Talmud, Yoma Chapter 8 – Lesson 5

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So with an oath: I’m not already sworn on this, so an oath can take effect on that matter; I’m not already under an oath and standing with regard to that. Maimonides goes one step further in the second root and argues that if the thing is not written in the Torah, then it is also not Torah-level. Maimonides takes the term “Torah-level” literally: Torah-level means from the Torah, meaning whatever is written in the Torah is called Torah-level. He identifies the question of source with the question of force. If the source is something written in the Torah, then its force is Torah-level. If something is not written in the Torah, even if it emerges from exposition, then its force is not Torah-level. From Maimonides’ perspective there is no difference between the question of source and the question of force. But all the medieval authorities disagree with Maimonides on this point, and also the Ran—there’s no reason to assume he doesn’t disagree with Maimonides. The Ran claims that in terms of force, something derived through exposition is Torah-level, but still, in terms of source, it is not written in the Torah, and therefore if I swear about it, the oath takes effect, because I am not already sworn and standing on that thing. That is the novelty that is basically written in this direction of the Ran. Rabbi, does this fit with our passage in Yoma? Not yet—we’ll see in a moment. For now I’m only talking about the passage in Shevuot. One more note before I move to our passage: in the Mishneh LaMelekh there, because I brought the Kesef Mishneh and I brought the Radbaz, the Mishneh LaMelekh there attacks—not attacks, but questions—the point that from the Radbaz’s perspective seemed self-evident, namely that one is not already sworn regarding a half-measure. The Mishneh LaMelekh says: “The writer said: see what the author wrote above, and in the responsum of Maharshal, part 1, he took it as obvious that an oath takes effect on a rabbinic prohibition, and the author wrote there as follows,” and so on. “The Ran wrote in a responsum that one who swears to violate a rabbinic enactment through positive action is not compelled to fulfill it, for the sages treated their words like Torah law in passive omission.” End quote. And see the words of the Maggid Mishneh in chapter 4 of the laws of lender and borrower. So he says: it is not correct what the Radbaz assumes as obvious, that an oath takes effect on rabbinic prohibitions. The Radbaz, after all, brought proof from that point that even though the prohibition is Torah-level, if it is not explicit in the Torah, an oath takes effect on it. What was his proof? From the fact that an oath takes effect on rabbinic prohibitions. In other words, he assumes as obvious that an oath takes effect on rabbinic prohibitions. Apparently his source is from our passage, from what Reish Lakish says—that for a rabbinic prohibition an oath does take effect. Says the Mishneh LaMelekh: that is a dispute among medieval authorities, among early halakhic decisors. Not everyone agrees that an oath takes effect on a rabbinic prohibition. What do they do with our passage? What I said earlier. It is true that Reish Lakish says that an oath takes effect on a rabbinic prohibition, but Rabbi Yohanan does not necessarily agree with that. On the contrary, from the flow of the passage it sounds like Rabbi Yohanan disagrees. That is why he attacks Reish Lakish. Reish Lakish, as an answer, says: “What do you want? For a rabbinic prohibition an oath does take effect.” But the moment Rabbi Yohanan hears that according to Reish Lakish there is a rabbinic prohibition, he immediately attacks him: “So how can an oath take effect on that?” Meaning, he assumes that an oath does not take effect even on a rabbinic prohibition. And if we rule in Jewish law like Rabbi Yohanan, then in practice an oath does not take effect on rabbinic prohibitions. So the dispute the Mishneh LaMelekh brings is apparently a dispute about how to interpret the conclusion of our passage according to Rabbi Yohanan. Does Rabbi Yohanan agree to Reish Lakish’s answer, that an oath takes effect on a rabbinic prohibition, or does Rabbi Yohanan stick to his view, and Reish Lakish answered only because he had been cornered, pushed into a corner? But Rabbi Yohanan remains with the simple assumption that even regarding a prohibition—a rabbinic prohibition—an oath does not take effect. And if so, then in practice, since we rule like Rabbi Yohanan, that is the law: an oath does not take effect on a rabbinic prohibition. The Radbaz learned it one way; the Mishneh LaMelekh brings in the name of the Ran that not so. And notice, this is the same Ran who says that on something not written in the Torah an oath does take effect, and the Ran says that on rabbinic law an oath does not take effect. It is the same Ran—the Mishneh LaMelekh brings that Ran. And that is very strange, because the Radbaz derives his strength from there, right, derives his strength from there—that is where he brings the proof. The Ran himself, who stated the principle you are trying to establish, says that on rabbinic prohibitions an oath does not take effect. For the Ran, when it says “do not turn aside,” that counts as something explicitly written in the Torah, whereas things derived through exposition are not explicit in the Torah. In any event, there is no proof from our passage that on something learned through exposition an oath takes effect. That we do not see from our passage; you cannot prove that from our passage. On the contrary, our passage speaks only about rabbinic law, not about something that comes out of exposition. Our passage seems the opposite—we’ll see in a moment. As I said, I still haven’t gotten to our passage; I’ve only gotten to a note on the conclusion of our passage regarding rabbinic prohibitions. I still haven’t spoken about whether a half-measure is Torah-level; we’ll get there in a moment—that’s the next step. Okay, but as for rabbinic prohibitions, I said that according to Reish Lakish an oath does take effect on rabbinic prohibitions; according to Rabbi Yohanan that is an open question. In fact, I would say, if you asked me, that the plain meaning of the Talmudic text is that according to Rabbi Yohanan an oath does not take effect on a rabbinic prohibition. That is why he attacks Reish Lakish. There is no reason at all to assume Rabbi Yohanan changed his mind from what he thought in the attack. Reish Lakish has to come up with answers because he is in distress—he was attacked—but Rabbi Yohanan, that is what he assumed, and there is no reason to say he changed his mind. Why would he change his mind? He attacked Reish Lakish. Okay? So therefore—but I’m saying beyond what happens in our passage—within our passage you can manage, you can say that after Reish Lakish answered, Rabbi Yohanan agreed too. But in the Ran himself there is apparently a contradiction, because the Radbaz brings proof from the fact that an oath takes effect on a rabbinic prohibition to his principle that an oath takes effect on things not explicit in the Torah even if they are Torah-level. But the father of that principle is the Ran, and the Ran himself, regarding rabbinic prohibitions, the Mishneh LaMelekh brings that he claims an oath does not take effect on rabbinic prohibitions. Apparently the Ran understands—and here the Radbaz probably does not agree—but the Ran understands that rabbinic prohibitions count as prohibitions explicitly written in the Torah, because it says “do not turn aside.” So what about prohibitions written through exposition, that come out of exposition? This is very interesting. I’ll jump ahead a little. There is a Minchat Chinukh. The Minchat Chinukh wants to argue that if there is a sick person who must be fed forbidden foods, it is preferable to give him a prohibition explicitly written in the Torah rather than a prohibition derived by exposition. Why? Because a prohibition derived by exposition has both “do not turn aside” and the prohibition itself, so it is more severe than a prohibition explicitly written in the Torah. That is what he wants to claim, and in my view it is unfounded, because I think he misunderstands the concept of “do not turn aside.” The concept of “do not turn aside,” when it refers—or let me add one more thing first—Maimonides