Conversion to Judaism – Lesson 3

Table of Contents

• The stages of conversion and acceptance of the commandments
• Marriage-related conversions, ulterior motives, and presumptions about accepting the commandments
• “Throughout your generations,” waiving stages, and the case of circumcision
• Acceptance of the commandments without knowledge: “We will do and we will hear” and informing him of some of the commandments
• Indicators of seriousness, the conversion system, and actual screening
• Apparently lenient sources: Rabbi Uziel and Melamed Leho’il
• Unspoken intentions, burden of proof, and rabbinical court rulings that annulled conversions
• Annulment of conversion after the fact, and the distinction between later sin and intention at the time of conversion
• Maimonides, “we are concerned about him until his righteousness becomes clear,” and criticism of the claim that conversion cannot be annulled
• Rabbi Dichovsky: proofs that were rejected

Summary

General Overview

The text sums up the state of the discussion on the issue of conversion and argues that acceptance of the commandments is the essence of conversion and is required according to all views at the level of inner intention, even if there is debate over whether an explicit verbal declaration before a religious court is an indispensable stage. It distinguishes between motives for conversion, such as marriage-related conversions, and the intention to accept the commandments; explains why a conversion done for the sake of some interest may still be valid after the fact; and describes how today’s social reality undermines the presumptions that once existed regarding observance of commandments after conversion. It argues that on the one hand this is a major stringency—that without an intention to accept the commandments there is no conversion—and on the other hand it is a major leniency, because there is no requirement for broad knowledge of Jewish law, only a basic commitment to the system of commandments. It also analyzes apparently lenient sources (Rabbi Uziel, Melamed Leho’il) as focusing on the threshold of certainty and clarification of intention. It concludes with an in-depth discussion of annulment of conversion after the fact, explains the burden of proof once a religious court has already acted, presents a case that allows annulment due to clear evidence of deficient intention at the time of conversion, and criticizes proofs brought to argue that conversion can never be annulled at all.

The stages of conversion and acceptance of the commandments

The stages required in the conversion process are circumcision, immersion, presentation of the blood-offering value, and acceptance of the commandments. Acceptance of the commandments is not emphasized by the halakhic decisors as a technical stage because it is the very essence of conversion, just as intent to acquire is not always listed as part of the laws of transactions. The text distinguishes between acceptance of the commandments as a formal act in which the convert declares before a religious court, and the inner question of whether he truly comes in order to accept the commandments upon himself, and it states that the inward intention to accept the commandments is necessary according to all views. It describes a dispute over whether a declaration before a religious court is an indispensable condition, and notes that the Shulchan Arukh writes that saying it before a religious court is indispensable to the point that if it was said before two witnesses and not before a religious court, the convert remains a gentile.

Marriage-related conversions, ulterior motives, and presumptions about accepting the commandments

Jewish law examines why the convert comes to convert, and in Maimonides and the Talmud it appears that ideally one does not accept someone who comes for reasons of marriage or some other interest. The text states that after the fact, if such a person has already converted, the conversion takes effect and is not invalidated, and it explains that the initial rejection is a policy judgment—that it is improper to bring such a person into the community of Israel—not an inherent flaw in the act of conversion itself. It resolves the tension between the rabbinic sayings that converts are as difficult for Israel as a scab and the praise of converts by saying that the difficulty refers to converts who are not genuine converts, whereas genuine converts are praiseworthy and one should assist them and even waive certain stages when there is no choice, such as the presentation of the blood-offering value in situations where it cannot be carried out.

The text argues that precedents of marriage-related conversions are not proof that one may convert someone without the intention to accept the commandments; on the contrary, they prove the opposite: that even when the motive was marriage, there was once a natural understanding that being Jewish meant observing commandments as a framework of life. It distinguishes between motivation to convert and intention to accept the commandments, and argues that in the past even someone who converted for the sake of marriage understood that he was taking on the commandments, whereas today a person can convert without that basic assumption, because there are fully valid Jews who do not observe the commandments. It cites a responsum of Rabbi Herzog that expresses hesitation because the historical presumption no longer exists in modern reality, and presents a position according to which today, if there is any presumption, it is sometimes the opposite: that one who comes to convert is not doing so for the sake of accepting the commandments but for reasons of integration, rights, or other interests.

“Throughout your generations,” waiving stages, and the case of circumcision

The text discusses the Talmudic exposition in Keritot of “throughout your generations” as teaching that even when there is no Temple, people are converted without a sacrifice, because there must be a channel for conversion in every generation. It notes that according to the plain sense of the Talmud and most commentators, the waiver applies only to the sacrifice, but raises the possibility of extending this principle also to the requirement of a religious court on the basis of Nachmanides, Rashba, and the rule of acting as the agents of the earlier ordained judges, while noting that today there are no ordained judges and yet conversions are still performed. It tells an anecdote about a rabbinical judge who described a case of a gentile connected to an institution who wanted to convert but claimed he could not undergo circumcision for security reasons, and it describes a dilemma that was brought before Rabbi Amar, but says that waiving circumcision for a personal-security reason seems absurd in his view.

The text discusses cases where circumcision cannot be performed, such as where the organ has been severed, and raises the argument that in such a case he may not be obligated in circumcision, so there is no proof from there that one may waive a component of conversion. It raises a question about a life-threatening situation, such as the case of “his brothers died because of circumcision,” and explains that exemption from circumcision because of danger to life in the case of a Jew does not create a “conditional Jew,” but in the case of a convert, without circumcision he remains a gentile. It connects this to the rule that coercion does not turn a failure to act into an action, and formulates the principle that coercion may exempt a person from a transgression, but cannot create a status as though the act was done when in fact it was not done.

Acceptance of the commandments without knowledge: “We will do and we will hear” and informing him of some of the commandments

The text presents a “major leniency” that follows from understanding acceptance of the commandments as a principled commitment and not as a transaction dependent on knowing the details. Therefore there is no requirement that the convert know all the laws, or even know much beyond the general structure of a binding system. It explains that acceptance of the commandments is similar to this hasty people, who put your mouths before your ears and to we will do and we will hear, and it distinguishes between a transaction one enters because of detailed content and a transaction one enters out of loyalty to the one who commands. It cites a midrash in which the nations ask, “What is written in it?” and reject commandments that do not suit them, and explains that the midrash teaches that acceptance of the commandments means unconditional commitment to what the Holy One, blessed be He, commands, and not selective identification with specific details.

The text states that the source for the particulars of conversion is the revelation at Mount Sinai, and therefore the essence of acceptance is a statement or intention of the type “I accept the system upon myself,” not comprehensive study, exams, or full knowledge. It argues that “they inform him of some of the commandments” is meant to allow the convert to withdraw in advance and to prevent a later claim of “had I known, I would not have converted,” and in his view it is not supposed to be indispensable when there is a principled commitment. It takes a critical stance toward the notion of a “serious conversion” as connected to the length of courses and exams, and argues that at most these are some indication of seriousness, but they are not the measure of conversion itself, because a convert can know a lot and still not accept commitment, and a convert can accept commitment even without broad knowledge.

Indicators of seriousness, the conversion system, and actual screening

The text describes controversies surrounding the policy of the conversion system, and argues that on the one hand he wrote a stringent position against a policy in which there is no real acceptance of the commandments, while on the other hand he is more lenient about knowledge requirements than is common in the system. He gives an example of the rapid conversion of a non-Jewish woman “within five minutes” in connection with the family of the head of the Ponevezh yeshiva, and argues that there is no halakhic problem with converting someone quickly if the religious court knows the intentions are serious, whereas a long process is not a real guarantee of seriousness but only a possible tool for clarification when there is no other way. He notes the concern that a convert may later claim that the details of the commitment were not clarified to him, and refers this to the later discussion of annulment of conversion.

The text describes changes in reality in which screening was created within the conversion system because of public criticism and stricter tracks, a drop in motivation to convert because of other available options, and an increase in the proportion of people coming with genuine intent. It describes an earlier period as a “catastrophe” of wholesale conversions, and mentions “wink-wink conversions,” where people know what to say in order to get through, based on information passed among candidates.

Apparently lenient sources: Rabbi Uziel and Melamed Leho’il

The text cites Rabbi Uziel in Piskei Uziel, siman 68, who says, “We do not require him to fulfill the commandments, nor do we need the religious court to know that he will fulfill them,” and explains this not as an absence of any requirement of accepting the commandments, but as recognition that there is no way to achieve full certainty about the future and about the inner heart. It explains that the dispute is not over the very need for an intention to accept the commandments, but over the threshold of certainty and clarification that the religious court can and should attain, and over the distinction between the stage of informing and declaration and the essence of entering under a framework of commitment. It presents Rabbi Uziel’s phrase “who can guarantee it?” as an argument against requiring absolute certainty, not against the essence of the requirement.

