Dilemmas Concerning Human Life – Lesson 10
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Table of Contents
- The framework of the series and the transition to wars
- Maimonides: coercion, sanctifying God’s name, and desecrating God’s name
- Maimonides: one who can flee but does not flee
- Tosafot, Maimonides, and the historical background
- Placing oneself into coercion, beginning with negligence and ending in coercion, and the Rivash
- The Rashba in Shevuot, menstrual cycles, and the Kli Chemdah
- Maimonides: illness, healing through prohibition, and the novelty regarding punishment
- Or Sameach: the distinction between an external threat and the consideration of healing
- Nimukei Yosef, “his fire is because of his arrows,” and placing oneself into coercion
- The Tashbetz: indirect coercion and a coerced bill of divorce
Summary
General Overview
The text places the issue of healing through prohibition within dilemmas of saving life, centering on Maimonides’ novel view that illness is not identical to “ordinary” life-saving situations with respect to the laws of coercion and punishment. In the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, Maimonides distinguishes between someone who transgressed under threat in a case where one must be killed rather than transgress, and is considered coerced and therefore not punished, and someone who transgressed in order to be healed through one of the three severe prohibitions, about whom he says that “the court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him.” Or Sameach explains that the difference depends on the structure of choice: under threat, another person “directs” the act, so the transgressor is not acting of his own will, whereas in illness a person uses the transgression as a means to save himself out of an internal calculation, and therefore punishment has a place. The Tashbetz brings a parallel distinction in the laws of a coerced bill of divorce, where coercion regarding some other matter creates an incentive for divorce but is not considered direct coercion regarding the divorce itself.
The framework of the series and the transition to wars
The text presents the discussion as part of a series on personal life-saving dilemmas in surgeries and medical problems, following prior discussion of saving oneself at the cost of another’s life as against the law of the pursuer, and of intermediate cases. The text says that wars will begin next time as a topic with its own unique character, and mentions the possibility of future discussion also of Tur Kelappei and “the Enigma.” The text presents “healing through prohibition” as the conclusion of the first part of the series, through the question whether illness falls under the same principles discussed until now.
Maimonides: coercion, sanctifying God’s name, and desecrating God’s name
In the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, chapter 5, law 4, Maimonides rules that if a person is told “transgress and do not be killed” but instead allows himself to be killed and does not transgress, “he is liable for his life.” If he is told “be killed and do not transgress” and allows himself to be killed rather than transgress, “he has sanctified God’s name,” and is included among “those killed by the kingdom, than whom there is no higher level,” together with verses of praise. Maimonides further rules that if a person is told “be killed and do not transgress” but he transgresses and is not killed, “he desecrates God’s name,” nullifies the positive commandment of sanctifying God’s name, and violates the prohibition of desecrating God’s name. Maimonides innovates that even though he desecrated God’s name, since he transgressed under coercion he is not flogged and not put to death, because punishments are given only to one who transgresses willingly, with witnesses and warning, and he emphasizes that this applies even to idolatry.
Maimonides: one who can flee but does not flee
Maimonides adds that if a person can save himself and flee from under the hand of “the wicked king” but does not do so, he is “like a dog returning to its vomit,” is “called an intentional idolater,” and is “cut off from the World to Come and descends to the lowest level of Gehenna.” The text emphasizes that the expressions “liable for his life,” “called,” and “cut off from the World to Come” are not unambiguous with respect to actual court-imposed punishment, and they raise a question about the degree of the “intentional” status being described. The text distinguishes between the question whether to save such a person and the question of his guilt and punishment, illustrating that even someone who acted recklessly is still rescued, and only afterward do we discuss legal punishment.
Tosafot, Maimonides, and the historical background
The text presents a scholarly distinction between the approach of the Tosafists and that of Maimonides and the Spanish sages who followed him: the Tosafists, according to the accepted view, were stricter in the period of the Crusades and raised the bar, so that one who transgressed where he should have been killed rather than transgressed is considered liable for death. In contrast, Maimonides and the Spanish sages operated in a calmer environment and therefore ruled that the act is forbidden, but if one transgressed, he is considered coerced and is not punished. The text raises the possibility of linking this also to differences between Christianity and Islam, but does not decide the matter.
Placing oneself into coercion, beginning with negligence and ending in coercion, and the Rivash
The text points to the difficulty in comparing “placing oneself into coercion” with “beginning with negligence and ending in coercion,” and notes that they are almost never connected, even though they appear in different contexts throughout the Talmud. The text brings from a responsum of the Rivash an example of a community that decreed not to come to the capital city because the king forced those who came “to play,” and asks whether someone who violated the ordinance and was coerced there is considered coerced or not. The text presents the discussion as focusing on the fact that the ordinance was instituted precisely to prevent that anticipated coercion, and therefore one who violated it may not be considered coerced with respect to the result, even if he is not fully intentional.
The Rashba in Shevuot, menstrual cycles, and the Kli Chemdah
The text brings the Rashba on Shevuot 18a regarding one who has relations with his wife close to her expected menstrual period, something the sages prohibited out of concern that she might see blood, and if she sees blood during the act a prohibition punishable by karet arises. The Rashba sharpens the point that such a person is not considered coerced but rather inadvertent, and is liable for a sacrifice, because the rabbinic prohibition already defined the act in advance as entering a dangerous state. The text cites the Kli Chemdah, who in the name of Yeshuot Malko brings an attempt to derive a broad rule that anyone who violates a rabbinic prohibition and thereby ends up violating a Torah prohibition is not coerced but inadvertent; and it rejects this by saying that it is true only when the rabbinic prohibition was instituted specifically to warn against that very Torah prohibition.
Maimonides: illness, healing through prohibition, and the novelty regarding punishment
In the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, law 6, Maimonides rules that “just as they spoke regarding coercion, so too they spoke regarding all illness,” and if one becomes sick and is near death, and his cure lies in something prohibited by the Torah, “we do it”; one may be healed through all prohibitions in a place of danger, except for idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed, through which one may not be healed even in danger. Maimonides innovates that if one transgressed and was healed through these prohibitions, “the court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him,” and the text presents this as a contrast to the previous law, where one who transgressed under threat is considered coerced and not punished. The text notes that the commentators on Maimonides disagree whether “the punishment appropriate to him” means actual judicial punishment according to each prohibition, or extra-legal punishment for reasons of deterrence and education.
Or Sameach: the distinction between an external threat and the consideration of healing
Or Sameach explains that the law in illness “certainly is not similar” to an ordinary case of coercion, because in coercion another person forces the transgression, and the transgressor does not act “of his own will” but rather “by the will of others,” and therefore “the Merciful One exempts the coerced person” from punishment even if it was forbidden to transgress. Or Sameach argues that in illness the danger comes without being caused by another person, and the individual saves himself by means of an act stemming from his own will to live, and therefore it resembles every murderer who acts out of will or interest; accordingly, if he is healed, he is liable to judicial punishment. The text raises the difficulty that even under threat a person is also weighing how to save himself, and suggests possible distinctions such as attributing the act to the one issuing the threat, or the difference between a situation in which the danger depends on carrying out the transgression and one in which the danger already exists and the transgression is a maneuver for rescue.
Nimukei Yosef, “his fire is because of his arrows,” and placing oneself into coercion
The text brings the Nimukei Yosef in Bava Kamma regarding Sabbath candles in light of the principle that “his fire is because of his arrows,” and presents a conception in which coercion is understood as a situation where the act is not attributed to the person, as though “I didn’t do this,” even though he created the situation by lighting before the Sabbath. The text suggests that a practical difference may exist between lighting for the sake of a commandment and lighting for an optional purpose, and links this to the question whether a person may place himself into a situation that will later develop into coercion.