and Nachmanides, as is known, disagree in Maimonides’ first root and in Nachmanides’ objections there, and Maimonides also at the beginning of the laws of rebels. Maimonides says that the force of rabbinic prohibitions is rooted in the verse “do not turn aside.” Because the Torah commands “do not turn aside,” therefore we are commanded to obey the sages and not eat poultry with milk and similar rabbinic laws. Nachmanides attacks Maimonides, because according to Maimonides it comes out that every rabbinic prohibition is really a Torah prohibition, because the moment you ate poultry with milk you violated “do not turn aside,” which is a Torah-level prohibition. Therefore Nachmanides says it cannot be that rabbinic prohibitions are based on—or that their force is based on—the prohibition of “do not turn aside.” So what is written in the prohibition of “do not turn aside”? That is one question. And where does the obligation to obey rabbinic prohibitions come from? That is another question according to Nachmanides. Regarding the prohibition of “do not turn aside,” Nachmanides himself says—he does not answer the second question, but on the first question he says—that “do not turn aside” speaks about the sages’ authority to expound and interpret, not to legislate. What is the difference between a rabbinic prohibition and a Torah prohibition? People think that the difference is chronological: that a rabbinic prohibition is one that arose later in history, whereas a Torah prohibition is something given at Sinai, and the matter is chronological. And that is a big mistake, of course. There are Torah prohibitions that arose later in history, and they are Torah-level in every respect according to all opinions. And there are rabbinic prohibitions that already arose at Mount Sinai; there are rabbinic prohibitions attributed to Moses our teacher. Rabbinic commandments, rabbinic prohibitions. Chronology does not determine it. What does determine it? The difference lies in the question of how the sages act. If the sages act as legislators, it is a rabbinic prohibition. If the sages act as interpreters, it is a Torah prohibition. When the sages determine that this is the correct interpretation of a verse, or that this is the binding interpretation of a verse, although they determined it, it may be that this is not the true meaning, maybe the verse does not say that, maybe I disagree with them—but “do not turn aside” tells me I must accept their interpretation. Now once I have accepted their interpretation, then for me that is what is written in the verse. Why do I observe it? I observe it because of the command of the verse, not because the sages said so. The sages are only the ones who revealed to me that this is what the verse says. In other words, here the sages are functioning as interpreters, not as legislators. In the end I fulfill the command because that is what the verse commands. Even if I do not agree, the sages determine that this is what the verse commands. By contrast, when the sages legislate—for example the prohibition of poultry with milk—that is legislation by the sages. They did not interpret that in the verse; they established a new prohibition that they innovated. That is authority. According to that, chronology does determine it. What do you mean? Because in the end, in every case where they are interpreters, the prohibition really always existed; we just may not have known about it. Fine, but that is indirect. No, that is a good sign. It covers one hundred percent of the cases. Do you have a prohibition that started later and is Torah-level? No. So that is an empty category. Okay. Chronology here is just an indication, an empty word. The criterion is not chronology. True, we received the Torah at Sinai, but chronology is a useless criterion, an empty criterion. In the end you need to decide whether it is Torah-level or rabbinic according to the mode of action of the sages, not according to chronology. The result is the chronological result. After I understand that the sages worked as interpreters, you can tell me, “Fine, so they revealed to me that this prohibition already existed at Sinai,” but that is a result; it is not a criterion that helps me. Why not say that? It is useful. I think it is useful because sometimes, for example, if the sages say something that is a new prohibition, then I no longer need to look for anything; it is obvious to me that it is a rabbinic prohibition. I do not need to know whether here they acted as interpreters. You do not need to know because they did not act that way. If they acted as legislators and not as interpreters, they told you that the prohibition is new. No, no, they do not need to say they innovated it. If it was not prohibited before and now it is prohibited, then I know it is rabbinic. In other words, translated into plain speech, that means “we innovated this.” What do you mean? Not true. No? Yes. No. It could have become new on its own. What does “become new on its own” mean? Until now it was not prohibited, and now it is prohibited because we agreed to it. Fine, that does not mean we… well. Of course it does; those are just words. More than that, Maimonides explicitly says that the sages must say so, otherwise it is “do not add.” Fine, but on the contrary, certainly there are prohibitions that once existed and then ended, right? Temporarily, as it says. Fine, those are not prohibitions that enter Jewish law at all. Fine, but they exist. They are Torah prohibitions, just temporary ones. By the same token, seemingly there could have been the reverse. Maimonides in the thirteenth root says they are not Torah prohibitions. They are things that the Holy One, blessed be He, did, like when He told Moses to place manna in a jar, or gave a specific instruction to some local person. That does not enter the halakhic definitions at all of Torah-level or not Torah-level. It is something else entirely. What, the prohibition against touching Mount Sinai is not a Torah prohibition? No. No. That is what Maimonides says in the thirteenth root; look there. He means that it is not counted in the count of commandments. Because it is not Torah-level. According to Maimonides, yes? Yes. So that is not called… What do you mean not Torah-level? One who violated it is liable to death, and it is also explicitly written in the Torah. What more do you want than that? Ah—but since it was not stated for all generations, it is not Torah-level; it does not enter the halakhic definition at all. It is not treated in a halakhic category. Fine, but let’s leave that, we will not get cornered there. In any case, for our purposes, what I want to say is that Maimonides and Nachmanides disagree over what we learn from “do not turn aside.” According to Maimonides, “do not turn aside” teaches me both the authority of the sages to legislate and their authority to interpret. For me at the moment, interpreting and expounding are the same thing. According to Nachmanides, “do not turn aside” teaches me only their authority to interpret and expound, not their authority to legislate. Because if it taught me their authority to legislate, then every rabbinic law would become a Torah law. Things that emerge from expositions really are Torah-level, so there there is no problem. There I can hang it on “do not turn aside.” So it comes out that according to everyone, the authority to interpret comes from “do not turn aside.” There is a dispute about the authority to legislate: according to Maimonides it comes from “do not turn aside,” and according to Nachmanides it does not. If so, then what is written here? How can the Ran say that a rabbinic prohibition is explicitly written in the Torah because it says “do not turn aside,” but a prohibition that comes out of exposition is not explicitly written in the Torah? What do you mean? After all, it comes from “do not turn aside.” Everyone agrees that something derived by exposition comes from “do not turn aside.” The whole dispute of Nachmanides against Maimonides is only about rabbinic laws. As for laws derived from exposition, according to everyone they come from “do not turn aside.” So how can we understand this Ran? The answer is: because the Minchat Chinukh I mentioned earlier is mistaken. Because both Maimonides and Nachmanides, who learn the authority to interpret and expound the Torah from “do not turn aside,” understand