The text cites Rabbi David Tzvi Hoffmann in Melamed Leho’il, part 3, siman 8, in the context of saving Jews from prohibitions involved in intermarriage, and emphasizes that in the responsum itself it says that if the woman explicitly says that she does not want to accept a commandment, “it is forbidden to accept her.” It explains that the leniency there is based on the fact that she does not explicitly say that she is not accepting, and on considerations of the welfare of the Jewish people, but it still assumes that inward acceptance of the commandments is an essential condition. It analyzes this approach as setting a very high threshold for rejection, so that one rejects mainly when there is clear certainty that there is no intention, and connects this with the principle that unspoken intentions are not legally binding intentions and the discussion of when unspoken intentions become “intentions in his heart and in every person’s heart,” which receive legal force even without being said.

Unspoken intentions, burden of proof, and rabbinical court rulings that annulled conversions

The text states that the rule unspoken intentions are not legally binding intentions shifts the burden of proof to the one seeking to invalidate a conversion after a religious court has already converted the person, because invalidating an act of a religious court requires clear proof that there was no intention to accept the commandments at the time of conversion. It describes how the ruling of the judge from Ashdod and later of Rabbi Sherman invalidated conversions wholesale by claiming that the judges who accepted converts in that way were “wicked,” and therefore were not a valid religious court, so the conversions were void, and it says that Rabbi Amar overturned that annulment. It presents this as a strategy that replaces the difficulty of proving the intention of each individual convert with a structural invalidation of the religious court itself.

Annulment of conversion after the fact, and the distinction between later sin and intention at the time of conversion

The text presents the question of annulling conversion after the fact as the final part, and distinguishes between a convert who begins violating prohibitions after conversion and a case in which it becomes clear that from the outset there was no intention to accept the commandments. It states that the fact that a person sins after conversion does not by itself prove that the conversion was not serious, because he may have intended sincerely and then fallen or changed his mind, just as Jews do not cease to be Jews. It argues that the focus is not on the quantity of transgressions but on the question of when one can become convinced with certainty that the intention at the time of conversion was not acceptance of the commandments, and it emphasizes that after a religious court has acted, a high degree of certainty is required in order to annul.

The text cites a case told by Rabbi Katz from a conversion court, which converted a man on Friday, and then that very Sabbath night it became clear that he held a wedding in a hall with an orchestra and Sabbath desecration, and the court annulled the conversion because the wedding preparations proved that the plan predated the conversion, so the intention at the time of conversion was not acceptance of the commandments. It concludes that the claim that there is no such thing as annulling conversion after the fact is “absurd,” because a case of clear proof of deficient intention at the time of conversion justifies annulment, but it emphasizes that in practice it is almost impossible to annul most conversions without unusual evidence, such as a prior admission of intent to deceive.

Maimonides, “we are concerned about him until his righteousness becomes clear,” and criticism of the claim that conversion cannot be annulled

The text cites Maimonides, Laws of Forbidden Relations, chapter 13, halakhah 17, as a source people quote to show that even if the convert went back and worshiped idols, “he is like an apostate Jew, whose betrothal is valid,” but emphasizes that in that very halakhah it also says, “we are concerned about him until his righteousness becomes clear,” so this is not a claim that blocks the possibility of annulment when it becomes clear that the intention at the time of conversion was flawed. It quotes the sequence in halakhot 14–15 regarding examining the convert’s motives and the fact that in the days of David and Solomon they did not accept converts ideally, and explains that Maimonides describes concern and doubt regarding converts who converted before laymen, a refusal to draw them close until their ultimate course is clarified, and the understanding that their end may prove their beginning. It interprets Maimonides as distinguishing between a case where there is no evidence against the intention at the time of conversion—so even idolatry afterward does not annul it—and a case where it becomes clear that the intention at the time of conversion was not for the sake of accepting the commandments, in which case the conversion is void from the outset.

Rabbi Dichovsky: proofs that were rejected

The text describes a conference at Bar-Ilan during the period of the Rabbi Sherman controversy, and the remarks of Rabbi Dichovsky, who argued that conversions can never be annulled at all, and it presents two proofs he brought and rejects them as irrelevant. It cites a proof from Maimonides in the Laws of Sanhedrin that in capital cases one does not judge on the basis of assessments but only on the basis of witnesses, and explains that there is no connection between a special rule of evidence in capital law and conversion, and that the distinction between circumstantial evidence and testimony is also not a hierarchy of strength but a difference in type of evidence. It also cites another proof from Nachmanides about a woman who is trusted to say she is pure but is wearing the clothing of a menstruant woman, and argues that this cannot establish any rule about annulling conversion, because in conversion the question is the intention at the time one stands before a religious court, not a technical comparison between a statement and an external sign.

The text concludes by arguing that the use of such proofs reflects a bias in the discussion, whereas the broad principled agreement is that inward acceptance of the commandments is an essential condition for conversion; that the real question is the levels of clarification and certainty both initially and after the fact; and that annulment of conversion is possible in principle but rare in practice because of the high burden of proof.

We’re in the topic of conversion, and we’ll summarize where we are. We talked about the stages required in the conversion process: circumcision, immersion, the offering of blood, and acceptance of the commandments. I spoke a bit about the question of the status of accepting the commandments. There are those who ask why this doesn’t appear in the halakhic decisors, and I said it doesn’t appear because that is the essence of conversion, just like it doesn’t say that you need intent to acquire in the laws of transactions. I distinguished between accepting the commandments as an act within the conversion process—that is, the person has to stand there and declare, “I accept the commandments upon myself”—and what is in his heart. Meaning: when he comes to convert, the question is whether he is coming in order to accept the commandments, regardless of what he says now before the religious court and regardless of what stages you put him through, but rather a real assessment of what is in his heart: does he intend to accept the commandments upon himself or not? That is certainly necessary according to all opinions. There can be disputes about whether he has to say it during the conversion process; even there there’s no real dispute, the only question is whether it is indispensable. The Shulchan Arukh, for example, writes that it is. The Shulchan Arukh writes that saying this before a religious court is indispensable. Meaning, if the court was not actually a court, and if he said it before two witnesses, not before a religious court, then he is a gentile. That’s what the Shulchan Arukh says. Not everyone agrees with that; you can argue about it. But regarding acceptance of the commandments in the heart, in my view there is no dispute at all. That is the essence of conversion.

After that I moved on to talk about marriage-motivated conversions, or conversions for the sake of something else. And the rule in Jewish law is that we check—this appears in Maimonides and also in the Talmud—we check the convert to see why he is coming. Is he coming for reasons of marriage—he fell in love with some Jewish woman—or for other reasons? In that case we do not accept him. But there, regarding conversions of that kind, it says that if he already converted, then the conversion takes effect. Meaning, it is not voided; if they accepted him, then it does not get voided. The claim—and I think this is the simpler plain meaning—is that we do not accept him not because there is a problem with the conversion, but because ideally it is not a good idea to bring such a person into our midst. True, if we did bring him in then it is valid, but as a matter of policy it is not right to bring such a person in, and that is the contradiction in the Talmud. There are sayings that speak about converts as… Did he say that he would accept all the commandments? What? Did he say it? Yes, if he doesn’t say it, then he hasn’t done the conversion process at all. He does say it, but it is clear to us that he is doing it in order to marry some woman, or because of some side interest. So there it is valid, it is valid, but ideally it says not to accept him. And why? Because I brought the Talmudic statement, “Converts are as difficult for Israel as a skin affliction,” on the one hand; and on the other hand, the Talmud greatly praises converts. And they explain there—and this is the plain meaning of the Talmud—that “converts are as difficult for Israel as a skin affliction” does not refer to all converts, to true converts. “Converts are as difficult for Israel as a skin affliction” refers to those converts who are not really coming to convert; they are difficult like a skin affliction. The others are excellent; one just has to help them. And we already saw that we are obligated to make it possible for them, and we even waive stages in conversion if there is no choice, such as the offering of blood, yes, in situations where it cannot be done.

By the way, I just saw some article—I had an argument with some conversion judge. He wrote, he tried to make an argument—and I’m putting this in parentheses because it relates to the class before the previous one, I think—we discussed there the Talmud in Kritot about “throughout your generations.” “Throughout your generations” means that from there the Talmud learns that on a day when there is no Temple, we still convert even without a sacrifice. Why? Because the assumption is that there has to be a path of conversion for all generations, in every generation. And if in some generation one of the stages cannot be carried out, then we waive it, and that is by Torah law. I said that according to the plain sense of the Talmud and most of the commentators, this applies only to the sacrifice. But I brought another proof that maybe it also applies to the court: Nachmanides and Rashba, where one can infer from their view—through the law of “they act as our agents,” we discussed that—that this could also apply to the requirement that there be a religious court. After all, today there is no court of ordained judges, and nevertheless we convert, and according to some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there is no enactment of “they act as our agents” here. So one can expand it.

