Conversion to Judaism – Lesson 2

Table of Contents

• General Overview
• The stages of conversion, the religious court, and acceptance of the commandments
• The status of the religious court as the one performing the act of conversion, and a minor convert
• Acceptance of the commandments: procedure versus essence, and the Shulchan Arukh
• Criticism of the claim that acceptance of the commandments is a late “invention”
• An analogy to the laws of acquisition and the claim that it is “self-evident”
• A methodological note: an academic researcher versus a halakhic authority
• Mount Sinai, “We will do and we will hear,” and the question of whether conversion endures over time
• “Converts are as difficult for Israel as a skin affliction” and the policy of making it difficult
• The current social-national context and the opposition to turning Jewish law into a policy tool
• A proposal for civil conversion and the separation of religion and state
• What counts as a “leniency” in conversion: invalidating versus non-invalidating, ideal practice and after the fact
• The affair of the annulment of conversions performed by the state conversion system and Rabbi Sherman
• “Throughout your generations” in Keritot: conversion at a time when there is no sacrifice
• Tosafot in Gittin, acting as their agents, and ordained judges
• There are no experts today and we act as the agents of the earlier ones
• Is “acting as their agents” Torah-level or rabbinic, and the expansion of “throughout your generations”
• Conversion for the sake of marriage: precedents and the reversal of their meaning today
• Acceptance of the commandments as the center of the decision, and criticism of a technical application of precedents

Summary

General Overview

The text presents conversion as a halakhic process with three basic stages: circumcision, immersion, and the offering of blood, alongside two decisive elements: that it be done before a religious court and that there be acceptance of the commandments. It argues that acceptance of the commandments is the essence of conversion, even if the formal verbal declaration is not always indispensable, and it emphasizes that according to the Shulchan Arukh, even the procedural acceptance before a religious court is indispensable. It sharply criticizes modern attempts to dispense with acceptance of the commandments or to justify “leniency” for social reasons, and proposes that instead of bending Jewish law to state needs, it would be better to create a civil track that is not a religious conversion. It interprets sources such as “throughout your generations” and Tosafot in Gittin as a basis for not closing the door to serious converts, but clarifies that this does not permit giving up foundational components such as acceptance of the commandments. It concludes that historical precedents of conversion for the sake of marriage actually prove the centrality of acceptance of the commandments, not the possibility of bypassing it.

The stages of conversion, the religious court, and acceptance of the commandments

Conversion consists of circumcision, immersion, and the offering of blood, and the offering of blood is a sacrifice, which does not apply nowadays. Conversion must be done before a religious court, and the requirement of a religious court is not an additional “stage” but a condition governing how the stages are carried out, and there are discussions about what is indispensable and what is not. Acceptance of the commandments is not listed among the stages in the Talmud or in the halakhic decisors, but it is understood as the essence of conversion, and the distinction is between procedural acceptance expressed verbally and inner acceptance in one’s heart as the necessary basis for the meaning of conversion.

The status of the religious court as the one performing the act of conversion, and a minor convert

There is an approach that defines the religious court as the one that “immerses the convert,” especially in the case of a minor convert, who is described in Ketubot as immersing “by the authority of the religious court.” The claim is that the court’s intention operates as part of the conversion itself, similar to immersing a vessel, and not merely as supervision over an act that the convert performs. This distinction sharpens the idea that conversion may be a legal act of the religious court and not only a personal act done in its presence.

Acceptance of the commandments: procedure versus essence, and the Shulchan Arukh

The statement before a religious court, “I accept upon myself the yoke of the commandments,” is not viewed as mere lip service but as an expression of inner acceptance. It is argued that the formal stage of verbal declaration may not be indispensable according to some sources, but that does not eliminate the need for inner acceptance. The Shulchan Arukh rules that the procedural acceptance of the commandments is indispensable and must be before a religious court, to the point that if it was done before two witnesses and not before a religious court, “he is not a convert.”

Criticism of the claim that acceptance of the commandments is a late “invention”

The text strongly criticizes the claim, advanced by some writers, that acceptance of the commandments is an invention of the nineteenth century, and describes this as confusion between procedure and essence and as sheer ignorance. It cites the Talmudic statement that someone who accepts everything except one single matter “is not a convert” as proof that acceptance of the commandments is, in principle, a fundamental condition. It notes that this Talmudic statement does not appear in Maimonides or in the Shulchan Arukh within their enumeration of the stages, and explains that the silence stems from the fact that acceptance of the commandments is self-evident and included in the very concept of “the laws of converts.”

An analogy to the laws of acquisition and the claim that it is “self-evident”

The text compares acceptance of the commandments to intent in acquisition law: even though it is an essential condition for making an acquisition, it is not formulated in the Shulchan Arukh as an explicit requirement, because the laws are addressed to someone who already wants to acquire. Similarly, the laws of converts are addressed to someone who wants to accept the yoke of the commandments, so there is no need to write separately that “one must want to accept the commandments.” The conclusion is that someone who does not want to accept the yoke of the commandments should simply “remain a gentile,” and there is no room here to turn conversion into a merely social process.

A methodological note: an academic researcher versus a halakhic authority

The text cites a response by a law professor who brought Melamed Leho’il and Rabbi Uziel as sources for an approach that does not require acceptance of the commandments. The author argues that he does not think that is actually what is written there, but even if it were, it would be a mistake that is not binding, and he emphasizes the difference between an academic description of a range of opinions and halakhic ruling, which distinguishes between an opinion that is viable and plain nonsense. He states that the fact that something appears in a printed book does not turn an error into a “halakhic position,” and he mentions the concept of “an error regarding an explicit Mishnah.”

Mount Sinai, “We will do and we will hear,” and the question of whether conversion endures over time

A question is raised about the “first conversion” at Mount Sinai and what acceptance of the commandments meant there, and the claim is brought that “We will do and we will hear” constitutes acceptance of the commandments. The question then arises what the status is of someone who accepts the yoke of the commandments and afterward does not endure or commits a transgression, including the observation that shortly afterward there was the sin of idolatry. The lecturer notes that he will later address the question whether conversion remains valid even when the convert does not observe the commandments. He sketches a distinction between the very possibility of carrying out a conversion and the examination of intention and seriousness.

“Converts are as difficult for Israel as a skin affliction” and the policy of making it difficult

The saying “Converts are as difficult for Israel as a skin affliction” is presented as the basis for a common policy, which in practical terms means making things difficult for a convert in order to test his seriousness. The text suggests that this is not meant to delay for the sake of delay, but rather as a tool to clarify whether the intention is genuine, using the standard formula, “What did you see that led you to convert? Israel at this time is downtrodden and oppressed.” It presents the view that if the convert truly wants to convert, there is no point in slamming the door in his face; the point is only to make sure there are no ulterior motives such as marriage.

The current social-national context and the opposition to turning Jewish law into a policy tool

The text describes a reality in which many people are not Jewish according to Jewish law but are nevertheless part of Israeli society, and sometimes have a Jewish father, creating a feeling that “there is no choice” but to be lenient in conversion. It objects to the motivation to be lenient in order to solve a social problem created by the state or by institutions not committed to Jewish law, and gives as an example criticism that was voiced about bringing hundreds of thousands of gentiles from the Soviet Union. It argues that a policy of “the rabbis will solve it” educates the public very badly and encourages the creation of problems instead of preventing them.

A proposal for civil conversion and the separation of religion and state

The text states that it is in favor of separating religion and state and proposes a solution of “civil conversion” that would recognize a person as Israeli, though not as Jewish according to Jewish law. It says there is no reason to impose the halakhic threshold of accepting the commandments on someone who wants to join the nation in its modern sense, and that this coercion creates problems. It mentions Rabbi Brandes and the claim of “wink conversions” as the argument that everyone knows there is a gap between the formal declaration of accepting the yoke of the commandments and the reality in which the judges “wink,” and it presents this as a symptom of a problem that cannot be ignored.

What counts as a “leniency” in conversion: invalidating versus non-invalidating, ideal practice and after the fact

The text states that there are no “leniencies” regarding circumcision, immersion, and acceptance of the commandments, and sacrifice when relevant, because without them “it is simply not a conversion.” It defines the area of flexibility as existing only in matters that are not indispensable or that apply only ideally from the outset, such as how many commandments to teach, how much to investigate, and how far to refrain from accepting a convert who comes for the sake of marriage. It emphasizes that the rule “if they accepted him, he is a convert” does not make the ideal prohibition meaningless, but it does mark the place where policy can be decided differently without changing the very validity of the conversion.