The Tashbetz: indirect coercion and a coerced bill of divorce
The Tashbetz, part 1, siman 1, distinguishes between direct coercion to divorce and a situation in which a person is coerced physically to do one thing, and “of his own accord, in order to save himself from that coercion, divorces of his own accord,” ruling that this “is not called coercion.” The Tashbetz brings proof from the Jerusalem Talmud in the chapter Almanah Nizonet, and explains that coercion to pay the marriage settlement can create a situation in which the husband chooses to divorce in order to rid himself of the financial pressure, yet the bill of divorce is not considered coerced because he was not actually compelled to divorce. The text connects this to the logic of Or Sameach and to the discussion of prenuptial agreements and financial sanctions, where the concern is a coerced bill of divorce and the claim is that the decision to divorce stems from the husband’s own calculation under the circumstances rather than from direct coercion regarding the act itself.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We are
[Speaker B] in the topic of dilemmas
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of saving life in the context of surgeries, medical problems, things of that sort, where the principles are overall fairly similar principles. I spoke about someone saving himself at the cost of another person’s life, which is forbidden — one must be killed rather than transgress — as against the law of the pursuer, and there are many other different things that lie in between them. The topic of wars I’ll begin next time; there’s still something unique about it, and that’s where I’ll start next time. In the end maybe we’ll also get to Tur Kelappei, and in the end maybe we’ll also get to what he asked to say a bit about the Enigma, so maybe after that. In any case, today I want to talk about healing through prohibition. Healing through prohibi— that is, healing through prohibition. There’s a very interesting Maimonides that serves as a point of departure for all kinds of discussions, and in fact tries to carve out, from everything we’ve seen until now, from all the questions of saving life, the issue of illness. In other words, his claim is that illness is not saving life in the ordinary sense. Illness is something else, and certain permissions that we find in saving life do not exist in illness. With this I want to conclude the first part of the series, the part before wars, the part dealing with personal life-saving dilemmas. The question is whether illness too is included in everything we’ve discussed until now. Maimonides — look at the first source you have — in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, chapter 5, law 4. I’ll just remind you that this is one law before the law we already saw in Maimonides about gentiles who besieged a city and said, “Give us one of you,” from the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot. That may be relevant to what I’ll say later. “Anyone regarding whom it was said: transgress and do not be killed, but he allowed himself to be killed and did not transgress — behold, he is liable for his life.” Yes, that’s a very amusing comment by Maimonides. Meaning, anyone who volunteered to be killed in a place where it’s forbidden to do so, then he’s liable for his life. What does “liable for his life” mean? I don’t know — maybe in the heavenly court. Good luck to him, yes, okay. Like Schwarzkopf there — Schwarzkopf who said they all want to get upstairs and our job is to help them do that. “And anyone regarding whom it was said: be killed and do not transgress, and he was killed and did not transgress — behold, he sanctified God’s name. And if it was in the presence of ten Jews, behold, he sanctified God’s name in public, like Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, and Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues. And these are those killed by the kingdom, than whom there is no higher level, and regarding them it is said, ‘For Your sake we are killed all the day; we are considered as sheep for the slaughter,’ and regarding them it is said, ‘Gather to Me My pious ones, those who made a covenant with Me over sacrifice.’”
[Speaker B] But Daniel, Mishael, and Azariah weren’t killed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but they gave themselves over; a good intention, the Holy One blessed be He joins to the deed. Just a note — there’s a point here where Maimonides says, that, no, sorry, that’s not related. Okay. “And anyone regarding whom it was said: be killed and do not transgress, and he transgressed and was not killed — behold, he desecrates God’s name. And if it was in the presence of ten Jews, behold, he desecrated God’s name in public, and nullified the positive commandment, which is sanctifying God’s name, and violated the prohibition, which is desecrating God’s name.” Sanctifying God’s name and desecrating God’s name are ostensibly two sides of the same coin, although there are places where the relation between them isn’t so simple. “And nevertheless,” says Maimonides — this is an interesting innovation — “since he transgressed under coercion, he is not flogged; needless to say he is not put to death by the court, even if he killed under coercion. For flogging and execution are given only to one who transgresses willingly, with witnesses and warning. As it says, ‘And he gave of his seed to Molekh, and I shall set My face against that man’ — by oral tradition they learned: that man, and not one under coercion, nor one inadvertent, nor one mistaken. And if in the case of idolatry, which is more severe than all, one who worships it under coercion is not liable to karet, needless to say not to death by the court, then all the more so the other commandments stated in the Torah. And regarding forbidden sexual relations it says: ‘But to the young woman you shall do nothing.’ But if he can save himself and flee from under the hand of the wicked king and does not do so, behold he is like a dog returning to its vomit, and he is called an intentional idolater, and he is cut off from the World to Come and descends to the lowest level of Gehenna.” There are very interesting expressions here beyond “liable for his life” that was at the beginning. Maimonides — and other Spanish sages followed him in this — says that if a person transgressed and was not killed in a place where he should have let himself be killed, he is still considered coerced. Even though in fact he should have let himself be killed — he’s forbidden to transgress. But if he transgressed anyway, despite the fact that it was forbidden for him, he is coerced, he is coerced. And therefore he isn’t liable to punishment. Meaning, there is a transgression here, but it’s a transgression under coercion, so he isn’t liable to punishment. Even though he was forbidden to do it. But apparently the prohibition he violated is sanctifying and desecrating God’s name. Meaning, failure to sanctify God’s name and violation through desecrating God’s name — and for desecrating God’s name you don’t incur punishment. There’s no punishment for desecrating God’s name in these circumstances. So if that’s so, then take for example someone who worshiped idols under coercion. Basically what Maimonides is saying is that he didn’t violate the prohibition of idolatry; he violated the prohibition of sanctifying God’s name or desecrating God’s name. For idolatry, someone who transgresses intentionally is liable to death; but someone who violated desecrating God’s name — he violated desecrating God’s name but not idolatry. As far as idolatry goes, he was coerced. And therefore he isn’t liable to death.
[Speaker B] Why doesn’t he violate desecrating God’s name? What? Because desecrating God’s name is also said in a situation
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of coercion,
[Speaker D] that’s what it says.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Idolatry is stated generally — it’s forbidden to engage in idolatry — but desecrating God’s name is stated precisely about a situation of coercion; that’s the point.
[Speaker D] You understand, there was a time when there was religious persecution in the world, and Maimonides tried to save those who thought maybe they were — in the Letter to Yemen?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Actually usually if you
[Speaker D] read the Letter to Yemen in a simple way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but Maimonides writes this in the Mishneh Torah; it’s not likely that he’s writing a law for the public based on the Letter to Yemen, some group in Yemen that was in distress and to whom he of course sent a letter — but because of that he sets the law for everyone? I find that hard to believe. More than that: the accepted view is the opposite. That’s exactly the point I wanted to make here. Because Maimonides is actually lenient in these laws in the end — he says that someone who transgressed is not punished. Tosafot say that someone who transgressed, even if it was under coercion — meaning if he was forbidden to transgress, then he is killed, he is liable to death. And in the research literature it is commonly explained in exactly the opposite way from what you said: that the Tosafists lived during the Crusades and they had to raise the bar; meaning they had to be stringent and not leave room to play, because otherwise everyone would find all kinds of interpretations for himself and try to manage with the difficult circumstances there, and therefore they said no — one must be killed rather than transgress, and if you transgress you are liable to death, meaning it’s a full-fledged transgression. And precisely Maimonides and the Spanish sages who followed him were in a calmer period — not in Yemen but in Spain itself or wherever he was — were in a calmer period, in a calmer environment, and therefore he says: it’s forbidden, but if you transgressed, you transgressed; you won’t get punished for it. So the usual way of looking at these two groups is actually the reverse.
