Dogmatics – Lecture 24

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You recoil from it in the emotional sense. But that doesn’t mean you can’t want it in the sense of will, not in the emotional sense. I don’t understand what the problem is; there’s no contradiction at all. Does will rest on emotion? Emotion at most expresses will, and even that not always. But emotion is not the will itself.

[Speaker D] Where does the Rabbi get this from? How can you make such a distinction? It sounds so strange. Will is a pure emotion, a pure emotion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a point here. You’re reminding me of a story. They tell about the Rabbi of Ponevezh that he went on some fundraising trip abroad. And when he came back to the yeshiva, the students were talking with him, and he said: Tell me, when I knocked on the rich man’s door to solicit a donation for the yeshiva, what do you think I prayed for? They said: That he would give you something graciously, that he would make a generous donation, host you respectfully, and so on. Not at all—I prayed that he wouldn’t open the door, that he wouldn’t be home. What does that mean? If you asked him, what do you want? Obviously I want him to be home and give me a donation—that’s why I’m there. If you ask him what he longs for emotionally? That he not be home and not open the door for me. You don’t understand this point? This point I understood perfectly well some—I don’t know—twenty years ago, something like that, thirty years ago. There was someone my wife and I knew who needed a combined heart and lung transplant. He’d been waiting for it for years, from childhood already, and in the end he moved to England and was there for years and spent huge amounts of money on it, and there was no money in the family, so we went on a fundraising campaign. Yes, I went around Elkana—I remember, I lived in Elkana then with my parents. I knocked on doors to ask for donations for that young man. Now this wasn’t for me; I had no personal interest in the matter, and I prayed to the Holy One, blessed be He, with tears that they wouldn’t open the door for me. It’s so hard to ask; it’s very, very hard to stand in that situation. So I understood very well that story about the Rabbi of Ponevezh. And he was asking for his own yeshiva, which looks a bit like asking for yourself. I was asking for someone else entirely; I’m not suspected of any personal involvement in the matter, and people in Elkana know me, so they understand I’m not taking it for myself—and still I prayed that they wouldn’t open the door. Now how do you describe such a thing? In my view, very simply. I very much want them to open the door for me and donate generously, and emotionally I hope they won’t be home. And there’s no contradiction. Isn’t that a sufficient explanation of the difference between willing and yearning? It seems to me a simple distinction.

[Speaker D] But the Rabbi decided to knock on the door even though his emotions and feelings were very, very much that this was difficult. But in the end, in the overall balance of the Rabbi’s emotions, the Rabbi decided.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not in the overall balance of emotions. No, no—don’t bring emotions in here. Not in the balance of emotions. No emotions at all. Rather, I decided at the level of will that it was right to ask for that donation, and therefore I knocked on the door even though all my emotions were against it. It wasn’t emotions for and emotions against. No. There were no emotions for it, only against. The “for” was something that was will, not emotion.

[Speaker E] Rabbi—

[Speaker D] I’m not distinguishing between very low emotions—like it’s hard for me to get up in the morning for prayer, or it’s hard for us to do this—but

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] when we look at the whole picture—

[Speaker D] more elevated emotions…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand this insistence. It’s not low emotions and high emotions. It’s emotion, and it’s will. Two different things. It’s not low and high—or call it low and high—but they’re simply two different things. There’s a big difference between wanting and yearning. Again, true, many times will is expressed through yearning—I agree—but I’m only claiming that will and yearning are not synonymous, and therefore sometimes it can be… I’m repeating my point. I don’t think only emotion moves us—and good thing too. Every time it’s emotion, that’s just a failure. We should try to overcome it.