But he wanted to say—he had a fascinating story. There was a man who worked for the Mossad, and apparently he was in a senior position in some country and was a Mossad agent. Now he was a gentile, and he came to his court—so that judge says—he came to the… he wasn’t even allowed to tell this story until some time ago, now that they permitted him, I don’t know exactly what. He came to them to convert. And he says to them, “Listen, I can’t have a circumcision. I’m in certain places and all that; if they see that I had a circumcision, they’ll understand that I’m Jewish, and the whole thing depends on that.” So he was very torn. He asked Rabbi Amar, who was then the Chief Rabbi. He was very torn about whether he could convert him without circumcision because of this matter of “throughout your generations”—that if you… that when it’s impossible, meaning there is no Temple. Meaning, then you can’t bring sacrifices. It’s not a matter of a particular person having a problem.

There are Talmudic passages that discuss a case where the organ was severed. “The organ was severed” means a person who had his sexual organ removed. Then you cannot circumcise him. Can he or can he not convert? About that—but I’m saying, that is no proof at all, because in the case of the organ being severed it may be that he is not obligated in circumcision at all. Like a Jew whose organ was severed—what does a Jew whose organ was severed do? Want a circumcision? Just a second. So he is not obligated in circumcision at all, so there is no issue for him. From the outset, that is not defined as a component of the circumcision stage in the conversion process. But to say that someone who has some security problem or other issue—with all due respect, and of course everything is fine—and when he comes back and finishes his role then he can convert, and that’s wonderful. But at this stage it sounds to me completely absurd to waive it.

What if his brothers died as a result of circumcision and he is in danger? Regarding a convert? Good question. I haven’t checked that, I don’t remember an explicit discussion of it at the moment. It’s an interesting question, because you understand that it’s a little problematic, since there wouldn’t really be such a case. “His brothers died as a result of circumcision” applies to a Jew, because they all get circumcised. But he is a gentile, so how did his brothers die because of circumcision? If they wanted to convert. In any case, I don’t remember a discussion of it right now. It would be an interesting practical difference. But you just said a moment ago that if the organ was severed then there’s no problem because he isn’t obligated at all. So if his brothers died, then he also isn’t obligated? No—that’s because of saving life, it’s not the same thing. That’s much closer to our case. Maybe one can distinguish here too, but that’s already closer to our case. It has to be checked; I haven’t checked it. Interesting question.

If saving life counts, does morality count too? If saving life counts, then also the person… Right, so I won’t circumcise him—but he also won’t be Jewish. Meaning, saving life is true—is he a conditional Jew? No. You understand? He cannot be Jewish without going through the stages. Meaning, if the commandment of circumcision is suspended for a Jew because of saving life, then I exempt a Jew from the commandment of circumcision. But he does not stop being Jewish if he is not circumcised, because there is no such law. But a convert without circumcision is a gentile.

His brothers died at the time, so that’s what they asked here: if his brothers died because of circumcision, if he can be accepted because of saving life, then morality could also be accepted. I’m saying: you can say that because of saving life he should not be circumcised, but you cannot say that he is Jewish without circumcision. “Is coercion considered as if he acted?” That is a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. There are variant readings between the Jerusalem Talmud and the Babylonian Talmud regarding whether coercion is considered as if he acted or not. This is about a person who set a condition in a transaction, or in a divorce, or something like that, that he would come within twelve months—on condition that he comes within twelve months. Now he was prevented and did not come. So now he was coerced. So what? Is that considered as if he came? Coercion can exempt you from a transgression that you committed; coercion cannot turn someone who didn’t do something into someone who did do it. Meaning, it can turn someone who did do something into as if he didn’t do it, but it cannot turn someone who did not do something, because he was coerced, into a מצב where he did do it. That is agreed by everyone. Meaning, the rule is that coercion is not considered as if he acted. So he was coerced, but he did not do circumcision—what can you do? No choice.

Anyway, I’m just saying this in parentheses, an interesting anecdote, because he really took that law of “throughout your generations” very far. In my opinion it’s absurd. In any case—no, he also didn’t actually do it in the end; he hesitated.

I talked about these marriage-motivated conversions because many times these are the examples people bring as precedents. Meaning, they try to show that essentially even a convert who comes not with the intention of accepting commandments, in the end if they accepted him then the conversion takes effect after the fact. And therefore they say today too: fine, I’m not getting into the guts of all the converts, I don’t know exactly why each one came, but bottom line, if they accepted them then they accepted them, so they are converts. We’re talking about motive—you’re judging motive—that doesn’t mean there is no intention. It could be that a person is doing a marriage conversion out of the motive of marrying a Jewish woman, but he has genuine intent; that is one of the conditions.

Right. What I said last time, and I’m repeating now, is that these precedents are no proof at all; on the contrary, as I explained, they are proof to the contrary. Why are they proof to the contrary? Because first of all, the fact that we don’t accept someone converting for the sake of marriage—why don’t we accept him? We don’t accept him because we think conversion means accepting the commandments. That’s the problem. Now why is it valid after the fact, if so? That is actually proof for what I’m saying. After all, why is it valid after the fact? It is valid after the fact exactly as you said: in the past, when a person converted, even if it was for the sake of marriage, it was clear to him that when he entered the Jewish public he would observe commandments. Because that is what it meant to be Jewish. And again, I’m not claiming that everyone kept all 613 commandments in all their details, but broadly speaking, as a framework, it was clear to everyone that being Jewish meant going to synagogue, putting on tefillin, doing the things—what everyone does. And with that understanding he did it. And that is exactly the difference between the motivation and his intentions. Meaning, he wants this for marriage, not because he fell in love with Rabbi Yosef Karo, but in the end he understands that he is going to do what Rabbi Yosef Karo said. Even if he is doing it for some reason—fine, but after the fact he accepted commandments. I’m not getting into his guts after the fact; I’m not getting into why he did it. Ideally I also don’t want such a person, but after the fact, if he accepted commandments, he accepted commandments; you cannot void that conversion.

But to bring proof from there to today’s situation—I mentioned afterward there is a responsum of Rabbi Herzog on this matter, and people often bring him as lenient. But Rabbi Herzog himself says he is very hesitant, because today that whole presumption does not exist. Because today, when a person comes to convert, he knows—he does not know that the moment he becomes a convert he will have to observe commandments. There are many Jews who are perfectly legitimate Jews and observe no commandments at all—legitimate Jews, not “good Jews”—and they do not observe commandments. So when he converts, it is obvious that there is no such presumption that he knows that after he converts he will have to accept commandments. In the past there were no secular people. No, no, no, obviously there were. There were people who were more lax, less lax, there were apostates—but there were no secular Jews; such a phenomenon did not exist. Of course not. What does “secular” even mean? There is no such concept as secular. There’s a slacker. It didn’t exist; it’s a modern phenomenon. Does a slacker count as accepting the yoke of commandments? Yes, and I’ll get to that in a moment. I already noted it, and I’ll expand a bit.

So I’m saying all those precedents are precedents that prove exactly the opposite. On the contrary: what happens today is that a person converts for all sorts of reasons—to integrate here, to get immigrant rights, I don’t know, all sorts of things, or just so they’ll let him come here. Therefore it is completely clear that there can also be ulterior motives. Each case on its own—not everyone is like that. But you cannot say there is a presumption that if he came, then surely he fell in love with Rabbi Yosef Karo; meaning, otherwise he wouldn’t have come. Come on, we know that isn’t true. The presumption is the opposite. Today, if there is a presumption, it is the opposite: a person who comes to convert is not doing it in order to accept commandments. That’s the presumption. Now if there is someone who does, then fine. I think that is the plain simple meaning. And therefore all these precedents are precedents that, if anything, prove the opposite; they do not prove the point itself at all.

Then I said that alongside this point—which is seemingly a major stringency—there is also a major leniency, and here I come to the second point, the point about being lax. Meaning, say now it says in the halakhic decisors—and it already appears in the Talmud—that “we inform him of some of the commandments.” Nobody would ever imagine that in the conversion process a person would have to study, be tested for rabbinic ordination, for judicial ordination, in every area—it’s not a practical requirement, and nobody ever demanded such a thing of anyone. So clearly he doesn’t know everything. So how can he accept upon himself a deal when he doesn’t know everything? I said here that the Jewish people accepted upon themselves a deal when they didn’t know everything. “A rash people who put your mouths before your ears,” the Talmud says—a rash people who put your mouth before your ears. Hear what it is about and then say, “We will do and we will hear.” What do you mean, “We will do and we will hear”? It should have been “We will hear and we will do.” No—we accept the yoke of commandments because we are obligated to what the Holy One, blessed be He, said; afterward we’ll see what exactly it is. That is not called buying a pig in a poke; we are undertaking an obligation.