[Speaker B] What? Is that because of Christianity and Islam?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe you can connect it to that too, I don’t know.
[Speaker B] Maimonides’ last sentence is a bit like beginning with negligence and ending in coercion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Similar. This is what’s called placing oneself into coercion. The question of the relation between placing oneself into coercion and beginning with negligence and ending in coercion is a very complicated one. One of the fascinating things there — I once gave a lecture about it — one of the fascinating things is that nobody comments on it. Nothing. Beginning with negligence and ending in coercion appears regarding bailees and torts, only in those two places. And placing oneself into coercion appears in various places — in the case of the baby whose hot water spilled in Eruvin and in all sorts of places; there’s the case of boarding a ship less than three days before the Sabbath, all sorts of things like that — and nobody connects it to the issue of beginning with negligence and ending in coercion. Here it really is placing oneself into coercion. A person knows he is entering a situation in which they will coerce him to commit a transgression. The question is whether such a person is considered coerced or not. There is a responsum of the Rivash, I think, about this, where he talks about a community in which anyone who came to the capital city, apparently where the king sat, he would force them “to play.” Now what does “to play” mean? I don’t know exactly — apparently some kind of idolatrous practice or I don’t know exactly what. He forced them to play, and therefore the community enacted a decree that nobody should go to the capital city, meaning to the king’s area. Just don’t go there. And then he discusses the question: what happens if someone violated that decree? He violated the decree, went there, and of course the king forced him to play. Now the question is: what did he transgress? He basically placed himself into coercion, but what he violated was the community’s decree. In the end, once he got there, he was already coerced. So the question is whether he is considered coerced with respect to the end or not considered coerced with respect to the end. Here there’s a Torah-level issue and a rabbinic-level issue.
[Speaker B] What do you mean by Torah-level and rabbinic-level?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s the decree.
[Speaker B] There’s a decree of the sages.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes — not even the sages, really; it’s a community ordinance. Right. There’s also a Rashba on Shevuot 18a; the Gemara actually — the Rashba sharpens this — regarding one who has relations with his wife close to her expected menstrual period, and we know that expected periods, in practice, are rabbinic law. Why? Because there’s concern that the woman might see blood and then he would violate a prohibition punishable by karet. Therefore the sages forbade sexual relations close to the expected period. Now someone violated the rabbinic prohibition, had relations with his wife close to her expected period, and then she saw blood in the middle of it. Now once she saw blood in the middle of it, that’s already a prohibition punishable by karet, okay? But on the other hand, with respect to that he is coerced — meaning, he didn’t know it in advance. He only knew that this was a time the sages forbade, but he didn’t know there was blood there; that he would not have transgressed. Now the question is what his status is.
[Speaker B] What? Is there any doubt? He’s not coerced? Nothing forced him to have relations with his wife.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Nothing forced him not to either. What’s the problem?
[Speaker B] Why isn’t that called coercion? Coercion is when they force you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. Coercion through lack of knowledge is full coercion. I didn’t know — what do you mean? If there had just been no rabbinic prohibition of expected periods, and now someone had relations with his wife — or on some other date — and she saw blood during it,
[Speaker B] isn’t that called inadvertent?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s coercion. Full coercion. By the way, inadvertence too is a type of coercion. In places where there’s a difference between inadvertence and coercion, those are very specific places. In several places in the Gemara, the Gemara sees inadvertence as actual coercion. More than that: there’s a Gemara in Shevuot where Rav Ami and Rav Asi argue about what Rava said. One says that Rava said this, and the other says that Rava said that, and each swears to what he says — on two opposite things. Then they go to Rava and ask him: who was right? Now the Gemara doesn’t say who, because that would be evil speech. It says one of them was right and the other was not. So he says: could it be that I’d be liable to lashes? An oath is a severe prohibition. So he says no: “a person in an oath” excludes one under coercion. Because you were coerced, since you thought that’s what I said. You truly thought that’s what I said, and therefore you swore. And the fact that I didn’t say it — true — but that’s what you thought, so that’s called coercion. “A person in an oath” excludes one under coercion. And there it’s really far-reaching — not only did you not know, you could have known; you heard it, you just jumped and swore — why are you swearing? No, still the Gemara says he is coerced. In any case, where was I? Ah yes, the Rivash — the Rivash also talks about placing oneself into coercion: someone who entered that city, the question is whether he is considered coerced or not, and there’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) on this issue. Ah, I started with the Rashba, yes, in Shevuot. The Gemara in Shevuot says — yes — that one who has relations with his wife close to her expected period and she sees blood, in the Gemara it’s already written, but the Rashba sharpens it, that he is not considered coerced; he is considered inadvertent. Meaning, he is liable for a sacrifice. What do you mean liable for a sacrifice? He violated a rabbinic prohibition. As for the Torah-level prohibition, in the end he was fully coerced; there was a Torah-level prohibition there and that was full coercion. What he actually violated was only a rabbinic prohibition. But the existence of the rabbinic prohibition turns his act into one that is not coercion. So on that there’s an interesting Kli Chemdah — I don’t remember which Torah portion anymore — the Kli Chemdah brings there, I think in the name of Yeshuot Malko, Rabbi Yehoshua of Kutna, that he wanted to derive that anyone who violates a rabbinic prohibition, and because of that somehow ends up violating a Torah prohibition, is not coerced but inadvertent. Because basically he violated a rabbinic prohibition, so there was something like beginning with negligence and ending in coercion. Then he says that this is not correct; it’s only in the case of the Gemara in Shevuot — he brings proof from the Gemara in Shevuot, Yeshuot Malko. So the Kli Chemdah says that this is not correct, because the Gemara in Shevuot is talking about a rabbinic prohibition whose entire purpose is to warn you against that Torah prohibition. In other words, why did the sages prohibit relations close to the expected period? Because of the concern that she may see blood. So if they warned you about this, and this is indeed what happened in the end, there you cannot say you were coerced, because the sages warned you. But if you violated, I don’t know what — some rabbinic prohibition, say you moved muktzeh on the Sabbath, and as a result of that you ended up violating some Torah prohibition — you came to carry from a private domain to a public domain. Fine, you didn’t know at all that it was a public domain, but you began with moving muktzeh. There it’s certainly not true. You violated one rabbinic prohibition and stumbled into a Torah prohibition that is completely different; there’s no connection between them. You are still considered coerced. And that’s a bit similar to the Rivash, because in the Rivash this is really the picture: the community that decreed on a person not to come to the city — that decree was so that they wouldn’t seize him and coerce him to play. Now he violated that, and as a result of it of course they coerced him, but that’s why they forbade you to come to the city in the first place; that was the reason. It’s not that you violated one thing and ended up in something else. Therefore there the argument is — and that is also the Rivash’s conclusion — that he is not considered coerced. But again, the question is what exactly “not considered coerced” means. Meaning, he also isn’t considered fully intentional.
[Speaker D] To say, there were really livelihood problems — where? In what context? Outside the Land? Even in Djerba there were real forced converts.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I’m not — I only brought it as an example of a way of thinking, so you have to look at the specific situation.