[Speaker D] In any case, Rabbi, generally speaking, suppose another five hundred years from now, we have perfect, sophisticated AI, and suppose every religious person has beside him a robotic AI device that he accepts, that accepts all the principles of faith and also knows the entire Torah. And a person accepts that; it would also make sense for him to accept it because it’s a well-grounded AI. So… but he himself currently knows nothing, yet he accepts all the principles of faith. You ask him: Do you accept the principles of faith? He’ll say: Whatever the robot accepts, I accept. And if it certainly accepts all of Maimonides’ principles of faith, then I accept them too. I know nothing about them and that doesn’t bother me either. So? But does he feel like a good Jew? Someone who has no emotional connection to anything?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously—a perfect Jew. The best Jew there is. If someone connects emotionally, he’s a less good Jew, because it could be that his faith is only dragged along by emotion. He doesn’t really believe. He believes because it’s convenient for him, because it feels good, because it resonates with him. Someone who believes without having that emotion is a greater believer. I’ve spoken more than once—well, okay, we’ve been talking about emotions—but I think I spoke about this story in Sde Boker. Once they asked me to speak at the school there, with the teachers and students in the high school. The principal was a friend of mine, so he invited me there during the Ten Days of Repentance, and told me: Speak about timely themes, but without religious matters. Meaning, without bringing in religious issues. So I decided to talk about atonement, regret, repentance, and the like. So I began with a question—I’ve mentioned this in the past—I began there with a question. I asked them: Tell me what you think about the following case. I hurt someone and came to the conclusion that I was in the wrong. I hurt him. I don’t have even a drop of guilty feeling. I go on my way whistling a cheerful tune, happy and lighthearted. I’m not bothered in the slightest that I hurt him, but intellectually I’ve reached the conclusion that I behaved wrongly. Now I go and ask his forgiveness. I asked them: Would you accept such an apology? Suppose Elijah came and told you that in my heart there’s nothing, you know, my heart is open before you, okay? You know me inside and out. Would you accept such a request for forgiveness? There was complete consensus there that no. What is this? It’s hypocritical. You’re not really sorry. You’re asking forgiveness just with lip service. I told them I completely disagree with them. In my eyes, that is the highest apology possible. Because if I ask forgiveness because I regret it or because I have pangs of conscience, then I’m making that apology in order to sustain my own stomach pains, to calm the stomach pains inside me. But if I have no stomach pains and I go ask forgiveness because I reached the conclusion that I was in the wrong, that is the purest apology possible. Then I’m really doing it because I understand that I’m in the wrong. Not because somehow the stomach pains need soothing—so instead of taking a pill I go ask forgiveness. In my eyes that’s a far superior apology.

[Speaker D] So here, Rabbi—another five hundred years from now the Rabbi won’t have to trouble himself to go to that person and ask forgiveness. He can send the AI robot. It’ll knock by itself and say, listen, I’m asking forgiveness on the Rabbi’s behalf. What’s the question? We’ll send the robot—what’s the question? So I’m supposed to accept the apology of that robot?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? If it expresses my request? A person’s agent is like the person himself. What’s the problem?

[Speaker D] It got carte blanche, full authorization from me and from him, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand the question. What’s the problem? Obviously that’s the case.

[Speaker D] I don’t understand—someone hurt me, and his robot comes to me and asks forgiveness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If that robot expresses the apology request of—

[Speaker D] the sender, it has his stamp on it, he signed off on it in the closest possible way…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not a stamp. Rather, it’s clear that I too am asking forgiveness, I’m just sending it through the robot.

[Speaker D] Ah, I’m not even aware of it—I don’t need to be aware that I trust this AI absolutely.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, then we’re just playing with words. If I intend to ask forgiveness, then I’m asking forgiveness. If the robot asks forgiveness in my place, then they should forgive the robot, not me. What does that have to do with anything? I don’t understand.