If you make a deal because of its content and you do not know the content, then it’s buying a pig in a poke, and the transaction is void. If you make a deal because you want to make a deal with a certain party, and you don’t care what the content of the deal is, then it doesn’t matter that you don’t know the details of the deal, because you want to make the deal with that party; I don’t care about the details. That is completely fine. It is a fully valid deal, regardless of whether you know the details or not.

I brought, I think, that midrash where the Holy One, blessed be He, went around to the nations and offered them the Torah, and they asked Him what was written in it. Right—and with the Jews, what’s in it, how much does it cost. So He asked the nations what was written in it: “Do not steal”—that doesn’t suit us. “Do not murder”—that doesn’t suit us. The message of that whole passage is something else entirely. People think the message is that the nations are immoral. That is not the point at all. It comes to describe what accepting commandments means. In that midrash, the nations basically thought that accepting commandments meant they identified with the content of the commandments. So they said: if we don’t identify with this, then we are not entering into this deal. This is a deal where we have to know the details and then we sign—so that’s “we will hear and we will do.” Right? That is what they wanted. And precisely because of that they did not receive the Torah.

Now the Jewish people said, “We will do and we will hear.” Why—are they idiots? No. The acceptance was for a different reason. They did not accept it because they identified with the details, because if that were really the case, then first hear the details—how do you know whether you identify with them? Rather, they accepted it because they were obligated to what the Holy One, blessed be He, said. They decided that whatever the Holy One, blessed be He, says—that’s it.

Now understand that this is the source for the conversion process. The source for the conversion process is Mount Sinai, the giving of the Torah at Mount Sinai. The Talmud derives all the details of conversion from there; that’s where it learns it. Now if I apply that to us, then what does that say about acceptance of commandments? Clearly you don’t need him to be fit for judicial ordination. What he needs is to understand that there is a complex system here with many demands, and he has to stand by it. He says, “Listen, I love Rabbi Yosef Karo so much—whatever he writes I’ll do.” Excuse the trivialization. So I fell in love with the Holy One, blessed be He, with the Torah; whatever is written there I will do, even without getting into the details. No problem. That’s an excellent convert. He doesn’t need to know everything; we just need to verify that the person really wants to come for that reason.

And that is why, in truth, marriage conversions are more problematic, because he isn’t doing it for that. So there, if he doesn’t know everything, there is room for hesitation. And still they say: fine, but he knows there is a system, and if he wants to enter the Jewish people, he will have to observe it. Even that, after the fact, is okay. But clearly in the background there is this unconditional commitment. He does not have to know anything. He just has to understand that whatever is in the system obligates him. Again, each of us stumbles here and there; that’s not the point, and it’s not permitted either—we’re all human. But he has to understand that it obligates him. That’s the point.

If that is really so, then all the convert has to do is say, “We will do and we will hear.” That’s all. He doesn’t really have to study anything. As for what it says, that we inform him of some of the commandments—in my view that should not be indispensable. It doesn’t matter. Meaning, if he knows that we’re dealing with a system that demands things, that has actions and this and the Sabbath and things in general, a system that can require all sorts of things from you, and it’s complex and limiting, and he needs to know that that’s what this is about—that’s all. He doesn’t have to know anything in terms of the actual content of Jewish law. Look at Mount Sinai and you’ll see. Meaning, you don’t need to know anything. Maybe “we inform him of some of the commandments” was at Marah. Yes, there were three commandments they received at Marah. They give him some commandments and then they entered conversion. Could be; I haven’t seen that.

So I’m saying that on the one hand it’s a stringency: without accepting commandments there is no conversion. He is a gentile. He is a gentile—this is not about marriage conversions, not about the purpose but about the intention. Meaning, if he does not intend to accept commandments. On the other hand, there is no requirement of knowledge. He does not have to know anything, because he only needs the basic willingness to accept whatever is in the system, even without study.

And in that sense, in that same article I wrote, I wrote something very stringent against the conversion policy of the state conversion system, but on the other hand I was much more lenient than they were. In all the arguments—afterward too, there are arguments with these guys to this day—they keep telling me, “Listen, there has never been such a serious conversion as theirs. People say it’s a sloppy conversion. This is the most serious conversion ever.” They bring the example of the brother of Rabbi Dov Povarsky who came to the Land of Israel—or Ponevezh Yeshiva—not Rabbi Dov Povarsky, his father, the head of Ponevezh Yeshiva. So his brother came to the Land from Russia, in one of the waves of immigration from Russia, with a non-Jewish wife. So they converted her there in five minutes. They converted her there in five minutes. I said to them: you see? In Bnei Brak they criticize the conversion system because we run year-long courses and we screen and test and accompany them and so on—and here they converted her in five minutes. And more generally they say: look, there has never been such a serious conversion, where they sit and study in an ulpan and take tests and all that. Nonsense. It’s simply nonsense. Why? Because there is no need to know anything. Meaning, if in five minutes I know that the person wants to observe commandments—say I manage to reach the conclusion that the person accepts commandments upon himself—then he is a perfectly legitimate Jew in the best possible way. Now he could be a professor of Judaism, know the entire Talmud with the medieval and later authorities, and the Mishnah Berurah in all its branches, but he doesn’t understand that this thing obligates him. He doesn’t accept that obligation upon himself—then he is a gentile.

And that’s not nonsense, Rabbi, because it can be an indicator. No, wait, you always say my next sentence before I do. I agree. Meaning, yes, it has one significance. That significance is that if a person goes through a year-long process, invests, takes the exams and all that, that is some indication that he probably means it seriously. Fine. In my opinion, a somewhat questionable indicator, because sometimes he has no other choice if he really has some goals—it depends whether he has some goals. Fine. But there is some level of indication here, I agree. But to look at that as the measure of how serious the conversion is—that’s nonsense. Meaning, all the religious court needs to know is whether the person truly intends it. How do you do that? If you can know that in five minutes, then fine. Let’s say Rabbi Dov Povarsky knew his sister-in-law—say they knew one another. I don’t know how much time had passed before they converted her once she was in the Land, but say they already knew each other, he understood who she was, and he saw that she had serious intentions—meaning, he knew her. Fine. So he comes and testifies before the court that her intentions are serious. Is there a problem converting her in five minutes? No problem at all. You can convert her standing on one foot, because we know their intentions are serious.

A person I don’t know—I put him through year-long workshops, and even afterward I’m still not sure I know. But what else can I do? You still have to give the person some possibility, whether you manage to get to the bottom of his mind or not. We can’t do more than that. So I understand the need and I understand there’s no choice, and I have no criticism of that. It’s perfectly fine; that’s how it works. Just don’t tell me that this is the indicator of the seriousness of the conversion. No, it isn’t.

It seems to me there is a danger in what you are describing from the convert’s side, because if you enter into a deal with him and you don’t spell out all the details of the contract before he signs, then after five years he can come back and tell you: I signed something and I had no idea what it even was. That’s my next move. I’ll talk about that in a moment—about voiding conversion after the fact. It doesn’t take effect at all if he didn’t know the details of the Torah? Hold on, hold on. I’m not sure about that, but in a moment I’ll discuss it. Yes, I understand.

So that is why I say it is a stringency with a leniency alongside it. This coin has two sides. One side is a major stringency: without accepting commandments there is no conversion. This is not the question of marriage conversions where after the fact it’s okay. No—he is a gentile. The other side is that all that is needed is acceptance of commandments. Not their actual observance—and in a moment I’ll explain about actual observance—and not knowledge of them either. What you need is seriousness, that he understands there is a system here that obligates him. That’s all. And in that sense this is as minimal as it gets. Because various halakhic decisors argue about how many commandments you have to tell him, how much he needs to know, which of them it has to be clear to us that he will observe or not observe—all those questions are unimportant in my opinion. They simply don’t matter. The only question is whether, at the moment of conversion, he seriously accepts the system upon himself. Then he is Jewish. That’s all.

We still haven’t discussed seriousness. Right. Your measure and his measure and everyone’s measure are different. What is seriousness? Okay, so for that the religious court is sitting there, and they have to decide. I didn’t say otherwise. I only said that all we have is an indicative measure. No problem, that’s true. But the point is that this coin has two sides. One is very stringent and one is very lenient, and they are both two sides of the same coin. Because I do not view obligation to the commandments as a practical transaction, and therefore—the lenient side—I do not need to check the details. But I do view it seriously as the essence of conversion, and therefore without it he is a gentile. Meaning, the stringency and the leniency here are two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, one derives from the other.