The affair of the annulment of conversions performed by the state conversion system and Rabbi Sherman

The text refers to the case of the ruling by the Great Rabbinical Court that claimed all conversions performed by Rabbi Druckman’s conversion system were void, on the grounds that the judges were “wicked.” The author agrees that there are things one must not do, but objects to labeling the judges wicked, because this was a policy dispute and not wickedness, and he notes that Rabbi Amar nullified that ruling. He adds that if there had been an explicit waiver of acceptance of the commandments, then there would indeed have been room for the claim that without acceptance of the commandments “all these guys are complete gentiles,” because this is not a matter of leniency but of eliminating a foundational stage.

“Throughout your generations” in Keritot: conversion at a time when there is no sacrifice

The Talmud in Keritot asks how converts are accepted at a time when there is no sacrifice, and answers on the basis of the verse “throughout your generations” that one may not close the door before converts, and therefore they are accepted even without a sacrifice. The text explains that in the straightforward reading the derivation refers to the sacrifice, but raises the question whether it can also be expanded to circumcision and immersion in extreme situations where they are not practically possible. It presents the understanding that the leniency here is intended for a case in which otherwise “there is no procedure at all by which to convert” for a serious convert who has been examined and found worthy.

Tosafot in Gittin, acting as their agents, and ordained judges

The text brings the Talmud in Gittin about compelling a bill of divorce in Babylonia and the principle of acting “as their agents,” meaning as agents of the ordained sages of the Land of Israel, a principle limited to a “common matter” that involves financial loss. Tosafot asks how converts are accepted when a convert requires three expert judges because “it is written ‘judgment,’” and answers, “for we act as their agents, since it is considered common.” The text dwells on the phrase “considered common” as reflecting a halakhic fiction meant to enable functioning when there are no ordained judges, rather than a factual claim that conversion is common.

There are no experts today and we act as the agents of the earlier ones

Tosafot adds that even when there are no experts in the Land of Israel, “we act as the agents of the earlier ones,” and the text presents this as the idea of acting on behalf of previous generations despite their death. It connects this to the discussion in the laws of agency about whether agency can survive the death of the principal, mentioning Ketzot HaChoshen and the discussion of “an extended hand” versus “power of attorney,” as well as the dispute regarding an agent for a bill of divorce when the husband dies. It concludes that, in the simple sense, “there is no agency for the dead,” and reliance on “the agency of the earlier ones” is seen as a necessary fiction to enable a legal system and conversion.

Is “acting as their agents” Torah-level or rabbinic, and the expansion of “throughout your generations”

A dispute is cited over whether acting “as their agents” is a Torah-level rule or a rabbinic enactment, and Netivot uses Tosafot on conversion to argue that there must be a Torah-level foundation here, because otherwise there would be no “religious court” with the authority to perform conversion. On the other hand, Rashba and Nachmanides are cited as arguing that acting “as their agents” is rabbinic, and the text suggests that this rests on a broad understanding of “throughout your generations” as a general rule in conversion that does not allow a situation in which “there is no possibility of converting,” and therefore pushes the system to find a minimal pathway even without ordained judges. It formulates the leniency as far-reaching in certain components, but limited to extreme cases of closing the door before serious converts.

Conversion for the sake of marriage: precedents and the reversal of their meaning today

The text presents the rule that ideally one does not accept a convert for the sake of marriage, but after the fact, if they accepted him, “he is a convert,” and it emphasizes that one should not belittle the ideal rule even though it is not indispensable. It argues that historical precedents of accepting conversions for the sake of marriage are not evidence for leniency today, because in the past it was obvious that conversion meant belonging to a framework of commandments, even if the initial motivation was marriage. It states that today, when many Jews as well are not committed to the commandments, a convert who comes for the sake of marriage does not truly accept the commandments, and therefore “today he is a gentile,” and the doubt surrounding acceptance of the commandments is so great that such a conversion must be annulled.

Acceptance of the commandments as the center of the decision, and criticism of a technical application of precedents

The text concludes that the reason one does not ideally accept a convert for the sake of marriage is the concern that there is no full acceptance of the commandments, but after the fact in the past the conversion was valid because in practice there was acceptance of the commandments arising from the social-religious understanding of what Judaism meant. It clarifies that an impure motivation does not invalidate the conversion if the acceptance of the commandments is genuine, and that the main problem is the absence of acceptance of the commandments in modern reality. It ends by arguing that bringing precedents of conversion for the sake of marriage to justify leniencies today is a “technical formal application” of precedents without understanding that their real message is precisely that “only acceptance of the commandments matters.”

We’re in the topic of conversion. We started a few weeks ago; it was timely then. Let’s continue a bit. We saw there that the conversion procedure is made up of several stages: circumcision, immersion, and presentation of blood. Presentation of blood means a sacrifice. Nowadays there is no sacrifice; in a moment we’ll get to what stands behind that whole matter. Beyond that, two more things are needed that don’t appear in the list in the Talmud and in the halakhic decisors. First, it has to be done before a religious court. If these things are not done before a religious court, then part of them are not indispensable, but it has to be done before a religious court. Some parts are indispensable. And the second rule is that there has to be acceptance of the commandments. The fact that it has to be done before a religious court doesn’t appear in the list because, as I said, it isn’t another stage in conversion; it’s a detail in how the stages are carried out. Meaning, the stages are three: immersion, circumcision, and presentation of blood. And how do you do that? You have to do it before a religious court. But the fact that it’s before a religious court isn’t another stage, so when you count the three stages, it isn’t mentioned. Wasn’t the sacrifice before a religious court? Right. I’m saying that even circumcision and immersion raise questions there that are not so simple. Acceptance of the commandments in general—regarding each one of them there’s a discussion whether it is indispensable or not indispensable. In principle, conversion has to be done before a religious court, and maybe even by a religious court. There are those who define it as the religious court immersing the convert. Meaning, take a minor convert, for example. The Talmud in Ketubot talks about a minor convert, so he immerses with the consent of the religious court, converts with the consent of the religious court, and then the claim is that the religious court’s intent is what actually converts him, because they are, as it were, immersing him like a vessel. It’s not a person immersing himself. So maybe conversion is really an act of the religious court, not just that the convert does something and it is done before a religious court. Especially in the case of a minor. With a minor you see it through the question of intent, but it may be that this tells you something in general about what is being said here, what happens, how the conversion process is carried out.

The second thing, which is more relevant to our discussion, is acceptance of the commandments, and that is what raises all the controversies even nowadays. And it really is more surprising why this does not appear in that list, because it is a stage. Meaning, there is circumcision, immersion, presentation of blood, and acceptance of the commandments. Meaning, acceptance of the commandments also has to be there. Now, I divided between two things. I said there is acceptance of the commandments as a procedure in conversion, meaning that the convert is supposed to stand there and say, “I accept the commandments upon myself,” and apparently that doesn’t appear because it isn’t indispensable. But that doesn’t mean that acceptance of the commandments in his heart is not required. Meaning, when the convert says before a religious court, “I accept upon myself the yoke of the commandments,” clearly we are not talking about moving his lips. Meaning, when he expresses something, he expresses something he thinks—that is, he accepts upon himself the yoke of the commandments and says it out loud. So the formal halakhic stage of verbally saying it before the religious court is not indispensable, but that says nothing about the internal process, meaning that a person needs to accept upon himself the yoke of the commandments as the basis of the conversion process. Otherwise, what is he converting to—socially? Yes. Well, maybe National Insurance has arrived. That’s what all the controversies came out about, because in fact acceptance of the commandments does not appear, and in places where it does appear it says that it is not indispensable. By the way, the Shulchan Arukh writes that it is indispensable, and even that it must be before a religious court—that is, if it was not done before a religious court, he is not a convert. That’s what is written in the Shulchan Arukh. The procedural acceptance? The procedural one, yes. He is talking about the procedural one, because internal acceptance—there is no such thing as “before a religious court.” Internal acceptance takes place inside me; that is not a matter of before a religious court or not before a religious court.