[Speaker D] But I accepted everything the robot said; I truly accept as correct everything the robot thinks is correct.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know about “accept as correct.” Do you think you need to ask forgiveness, and are you asking forgiveness in principle? Then there’s no problem. I accept the apology through the robot, yes. Yes, repentance too—if in fact you also are asking forgiveness, and the one who expresses the request in my hearing is the robot. But if you aren’t asking forgiveness and only the robot decided to ask forgiveness, then we’ll forgive the robot, not you. I don’t understand—these things have nothing to do with each other. What’s the connection? Okay, let’s return to our topic; this is really a side remark relative to our topic. So the claim is that one should await—one should even await salvation, not only believe in the coming of the Messiah. Beyond that, both in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) and in the words of the Sages—I mean in the Talmud, in tractate Sotah and elsewhere—they give us various signs and descriptions of redemption. Yes, there are characteristics of the generation of redemption—“insolence will increase,” and all the “a son rises against his father,” and so on. Various signs, some more pleasant and some less, but there are all kinds of signs. Both in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) and in rabbinic literature. The blossoming of the land, the return of the Jews, all sorts of things like that. And these signs prompt various people to engage in identifying the process of redemption or in recognizing the period in which redemption is occurring. Meaning, these signs have two meanings. First, they give us some kind of hint that makes possible calculating the end-times. Yes, if there are signs, I can try to check whether my period fits the signs or doesn’t fit the signs. So first of all, then it’s no longer sheer speculation; I already have some tools to try to check exactly when—now, tomorrow—yes? When is the Messiah coming, or whether he’s currently coming at least. Yes, signs deal with something happening now, not a future forecast. But second, beyond that, if signs are given then ostensibly it’s even a call to engage in this. Not only does it make the engagement possible, but if signs are given—why were they given? They were given so we would use them, right? So that we would know how to identify the period in which the Messiah arrives. If it fulfills such-and-such signs, then we understand that this is the period in which the whole business begins to roll. So that means that the appearance of signs in Scripture and among the Sages not only permits engagement with redemption, but also encourages it. Because otherwise, why is it written there? Meaning, if in fact we’re not supposed to engage in it, then why did they bother writing these things at all? Therefore, although often the motivation for engaging in the signs of redemption is a result of hard times, troubles, and the like, sometimes engagement in the signs of redemption is simply because we suddenly identify that indeed some or all of the signs are being fulfilled. And we begin—as for example in our own time—various people claim that various signs from among the signs of redemption have been fulfilled here, and therefore it is obviously the beginning of redemption. Therefore it is obvious that some process has begun here, one the prophets spoke about. This is basically a kind of engagement in calculating the end-times, yes? A kind of effort to identify the period: when is the Messiah coming? How do we know the Messiah is coming, when will he come, how do we identify his coming, and so on. That’s on the one hand. On the other hand, in that same passage in Sanhedrin, the Talmud brings there: It was taught: Rabbi Natan says, “This verse pierces and descends to the depths: ‘For the vision is yet for the appointed time, and it speaks of the end and does not lie; though it tarry, wait for it, for it will surely come, it will not delay.’” Not like our rabbis who would expound “until a time, times, and half a time”—doesn’t matter, all kinds of calculations—not like Rabbi Simlai and all the rest. Rather, in the end the Talmud says: and not like Rabbi Akiva, who would expound: “Yet once, a little while, and I will shake the heavens and the earth.” But what? The first kingdom seventy years, the second kingdom fifty-two, and the kingdom of Ben Koziva two and a half years. So here in fact we see some kind of end-times calculation. When exactly the Messiah is supposed to come. We take these prophecies and try to locate them in history. But in the end, what is the meaning of “and it speaks of the end and does not lie”? Yes, the verse brought in the Talmud earlier. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: May the souls of those who calculate the end-times expire. For they would say: since the end-time has arrived and he did not come, he will never come again. Rather, wait for him, as it is said, “Though it tarry, wait for it.” And from here comes the claim that on the one hand one must await salvation—yes, “Did you await salvation?”—but on the other hand one must be careful about calculating the end-times. And that creates a kind of dissonance. Because if I’m awaiting something, I usually try to calculate or estimate when it will arrive. Meaning, await it you must, and even await that it will come in your own days. But don’t calculate. Meaning, don’t try to identify exactly when it is supposed to come, to make such calculations, even on the basis of the verses. So why not, actually? In the Talmud it sounds like they said that once the end-time arrived and he did not come, then he will never come. Meaning, if you make a mistake and miss—miss the correct calculation—then people will be disappointed, and once they see that the Messiah didn’t come now, they’ll say: well, apparently this whole story isn’t true and the Messiah is not going to come at all. And it’s all a mistake. So therefore don’t make calculations at all; don’t test the Holy One, blessed be He, because it can lead to severe results. We know there were phenomena like this in history in which people really estimated that the Messiah was at the door, based on various signs and all sorts of calculations, and when the Messiah didn’t arrive, in the end there was a very great crisis—not only did they conclude that the Messiah would no longer come, but they abandoned their entire religious commitment, left Judaism, some converted to Christianity, all kinds of things like that. It goes much farther than merely giving up belief in the coming of the Messiah; they gave up belief altogether. Therefore, these concerns about calculating the end-times are not really an essential matter. Essentially, we await the Messiah, and it would have been proper for us to try to calculate, to hope, to check whether perhaps we can estimate when he will come. But because of these concerns they say: don’t do it; may the souls of those who calculate the end-times expire. More than that: calculating the end-times, on the one hand there is concern about error. Meaning, the verses are probably not unequivocal. If the verses were unequivocal, what would be the problem? Make the calculation, and what comes out should indeed materialize. So what’s the problem? No problem is expected, because it will materialize. No—they tell you: you can make a calculation, but you may be mistaken, and if you are mistaken various problems will arise. Therefore don’t make the calculation. What does that mean? That even when you make the calculation on the basis of the verses, apparently it’s not unequivocal. There’s a pretty good chance you’ll make a mistake, so leave it alone—don’t make the calculations at all. Fine, and then of course the question returns: so why were the verses written? If these verses teach us how to make the calculations, why were they written at all if in fact we aren’t supposed to make these calculations? Fine, it could be that there is a difference between making calculations about the future—how much longer until he comes, or in what year he is supposed to come—and trying to identify the present situation. Whether the signs I see before me now are being fulfilled, and therefore this is part of the process of redemption. Maybe that’s not called calculating the end-times. For example, the entire Religious Zionist view that sees in the ingathering of exiles, the establishment of the