Dogmatics – Lesson 25
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The previous framework: belief in the coming of the Messiah, signs, expectation, and calculations of the end
- “False messiah” as a non-halakhic concept, as opposed to “false prophet”
- The flexibility of the label “messianism” and the difficulty of diagnosis
- Religious Zionism as a claim to messianism, and the connection between definition and negative judgment
- Messianism as dependent on factual claims, disconfirmation, and the excuses of “we did not merit it”
- Sources of the negative connotation: abandoning commandments and the crisis after an expectation that was not fulfilled
- The Leibowitzian and Ben-Gurion approach: “A messiah who arrived is not the Messiah”
- Three possible definitions of negative messianism: belief, action, and problematic action
- Examples of problematic actions: halakhic transgression, “tradition,” and realism
- Messianism as metaphysical reliance instead of realistic considerations: “If they’re shooting, you have to run away”
- Religious Zionism versus Vayoel Moshe: two theologies versus a third option without “demons”
- A qualification: observing commandments with realistic considerations versus pushing realism aside in the name of redemption
- The draft debate and the criticism of the discourse of “an obligatory war”
- Conclusion and technical announcement
Summary
General Overview
The lecture lays out the difficulty of defining “messianism” and “false messianism,” and emphasizes that the expression “false messiah” is hardly a halakhic concept at all, but mainly a sociological-historical one, unlike “false prophet,” which is an explicit halakhic prohibition. The text argues that the public use of the term “messianism” is sometimes a flexible and manipulative label, and connects the negative connotation of messianism to practical concerns such as abandoning commandments, unreasonable actions, and the crises created after disconfirmation. Along the way, historical and contemporary examples are presented (Shabbetai Tzvi, Bar Kokhba, Chabad, Religious Zionism), and a principled possibility is examined: that the central problem is mixing metaphysical considerations into realistic decisions, to the point of claiming that many people actually conduct themselves in a Leibowitz-like way even if they do not say so explicitly.
The previous framework: belief in the coming of the Messiah, signs, expectation, and calculations of the end
The discussion opens with a summary of what was learned previously: the obligation to believe in the coming of the Messiah as one of Maimonides’ principles, the signs of the Messiah, expectation for the Messiah, the prohibition against engaging in calculations of the end, and the dispute between Rashi and Arukh LaNer over how much human beings are supposed to take part in the process of redemption, as opposed to a view that the Temple will descend built from heaven without human initiative.
“False messiah” as a non-halakhic concept, as opposed to “false prophet”
The text states that when you look in the sources of Jewish law, you do not find a clear halakhic concept of a “false messiah,” and there is no halakhic prohibition against being a “false messiah” as such—at most, there are accompanying transgressions such as lying, Sabbath desecration, or false prophecy if the person also claims to be delivering prophetic words in the name of the Holy One, blessed be He. The text distinguishes between a false messiah and a false prophet, and emphasizes that a false prophet is an explicit prohibition counted by the enumerators of the commandments, whereas a false messiah does not necessarily overlap with that, because a messianic claimant can use prophetic language to strengthen his status without actually delivering prophecies. The text argues that precisely because this is a sociological-historical concept, it is hard to derive from it a clear definition, and the lack of a binding halakhic framework allows historical disagreements over figures who were or were not considered messianic in real time.
The flexibility of the label “messianism” and the difficulty of diagnosis
The text describes a reality in which people accuse “messianism” from all directions—“messiahs from the left” and “messiahs from the right”—and slap on the label in order to avoid discussion, because the concept is not well defined. It distinguishes between “one who awaits the Messiah” and “messianic,” and argues that the term “messianism” in its negative sense is usually connected to active, and sometimes irrational, actions to bring the Messiah. It illustrates the uncertainty of diagnosis through Shabbetai Tzvi, in whose early career “very many sages of Israel followed him,” and emphasizes how hard it is to decide who is “right” in the absence of a halakhic ruling, because this is not a halakhic question.
Religious Zionism as a claim to messianism, and the connection between definition and negative judgment
The text presents a paper written by the lecturer’s daughter on the question of whether Zionism or Religious Zionism is “false messianism,” and argues that it is hard to dismiss out of hand the definition of Religious Zionism as a messianic movement, because some of its actions are directed toward “advancing the process of redemption.” It emphasizes that the term “messianism” carries a negative charge, so its definition is intertwined with the question of why the thing is negative; otherwise, “I can define every religious Jew as messianic” simply because he awaits the Messiah. The text argues that a distinction is needed such that the definition explains why the concept receives a negative attitude, and if there is no negativity in the definition, then “I have not identified the concept correctly.”
Messianism as dependent on factual claims, disconfirmation, and the excuses of “we did not merit it”
The text presents messianism as a phenomenon made up to a great extent of factual claims—such as whether a certain person is the Messiah or whether a certain process is part of redemption—and therefore hard to turn into a halakhic topic. It challenges the criterion of “disconfirmation” as proof of false messianism, bringing the example of Rabbi Akiva and Bar Kokhba, alongside a description of the Chabad position according to which “disconfirmation says nothing at all,” because “the Rebbe is the Messiah” and only “the generation did not merit it.” The text argues that such a position makes the thesis unfalsifiable, and sharpens the question of how one can distance oneself from false messianism if there are no clear criteria for distinguishing it.
Sources of the negative connotation: abandoning commandments and the crisis after an expectation that was not fulfilled
The text rejects the claim that the negative connotation of messianism is “postmodern,” and argues that it is ancient, “as old as Jewish history,” even if contemporary political uses are widespread. It points to factors behind the problem, such as abandoning commandments and problematic actions, as well as the fear of psychological and social collapse after an intense expectation is not fulfilled. It brings stories of sages such as Aharon Kotler and the Tzemach Tzedek who swore that “the Messiah will not come,” because people were selling property and heading into crisis if the expectation was disconfirmed. It cites Shulamit Lapid’s book Like a Broken Vessel about rumors in Jerusalem around World War I that eventually led to “mass conversion to Christianity,” and also mentions Rabbi Kalner, who said that if the State of Israel were destroyed, “he would take off his kippah,” as an example of that same mechanism of messianic certainty creating the danger of breakdown.
The Leibowitzian and Ben-Gurion approach: “A messiah who arrived is not the Messiah”
The text lays down a “first stone” through Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who said that “a messiah who arrived is not the Messiah,” and that messianism is a utopia with a psychological role, not a concrete historical event. It also quotes Ben-Gurion: “The Messiah has not yet come, and I do not wish for the Messiah to come. The moment the Messiah comes, he ceases to be the Messiah… when you find the Messiah’s address in the telephone book, he is no longer the Messiah.” The text argues that there is something “terribly Jewish” in this remark: an official declaration of “I believe with perfect faith” alongside a sober wink. It presents a distinction between an extreme ideological position and the practical conduct of many people who relate with suspicion to anyone who declares the imminent realization of the Messiah.
Three possible definitions of negative messianism: belief, action, and problematic action
The text proposes three possible levels of negative messianism. The first identifies messianism with the very belief that the Messiah really is supposed to come, as in the positions of Leibowitz and Ben-Gurion. The second identifies messianism with the transition from theoretical expectation to active action aimed at bringing the Messiah. The third identifies messianism with active actions of a certain kind that are “problematic.” It explains that within this third option there are three types of problematic behavior: actions involving a halakhic prohibition, actions that are not accepted in tradition even if they are not a clear halakhic transgression, and actions contrary to realpolitik and rational judgment, based on the assumption that “God will help” because this is redemption.
Examples of problematic actions: halakhic transgression, “tradition,” and realism
The text gives as an example of activity involving a halakhic transgression “Sheinberg, the rabbi from Safed,” who described married women as being supposed to commit adultery with him “as part of” bringing the Messiah, and defines this as false messianism because the action itself is a transgression. It presents a possible argument against Religious Zionism through cooperation with a legal system that does not operate according to Jewish law, as something that could be considered a halakhic prohibition, though he himself thinks there is justification for cooperating with the system “regardless of redemption.” As an argument of the “not accepted in tradition” type, it mentions the Haredi opposition to cooperation with secular people in building a state, and notes that the claim is not necessarily that this is a halakhic prohibition, but that it does not fit traditional thinking.
Messianism as metaphysical reliance instead of realistic considerations: “If they’re shooting, you have to run away”
The text argues that the sense closest to contemporary use of the term “messianism” is taking “unrealistic” actions while relying on metaphysical considerations, and it cites Ben-Gurion’s remark, “In Israel, one who does not believe in miracles is not realistic,” as a description of that phenomenon. It recounts the discourse during the War of Independence between Rabbi Herzog and the rabbi of Brisk, in which Rabbi Herzog argued, “We have been promised that the Third Temple will not be destroyed,” and therefore there is no need to worry, while the rabbi of Brisk replied, “I have a tradition from my father that when they’re shooting, you have to run away.” The text presents this as a debate in which the Haredi refuses to decide practical matters of life through metaphysics—not necessarily because he denies the metaphysics, but because he insists on making decisions on the basis of realistic considerations.