[Speaker D] To say that this’s very true in an elective procedure — you should have refrained, yes, the decree was to refrain, and you almost intentionally put yourself into it. But there were many very, very…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, if we need to discuss it — whenever we talk about Jewish law, we talk about an abstract situation. When we talk about a concrete person, you always have to see why he did it. You’re right, but when we learn something general, we talk about a hypothetical situation. The hypothetical situation is that he intentionally put himself there. I’m talking about such a person. I don’t care at the moment what actually happened there; that of course requires examination. But notice Maimonides’ wording: in the end he says that if he can save himself and flee and he does not do it — by the way, this is somewhat different from the Rivash, less severe. Exactly. He didn’t place himself in the situation; he’s already in it, only he could have fled. So even that is already another level, and Maimonides’ wording is very non-committal. He is called an intentional idolater, and he is cut off from the World to Come and descends to the lowest level of Gehenna. And what about the death penalty? An intentional idolater? Apparently not, right? Meaning, an intentional idolater, but not completely intentional — it’s still not really an intentional transgression. There’s some very — above he said “liable for his life,” here it’s “cut off from the world,” all kinds of non-committal expressions. Why am I saying this? Because in a moment we’ll see the next law, and there too this continues.
[Speaker B] It says “is called,” yes, “is called”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] intentional — as if considered, right. He isn’t intentional. It’s like what we said about “like a pursuer”; we saw in Maimonides that law of “like a pursuer” and not an actual pursuer.
[Speaker B] But Rabbi, it’s not intentional — then what is it? He doesn’t say what it is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says it’s intentional, but not intentional at the level where he is apparently liable to punishment, punishment by human hands. It’s intentional…
[Speaker B] No, a sacrifice is
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] already worse than inadvertent, so a sacrifice won’t help him anymore. Meaning, inadvertent but close to intentional does not require a sacrifice; inadvertent but close to coercion also doesn’t require one; plain inadvertent does, right? Now here this is inadvertent close to intentional, or maybe even actually intentional… inadvertent close to coercion דווקא? No, the opposite. He writes that he is intentional; he writes that he is intentional, “is called intentional.” “Is called intentional.” In the Temple period he would have been intentional.
[Speaker B] Rabbi,
[Speaker F] there are all kinds of situations where we warn people not to do dangerous things — say, not to drink alcohol and drive — but once there’s an accident, we still go help him and rescue him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s something else, that’s something else. We’re talking here about whether he deserves punishment for what he did; that doesn’t mean that now you should leave him to die. Those are two different things.
[Speaker F] We’ll save him, and afterward he’ll go to court and get punished, okay?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s something else. The punishment is not a death penalty for such a transgression. Meaning, you don’t need to leave him to die; those are two different things. The example of the person who entered that city of apostasy — yes, that’s the apostasy we mentioned — so we would send the army to rescue him even though he entered… army already involves broader considerations, but let’s say I as a private person had to do it. I say: if I endanger my life, then I’m forbidden to do it even if he’s not guilty. According to most opinions, I’m forbidden to endanger my life in order to save someone else. Okay? If I’m not endangering my life, then certainly I have to save him — why not? That has nothing to do with the question of guilt here. Well, in war it can be related — meaning, yes. Now all the… that fellow who crossed into Gaza there, who is somewhat mentally unwell and somehow entered there — now the question is what price should be paid to save such a person, who basically put himself there? He’s not guilty, fine, because apparently he has some problem… he isn’t fully sane or he has a mental issue.
[Speaker B] Gilad Shalit was a sane person. What? With Gilad Shalit or Elkhanan… yes yes, fine, that’s another affair, yes, right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in summary I said there’s a very large gap
[Speaker F] between the question whether we… that’s my conclusion — whether we call it coercion or not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but not in the sense of whether to abandon him. You asked a different question. I asked whether to punish him for the transgression he committed. Here the question is whether he is coerced, inadvertent, intentional. Whether to save him is another question; he is not liable to death. Now look at law 6, the next law in Maimonides: “Just as they said regarding coercion, so they said regarding all illness.” For now it starts as if illness is simply a kind of coercion. How so? “If one became sick and was near death, and the doctors said that his cure lies in some matter from the prohibitions of the Torah — we do it.” So we do it; we violate all the Torah’s prohibitions in order to save him. That’s called coercion; illness is called coercion. By the way, this sentence itself already says something,
[Speaker D] because
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I wouldn’t even have bothered to write it. Fine, we already spoke about the laws of coercion — what’s the problem? Maybe also say that a pistol is like a rifle, and a cannon is like a grenade. Fine — any situation in which I am threatened and my life is in danger is called coercion. Why do you need to speak about illnesses in a separate clause, to say that illnesses too are coercion?
[Speaker B] Maybe it’s not a life-threatening situation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we’re talking about a life-threatening situation.
[Speaker B] One
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] who became sick and was near death.
[Speaker G] Yes.
[Speaker B] Meaning
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that of course he is in mortal danger. So what is there to discuss? Already in this sentence, when Maimonides says that it is similar, you can see that there is something not similar here,
[Speaker B] because
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if there were nothing dissimilar here, there’d be no need to say it. There’s some distinction he senses here. At this stage he claims that all transgressions may be committed also when you’re ill, not only when you’re under threat. Now he continues: “And one may be healed through all the Torah’s prohibitions in a place of danger, except for idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed, for even in a place of danger one may not be healed through them.” Up to this point everything is fine, right? It simply says that illness is like any other danger. “And if he transgressed and was healed, the court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him.” That’s the interesting sentence. Meaning, if he is a sick person and now he ate — not pork, but he needed idolatry, fine? He needed idolatry in order to save himself. I think I once told you, there was some question on the internet — a discussion came up about someone who had an incurable illness, and no, there was no medical solution in conventional medicine, no solution to the problem. But he heard that there was some Native American sorcerer in South America who was successful in such cases, and there one has to do all sorts of, I don’t know exactly what, matters of idol worship. The question was whether it is permitted to do that or not. A very interesting question. And it really is saving life, and he needs idolatry to save himself. So in principle no, because idolatry is forbidden even under threat, and illnesses are like threats. But Maimonides says more than that: if in the previous law we saw that if you transgressed despite the fact that it was forbidden for you to transgress, you are not punished because you are coerced — right? that was the previous law — here Maimonides says: if you transgressed and it was forbidden, “the court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him.” What’s the distinction? Why here suddenly is illness not like an ordinary threat? Until now the whole claim was that illness is like an ordinary threat. This final sentence, when we compare it to the previous law we read, suddenly shows that it isn’t. In an ordinary threat — one second, wait
[Speaker B] wait,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in an ordinary threat, if I have to be killed rather than transgress, say in one of the three severe prohibitions, Maimonides says that even if you transgressed anyway, you committed a prohibition, but you’re not liable to death. Why? Because I was coerced. But in illness, I am forbidden to transgress just as in an ordinary threat, but if I transgressed, then I am also punished.
[Speaker B] Illness isn’t total; maybe illness is not really — no, not in mortal danger.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that it’s not coercion,
[Speaker B] maybe it’s not the only solution. What? Maybe it’s not the only solution.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s also true in all threats, so that’s not something unique to illness.
[Speaker B] So that’s it, find it there — I can save myself through ten different transgressions.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not the only solution, or through ten different ways. If we’re talking about a case where it’s not the only solution, then that’s not a distinction between illness and non-illness. Then it’s a distinction between whether there is an alternative or whether there isn’t an alternative. That has nothing to do with illness. You can have both situations in illness, and both situations outside illness. It’s like what he said above, that someone who could have saved himself from the situation he is in — that means he had another solution.
[Speaker B] Right, but he isn’t punished, he
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] doesn’t get — I also said that even if so, that’s not Maimonides’ distinction here. That’s what he said in the previous law.