State, and so on, certain signs heralding redemption—maybe there are also Haredim who see it that way; there are different approaches. So the question is whether such a thing is called calculating the end-times. There would be room to say yes, but it isn’t necessary. Why? It could be that calculating the end-times means I make a calculation in light of the verses that in another one hundred and thirty-four years the Messiah will come, or in another one hundred and thirty-four days the Messiah will come. That is calculating the end-times. Because I’m not looking at the signs around me and trying to identify whether these are in fact signs of the Messiah; rather, I’m making future calculations, and those calculations can prove false. But if I try to identify signs that already exist—not about the future—and on the basis of those signs decide whether this is a period that is part of the process of redemption, maybe that is not calculating the end-times. Though in terms of reasoning I would say that this too is calculating the end-times, and therefore it isn’t right to do that either. But I can understand someone who does do it, because he apparently thinks there is a distinction here. I’ll give you an example maybe. There is Rabbi Kalner—you know who that is—from the Har Hamor circles, one of those line-people. So he once said—I was told; I heard from people who heard him say once—that if the State of Israel were destroyed, he would take off his kippah. In other words, it’s so clear to him that the State of Israel is the beginning of redemption that if it were destroyed, that would mean the prophets apparently didn’t know what they were talking about, there are no prophets, he would lose his faith and that would be the end of his career. Now here you suddenly see how even looking at present signs is itself a kind of end-times calculation. Because in the end you may be wrong in interpreting the verses, right? And then even if the verses predict correctly, you didn’t identify the period correctly. After all, we know that there were very many false messiahs throughout history, and there was not a single false messiah who didn’t base himself on this—on some calculation drawn from the signs in the verses—and identify that this was the period of redemption. And meanwhile, all those false messiahs up to now have been proven wrong. What does that mean? That even identifying present signs can prove false. And if so, there is no logical basis to distinguish between future expectation or calculation—how many years until the Messiah comes—and trying to understand whether right now this is the coming of the Messiah, because that attempt too can fail. And if concern about failure tells us not to calculate the end-times, then it seems to me that that same concern should also tell us not to make these present-day calculations and not to look at current signs in that way. And if so, then indeed the Religious Zionist outlook I described earlier, which is basically built on the idea that the processes happening now fit the signs of redemption and therefore this means that in effect the Messiah is on the way—this too is end-times calculation. And one must not do it. “Must not,” again, not in the sense of a prohibition, but it is not recommended, or they curse those who do it. But the fact is that many people do it; that means they apparently don’t think it’s the same thing. But I’ll say more than that: many people also made future end-times calculations, including medieval authorities (Rishonim). Some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) made calculations from verses in Daniel and so on about when the Messiah would come—calculations with years, in what years he would come. By the way, even the Vilna Gaon in Kol HaTor has all kinds of such calculations, and among other things he even predicts that in ’48 the State of Israel will arise—in 5708—according to the hours of Adam the first man. When Adam stood on his feet on the sixth day, that is when the State of Israel would stand on its feet in the sixth millennium. Because each thousand corresponds to a day; he has this calculation there, of the Vilna Gaon, and he arrives at 5708, that in 5708 the Jewish people will stand on their feet. That is what he writes in Kol HaTor. This too is basically a kind of end-times calculation. So the great medieval and later authorities did it, and therefore these curses—“may the souls of those who calculate the end-times expire”—apparently did not deter various people enough from calculating the end-times. Therefore those who calculate the present, not only those who calculate the future—whether they do it because they have excuses, or because they’re not impressed by that curse—I don’t know. It could be either way. But I’ll return to that, because ultimately I want to ask the question: what is messianism, really? And is Religious Zionism messianism? Is a Religious Zionist outlook basically what we call messianism? So this is the beginning of touching on that question, but I’ll formulate it more precisely later. In any case, Maimonides actually writes that not only is it forbidden to do this, but there is also no ability to do it. And all these matters—Laws of Kings, chapter 12—“And all these matters and the like no person will know how they will be until they happen, for they are obscure matters in the prophets. Even the Sages have no tradition concerning these matters.” Meaning, the verses are obscure, and we have no received tradition about them, no transmission about them, “but only according to the apparent implication of the verses. Therefore there is disagreement among them about these matters.” Now this argument is very interesting, because it’s the very argument I raise against a large part of Maimonides’ own principles. He derives them from verses, but if you say that we have no tradition about this and it’s only verses, then you know—interpretation of verses, each person can interpret as he interprets. So everything he claims here against those who calculate the end-times can in fact also be claimed against his own principles, and I made that claim earlier as well. In any case he says: “And in any event, the order of how these matters will occur and their details are not a principle of the religion. A person should never occupy himself with aggadic literature, nor dwell at length on the midrashim stated concerning these matters and the like, nor make them fundamental, for they bring neither fear nor love. And likewise one should not calculate the end-times. The Sages said: may the souls of those who calculate the end-times expire. Rather, one should await and believe in the matter in general, as we have explained.” Meaning, believe in it in general and don’t make a concrete calculation about exactly when the Messiah will come, don’t try to identify the period in which he is arriving. That’s one point. It has no value. He gives two arguments: it has no value—it doesn’t increase fear or love, don’t make it fundamental. And second, even if it had value, we really have no way to reach a conclusion on this matter, because the verses are obscure and can be interpreted in various ways. Therefore this whole story is both valueless and dubious. So that’s the next stone in this puzzle. So again: there is belief in the coming of the Messiah; there is an obligation to await him, though not necessarily to yearn for him emotionally as I said earlier, but to await. There is a prohibition on engaging in calculations, end-times calculations. One can debate the question how legitimate it is to identify one’s present period according to the signs, to try to identify it that way. I said that many people do it. False messiahs throughout history tried to do it and were disproven, so the concern exists in my opinion in that kind of engagement too, although people do it. And in the end there really isn’t much way to do it anyway, as Maimonides says, and there is no value in doing it. That’s basically where the argument has gotten to so far. There’s no way to do it because the verses are not unequivocal, and there is no value in it because what difference does it make when the Messiah will come? You need to await that he will come and leave it to the Holy One, blessed be He, to decide when to send him. You are not supposed to make such calculations; there is no value in it even if it is correct. Meaning, even if you didn’t miss and you understood the verses correctly, it doesn’t matter; it’s a valueless pursuit. But—