In any case, there are all sorts of disputes among the halakhic decisors about this. There really are also precedents showing that converts were accepted even without going through this stage of accepting the commandments, to the point that some wrote that acceptance of the commandments is an invention of the nineteenth century and therefore the whole thing is absurd. And that’s unbelievable. I wrote about this that it was ignorance, and they were terribly offended. Some book came out about conversion by two important authors, and I said they were simply ignoramuses. There are explicit Talmudic passages, there are all the halakhic decisors, there’s nothing to discuss. They simply mixed up the procedure with the essence. The Talmud says there that someone who accepts everything except for one single commandment is not a convert—it says so in the Talmud. So what is this about the nineteenth century? Now true, by the way, that it doesn’t appear in Maimonides and in the Shulchan Arukh—it doesn’t appear there. That Talmudic passage? Ah. Now, I said this last week, last time: here the question really does arise, and this is the claim of those who want to waive acceptance of the commandments today—that it does not appear as a requirement in the conversion process in the halakhic decisors. These three stages appear, it says it has to be done before a religious court, but it doesn’t say that acceptance of the commandments is indispensable internally. It doesn’t even say it is required, aside from the procedural stage. So what I claimed is that it isn’t written because it is self-evident. Not only is it self-evident, it is actually conversion itself. It is written in the heading of the section, where it says laws of converts. Laws of converts means the laws of those who want to accept upon themselves the yoke of the commandments. That is what laws of converts means. What do you need to write in the laws? I gave an example, like the fact that in the Shulchan Arukh you will not find a law saying that in order to acquire something, you have to intend to acquire it. There is no such law. And yet it is obvious and agreed by all the halakhic decisors that without that you do not acquire. If you don’t intend, you can lift an object, you can perform an act of possession, you can do all the acts that effect acquisition, but if you didn’t intend to acquire, you didn’t acquire. That’s why a minor cannot acquire. What? That’s why a minor cannot acquire. Yes, correct. And an adult who does not intend also doesn’t acquire. It fell onto a found object. There are various discussions in Bava Metzia and elsewhere. It is completely obvious. So why doesn’t it appear as a requirement—that you need to intend to acquire? Because—what do you mean? The laws are addressed to someone who wants to acquire. Meaning, if someone wants to acquire, he opens the Shulchan Arukh and looks at what he has to do in order to acquire land, to acquire such-and-such an object, to acquire an animal—it doesn’t matter—whatever it is, how to acquire it. But if he doesn’t want to acquire, what do you want from me? There is no rule that says you must want to acquire. If you don’t want to, then don’t acquire. No problem. If you want to, do such-and-such. Those are the things you need to do in order to acquire.

So by analogy, I say the same thing regarding conversion. Since the conception was that conversion means entering into the yoke of the commandments, accepting the yoke—that is the meaning of the concept conversion. Therefore, there is no point in writing that you need acceptance of the commandments. Someone who wants to accept the commandments—how does he do it? Circumcision, immersion, and presentation of blood before a religious court. That, that is what has to be done. No one has to write to you that you need to accept the yoke of the commandments. You don’t have to. If you don’t want to, then don’t accept it—just remain a non-Jew. Meaning, no problem, whatever you want. It doesn’t need to be here. These laws are addressed to someone who wants to accept the yoke of the commandments. If someone wants to, this is how it is done. Yes, but that’s what—it was never like this. In the last hundred years there is nationality and there is religion and all these separations, and that is what creates… okay, I’m getting to that, I’m getting to that. In any case, the… I’m speaking right now about the basic law. We’ll get to our own day as well; at this stage I just want to build the basic conceptual foundation. So therefore it seems to me that in the straightforward sense it is clear that acceptance of the commandments is required. And in the Shulchan Arukh, as I said, even acceptance of the commandments as an act of speech, a verbal act, is indispensable. And that it be before a religious court. If it was done before two witnesses but not before a religious court, he is not a convert. That is what is written in the Shulchan Arukh. Meaning, there are things here that I don’t think one can deny. And it seems to me that no one argues about them either; in my humble opinion no one ever argues about them.

Now here I want to make an interesting methodological comment connected to previous topics I spoke about. After I wrote the article, this article in the introductions I wrote on conversion, there was a response from some law lecturer who brought all kinds of—not all kinds, one or two, I think—one source or two. I had said that there is no such thing, no one ever thought that one could convert without acceptance of the commandments. So he said: here—Melamed Leho’il, I think, Rabbi Hoffmann, and maybe Rabbi Uziel too he brought. Those are usually the two sources people bring; I’ll mention them again in a moment. Yes. So my response was never published, because they no longer had the energy to continue the argument. But what I wrote there was two things. First, I don’t think that is what is written in Melamed Leho’il and in Rabbi Uziel, and I’ll discuss that further on, although people always cite them in this context. And second, even if it is written there, then they were wrong. So what? There is a difference here; this is an important methodological point. There is some difference in point of view between someone who writes or studies a topic as an academic researcher—say, a scholar of Jewish law in this case—and someone who deals with the topic as a halakhic person. What is the difference? The real difference—and this isn’t criticism, it really is a difference, and that is how it should be—is that when a researcher sees that Melamed Leho’il wrote that acceptance of the commandments is not needed, then from his standpoint there is a halakhic opinion that acceptance of the commandments is not needed. He is right. He needs to survey the collection of opinions. He is a researcher; he is not supposed to express his own stance. Therefore he basically says: so here is this approach and that approach and there are approaches that say acceptance of the commandments is unnecessary. In contrast, a halakhic person, or someone who deals with this matter again from within, as someone involved in it, not as a researcher describing things from outside—so what if Melamed Leho’il wrote that? I can also write a few books and write mountains and hills in them, so then there will also be such an opinion? If someone writes nonsense, then he wrote nonsense—what can I do? Then he made a mistake. And that can mainly be said by someone who participates in the discourse; someone from outside cannot say it. Again, in my opinion Melamed Leho’il did not write that, I’m only saying this on the principled level. In principle. So even if he wrote an error, then he wrote an error. And if it’s printed in Rashi script with gold letters in some holy book, does that mean there is such a halakhic opinion? If it doesn’t hold water, it’s nonsense. It’s an elementary error. There are laws about an error in an explicit Mishnah. Wait, the first conversion—how did you do acceptance of the commandments there? What do you mean? At Mount Sinai. Because they were non-Jews? What acceptance of the commandments was there at Mount Sinai? There was speech there about the commandments. So what? So what? So what was there besides acceptance of the commandments? No, no, no. The other things—circumcision, immersion, and presentation of blood—were there as an idea. The whole act was acceptance of the commandments. No, no, that was informing them of the commandments. You say acceptance of the commandments. Right—“we will do and we will hear” is acceptance of the commandments. The convert too, at the beginning, says “we will do and we will hear.” The convert does not need to know what the commandments are. He accepts it, and that comes later. He doesn’t need to know what the commandments are. Are you talking about acceptance of the commandments in the heart? You mean as a self-evident condition without which there is no conversion? Are you talking about it in potential or in actuality? After all, if you take the example of Mount Sinai, a moment later they worshipped idols. So I’ll get to that. Wait. I’ll get to that. What happens with a convert who accepts upon himself the yoke of the commandments and afterward it doesn’t hold up, and then the question is whether it’s a conversion or not if he does nothing. Fine, in a moment, in a moment, we’ll get there, get there. Slowly. Let’s continue. I want us to go step by step, friends, because otherwise we keep jumping around. I’m intentionally building this up. I’ll get to all these questions. Okay? Is it possible to carry out a conversion if he doesn’t observe the commandments? Yes, it’s possible; I’ll get to that in a moment. It’s possible only if he really means it. If not—I’ll get to that in a moment. There is a rule. So that is the picture in general.

Now I started speaking about the fact that the basic policy in conversion was “converts are as difficult for Israel as a scab.” That saying of the Sages is the basis of the fundamental approach of all the halakhic decisors. In practical translation, beyond the general statements, it means that one should try to make things hard for the convert. Try to delay him, not allow him, lower his motivation. I said I’m not entirely sure that this is the right way to describe it. It may be that what we do there is only an attempt to clarify whether he is serious. And that is not the intention—if someone truly intends seriously, there is no point in not letting him convert. On the contrary, if he wants to, why not accept him? Rather, you really have to clarify truthfully whether his intention is genuinely serious. How do you do that? You make it difficult for him; you say to him, “What have you seen that made you come to convert? The Jewish people nowadays are downtrodden and oppressed,” and all the rest of what is written in the halakhic decisors that you are supposed to tell him, and so on. But all of this, again, I don’t think the second wording is right. I don’t think the goal is to delay him, or the goal is not to let him convert. The goal is to make sure that he really is a genuine convert. That he is a convert of truth, who really wants to join, and not for all sorts of other reasons. Therefore, in this matter it is true that there is a policy of making it difficult, but I do not think this is an essential policy. Meaning, it is clear that if he wants to convert, then certainly one should open the door to him. In a moment we’ll see this even more explicitly. But one has to make sure he truly and sincerely wants to convert, and isn’t doing it for other reasons—for marriage or all sorts of other things, which we’ll also get to later.