Religious Zionism versus Vayoel Moshe: two theologies versus a third option without “demons”
The text describes the dispute between the Religious-Zionist theology that sees the state as “the beginning of redemption” and the view of Rabbi Yoelish of Satmar in Vayoel Moshe, which sees it as “an act of Satan,” and presents these as two positions that agree that behind history stands a “demon,” but disagree whether it is “from the side of holiness” or “from the other side.” It lays out a third possibility, according to which there are no “demons behind history,” and historical processes should be approached through the lenses of a historian and realistic judgment, not through a theological conceptual system. The text formulates this as a demand “to make calculations like a gentile,” meaning practical decisions that do not rely on metaphysics even if the person observes commandments.
A qualification: observing commandments with realistic considerations versus pushing realism aside in the name of redemption
The text qualifies that “thinking like a gentile” does not mean that someone who acts in order to fulfill commandments, such as settling the Land, is messianic. Rather, one must combine halakhic considerations with realistic ones, without allowing metaphysics to “replace” realism. It argues that negative messianism arises when people say that if this is a commandment or redemption, then “the Holy One, blessed be He, is with me,” and so there is no need for a realistic reckoning of cost and probability. It gives the principled example that even an “obligatory war” does not justify going to war if the realistic assessment is that they will not win, and formulates this as a demand not to mix Torah-metaphysical considerations into the realistic decision itself.
The draft debate and the criticism of the discourse of “an obligatory war”
The text presents a problem with the Religious-Zionist discourse that tries to persuade Haredim to enlist by invoking “an obligatory war of helping Israel against an enemy,” and argues that the correct reason is a realistic consideration of danger: “you need to enlist because they’re shooting.” It argues that even if they were in the same situation in Belgium, without the framework of “helping Israel against an enemy,” preservation of life would still require action, and therefore the argument in terms of commandment is “a great piece of nonsense,” making the debate similar to the Rabbi Herzog–rabbi of Brisk discussion. It concludes with the claim that “messianism is taking unrealistic actions on the basis of metaphysical considerations,” and that this is also the sense in which secular discourse accuses people of messianism when religious actions carry heavy costs out of unrealistic confidence.
Conclusion and technical announcement
The lecturer stops the discussion and announces a time change: “Tomorrow at nine and not at eight-thirty,” because of the clock change, and ends with “Shabbat shalom and goodbye.”
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s begin. We talked—we started talking a bit within this basic framework of the coming of the Messiah—we started talking a bit about the phenomenon of messianism. Among other things, after we talked about the obligation itself to believe in the coming of the Messiah, this principle of Maimonides, we talked about signs of the Messiah, about awaiting the Messiah, about the prohibition against engaging in calculations of the end, and about the dispute between Rashi and Arukh LaNer over how much we are supposed to take part in the process of redemption, or whether it is supposed to happen through the Holy One, blessed be He—yes, the Temple will descend to us built from heaven, and not that we are supposed to do the acts to build it, yes, or take actions on our side to advance the process of redemption. I think that’s where I finished last time. Now, an important general remark about this whole discussion is: how should we relate to the phenomenon of a false messiah, or false messianism, or yes, this whole family of concepts—how should we relate to it in principle? And we do not find, if you look in the sources of Jewish law, the concept of a false messiah doesn’t really appear. Yes, it’s a sociological concept, not a halakhic one. We do not find in Jewish law a prohibition against being a false messiah. There is no such prohibition. Meaning, at most, if you lie, then you violated the prohibition against lying, but false messianism is not defined in Jewish law as a prohibition. And that basically means that this concept of false messianism, or of messianism in general—let’s talk about messianism; false messianism for now at least—is a concept that is more sociological-historical than religious and halakhic. Simply put, when you say about someone that he is a false messiah, you have not thereby said that he violated a prohibition, even though the connotation this term usually arouses is of course a negative one.
[Speaker B] Doesn’t that overlap with the prohibition of a false prophet? Doesn’t it overlap with the prohibition of a false prophet?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in my opinion it doesn’t. On the contrary—I was just about to say exactly that. I think the parallel concept here can sharpen this claim a bit. There is an explicit prohibition in Jewish law against being a false prophet. Meaning, it is counted by all those who enumerate the commandments. It is a clear part of Jewish law. In other words, someone who prophesies a false prophecy violates a prohibition. And when I take that into account, and I ask myself whether there is a parallel prohibition against being a false messiah—I do not find one. Now, you can say that the Messiah is in fact some kind of prophecy, because he basically says that the Holy One, blessed be He, revealed Himself to him and told him, I don’t know, to do such-and-such. But that is not the definition—at least not the simple definition—of the concept of a prophet. When we say prophet—well, here a false messiah may perhaps use concepts from the world of prophecy to strengthen his status. Meaning: the Holy One, blessed be He, told me that I am the prophet, I am the Messiah, and my role is to save Israel and do such-and-such. So that can be an argument that strengthens his status as Messiah, but he is not—at least not inherently—not saying things in the name of the Holy One, blessed be He, and delivering to us prophecies that never existed. If he does that, then he violates the prohibition of a false prophet. But if I want to clarify whether there is a prohibition against being a false messiah, then I want to separate that from the question of false prophecy. So let’s say we are talking about a messiah who does not prophesy. He does not deliver prophecies to us. Because if he also desecrates the Sabbath, then he violated the prohibition of Sabbath desecration, fine, but that does not mean that being a false messiah is a prohibition. Obviously, if you are a false messiah and that leads you to commit prohibitions, then you committed prohibitions. But I am asking whether the very fact of being a false messiah is a prohibition. And here, at least, I do not find that. Meaning, I do not think it falls under the definition of a false prophet. And therefore I think that at most you can say that if he is a false prophet then he is foolish, he is unstable, he is a liar, maybe he is harmful, maybe various other things—but there is no criminality here, in the halakhic sense. And that, in turn, means that if this really is a historical-sociological concept, then it is very hard to try and clarify what it means. If it were a halakhic concept, I could search the sources of Jewish law to see what exactly Jewish law prohibited, and from that I could try to define the concept of false messiah. But if it is not a halakhic concept—if it is a historical-sociological concept—even though sages throughout the generations do of course relate to it negatively, still, fine, people can relate negatively to lots of things, all kinds of people for all kinds of reasons. But from there to extracting a clear definition of what this concept, false messiah, actually means—that will be pretty difficult. Because today, for example, you can hear all kinds of discussions about messianism nowadays, and people accuse all kinds of others of messianism—by the way, from every direction. There are messiahs from the left, messiahs from the right, religious messiahs, secular messiahs. Everyone who doesn’t—well, not everyone, but many of those I don’t like—I stick the label “messianic” and “false messianism” on them, and then I’m exempt from continuing the discussion. And you can at least get the impression that this usage is possible because the concept of messianism or false messianism is not well defined. It’s not well defined, and therefore it can be used manipulatively, flexibly. It’s very hard to point and say: let’s examine this—is he really a false messiah, or is he messianic or not messianic? Someone who awaits the Messiah is not what we call messianic. Fine, we call him someone who awaits the Messiah. Okay, so what? Usually this is connected to some kind of irrational actions, some sort of active attempts to bring the Messiah, or I don’t know what, various other things that maybe I’ll try to define more as we go on. But it is very hard to define. And mainly, I think, it is hard to define because it is not a halakhic concept. A halakhic concept can have disputes, but we have the framework within which the discussion can be conducted. I can bring sources, interpret them this way or that way—we have a way to conduct the discussion. With a concept that does not belong to the world of Jewish law, at most I can investigate historically to whom people related as a false messiah. But how do you know? I mean, there can be people who regarded someone as a false messiah and other people who did not. So who is right? How do I decide who is right, if there even is such a thing as right here? After all, there is no halakhic ruling here; this is not a halakhic question. Yes, even with Shabbetai Tzvi, very many sages of Israel, some of the prominent later authorities (Acharonim), followed him. Meaning, they did not think—at least at first—that he was a false messiah. Later he was disconfirmed and everything that happened there, okay. But the point is: when you encounter the phenomenon of messianism or false messianism, it is not at all simple to put your finger on it and distinguish—even before the question of what to do with a false messiah—whether this is even a false messiah in the first place, whether this is messianism at all. And therefore I said that these lectures are based on a paper my daughter did. I supervised her, but it was a paper she did on the question of whether Zionism is false messianism, or whether Religious Zionism is false messianism. There is room to say yes. Quite a few people today think so—that Religious Zionist messianism is messianism, that this is a messianic movement. False messianism—that already, the “false” is an additional religious layer. In the public discourse people speak about you being messianic, not about you being a false messiah, but really these are very close concepts. And for you, as someone who belongs to the religious public—especially someone in the Religious Zionist public—that puts him in an even more awkward position, because when you ask yourself honestly whether this isn’t true—maybe yes. What exactly is the definition? After all, Religious Zionism does await the Messiah and does take practical steps to advance his coming. Isn’t that the definition—isn’t that the definition—of a messianic movement? It seems that on the face of it, yes. So basically yes, it is true to say that this movement or this group is a messianic group. Now of course you can distinguish between different shades. There are those who take more active steps, less active steps, those who want to bring the Messiah from the right and those who want to bring the Messiah from the left. But in the end, some people at least are taking actions whose declared purpose is to advance the process of redemption. That is part of what motivates people in doing all kinds of things, part of their worldview. So I think it is hard to dismiss out of hand the claim that this is a messianic group. Now fine, you can say this is a messianic group—so what? What is wrong with being a messianic group? And that sharpens the second point exactly. First, diagnosis—what is a messianic group? What is messianism, what is false messianism? Second, is it bad? Meaning, after I define it, in a certain sense I have to connect the two questions, because since the concept of messianism—as distinct from awaiting the Messiah in some theoretical passive way—the concept of messianism has a negative connotation, therefore when I look for the definition of the concept, I cannot ignore that. The definition has to be such that it explains why such a thing deserves a negative attitude. Meaning, that is part of the tools by which I can search for the definition. Therefore the two questions—what is the definition of the concept, and whether or why it is negative—are intertwined. They are two questions, but they are interwoven. Because otherwise I can define every religious Jew as messianic. He is messianic in the sense that he awaits the Messiah. Okay, but that is not negative. Therefore, when we speak about messianism in the sense that carries a negative