[Speaker D] Isn’t this just another example from some of the previous principles we studied, where Maimonides gives you some principle and then in a reverse move tells you not to deal with it and basically takes it out of the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Maimonides explicitly says not that. Maimonides answers your question in what we just read. He says: you need to await the Messiah in a general sense. You need to believe that the Messiah will come and want him to come, but not engage in calculations about when he will come—not to identify, this is my addition, not to identify from the signs of the times whether he is already here or his footsteps are already audible—that, don’t do. But you must await him in general.

[Speaker D] Maybe that’s the importance Maimonides saw in putting this in as a principle—as a warning, for example, against what happens in this Hegelian messianic Religious Zionism that decides that now is the messianic age and therefore it’s permitted to do things…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to our own times and to Religious Zionism. For now I’m just putting the tools on the board. But at the moment Maimonides definitely counts awaiting salvation as a principle. Calculations and identification—that, no. “May the souls of those who calculate calculations expire”; identification, I’m adding—that’s no, for two reasons. First, there’s no possibility of doing it. Second, it also isn’t important; that is, it has no value. Okay, that’s briefly what we’ve seen so far. Another point: what is our obligation to bring redemption? Here we’re talking about something else. There is belief in redemption, there is awaiting redemption, there is yearning for it—that’s already the emotion we discussed earlier. There is engaging in end-times calculations or identifying redemption in a given period. And now I’m talking about something that is none of the above. The question is whether there is some point in doing actions that will bring redemption. Are we supposed to bring it with our own hands? In this context people often cite Rashi and Arukh LaNer in the Talmud, tractate Sukkah 41. It goes like this: Rabbi Yehudah would say: Israel were commanded with three commandments upon entering the land—to appoint a king for themselves, to wipe out the seed of Amalek, and to build for themselves the chosen House. Three commandments they were commanded upon entering the land. Are these commandments that were stated only for entry into the land? Apparently not. One indication of this is that Maimonides counts these three things as commandments: the destruction of Amalek, building the chosen House, and appointing a king. And once Maimonides counts them as commandments, he is basically saying that this was not a one-time commandment but a commandment for all generations. Because one of Maimonides’ principles—his third root—says that a commandment that is not for all generations is not counted. For example, the jar of manna—taking manna and putting it in a jar. That command is not included in the count of commandments. Why not? It’s a command they were commanded by the Holy One, blessed be He. Or the fiery serpent to place on a pole. Why not? Because it isn’t for all generations; it was said only for its time. The commandments that are counted are commandments for all generations. Then Maimonides comments on the commandments of wiping out Amalek and the seven nations. Maimonides says: You’ll ask me, why do I count these commandments, since they are no longer relevant—there is no Amalek anymore, there are no seven nations anymore—so these commandments too are temporary commandments. So why do I count them? Maimonides says: whoever asks that question has not understood my third principle, my third root, that we do not count commandments that are not eternal, commandments for their hour. Why? Because the commandment of wiping out Amalek and destroying the seven nations—these are not commandments for their hour but eternal commandments. The fact that they are currently not relevant is not because today we are not commanded in them, but because we finished. Because we did the job. Say the fiery serpent—today we are not commanded at all to place it on the pole, or manna in a jar. That command was said only for that time, when they were in the wilderness and the command was given to them. Afterwards there is no command. Regarding the destruction of Amalek, even today we are commanded to destroy Amalek. It’s just that it has already been destroyed; it has already been carried out. So it is not a commandment limited in time, one that applies only during a certain period. This command exists at all times. It’s just that we already did it. Like the commandment of building the chosen House. Once we built the chosen House, there is no longer a commandment to build it—it’s already built. Does that mean it is a temporary commandment? Not an eternal commandment? No, of course not. The commandment is to build the Temple; once we built it, we simply fulfilled it. But say if it is destroyed, then of course we need to build it again. The command is a command that never ceased; it’s just that it was fulfilled. Once it was fulfilled, it is no longer relevant. So now it no longer needs to be done not because we are no longer obligated, but because we did it. That’s not the same as commandments which, regardless of whether we performed them or not, are no longer obligatory—they were only said for their time. Those are commandments Maimonides does not count. But commandments that are eternal, only exhausted or carried out—those are commandments Maimonides does count, even though practically they too are not relevant today. And what about building the Temple? If Maimonides counts it as a commandment, that means he understands it as a continual commandment—yes, as an eternal commandment. Yes, commandment twenty: “That we were commanded to build a house of service, in which there shall be offering and the fire shall always burn, and to it there shall be going, pilgrimage, and gathering every year as explained. And this is what He, exalted be He, said: ‘And they shall make Me a sanctuary.’” From the verse “And they shall make Me a sanctuary,” Maimonides learns that there is a