[Speaker B] There’s a principle that the threat is from a person and the illness is from Heaven. Okay, and in that the threat is from a person—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait — as for the distinction, why there is a distinction, in a moment we’ll see. I just want everyone to be with me that there is a distinction. Okay? Afterward we’ll try to think about why. But in Maimonides you can see that there is a distinction at the end. Meaning, all the laws are the same — threat and illness are the same except at the end. Meaning, if you transgressed one of the three severe prohibitions even though it was forbidden for you, in illness just as in an ordinary threat — but if you transgressed here, you are also punished, as opposed to a threat that is not illness, where you are not punished. And then the question is of course what the difference is. Before I enter the question of what the difference is, notice that once again Maimonides’ wording is not unambiguous. Maimonides does not say: and if he transgressed and was healed, then the court puts him to death. “The court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him.” That sounds a bit like “cut off from the World to Come and descends to the lowest level of Gehenna.” Maybe it means an extra-legal punishment. Meaning, the court has to deal with such a person because this is dangerous, because he committed a transgression and other people may think it’s permitted, but not that he is really saying that there is an actual court punishment here, that he receives the regular judicial punishment. The wording is a bit different, like fining him. What? Fining him, punishing him extra-legally — because the court, where necessary, administers lashes and punishments extra-legally. So maybe that’s what he means: look, if someone does this and is not punished, everyone will learn that it’s permitted, and then there will be a breach. They need to handle him educationally, but he isn’t liable to punishment for the transgression itself. The commentators on Maimonides disagree on how to understand this final sentence. Does it mean actual judicial punishment, or does it mean something like “cut off from the world,” meaning extra-legal punishment? How can you understand it as actual judicial punishment? It seems to me the explanation is this: after all, Maimonides is talking about the three severe prohibitions, right? Each of those severe prohibitions has a different punishment. Stoning, burning, and each one — the sword for murder. So each of them has a different punishment. So when Maimonides wants to speak generally, he says: the court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him. What does “the punishment appropriate to him” mean? Not extra-legal punishment, but rather: for each transgression, the punishment appropriate to it, meaning the punishment that fits that transgression. I’m not getting now into the question whether he committed idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, or bloodshed, and what exactly he violated. I’m telling you in general: look in the laws of idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed, and there you’ll see what punishment applies.
[Speaker C] Is he talking about a concrete case? No, three.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All the transgressions. The threat is illness, but what did he do in order to escape the illness? Either idolatry, or forbidden sexual relations, or bloodshed. For each of them he deserves a different punishment. Now, so as not to enter into the specific punishment, he doesn’t need to say now each one separately: look in the laws of idolatry, in the laws of murder, and see what the punishment is. He says that for each of them the court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him, meaning the punishment written regarding it. And if you read it that way, if you read it that way, then what is written in Maimonides really is that he gets ordinary judicial punishment. Okay?
[Speaker B] If you don’t say that, and you read all three in the same category, that means that a sick person goes and kills someone and takes his heart for a transplant, so he won’t be executed? That’s not murder? Is there even such a claim?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Why not? And if I threaten you and because of that you kill?
[Speaker B] That’s not the same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why isn’t it the same thing? Now you’re going to tell me the distinction that we’ll get to in a moment. On the face of it, it’s the same thing. Maimonides says that illnesses and threats are the same thing. What’s the difference? So if I threaten you and you kill, you are not punished, right? Maimonides said that in the previous law. You’re coerced. Even though it was forbidden, as far as you are concerned you’re coerced; no punishment. Well then, illness is the same thing too. I’m in mortal danger. Of course you can feel that there’s a difference, and that’s exactly what I’m going to talk about.
[Speaker B] You yourself said that a person may not save himself through another person’s money, so all the more so through another person’s body.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but still they are not executed; that’s not the point. And if someone threatens me, then I saved myself through the loss of another person’s life, and still I’m not executed. That it is forbidden to do it is obvious — that’s what Maimonides said both in illnesses and in ordinary threats. The question is only why there is no punishment.
[Speaker G] By the very fact that there is forbidden sexual relations here, it can’t be that this is the punishment appropriate to him, because if what heals him is sexual relations, then he doesn’t need to do it דווקא with close relatives.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only she is there; there’s no one else. We’re back to his distinction: if there’s another way out, then it’s a different discussion, but I’m talking about a case where there is no other way out. This is the only way out there is. It’s still forbidden for you to do it, because this is a case of “be killed rather than transgress.” If you did it, the question is whether you’re punished or not. So the Or Sameach there, in that place—it’s a well-known Or Sameach. The Or Sameach understood Maimonides as talking about a punishment by the religious court. Okay? I said that the commentators on Maimonides disagree about this, and he says as follows: “Just as they said regarding coercive situations, so too they said regarding illness: one may seek healing through all prohibitions in the Torah in a situation of danger, except for forbidden sexual relations, etc.; one may not seek healing through them. If he transgressed and was healed, the religious court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him.” That is certainly, says the Or Sameach, not similar to Jewish law 4—that’s the earlier Jewish law I read—because in a situation of coercion, even in matters of ‘be killed rather than transgress,’ if he transgressed, they do not punish him, because “the Merciful One exempts one under coercion.” And so too in Jewish law 4 he said that if there is a threat and he transgressed, then they don’t punish him, because “the Merciful One exempts one under coercion.” Here he says it’s not similar. Meaning, he understands that here they do punish him; this is not some punishment outside the formal law. By the way, even if it were a punishment outside the formal law, you’d still have to understand why it’s written here and not written above. Even if it’s a punishment outside the formal law. Meaning, I think that doesn’t solve the question of why Maimonides does not compare Jewish law 5 to Jewish law 4, because even if it’s a punishment not mandated by formal law, still in Jewish law 4 he should have written that one who transgressed and was not killed is indeed under coercion and not liable to punishment by the religious court, yet the religious court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him. He doesn’t add that. So in any case, I think we can’t avoid looking for some difference between these two laws. And then he says this—the Or Sameach explains: “The logic is that specifically when they coerce him to kill so-and-so or commit forbidden sexual relations, in a way that is externally imposed, then he is not acting of his own will but only by the will of others, because the other person wants him to kill so-and-so, and if not, he himself will be killed on account of not killing so-and-so. So then, what is the cause of his death if the coercer kills him? It is his refusal to kill so-and-so. But here, the illness that came upon him was not caused by any such thing; rather, he can save himself through the blood of so-and-so or through that idolatrous act. If so, this stems entirely from his own desire to preserve his life, just as any murderer who wants to vent his anger or see revenge. Therefore here, if he was healed, he is liable to all punishments of the religious court.”
[Speaker B] The cause? The cause of the punishment? That’s the difference?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The consideration, yes. The consideration a person applies when he does this act. Basically, the Or Sameach claims—I’m speaking generally right now—the Or Sameach claims that the person has some consideration for why he did it. In this case, a medical consideration, meaning he wants to be healed. But every person who does something does it because of some consideration. When you want—why do you murder just like that? No one is threatening you. Why do you murder? You want the money, or I don’t know exactly, or you hate the person so you want revenge on him, as he said, and therefore you murder. So every person who does something does it based on some consideration. Illness is just another consideration. You did something out of the consideration that you need to be healed, so he says that’s not called coercion. A threat made against me is coercion, but when I do something based on my own considerations, that’s not coercion. And here, recovering from the illness is just a consideration; it’s an interest. There’s an interest here. Escaping death is not a consideration? Then how much poverty threatens me? So I steal. Poverty threatens me. If I didn’t steal, I’d be short of money.
[Speaker E] Escaping death is not a consideration.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can always present my interest as a threat. The threat is that I won’t have the thing I’m interested in. But you can also present the threat as someone threatening me. Oh, that’s a stronger question. Yes, the obvious question is: what do you mean? If someone threatens me with a gun—if someone threatens me with a gun, then in the end I’m also making a calculation. So that he won’t shoot me, I worship idols or commit forbidden sexual relations. So that too is a consideration. So why is that considered coercion?