connotation, we cannot disconnect the question of what messianism is from the question of why it is negative. And when I try to identify it, I will have to see why the concept I identified is in fact negative. Because if it is not negative, then I did not identify the concept correctly. This whole discussion is extremely slippery. When we started dealing with it—that’s why I told her, I suggested this topic to her. I said, listen, this is a fascinating topic, because I do not know what answer you will reach at the end. In other words, this is a question where I really am not sure how to handle it at all. It is very slippery. There are religious connotations, many rabbis, halakhic decisors, and so on have related to it, but there is no halakhic tool with which to handle it. You can survey what happened in history—and she did that—and try to understand the meaning of the matter from there. But on the other hand, history is facts. Meaning, it could be that all the sages of Israel saw certain phenomena as false messianism or as messianism in the negative sense, and I can say, “I disagree.” Here we return to our discussion about dogmatics and principles, namely that since we are dealing with matters of thought, factual claims, then it does not seem to me that they can be assigned binding force—that I must, from some religious standpoint, accept them. If I disagree, then I disagree, especially if this is a factual question. After all, the question whether someone standing before me is the Messiah or not is a factual question. Therefore, if I assess that he is the Messiah, you cannot say to me, “Then you are messianic.” That’s my assessment—what do you want? Do you want me to give up my assessment because if I assess it that way you call me messianic? Yes, this reminds you of all the discussions we had about Maimonides’ principles, about Maimonides’ foundations in this sense of giving authority or validity to factual claims. And messianism is definitely something composed to a large extent—I don’t know if only of this, but to a large extent—of factual claims. Meaning, the question really is whether a certain process is part of redemption, whether a certain person is the Messiah or is not the Messiah—apparently these are factual questions. And if so, it becomes even clearer why this cannot be a halakhic subject. Because in the end, the Messiah is supposed to come, and when the Messiah comes, then in the end it will become clear that he really is the Messiah. So is someone who said about him that he is the Messiah still messianic, even though in the end his messianism turned out to be correct? Meaning, not every time I identify a messiah, am I messianic? Right? So what is it, then? Is it the eventual disconfirmation of the process? Meaning, if in the end it turns out that he is not the Messiah, that I misdiagnosed, is that what makes me messianic, or part of a false messianic movement? What, just because in the end it was disconfirmed? So I made a mistake in diagnosis. In the end some Messiah will come who will not be disconfirmed, right? That is part of belief in the coming of the Messiah. So the fact that I made a mistake in diagnosis and the messiah I thought was the Messiah turned out in the end not to be—what can I do? I diagnosed wrongly. Like Rabbi Akiva and Bar Kokhba, right? He thought he was the Messiah, and in the end it was disconfirmed. Especially—yes, ask the Chabad people, and they will explain to you that disconfirmation means absolutely nothing. Because in fact the Rebbe is the Messiah, he was the Messiah and remains the Messiah, and really it is we who did not merit it, and therefore in the end it did not come to fruition. That was not false messianism, heaven forbid; no one there says such a thing. Rather, what? He really was the Messiah; the generation did not merit it. Well then, if that is so, even disconfirmation is no longer a criterion. Meaning, even if in the end it turns out he is not the Messiah—he died in the end, or he did not succeed, or things like that—fine, so what? So it was disconfirmed in the end, it didn’t work, the generation did not merit it. Then we have completely lost the ability to make this kind of diagnosis of false messianism. So what then? Is the concept empty?
[Speaker C] So what you said earlier—that regarding Shabbetai Tzvi, you can’t really—there’s a dispute whether he was a false messiah or not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there were disputes then, not today. Meaning, in his own time.
[Speaker C] Meaning that it’s hard to define whether a certain figure is a false messiah or not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So I said that at the time, in the early phase of Shabbetai Tzvi, very many sages of Israel followed him.
[Speaker C] But the retrospective clarification counts.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what is retrospective clarification? The fact that in the end he did not succeed—that’s true. The Rebbe of Lubavitch also, in the end, did not succeed. So you can say, because the generation did not merit it. With Shabbetai Tzvi, other things also happened. People also converted to Islam, people also abandoned the commandments. Okay, we’ll still talk about that. But at the principled level, the very disconfirmation of the process is hard to see as a criterion. The fact that I—that I did not diagnose well—fine, what can I do? So I did not correctly read the meaning of history and the metaphysics standing behind historical processes. Okay, that can happen.
[Speaker C] So seemingly there is, let’s call it, a true messiah, a false messiah, and a messiah whom the generation did not merit, let’s call it that? Meaning, a messiah that didn’t end up being realized.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. I’m saying I don’t know—I’m searching. I’m only showing the difficulty and the complexity in the search, because for everything there is an excuse that basically leaves you legitimate. Even the final disconfirmation—that’s what I brought from the Chabad people—even the final disconfirmation, which is ostensibly the supreme criterion, they pull the ground out from under even that criterion. It turns into an unfalsifiable thesis, because no matter what happens, I will not have to give up the claim that the Rebbe is the Messiah. No matter what happens.
[Speaker C] Let’s say the Bar Kokhba story—maybe that’s some kind of example of something that really existed in potential and wasn’t realized. I think Maimonides also notes such a possibility, and he’s not a false messiah. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying again, this is not an accusation against the Chabad people—I don’t agree with them. But their claim is a possible claim. Meaning, that’s exactly why I’m saying that precisely because this claim is a tenable one, a possible one, then what do we do? How can I examine what messianism is, what a false messiah is, how can I distance myself from phenomena of false messianism if I do not know how to diagnose them? How can I condemn them if really—what’s the problem? All in all I identified the Messiah here. It may even be that I was right; it’s just that, what can I do, we did not merit it. On the contrary—then the people I would blame are those who did not allow the Messiah to act, not those who tried to help him and whom we undermined.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, correct me if I’m wrong, but it seems to me that the concept of messianism with a negative connotation is actually very postmodern. I really think you hear it most nowadays דווקא from the left side of the political map. That’s true, but it’s not—with all the Smotrich and all these people as messianic, like some sort of utopia.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a use people make of the term for current political purposes. The concept was not born today, and I’m not—
[Speaker D] I’m not talking about the concept, I’m talking about the negative connotation of the concept.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The negative connotation of a messianic movement is ancient—as old as Jewish history. It was not born today.
[Speaker D] When was it negative to be messianic?
[Speaker E] Surely it was born together with Christianity, surely—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe.
[Speaker E] It was born with Christianity, with Jesus.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying that with Jesus, in the end there really were symptoms—I haven’t yet gone into the symptoms—there were symptoms there of abandoning the commandments, okay, so there it’s already blatant. But no, there was also a negative attitude toward messianism even apart from that. I’ll bring some examples without going into too much detail, and then I hope it will be more grounded. In short, the problem, the problematic side people see in false messianism—much of it may perhaps be the abandonment of commandments, various problematic actions; and a large part of it is what I discussed in the previous lecture: the fear of the consequences after disconfirmation. I think I brought those stories about sages who banged on the table and swore that the Messiah would not come. Aharon Kotler and the Tzemach Tzedek and there were a few others—because they felt that people were losing their—meaning, they were selling their property because the Messiah was just about to come and everything, and then there would be a terrible collapse. Meaning, if in the end the Messiah did not come, there would be a crazy crisis. So that fear led certain sages to swear that the Messiah was not about to come. For me, though, I’m only saying that here we see part of the reason why we view the phenomenon of messianism as problematic—because it has problematic consequences. Disconfirmation in this case is not an indication that you were a false messiah, as the Chabad people say, or at least it may not be an indication. But still, if his messianism is in fact disconfirmed—even if he was a true messiah and it’s just that we did not merit it—the crisis this can create is itself a concern. Not because it proves the messiah was false. Even if he is a true messiah, it is still a messianic movement, and a messianic movement is problematic because of the fear of disconfirmation. Because if you are disconfirmed—and maybe you won’t be, maybe you are a true messiah—but if you are disconfirmed, a very great crisis can be created. I mentioned, I think—yes—Shulamit Lapid’s book, right? Like a Broken Vessel, where she talks about this phenomenon that occurred, I think around World War I in Jerusalem, when once again there were rumors that the Messiah was just about to come. There was enormous distress there—the Messiah is just about to come. Of course in the end the Messiah did not come, and there was mass conversion to Christianity there. Meaning, people are not all that aware of this in the old yishuv, yes? The pious people of the old yishuv—there was mass conversion of Jews in Jerusalem to Christianity there. Because there was terrible despair: the Messiah did not come, so there’s no point, let’s shut down the whole business. I think I also mentioned Kalner, right? Rabbi Kalner, one of the rabbis of Har Hamor, yes, of the “Kav.” He said that if the State of Israel is destroyed, he will take off his kippah. Meaning, this is exactly the same phenomenon. His messianism is rooted in the fact that for him it is absolutely obvious, with total certainty, that the State of Israel is the arrival of the Messiah. If that is disconfirmed, he takes off the kippah. He declares it. It doesn’t even have to get to the stage where it happens and then the crisis is created—he is already declaring now that this is what will happen there. And this is exactly an indication of a certain kind of problematicity—or problematicity in general—that people see in messianic phenomena. And note that this is not necessarily the problematicity of a false messiah, because even if I claim, like the Chabad people say, that a messiah who was disconfirmed is not a false messiah, it’s just that we did not merit it, the problematicity remains. Because not everyone will buy the Chabad excuses, and some people will say: okay—and leave everything. By the way, there really was a major fear of this when the Rebbe of Chabad died, and it didn’t happen. Again, there may have been phenomena there—I didn’t check the details exactly—but there wasn’t some mass abandonment of the—meaning, just as they bought the line that he is the Messiah, they also bought the line that only because we did not merit it he didn’t come, so everything is fine. As a friend of mine always says: if you make mistakes, always make them in pairs. There’s a chance one mistake will cancel out the other and you’ll arrive at the right answer. Yes, he told me that when someone resolves a “requires further analysis” of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, all it means is that he has one more mistake than Rabbi Akiva Eiger. Meaning, if Rabbi Akiva Eiger remained with a “requires further analysis” on the Talmudic text, then it means he missed something—there was something in the Talmudic text he didn’t understand. If you answer Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s difficulty, you certainly weren’t smarter than him—you can only be more foolish than him—so it just means you made one additional mistake that canceled out his mistake, and that’s why you reached the correct answer. Okay.