commandment to build a house of service, to build a Temple. There is, I think, a long article by Rabbi Re’em HaCohen—but this is not his idea, it’s a known matter—about a dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides on the question what the Temple is. Maimonides sees the Temple as a house of service. When we build the Temple, it is simply so there will be a place to offer sacrifices. According to Nachmanides, the Temple is a place for the Divine Presence to dwell. The sacrifices are simply the service we perform so that the Divine Presence will dwell in the Temple. Yes, so according to Maimonides the Temple is basically some kind of instrument for a commandment, not the commandment itself—simply so that we can offer sacrifices. According to Nachmanides, the opposite: the sacrifices are the instrument for the commandment; the Temple is the goal, so that the Divine Presence will be there. This has enormous halakhic ramifications in many directions, this dispute. But okay, never mind. In Maimonides himself it says here that this is a house of service, and his view is that we offer there—establish it so that we have somewhere to offer sacrifices. Now Rashi on the Talmud in Sukkah 41—Rashi writes there, a famous Rashi. Many theological debates revolve around this Rashi. Yes: “But the future Temple, for which we await, is built and perfected; it will be revealed and come from heaven, as it is said: ‘The sanctuary, Lord, which Your hands established.’” And from here, I think even in VaYoel Moshe he brings this, but many opponents of Zionism and Religious Zionism derive from this Rashi an outlook that says that building the Temple is not a task placed upon us. The Temple is supposed to come built and perfected from heaven, and we are not meant to build it or bring it. And this is perhaps a model case for an attitude to redemption in general. There is a kind of reservation about actions whose purpose is to bring redemption ourselves. Yes, often Haredi statements are statements that say: redemption will come, but that is not our task; that is the Holy One, blessed be He—we are not supposed to be the ones who bring redemption. And this Rashi serves as some kind of paradigm. He’s talking about the Temple, not specifically about redemption. But people see it as symptomatic or as an example of a general approach to bringing redemption. We are not supposed to bring redemption. Some even connect it to calculating the end-times—as part of the same issue of not engaging in end-times calculations, we are also not supposed to engage in bringing the Messiah or bringing redemption. This should be left to the Holy One, blessed be He; He will decide when to do it. But what place does that have? This statement is very difficult, because all in all we have a positive commandment to establish a Temple. If there is a positive commandment to establish a Temple, then how can one say to us: no, no, don’t do it. Don’t do anything; wait for it to descend built from heaven. The whole point of the commandment is that we have an obligation to establish the Temple. How does that fit with the obligation? So Arukh LaNer says there in Sukkah 41—Rashi is the Haredi one and Arukh LaNer is the Religious Zionist one, as it were—“Therefore it seems to my humble opinion that certainly the future Temple will be built as an actual structure by human hands. And what is said, ‘The sanctuary, Lord, which Your hands established,’ which in Tanchuma is expounded to mean that it will descend below, refers to a spiritual Temple, which will enter into the physically built Temple, like a soul within a body. And just as in the Tabernacle and in the Temple the heavenly fire descended into the ordinary fire kindled by wood, so it appears in the Mekhilta, which expounds from the verse ‘The place for Your dwelling that You made, O Lord,’ that the heavenly Temple corresponds to the earthly Temple. And concerning this it is said, ‘The sanctuary, Lord, which Your hands established’—that in the future, when the Lord will reign forever and ever before the eyes of all the inhabitants of the world, He will dwell below within a sanctuary that is already built and aligned with the heavenly Temple; and that is what it means that it will descend below, into the Temple that will be built.” So he basically reconciles it like this: he says that we are supposed to build the earthly Temple, and the proof is that there is a commandment to build the Temple. And what is written in Tanchuma, and Rashi brings it here, that the Temple will descend from above—the meaning is the Divine Presence descending from above in order to dwell in the Temple that we built below. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, together with some sort of spiritual Temple—I don’t know exactly what that means—are supposed to enter into the physical Temple and dwell in it. And that is the meaning of the Temple descending below, and it does not contradict the fact that we have a commandment to build the Temple. The physical building of the Temple—we are indeed supposed to build that. And truly Rashi’s view is a difficult one. Meaning, unless we say that perhaps one can interpret, with some pressure, that Rashi means what Arukh LaNer says. That this is also what Rashi means when he says that the Temple will descend built from heaven. Arukh LaNer speaks about the Tanchuma and not about Rashi. In Rashi it seems he is speaking about the Temple itself descending built and perfected from heaven. It is difficult to interpret him the way Arukh LaNer proposes. Therefore, simply speaking, Rashi really means that the Temple will descend from heaven, and then the question arises: what about the commandment to build a Temple? Perhaps Rashi does not accept that there is such a commandment. It could be that he says these are commandments they were commanded upon entering the Land of Israel, but it was one-time only. And there is no commandment to build a Temple, and therefore the Temple will in fact not be built by us but will descend from heaven. But if one holds like Maimonides or like the decisors who say there is a commandment to build a Temple, then one cannot interpret it simply as meaning that the Temple will descend from heaven, and perhaps one must say like Arukh LaNer.

