “to exempt him from the prohibition of the oath” mean? Maybe you can understand it as meaning to nullify the prohibition, but literally “to exempt him” means to exempt him from the punishment of the prohibition of the oath. And it’s still called the prohibition of the oath. Yes, there is a prohibition of an oath, only there won’t be punishment, because it cannot be that someone is punished for fulfilling a commandment. But that’s a bit difficult, because you’re assuming here that the profanation of the utterance happens when I perform the commandment. But seemingly, when they say “one does not swear concerning commandments,” I understand that initially I’m forbidden to swear concerning commandments—not that I didn’t swear. After all, it says one does not swear to violate the commandments. Fine—give him a punishment for that, but we’re not talking about that. We are talking about the punishment for a false oath, when you profane your word by not fulfilling what you swore—not about the very act of swearing. Punishment for the very act of swearing is a false oath in the other sense, a vain oath. We are talking here about breaking an oath. Here the assumption is that I violate the prohibition but am exempt from punishment? Yes. It’s kind of like—not like, say, on the Sabbath where they say, like a prohibition that has no action. Like a prohibition that has no action—it’s a prohibition with no punishment, but the prohibition itself can still exist. So one can say that the oath exists and there is no prohibition, and therefore no punishment either. One can say that even the prohibition exists, only there is no punishment. And of course one can also say that there is no oath at all. But in the initial assumption that of course cannot be, because then we wouldn’t need—one can say the oath exists and there is no prohibition, and therefore no punishment either. One can say that even the prohibition exists, only there is no punishment. And of course one can also say that there is no oath at all. But in the initial assumption that of course cannot be, because then we wouldn’t need two sources: one to exempt from the prohibition and one to exempt from the sacrifice. But after the two sources have been brought, it could be that this itself is what they teach us—that there is not even legal effect of an oath. It isn’t an oath at all. So automatically there is no sacrifice, no prohibition, no punishment, and nothing. Now, what this really means for us is that we have two possible ways to understand the question whether there is legal effect here to the oath, except that there is no prohibition to violate it because, for example, the commandment overrides it. Okay? Or whether there is no legal effect of the oath at all. The implication could be in our topic. What happens in our topic? In our topic we are dealing with an oath to fulfill a commandment, not to violate a commandment. Right? Now, “to do harm or to do good,” as I said earlier, seems relevant there too; it is still not swearing about something that is in my control, an optional matter. So there would be no sacrifice there either. The question is whether there is a prohibition there. So if in our case it is only an exemption from punishment, because it cannot be that they punish you for fulfilling a commandment—that doesn’t exist on page 8, right? In the case of an oath to nullify a commandment, what am I saying? In an oath to nullify a commandment, there is no contradiction at all between the oath and the commandment. Exactly, exactly. Therefore, with an oath to fulfill a commandment there was room to say that there is an oath, and if he violates it there would also be a prohibition and a punishment and everything. The only thing there would not be is a sacrifice, because “to do harm or to do good” does not apply there. But the actual effect of the oath—and even the prohibition and even the punishment—could very well exist. If you tell me that where someone swears about a commandment there is no legal effect of an oath at all, then apparently “to do harm or to do good” is really broader. It’s not just an exemption from sacrifice; it actually means there is no oath. Then I would say that even in an oath to fulfill a commandment there is no oath. But if all I’m saying is: look, there is an oath here, and maybe there is even a prohibition, only they do not punish you for it—why? Because you violated the oath in order to fulfill a commandment—that is only true when you actually swore to nullify a commandment, where violating the oath would be in order to fulfill a commandment. But on page 8 we are dealing with someone who swore to fulfill a commandment. If he violated the oath, then in addition to violating the oath he also committed a transgression. So why shouldn’t we punish him? You see? There could even be double punishment. What? I can’t hear. Yes, here certainly there would be punishment; the question is what happens with the oath. So what happens here is that if “it cannot take effect” is overridden by the commandment—that’s what is written in our Talmudic passage on page 16—then on page 8 that is irrelevant, and “it cannot take effect” would remain in place; there would be an oath and there would be a prohibition, everything. Now you see that in fact the “motivational oath” in our topic can be interpreted in two ways. Why only in one way, according to what you just said? No, in two ways. If I say that ultimately an oath concerning a