[Speaker F] Or there was a mistake in the Talmudic text.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A cute bit of pilpul. What?
[Speaker F] Or there was a mistake in the Talmudic text.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s impossible. Ask him—he’d destroy you if you said such a thing. But yes, mistakes accumulate. Meaning, the one who raises the question has one mistake, the one who resolves it has two mistakes, the one who objects to my resolution has three mistakes, the one who resolves that question has four mistakes, and so on. And all this on the assumption that the questioner is lesser than the responder and the responder is lesser than the questioner—yes? If there is decline of the generations, then that means we are only accumulating mistakes. Meaning, we never really progress in understanding, yes? So therefore there is no point in resolving the difficulties of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and the later authorities (Acharonim), because if you resolve them, all it means is that you have one more mistake than they do. That’s all. And if you raise a difficulty against the resolution, you have one more mistake still. Therefore there is no point in engaging in these things at all. It is only a scriptural decree, so to speak, that we resolve difficulties according to his approach. Meaning, there is a scriptural decree that even though we are in fact only accumulating mistakes, nevertheless for this we receive reward—the reward of Torah study. Yes, the ways of Haredi thought are wondrous. Anyway, so the claim is that… Rabbi?
[Speaker G] What? What does the rabbi think about the fear of the sixth millennium? Meaning, there are many in the Haredi public who really think—I don’t know how it is in the religious public—but that in the sixth millennium there is going to be an apocalypse. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like the Y2K bug—it was a nice try. Fine, what do I think about it? I don’t think anything about it. Somebody invented an invention…
[Speaker G] No, I mean that nobody goes out against that sort of thing the way the rabbi brought with Rabbi Kotler, for example, regarding the Messiah, in order to…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, I assume nobody will come out against this as long as you’re, what, two hundred—where are we? Two hundred and twenty. We still have another two hundred and twenty years. That’ll be a problem for our great-great-grandchildren or something like that. By then someone will already be found who will swear and say it never happened and never existed, everything’s fine, no worries. It’ll be fine. It’s Y2K, the Jewish Y2K. Somebody invented an invention and it turned into a principle of faith, like we have many such phenomena. It’s fine, we manage with it in the end. The art of Jewish thought is not to put anything to a real test. That’s the principle. Every time you try to make a claim that can actually be tested, you’re a heretic. Yes, think about it: “Test Me in this,” right? I spoke about Divine providence and all kinds of promises. “Test Me in this” means you’re allowed to test the Holy One, blessed be He, regarding tithes; you’re not allowed to test Him in anything else, but regarding tithes, yes, okay? So in the other things we certainly won’t test the Holy One, blessed be He, because it’s forbidden, so there’s no problem at all, we’re all set. But there’s one thing where it is allowed to test Him, so why doesn’t anyone do a systematic, orderly study to see whether someone who separates a tithe really does become wealthy? “Tithe so that you may become rich.” You can try it; it’s permitted to test the Holy One, blessed be He: “Test Me in this.” True, maybe that means a tithe of produce and not a tithe of money; there’s room to discuss that. I promise you that even anyone who says this about monetary tithe—still nobody will do a systematic test to check it. And why not? Because everybody knows that in the end the test will fail. So we protect ourselves. By the way, unlike the Christians, for example. Christians are serious people, not like us. Christians—many Christians, meaning the evangelicals and the fundamentalist Christians—when they believe in something, they really believe it. They’re not joking around. They don’t make excuses: no, that’s only when all its inhabitants dwell upon it, and there’s no promise that after the seventh year we’ll have produce, before the seventh year we’ll have double produce, because today the Sabbatical year in our times is rabbinic, so the promise wasn’t said. And where is this one’s long life? After all, the Torah promises long life for honoring parents and for sending away the mother bird, and Elisha ben Avuya sees that person who did both those things and then fell and died. So he draws the conclusions, because he was a Christian. Jews say, okay, if necessary we’ll give an answer and keep going to the next Tosafot, as they say about Rabbi Akiva Eiger. Yes, I mean, we’re used to the fact that our beliefs aren’t supposed to stand up to a factual test. A Jew is a pragmatic person. They don’t really believe—between us, we don’t really believe the things we declare that we believe. When it has to stand a real test, we’ll all explain that it’s not exactly that, and not now, and we’ll do it indirectly, and all kinds of things like that. With Christians it doesn’t work that way. If Christians oppose abortions, they’ll burn down the clinic that performs them. I mean, if Christians think that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world and there’s no evolution, then they establish whole research institutes that show the bugs in evolution, and they fight for it and set up media networks and work on this, put dozens and hundreds of serious researchers on it who work on the matter and try to show that evolution is not a correct scientific theory. With Jews, you ask them: evolution? They say, yes, evolution, fine, yes, it fits with faith, no problem, okay, so the creation of the world is an allegory, everything’s fine, we can work with anything. Meaning, we don’t really believe these things, yes. Let’s be honest among ourselves. And that remark, by the way, is important for the series we’re talking about here, because this series speaks precisely about those points, about this dogmatics—that is, about the principles that supposedly we are obligated to believe. Right? Now, I spoke about the question of the problematic nature of being obligated to believe something, but from Maimonides’ perspective, and that’s how most of the public accepts it, yes, these are binding principles. So of course we’ll all recite them loudly and in a completely clear and unequivocal way. In practice, we usually won’t do anything with them. Someone who does act in light of these things, usually we’ll see him as messianic. All these fundamentalist Christians among us would be called messianic. Because someone who thinks that the establishment of the State of Israel really is the Third Temple, and the Third Temple will not be destroyed, and so on, and therefore also draws conclusions and takes action and so forth—that’s already messianic. Why messianic? He simply believes what the prophets said and draws the conclusions. What’s the problem? You’re allowed to believe, but not to act accordingly. Acting accordingly is already messianism, because somehow the feeling is that we don’t really believe this story. We sell ourselves all kinds of things. Now by the way, I’m like that too. I mean, I’m like that too; I just from the outset don’t regard these things as binding beliefs, because I don’t believe in an obligation to accept factual claims, to believe factual claims. But most people do accept it. They accept it—but with a wink. That is, they accept it with a wink. Yes.
[Speaker D] What Rabbi just said reminds me very much, I think, of the second book of the trilogy, where Rabbi talks about the creation of the world and the whole Book of Genesis. About the obligation to accept factual claims, to believe factual claims. But most people do accept it, they accept it but with a wink. They accept it with a wink, yes. What Rabbi just said reminds me of, I think, the second book of the trilogy, where Rabbi talks about the creation of the world and the whole book—basically the whole Book of Genesis. After all, when we talk about dogmatics, okay, then Maimonides’ thirteen principles—Maimonides, with all due respect—but when we’re talking about the Book of Genesis, which is literally Torah given at Sinai—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Serious Christians don’t accept the Big Bang, or evolution, or anything, because Scripture said otherwise. Tell a Protestant something against Scripture—he’ll hang you. Factually, without commentators and interpretations, interpretations and excuses. Not Protestant—not all Protestants—but the evangelical branches, yes, the American Bible Belt. Yes exactly, a literal conservative. Yes, a literal conservative not in Jewish law, a literal conservative in his attitude toward Scripture. For him, what they say in the name of the Rabbi of Brisk: the Rabbi of Brisk says that if they said the messiah will come on a white donkey, then he’ll come on a white donkey and not in a white Mercedes, and certainly not in a yellow Mercedes. He’ll come on a white donkey. Now I don’t believe he himself believed that. Jews don’t really believe that.