If he takes it seriously, that means he is going to observe the commandments. Indeed. So what is seriousness? That’s one thing. No, no—that he is going to observe the commandments. Whether he will in fact observe them is a different question; I’m getting to that in a moment. That he is going to—certainly. That is the acceptance. Acceptance means: I am going to observe. In this whole matter we all take it very seriously. What I said is that there is no test of the reality except in these mass-conversion situations. I said I am not proposing any indicator; I have no criticism. I too would have acted this way. I am only claiming that the argument that they study for a year and study much more than the average convert studied throughout the generations—that is not an indicator of the seriousness of the conversion. I don’t have a better alternative; I didn’t claim I did. But it is correlated to some degree because there is, as the lady said, a situation where a person accepts in principle and when he sees the depth of the tangle he recoils. To that I said: I’ll get to that. I’ll get to that.

So those are the two sides of the coin of this conception of conversion. I want maybe to look at two sources—the two main sources, I think—that are brought to show that accepting commandments is not indispensable. I didn’t take the most extreme ones there are, because basically there are almost no such sources. All those who try to be lenient gather them with tweezers. The sources from which one can infer this—I already mentioned Melamed Leho’il, and others, and Rabbi Uziel in several places; there are also contradictions; and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein too—there are various responsa that go in different directions. But I took the two most extreme examples to show you that even there the question is not simple.

So look: first example is Rabbi Uziel, in Piskei Uziel, siman 68: “From here it emerges explicitly that we do not require him to observe the commandments, and the court does not even need to know that he will observe them. For if not, no converts would ever be accepted into Israel, because who can guarantee that this gentile will be faithful to all the commandments of the Torah? Rather, the reason we inform him of some of the commandments is so that if he wishes he may withdraw, and so that he cannot later say, ‘Had I known, I would not have converted.’ And this is only ideally, but after the fact if they did not inform him, it does not prevent the conversion. From all that has been said we learn that the condition of observing the commandments does not prevent conversion even ideally.”

Seemingly a very strong and clear statement. Observance—he’s not talking about acceptance. Wait. No, he’s talking about observance, but he’s also talking about acceptance, because he says that otherwise we couldn’t accept any convert because we can’t know what’s in his heart. So he’s searching for what’s in his heart, not for what he does. But look, the point is this: it is completely clear from the wording—this is a document and its contradiction right beside it. It is completely clear that if I know he will not observe, then he is a gentile. Rather, you don’t have to be in a position where you know with certainty what is in his heart, because the court cannot know with certainty what is in his heart. So the court does indeed have to assess what is in his heart. I think the Talmud itself clearly says that, and many times that is indeed the role of the court. He writes not to require. Yes—not to require? No, on the contrary. So I’m saying: that’s what I discussed earlier. As for requiring the commandments, here that is an act, a component in the conversion process. It’s an action. But as for checking whether he really intends to observe commandments—that is the essence of conversion. He says not even to require it. No, not yet—not to inform him of commandments. So that’s what I’m saying: informing him is the act in the conversion process. Whether there must be a stage in the conversion where he says “I accept upon myself” and we tell him—there is a dispute whether that is indispensable or not. But if in his heart he has no intention at all of accepting commandments, then he is a gentile.

He is speaking—and this is clear from his wording—about the question of how much certainty I need that this is what he intends to do. He says: clearly I do not need full certainty, because otherwise you would never be able to accept any convert, because who can guarantee—that’s what he says—who can guarantee that he will observe all the commandments of the Torah? I didn’t say that; you were talking about the obligation to observe commandments, not about whether he will observe all the commandments. Clearly he means to say that when you are not entirely sure, don’t be worried. Fine—you’re a human being, and what you can assess is what you have. So I really don’t think that is what is written here, even though seemingly very explicit things are written here.

The same thing appears in Rabbi David Tzvi Hoffmann in Melamed Leho’il—not exactly the same; this goes further, even further, and even there look what happens. “In order to save the Jew from a severe prohibition, it is certainly good to convert the non-Jewish woman.” There they were marrying. Where is that written? Melamed Leho’il, part 3, siman 8. “And one may say that in truth if she says explicitly that she does not want to accept this commandment, it is forbidden to accept her.” And here, in the very responsum that everyone brings as the most extreme lenient marker there is—there is nothing more extreme than this in leniency, right?—but in our case, she does not say so explicitly. “And if so, even though we know that she will transgress this prohibition, nevertheless for the sake of the priest and for the sake of his offspring, we accept her. One may also say that if we convert her because of the welfare of Israel, it is certainly better that she convert and that Jewish offspring not be lost and that the Jew not incur karet because of her, even though both of them will commit a minor prohibition. And especially in our case there is also concern that if the woman becomes insane because they do not accept her, there will be a desecration of God’s name, Heaven forbid,” and so on—not important now.

What is written here? First of all, it is completely clear that he says if she says she does not accept commandments, then we do not accept her. And if acceptance of commandments is not essential, not a condition of conversion, then why not? He says that even though we know that yes—wait, wait, I didn’t say… I’m going from the light to the heavy. If she says she won’t observe, she says so during the conversion process. Now if I really take him literally—acceptance of commandments is not needed, acceptance of commandments does not prevent conversion at all, acceptance of commandments in the heart, okay?—then what do I care what she says? What do I care what she says? Clearly, ideally don’t accept her—but in any case ideally he says not to accept her, yet because of the welfare of Israel and all the complications, he says yes, accept her. Which means that if she says she does not accept, she is a gentile even if they do accept her. So he too agrees that acceptance of commandments matters.

Rather, all he is saying here is: listen, let’s not get into the guts. I know—my assessment is that she won’t observe commandments, true—but there is some chance that she will. You cannot know with certainty that she won’t. Now the whole question is what level of inquiry you are going to make. In a place where there is great need and the welfare of the priest and of Israel and so on, he says you need certainty that she won’t; you don’t need certainty that she will. Exactly. And the level of certainty you demand becomes more flexible because it depends on circumstances. Fine.

Here he goes very far, in the sense that he says that as long as there is a reasonable concern, a reasonable chance that she will indeed intend to accept, that is enough for me. If so, then almost only in a conversion where I know with certainty—like where she says it—would I reject. Seemingly, any conversion where there is a probability… Fine, no problem. Again, the practical implications are always that in order to dismiss the concern about acceptance of commandments, you need to know with certainty that he does not intend it. Meaning, I don’t know exactly what the threshold is. One has to distinguish here between two things. I am not dealing with the practical question; I am dealing with the conceptual question: is acceptance of commandments a condition of conversion? That is the conceptual question. Now the practical side—how you investigate, how much you investigate, how much you clarify—that depends on circumstances. I completely agree. That has to be examined. But in the conceptual claim, he too agrees with this claim: without acceptance of commandments there is no conversion—acceptance of commandments in the heart. Only, now the question is what? So he takes it to the extreme. He says the only way you don’t accept is if you know she will not accept commandments. But because the circumstances say that I conduct only a minimal inquiry. Still, there is Jewish law in practice here. This is essential, not merely a matter of degree.

Yes, you come to convert and say: I intend to observe commandments. The moment he does not say: I do not intend to observe commandments, then you are in his situation. Okay, so I’ll bring an example in a moment, but I just want to say that even in his case—what stands behind this? In my opinion, what stands behind it by mistake is the mechanism of “matters in the heart are not legally significant.” And we’ll get to that in a moment. Meaning, she underwent a conversion process, or he underwent a conversion process, so the acts were done. She also declared, “I accept commandments,” presumably, because the conversion procedure includes that too. Okay? Now you assess that in her heart she does not accept commandments. The rule in Jewish law is that matters in the heart are not legally significant. Meaning, if she says the words, then you need to—and even if you think that in her heart it’s not true—matters in the heart are not legally significant.

But you have to pay close attention: there is indeed a far-reaching claim here, because clearly, if what is in his heart is also in the heart of every person—meaning, if there is a clear indication of what is in his heart—then verbalization is unnecessary. You see this in the laws of buying and selling, in all kinds of places. Meaning, where Tosafot in Kiddushin 49 speaks about someone who sold his property intending to go up to the Land of Israel, in order to immigrate to the Land of Israel. And then something went wrong and he was unable to go. And the Talmud says there the sale is void. He did not stipulate it, he didn’t say, “If I do not go up to the Land of Israel, then I did not sell.” Fine? But if it is clear to everyone that this is what he meant, then the sale is void even though he didn’t say it. Why? Matters in the heart are not legally significant—he sold, but in truth he thought it was only if he would go up to the Land of Israel. So why aren’t matters in the heart legally significant? Tosafot says there: matters that are in his heart and in the heart of every person—what is clear to everyone—do not require speech, because speech is not essential. Speech is an indication of what is in the heart. If you know what is in his heart, then you don’t need speech. Fine? Everyone knows; it’s as if he said it explicitly.