Now I began speaking—I jumped to what is happening today. I’ll come back once more to the stages in the middle, but I jumped to what is happening today and said that what is happening today is that some social problem has arisen in the country. And yes, there are many people who are not halakhically defined as Jews and came here, and all in all they are part of our society; some of them have a Jewish father; there are all kinds of nuances in this matter. And the feeling is that there is no choice; one has to open the door wider here. Meaning, one has to be somewhat more lenient and not continue the accepted policy of conversion. On this matter I have two comments, and then I’ll return to the systematic discussion, because I only want to place this in context to understand where I’m heading.

One comment concerns motivation. Meaning, the very motivation to be lenient in conversion in order to solve a social problem—I am not sure I agree with that. I’m not sure I agree, because I do not think Jewish law is supposed to be a tool in the hands of society, the state, or anything of that kind—certainly not when society and the state are not committed to Jewish law. Meaning, it cannot be that the authorities or the institutions do whatever they want here, and afterward halakhic people come and arrange the whole matter for them. There was very heavy criticism—I still remember Rabbi Peretz, yes, he is the city rabbi here—he spoke then about this matter, that hundreds of thousands of non-Jews were being brought from the Soviet Union, and everyone shouted at him and was angry with him: what do you mean, how can that be? In the end, of course, he was completely telling the truth. Everyone denied it at first, if you remember—they simply denied it factually—and what he said was entirely correct. And then, after we are already here, now they say, look, there is a social problem here, there is no choice, we have to be lenient, and we have to do this and that. It is exactly the same thing as the problems created in betrothal and marriage, where people wait for the rabbis to become lenient. Among other things, the state creates the problems. On this matter—without getting into the whole subject, because it is a topic in its own right, and God willing we’ll speak about it sometime too—on the level of motivations, even before the halakhic considerations, I do not tend to agree. Meaning, I don’t think one should—on the contrary, even as a policy I would say one should not respond to such demands. One should not respond to such demands, because it basically means that everyone does whatever he wants, and after that he just relies on the halakhic institutions or the halakhic decisors or the Chief Rabbinate or whoever it may be to solve the problem for him. You rabbis can do anything, after all; you’ll find the way somehow. I think this is very bad public education, even on the policy level, before the question of whether it is permitted or forbidden. I’ll get to that in a moment.

That is one question. Meaning, I don’t think the Torah or Jewish law should be a tool for solving social problems or problems of the state. This is of course connected to questions of the separation of religion and state, which I have already said I am entirely in favor of. And therefore in practice, if I had to suggest a practical proposal on this issue, I would definitely say they should create another kind of conversion, a civil conversion. Meaning, it would not be a religious conversion. He would not be recognized as a Jew; he would be recognized as an Israeli. And that is perfectly fine. I am entirely in favor of it. I think one should cooperate with such a thing, because there is some kind of Israeli nationality here that is not defined on the basis of the commandments and Jewish law, and there is no reason to keep forcing on people who want to join the nation—the nation in its modern sense, yes, the State of Israel, those who live here—the halakhic threshold, meaning that they must accept the commandments. And that creates a huge number of problems. It creates what? Fine, there are already two peoples; I don’t want to create them. Rabbi Brandes writes in some article, to which I responded in the article I mentioned earlier—he writes there about “wink conversions.” Wink conve… He is in favor of it, by the way; he comes from the pro side. I opposed it. But he says: stop the wink conversions, put it on the table. Meaning, everyone knows you’re winking. That is, the judges basically know that the convert is not really accepting the yoke of the commandments, but they go through the whole procedure as if, and he declares this and that… and everybody knows there is nothing in it. Fine, so there were also responses saying that this isn’t true, these are not wink conversions, it is serious, not serious—there are all sorts of discussions around it. But what does that mean? It basically means that this feeling cannot be ignored. This feeling that says that the religious courts are doing things here that we would not have done were it not for the fact that this problem was created for us because people do not care. Now I do not think this is the right policy—to keep going and solving problems that are created by people who do not care. Let them know that if they create problems, they will have to deal with them, and not that there will always be some solution found. Again, the line is thin, and it is not always true, obviously. I’m saying something very sweeping here, but I still think it is right. There is some kind of mentality here that if there is a problem, we have to solve it. No—if there is a problem, then don’t create it, and don’t keep solving it all the time. In the end, we too can pay prices for solving this problem. “Converts are as difficult for Israel as a scab,” as the Sages say. There is something to that. Again, without slandering and without sweeping generalizations, of course, but you can also bring in all sorts of elements that may turn out to be problematic elements if these are not people who truly want to join us. Therefore that has to be taken into account too. That too has a price. It is not that on one side there is a price and the other side is just stubborn because of halakhic rigidity.

The second point I want to make is the truly halakhic point, because the question is: what does it mean to be lenient in conversion? What does “be lenient” mean? Suppose I accept that—one should be lenient in conversion. Of course one can be lenient. One can argue about policy. There are those who think differently from me; they do think that, as a matter of policy and in the policy consideration, yes, of this halakhic policy, leniency should be adopted. Fine—that is a legitimate dispute. I think not, he thinks yes. But now the question is what does he do with that? What does it mean to be lenient? That is another discussion. The question is whether one can waive acceptance of the commandments. By the way, none of the halakhic decisors says that—not even the conversion revolution of Rabbi Druckman—no one says to waive such a thing. On the contrary, that was the call of those authors of that book, and Rabbi Brandes wanted to put it on the table because he essentially thought that was what was being done in practice, even though people were not stating it. But no one, none of those who deal with this subject, really supports or holds that one can waive acceptance of the commandments. So what are “leniencies”? Here the question is really practical in its meaning. What does leniency mean? What leniencies can be made? Here I laid the groundwork in order to understand what cannot be waived. There are no leniencies on the subject of circumcision, immersion, and acceptance of the commandments too, and sacrifice when relevant. Without that, you are not a convert, and this has nothing to do with leniencies. So where is there room to maneuver? Where can one play with the level of stringency, let’s call it that? In places where there are two possibilities: either it is only an embellishment, or it is only an optimal requirement and not an indispensable one after the fact. There one can discuss whether nevertheless to waive it or not waive it, because an optimal requirement is still a real requirement. When they say, for example, not to accept—when they say not to accept a convert who comes for the sake of marriage, he fell in love with some woman and therefore he wants to convert, wants to marry a Jewish woman. Fine. It says in Jewish law not to accept him, not to accept him. But it also says in Jewish law that if they did accept him, then he is a convert. Meaning, the conversion is valid; it is just that from the outset one should not accept him. Now one should not belittle an optimal requirement; an optimal requirement too is meaningful. People think, well, if it isn’t indispensable, then what’s the problem? What’s the problem? An optimal requirement is also problematic. But true, if as a matter of policy you have reached the conclusion that one needs to be lenient, these are the kinds of things where one can be lenient. Because after the fact it takes effect; no problem. You cannot be lenient in those matters that do not take effect even after the fact. What does it mean to be lenient? You can recognize him as a non-Jew, then recognize him as a Jew, and that’s that. That isn’t “after the fact”; “after the fact” usually means inadvertent, but if you turn it into deliberate, it becomes from the outset. No. Then you committed a transgression by doing it, but he is a convert. Two different things. Even if it was deliberate, and the policy is wrong, and what you did was not an error but a deliberate transgression—then you, the judge, are a wrongdoer, fine, but the convert is a convert. Because the rule applies to you, not to him. No, no. Meaning, the relation between inadvertent and deliberate is not… No, it is not inadvertent and deliberate; it is from the outset and after the fact. You are translating it into inadvertent and deliberate, and that is an incorrect translation. From the outset and after the fact can also be deliberate. Someone deliberately performs a conversion that it is not proper to perform—a marriage conversion. There is no doubt that the conversion is valid, deliberately. So what? Even if he did it deliberately, he is a wrongdoer; the judge did something improper. But the convert is a convert. Again, I’ll explain later why.