that “do not turn aside” does not function in the same way there as it functions regarding rabbinic prohibitions. Regarding rabbinic prohibitions, to explain it simply for the moment—and later I’ll qualify it—if I ate poultry with milk, I violated the Torah-level prohibition of “do not turn aside.” Therefore eating poultry with milk is a prohibition explicitly written in the Torah. At least that is what those who say so would say; there are those who disagree, but we’ll discuss that further, and that is what, say, the Ran would say. Therefore he says an oath does not take effect on that. What happens with laws derived by exposition? With laws derived by exposition, after the sages expounded, and by force of “do not turn aside” I accepted their exposition even though I myself perhaps do not agree with it—so now I know that there is a certain prohibition learned through exposition. Now when I ask myself what the source of that prohibition is, what I violate if I transgress that prohibition, the answer is: not “do not turn aside.” I violate the prohibition itself. “Do not turn aside” is only the authority given to the sages to interpret the Torah. After they interpreted the Torah, the prohibition derives from the verse, not from “do not turn aside.” The sages included the membranes, or whatever it is, what Maimonides brought in forbidden foods. Okay, so you tell me, fine, the sages expounded the membranes, and because of “do not turn aside” I must accept what they say, that in the verse the membranes are included as well. Fine. Now when I eat those membranes of an impure animal, what did I violate? “Do not turn aside”? No. I violate “do not turn aside” only where I refuse in principle to accept the sages’ authority to interpret. But if I accept their authority and yet commit the transgression, then like any transgression written explicitly in the Torah, there I violated the prohibition of membranes, not the prohibition of “do not turn aside.” And therefore the Minchat Chinukh is wrong to say that it is preferable to give the sick person a prohibition explicit in the Torah rather than one not explicit in the Torah. In my opinion that is nonsense. A prohibition not explicit in the Torah—if you transgress it, you did not violate “do not turn aside”; you violated the non-explicit Torah prohibition itself. And it is either lighter than an explicit Torah prohibition, or equal to it, or lighter—but certainly not more severe. “Do not turn aside” is not an added prohibition. “Do not turn aside” is a revelation that tells me that if the sages expounded or interpreted the Torah this way, then for me that is what is written there, and therefore I must obey. But I obey because it is written in the verse, not because the sages said so. “Do not turn aside” is only a revelation here. In rabbinic commandments, “do not turn aside” is the source. In commandments that emerge from exposition, “do not turn aside” is a revelation, but the prohibition is a prohibition because it is written in the Torah, not because there is a prohibition of “do not turn aside.” A practical difference, for example, for someone who says that “do not turn aside” is a prohibition on the person, like Netivot—maybe we’ll get to him later—here it would be a prohibition on the object, a prohibition written in the Torah. The sages only revealed to me that it is written in the Torah. So after they revealed it, it is written in the Torah. Therefore the Minchat Chinukh is wrong, and this Ran is excellent proof for the matter. Because what does the Ran tell me? That when something is learned through exposition, then it is not explicitly written in the Torah, and an oath takes effect on it. The same Ran himself says that a rabbinic law is one on which an oath does not take effect; it is considered as though it is explicitly written in the Torah. Why? Is that better than exposition? They both emerge from “do not turn aside.” No, because a rabbinic law is explicitly written in the Torah in “do not turn aside.” If I ate poultry with milk, I did not violate a prohibition of poultry with milk according to this Ran; I violated—there is no such thing as a prohibition of poultry with milk—what I violated is “do not turn aside.” I violated “do not turn aside,” and the prohibition of “do not turn aside” is explicitly written in the Torah. Think, for example, if I vowed not to eat bread and then I ate bread—did I violate a prohibition explicitly written in the Torah? Of course: “he shall not break his word.” But it does not say bread there; it says whatever you vow. You vow about bread, you vow not to use chairs, you vow whatever, to stand on one foot—whatever you want. That is an oath, it does not matter, yes. You vow abstention from meat, whatever it may be. The Torah does not explicitly say bread there, and it does not need to. It says that whatever you vow, “he shall not break his word.” What you happened to vow about was bread. You ate the bread? You violated “he shall not break his word”; you did not violate a prohibition of eating bread. Right? “Do not turn aside” works the same way. “Do not turn aside” says: whatever the sages prohibit is prohibited to you. The sages can vow in your place, vow on your behalf. So the sages say this is forbidden. The moment they forbid it, when I ate poultry with milk, there is no such thing as a prohibition of poultry with milk; the prohibition I violated is “do not turn aside,” just like “he shall not break his word.” That is how the Ran understands it. Therefore an oath does not take effect on it. It is a Torah-level prohibition, just as an oath does not take effect on a vow, on a vow prohibition. Now, an oath on a vow is another issue actually—maybe object and person, in tractate Nedarim page 15 there is a whole discussion about it. But in principle, all that is in rabbinic commandments. Torah commandments, if they emerge from exposition, then there the prohibition is not explicit in the Torah. Because the prohibition is not “do not turn aside”; “do not turn aside” is only the revelation that the sages have authority to interpret. After they interpreted, then I understand that there is a prohibition of membranes that comes out of the Torah, not that it is written in the Torah. That prohibition is not explicit in the Torah, but its source is that exposition the sages made. When I transgressed that prohibition, I transgressed the prohibition of membranes, not the prohibition of “do not turn aside.” And that prohibition is not explicit in the Torah, and therefore the Ran says an oath does take effect on it. Consequently there is no proof for what the Radbaz says. The Radbaz wants to bring proof for his interpretation of Maimonides that an oath takes effect on a half-measure, because a half-measure is not explicit in the Torah. And the proof is that an oath also takes effect on rabbinic prohibitions. First of all, it is not certain that an oath takes effect on rabbinic prohibitions. Fine? Second, even the Ran, who agrees with you that an oath takes effect on something not explicit in the Torah, says that on rabbinic prohibitions an oath does not take effect. From the very place you came from, right? The Ran himself. Now the Radbaz apparently understood, first, that as a practical matter in Jewish law an oath does take effect on rabbinic prohibitions—that is obvious. Second, he probably also understood that an oath takes effect on rabbinic prohibitions because they are not explicit in the Torah. And in that he obviously does not fit what the Ran says. How did he understand it? He apparently understood that there is a prohibition of poultry with milk. When I eat poultry with milk, I have not violated “do not turn aside”; I violated the prohibition of poultry with milk. And that prohibition is not explicitly written in the Torah. What is written in the Torah, “do not turn aside,” is only a revelation. The Radbaz says that even in rabbinic prohibitions, as I said earlier about expositions, even in rabbinic prohibitions “do not turn aside” is only a revelation. It reveals to us that the sages can create additional prohibitions, such as the prohibition of poultry with milk. But after they created it, there is a prohibition of poultry with milk, and that prohibition is not explicit in the Torah, and therefore an oath takes effect on it. In other words, his dispute with the Ran is not only on the question of what an