[Speaker D] No, but again I return to the point about the Book of Genesis, which is unequivocally much more binding than the facts of Maimonides. And there are lots of facts there—it’s only facts, the Book of Genesis. So how binding is that on me? And despite the fact that it’s a fact, I mean, I don’t know, you decide.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying: as far as I’m concerned, if I become convinced that scientifically this description is incorrect, then it’s incorrect. I’m not bothered by it. I’m Jewish, you know—Jews know what to do with their beliefs. Even though it’s from the Torah itself. Yes, and I claim there’s no point learning these things either, because they teach me nothing.
[Speaker D] No, but we’re not talking about learning, we’re talking now about believing. Since it comes from the Torah, it’s more binding than Maimonides.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand. Since I can’t extract from it any factual claim, then there’s no point learning it either. Meaning, because I don’t believe it, there’s also no point learning it. These aren’t two questions; it’s the same question. What do you mean I don’t believe it? I do believe that the Torah was given by the Holy One, blessed be He, but I do not accept the content of the Torah as binding factual claims. So if it contradicts any scientific findings, I’ll say, okay, then it’s a founding myth, an educational myth, I don’t know, some allegorical description or another. That’s all fine. But if that’s really the case, then what’s the point of dealing with this thing? Basically you can’t get anything out of it. Anything that doesn’t fit, you’ll say, okay, then it’s only an allegory. Fine, everything’s fine. I really do think that’s true. But why deal with it? I mean, if something teaches you nothing, then there’s no point in dealing with it.
[Speaker D] Actually I think that in the book Rabbi explains it a little differently, also about the age of the universe, and there are all kinds of answers there for how Torah and science can somehow connect after all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: how can they connect? If what the Torah says isn’t really what it writes. Fine, then that’s obvious. That’s exactly what I’m talking about. I’m not claiming that this part was not given by the Holy One, blessed be He. I’m claiming that this part should not be taken as factual claims. And that’s exactly the way we reconcile Torah and science—or I don’t know, “we”; I do. Okay? There are those who will proclaim “science is false and our Torah is true,” like at the beginning of Rabbi Wolf’s book from the seminar. So a friend of mine told me—I didn’t see it inside—he told me the book begins with the following wondrous sentence: “Science is false and our Torah is true.” I’d bet that if he were sick, he wouldn’t go to “our Torah,” he’d go to a doctor. But that’s my bet; maybe I’m wrong. Okay?
[Speaker D] So the Torah can be true because it comes from God, but still what He gave is an allegory.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and what does that truth say? You know, it’s like saying the Talmud has halakhic authority; you don’t disagree with the Talmud. But you understand that the interpretive freedom we have regarding passages in the Talmud is so great that this is almost an empty statement. To say that we don’t disagree with the Talmud and what it says is binding. Because commentators can do so many somersaults there and creative interpretations and reconcile passages and determine that there is a dispute between passages and leave a difficult passage unresolved and things of that kind—so how much is really left when we say we’re committed to the Talmud? Now I wrote about this. I actually think it does mean something with regard to the Talmud and Jewish law much more than with regard to the Torah. But still, the idea is an idea that exists here too. You can be committed to something and still leave yourself such enormous interpretive freedom that this commitment basically remains a dead letter. Meaning, okay, so I’m completely committed to what you say—I’ll just interpret what you say in whatever way I want. Fine, so in what sense is that called commitment?
[Speaker D] No, so I mean, fine—am I fulfilling the obligation if I understand what you wrote as allegory and not as… I think yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m only saying that if I understand it as allegory, and basically everyone can make it into whatever allegory he wants, then really—why deal with it? Why waste time on it? And in the Talmud too, then? No, I don’t think so regarding the Talmud. That’s why I said: regarding the Talmud I don’t agree. I brought it as an example, but in fact I don’t agree with the example. There is great interpretive freedom, but it’s not true that commitment to the Talmud has no meaning. Anyone who opens responsa and discussions among medieval authorities and later authorities will see that. Why? Because—
[Speaker H] Because there, because this freedom is limited? Because there are things you really can’t do?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. There, you know, there are interpretations that are more reasonable and less reasonable. The Talmud is also a creation of flesh-and-blood people, so you won’t make there the kinds of forced interpretations that you’re willing to make in the Torah. What the Holy One, blessed be He, intended—who knows? His ways are far removed from the form of our thought. In the Gemara we’re talking about human beings; you won’t say something else in exactly the same… But the Gemara gives the Mishnah the stupidest forced readings.
[Speaker H] If they wrote something, they meant what they wrote. But the Gemara says “something is missing here and this is what it teaches,” and there they sometimes completely reverse formulations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Something is missing here and this is what it teaches”—that is still far from the interpretive freedom we have in the Torah. And when they do that there, they also do it based on other sources that are themselves found in the Gemara, and then you somehow have to maneuver in order to interpret the Gemara. And it’s also not done all that much. But that’s why I say, let’s ask honestly—
[Speaker H] What are the chances that if someone tells me a line of reasoning in some difficult passage, I’ll be able to refute him from some other Gemara? Usually if he’s stubborn, it won’t happen.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he’s stubborn, that’s not interesting. I’m talking about someone who is prepared to preserve intellectual honesty and understand when he’s saying something unreasonable. Anything can be propped up somehow with difficulty, but if you insist on intellectual honesty and you really do stick to what is reasonable and unreasonable, then yes, discussion has meaning. You can bring proofs and tell a person: no, you’re mistaken, because this contradicts the passage here, the passage there. Things like that are done; you can’t ignore it. Now the question is: where does interpretive freedom stop? At the point where you go beyond intellectual honesty. Where’s the line? I don’t know where the line is. They also always say it’s better to strain the language than to strain the reasoning, right? I heard that in the name of the Chazon Ish.
[Speaker H] So maybe in the Torah too there’s such a line, it’s just farther away?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And maybe nobody can find it? But I don’t see anything I can learn from the Torah in some way where I think one way, but the Torah says otherwise, and therefore clearly you’re wrong. No, I haven’t found a place where anyone learned something new from the Torah. I haven’t found it. There isn’t a single example.
[Speaker H] The fact that Moses our teacher—this is also something you could say—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not talking about facts; I’m talking about values.
[Speaker H] Regarding facts there is a limit to what one can—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Facts, yes. There was Abraham our father, there was the revelation at Mount Sinai, there was Moses our teacher—in the simple sense, yes. To tell me that all these were allegory—by the way, that too existed. There was Yedaya HaPenini and the allegorists and Philo and various people like that who interpreted it allegorically; there were such people. But I think that’s unreasonable. It’s unreasonable.
[Speaker H] So we’re back to the point that regarding facts too one can learn from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh)? So at least that, maybe we’re not obligated, but there is plausibility to what’s written there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The facts of the Torah I know; I don’t need to spend too much time on that Torah, I know that already. You want to dig into the Torah and find what the ideas are—
[Speaker H] No, the ones that contradict science. We’re talking here in our topic about those that collide with science, for example.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I’m saying is: the moment it collides with science, I’ll reject it. I’ll reject it, I’ll say it’s a founding myth. Meaning also—
[Speaker H] So even regarding facts we have some very serious freedom.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Meaning, where it contradicts something in which I have strong confidence, then I won’t accept it. Basically, when you look at Scripture, I think you also can’t help but be impressed by the fact that the first chapter of Genesis, or even the first two chapters of Genesis, don’t look like the end of Genesis, and certainly not the continuation. The end of Genesis looks like a historical chronicle. You can accept that it happened, you can accept that it didn’t happen, but the plain sense is that this is a historical chronicle. Joseph went down to Egypt, the brothers came, these events, those events—events described like in any book. The beginning of Genesis, the seven days of creation—it smells like some kind of myth. It doesn’t smell like a dry factual description, like a historical chronicle. And in fact Nachmanides says this even before he heard about the Big Bang and evolution. He says that Genesis has no plain sense at all—I mean, the creation section has no plain sense at all, only allegory for all kinds of secrets and things of that kind. Not secrets alongside the plain sense—in place of the plain sense. Meaning, what gives him the right to say that? Maybe there was no need to answer evolution and the Big Bang—he hadn’t heard of them yet. Yes, but you can see from the character of the text that we’re dealing here with some kind of myth. It’s like myths.
[Speaker H] So maybe just as we make a certain hierarchy within the work of the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), maybe regarding things that can be extracted on the level of values too, one should distinguish between one level and another.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no a priori claim. If you do it, fine, health to you. I just don’t find it.
[Speaker H] When a prophet appears and speaks, usually you can extract more precise things from that than maybe—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t find such things. If it happens, please—I have no principled objection, on the contrary. The picture I’m describing is hard for me, because I would have expected that one could learn something from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh); after all, we’re supposed to study it. But in practice, I say, I can’t deny the facts. In terms of the facts, I see that no. You can’t learn from it. Everything people learn from it is only things they already thought were true beforehand.
[Speaker I] What do you mean you can’t learn anything? You can’t learn from the fact that Abraham our father didn’t want to send Hagar into the desert and the Holy One, blessed be He, tells him, listen to your wife? You can’t learn something from that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the classic example—you’re bursting through an open door here. The argument between the kollel fellow and his wife, where his wife says to him, listen, after all the Holy One, blessed be He, says to Abraham our father, “Whatever Sarah tells you, listen to her voice.” What does the kollel fellow say to her? He says the opposite: from here there’s proof that one should not listen to one’s wife, because that’s why there had to be a special decree of Scripture concerning Abraham our father that he should listen to Sarah. And everything is perfect, everything is excellent. Everything is nicely settled. In the end, you’ll take this text wherever you thought was correct before you started dealing with it. I mean, it will always be like that. It’s like the Holocaust, you know? The Holocaust proves Zionism was right, or the Holocaust proves opposition to Zionism was right. These explain that the Holocaust is a punishment for Zionism, and those explain that the Holocaust is a punishment for opposition to Zionism. So that means you can’t learn anything from the Holocaust.