So I’m saying he wants to take the rule “matters in the heart are not legally significant” and build from it a kind of legal fiction. Meaning: “matters in the heart are not legally significant”—after all, I know with certainty what is going on in her heart, but “matters in the heart are not legally significant.” That is what she did. There is room for legal fictions when you are in severe distress. I think this is a problematic legal fiction, because when you know she is a gentile, you cannot take a gentile and make her Jewish.

Maybe that’s not the reason. Maybe the reason is that if a person comes and wants to attach himself to the Jewish people, and there is a possibility that once you are inside the Jewish people, in the end you will observe commandments—that is enough. Okay. No, and if she says, “I do not accept the commandments,” then the issue is that she is unwilling to accept the commandments. But the issue need not be that even if we know right now that he will not accept the commandments, maybe according to that it is still okay; it’s just that we are entering a track that will eventually bring him to observance of commandments. Could be. One can discuss that.

Okay, Rabbi Bamberger—that is apparently the end of the nineteenth century? End of the nineteenth century, when secular people started; we discussed earlier whether there were secular people. You have to see the context. The context, as I said, is that there were intermarriages in the community, and the question was a priest with a gentile woman. The question was whether to convert her or not, because we were in trouble with the children and with the prohibitions and all those things. And that is the context in which he writes it.

So regarding the question of how far to go, therefore I do agree with the principle: “matters in the heart are not legally significant” is a clear halakhic principle. Here too, you have to understand, that is certainly true. The only question is how clear the opposite has to be to you in order nevertheless to take into account what is in the heart. The question is whether he has to actually say it. Usually “in his heart and in the heart of every person” is considered sufficiently clear; he doesn’t have to say it. He raises the bar even more. But understand: he too—the most extreme case—did not go beyond the boundaries of Jewish law. Meaning, basically, of course acceptance of commandments is required, and there is a rule that “matters in the heart are not legally significant.” Up to here everything is agreed. The only question is what threshold of certainty you have regarding what is in the convert’s heart that will be enough to take it out of this rule of “matters in the heart are not legally significant.” Then it is no longer just “matters in the heart” but rather “in his heart and in the heart of every person.” On that there is a dispute, and it is certainly possible that under different circumstances it would be applied differently. So there too I don’t think this proves anything. Nothing at all.

Of course, on the practical level it is true. On the practical level we don’t need these proofs, but on the practical level it is true. For example, in our case, where we are talking about converts regarding whom there is concern that they are not coming in order to accept commandments—here the question is what level of concern is needed, because indeed “matters in the heart are not legally significant.” So there is a significant concern, and that doesn’t mean—and I’ll say more than that—not only is there a significant concern, maybe that is the presumption. Whoever wants to remove that presumption has the burden of proof. Meaning, there is a presumption today that the convert is not coming in order to accept commandments. Thank you, Beni.

I was present at the process in Gush Etzion of the military conversion, and it turns out not everyone manages to remain there. Most drop out, obviously, so those who do stay, it may be that within the general statistics, where there is an opposite presumption, specifically those who stay have a presumption… That’s a very interesting point. Maybe I’ll say a word about it, because it really was a point that came up in arguments I had after I wrote the article.

You know, they say about the Vilna Gaon that he argued against the Hasidim. Look, in the end they remained good Jews, everything is fine, so the Vilna Gaon was wrong. That’s how they ask the Litvaks. To say the Vilna Gaon was wrong—good thing they can still breathe afterward. So they say—the typical Litvak, what does he answer? Obviously. Why did they remain good Jews? Because of the Vilna Gaon. Meaning, if the Vilna Gaon had not fought them, they would have become Christians. But since the Vilna Gaon fought them, that is what kept them good Jews. Same thing here. I didn’t understand the parallel. The parallel is exactly that: because of the severe criticism that arose against the conversion system, screening began there. It started in a completely wild way. It started in a way that basically used the legal fictions of Rabbi Hoffmann at every step. They let everyone in because there was a social problem—they wrote this, Rabbi Druckman wrote it, everyone wrote it; that was the policy. No, no, they leave from the ranks—not, not, they leave, but that is the result of screening. Not screening when I first apply; it is from tightening the track, making it harder. There’s no point arguing about the facts: there is screening. There is screening, I know, yes, there is screening. There are people who do not pass the conversion process not because they dropped out, but because the court does not convert them. And there are those who drop out, but that too is a result of the tightening of standards; tightening standards is also a process of screening—screening by hand, not by mouth. But clearly there is, and clearly this process of screening was created, or intensified, because of the criticism. So now it really is better. Without a doubt the situation is better.

By the way, more than that: now too there is much less motivation for people to come convert. Today you can get by in various other ways, and therefore it is not as dire as it once was. And since that is so, the distress has gone down. Exactly. And therefore today, those who already come to convert, there really is a higher percentage who genuinely intend to convert. So many processes have happened. I wrote that article quite a few years ago already, and in the meantime the situation really is somewhat different, and I don’t know it closely enough today to make a firm determination. But what existed then was a catastrophe. It really was a catastrophe. Everyone was crying out about it.

And again I say: and even the conversion system itself—no one ever claimed there was no acceptance of commandments there. No one made that claim. Afterward came people who wanted to say: come on, everybody, as Rabbi Brandes wrote in an article in Akdamot, these are “wink conversions.” Everyone knows that when I say “acceptance of commandments” in the end it means nothing, but you have to do it so they’ll accept me as a Jew. I have a friend who is married to or living with a gentile woman, and he too was looking for some route. He said to me, “Yes, I know that in that court and such-and-such, if she goes and says what she’s supposed to say, they’ll accept her.” Meaning, these guys pass information around and they know how the game works. Okay, fine—not important. I started saying something and lost the thread.

In any case, I’m saying the rule that “matters in the heart are not legally significant” definitely shifts the burden of proof onto the one who comes to invalidate. And whoever comes to invalidate has to prove that the intention was not for conversion. After the court has already ruled that the person is Jewish, if you want to invalidate that, you have to prove that there was no intention to accept commandments. That is much harder to do. To prove that there is acceptance of commandments—that is what the court has to check. But to prove that there was no intention to accept commandments—even if you think there is such a presumption, or that it is a high percentage—that is not enough to overturn a judicial act.

And that is one of the reasons why in the ruling of the judge from Ashdod, and afterward Rabbi Sherman, which stirred up this whole controversy, they basically invalidated all the conversions wholesale, because they claimed the judges were wicked. That is the best way to invalidate all the conversions, because try proving that each individual did not intend to accept commandments and so on. Judges who accept converts in such a wholesale fashion are wicked; therefore it is not a religious court. If it is not a religious court, then the conversion was not done before a court, and therefore all the conversions are void. Afterward Rabbi Amar voided the voiding. But that is what they said there, because in truth it is hard to prove.

And now the next point—and here I come to the last part in our route—and that is the question of voiding conversion after the fact. Until now we discussed what is needed in order to convert. Now the question is: voiding conversion after the fact. Here indeed the question arises: a convert, after completing the process, goes back to behaving as he did before. He did nothing. Does that cast the conversion in a different light? Right—so the question is whether that voids the conversion or shows that the conversion was not serious, or not. And here there are all kinds of disagreements among halakhic decisors. Is it just that he doesn’t observe, or say he goes on going to church? Even that—anything. There are all kinds of degrees. That is where all the arguments really are: how much exactly does he need to do for us to understand that the whole thing was not serious.

On this matter one has to distinguish between two situations. One situation is where a convert who converted begins to commit transgressions. If he commits transgressions, he’s like any other Jew—fine, what can you do, no one is deluding himself—so he is still a Jew. The moment he starts talking during the prayer service we know he is a righteous convert, and so on. The point, yes, is that there can be a Jewish thief, just as Herzl dreamed there would be a Jewish thief and a Jewish policeman and so on. So the point is: when does he really cast off the whole yoke, even go to church? Even there it isn’t simple. Why? Because in order to void the conversion, you have to infer from what he is doing now that at the time he converted he did not seriously intend it. Now there is always the possibility that he did intend it seriously, and afterward his inclination overpowered him, or he changed his mind—which can also happen to Jews. And they do not stop being Jews because of that. At the time that… Yes, exactly. So that does not make them stop being Jews, and therefore he too is a sinful Jew, but that does not void his conversion.

So the question always—the focal point of the question, and this must be understood because in the arguments they always mix these things up—the focal point of the question is not how many transgressions he commits. That by itself does not matter at all. The question is: when have I become convinced that from the outset this was not his intention? And pay close attention: “become convinced” means to be certain. Because after there has already been an act of a court, where the court converted him, in order to overturn a judicial act the burden of proof passes to the one overturning it. You have to show with certainty that the man did not intend to accept commandments.