oath takes effect on, but on how to understand rabbinic prohibitions and their relation to “do not turn aside.” According to the Ran, when I eat poultry with milk, I violate the prohibition of “do not turn aside,” and that is an explicit Torah prohibition—apparently Torah-level as well. According to the Radbaz, when I ate poultry with milk, I violated the prohibition of poultry with milk. True, it is based on “do not turn aside,” but “do not turn aside” only gave the sages authority to create the prohibition of poultry with milk. “Do not turn aside” is only a revelation. I violated the prohibition of poultry with milk, not that I violated “do not turn aside.” I violated the prohibition of poultry with milk, and that is a prohibition not explicitly written in the Torah, and therefore an oath takes effect on it—that is how the Radbaz learned. Okay, we’ll take a five-minute break, refresh a bit, and come back. He explains the connection between the sun and the moon, between this world and the world to come. The Torah is what connects them. The Maharal of Prague, in his book Tiferet Yisrael, chapter 25, explains the secret of the nineteen-year cycle. He says there are seven leap years. Each leap month has thirty days. Seven times thirty is two hundred and ten. And the difference between the solar year and the lunar year over nineteen years is two hundred and nine days. That one-day difference, the Maharal explains, is the point that connects this world with the world to come. The Torah is the power that unites these opposites. The commandment of counting the Omer is not only a counting of days, but an illumination of the soul. The word sefirah comes from sapir, a precious and shining stone. We leave Egypt with the Omer offering, which is from barley. The sages say that barley is animal food. A person comes out of bondage while still immersed in the material world, in the world of drives. Over seven weeks, seven complete Sabbaths, we refine the seven traits of the soul: kindness, strength, beauty, endurance, splendor, foundation, and kingship. Each week is devoted to a different trait, and each day within the week to a detail within the trait. Forty-nine days of self-work. On Shavuot the offering is the two loaves, and it comes from wheat. Wheat is human food. That is the transition from animality to humanity and holiness. Wheat has the numerical value of twenty-two, corresponding to the twenty-two letters of the Torah. Only after this refinement are we worthy to receive the Torah on the fiftieth day. Okay, let’s get back. Up to this point we have seen what Maimonides, the Shulchan Arukh, and the Ran rule, and the explanations for the distinction between rabbinic prohibitions and prohibitions learned through exposition: the principle being that something not explicitly written in the Torah, even if it is Torah-level, an oath takes effect on it. And that is how they explain the ruling of Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh, and that is how it appears from the plain sense of the passage in Shevuot on page 23. But what about rabbinic law? I said that regarding rabbinic law there are two possibilities in our passage for how to learn the conclusion, at least according to Rabbi Yohanan. The big problem is that this flatly contradicts what appears in our passage regarding Rabbi Yohanan’s view on a half-measure. In our passage Rabbi Yohanan holds that a half-measure is prohibited by Torah law, as Doron asked earlier. A half-measure is prohibited by Torah law, and he attacks Reish Lakish with the claim: “Wait, if you hold there is a rabbinic prohibition, then how can an oath take effect on it according to your view?” And then Reish Lakish answers, “Yes, because it is a rabbinic prohibition, and on a rabbinic prohibition an oath takes effect.” As for Rabbi Yohanan himself, there is no question—why? Because according to Rabbi Yohanan the question never arises. Clearly a half-measure is Torah-level prohibited, and therefore the oath cannot take effect on it. So what are the sages in the Mishnah in Shevuot talking about when they say the oath does take effect? It is by inclusion. Right, and therefore Rabbi Yohanan answers it like Rav and Shmuel, not like Reish Lakish. And he explains it by inclusion, because a half-measure is not an option for him. A half-measure is a Torah prohibition, and it will not help to establish the case as a half-measure; on a Torah prohibition an oath does not take effect. On the contrary, he attacks Reish Lakish even on the possibility that a half-measure is rabbinic. So according to his own view that a half-measure is Torah-level, all the more so the oath does not take effect. That is what emerges from our Talmudic text. So if so, the rulings of Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh and all these authorities are flatly contradicted by our passage. Since in practice we rule like Rabbi Yohanan, that a half-measure is prohibited by Torah law, our passage says that an oath should not take effect on a half-measure, but Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh rule that an oath does take effect on a half-measure. So they explain to me that this is because it is not explicit in the Torah. Fine, I don’t mind the logic right now; I can understand the reasoning. But what do we do with our passage? In our passage it says explicitly that an oath does not take effect on a half-measure according to Rabbi Yohanan—even according to Reish Lakish until his answer, where he says that since it is rabbinic the oath takes effect. At the stage where, if it had been Torah-level, there would be nothing to discuss at all—even on rabbinic law Rabbi Yohanan would apparently disagree with him. How can such a thing be understood? Do you have a suggestion? Well, on the conceptual level, we’ve now discussed the distinction made by the Ran, which is seemingly against the logic, against the intuition, that on rabbinic laws an oath does not take effect, while on a law that comes from exposition it does take effect because it is not explicit in the Torah. Now if you insert that into Rabbi Yohanan’s position, then let’s read our passage through the Ran’s glasses. Rabbi Yohanan attacks Reish Lakish and says as follows: I, according to my own view, hold that an oath does take effect on a half-measure. Why? True, a half-measure is prohibited by Torah law, but it is a prohibition not explicit in the Torah; on that an oath takes effect, no question. I am attacking you, Reish Lakish. You claim that the prohibition of a half-measure is rabbinic. But rabbinic prohibitions are prohibitions that are explicitly written in the Torah. According to your view, it should not take effect. So why does Rabbi Yohanan answer like Rav and Shmuel? Let him answer like Reish Lakish! Ah, that is a good point. The question that arises here—and again, this is more on the level of the passage in Shevuot—is correct: why does Rabbi Yohanan himself not answer that we are dealing here with a half-measure? Because according to him, if we are dealing with a half-measure, what is the problem? Then an oath takes effect. So there is no need to get to an oath by inclusion. But you understand that this is already a side question. In the course of the passage, the very fact that Rabbi Yohanan attacks Reish Lakish is not itself a proof. True, there is a comment here that if I am right in this explanation, then it is not clear why Rabbi Yohanan chooses to interpret the sages of the school of Rabbi Shimon in the forced way of Reish Lakish’s position. He could also have said like Reish Lakish that we are dealing with a half-measure. On the contrary, Reish Lakish cannot say that, but I, Rabbi Yohanan, could have said it. And what comes out is exactly the opposite: Reish Lakish says it, and Rabbi Yohanan runs to a different explanation of inclusion. So that is indeed a point; we’ll see in a moment. The Ran there in the passage in Shevuot senses this. Incidentally, this is the same Ran that the Ran in Nedarim refers to; this is that Ran. “And since we concluded that even according to Rabbi Yohanan we require a half-measure, all the more so it can be found in a prohibition. Therefore we no longer need to strain ourselves with the answers mentioned above”—I’m jumping in the middle because it is long—“for certainly Rabbi Yohanan, if not for the reason that he wanted to establish it according to all opinions, could