[Speaker H] Or maybe you simply have to use the honesty you spoke about earlier regarding the Talmud.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there can be one kind and there can be another. If I think Zionism is a blessed thing, then my honesty says the Holocaust is a punishment for the opposition.
[Speaker H] I meant, for example, the case you brought with the kollel fellow. But the case you brought earlier—it seems that most people, on first instinct, would say the kollel fellow is the one manipulating, and she is the one reading the text correctly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Gemara makes considerations like these. The Gemara makes considerations where, on the one hand, something that left the general rule did not leave in order to teach about itself but in order to teach about the whole rule. On the other hand, sometimes something that left the general rule teaches about itself, and from here it emerges that the general rule is the opposite, because we needed the special decree of Scripture here since ordinarily it’s not like that. There are such considerations in the sages, and there are such considerations in the sages. And by the way, this is also true in Jewish law. It’s even in Jewish law, not only in values. And in Jewish law I wrote about this too; I also gave a few lectures on the issue—when you say this and when you say that. The question is whether the simple assumption seems reasonable to us or unreasonable to us. Never mind, but it could be that there is some criterion that says when you use this consideration and when you use that one. I think I also wrote about this in some column. Why does every verse teach the opposite of what it says? Yes, that’s the example with Abraham and Sarah. After all it says, “Whatever Sarah tells you, listen to her voice.” From here they learn that a person is forbidden to listen to his wife. Every verse teaches the opposite of what it says, because if the verse itself teaches the correct principle, then it doesn’t need to say it. Why do you need the verse? You need the verse to tell you that here this is not the ordinary reality; here it’s something else. Maybe this way, maybe that way. An analogy says not that way. Okay, I don’t know. When do you say this, when do you say that? In the end you’ll say what you thought in advance was correct. And I think that’s part of the difference—I’m wandering a bit here—I think that’s part of the difference between Jewish law and non-halakhic passages. Because in the realm of Jewish law, in a large part at least of the areas of Jewish law, we don’t have some initial intuition of what is right. We feed off the sources. The source determines it. Do I have a line of reasoning whether it is forbidden to eat pork or permitted to eat pork? I have no idea. What the Torah says is what is forbidden and what is permitted. So in the halakhic sphere I’m less biased toward my a priori reasoning. I try to understand what is written in the Torah or the Gemara or whatever, in the medieval authorities. In value contexts—what is proper to do and how one should behave—there we have a priori understandings of how it is right to behave and how not. And now there is a verse that tells us the opposite. What do we do? We reconcile it somehow so that it fits what we think. Think about Jacob our father. Jacob our father lied to Laban, to Esau, to Isaac. He lied to them. So someone who really learns from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), what is he supposed to do? Understand that lying is a commandment, right? Jacob our father, the choicest of the patriarchs, lied. Conclusion: one should lie. Or at least in such and such circumstances, whatever. What do we say? No, of course not—after all it’s obvious that one must not lie. So if Jacob lied, it was by Divine instruction. It was an exceptional case by Divine instruction. Why? If we learn from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), then clearly we ought to learn from here that it is proper to lie. No, since we have an a priori reasoning that it’s not proper to lie, we impose it on the text. We interpret the text in such a way that the conclusion will be what we thought a priori. Well, but if that’s the case, then why bother with the text? If in the end I’ll always remain with what I thought beforehand. If I remain with what I thought beforehand, I know that even without dealing with the Torah. So why deal with it? This—we were in the relevant columns. There was one column where I even challenged people: bring me one example of a section in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) from which you learned something new. Something where you would have said the opposite before, but because this section is written that way in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), you say, well, apparently I was mistaken and I retract. I don’t remember anyone there convincing me with the example he brought. There were dozens, hundreds of examples there, all kinds of readers brought them. In my opinion there wasn’t a single convincing one. Even if you find one, that still doesn’t justify devoting, I don’t know, an hour a day to the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). Find once in your life some example from which you also learned something. Deal with Jewish law—you’ll learn new things every day.
[Speaker D] Yes, but Rabbi says there’s no need to study it because all of us here already have the basics, but say a child in school has to study it, because that’s where everything begins, basically.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everything began in history. Today you can teach him directly what is right, and every non-Jew knows what is right too, even without studying the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), or every secular person or every human being, because everybody knows what is right and what is not right.
[Speaker D] But a person who is converting, say, and doesn’t know anything at all—does he need to study only Jewish law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. He knows what is moral and what is immoral; nothing needs to change. Morality by definition is universal; there is no Jewish morality.
[Speaker D] But the whole basis of Jewish law is also based on the Torah itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem, fine. Then the halakhic sections of the Torah, if you want to study them, if you think that helps you, then study them. I’m talking about the non-halakhic parts. Remember the first Rashi? Yes. The first Rashi on the Torah, where he brings there that Rabbi Yitzhak asks: why didn’t the Torah begin with “This month shall be for you the beginning of months”? What kind of question is that? What do you mean, why didn’t it begin with “This month shall be for you”? Because you need to explain to us the whole Book of Genesis. What kind of initial assumption is that? I mean, why should the Torah have begun with “This month,” the section of the month? So Rashi says there: because that is the Jewish law, the first commandment we were commanded. What does that mean? That basically only commandments were supposed to appear in the Torah. Everything beyond that which appears in the Torah needs justification; it needs explanations as to why it appears there. It wasn’t supposed to be there. And his justifications are fairly dubious, I must say; the question is much better than the answer.
[Speaker D] We’re returning to the discussion about morality, basically—whether morality is learned from there or not necessarily.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Again, historically it’s obvious that the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) influenced morality. Obviously the world’s morality was shaped, among other things, thanks to the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). That’s clear. But practically speaking today, I’m asking in practical terms: I don’t need the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) in order to understand what is moral and what is not moral. On the contrary, the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) would only hold my morality back. I’d have to explain all sorts of excuses for why here they acted this way even though it’s immoral. I have excuses, because it was like this, because it was like that. But from the outset I’m left with the morality I thought of beforehand, so what’s the whole story for? So use the morality you know, and that’s it. Yes, the Holy One, blessed be He, comes to Cain and says to him, “The voice of your brother’s blood cries out to Me from the ground.” So Cain was supposed to understand that murder is forbidden. Why? The verse “You shall not murder” hadn’t appeared yet. The verse “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” also hadn’t appeared yet. So how was he supposed to know that? From the fact that every person understands that murder is forbidden. That’s all. You don’t need “You shall not murder” for that. I know it even without that. Fine. I don’t know how we drifted into this whole business, but I’m saying, let me get back to our topic. So basically we’re talking about the phenomenon of false messianism and the concerns that accompany it. And here I’m placing the first stone on the board. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, of course, who explained to us very sensibly and eloquently that a messiah who has arrived is not the messiah. The messiah will always arrive. A messiah who has arrived is not the messiah, in his colorful language. Why? Meaning, from his perspective, messiah is some sort of utopia that is not really meant to be realized at all. Meaning, according to his view, you’re not supposed to believe in the messiah as a historical event that will one day happen; rather, messianism perhaps has a role in motivating you to act, giving you some optimistic horizon, I don’t know what—it has psychological functions. But you’re not supposed to believe in the coming of the messiah as a concrete historical event. By the way, Ben-Gurion too—who of course is not from the religious camp—basically says this as well. Yes, I brought the quote here. Yes: the messiah has not yet come, and I do not wish for the messiah to come. The moment the messiah comes, he ceases to be the messiah. When you find his address—Ben-Gurion doesn’t have the word “you”—when you find the messiah’s address in the telephone directory, he is no longer the messiah. Yes, that’s a very Jewish statement. Meaning, even though Jews generally do believe in the coming of the messiah as an actual event that is supposed to occur, there is something very Jewish about this attitude. Meaning, leave it alone—I believe with complete faith in the coming of the messiah, but between us, he’s not coming. Meaning, I’m winking at you, like—we all know he’s not coming. But I believe with complete faith in the coming of the messiah; I’m ready to be killed over it. Meaning, if they force me to say that the messiah will not come, I’ll give my life. Except when I’m speaking with you quietly and winking. There’s something here—this duality is very Jewish. Sorry that I’m laughing, but it really is like that. There’s something very sober and pragmatic in Jewish faith, very not fanatical and not fundamentalist. When we talk about Jewish fundamentalists, forgive me, but that’s a joke. There are no Jewish fundamentalists. There are fundamentalists among Christians. Meaning, among Jews there aren’t fundamentalists. Maybe there are, yes, but not as a movement. Maybe that fellow who murdered—what’s his name—at the pride parade, I forgot, never mind. Maybe he was a fundamentalist. Fine. But there really aren’t Jewish fundamentalists. There are, but not very many. So that’s the approach, as it were—that’s perhaps the most extreme conclusion drawn from the problem of messianism: what? That basically messiah is only some belief with a psychological role, but it isn’t really supposed to be realized. Now of course the central view in the Jewish world