When you argue that one can adopt a lenient policy, does lenient mean not investigating the true motive of the marriage, or knowing and ignoring it? That’s different. Now I’m talking, now I’m talking. So I’m saying first of all as a general principle: when I speak about leniency in the laws of conversion, it always has to be on the plane where we are talking about things that are not indispensable. How hard to make things, how much to demand, how many commandments, how much to teach him, how much to examine him—fine. With all that, one can play. But not in the context of, say, if there was no acceptance of the commandments. That is not leniency—that is simply not conversion. Therefore this introduction was important, to understand where our freedom lies in terms of what can be made lenient, even if one does not accept my position, the policy I think is correct, namely that one should not be lenient, at least in a large portion of the cases. Again, one should be somewhat careful with the generalization. But fine, if someone thinks one should be lenient, the question still remains: in what place?

And I also wrote there in the article that Rabbi Sherman in the Great Rabbinical Court of the Chief Rabbinate—it started already in the regional rabbinical court of Ashdod, and then reached the high court of the Chief Rabbinate, the supreme high one, whatever they call it—where they announced that all the conversions of the state conversion system, that of Rabbi Druckman, the state system, were void, because the judges were wicked. Wicked judges, because they do acts that are forbidden to do. Now I agreed with them that these are acts that are forbidden to do; I did not agree that the judges are wicked. Why? Because this is exactly a question of policy. On a question of policy, they think one way and you think another. The fact that someone does not think like you does not make him wicked. Fine, I believe in the sincerity of the intentions of those who do this, even though I do not agree with them. Therefore obviously, remove wickedness from here; it has nothing to do with wickedness at all. It’s nonsense. And later they also canceled it—Rabbi Amar canceled that ruling, I think, as far as I remember. It is not in force.

In any event… yes, but in a place where we are talking about damaging the procedure itself, not a question of policy—if in fact the conversion system had waived acceptance of the commandments, waived it openly—then in my opinion Rabbi Sherman’s claim would have had a place. Then there would have been room for Rabbi Sherman’s claim, because all those people are complete non-Jews, and there would be no need to get to the point that the judges are wicked—they simply did not undergo conversion. Without acceptance of the commandments, it is not conversion. And it may even be that then I too would agree that the judges are wicked, if they know that and do it. So therefore this is not right. I’m speaking on the principled plane. And why? Because waiving acceptance of the commandments is exactly like waiving circumcision and immersion. It is simply waiving a stage in conversion. You cannot declare a non-Jew to be Jewish, with all the good intentions. But in the context of such leniencies within the spectrum of leniency and stringency, in things that are not indispensable—there it is more a matter open to dispute.

Now… is acceptance of the commandments on the same level as circumcision and immersion? Same level—more. More. More important, certainly. It is the essence of conversion; without it there is no conversion. Also circumcision and immersion. I am prepared to waive circumcision and immersion in certain situations—I’ll explain that in a moment—but not acceptance of the commandments. Yes, now… No, no, I’ll get to that too. I don’t think it requires knowledge. Fine. So first of all I want to see where these things come from. Where does this policy of being lenient toward converts begin? If the basic approach in Jewish law is actually to make things difficult for them, to try to delay them—as I said, not necessarily to make things difficult but to clarify that their intention is serious—where does the matter of leniency come from?

The Talmud in Keritot, of which I already brought part, asks: “If so, nowadays, when there is no sacrifice, shall we not accept converts?” The Temple was destroyed, yes? Now there is circumcision and immersion, but no sacrifice. Rav Acha says—so is it impossible to accept converts? Then there are no more converts, that’s it? When there is no Temple, one cannot accept converts? Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: “And if a convert dwells with you, a convert among you,” and so on. You have to see the verse in its original context. The verse in its original form in Numbers says: “And if a convert dwells with you, or whoever is among you, throughout your generations, and he offers an offering by fire, a pleasing aroma to the Lord, as you do, so shall he do.” Here it is talking about a convert offering a pleasing aroma, which is in fact the sacrifice, right, the presentation of blood. And it says “throughout your generations.” What does “throughout your generations” mean? The Talmud learns from here, as Rav Acha bar Yaakov says, that the verse teaches us that conversion has to exist throughout the generations. Meaning, if you cannot accept a sacrifice, then it will be without a sacrifice. Meaning, it cannot be that you lock the door before converts, meaning that there is no procedure at all by which one can convert. You can examine the convert as to whether he is serious or not—you have to do that—but it cannot be that a serious convert, whom you have examined, has no way to convert. Wait, that is his law—“throughout your generations”—it overrides the sacrifice, because in the verse both appear at the same level. At the same level. It is not two requirements; one is speaking about the other. “Throughout your generations, and he offers a sacrifice.” It refers to the sacrifice. As a substitute for the sacrifice. As a substitute for the sacrifice? Yes. That is his own derivation, his own rule. It is obvious that it is not as though one follows from the other. Ah, all right, he is in the Talmud, he is an Amora. We do not argue with Amoraim. If possible? Maybe one can. Even after the resurrection of the dead, I don’t know. Maimonides writes that in the future he will bring a sacrifice.

In any case, that is what is written in the Talmud. In the simple reading, the Talmud says two things. First, according to most opinions the sacrifice does not hold up the conversion even when it is possible to bring a sacrifice. Or I don’t know if “most opinions”; according to some opinions, there are disputes about this. Then it is easier to understand why “throughout your generations” means that even from the outset do not require a sacrifice, because it is not indispensable. That I can understand. But the opinions that say it is indispensable—that is already more far-reaching. And still, fine, there is a verse. The question is whether I can apply this to other things—for example to circumcision and immersion. Suppose there were a case where there were no valid ritual baths left in the world, I don’t know, no kosher ones left in the world, or it was impossible to perform circumcision for some reason, I don’t quite know why. What would one do then? Could I then convert someone without circumcision and immersion? Seemingly, “throughout your generations,” no? On the face of it, it seems not. On the face of it, it seems to speak only about the sacrifice, and that is also how the commentators there understand it. But there is a very interesting source in the Talmud in Gittin 88b.

The Talmud brings that one of the Amoraim compelled a divorce in Babylonia. A Babylonian Amora compelled a divorce. Now the rule is that a religious court that is not ordained cannot compel. The power to compel belongs only to an ordained religious court. In Babylonia there were no ordained courts, because there is no ordination outside the Land of Israel. At that time, by the way, there still were ordained courts in the Land of Israel, but in Babylonia there were no ordained ones. Therefore Abaye asks him there, I think: “Did the master perform a coercion of divorce in Babylonia?” Meaning, how can you compel a divorce in Babylonia? So he says to him: yes, “we act as their agents,” or “we act as the agents of the sages of the Land of Israel.” “Of the earlier ones” comes later. “We act as the agents of the sages of the Land of Israel.” Meaning, we are the agents of the ordained judges in the Land of Israel, and by their power we can do what an ordained judge does. And on that the Talmud says that this is only for a matter that is common and involves financial loss, where there is a loss. The Talmud discusses this in various branches both in Bava Kamma and in Gittin. Yes, exactly. So this applies only to things that involve a loss. A fine, for example, has no financial loss, or things that are uncommon—a common matter or an uncommon matter. Meaning, uncommon matters—the law basically says that without ordained judges one cannot function as a religious court. But we do not want to uproot Torah law; we just want to function. So in common cases, and where there is financial loss so that it is important to deal with it, we waive the requirement of ordained judges and regard the unordained sages as the agents of the ordained ones.