have established it as a half-measure like Reish Lakish.” You see what he says? That the only reason Rabbi Yohanan established it like Rav and Shmuel, by inclusion, was because he wanted to establish it according to all opinions. I’ll explain that a bit more in a moment. Were it not for that, he could have chosen the answer chosen by Reish Lakish, to establish it as a half-measure. “And it can be found both in a prohibition and in a positive commandment, as I wrote, whether one swore to eat creeping creatures or swore not to eat creeping creatures.” I didn’t understand again—what is the reason he established it like Rav and Shmuel? Because he wanted to establish the Mishnah in Shevuot according to all opinions. If you establish it like Reish Lakish, as a half-measure, then it will depend on Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis—whether when you swear generally it applies to a half-measure or not. You would have to establish it according to the Rabbis as explicit and according to Rabbi Akiva as general. Sorry, according to the Rabbis as explicit and according to Rabbi Akiva as general. Right—that is what Reish Lakish himself does. Now Rabbi Yohanan does not want to get into such a strained reading. He does not want to explain the Mishnah differently according to each tanna, so he wants to establish it according to all opinions, not get into the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, and so he establishes it by inclusion like Rav and Shmuel. But conceptually he too could have established it as a half-measure—according to the Rabbis with an explicit statement, and according to Rabbi Akiva with a general one. At least that is how I understand the Ran’s intent, that “according to all opinions” means according to both Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, so as not to get into that dispute at the beginning of the chapter. “And that which he says in Yoma to Reish Lakish”—he continues reading—“‘since it has permission from the Torah, should he be liable for an oath-offering?’—which implies that if it has permission from the Torah, he is not liable because the oath does not take effect—that wording is used for greater clarity because according to Reish Lakish it is so. But even so, anything that does not have an explicit positive or negative commandment, even though it is prohibited by Torah law in the case of a half-measure according to Rabbi Yohanan, one is liable on it for an oath-offering. And so I found with Maimonides”—in Maimonides, chapter 5 of the laws of oaths, what we just read—“in line with my words, that he wrote that one who eats less than an olive-bulk of carrion or torn meat is liable in an oath.” So that is how the Ran also explains Maimonides. You can see how everything comes together here. The Ran goes consistently according to his own view. In other words, Rabbi Yohanan attacks Reish Lakish: You, Reish Lakish, according to your own view hold that a half-measure is not prohibited by Torah law at all; a half-measure is only rabbinically prohibited, right? So if so, the oath should not take effect. I also agree that an oath does not take effect on something not explicitly written in the Torah—but you, I’m now adding what I said before—you hold that it is a rabbinic prohibition, and a rabbinic prohibition is considered as if explicitly written in the Torah, so you should not have established it as a half-measure, because on a half-measure an oath should not take effect. Okay? That is Rabbi Yohanan’s attack. But “even so,” he himself could indeed have established it as a half-measure. So now I bring in the Ran cited by the Mishneh LaMelekh that we saw above into this Ran. This Ran, when he explains Rabbi Yohanan’s attack on Reish Lakish, is really saying the following: I, Rabbi Yohanan, hold that a half-measure is prohibited by Torah law, but it is something not explicit in the Torah, and therefore I have no problem with the statement that an oath takes effect on a half-measure. I just do not want to establish the Rabbis in the Mishnah of Shevuot as a half-measure, because that would drag me into the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, and I want to establish it according to all opinions, so I established it by inclusion. But you, Reish Lakish, did establish it as a half-measure. But according to your view, a half-measure is a rabbinic prohibition. If there is a rabbinic prohibition, then a half-measure—sorry, then the oath should not take effect on it. Yes, because a rabbinic prohibition is considered explicit in the Torah. So what do you do with that? Reish Lakish answers him: Not so; on something not prohibited by Torah law, an oath does take effect. In other words, what he is saying is that since this thing is not prohibited by Torah law but only rabbinically, I understand rabbinic prohibitions the way you, Rabbi Yohanan, understand Torah prohibitions. Here they are disagreeing in the dispute we saw above between the Ran and the Radbaz, okay? The question is whether, in rabbinic prohibitions, when you eat poultry with milk you violated “do not turn aside,” or whether when you eat poultry with milk you violated the prohibition of poultry with milk. So Reish Lakish says: I violated the prohibition of poultry with milk, and since that is only a rabbinic prohibition and is not written in the Torah, an oath takes effect on it. Reish Lakish claims: No, rabbinic prohibitions are considered explicitly written in the Torah; it is by force of “do not turn aside.” I violate “do not turn aside,” not poultry with milk. Therefore if it were a rabbinic prohibition, I would hold that an oath does not take effect on it. But for me it is a Torah prohibition not explicitly written in the Torah, and on that an oath takes effect. Now look at the implication of what we saw also in the Ran in Nedarim. These Rans fit very nicely with one another. What I explained in the Ran in Nedarim is that the strength of the prohibition, or the force of the prohibition, is not the determining criterion. A half-measure by Torah law is more severe than a half-measure by rabbinic law, and still, a half-measure by rabbinic law is considered a prohibition explicitly written in the Torah, while a half-measure by Torah law is considered a prohibition not explicitly written in the Torah. So what? In terms of severity, a Torah prohibition is more severe than a rabbinic prohibition. True, but with regard to whether an oath takes effect on another prohibition, or on a prior oath—on another prohibition—there what determines it is not severity. That is the whole novelty of the Ran in Nedarim. What determines it is not severity but source. Not force but source. If it is written in the Torah, then we are already sworn on it—what can we do? Not because it is more severe, but simply because that is what we were sworn on. On a rabbinic prohibition we were sworn. On a Torah prohibition that is not written in the Torah, we were not sworn. Not because it is more severe—but we were not sworn on it. The category of our obligation there is not the category of an oath but some other category. Not less severe, maybe more severe, but it is not an oath. And an oath only takes effect on something prohibited by force of an oath, not on something prohibited by force of another prohibition. And this is not a prohibition by force of an oath; it is another prohibition, more severe than rabbinic prohibitions, but another one. The type of prohibition determines it, not the force of the prohibition. Okay? That is really what you see here. The Meiri that we saw in the previous lecture writes as follows: “A half-measure is prohibited by Torah law, except that there are no lashes for it. And since it is prohibited by Torah law, if one swore not to eat a half-olive-bulk of forbidden fat, it would appear from this passage that an oath does not take effect on it, for he is already sworn and standing, even though there are no lashes for it. Nevertheless, we have ruled in Shevuot 21b”—there too there is a parallel to our passage, 23 and 21—“that the oath does take effect on it.” The Meiri says: I too rule like Maimonides, the Shulchan Arukh, and everyone else, that an oath takes effect on a half-measure. And the Ran—why? “And we explained the reason that even Rabbi Yohanan only said it is prohibited by Torah law because it is fit to combine, and so it is the beginning of eating