is not like that. When Maimonides speaks about belief in the coming of the messiah, he presents it as a principle such that someone who does not believe in it is denying a fundamental principle. Leibowitz has no problem being Maimonidean together with this. He does to Maimonides what we do to the Torah. Maimonides too commands us to believe in the coming of the messiah in the same sense Leibowitz is talking about. That the messiah is supposed to come in the future—but a messiah who has arrived is not the messiah. Now, I think you need to understand that although this is indeed an extreme statement, the truth is that most of us—including rabbis and righteous people and everyone—conduct ourselves like Leibowitz. We would never say it. We would never dare put it on the table explicitly. We conduct ourselves like Leibowitz. Meaning, if someone tells me, here, this is the messiah, the messiah is about to be realized any minute now, something is wrong with him. He should go see some professional. It’s not really like that. There is something Leibowitzian in all of us. He usually takes things to an extreme, of course, but there is something like this in the Jewish world. But again, I’m saying: ask a person on the principled level, and obviously he believes that the messiah really is supposed to come—not just a messiah who will come in the future, but that he is actually supposed to come. Meaning, this is a factual belief; that is the accepted view. So on this issue we really have to ask ourselves, okay, so now we’re beginning to approach the question: what exactly is problematic messianism? Let’s try to formulate this in maybe three—three, three, three. The most extreme approach would say that anyone who believes the messiah is really supposed to come—that is messianism, or false messianism. That’s Leibowitz, yes? Leibowitz and Ben-Gurion. Fine? Because the messiah is supposed to come in the future, but will never really come. A messiah who has arrived is not the messiah. But that is an extreme, esoteric conception. I don’t think one can really join it. In practice, many of us are there, but in terms of ideology—when I say ideological conception—people are not there. And that’s not the approach underlying the attitude toward messianism or false messianism as something problematic. So what can false messianism be? The next approach, the second possibility, is maybe the point at which you stop merely waiting for the coming of the messiah and begin acting to bring about the coming of the messiah. Meaning, people who take practical steps in order to bring the messiah—that is messianism. Yes, according to Leibowitz, messianism is someone who believes the messiah will actually come. So I’m saying, fine, that’s the most extreme approach. The next approach says no: I believe the messiah will come, but that remains in the realm of beliefs and opinions. If I take practical steps in order to bring the messiah, that is already messianism in the negative sense, false messianism. That’s a second possibility. I’m just laying out possibilities right now; I’m not yet saying what is right, what is not right, or how one even checks this. Possibilities. The third possibility is no—it is also possible to take action to bring the messiah, but not problematic actions. And there is a certain kind of activity aimed at bringing the messiah that is false messianism. Not the very fact that you take action; maybe that’s fine. But when the actions begin to be problematic, that is false messianism or a messianic movement. What exactly are problematic actions? So three possibilities. First possibility: actions that involve a halakhic prohibition. Yes, Sheinberg, the rabbi from Safed, who explained to various women that they were supposed to commit adultery with him as part of the—married women, yes—who were supposed to commit adultery with him in order to bring the messiah. That is false messianism in the sense that you are doing something that is halakhically forbidden in order to bring the messiah. Okay, it doesn’t matter whether he really believed it or not, I have no idea. It could be that he really believed it or that he was simply lying because he wanted to commit adultery. I don’t know. But either way, for our purposes, that is only a question of how guilty he is, but I am not discussing right now whether he is guilty; I’m discussing whether activity of that kind is negative activity. So obviously yes. Why is it negative activity? Because it is halakhically forbidden. When you bring the coming of the messiah by means of halakhic prohibitions, you are messianic or a false messiah, okay? That’s the first possibility; that’s possibility three-A, yes? Meaning, the third possibility is that the actions are problematic. What are problematic actions? First possibility: actions that involve a halakhic prohibition. The second possibility is actions that are not accepted in our tradition, even if there is no violation here in the ordinary halakhic sense. If I try to apply this, say, to Religious Zionism: say Religious Zionism—yes, the research question of my daughter’s thesis is whether Religious Zionism is a messianic movement. About Hasidism I may speak later; it doesn’t exactly fit here. Is Religious Zionism a messianic movement? So I say, according to the first criterion: does it involve halakhic prohibitions? On the face of it, no. There is no statement saying it is permitted to commit halakhic violations in order to bring the messiah. But it’s not so simple. It’s not so simple, because you can find, for example, statements that do not reject relying on the Israeli legal system. Now, to rely on a legal system that does not operate according to Jewish law, ostensibly that is a halakhic prohibition, like planting an Asherah tree beside the altar—an accessory of idolatry. How do I justify that? In fact, many people do not justify it. Religious Zionists too say: one may not come before them and not before laymen; before them and not before gentile courts; before them, and so on. But someone who does say yes, as part of the redemption process and the State of Israel and so on, you need to take part in these activities as well, including the legal system—then someone could come and say: in fact, you are doing something halakhically forbidden as part of your activity on behalf of bringing the messiah, on behalf of advancing the redemption. Maybe. I, for example, think—independently of redemption—that one ought to cooperate with the Israeli legal system, not in order to bring redemption, but because I think one should do it, regardless of whether this is redemption. But that is another whole issue, and I won’t get into it here. I am only saying that this could perhaps be a claim of the first type, of type three-A: that there are actions here involving a halakhic violation, and therefore this is false messianism. The second possibility is, as I said, actions that are not accepted in our tradition. For example, many Haredi claims against Religious Zionism were that it is not right to cooperate with secular people, heretics. Okay? A state established by heretics—that cannot be the bringing of redemption, that cannot be part of the redemption process. Okay? Now, claims of this kind are not really claims saying that if you cooperate with secular people you are committing a halakhic transgression. What halakhic transgression is there? I engage in some sort of cooperation with secular people, fine, so what? Who is cooperating with secular people today, by the way? Haredim, right? Who is in the coalition? Meaning, in principle—I’m speaking now on the theological level, not in practice—the claim about cooperating with secular people is not a claim that it is halakhically forbidden, unless you also do actions that are halakhically forbidden, as I mentioned perhaps regarding the legal system. But usually that is not what is at issue; rather, seeing this as bringing the messiah—these are actions that do not fit with traditional thinking, with the way of thinking we are used to. And that is the second type. Yes, the type that says activities that do not fit the normal way of thinking, even though it is not really a prohibition. The third way is—yes, maybe I’ll give an example of that. Actually, that example belongs to actions of the third type. Actions of the third type are actions that run counter to realpolitik. Actions that have no justification when you look at them through realistic lenses, and people do them because they are relying on the fact that since we are on the way to redemption, everything is fine. That is the third possibility. One can see this as part of the second possibility too, yes—that it doesn’t fit our tradition—but that’s not the point. I’m not speaking right now about whether it fits the Torah way of thinking. That’s not the point. I’m speaking about whether it fits logical, rational thinking, regardless of Judaism at the moment. If, as part of the actions you take to bring the messiah, you do things that are not realistic, then that is false messianism. The third possibility. Yes, Ben-Gurion—again I’m bringing him in—Ben-Gurion said that in Israel, someone who does not believe in miracles is not realistic. Meaning, yes, that’s exactly this statement. We, of course, not on a religious basis—but that’s what it looks like—we allow ourselves to take unrealistic actions. Why? Because redemption will not disappoint. Meaning, we are the kind who say: look, we need to go against all the nations, do what we think, conquer the Land of Israel, build the Temple, all kinds of things like that—and someone like that is immediately accused of messianism. Why? There is a commandment to build the Temple; the commandment to build the Temple is one of the 613 commandments. So in what sense is being a religious Jew automatically messianic? Is every religious Jew messianic? No. Why not? Because many people say, look, true, there is a commandment to build the Temple, but you cannot ignore the political, security, and international circumstances, and you have to take account of what is happening around you. And someone who does not take account of what is happening around him, who takes unreasonable risks and so on, even though what he is doing may perhaps be something positive—he is messianic. I think this comes closest to the concept of messianic as it is used in our discourse today. When you do actions that are unrealistic, actions that according to rational calculation will exact a heavy price, and you rely on the fact that God will help because I am now bringing redemption or advancing the messiah—that is messianism. Since you are basically doing things that are not realistic. And regarding this, I have a story that I can’t resist telling, even though it belongs later. There is a story like this—I saw articles discussing even its original source and splitting hairs over what exactly happened there—but during the War of Independence there was a rumor that the rabbi of Brisk was about to leave Jerusalem. There was danger, yes, they were fighting there, it was dangerous. So Rabbi Herzog, who was then the chief rabbi, came to visit the rabbi of Brisk and tried to persuade him to stay so as not to spread demoralization. Yes, he was afraid that his leaving the city would spread demoralization. So he came to the rabbi of Brisk and said to him—yes, it’s a wonderful exchange. He said to him, look, we have been promised that the Third Temple will not be destroyed. Okay? Therefore don’t worry, everything will be fine, we’ll manage. That is messianism par excellence. So the rabbi of Brisk says to him: and I have a tradition from my father that when people are shooting, you run away. Now this is a wonderful exchange because it’s a classic dialogue between a Religious Zionist and a Haredi. He doesn’t even argue with him over whether the messiah will come, whether the Third Temple will be destroyed or not—right now they’re shooting here, what do you want from me with this Third Temple business? If they’re shooting, I’m leaving, I’m running. He