On this Tosafot says there in Gittin: like acknowledgments and loans, and so forth—like acknowledgments and loans, period. “And as for the fact that we accept converts, even though a convert requires three experts, as we say in HaCholetz”—that is a Talmudic passage in Yevamot—“for it is written ‘judgment.’” Regarding a convert it says “judgment”; from there they learn that it has to be done before a religious court. It is a legal act. Okay? So how can it be that we accept converts? After all, it has to be before a religious court, and a religious court that is not ordained is not a religious court. So it comes out that conversion in Babylonia, or conversion today when there are no ordained judges at all, is not done before a religious court. And a conversion not done before a religious court is not a conversion. By Torah law, not a conversion. So Ri says—notice, this is Tosafot’s question, not the Talmud’s. The Talmud does not address this. Ri says: “We act as their agents because it is considered as though it were common.” Meaning, the act of conversion falls into the category of things that are common and involve financial loss. And by the simple reading, by the way, you need both requirements, so he mentions here only the commonness, but you need both requirements: that there be financial loss and that it be common. And he says: but since we are acting as their agents, this is considered like a common matter, and therefore it is fine. What does that mean? We, the judges of Babylonia, are not ordained, but we are permitted as the agents of the judges of the Land of Israel, the ordained ones, to judge things that are common and involve loss. Right? By the law of acting as their agents. But conversion, seemingly, is not such a thing, and how common it is I don’t know exactly. It seems from Tosafot itself that he says it is not common. He doesn’t mean that it is common; rather, “it is considered as though common.” Yes? That is what he says. What does that mean? What does “considered as though common” mean? As if. But it isn’t. What are you doing, playing games with me? It isn’t common. What does “considered as though common” mean? Nowadays everyone comes to convert all at once. Nowadays yes, but in Tosafot’s time it wasn’t. In our day. Why? How can you… what are you doing, playing games? An uncommon matter does not come under acting as their agents, so the conversion does not take effect. Presumably this is talking about policy. If you performed the conversion not before an ordained religious court, the convert is a non-Jew. It does not take effect. The conversion does not take effect. What does it mean, “considered as though common”? No, no, maybe to say that whether something is common has to be measured relative to something else. Okay. So if you have fines or something that has a legal element, you can measure how much it costs. How do you measure the commonness of conversion? Maybe that’s what Tosafot means. But then Tosafot says it is a category unto itself. No, but then Tosafot says that it is common. Again, you have to measure it against something else. What does “common” mean relative to what? But you are claiming that in the end, if so, Tosafot is simply saying it is common. But Tosafot doesn’t speak that way. Tosafot says “it is considered as though common.” It is also considered like a common case, even though it isn’t. The question, it’s a little different, and it would depend on each place and each generation. It could be that at the time of Tosafot it was very common. Okay. But fines are like that too. It could be there will be a generation in which fines are very common. No one would even think of judging fines without ordained judges. No. Once they entered, there is roughly a list of what counts as common. Fines are not common. Therefore it makes no difference that in Tosafot’s time it was common. And the language of Tosafot too seems very much—again, I’m not one hundred percent certain—that it was not common: “considered as though common.”

I’ll explain again. Why does something common basically overcome the requirement of ordained judges? Because it is covered by the enactment of acting as their agents. We are the agents of the ordained ones with respect to common matters. So if this matter is common and included in the mandate of my agency, no problem—I act in the name of the ordained ones, and the ordained ones are allowed to do it. Maybe the logic behind it is that something common, to which agency applies, is something a religious court knows how to do even if it is not ordained. Right, but “considered as though.” A religious court knows how to do everything. A religious court of rabbis would know how to judge fines too. That’s no problem. The problem is not lack of knowledge; it is lack of authority. They were not Torah scholars any less than the scholars of the Land of Israel. It could be because this is a built-in template. It is not a case that has to be discussed as a case study. It’s a template. What template? If the convert comes to convert—just as if that person damaged someone else. Is that what “common” means—not frequency but that the framework is very structured, and in that sense it is like… “considered as though” means it is almost automatic: I do this, this, and this, and that’s it. But why in torts is it not like that? If something happened and someone damaged someone else, I do this, this, and this, and that’s it. Appraisal of damages—it’s complicated. The conversion process is no less complex than judging your ox that gored my ox.

I think what stands behind this Tosafot—wait a moment, we’ll soon see—is: “And if you say, how do we act as their agents when now there are no experts in the Land of Israel?” Tosafot, we are talking here already about the twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth centuries, yes? So now, in the time of the Talmud there still were ordained judges in the Land of Israel, so we, the sages of Babylonia, were their agents. But in the time of Tosafot there are already no ordained judges. So how do we accept converts today? And how do we generally judge the common monetary cases today, after all one needs the law of acting as their agents? What, is there agency for the dead? The answer is yes. There is agency for the dead. Who will give us permission? “And now there are no experts in the Land of Israel, and who will give us permission?” “It may be said that we act as the agents of the earlier ones.” We act as their agents. Those who died five hundred, six hundred, a thousand years ago—we are their agents. I have never heard of such a thing in all my life in Jewish law. That there is agency when the principal has died. There is such a proposal by Ketzot HaChoshen in the laws of agency. As you know, in the laws of agency a distinction is made between an extended hand and a power of attorney. How do we understand the mechanism of agency? Is the agent the extended hand of the principal, or does the agent stand on his own and now step into the principal’s shoes? What he does is credited to the principal. Where is the practical difference? Suppose I appointed an agent and then I went insane. Some say I’m always like that. Now the question is whether the agent can do what I appointed him to do. If he is an extended hand, then he cannot, because in effect I am now doing it through him, but I am not sane now. Someone not sane cannot perform legal acts. Okay? But if it is a power of attorney, then now he stands in my shoes. What he does is credited to me. He is of sound mind, so he can perform the act. That is a practical difference in the dispute between Maimonides and the Tur, for those who know it, in a case where the principal became insane. It also happens in the Knesset that the person dies sometimes. Yes. It’s amazing that every day, for fifty dollars, even if you are alive, you can vote with someone else’s ID card.

In any case, Ketzot wants to apply this to a case where the principal dies. A dispute between Rashi and Rif—that is how Ketzot wants to explain it. He claims that if we say it is a power of attorney, then even if the principal dies, the agent can carry out his mission. For example, a man sent an agent to divorce his wife. Fine? And now he dies before the agent divorced her. He dies. Now, if he died without children, she needs halitzah or levirate marriage, it’s a whole mess. So obviously she wants, and we all prefer, that she receive the divorce and be divorced. The question is whether one can do it; the husband already died. So there is a dispute between Rashi and Rif. It cannot be done. Why can it not be done? According to Rif, because the agency expires, because once the principal dies there is no agency. Or is it impossible because the woman is already a widow—you cannot divorce a widow? Then Ketzot infers: if Rashi, as I recall, explains it that way—Rif and Rashi—Rashi explains that she is simply already a widow; you cannot do it. That implies, he says, that if she were still considered a married woman, then in principle one could divorce her even though the husband died. Meaning, what bothers Rashi is not the fact that the principal died. In order to explain why it cannot be done, he says it is because there is no one to divorce; the woman is a widow. Fine, you can debate the inference, but that is what Ketzot says. All the later authorities reject his words. There is no such creature. There is no agency for the dead. That is, nobody accepts that. But what about spiritual matters? What do you mean spiritual matters? Agency is a legal status. What is “spiritual matters”? We are in Jewish law here. Jewish law is not spirituality. Regarding sanctifying the new month? Yes, there too. What do you mean? For example Maimonides also says that we act on the authority of the courts then. Fine, that depends on Hillel the Last—there is a dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides there, whether Hillel the Last, not Hillel the Elder, who fixed the calendar—it is not clear there that this is truly talking about agency in the strict sense. It may be that they already sanctified it and we are only calculating where the point falls. What is it? An astronomical calculation. But let us not enter into that topic in itself. Is there a halakhic difference if the principal stipulates in advance that the agency does not expire upon his death? I don’t think so. What is not in his power he cannot stipulate. He has no power to do it, so it doesn’t matter even if he says it. Can I send an agent to divorce someone else’s wife because I decided? What do you mean, I decided? I can’t. It’s not in my power. And likewise, after he dies, he cannot divorce. What you cannot do yourself, you cannot delegate to an agent. And in monetary matters, for example? In monetary matters too, the same thing. There is no such thing. You cannot say anything about your property after your death. If I set up a will in advance? You cannot do anything; there are no wills in Jewish law, there is no such thing. What you can do is give a gift during your lifetime. That’s all. After you die, you are dead; the property is no longer yours, and you cannot do anything with it.

Anyway, the concept of “acting as their agents” is a strange concept. It is clear that we are dealing here, in my humble opinion, with a legal fiction—a fiction. What do I mean? The ordained judges did not appoint the sages of Babylonia as their agents, and certainly did not appoint the future generations. They also did not think ordination would come to an end—I think at least, certainly not entirely. Rather, it is obvious that you simply cannot function otherwise. Once you cannot function otherwise, the Sages say: okay, we are considered the agents of the earlier judges. There is no choice. That is an interesting question about legal fictions; maybe we’ll talk about it another time. I actually mentioned another fiction yesterday. But I think that is what is going on here.