a prohibition. But when one swears regarding a half-measure, he reveals his intention that he is not aiming at combination, and even Rabbi Yohanan agrees it is rabbinic. And we already explained there that on anything rabbinic, an oath takes effect.” The Meiri goes in the same direction, but not for our reason. He also says that according to Rabbi Yohanan an oath takes effect on a half-measure. But why? Because specifically in the case of an oath, when he swears not to eat a half-measure, it is clear that this oath is really directed at the half-measure itself. There is no concern here that he might come and add another half-measure to make up a full measure. We saw this Meiri when we discussed the essence of the prohibition of a half-measure. So here too Rabbi Yohanan agrees that the prohibition of a half-measure is only rabbinic, and therefore an oath takes effect on it. In two respects the Meiri differs from the Ran as I explained earlier. First, the Meiri claims that an oath does take effect on rabbinic prohibitions, against the Ran, like the Radbaz. Right? An oath really does take effect on a rabbinic prohibition. Second, he says that if a half-measure is prohibited by Torah law, an oath does not take effect on it. Only when you swear to a half-measure, there is no concern that you will combine it with another half-measure, and therefore there is no rationale of “fit to combine.” In such a case, the prohibition of a half-measure is not prohibited by Torah law. In a case where it would be prohibited by Torah law, an oath would not take effect on it, and in that he is not like Maimonides and the Ran. It is only here specifically that it is rabbinic, and his view is that where something is prohibited rabbinically, an oath does take effect on it. So he disagrees both on that point—whether an oath takes effect on rabbinic prohibitions, where he says yes, in practice, according to Rabbi Yohanan, like the views disputed in the Mishneh LaMelekh that we saw, and against the Ran and his camp—and besides that he also claims that if something is prohibited by Torah law, regardless of whether it is explicit in the Torah or not, an oath does not take effect on it. In other words, he also disagrees about the parameters of “one prohibition does not take effect upon another.” He claims that the point is the severity of the prohibition and not its source, contrary to the Ran. And therefore, if there is a prohibition of a half-measure, even if its source is not explicit in the Torah, since the force of the prohibition is Torah-level, an oath does not take effect on it, because it depends on the force of the prohibition, not on its source. Also in that respect he is not like the Ran. So on the one hand he too agrees that an oath takes effect on a half-measure; he rules like Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh. But in the conceptual sense, once again, one has to understand how Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh are interpreted. It could be they are interpreted like the Meiri and not like the Ran. But at least, against the Ran he certainly writes against the Ran, because the Ran ties it to whether it is explicit in the Torah or not, and he ties it to the force of the prohibition. He does not care whether it is explicit in the Torah or not; as long as it is Torah-level, an oath does not take effect on it. Only when you swear not to eat a half-measure, there is no Torah prohibition because it is not fit to combine. But the Meiri continues and writes, in the continuation of that same discussion: “Nevertheless, this passage testifies according to the first opinion. For he asked against Reish Lakish, who said a half-measure is permitted, ‘What can be said?’ And he answered that even according to Reish Lakish it is prohibited rabbinically. And he asked, ‘If so, let the oath-offering not take effect on it,’ for even with rabbinic prohibitions one is already sworn and standing with regard to them, as we learned in Shevuot 30, and the oath of testimony does not apply to disqualified persons,” and so on. He continues citing the Talmudic text. I’m jumping to the end of the first paragraph. “Thus all the more so according to Rabbi Yohanan, where it is a Torah prohibition, an oath does not take effect on it.” From the flow of our passage it appears: first, that in principle an oath does not take effect even on a rabbinic prohibition; and all the more so an oath would not take effect on a half-measure if its prohibition is by Torah law. But here, if its prohibition is rabbinic, according to Rabbi Yohanan—only Reish Lakish, because he is pressed, answers that an oath does take effect on rabbinic prohibitions. And Rabbi Yohanan in the end apparently remains with the view that an oath does not take effect on rabbinic prohibitions, as I inferred from the passage earlier. But we need to do some checks first, no? I can’t hear. I didn’t hear the question. Something geographic? Is someone talking to me? The question was meant for someone else then. Fine. The wonders of Zoom. Okay. So the Meiri notes that the flow of the passage does not support him. And nevertheless, says the Meiri, this is how we explain it. “‘If so, let the oath not take effect on it,’ and so on? According to Rabbi Yohanan that itself is not difficult for me, for perhaps I too would say according to him that it does not, and the Mishnah in Shevuot, which said that the oath takes effect on carrion, is no difficulty for me, because he explained it specifically by inclusion. Rather, the difficulty is for Reish Lakish, who establishes the Mishnah in Shevuot as a half-measure.” You say an oath does not take effect on a half-measure according to Rabbi Yohanan. And according to his own view the Mishnah is not difficult because he establishes it by inclusion like Rav and Shmuel. It is Reish Lakish, who chooses a different answer and establishes it as a half-measure, whom Rabbi Yohanan attacks: how can the oath take effect? “The difficulty is for Reish Lakish, who establishes the Mishnah in Shevuot as a half-measure.” “Nevertheless, this is only the way of the passage, but for us, even according to Rabbi Yohanan it takes effect. It is just that he preferred to establish the Mishnah in Shevuot as full eating and according to all opinions,” as we saw in the Ran, “rather than as a half-measure, and by inclusion. And these laws of oaths on prohibitions by inclusion or by half-measure, and the matter of the oath of testimony, what they said,” and so on—that is another issue. Okay, so he explains the flow of the passage according to his own view as well. Let’s now see sections from the responsa of Avnei Miluim, as much as we have time for. Overall, I think the points have already become clear from what I said earlier, but Avnei Miluim really does give a broad summary here. The question: Since we hold that one who swears not to eat carrion, the oath only takes effect through inclusion, but on carrion by itself it does not take effect—if he swore not to eat a half-measure of carrion, does it take effect or not? That is the first question. And further: the fact that through inclusion it does take effect—does that apply only when the oath is to uphold the commandment, but to violate the commandment it does not take effect? Or through inclusion does it also take effect in order to cancel the commandment? Answer: yes, the responsa of Avnei Miluim are a responsa section found at the end of his book. At the end of his book there is a section of responsa. In the Bar-Ilan Responsa Project it is printed separately as Responsa Avnei Miluim. Answer: “We have the text in Shevuot, chapter 3: ‘An oath that I will not eat,’ where the text raises the difficulty: You said, ‘An oath that I will not eat,’ and he ate foods unfit for eating,” and so on. And he brings the whole citation of the passage there. Up to here is the passage in Shevuot; here it ends. “And Tosafot there, who establish it according to all opinions, asked: why not say that this is why Rabbi Yohanan did not say like Reish Lakish—because Rabbi Yohanan holds that a half-measure is prohibited by Torah law? And from this they concluded that a half-measure, where there is not even a positive commandment but only a prohibition in general, is not considered ‘already sworn and standing,’ and the oath does take effect on it,” like Maimonides and the other authorities. “And Rashba in his