[Speaker D] There’s a nuance here that he gets some benefit from it. What? He doesn’t choose to enjoy it, but he does enjoy it in the case of sexual relations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but in idol worship, for example, and in murder too, no. It’s not pleasure. More than that: regarding the sins that are not the three severe ones, the other sins—regarding the other sins, we do treat it as coercion. Maimonides says that another sin I also do when there is illness. So if illness is only a consideration and not coercion, just action under a consideration, then why is it permitted to eat pork in order to recover? After all, on that point Maimonides does say that it’s similar to a threat. So where does this distinction stand? Here one could suggest a few directions. One direction is that Maimonides distinguishes between a situation where there is a person threatening me and a situation where what threatens me is some natural circumstance. What’s the difference? The source. If there is a person threatening me, then the transgression can be attributed to him. Because he is the one who created the situation and forced me to transgress, or threatened me that if I don’t worship idols then he’ll kill me. So basically there is culpability here. Meaning, there is someone to whom this transgression can be attributed. True, he does it through me—meaning he uses me. But at the end of the day, there is a person to whom this transgression can be attributed. In illness, you can’t attribute transgressions to a virus or a bacterium. Okay? True, there’s Nachmanides on the Flood where he attributes transgressions even to animals. But in the simple sense, animals or living creatures don’t commit transgressions, and therefore in a situation where the threatener is a natural threat, then indeed we see it as my own consideration, because I’m the one who made the decision. If someone is threatening me, the one who decided that so-and-so will die is the threatener. Since in the end he put me in a position that forced me—I mean on the assumption that I would die, yes—he forced me to commit the transgression.
[Speaker C] Then why are other transgressions permitted?
[Speaker B] What do you mean?
[Speaker C] Not these three transgressions. Other transgressions, like eating pork, are permitted if I need it to save myself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re saying that here there’s no one to whom to attribute the transgression, because in such a case it isn’t a transgression. “And live by them, and not die by them.” Meaning, in a place where I’m forced to die, this is not an exemption of coercion. Here it’s an exemption of coercion. In the other transgressions it’s not an exemption of coercion; there is no transgression. Because the transgression is defined only in a place where I’m going to lose my life in order to uphold Jewish law. That’s what the verse says: “And live by them, and not die by them.” Meaning, in a place where keeping Jewish law will lead to the loss of my life, Jewish law suspends itself. Meaning, you don’t have to. There is no prohibition. So automatically this isn’t merely overridden; it is fully permitted. Meaning, there is no transgression here.
[Speaker H] Then even if it were a policeman who put me into that situation, it would be the same? And what if it were a policeman with no significance?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to this understanding, if the threatener were insane, then indeed it would be like illness—if this really is the distinction, okay? I don’t think that’s the distinction the Or Sameach means. You could perhaps say this distinction on our own, but it doesn’t seem that this is what the Or Sameach has in mind. His focus is not person versus non-person, but whether this is a consideration like any other consideration or something different. Meaning, he distinguishes between two kinds of my considerations. He does not distinguish on the question of who is making the calculation; that’s not what is written in the Or Sameach. By the way, among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and the later authorities (Acharonim) you can find views that even in natural coercion, my exemption as someone under coercion comes from the fact that I did not commit the transgression, even though the factor threatening me is not a person but a natural force. Fine, so there’s no one else to whom you can attribute the transgression, but practically speaking, if in a situation where someone else threatens me I’m not considered the one who committed the transgression, then when a natural factor threatens me I also did not commit the transgression. What difference does it make to me that you have no one on whom to pin the transgression? If there’s no one to pin it on, then don’t pin it anywhere—but if I in such a situation am not considered the one who did it, then what difference does it make whether the threatener is nature or a person? Therefore, for example, the Nimukei Yosef—there is the famous Nimukei Yosef in Bava Kamma, in chapter 2. The Nimukei Yosef speaks there about lighting Sabbath candles, in the topic of “his fire is considered like his arrows.” So he says that if I lit a Sabbath candle before the Sabbath, and the Jewish law is that “his fire is considered like his arrows,” and the decisors rule like Rabbi Yohanan, meaning that kindling a fire is considered continuously as something I’m doing through my force, then if so, when the candle continues burning on the Sabbath I am in effect continuously kindling a fire. So how is it permitted to light Sabbath candles? In the course of his discussion there he says that coercion is as if I did not do it. Meaning, the claim is that if I lit it and afterward it continues—true, it’s as if I’m kindling continuously, but I’m kindling under coercion. So what? Isn’t that still a transgression under coercion, and I could have avoided it? He says no—it’s not a transgression at all. It’s not a transgression at all because I did not do it. When I am under coercion, it’s not me. What does “not me” mean? Here it’s me myself—even more so, I created this situation. That’s even worse than where there is another person or some illness. Here I myself created this situation; I lit the candles earlier. No, he says, true—but if I’m under coercion, then it’s not me.
[Speaker C] So that means a person is allowed to put himself into coercion? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A person is allowed to, at least in a place where there is such a commandment. After all, there is a commandment to light Sabbath candles. Here he didn’t do it just in order to arrive at a transgression; there is a commandment. You’re saying, fine, but in the end a transgression results. Fine, that’s not a problem, because it’s coercion, and if there’s a commandment to do it, then yes. In a case where it’s optional, there’s room to discuss it.
[Speaker G] And that is basically the commandment? What? And that is basically the commandment. Obviously, the commandment is to light Sabbath candles.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And by definition that’s what will happen in the end.
[Speaker G] Meaning yes. And if you light it for heat? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you light it for heat, which is not a commandment?
[Speaker G] If you light it for heat then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said that would be a practical difference.
[Speaker G] That would be a practical difference? Certainly. It would be forbidden to light for heat on Sabbath eve.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying according to the Nimukei Yosef’s question and answer—according to the Nimukei Yosef’s question, then yes indeed.
[Speaker G] That it would be forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. If only the commandment permits it, then the prohibition doesn’t permit it. So where there is no commandment, it is not permitted. It reminds me—my in-law once showed me an amusing website on the internet, and I collapsed laughing. When the issue of heat and light comes in, it reminds me: when they introduced the prohibition on using incandescent bulbs because it’s wasteful and so on, because the efficiency is low—so much goes to heat—they prohibited selling incandescent bulbs. In Israel that came in late; in Europe it was already earlier. Now, I think it was in Germany, I don’t remember—there was someone there who had a website, worth seeing, I once wrote a column about it. He sold little heaters with high efficiency. He sold a heater. He said, I’m not selling a lighting bulb with low efficiency; I’m selling a heater with high efficiency. Meaning, only a little energy goes to light, but overall most of the energy goes to heat, so this is a heater. So buy my heaters. I love that. It’s so beautiful. It’s so beautiful—it shows how no legislator ever manages to deal with clever people on the ground. It’s just marvelous.