And for our purposes, there is a dispute over whether the law of acting as their agents is rabbinic law or Torah law. Is this an enactment—acting as their agents—or is this Torah law? The very term itself already suggests something, because if this were ordinary agency in the normal legal sense, what is the problem? Why would I need rabbinic enactments? They are my agents. What I can do, they do in my name—what is the problem? From the very existence of the dispute one can already see that this is not the concept of agency in its regular halakhic sense. In any case, there is a dispute about it. Netivot claims, on the basis of this Tosafot I just read, that it must be Torah law. Why? Because if it were rabbinic law, then today’s judges who convert are actually acting by the law of acting as their agents. They are not ordained; there are no ordained judges anymore even in the Land of Israel. There are none. No regular mechanism can justify it. So what does that mean? There was no religious court. Now we will apply acting as their agents—very important, acting as their agents, very necessary, everything is fine—but what can we do? We have no religious court. You cannot convert without a religious court. Therefore, says Netivot, from here it is proven that the law—at least as Tosafot understood it, and from the very fact that we convert—it must be that the law of acting as their agents is Torah law. But he himself brings that Rashba and Nachmanides claim that it is rabbinic law. From where do they claim that? I don’t remember—look there—but that is what they say. Doesn’t it seem strange to you to derive Torah law from the status quo of what is happening? I didn’t understand. You say: we are converting, a sign that it is Torah law? No, it is an indication, not a cause. It is an indication that apparently there is Torah law here. You can’t establish something from an indication. What do you mean? Every Mishnah you bring—if it says Sabbath, does that mean Sabbath is Torah law? I’m saying: we have a dispute whether agency is a power of attorney or an extended hand. Now I bring one of the medieval authorities who says that if the principal became insane, the agent can act. So I bring proof that apparently agency is a power of attorney. What do you mean? On the basis of the law you bring me evidence for the conception? Of course. The law is an expression of the conception. Like in science—you do an experiment and from that you understand what the theory will be. It’s not one hundred percent direct; it’s not one-to-one. No, it is. It is. Because without acting as their agents being Torah law, there would be no religious court here—so how are they converting? So I say, again, I am not turning it into Torah law because they convert. Rather, from the fact that they convert, that is an indication that apparently everyone understands that it is Torah law, because otherwise they would not convert. So how do they say it is rabbinic? Exactly—that is the question.

Those medieval authorities who say that it is nevertheless rabbinic—and they too of course do not deny that conversions take place. No one denies that. We convert in every place, in every generation. So how can they say that? It seems to me that what needs to be said there is to return to the Talmud in Keritot that we saw. The Talmud there learns from the verse “throughout your generations” that even when there is no sacrifice one can convert. Why? Because conversion has to exist throughout the generations. As I said, usually people interpret this as referring to the sacrifice. Meaning, because the sacrifice is not indispensable, and besides, the verse “throughout your generations” speaks about the offering by fire, a pleasing aroma—that is, it is speaking about the sacrifice. So it is natural to say that this rule is a rule about the sacrifice. According to Nachmanides and Rashba, in my opinion, it is a general rule. It is a general rule saying that it cannot be that there is no possibility of conversion. It cannot be. So is that Torah law in any case? Not that acting as their agents is Torah law; rather, the conversion is Torah law. That is exactly the difference. Acting as their agents is rabbinic law, and the judges are not ordained judges; they do not have the authority to do it. But it cannot be that in the whole world—say in the Land of Israel there is a situation, let us suppose—but in the whole world there is no possibility for conversion even for someone who wants it. There is no such thing. Nachmanides and Rashba understand the verse “throughout your generations” not as speaking only about sacrifice, but about conversion in general. Therefore, as I said earlier, even circumcision and immersion too—at least according to that approach of the medieval authorities—if there were some situation in which it were impossible to do immersion anywhere in the world, or impossible to do circumcision anywhere in the world, then according to that approach one could convert without that too. So then maybe one doesn’t need judges? Maybe one doesn’t need a religious court at all? No. If you say, “So there is no ordination,” then let’s go down one level. Maybe let’s go down a level, if it is after the fact of after the fact. Maybe they could have done it? After all, the Sages are supposed to determine how to do it, so they say: we will apply the law of acting as their agents to this too. And that is what Tosafot says, “considered as though common.” What does that mean? It does not mean that it is common. No—just the opposite. It does not mean that it is common. It is not common. But it cannot be that there is no avenue for conversion. Is that less necessary than common monetary law involving loans? Why did they enact it for common matters? Because it is necessary, because it is needed, right? And conversion—is that not needed? Fine, so there are only two in a generation, but it is considered as though common—not because it is common, it is not common. Therefore, in my opinion, Netivot is not right even in Tosafot. Tosafot also is not saying that acting as their agents is Torah law. On the contrary, Tosafot says that acting as their agents may be rabbinic, but it is considered as though common because of “throughout your generations.” It is clear to us that you have to convert—what do you mean, how can one not convert? It is like a case of common matters, and so we apply it. More than that, what he means by saying “considered as though common” is that, as you said earlier, there would have been room to say that perhaps one could convert them even without a religious court at all. So that is what he says: it is considered as though common and falls under the enactment of acting as their agents, and therefore one should do it before a religious court—but before the kind of religious court we have today. That is exactly what you are saying—not an ordained religious court. Exactly. Exactly. A religious court—you cannot just not do it. But at least the minimum, even though that minimum does not work halakhically in the full sense, still, this is the religious court we have today, so do it. It comes under the enactment of acting as their agents, even though the original enactors probably did not think of this; it is not written in the language of the enactment. But Tosafot says: this is obvious. From where is it obvious? From the verse “throughout your generations.” And in my opinion, again, the verse “throughout your generations” itself in the end only comes to justify an intuition that the Amoraim already had there. They found it in the verse “throughout your generations,” but basically they grasped that such a thing cannot be. It cannot be that the door is locked before converts.

Now, this is an interesting source for the idea of leniency in conversion, but understand that this is a very particular kind of leniency. On the one hand it is very far-reaching, and it is not a leniency within the domain of non-indispensable rules. It is a leniency that can waive indispensable rules, like religious court, like sacrifice according to some opinions, and so on. I said also circumcision and immersion. But on the other hand, this is a leniency one may adopt not whenever one wants, but only when one must—when there is no other way to convert without it. Meaning, if you cannot convert people without it—people who are fit to convert. So suppose there are no converts at all, only marriage converts. Then, well, one cannot convert without this, so shall we convert them? Again, no. If one cannot convert the serious converts, that is a problem. Such a thing cannot be. But if there are no serious converts, that is not a problem—then don’t convert. That is not the point. Therefore this leniency, on the one hand, is very far-reaching, but on the other hand it is limited to very specific cases. Only to cases where there is no solution, meaning you are locking the door before converts.

On the other hand, according to your interpretation of “common” in Tosafot, Maimonides says that “common” is something positive within this process. Meaning, unlike “a scab,” Tosafot says that commonness is something positive. Tosafot sees commonness as something positive. I agree, I agree. But I’m saying more than that: the Talmud already said it too, not only Tosafot. The Talmud in “throughout your generations.” But that takes me back to the comment I made earlier: even with “a scab,” what we do in making things difficult for converts is not to make things difficult just for the sake of it. Not in order to make it difficult, but to make sure he is serious. If he is serious, then certainly one should enable him to convert—on the contrary. And that is what Tosafot is talking about. By the way, the medieval authorities already write that “converts are as difficult for Israel as a scab” refers to those converts who did not come seriously. Converts who came seriously, obviously, are perfectly fine. But Tosafot makes this distinction. Why can’t one lock the door in an essential, ideological way? What would be the problem with just locking the door and that’s it? The conception—again, such reasoning as says: what do you mean, the person wants to enter the yoke of the commandments, to serve God, to fulfill the 613 commandments—how could we possibly prevent him? It simply cannot be that the door would be locked. Yes, no, obviously. But I mean the reasoning that says, no—the verse could be interpreted only about the sacrifice. Nachmanides and Rashba say no: this is a general conception in conversion. Therefore we also waive the religious court requirement, and probably other things too, whatever will be needed. What is the basis for that reasoning? As I said, the basis for that reasoning is the reasoning that says that if a person sincerely wants to convert and keep the commandments, it cannot be that we would prevent him from doing so. It cannot be that we would not allow him to do it. A person wants to rise to spiritual heights. I want to be a priest tomorrow. But being a priest you cannot, because that really is a different type of thing. There is no conversion into priesthood. But there is conversion from non-Jew to Judaism. That means it is the same type. Meaning, one can indeed move from here to there. So if one can move, it cannot be that we would not allow it. The famous joke about some priest, an urban legend about the priest—fine, everyone knows it. Okay.