novellae there wrote that according to Rabbi Yohanan an oath does not take effect on a half-measure, since it is prohibited by Torah law.” This is actually the first authority we encounter who says practically that according to Rabbi Yohanan an oath does not take effect on a half-measure. The closest one to him was the Meiri, but the Meiri also said that in practice it does take effect. On the conceptual level it should not have taken effect, but when you swear regarding a half-measure there is no concern that you will complete it to a full measure, and therefore there is no rationale of “fit to combine,” and so the prohibition is rabbinic and the oath takes effect. But on the conceptual level even the Meiri agrees that if there were a case where you swore regarding a half-measure to which the rationale of “fit to combine” applied, where it was prohibited by Torah law, in such a case the oath truly would not take effect. In that sense he is like the Rashba. For him it is a hypothetical statement because there is no such case. The Rashba says it as practical law. So Tosafot joins Maimonides, the Shulchan Arukh, the Meiri, the Ran, everyone. The Rashba stands against all of them—though conceptually the Meiri is with him—but the Rashba says it also in practice, whereas the Meiri says it only hypothetically. Okay, so the Rashba says that an oath does not take effect on a half-measure according to Rabbi Yohanan because it is prohibited by Torah law. And again, what is the basis? The basis is that according to Rashba, whether an oath takes effect or not depends on the force of the prohibition and not on its source. Is it a Torah prohibition? I do not care whether there is an explicit warning in the Torah or not, explicit or not explicit in the Torah—if it is a Torah prohibition, an oath does not take effect on it. It depends on the force. “And he proved it”—here Rashba proves his approach—“from what they said in the chapter Yom HaKippurim regarding Reish Lakish, who holds that a half-measure is prohibited rabbinically: how did he say there in the case of explicitly specifying a half-measure, that if so one should not be liable for an offering on it? And he answers, since it is permitted by Torah law, the oath takes effect on it.” It implies that according to Rabbi Yohanan, where it is prohibited by Torah law, it is obvious that it does not take effect. So you see that according to Rabbi Yohanan an oath does not take effect on a half-measure. “And as for the fact that he answers here by establishing it according to all opinions, that is for Rav and Shmuel, who had not heard that he holds a half-measure is prohibited by Torah law. And see the book Kapot Temarim at the beginning of chapter Yom HaKippurim, who also asked that it is proven that according to Rabbi Yohanan an oath does not take effect on a half-measure, and Rashba had already preceded him.” “And in my humble opinion, there is no difficulty at all,” says Avnei Miluim. In my opinion there is no difficulty from what Rashba asked, from what they asked on Rashba from our passage. What Rashba asked from our passage against the opposing opinions—let’s call them now by the name of the Ran or Tosafot cited here. “For the reasoning of Tosafot, that an oath takes effect on a half-measure according to Rabbi Yohanan, is because it is not explicit in the Torah, as the Ran wrote in chapter 3 of Shevuot regarding one who swears to do harm to himself. And there in the first chapter of Yom HaKippurim, where he objects to Reish Lakish, who agrees that a half-measure is prohibited rabbinically, ‘If so, let him not be liable for an offering on it’—meaning, since it is prohibited rabbinically, then it falls under ‘do not turn aside,’ and so according to Reish Lakish, since it is rabbinic, it falls under ‘do not turn aside,’ and therefore it is explicit in the Torah.” Notice: explicit in the Torah, as opposed to a half-measure, which is a Torah prohibition but not explicit in the Torah—exactly what we inferred in the Ran. In the Ran himself it is precise from his own words; Avnei Miluim says it from his own reasoning. “Which is not so according to Rabbi Yohanan, for it does not fall under ‘do not turn aside,’ since it is not from their words. And from the Torah, even though there is a prohibition, since it is not explicit, an oath can properly take effect on it.” That is perfectly fine. Therefore Rabbi Yohanan, when he objects to Reish Lakish, objects to him according to his own view—not by an a fortiori argument. He does not say: according to my own view it is clear that an oath does not take effect, but how would you explain it? No. Rather: according to my own view, an oath does take effect; why are you explaining it as a half-measure, since on a half-measure an oath should not take effect? That is his question. Therefore the passage here is no difficulty, and Rashba’s objection is not difficult. Now I already raised the question earlier—I anticipated everything, so I’m only reminding you—because I asked earlier that according to both Nachmanides and Maimonides in the first root, “do not turn aside” is the basis for prohibitions learned through exposition. So how can he say that rabbinic prohibitions involve “do not turn aside,” while a prohibition like all forbidden fat, all blood, all fat, is not connected to “do not turn aside”? It is the opposite. Everyone agrees there is a prohibition of “do not turn aside” here. So I said—I explained it earlier, I’m only reminding you here—he does not even address this, but apparently one could object to him: you cannot say that. My claim is that it is not correct, because true, the source of the force of the sages’ authority to interpret and expound is in “do not turn aside,” but it is not that if I ate a half-measure I violated “do not turn aside.” I violated the prohibition of a half-measure, not the prohibition of “do not turn aside,” against the Minchat Chinukh. The Minchat Chinukh says that I also violated “do not turn aside,” and therefore it is more severe. I say—what are you talking about? “Do not turn aside” is a revelation. I violated the prohibition of a half-measure. And that is unlike rabbinic prohibitions, where there—at least according to the Ran, not according to the Radbaz as we saw—according to the Ran, in rabbinic prohibitions I violate “do not turn aside” itself and not the separate prohibition. And therefore Rabbi Yohanan attacks Reish Lakish: if it is a rabbinic prohibition, then the oath should not take effect on it. “And why did Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan not say like Reish Lakish? Because Rav and Shmuel may hold that a half-measure is prohibited rabbinically, and we have not heard from them what they hold regarding a half-measure,” as Rashba wrote. Fine. So that is already another discussion—why Rav and Rabbi Yohanan do not explain it that way. But that is really a discussion more relevant to Shevuot than to us. “Now the view of Maimonides in Sefer HaMitzvot, root 1”—I move to the second paragraph—“is that every rabbinic matter was already commanded by Moses our teacher, peace be upon him, at Sinai, that he commanded us to do it; and this is what Scripture says, ‘According to the Torah that they shall teach you,’ and the Blessed One warned us not to transgress any word.” “And in Zohar HaRakia it was written that one must wonder at the reasoning of the Rabbi”—meaning Maimonides—“who says that one who transgresses a rabbinic commandment transgresses the prohibition of ‘do not turn aside,’ for this is the opposite of what they concluded in the third chapter of Shevuot and in Yoma, in the last chapter, where they said that one who swore not to eat carrion and torn meat is liable, and they asked: but is he not already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai? Meaning, an oath does not take effect on an oath. And they answered: a half-measure, regarding which he is not already sworn from Mount Sinai. And so it is the conclusion in the Talmud, that since a half-measure is only rabbinic, he is not already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai, and the oath takes effect on it.” So that is what he says is the conclusion in the Talmud. But Reish Lakish is the opposite, and the law follows Rabbi Yohanan. No—the conclusion in the Talmud is that on rabbinic prohibitions an oath does not—does take effect, sorry. Rabbi Yohanan does not disagree with that. Rabbi Yohanan only claims that a half-measure is not a rabbinic prohibition. Of course that is how Zohar HaRakia understood it. So what can we answer to Zohar HaRakia’s objection? Not true! Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with that too. He claims that an oath does not take effect on a rabbinic prohibition. Reish Lakish alone is pushed into that corner because he was under attack. But that does not mean—Rabbi Yohanan remains, as he assumed in the objection, that an oath should not take effect on a rabbinic prohibition. “If so, how can the Rabbi say that rabbinic commandments are included in ‘do not turn aside,’ seeing that then one would also be already sworn with respect to them? For we are sworn on all that is in the Torah, and the verse has ruled, ‘do not turn aside.’” We already answered that. “And in the third chapter of Shevuot and in the second chapter of Nedarim it is proven that one who attaches himself to a Torah prohibition is not a vow and in a prohibition”—fine, that is now less important for us, regarding attaching. “And as for an oath on prohibitions in the case of a half-measure, the view of Tosafot above is that the oath does take effect; it is not considered already sworn and standing.” But the view of Rashba in his novellae is that an oath does not take effect on a half-measure, since it is prohibited by Torah law and therefore he is already sworn and standing. “And so too he wrote in another responsum, section 656. And in the Tur, Yoreh De’ah, it is written: if one swore not to eat this loaf, he is liable for every olive-bulk he eats from it, and it is forbidden even in any amount. If he swore not to eat it, he is not liable until he eats all of it, but it is forbidden even in any amount. And he wrote, or if he said, ‘An oath that I will not eat it,’ and afterwards said, ‘An oath that I will not eat this loaf,’” and so on. In short, he infers from the Tur that an oath takes effect on a half-measure. “Rather, certainly the Tur holds that an oath takes effect on a half-measure. And I saw in the Mishneh LaMelekh, chapter 4 of the laws of oaths, who wrote that even according to the Ran, regarding an oath ‘I will not eat,’ that by Torah law even the smallest amount is forbidden, that is specifically where one said eating in general and did not specify. Even though ordinary eating means an olive-bulk, nevertheless since even any amount is included, we say that any amount too is forbidden because it is fit to combine. But where he explicitly specified, we have only what he said.” That is really the logic of the Meiri that we saw. There is more here—ah yes: “And here appears to be one more note, and with this I’ll finish. It appears from the words of the Shakh and the author of Mishneh LaMelekh that the fact it is forbidden in any amount when one says ‘an oath that I will not eat’ is because that was the intention of the one swearing: to prohibit himself in any amount, and only not to be punished except at the proper measure.” In other words, here a new discussion begins: what happens if he swore not to eat even the smallest amount? Fine? Now he ate part of it. Is there a prohibition of half-measure in an oath? In general, this is a new discussion: is there a prohibition of half-measure in an oath? So he says that the Shakh and the Mishneh LaMelekh write that it is forbidden even in the smallest amount, but how do they explain it? Because that was the intention of the one swearing. He intended to prohibit himself even in a half-olive-bulk, but to be punished only at an olive-bulk. Incidentally, according to that it comes out that if he intended to be punished for a half-olive-bulk… “And the Shakh innovated and says explicitly: if one said, ‘An oath that I will not eat an olive-bulk,’ then by Torah law any smaller amount is permitted.” If he says explicitly in his oath: I will not eat an olive-bulk, and then he ate half, then there is no prohibition of half-measure. Why? Because according to the Shakh, in oath prohibitions there is no prohibition of half-measure at all. So what is there? If he does not specify that he means to swear about an olive-bulk, then he himself plainly intended to prohibit himself even on half an olive-bulk. But if it is clear he did not intend to prohibit himself on half an olive-bulk, then there will be no prohibition of half-measure in the prohibition of an oath. And that is a very interesting novelty. It comes out that in the laws of oaths no prohibition of half-measure was ever introduced at all; it only exists because that is the intention of the one swearing, and not because of the prohibition of half-measure. This could have many implications also for our passage. Because the moment I swear about something prohibited and then I eat half an olive-bulk—from the side of the prohibition I violated the half-measure prohibition of carrion; from the side of the oath I violated the half-measure of the oath. But if the half-measure of the oath is itself an oath prohibition, then it depends on the question whether the oath takes effect or not. But if the half-measure of the oath is a half-measure prohibition, then I do not care that there is no oath on half an olive-bulk. The prohibition of half-measure is triggered even if the oath prohibition itself applies only at an olive-bulk. And then this enters the question of whether one prohibition can take effect upon another, not whether an oath takes effect on an oath. Because the half-measure prohibition of the oath is not an oath prohibition; it is a half-measure prohibition. So that already brings us into all the understandings of half-measure that we discussed, but here I’ll suffice with this brief point. Okay, I’ll stop here. If you want, you can look at the continuation of Avnei Miluim. I really brought the first half of it here as a summary, and overall the points summarize what I said earlier, with a few additions from Tosafot here and there. Does anyone want to comment or ask? More power to you. I’d be happy to ask, if possible. Yes. I think the whole discussion here, whether the idea that an oath takes effect—the difference between force and source—actually also touches on the discussion you had with Binyamin at the beginning of the lecture. I think what it really means is: from the moment the sages interpreted a certain verse and now we know that this is what the verse means, does the law of that verse apply retroactively from the outset, or does it apply only from now on? If it applies from the outset, then one can say we were already sworn on it back at Sinai; but if it applies only from now on, then it is understandable that at Sinai we could not have been sworn on something that only takes effect now. I think even I—we all agree, it seems to me—that after the sages interpreted it, from our perspective the matter is revealed retroactively that it was prohibited. Of course we would not punish someone who transgressed earlier, because he was under compulsion—he did not know it. But in principle he violated a prohibition. I don’t think there is any disagreement about that. Yes, so if that is the case, then it is obvious that we were sworn on it at Sinai. So I do not see any need at all to say that whatever is not explicit in the Torah we were not sworn on. Why? Why? It still is not explicit in the Torah. Even when it existed at Sinai, it was not explicit in the Torah; rather, it branched out from the Torah. But that does not matter. If it was still part of the Torah, then we were still sworn on it. No, we were sworn only on what is written in the Torah, not on what branched out, because what branched out depends on the question of when and whether the sages will derive it. It is not written in the Torah itself. We are sworn only on the text we received from the Holy One, blessed be He—even not on the Oral Torah. The Oral Torah was also given at Sinai; never mind, one has to discuss in what sense. But we are not sworn on it. We are sworn only on the Written Torah, on what appears in the Torah. Okay, meaning that even though the law applied retroactively from the outset, we could not have been sworn on those things because they were not said explicitly. Yes, the oath was on the Torah we received from the Holy One, blessed be He—on what is written in the Torah. Okay, I understand. Thank you very much. Okay, goodbye. On Thursday we are supposed to continue.