[Speaker F] According to Rashi, what about the Second Temple?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker F] Why did they build it? Why trouble themselves at all, if it wasn’t—if it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi doesn’t say there’s no point in building a Temple. He says there’s no commandment to build a Temple. Or there is—we need to build a Temple so there will be a place to offer sacrifices. At least as an instrument for a commandment we need to build a Temple.

[Speaker G] There’s a difference between saying that Rashi says there’s no point in building a Temple and saying there’s a prohibition on dealing with it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He didn’t say there’s a prohibition. That’s what I’m saying. It will descend from heaven; the task is not placed upon us. If we understand that the Temple is only an instrument for a commandment, just so that there will be a place to offer sacrifices, then if it descends from heaven there’s no problem. Right? Then everything is fine; no need to build it. If it doesn’t descend from heaven, we build it so we can offer sacrifices. But if it descends from heaven, then everything is fine. If the commandment is to bring the Temple—not that the Temple is an instrument for a commandment. If the commandment is to build the Temple, then it has nothing to do with descending from heaven; we are obligated to build it—that’s the commandment. So it could be that Rashi says it’s only an instrument for a commandment. By the way, that is one of the explanations—perhaps the most plausible one—for why Maimonides does not count settling the Land of Israel as a positive commandment. It could be that Maimonides basically says that settling the Land of Israel is an instrument for a commandment and not a commandment. In order that we fulfill the commandments dependent on the Land—but not a commandment in itself. And instruments for commandments are not counted; that is Maimonides’ tenth principle, his tenth root, that instruments for commandments are not counted. So perhaps the same thing can be said in Rashi’s view about building the Temple: that in his opinion it is basically an instrument for a commandment and not really a commandment itself. But for our purposes, basically there is a dispute here over whether the task of building the Temple—and if you like, by extension, bringing the Messiah, bringing redemption—is a task imposed upon us, or whether it is something we are supposed to wait for passively and in fact the Holy One, blessed be He, is supposed to do it. So here we are already beginning to see, to get even closer to, the dispute around Religious Zionism or opposition to Religious Zionism—Haredi-ness. Later on I’ll try to explain the connection of these matters to the concept, to the concept of messianism. Okay, we’ll stop here. If there are comments or questions, we’ll continue next time. If there are comments or questions.

[Speaker B] I wanted to remark that Maimonides, in the Epistle to Yemen, himself engages in calculating the end-times.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, yes, that’s well known.

[Speaker B] It’s interesting. Yes. And also, going back to what I mentioned at the beginning of the lesson—you spoke about, I asked why Maimonides puts the issue of the House of David into the principle of the Messiah, and you spoke about how he brings verses from the testament of our forefather Jacob. Maimonides himself does not mention those verses in the principle. He speaks about the portion of Nitzavim, the portion of Balaam. He doesn’t speak about the testament of our forefather Jacob.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nitzavim and Balaam are only about the fact that the Messiah will come. Yes, yes—“I see him, but not now; I behold him, but not near.”