commandment—the oath itself does not exist on page 16—then presumably on page 8 it also does not exist, because there too it is not “to do harm or to do good,” and in a place where it is not an optional matter there is exemption from sacrifice, no prohibition, no punishment, and the oath does not exist. But if I make a distinction and say no, the oath exists and the prohibition also exists; it’s just that the sacrifice of course does not exist because this is not “to do harm or to do good.” But the prohibition exists, only I don’t punish for it because it cannot be that someone is punished for fulfilling a commandment. On page 8 that consideration doesn’t apply. Right, so on page 8 you are left only with the first possibility. No—on page 8 I now have two ways to read page 8. When it says there, “What is a motivational oath? One swears to fulfill a commandment,” I can say the oath takes effect. The oath takes effect; it’s just that there is no sacrifice for it. And I can say that the oath does not take effect at all. And what is written there, “he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai,” has to be interpreted in two ways—we’ll soon see. But at the conceptual level, from the sugya here, two possibilities emerge for understanding our sugya. In our sugya, in the “motivational oath” to fulfill a commandment, does the oath exist, and does the prohibition also exist? There may be exemption from a sacrifice, apparently, but the oath and the prohibition exist. And the novelty of Rav Giddel in the name of Rav is that it is permitted—or that this is not a superfluous oath—that one may do this, one may motivate oneself. That’s the novelty, but the oath takes effect; there is an oath here. Second possibility: no, there is no oath there at all. But why shouldn’t there be an oath? We said here that it is because he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai. Rather, there is simply no sacrifice and no prohibition for it. On page 8 that’s what we said—that there is no oath. How can one understand it differently? Now I’ll return to page 8; that’s exactly where I’m going now. On page 8, I remind you again, we had at the beginning: From where do we know that one may swear to fulfill the commandments? “I have sworn, and I will fulfill.” The Talmud asks: but he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai! How did we understand that there? The oath does not take effect; one oath does not take effect upon another oath, right? Then Rav Giddel comes and says—that is, it’s a motivational oath. A motivational oath, right? What does that mean, a motivational oath? The oath does not take effect, but it is permitted to swear in order to motivate myself even though it does not take effect. A novelty for the unlearned masses, right? That’s how I explained it there. The unlearned masses who don’t know that the oath does not take effect—it may be that the fact that they swore will spur them to fulfill the commandment, and therefore I allow them to swear even though the oath does not take effect. A second possibility that I’m now suggesting: no, it could be that the oath does take effect, as we saw from here. The oath takes effect. There may not be a sacrifice for it, but there may even be punishment for it. So here the question arises: then what does the question “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” mean? Seemingly the question is that the oath does not take effect. We’ll soon see. And what the Talmud answers afterward, that it is a motivational oath, means basically this: the oath takes effect, but still, why swear it? After all, there is already a commandment obligating me to sit in the sukkah, so why do I need to swear? So they say: no, in order to motivate yourself—then swear, it’s fine, it is not a superfluous oath. Okay? I still haven’t explained what the difficulty of “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” is according to this reading. Are you with me? Yes. Fine. Two possible ways to read our Talmudic passage. Is it a novelty for the unlearned masses, as I explained in the previous lecture—meaning, people who don’t know that the oath does not take effect, and they swear in order to motivate themselves? And the novelty is that okay, he’s an ignoramus, but at least he didn’t utter God’s name in vain; he swore for a useful purpose, and therefore a motivational oath is permitted. Two ways to read the Talmud there. Now let’s see this in the medieval authorities (Rishonim). The Ran, in our sugya on page 8a—our sugya, page 8a—look what he writes. “But he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai? Rather, this is what it teaches us,” and so on. “It seems to me,” says the Ran, “that this is the explanation: initially the assumption was that Rav Giddel came to teach us that an oath takes effect concerning a commandment just as it does concerning an optional matter. And he proves it from what is written: ‘I have sworn, and I will fulfill.’ And for that reason it asks: but is he not already sworn and standing? For they prove in the last chapter of tractate Shevuot that when the verse says ‘to do harm or to do good,’ Scripture is speaking of an optional matter and not of a commandment. And if you would say that this applies only to a sacrifice, because ‘to do harm or to do good’ is written in connection with a sacrifice, but ‘he shall not profane’ applies even to a commandment—if so, what is the significance of ‘I have sworn, and I will fulfill’? It should have said this: granted that if a commandment is excluded from the sacrifice, it is not excluded from ‘he shall not profane,’ as we see there in the last chapter of Shevuot, that something which does not involve both yes and no, or alternatively does not concern the future, is excluded from the sacrifice by ‘to do harm or to do good,’ but is not excluded from lashes. And for that one does not need a verse. If so, what does it mean when it says ‘as it is stated: I have sworn, and I will fulfill’?” In other words, what is he explaining here? He says that when the Talmud asks, “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai,” what is the difficulty? The difficulty is: why do you need to tell me “I have sworn, and I will fulfill”? We already know that point even without “I have sworn, and I will fulfill”; we know it from the laws of oaths themselves. It is obvious that an oath takes effect in order to fulfill a commandment. Why does an oath take effect concerning a commandment? Why is that obvious from the ordinary laws of oaths? Why shouldn’t it take effect? He is taking the side that it does take effect. Obviously. What does not take effect on page 16 is an oath to nullify a commandment. Whether it doesn’t take effect or whether there is no prohibition—it doesn’t matter right now, maybe we’ll still get to that. But that is with nullifying a commandment. When it comes to fulfilling a commandment, what’s the problem? Why shouldn’t there be a prohibition? There he apparently understands that because I swore to nullify a commandment, it is impossible to impose upon me a prohibition if I fulfill commandments—or impossible to punish me; impossible to impose upon me a prohibition. But in our case, why should it be impossible to impose upon me a prohibition if I do not fulfill the commandment? Therefore he says that from the ordinary laws of oaths it is obvious that an oath takes effect concerning a commandment. And he rejects the possibility that this is only regarding the sacrifice. “And if you would say that this applies only to the sacrifice, because ‘to do harm or to do good’ is written regarding the sacrifice, but ‘he shall not profane’ applies even to a commandment”—yes? What would you say? That “he shall not profane” applies even when one swears concerning a commandment, and only with respect to the sacrifice is it excluded, and what was excluded from the prohibition is an oath to nullify a commandment, but not an oath to fulfill a commandment? If so, what need is there for “I have sworn, and I will fulfill”? Why do you need the verse “I have sworn, and I will fulfill”? The answer is that from the regular laws of oaths themselves. Granted that the commandment is excluded from the sacrifice, it is not excluded from “he shall not profane,” as we see there in the last chapter of Shevuot, that something which does not involve yes and no, or alternatively not in the future. Excluded from the sacrifice, but the prohibition exists. So then why do you need “I have sworn, and I will fulfill”? Just from the regular laws of oaths. Granted that the commandment was excluded from the sacrifice, it was not excluded from “he shall not profane,” as we see there in the last chapter of Shevuot, that something which does not involve yes and no, or alternatively not concerning the future, is excluded from the sacrifice by “to do harm or to do good,” but is not excluded from lashes. Exclusion from lashes would require an additional exclusion. So regarding an oath to nullify a commandment I have an additional exclusion in the Talmud on page 16. But regarding an oath to fulfill a commandment I have no additional exclusion. But from the fact that Rav Giddel brings “I have sworn, and I will fulfill,” that shows that in fact even an oath to fulfill a commandment was excluded? Right—that’s what the Talmud asks. According to the Ran, that’s what the Talmud asks. Why did you bring the verse “I have sworn, and I will fulfill”? And to that the Talmud answers: to teach me that it is permitted for a person to motivate himself. That is, “rather, this is what it teaches us,” and we answer—sorry—“rather, this is what it teaches us: that one is permitted to motivate himself.” Meaning: certainly, the verse is not needed to say that it takes effect regarding “he shall not profane.” You don’t need the verse “I have sworn, and I will fulfill” to say that the oath takes effect and there is a prohibition of “he shall not profane.” I know that even without the verse. Rather, this is what it means: from where do we know that it is proper to swear in order to fulfill a commandment? And that even upright people, who ordinarily refrain from swearing, do swear in this way—as it is stated, “I have sworn, and I will fulfill.” Meaning, after all, David did this. This is proof from King David that people do this, and he certainly would have refrained from swearing as much as he could. So if he did this, apparently there is no reason to refrain from such an oath. So the whole novelty is just that there is no need to avoid such an oath, but the fact that the oath takes effect is obvious. And the difficulty of “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai”—is that only regarding exemption from a sacrifice? Meaning, is that the— No, there is no sacrifice here because this is “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai,” if I understand correctly what he is saying; his language is a bit