So now I move to the question of the leniencies, the leniencies that are actually being discussed in practice. As I said, I don’t think this source is really a source for leniencies, except in a case where there would truly be some problem that would lock the door before serious converts. But the leniencies are of course with respect to the seriousness of the conversion. Those are really the leniencies being discussed. A convert who comes for the sake of marriage. But then they conclude that he is serious, fully serious; he wants to marry, he is serious, he is willing to accept upon himself… Wait, wait, wait, wait. I’ll get to that seriousness in a moment—you’re getting ahead of me. First of all, seriousness is not “because he wants to marry.” We’ll soon get to the seriousness of wanting to marry. Seriousness means accepting the yoke of the commandments. He had an illumination and decided he wants to observe. Not technically. I’m talking about someone for whom that is what he wants. So he says that one has to dig into his true intent, one has to assess whether the person can, wants to, or does not want to. Yes. He wants to—he wants to marry. If he wants to marry, then he doesn’t want to. He is willing to keep the commandments, he is willing—so he doesn’t want to? That is exactly the distinction. I’ll get to it in a moment. I said I’ll get to the question of the criterion. In two minutes—does only the religious court have a mandate, even if it isn’t a criterion… Doesn’t it have a criterion? It has criteria, except that the criteria are… A criterion is not a precise measuring instrument, but one has to assess. We are human beings—what can we do? And human beings assess. A religious court’s job is to assess what is in a person’s heart in many contexts. And saying that this cannot be done is incorrect. It is true that you can never be sure you are right, but the Torah was not given to ministering angels. The religious court makes an assessment. What it assesses is what exists.

Now, regarding the leniencies. I’ll start now, for example, with marriage conversions, since that came up in the comments. As I said earlier, the accepted practice is not to accept the convert from the outset, but if they did accept him, the conversion is valid. There are places where they did this even from the outset—precisely regarding what you asked earlier—because it was clear that otherwise they would live together and serious problems would arise. In short, therefore there was some policy of accepting converts for the sake of marriage from the outset, meaning not to delay them. And here the reasoning you raised really comes in. Because we need to understand: these are often the precedents people bring to explain that today too one can be lenient if a person does it for marriage, for National Insurance, for I don’t know what kinds of things like that. In my view that is nonsense. These precedents have no connection whatsoever to our case. And why? Exactly because of what you said earlier. In a society where, when someone converts, it is obvious that he enters the community of commandment-observers—not that everyone observed all 613 with every tiny sub-clause attached, but the framework was clear. Meaning, if you are Jewish, then you come to synagogue, and more or less you observe commandments in principle, some more and some less. In such a place, even if a person converts for the sake of marriage and does not really want to keep commandments, still it is clear to him that conversion entails that. So true, his basic motivation is a motivation for marriage, but on the other hand it is also clear to him from the outset that if he does this, then he is obligated to keep the commandments, whether he likes it or not. So from the outset we do not like this. From the outset we do not accept him. But the conversion is a good conversion; it is valid conversion. After the fact one cannot cancel it, because the person accepted the commandments. The whole problem here, after all, is acceptance of the commandments—that is the whole point. The whole point why we do not accept a conversion for the sake of marriage is because we have a problem that there was no acceptance of the commandments. That is exactly what is meant to refute the proof from those leniencies. Why don’t we accept converts for the sake of marriage? After all, for the sake of marriage he is coming to join the Jewish nation—what is the problem? He wants to marry a Jewish woman, live among us—what is the problem? Wonderful. So from the outset accept him. It is the opposite. These precedents of marriage conversions prove what I am saying. What do they say? They say that what I really want is acceptance of the commandments; without acceptance of the commandments there is no conversion. Therefore someone who comes for the sake of marriage I do not accept, because he does not truly want to keep commandments. On the other hand, I did accept him for some reason or another. It is valid. Why is it valid? Because it is clear that even if that was not his motivation, in practice he did accept the commandments, because he knew that that is what it means to be Jewish. He cannot live among us without being obligated to the system of commandments. Again, at one level or another, without idealizing it.

He gets divorced—so does he also get divorced from the yoke of the commandments? No. Why not? Because he became Jewish. A Jew is a Jew—he became Jewish. The claim because of which after the fact I accept him is actually the existence of the divorce or the widowhood… After the fact I recognize him, not accept him. The conversion took effect from the outset; after the fact I recognize it. He was Jewish; he is Jewish. From the outset I don’t do it because I don’t want such a Jew. But he is Jewish—there is no doubt whatsoever that he is Jewish, because he accepted upon himself the yoke of the commandments. About that I ask: he accepted it temporarily, only so long as he wasn’t divorced. No, not temporarily. He accepted the commandments. He also didn’t marry in order to get divorced. He accepted the commandments and wanted to marry, and he decided to live here. Later something happened and he got divorced. Fine. So maybe now he doesn’t want to observe commandments, but that won’t help him, because the acceptance of the commandments was a valid acceptance. Now he is like a Jew. By the way, there are opinions among the Geonim—but this disappeared somewhere in the middle of the Middle Ages—that a Jew who changes his religion becomes a complete non-Jew. Meaning, one can move to the opposite side too. But somehow that was not accepted. At least in the period of the later authorities there is no trace at all of that opinion.

So therefore the marriage conversions, the fact that they accepted them after the fact, is simply because the conversion was conversion in the best sense. The reason I do not accept him from the outset is because he may be difficult like a scab, because he does not truly want to observe commandments; he wants it for marriage. But at the end of the day he accepted the commandments, and he is a fully proper Jew in every sense, from the outset too. I just do not accept him—I would not want to do it because I fear he will be difficult like a scab. That is all. But there is no doubt about the validity of the conversion. Why? Because it is clear to him that when he enters the Jewish social framework, he enters the framework of the commandments. That is what a Jew is.

What happens today? Today it is clear that this is not the case. Even Jews by birth— we talked about this last time—many of them do not observe commandments, are not committed to commandments. It all seems like complete nonsense to them; it isn’t even just sloppiness. Fine, if they were merely lax. They’re not lax—it seems bizarre to them to keep commandments. Now when a person comes today and goes to the Rabbinate to convert, or to the conversion courts, in order to convert for marriage—if he converts, is it obvious to him that if he enters the Jewish framework then he will observe commandments? Nonsense. It is obvious to him that he will not. Right? So today a great doubt arises about the very acceptance of the commandments. Therefore this is not a question of after the fact or from the outset. Today he is a non-Jew. Someone who comes today for the sake of marriage is a non-Jew. A complete non-Jew. One has to void his conversion; he is a non-Jew. That is the straightforward assumption. Will you say that the reason, the source of why I require acceptance of the yoke of the commandments, is because then it was an expression of belonging to the Jewish people, and today the expression of belonging—that is something I spoke about last time and I’ll come back to it later too. I also discussed this claim: national conversion, where the commandments are only an indication of the desire to belong.

Therefore, these precedents of conversion for marriage or conversion for other purposes are simply irrelevant. To bring them is simply a lack of understanding. Everybody always brings them. I simply don’t get it—it’s so mechanical. Fine, like there—as though. Look what a difference there is in reality; what connection is there at all? The whole idea there is precisely the opposite of what you want to do. The whole idea there says that only acceptance of the commandments matters. That is what you learn from there. Not that acceptance of the commandments does not matter. On the contrary—what you learn from there is that only acceptance of the commandments matters. Therefore, if he accepted the commandments, what difference does it make to me that his intention is not pure? He is Jewish; he accepted the commandments. Meaning, only acceptance of the commandments is what matters. That is what one sees there. So if today there is no acceptance of the commandments, what relevance does that have? It is a precedent that says the same thing, but in fact its meaning is the opposite of what is happening today. It is a classic case of applying halakhic precedents in a technical, formal way without entering into an understanding of what they are actually saying.