I once gave an example—I said I’d bring it—that Rabbi Katz told me. He once sat on a conversion court. On Friday they converted some convert, and that same evening, it turned out to them later, it turned out that that Friday night he held a wedding party in a hall with an orchestra, invited friends and guests and so on, on Friday night, with Sabbath desecration obviously and all the rest. They voided his conversion. Why? Because a wedding does not get born on Friday afternoon. Meaning, if he booked a hall and an orchestra and planned everything, that was planned before the conversion; the conversion was that same morning. So because of that—my friend always says he doesn’t understand why they celebrate a bar mitzvah for a secular boy; they should mourn. The poor kid is now going to start getting hit. From now on he is responsible for his actions. So he celebrates the fact that he is now going to get hit. So here too, same thing. The point is that here they had clear and unequivocal evidence that at the very stage of accepting commandments he did not really intend to accept the commandments. So the conversion is void. That is clear. There is no argument about that. Maybe he intended it, he just didn’t know the laws of the Sabbath. Yes, that’s possible.

In any case, the claim that there is no such thing as voiding conversion after the fact is absurd, even though quite a few important halakhic decisors say it. It is simply an absurd claim. Nonsense. It is nonsense. Of course it can be voided. True, in order to void a conversion you need specific evidence about that particular person that at the time he converted he did not seriously intend it. For example, what I wrote there in the article was that in my view there is a presumption that the convert does not intend to accept commandments, and whoever claims otherwise bears the burden of proof. So the presumption has flipped. But on the other hand I also wrote in that same article that if a court whose policy I do not accept accepted his conversion—and of course I do not think they are wicked, they have a policy, they think differently from me—then of course they are foolish but not wicked. So I say: if they accepted the conversion and the court is in my eyes a valid court, then in order for me to void it, it is not enough that there is a presumption that the convert does not intend to accept commandments. I need to see, regarding this specific convert, evidence that he did not intend it at the time of conversion. That is very hard to do except in severe cases. And therefore I claim that for all the stringency I wrote there, clearly that is not enough to void almost any conversion, except cases where he said before witnesses beforehand, “Come on, I’m going to fool them,” or I don’t know, all sorts of things of that sort. Otherwise, in practice, you really cannot void conversion after the fact. But it is not true that you cannot in principle. Meaning, it is not the case that once he is a convert, nothing can follow a judicial act. There are many who claim that. There are—I’ll perhaps bring two examples.

What is the practical significance of his ceasing to be Jewish? What? What is the practical significance? Marriage betrothal is not betrothal; if it’s a woman, then her children are gentiles. What do you mean? There are many implications. So he was in-between too? He was a gentile. He was never Jewish at all. It is voiding a transaction, like voiding a sale, like betrothal on condition, like… It’s as if it never was. It’s what is called an implied condition.

I’ll give you an example of how far this dispute goes. There was a conference at Bar-Ilan during that period of the Rabbi Sherman controversy and that whole dispute. There was a conference at Bar-Ilan on conversion. And it was one of the things that caused me to write the article, because of course there was a consensus choir there where everyone explained that this was all nonsense and it was a wonderful conversion system and Rabbi Sherman was anti-Semitic and all kinds of things of that type. And it really irritated me—especially this uniformity of opinion that suddenly appears in academia, which is supposed to be more open and hear other views. There everyone—really all these ignoramuses—explained to everyone how conversion should be. So I took things that Rabbi Dichovsky said there. Rabbi Dichovsky is on the lenient side regarding conversion as well. What? Not a fool. No, he’s not a fool. He said foolish things; he is not a fool.

So he said there—his claim was that you cannot void conversion at all. Nothing, in principle. You cannot void conversion. He brought the Maimonides that everyone brings, chapter 13 of the laws of forbidden relations, halakhah 17: “A convert who was not investigated, or who was not informed of the commandments and their punishment, and was circumcised and immersed before three laymen—he is a convert.” Fine. Up to here, he says that informing him of the commandments is not indispensable. Not even a court? Not even a formal court—laymen. Yes. “And even if it becomes known that he converted for some ulterior matter”—marriage conversion or something like that—“since he was circumcised and immersed, he has left the category of gentiles, and we are concerned about him until his righteousness becomes clear. And even if he goes back and worships idolatry, he is like an apostate Jew whose betrothal is valid.” Meaning, he does not go back to being a gentile, even if he worships idolatry. “And there is a commandment to return his lost object, since once he immersed he became like a Jew,” and so on.

So that is the proof always quoted from Maimonides that there is no such thing as voiding conversion after the fact. First of all, it is no proof. It is no proof because what is written here—“we are concerned about him until his righteousness becomes clear”—it is written in this very halakhah itself; in a moment I’ll also read the surrounding halakhot. “We are concerned about him until his righteousness becomes clear.” Why are you concerned? If nothing can follow a judicial act, and matters in the heart are not legally significant, then you are not concerned about him, and his righteousness doesn’t need to become clear, and nothing of the sort. He is Jewish and that’s it. Maybe not regarding his Jewishness but regarding his presumption as a decent person? Maybe not regarding his Jewishness, but whether he’s a decent person? He says: a decent person—his betrothal is valid even if he worshipped idolatry. So what? I don’t understand the meaning of “we are concerned about him until his righteousness becomes clear.”

So I’m saying: we are concerned about him because if it turns out that… wait, for example—so I’ll explain. This is exactly the point: there is a contradiction between the two parts of this very halakhah that everyone quotes. There is a contradiction between the two parts. After all, even if he worships idolatry, he is Jewish—so what is “until his righteousness becomes clear”? How can his righteousness become clear if even if he goes to church it still doesn’t become clear? So how can it become clear? The point is this: when he converts, what you need to know is what his intention was at the time of conversion, not what he does afterward. Now I’m saying that if it becomes clear to you that at the stage of conversion there is no indication that he did not intend it, then he is a perfectly valid Jew, and even if afterward he goes and worships idolatry, that does not void the conversion retroactively; it only means he is an apostate Jew. You can also see this from the wording here: “even if he went back and worshipped idolatry.” It doesn’t say he continued—not continued in idolatry… No, “went back,” yes, returned to his gentile behavior. Right. Which means clearly Maimonides means exactly not that. Maimonides says “we are concerned about him,” which means that if there really was no sincere intention, and if it becomes clear to us—as in Rabbi Katz’s case—that at the time of the conversion he did not intend it, then clearly it is void. Only, it has to become clear to you that it was so at the time of conversion, not just that afterward he acts a certain way. Afterward he is an apostate Jew. That is what Maimonides writes here. He is simply saying what everyone says; there is nothing beyond that here.

Maybe when Maimonides says “we are concerned about him until his righteousness becomes clear,” he means that after he does all these acts and we see at the first stage that he is not going in the right path, then after the fact we investigate what had been before? That can’t be. I’m saying: if after the conversion he doesn’t do that, but really behaves okay, and afterward he goes back and worships idolatry, then he is just an apostate Jew. But the whole concept of “we are concerned about him”—also in the previous halakhot he says, I’ll read it all so that we can be…

“Do not let it enter your mind that Samson, the savior of Israel, or Solomon, king of Israel, who was called Yedidya, married foreign women while they were still gentiles.” That was halakhah 14; I’m starting from 14 because this is the whole sequence. “Rather the secret of the matter is this: the correct commandment is that when the convert, male or female, comes to convert, we investigate him lest he be coming because of money he will take, or because of authority he will gain, or because of fear, to enter the religion. And if he is a man, we investigate lest he has set his eyes on a Jewish woman, and if a woman, lest she has set her eyes on one of the young Jewish men. If no such motive is found in them, we inform them of the weight of the yoke of the Torah and the burden involved in its observance for the unlearned masses”—because for Torah scholars, of course, it’s no burden for them—“so that they may withdraw. If they accepted and did not withdraw, and we saw that they returned out of love, we accept them, as it says: ‘And she saw that she was determined to go with her, and she stopped speaking to her.’”

So what is he saying? Here Maimonides gives the criteria for when we ideally accept them. Ideally, we accept them only if they are not coming for some ulterior matter. That is clear. On the other hand, after the fact we accept them in any case. That too is clear. Now, that is halakhah 14. Halakhah 15: “Therefore the courts did not accept converts all the days of David and Solomon. In the days of David, lest they had turned because of fear. In the days of Solomon, lest it was because of the kingship and the great good that Israel had”—which is really parallel to today—“because of the great good that Israel had they wanted to enjoy the flourishing Jewish kingdom, and had turned for that reason. For anyone who turns from among the gentiles for some worldly matter is not one of the righteous converts. Nevertheless, there were many converts who converted in the days of David and Solomon before laymen, and the Great Court was concerned about them. They did not reject them after they immersed, but neither did they draw them near until their end would be seen.” Again, I remind you about checking their righteousness. What does it mean not to draw them near and to be concerned about them? We are basically trying to cause them either to leave or to see what happens—simply because, after all, in order to void a conversion, once a conversion has taken place, you need clear evidence. But meanwhile you have concern that they are doing it for other reasons. So you can’t know, but he says: you are concerned—a kind of doubt. Maimonides is not saying there is no such thing as voiding. Rather, if their end reveals that from the outset they did not intend it, then they are indeed gentiles. That is written in Maimonides.