vague. “Already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” means: from the laws of oaths given at Sinai it is obvious that the oath here takes effect. Why do you need to tell me “I have sworn, and I will fulfill”? A sacrifice is not relevant here. Different from how we understood it all along. Obviously, completely differently. That is why he says that the novelty in our Talmudic passage is a novelty for Torah scholars, not for the unlearned masses. But can’t one say that “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” is really the same story as “to do harm or to do good”—that it’s the exemption from the sacrifice? No, of course not. Here he swears to fulfill a commandment regarding which he was already sworn at Mount Sinai. “To do harm or to do good” is an optional matter, not a commandment. Right, but that’s why I’m exempt from a sacrifice, while there is still a prohibition. Right—why? What is written, “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai,” if I understand the Ran correctly, means: why are you bringing me the verse “I have sworn, and I will fulfill”? The oath takes effect anyway. Why? Because there is already an oath from Sinai in principle. You’re bringing me a verse from King David? By the way, that also resolves what I noted in the previous lecture, that the verse is from the Prophets/Writings, from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). So why do they bring a verse from the Hebrew Bible on a Torah law? According to the Ran, the claim is that the verse from the Hebrew Bible is indeed merely an indication. Look—King David also swore this way. A sign that it is proper to swear in such a manner. This is not talking about the laws of oaths at all. The laws of oaths—whether they take effect or do not take effect—come from the verses we just saw now. And an oath to fulfill a commandment is an oath that does take effect and has a prohibition attached to it, and someone who violates it would receive lashes; besides the commandment, he also violated the oath. There would apparently be no sacrifice because of “to do harm or to do good,” but the prohibition would obviously exist. There was only room to say: but what is the point of swearing, since you are already obligated by the commandment? To that they say, “I have sworn, and I will fulfill”—look, even King David swore about this. Like a practical precedent? Yes, exactly. It is a kind of indication of the matter. In that respect, it fits the Talmud nicely, including the fact that they bring a verse from Psalms for what is seemingly a Torah law. Okay? So in effect it comes out that according to his view, as he really learned it, an oath to fulfill a commandment does take effect. He goes with that side of page 16 that I spoke about there. The oath does take effect in order to fulfill a commandment. And what happens there—that the oath has no prohibition on page 16—is apparently because the commandment overrides the prohibition. But in our case, where it is an oath to fulfill a commandment, the prohibition exists, and there is no commandment overriding it, so the prohibition remains in place. It’s clear that on page 16 he learned that the absence of a prohibition is simply because the commandment overrides it—not because an oath does not take effect there. The oath takes effect and there is a prohibition; in principle there is indeed a prohibition, only the commandment overrides it, or at least exempts from punishment—those are the two possibilities I mentioned there. Are you with me? Fine. Now, the Baal HaMaor writes something very similar, also like the Ran. And he says: “And in our Talmudic passage, and from our Mishnah which teaches: one who swears to nullify the commandment, not to make a sukkah,” and so on, “that an oath never takes effect at all when someone swears to nullify a commandment, whether positive commandments or prohibitions, except that he incurs lashes because of a vain oath.” Here he introduces the vain oath: for the very act of swearing he is liable to lashes, because he simply swore pointlessly. From the moment of his oath—whether he fulfilled the oath and violated the commandment, or fulfilled the commandment and violated his oath. That’s the practical difference. For a vain oath he gets lashes for the very act of swearing; it makes no difference whether in the end he fulfilled the oath or not. But at the time of violating the commandment or fulfilling it, he incurs no punishment of the oath because of that act at all—no sacrifice and no lashes. Now here the wording is interesting. He says that an oath never takes effect at all when one swears to nullify a commandment—seemingly implying that the oath does not exist at all. But in the end he concludes that “he incurs no punishment of the oath because of that act at all—no sacrifice and no lashes.” That sounds a bit as if the oath does take effect, but there is just no punishment and no sacrifice. Fine, there is room to hesitate about that. Now he continues. One can’t say—maybe I didn’t understand correctly—but following the Ran as well, maybe they are making a deeper distinction, as it were, because from the fact that I see that the Ran distinguishes between one who swears to nullify a commandment and one who swears to fulfill a commandment, perhaps one could also say that within those cases there is a distinction regarding whether the oath exists at all—even if with an oath to nullify a commandment the oath does not exist at all. Very