[Speaker G] Who was that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think he was German, which is rather surprising, I think, but I don’t remember right now. It was somewhere in Europe; I just don’t remember anymore. My in-law told me that his father had a furniture store in England—apropos, we were talking about this issue—he had a furniture store in England, and they prohibited something. So he opened his store and offered a sale: whoever buys a kilo of carrots for 2,500 shekels gets a living-room set as a gift. Just wonderful. You reminded me of it—with the light and the heat. It’s exactly the same thing, yes. With the candles, he lights them in order to get warm, not in order to illuminate. It’s the same shtick. Okay, so the first possibility is that there’s a difference between a human cause and a natural cause. A second possibility, which I think is already closer to what the Or Sameach means, is that with a human threatener he usually says to me: either worship idols or I’ll kill you; either kill so-and-so or I’ll kill you. He identifies a particular person or act that must be done and tries to make me do it by means of a threat. If you remember the Jerusalem Talmud and Maimonides, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah: “Give us one of you,” it is forbidden to hand someone over. But if they identified a particular person, there Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish already disagree, and if he is liable for death then all the more so. But if he is singled out, that’s already different. Why is it different? Because I did not decide to hand him over; they decided it. True, I could have handed over myself and not him, but here I’m handing over myself in order to save him. And that’s exactly the difference between my not being allowed to hand him over in order to save myself, and yet I’m also not obligated to hand myself over in order to save him. Now the question is exactly where the line runs. So if they don’t identify anyone and say to me either hand him over or we’ll kill—
[Speaker C] —you, then I can’t hand him over in order to save myself. The threat is directed at me. What about if they come and threaten you that there are ten people here, and if you don’t kill one of them, we’ll kill all of them?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—here they didn’t single anyone out. When they don’t single someone out, exactly, that’s what the Jerusalem Talmud says, then it is forbidden. The Jerusalem Talmud says it is forbidden. Only if they single someone out is there the dispute of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, and even there, in practical Jewish law, it is forbidden.
[Speaker B] But if not—if they tell him, kill one of these ten—then it’s forbidden. Yes, the Jerusalem Talmud says that explicitly. What you’re saying has a very serious practical implication, because sometimes someone needs a transplant and out of a million people only one person is a match. So is he singled out?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he’s not singled out. That takes us a bit back to the previous discussion, which is why in the end I think the Or Sameach also doesn’t mean this. Because the claim is that in the end, that’s an excellent example, I think. If, say, I need a transplant and there is only one person whose organ matches me, then in effect that’s a singled-out person. Seemingly, that’s a situation where I can do it, because someone else singled him out, not I. But that’s not true, because in order for him to be singled out, there has to be someone who singled him out. The circumstances don’t single him out. Obviously, he is not in danger right now just because he has a lung that suits me; he will only be in danger because I’m going to take his lung. So you can’t say that he is basically—when there is no human factor that—again, the focus is not whether it’s a person or not a person, no no. It goes back to the previous discussion but not entirely. Notice: if there is someone else who says, kill so-and-so, and if not I’ll kill you, then that person really initiated the whole thing; he wants so-and-so. In the end, what does he want? He wants so-and-so to be killed; he doesn’t want to kill me. He only motivates me to do it by threatening my life. So it really is possible to say that he killed so-and-so, because in the end he brought about that so-and-so would be killed. Here it’s not like that. No one wants the life of that person whose lung fits me. Is he a pursuer? Let him take care of himself. But I’m saying, in our world there is no one who singled him out, who put him in danger, such that you can say: listen, he was already in danger, and I don’t have to hand over myself in order to save him from danger, right? If the one threatening me is doing so in order to kill him, there is room to argue: look, he’s already in danger, since the threatener is threatening me in order to kill him; essentially they want his life. Do I need to hand over my life in order to save his? Here there’s room to discuss. But here, that person isn’t in the picture at all until I decide that his lung suits me and therefore I take it. So that’s not the same thing.
[Speaker B] Wait, but if he says, hand over your tallest one.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Huh? That’s the same thing. That’s singled out. It’s singled out. What difference does it make how he singles him out—by name or by height? It’s singled out. No, no, because “hand over your tallest one”—
[Speaker B] that’s not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter, because when he says “hand over your tallest one,” he is basically saying: I’m going to kill the tallest man in town. Okay? How do I do that? I threaten you so that you’ll do it. So one can say: here I killed that tall man, not you, the one being threatened; rather I, the threatener. But that person who has a lung that fits me is not threatened in any way. I can save myself by taking his lung, but before I did that he wasn’t threatened. You can’t say that he was threatened. So I’m saying this connects somewhat to the first distinction I made between a human threatener and a natural threatener, but it’s not exactly the same. The point is not whether you can attribute the transgression to someone, but in the end whether there is a danger hanging over you from which I need to save you by handing over my life. If you are singled out, then one can view it as though—what do you want from me? He’s already marked. They’ve basically decided to kill him. You want me to hand over my life to save him? That’s not—obviously, in an illness where I need his lung in order to survive, you can’t say he’s in danger and ask, what, do you want me to hand over my life to save him? “Hand over my life” meaning not to take his lung. And none of this works at all with regard to idol worship—
[Speaker B] —and forbidden sexual relations in general.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Same thing. The transgression is singled out. It doesn’t matter. They decided—in effect, that transgression is singled out. So now what do I do? I basically want to save the world from the transgression, or save myself or the world from the transgression, and therefore I’ll die. But who says I have to die for that?
[Speaker B] If the one threatening me is doing it so that I’ll bow to an idol, he doesn’t want someone to bow to an idol—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He wants me to bow to an idol. No, exactly the opposite. Exactly the opposite. In such a situation, what difference does it make to him whether you bow to the idol? He wants—
[Speaker B] No, he wants—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —to force you; he’d force someone else too if he could. He wants everyone to bow to this idol—that’s what he wants. On the contrary, he wants the result. He wants people to bow to that idol. That’s what he wants. He just picked you because at the moment you were available, so he threatens you. That’s usually how it’s understood. And again, maybe that will be a practical difference; every explanation has its own practical consequences. So therefore that’s perhaps another possibility.
[Speaker H] Could it be that there’s an issue here of probabilities? Maybe it’s all connected to probabilities. If it’s “you kill that specific person,” then either he is 100% going to be killed or you are 100% going to be killed. But if it’s just someone from the public, each one has, say, if there are a hundred people, a 1% chance of being the one who dies. That’s a lower expected value.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But on the contrary, then I’d say that would be the more forbidden case, whereas we say that the singled-out case is the less forbidden one.
[Speaker H] Maybe it’s a question of which is more severe.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Maimonides it says the opposite. The explanation that I ultimately think the Or Sameach intends is that when someone threatens me—when someone threatens me to do something—I’m not in danger at all right now. Right? I’m only in danger if I don’t do it. Meaning, if I decide not to do it, I will enter danger. Illness is already a state where I’m in danger right now. Now the question is whether I may take this step in order to save myself. Meaning, in an ordinary threat, and now I’m moving completely away from the question of a human threatener or a natural threatener—in the case of a threat, there is actually no danger upon me. Because after all, what’s the issue? All they want is simply to make sure I do something. If I do it, everything is fine. True, if I don’t do it, I’ll get myself into trouble—they’ll kill me. So I say: here, I don’t need to get myself into a state of danger. Okay? But in a place where I’m already in danger—and in illness, I’m already in danger. Now I’m already in danger, and nothing will help. So now what do I want? To take from him in order to save myself from the danger in which I already exist. That I may not do. Meaning, that is already called a consideration. Do you see? The Or Sameach is basically saying this: how is this different from any other consideration? Right? After all, everyone who does something does it because of some consideration. A medical consideration too is a consideration. So how can you call that coercion? It’s an ordinary consideration. And that is all true in a place where you really are doing it because of some consideration. I’m saying: I have a medical consideration, and therefore I commit this transgression in order to recover. So he says that’s like any other consideration; it’s not called coercion. Because I’m already in that situation, and now I’m merely maneuvering within the circumstances I’m in. But when someone threatens me, I’m not in mortal danger at all. That’s not a consideration.