doesn’t argue. Maybe the Third Temple won’t be destroyed; maybe the Temple will be built and we’ll win, fine. But I’ll die on the way—they’re shooting here. And if they’re shooting, I run away. Now that outlook, the classic Haredi outlook, does not enter at all into the question of whether the messiah will come, whether we will build the Temple, whether we will succeed or not. I make realpolitik calculations, or real-security calculations, yes? I make practical calculations just like any gentile would think. If it is dangerous right now, you have to flee. I do not make metaphysical calculations. Rabbi Herzog makes a metaphysical calculation; he says: since there is a promise that the Third Temple will not be destroyed, everything is fine, we can stay here, everything is fine. Leave me alone with metaphysical calculations—not because you’re wrong. He does not argue over the metaphysics. He argues over the very fact that he is using metaphysics at all. I am not willing to make metaphysical calculations—not because they are not correct, but because I run my life not on the basis of metaphysics; I run my life on the basis of realistic calculations—not realpolitik, real-security—realistic calculations, without entering into metaphysics. Meaning, people think. I’m still jumping ahead because I think you can see it here in a very sharp way. There is a dispute between Religious Zionist theology, which sees this as the beginning of redemption, yes, the footsteps of the messiah and so on, and the Haredi conception, say, of Rabbi Yoelish of Satmar, the Vayoel Moshe, who explains that this is an act of Satan and that there are negative demons standing behind this process. So the dispute is basically a metaphysical dispute, yes? Which demon stands behind these historical processes. Religious Zionism thinks this is a demon from the side of holiness, and militant anti-Zionist Haredism thinks this is a demon from the Other Side. Okay? But both agree that behind this process stands a demon. And we discuss our relation to this process through the question of which demon stands behind it. Whether it is our demon or our enemies’ demon. That is what determines our attitude toward this historical process—yes, Zionism, the establishment of the state, and the like. In the middle stand quite a few people—not always, this is the third path, yes? Quite a few people stand in the middle, and I think many of them are not aware of the option of disagreeing with both of these possibilities. How do I disagree with both possibilities? After all, either it is a positive demon or a negative demon—what else could it be? What else could be is that there are no demons behind history. Neither negative nor positive. When I look at history, I am supposed to look at it through the eyes of a historian, not through the lens of what spiritual force stands behind it. And again, regardless of the factual question of whether there are demons there or not. That’s a metaphysical question. I am asking: how am I supposed to relate to this process? When I relate to this process, am I supposed to form an attitude toward it through the metaphysical question—what stands behind it, what will it lead to? Or am I supposed to relate to this process as it is, and determine my attitude toward it according to how I think on the realistic level? Then I do not need to agree either with Vayoel Moshe or with Eim HaBanim Semeichah, yes? Neither with this metaphysics or theology nor with that theology. I simply do not agree with theology at all. I am not willing to discuss my relation to this process in theological language or in a theological conceptual framework. If they’re shooting, I run. Yes, “if they’re shooting, I run”—of course I’m not saying that everyone who doesn’t use theology needs to run from every place where there is shooting. We won’t get far that way. But I am saying that you need to make your calculations in realistic terms. If you do not run away, it is not because the messiah is about to come. If you do not run away, it is because you think this mission needs to be carried out and one should not recoil—just as a gentile would stand here and not run away. In short, you need to make the calculations of a gentile. That’s the point. And in this sense, when I speak about messianism in the sense of number three, yes, of taking unrealistic actions—that is what is called messianism—then that basically means messianism in the negative sense, yes? So that basically means that when I discuss my relation to ideological phenomena or historical phenomena, I am really supposed to think like a gentile. And if I do not think like a gentile, then I am messianic. That sounds a bit blunt, but I personally, for example, tend toward this view. I think that is the definition of messianism. Now I’ll qualify it even more, because after all I’ve gotten ahead of myself here. Thinking like a gentile does not mean, for example, immigrating to the Land of Israel in order to fulfill the commandment of settling the Land of Israel. Is that messianism? After all, a gentile would not do that; I do it because of the commandment. No, that is not messianism. Since if there is such a commandment, then obviously I strive to fulfill it. Commandments are meant to be fulfilled. I am not claiming that someone who takes action in order to fulfill commandments is messianic. Therefore my claim is a bit more moderate than I formulated it earlier. What I want to claim is that when I do certain things, I have two kinds of considerations that I take into account: halakhic considerations and realistic considerations. Yes? I want to realize the commandments. If there is a commandment to conquer the land or settle the land, I will definitely act in order to fulfill it. But I will do so within the limits of realistic considerations. Okay? And I will not ignore realistic considerations because there is a commandment here, or because the messiah or the Holy One, blessed be He, is with me. That is not what I am supposed to do. I will make realistic calculations about how to fulfill the commandments. But yes, I do have a goal of fulfilling the commandments, obviously. But that is different from saying that fulfilling the commandments replaces realistic considerations. Not that I weigh both together, but that it replaces realistic considerations. If it is a commandment, then I don’t make realistic calculations; I go all in. Okay? Because no problem—if it’s a commandment, then the Holy One, blessed be He, is with me, everything is fine. So in that sense, I think that this is—it’s not really acting like a gentile, because you do also take commandments and prohibitions into account, but in the sense of realistic considerations, it is like a gentile. You don’t take Torah, halakhic, metaphysical considerations and mix them into realistic considerations. Do I say God will help and therefore I will do it? No. If my assessment is that I won’t win the war, I don’t go out to it, even though it is an obligatory war. Okay? So in that sense—maybe I’ll mention another point, again somewhat jumping ahead—but another point: I’ve always had a problem with the debate about drafting Haredim. Because when Religious Zionists try to persuade Haredim to enlist, they explain to them that this is an obligatory war of helping Israel against an enemy. I have never heard a bigger absurdity in my life. Meaning, if I were in Belgium and I was in the same situation, then fine, Haredim could stay in the kollel and study—there is no commandment of helping Israel against an enemy? We will all die if we don’t go fight? Okay, but there is no commandment of helping Israel against an enemy, so what is there to do? The claim, the demand that people enlist, is that we are in danger because they are shooting, like the rabbi of Brisk said. That is a Haredi claim, not a Religious Zionist claim. You need to enlist because they are shooting, meaning they will kill us if we do not enlist. What does that have to do with a commandment or an obligatory war of helping Israel against an enemy? I’m not talking about commandments; I’m talking about realistic considerations. By the way, in my view too, helping Israel against an enemy is not an obligatory war. It is baseless. And Maimonides also does not mean that it is an obligatory war, even though he writes that. I’ll show you: there is a contradiction in Maimonides; in the very next chapter he does not list it as an obligatory war. When he says that it is an obligatory war, he means there is an obligation to fight—not that it is an obligatory war. Why is there an obligation to fight? Because otherwise we’ll die. Saving life. That’s all. A realistic consideration. It is not because of the commandment that we go out to this war. This is not like a commandment-war to conquer the Land of Israel, which is an obligatory war, because I do that when my goal is a commandment. But if I go out to war because I am in danger, then that is not an obligatory war; I go out to war because otherwise I will die. You can say there is a commandment to live by them, okay—but the war, if I were in Belgium I would fight that war too. That is not helping Israel against an enemy. By Belgium I mean surrounded by gentiles—if I were the only Jew, not if all the Jews lived in Belgium. If I were the only Jew living in Belgium and everyone else were gentiles, there is no helping Israel against an enemy. Fine. But there is danger to life; they will kill all of us, including me. So obviously you need to enlist. What does this have to do with obligatory war and all kinds of concepts like that? In this sense, I think that today’s debate about enlistment reflects the same bizarre conversation that took place between Rabbi Herzog and the rabbi of Brisk. Because Rabbi Herzog said not to flee because the Third Temple will not be destroyed, and the rabbi of Brisk said I flee because they are shooting. But here I draw the opposite conclusion from the rabbi of Brisk—but for his reasons. Not that I disagree with him. I agree with him—but not for his reasons. I disagree with him, but for his reasons—and that’s the opposite. Meaning, I think one should fight and not flee, but because they are shooting, not because it is an obligatory war. The reason is the reason of the rabbi of Brisk; the conclusion is the conclusion of Rabbi Herzog. As usual, like in every dispute, both sides are wrong. It’s always like that. This dispute reflects exactly that point, and I think that really, if I want to know what messianism is, in my opinion, that is really the essential definition of messianism. Messianism is taking unrealistic actions while relying on metaphysical considerations, or Torah considerations, whatever. You need to weigh realistic considerations. If you do not weigh realistic considerations, you are messianic. And in that sense I think this is really also the discourse of secular people, the public discourse conducted today—when people talk about messianism, this is what they mean. If someone wants to do commandments, good health to him. At the point where that brings problematic costs upon us—building the Temple, settling in Gaza, or all kinds of things of that sort, regardless, without formulating or expressing a position right now—but people who feel that these things are unrealistic are basically accusing others of messianism. Messianism is taking actions whose goal is religious, but that in itself is not messianism. Only if the actions do not fit realistic considerations—only then does it become messianism in the sense of the negative connotation. Okay, I’ll stop here. We’ll sharpen this further later on. Up to here. Any comments, or?
[Speaker C] I wanted to announce the schedule change for tomorrow.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I’ll remind everyone indeed: tomorrow at nine and not at eight-thirty. I sent a message because the clock moved forward today. So we’re back to a later Sabbath entrance time, and also the morning is later, so we’re back to nine. Okay, have a peaceful Sabbath and goodbye. Thank you.