good—that is two possibilities. The Baal HaMaor begins with this. We’ll soon see—the Baal HaMaor goes in the Ran’s direction. But the Baal HaMaor begins by saying that the oath does not exist at all: “an oath never takes effect at all when one swears to nullify a commandment.” So that is the opposite of the Ran’s approach. Wait. He ends by saying: “he incurs no punishment of the oath because of that act at all—no sacrifice and no lashes.” That sounds a bit as though there is an oath, only no sacrifice and no lashes. Now I’m saying: both possibilities fit, because we’ll see later, when he speaks about someone swearing to fulfill a commandment—in his next paragraph—there he goes like the Ran. But in the case of swearing to nullify a commandment he can learn that there is no oath at all. After we learned that there is no prohibition and no sacrifice, maybe there is no oath at all. But there being no oath at all is not because of “to do harm or to do good,” but because this runs against a commandment. And in our case, where it does not run against a commandment but goes with a commandment, in our case there is an oath. Therefore this doesn’t have to be—he doesn’t have to adopt the position that I mentioned regarding page 16 and say that there too there is an oath in the case of swearing to nullify. He can say that when one swears to nullify, there is no oath at all, and when one swears to fulfill, there is. Look—he goes on here and says as follows: “And similarly, when one swears to uphold prohibitions, he incurs no punishment of the oath”—to uphold prohibitions, yes? Meaning, not to transgress them. “He incurs no punishment of the oath whether he upheld it or nullified it, for because of the oath there is, in his nullifying the commandments, neither sacrifice nor lashes. And this is what we say at the end of tractate Makkot: let us count as an example one who swore not to plow on a Jewish holiday. There too—does the oath take effect upon him? He is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai is he not?” Meaning, “and the prohibition of the oath does not take effect upon the prohibition of the commandment, because one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition.” What is he saying? Someone who swears to uphold prohibitions—so the prohibition of the oath does not take effect upon the prohibition of the commandment, right? Because if he violates his oath, he will also violate the prohibition itself; he swore to uphold the prohibition. So if he violates the prohibition, he also violates the oath, and the oath has added another prohibition on top of the prohibition itself, because in the same act that I do, in addition to the prohibition itself, I also violate the prohibition of the oath. But one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. So it doesn’t exist. Does it not exist, or is there just no punishment? Yes, you can understand it either way. Now look at the next paragraph. It sounds as if it doesn’t exist. It sounds as though with nullifying commandments he really writes it explicitly—I don’t understand how one could understand it otherwise. Where? That it doesn’t exist, that the oath does not exist at all. Then why did he speak about punishment? He says, “he incurs no punishment of the oath.” Right, he says there is no punishment because of the oath. The punishment is because you nullified a prohibition, you violated a prohibition, but there is no punishment—who said there is no oath? Because he writes—I don’t know, look. He doesn’t even say there is no prohibition; he says there is no sacrifice and no lashes. The practical difference is that perhaps the prohibition does exist. At first it really sounded sensible to me, what Noa is saying—that at the beginning it clearly sounds as though he is saying that the oath does not take effect at all. Now you’re saying that at the end it’s a bit— What beginning? Are you talking about one who swears to nullify the commandment? Here? Yes. Fine. We’re talking here—you have to distinguish. But it’s the same thing—the first two paragraphs are the same thing; we still haven’t reached our sugya. Right, right, right—no, no, pay attention. This is an important point; it is a little confusing. There is one who swears to nullify a commandment and one who swears to fulfill a commandment. That is, an oath against the Torah, and an oath in favor of the Torah. But swearing in each of those two possibilities can concern either a positive commandment or a prohibition. Right, but it’s the same thing. If I uphold a prohibition, to uphold a prohibition means to refrain from violating it. And one can swear to violate a prohibition. One can swear to fulfill a positive commandment and one can swear to nullify a positive commandment. But the first two paragraphs are both going against the Torah’s will. No—why not? Someone who swears to uphold prohibitions is going together with the Torah. He swears— Why is the second paragraph about upholding prohibitions? Right—upholding prohibitions means not stumbling in them. He swears not to eat pork. Yes. That’s like swearing to fulfill the commandment. Yes. Why? He writes, “and an oath not to plow on a Jewish holiday.” No, there he brings the Talmud in Makkot and says that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. But that’s what he’s discussing, isn’t it? No, not that. Someone who swears to uphold prohibitions, okay? “Not to plow on a Jewish holiday”—yes, an oath not to plow on a