[Speaker C] The threat isn’t mortal danger?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. The threat means only that if I don’t do it, I’ll be in mortal danger. No, right now I’m not in mortal danger. He only says, look, if you don’t do it I’ll kill you—that’s all. If you do it, everything will be fine. Meaning, right now I’m not yet under mortal danger; I’ll enter danger only if I don’t do what he demands that I do. That’s not called acting based on a consideration. Understand? That’s called coercion. He says to me: right now I have no consideration; I simply don’t want to enter a situation where they’ll kill me. But I’m not taking action in order to obtain something. I’m not inside the situation.
[Speaker B] But with illness too, if I don’t take the thing to recover, then I’ll be there too, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the level of that technical description, they’re both the same—that’s where we started, which is why there’s a difficulty. Now I’m saying—right, in that technical sense it’s the same, but if you look essentially, it’s still different. Illness is a consideration; it’s a consideration because it belongs to the circumstances in which I already find myself. So now I have to maneuver how to manage best within the circumstances I’m in. So the Or Sameach says: what difference does it make whether it’s illness or economics or wealth or pleasure? All of these are considerations. When you do something based on considerations, you can’t say you were coerced—those are your considerations. You did it in order to maneuver. You’re already sick; you didn’t do this in order not to enter illness. This is how you treat your illness. A person born with some defect—it’s part of his life. He can’t say that the defect is coercion. What do you mean coercion? That’s you. But then there are more alternatives.
[Speaker E] Right, there are more alternatives.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why are there more alternatives?
[Speaker E] To die. So if there is only one alternative, which is to die, then it’s coercion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—that’s what he argues: no. It’s a consideration. The consideration of life is also a consideration. It’s an option; dying is also an option. By the way, there really are later authorities who distinguish between two kinds of coercion. There is coercion where there is no choice but to do the act, and coercion where if I don’t do the act, they’ll kill me. That’s not the same thing, because in the second kind of coercion I can choose not to do the act. True, I’ll die, but you can’t say that I wasn’t the one who decided to do the act. They argue that even a threat is called a consideration. The Or Sameach here on Maimonides says no: a threat is not a consideration, but illness is a consideration. It’s the same scale, just one degree lower.
[Speaker B] A very strong practical difference: suppose in a threat, if I don’t act—say they put me in a place where I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll get you out of there if you worship idols.
[Speaker B] There’s an explosive charge and a button. If I don’t touch the button, in another minute the charge will explode on me. If I touch the button, it will explode on you. So what is that? That’s illness. That’s illness even though it’s purely a threat? Because I’m already in danger.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly—that’s illness. Like with the arrow and the Purim doll, with throwing the vessel and shooting the arrow. Look, I found in the Tashbetz—and I’ll finish with this. I found in Tashbetz, part 1, siman 1. Afterward you can read the Kovetz Shiurim, whether he says the same thing or not; there’s room to hesitate. But the Tashbetz really says this: “And there is another kind of coercion: even though he coerces him physically, it is not coercion to divorce; rather, he coerces him to do one thing, and he, of his own accord, in order to save himself from that coercion, divorces of his own accord. And this is not called compulsion.” Meaning, if I now want to cause a man to divorce his wife—a recalcitrant husband. I want to cause a man to divorce his wife. Now I do not threaten him that he should divorce his wife. I place him in a situation such that if he does not divorce his wife he will die, or lose all his money. Okay?
[Speaker C] I make him sick.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, I make him sick. If he divorces his wife, he’ll recover. That is not coercion, says the Tashbetz. As opposed to a case where I threaten him that he should divorce his wife, which is a coerced bill of divorce. The bill of divorce is invalid; it can’t work. A bill of divorce is not valid if he is under threat. But if it is that kind of threat, then it is not a coerced bill of divorce. Exactly Maimonides’ distinction. By the way, I also wrote in one of my pieces—a suggestion of my son’s, huznext dot com—to set up a website on the internet with missiles aimed at five houses in Gaza. Okay? The next missile that arrives automatically—five missiles. Automatically, no one involved in it—five missiles launch, destroy five houses, and on the internet it says which houses are next in line. Meaning everyone can be careful. No problem; no one will be hurt. Okay? But every missile that comes means five houses go.
[Speaker B] A hundred children will be hurt. What? A hundred children will be hurt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I warned them. If they didn’t leave, that’s their problem. And also, it doesn’t depend on my decision; it’s all automatic. Meaning, I didn’t decide anything. A missile is just fired, five missiles come down. Now every terrorist knows that he is destroying five houses in Gaza. And that’s it—it’s essentially like your explosive charge example. It’s exactly the same thing. You—I’m placing the situation into a setup, and now the terrorist is not under coercion; the terrorist made a calculation, and he decided to kill the five. You exaggerated. Fine, never mind, I’m just talking about the principle.
[Speaker B] How does the Or Sameach there deal with Yitzhak Trachti?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. So at least we’ve done something. “And this is not called compulsion, since they did not actually force him to divorce. And the proof is from what is said in the Jerusalem Talmud, chapter ‘A widow is sustained’: Shmuel said, we compel only in cases of invalid women. And they challenged him there: but didn’t we learn, one who vows against his wife must divorce and give the marriage settlement? And it answers: we heard that he must divorce; did we hear that we compel? And Rabbenu Chananel wrote this Jerusalem Talmud in his commentary, and explained that this Jerusalem Talmud means as follows”—they don’t want—that it’s not difficult, because even though we learned “he must divorce and give her marriage settlement,” have we at all heard that we compel?—rhetorically. “He must divorce” is one thing and “we compel” is another. We do not compel him to divorce. Never mind the details right now. It means: we compel him—meaning, we compel him to pay her marriage settlement, and if through this compulsion he wants to divorce, let him divorce. That’s what he says in the Jerusalem Talmud—again, I’m not going into the details. We tell him, look, you have to pay the marriage settlement. If you want to divorce, divorce. So in the end we created the threat already now—not only “if you don’t divorce we’ll take your money,” but rather we are taking your money now. Do what you want. Fine? Now, if he divorces, and says: what, you forced me, because you took my marriage settlement—no, we only took the marriage settlement. You, out of your own consideration, decided to divorce in order to gain that advantage; that’s your own almost-free consideration.
[Speaker B] What? He offers his own option? No, not to divorce.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To lose the marriage settlement, of course. “And so too Nachmanides wrote in chapter ‘Even though’; and some explain that compulsion is with whips, as we say in chapter ‘One who vows,’ concerning matters a person cannot bear.” Fine, in short, that’s the distinction. “In any event it is proven from here”—I’m reading in the second paragraph—“that when they compel him to pay her marriage settlement, and sometimes because of payment of the marriage settlement he needs to divorce, and behold he stands compelled regarding this bill of divorce—since they did not actually compel him to divorce, but rather in order to free himself from the coercion of paying her marriage settlement he agreed to divorce, this is not called a coerced bill of divorce at all.” This is very relevant to prenuptial agreements and all those things, because that is exactly what people are trying to do there as well. They try to force recalcitrant husbands to give a bill of divorce by means of financial sanctions, and the concern all the time is that this is a coerced bill of divorce. And the Or Sameach’s claim is that such a thing is not a coerced bill of divorce, “for the coercion was in another matter, and he gave the bill of divorce of his own will, since they were not forcing him to divorce.” Exactly the Or Sameach’s reasoning. He made a calculation in order to keep his marriage settlement, and he decided to divorce. That’s his own calculation; it has nothing to do with me. I merely put—why? Because the threat is already imposed on him in advance. Not “if you don’t divorce we’ll take your money.” If they said, “if you don’t divorce we’ll take your money,” that would be a coerced bill of divorce. But if we take your money, period, and you want to divorce—maybe we’ll reconsider—fine, that’s another matter. So that’s not the same. That is called his own calculation. That is exactly the Or Sameach’s distinction. Okay? Good.