[Speaker B] I looked in Maimonides himself, also in Mishneh Torah; he doesn’t bring that verse when he speaks about the Messiah being from the House of David. He doesn’t mention Jacob’s verse, and he has no principled problem—he says there is no problem with a king being, of course, from the other tribes, only that the main kingship is from the House of David. Therefore, ostensibly, what is the problem with the Messiah being…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I assume, I assume he derives it from the verse—otherwise where did he get it from?

[Speaker B] He says that once David was anointed, he acquired the kingship for himself and for his descendants after him; he brings verses from Psalms.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He brings it from Psalms. And also from the verse, I assume.

[Speaker B] No, he brings verses from Psalms, not from our forefather Jacob.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, maybe.

[Speaker B] I can send it afterward. But in any case, he has no problem with a king being from the other tribes. Meaning, he says there’s no problem at all, only that the main kingship is from the House of David. So what’s the problem if the Messiah is from another tribe, not from the House of David? Or from the tribe of Judah but not from the House of David?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the verses of Psalms, I don’t know exactly what…

[Speaker B] No, because he also has no problem—he himself has no problem at all with a king being from another tribe.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Except that it contradicts the verses.

[Speaker B] No, it doesn’t contradict, it doesn’t contradict, because he explains that the main kingship belongs to the House of David, but there’s no problem with there also being a king from other tribes; it’s just that for the House of David it’s not… meaning, he explains that if a king arises from another tribe, then kingship is acquired by him, but it will not be forever. That’s it—that’s the difference.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying, where is that from? From Psalms, he—

[Speaker B] He brought verses from Psalms. But there’s no problem…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that one has to believe that the essential monarchy belongs to the House of David, based on the verses in Psalms, but that doesn’t matter right now.

[Speaker B] No, but he has no problem—he has absolutely no problem with a king arising for a hundred years, a dynasty not from the House of David.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that here too he’s talking only about a long-lasting dynasty and not about some local king. That could also be.

[Speaker B] No, so then what’s the problem with the Messiah being from another tribe? Why does that have to be a principle of faith?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Messiah is not a local king. The Messiah is the one to whom the essential monarchy belongs.

[Speaker B] “And unto him shall the obedience of the peoples be”—who is the Messiah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even if the Messiah himself doesn’t have to belong to the essential monarchy—leave his sons aside—even the Messiah himself can’t be just some random king. Ahab won’t be the Messiah.

[Speaker B] Why? What’s the problem?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because he’s not… because the Messiah is the essential monarchy that we have, and the essential monarchy is the House of David.

[Speaker B] Meaning, it’s part of the overall puzzle?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Essentially, the king is from the House of David. Even if you install another king, fine—he’s not essential, but it’s valid. Okay, but a real king is a king from the House of David. And the Messiah is a king whom the Holy One, blessed be He, sends—not one whom the people appoint. If the Holy One, blessed be He, sends him, then he should be from the House of David. I don’t know, I don’t know exactly what Maimonides means; he’s vague. Yes, whatever people want…

[Speaker B] No, because after all, the Holy One, blessed be He, also sent prophets to anoint kings who were not from the House of David, and that was perfectly fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It was valid. Yes. Okay.

[Speaker E] And in general, since we don’t know when the Messiah is coming, then the possibilities here are infinite. Meaning, the whole future is spread out before us. So what does expectation mean? Why should I expect at all that it will happen tomorrow, or even not for another thousand years?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Expectation is not estimation. You don’t need to… expectation means wanting him to come.

[Speaker E] Yes, I understand, but still there are formulations like waiting. What does waiting mean? Why should I think he’ll come in this millennium or the next one?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Waiting means wanting him to come.

[Speaker E] But that’s like wanting something that’s almost impossible, because the chances that he’ll come in our lifetime are approaching zero.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not about the chances; it has nothing to do with chances at all. Again, you’re taking me back to estimation. We’re not talking about the question of when I estimate he’ll come—that’s irrelevant. No, the faith is faith that the Messiah will come in general. Besides that, I need to want the Messiah to come. None of this says anything about any date, under any circumstances. That’s all. Wanting something to happen doesn’t involve any estimation of whether it will really happen and when it will happen. I very much want it to happen. That’s it.

[Speaker E] So, meaning, the commandment is about the desire itself, not as a result of the need to believe that he will come.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. No, believe that he’ll come at some point, but you don’t know when. We’ll still get to Leibowitz; I’m not finished yet with the whole messianism issue. Okay then, good night, good news, Sabbath peace.

[Speaker B] Sabbath peace.