Jewish holiday is exactly that. So what’s the problem? “Not to plow on a Jewish holiday”—I’m going with the Torah’s will. Right, exactly. Someone who swears to uphold prohibitions. So yes, now I understand. It goes with the Torah’s will. Right, both are with the Torah’s will. No, no—swearing to nullify a commandment is against the Torah’s will, and the second is with it. Right, right, right. Wait, so now I got confused. That’s exactly the point—you have to pay close attention. The first paragraph is someone who swears to nullify a commandment; that is the sugya on page 16. And there he does not distinguish between positive commandments and prohibitions—notice that here. You see? “One who swears to nullify a commandment, whether positive commandments or prohibitions”—there no distinction is made. But with one who swears to fulfill a commandment, he does make a distinction, and he even divides it into two paragraphs. There is one who swears to uphold prohibitions—that has no punishment, or no prohibition, because one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. Because you understand why this is “one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition”? When I violate the—yes, because when I violate it, I plow on a Jewish holiday, then besides the prohibition against plowing on a Jewish holiday there is also the prohibition that I violated the oath. So it comes out that all the oath did was add a prohibition onto something that was already prohibited anyway. One prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. So the second prohibition of the oath does not take effect, or there is no prohibition, or there is no punishment—but one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. But in the next paragraph: “And one who swears to fulfill a positive commandment”—that too is an oath going with the Torah, but now regarding a positive commandment—“the oath and the vow do take effect upon him for lashes.” Not only does the oath take effect, not only is there a prohibition, there are lashes too, there is punishment too. But not for a sacrifice, because it is not a matter of both yes and no—yes, that is “to do harm or to do good”—and Scripture excluded it only from a sacrifice, as it is written “to do harm or to do good.” “And it is entirely proper,” fine, exactly like the Ran. “And it is entirely proper from the outset to do so,” and know that it is proper, that it is permitted from the outset to do this as well, whether by oath or by vow, “and to fulfill it.” What does “and to fulfill it” mean? To fulfill what was said, for we say there: from where do we know that one may swear to fulfill a commandment? As it is stated, “I have sworn, and I will fulfill,” and so on, as it says there. Like the Ran, right? Wait, but in the first two cases would the Ran also say that the oath does not take effect? Who knows? I said there are two possibilities. I tend to think that if you say the oath takes effect on page 8, then presumably on page 16 too the oath takes effect. And all that is missing there is the punishment. You do not punish a person for doing a commandment. And of course that is not relevant on page 8, because on page 8 you are supposed to do the commandment, and therefore if you do not do the commandment then surely you deserve punishment. But the Baal HaMaor, for example, does not go that way. The Ran could go that way, and he could also go like the Baal HaMaor. What does the Baal HaMaor say? The Baal HaMaor on page 8 learns like the Ran: one who swears to fulfill a positive commandment has a prohibition and a punishment, everything except a sacrifice, because this is not “to do harm or to do good.” But on page 16 he says there is no punishment, and it could be there is no oath at all. But why claim that? What is the logic? What is the logic of the Baal HaMaor to say that with one who swears to nullify a commandment there is no oath at all, if in principle he thinks like the Ran? Because the verse comes to teach me that there is no prohibition. How do you understand a verse that says there is no prohibition? A verse that says there is no prohibition probably means that the oath does not take effect. So in other words, the Baal HaMaor basically assumes—not like you—that the prohibition tells me whether or not there is an oath at all. So that remains open, I’m saying. It can go in both directions. In the Ran, since he said nothing about page 16, I would read the Ran the way I said earlier: the oath takes effect, only the punishment is overridden because of the commandment. On page 8, where the commandment does not stand against the oath, there too there would be punishment. But that is not necessary. One could say that the oath takes effect on page 8, including punishment, including everything. On page 16, true, there was a initial assumption that the oath takes effect, but after they taught us that there is no prohibition and no sacrifice, it could be that this itself is what they taught us—no prohibition, no sacrifice, nothing; the oath does not take effect. Okay? And then he says: “and vows do take effect in nullifying positive commandments.” That doesn’t interest me. I said that I am dealing with oaths, not vows. Fine, we’ve gone a bit far afield. Next up will be Nachmanides. Nachmanides disagrees with the Ran and with the Baal HaMaor, but we’ll see that next time. So I think we’ll stop here. Thank you very much, good night. Goodbye. Thank you very much, good evening.