And then this halakhah appears: “And because Solomon converted women and married them, and similarly Samson converted and married, and it is known that these women turned only for some ulterior matter, and were not converted by the authority of a religious court, Scripture regarded them as though they were gentile women and remained in their prohibition.” Even though they were only possibly gentile women, Maimonides says—but Scripture called them gentile women. Yet they were only possibly gentile women. Maimonides does not say that you cannot void conversion. Only that in order to void it you need clear evidence. Doubts cannot turn a Jew back into a gentile. If you are in doubt—you need clear evidence. Ideally you need clear evidence that he really wants to convert. After the fact, in order to void it, you need clear evidence that he didn’t. Melamed Leho’il takes this in a very extreme direction, but that doesn’t matter now. The principle is agreed upon by all the halakhic decisors. All the proofs brought from all directions are simply misunderstanding. Everyone is saying one thing. There is no disagreement about anything here. There may be disagreement about dosage, about the dosage, yes—nothing more than that. The basic scheme is agreed upon by all. Whoever does not understand that is simply mistaken.

“And moreover, their end proved their beginning, for they worshipped idolatry and built high places for themselves, and Scripture treated it as though he had built them,” and so on. Meaning, from here he learned that even if afterward they go back and worship idolatry, we still cannot void the conversion. But clearly that is only because at the stage of conversion we have no evidence that they did not seriously intend it. But from within his own words it is clear that if we had evidence—it’s just that in reality it is very remote. How could we have evidence about the stage of conversion? After all, anything afterward you can always attribute to the fact that only later he reverted. Maybe two witnesses will come and say that beforehand he told us, “I’m going to fool the court,” or like the case we discussed earlier. So we said that at that level, yes, it’s really hypothetical. It is more relevant to accepting converts initially. But to void the conversion, you need clear contrary evidence.

I’ll maybe finish with the remarks I started with about Bar-Ilan. At that Bar-Ilan event, one of the speakers was Rabbi Dichovsky. And Rabbi Dichovsky also said there in a very forceful and clear way: you cannot void conversions. Period. You cannot void conversions in principle. Okay? And he brought two proofs for this. By the way, these things are written in his book; he said it in other places too. I just happened to hear it from him there at the conference.

He brought two proofs, and neither of them gets off the ground at all. They are simply unrelated. Really—with all due respect—completely unrelated. It shows so clearly how biased people are when they think about this subject, that the discussion is conducted in a way—I don’t know—it’s not just that he doesn’t know; what I said before is obvious. But I’ll tell you the proofs.

He brought two proofs. One proof is Maimonides in chapter 20 or chapter 24 of the laws of the Sanhedrin. Maimonides writes that in capital cases we do not rely on circumstantial evidence. Meaning, if one person runs after another with a knife and enters a ruin, and there is nothing else there, no one else was there, the ruin was empty, he comes out with the knife dripping blood, you enter the ruin and see that the person is dead—you cannot convict him of murder because you did not see it; there are not two witnesses to the murder. According to Maimonides you need two witnesses. By the way, Tosafot disagrees with him. Tosafot claims that clear proof, clear circumstantial proof, is sufficient even in capital cases. But Maimonides says no, only testimony. Fine?

Incidentally, one should know that testimony and clear proof and circumstantial proof do not stand in any clear hierarchy. Sometimes circumstantial proof of this sort is very strong proof—much better than two witnesses. Fine, witnesses have a presumption of reliability, but concerns always exist. So when we say “circumstantial proof,” that doesn’t mean weaker proof; it’s a question of the type of proof. Not direct proof, but rather we infer it from the circumstances. Therefore Maimonides says in capital cases it is not accepted. In monetary cases, the judge may follow where his understanding inclines. That’s chapter 20 and chapter 24 in the laws of the Sanhedrin.

That is the first proof Rabbi Dichovsky brings. What? I don’t even know where to begin. What does this have to do with us? The fact that in capital cases there is some clear evidence but we do not follow circumstantial indications and instead require testimony—does that mean that matters in the heart are legally significant? What does that mean? Does it mean that if the convert converted and the court performed the act, and afterward it becomes clear to us retroactively that he did not intend it—becomes clear to us not by testimony but by clear proof—then what? In monetary law and every other field we accept that; only in capital law there is a scriptural decree that only witnesses count. And this has nothing to do with the strength of the proof, only with the type of proof. But that is in capital cases. What does it have to do with conversion? Even if it had been similar—which it isn’t at all—but even if it were similar, it is said in a special law specifically about capital cases. What does that have to do with conversion? And not only that—if in capital cases one can also judge with laymen today, as in conversion? Tosafot said one can judge with laymen in conversion based on “they act as our agents”; can you also judge capital cases that way? I don’t understand this comparison.

And not only that, but he says: so does he agree that there is a case where there are witnesses who saw him desecrating the Sabbath at that very moment during the conversion itself, that he was doing something, I don’t know, committing a transgression in the middle? Yes, that could be. But then there simply is no acceptance of commandments. That’s not after the fact. I’m talking about a situation where the court accepted him, and now something becomes clear after the fact. What do we do then? No, no, clearly, after the fact. He says the proofs—say he goes to worship idolatry. So he says that is only circumstantial proof that he did not intend to accept commandments. I say no, that is not even circumstantial proof; it is no proof at all, because he could be an apostate Jew. You need clear proof. If you have clear proof, even if it is circumstantial, that is good enough. But the Maimonides you quoted before—both of them were at the time of the conversion itself, or not in the conversion itself, or on the side of laymen. Maimonides isn’t talking about if a proper court converts them, okay? So as a starting point that makes no difference. What difference does it make? No, maybe if there is a court of converts that converts them… But a court of laymen is also a court, okay? A court of laymen is also a court. So maybe they acted rashly and judged when they shouldn’t have, but it is still a court; otherwise it wouldn’t be a conversion at all. Then it is simply not a conversion, and it has nothing to do with these concerns. What concerns? A court of laymen, because he says a regular court would not have accepted them at all. Ideally we don’t accept them; laymen accepted them because they don’t understand. But he has no issue with the validity of the conversion itself.

The second proof he brought: there is a Nachmanides who says that when a woman wore—when a woman was menstruating in their times she would wear a special garment for women who were in that state. Fine? But on the other hand it says in the Talmud that a woman is believed to say about herself whether she is impure or pure. That’s where Tosafot derives the rule that one witness is believed regarding prohibitions. So he says: what happens if a woman says she is pure but is walking around in the garment of a menstruant? Then Nachmanides says we follow the garment, not what she said. Again, a kind of thing where the clear external evidence shows you the truth, and you don’t pay attention to statements that may not reflect it correctly. He brought this from the Ben Ish Hai, who says that afterward the woman even recites a blessing over immersion, even though she is pure and does not need to immerse at all. That is truly completely absurd—after all, to recite a blessing? She herself says she does not need immersion, so how can you obligate her to bless when according to her own view that blessing would be in vain? There is no such thing. But fine, never mind, I’m now talking about Nachmanides, not the Ben Ish Hai.

What proof is that for us? What does that have to do with us? There are two things there: one is her clothes and one is the credibility of a single witness. And the whole question is okay, which proof is stronger? What does that have to do with us? Why is that proof for us? That’s what I’m saying—I asked people around me just to make sure I hadn’t missed something. Everyone told me it is completely absurd. It didn’t get much of an answer. No, maybe there is something here about circumstantial proof, because how do you really void a conversion according to your view? For example, if he says out loud, “I’m going to worship an idol.” Now he is testifying about himself; that is similar to a woman testifying about herself. Whereas there is an act, like her wearing the garment, and he goes and converts. In comparing the two, even if you make that comparison, I don’t accept it. Because when he converted before the court, that does not contradict in any way his lack of intention. After all, he says, “I’m going to worship an idol.” So clearly the fact that he stood before a court proves nothing. Wait—the whole question is what he did when he stood before the court; what would be parallel to that? If the woman says, “Friends, I’m pure—I’m wearing this garment because of a hundred-dollar bet,” okay? Then that would be similar. Because then you cannot bring me proof from the fact that she is wearing the garment when she tells you in advance she is wearing it for some side reason. But here the wearing of the garment really does testify. Here our question is whether his standing before the court was serious or not—that is the question. So what are you telling me, that he stood before the court? I’m asking whether it was serious or not. Okay, so that just shows how biased the discussion here is.